Shaibanids
Shaibanids (Shaybanids). Tribal confederation of Uzbek Turks who traced their ancestry to Shiban, the youngest son of Jenghiz Khan’s eldest son Jochi. The Shaibanids ruled over Transoxiana from their capital at Bukhara (r.1500-1598).
The conditions for the rise to political prominence of the Uzbek clans were set some half century before the Shaibanid’s assertion of independent rule through their relationship to the Timurid ruler Abu Sa’id (1451-1479). His succession to the throne had been secured only by the helpof a tribal coalition dominated by the Uzbek chief Abu al-Khair Khan, who ruled in Khwarazm between 1447 and 1468. Throughout the latter half of the fifteenth century the Timurids, while still controlling major cities such as Samarkand, Bukhara, and Herat, were forced to contend with a rising tide of Uzbek power, both in Transoxiana and in Khurasan, and were preoccupied with the necessity of warding off the continuous attacks launched by the Uzbeks from secure bases in the hinterland of Transoxiana. The end result of a half century of constant military interchange was the capture of Samarkand and Bukhara in 1500 by Muhammad Shaiban, thereby inaugurating a century of complete domination of Transoxiana by the Uzbek confederation. During the same fifty year period when the Sunni Muslim Uzbeks were consolidating their power in eastern portions of the Timurid Empire, the Shi‘ite Muslim Safavids, benefiting from the preoccupation of the khans of Samarkand and Herat in their eastern territories, were building up a base of strength in western Iran. The Safavid Ismail I clinched his victory over his Akkoyunlu rivals at about the same time that Muhammad Shaiban marched into Samarkand and Bukhara.
In much the same way that military harassment by the Uzbek khans had prevented true unification of the Timurid realm from the mid-fifteenth century, Uzbek military pressure in the east, exerted primarily against Khurasan and particularly Herat, which changed hands many times, substantially weakened the effectiveness of Safavid rule. Throughout the sixteenth century the Uzbeks prevented a lasting consolidation of Safavid power over Iran, whose eastern and western portions were only securely and thoroughly united in the next century. In the latter day age of Sunni internationalism, a revival of earlier Seljuk policy led by the Ottoman sultan Suleiman (1520-1566) and continued under his successors, the Shaibanids were formally approached with proposals for a mutual alliance aimed at dismantling Shi‘ite Safavid control of Iran. These overtures were intensified during the reign of the Shaibanid khan Abdullah II (1583-1598), but no truly coordinated attack resulted, and soon afterward the Shaibanids were displaced from rule over their home territories in Transoxiana by a rival collateral branch of the Chinggisids.
The Shaybanid dynasty was an Uzbek dynasty, whose members ruled the Khanate of Bukhara (1505–1598), the Khanate of Khwarezm (Khiva) (1511–1695) and the Khanate of Sibir (1563–1598).
The Shaybanid dynasty traces its origins generally to the Shaybanids, descendants of Genghis Khan through his grandson Shayban (Shiban). By the 15th century, one branch of the Shaybanids moved south into Transoxiana, from whence, after a century of conflict, they managed to oust the Timurids. Abu'l-Khayr Khan (who led the Shaybanids from 1428 to 1468) began consolidating disparate Uzbek tribes, first in the area around Tyumen and the Tura River and then down into the Syr Darya region. His grandson Muhammad Shaybani (r. 1500-10), who gave his name to the Shaybanid dynasty, wrested Samarkand, Herat and Bukhara from Babur's control and established the short-lived Shaybanid Empire. After his death at the hands of Shah Ismail I, he was followed successively by an uncle, a cousin, and a brother, whose Shaybanid descendants would rule the Khanate of Bukhara until 1598 and the Khanate of Khwarezm (Khiva) until 1695.
Another state ruled by the Shaybanids was the Khanate of Sibir, whose last khan Kuchum was deposed by the Russians in 1598. He escapted to Bukhara, but his sons and grandsons were taken by the Tsar to Moscow, where they eventually assumed the surname of Sibirsky. Apart from this famous branch, several other noble families from Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan (e.g., Princes Valikhanov) petitioned the Russian imperial authorities to recognize their Shaybanid roots, but mostly in vain.
Shaybanids see Shaibanids
Shaibanids (Shaybanids). Tribal confederation of Uzbek Turks who traced their ancestry to Shiban, the youngest son of Jenghiz Khan’s eldest son Jochi. The Shaibanids ruled over Transoxiana from their capital at Bukhara (r.1500-1598).
The conditions for the rise to political prominence of the Uzbek clans were set some half century before the Shaibanid’s assertion of independent rule through their relationship to the Timurid ruler Abu Sa’id (1451-1479). His succession to the throne had been secured only by the helpof a tribal coalition dominated by the Uzbek chief Abu al-Khair Khan, who ruled in Khwarazm between 1447 and 1468. Throughout the latter half of the fifteenth century the Timurids, while still controlling major cities such as Samarkand, Bukhara, and Herat, were forced to contend with a rising tide of Uzbek power, both in Transoxiana and in Khurasan, and were preoccupied with the necessity of warding off the continuous attacks launched by the Uzbeks from secure bases in the hinterland of Transoxiana. The end result of a half century of constant military interchange was the capture of Samarkand and Bukhara in 1500 by Muhammad Shaiban, thereby inaugurating a century of complete domination of Transoxiana by the Uzbek confederation. During the same fifty year period when the Sunni Muslim Uzbeks were consolidating their power in eastern portions of the Timurid Empire, the Shi‘ite Muslim Safavids, benefiting from the preoccupation of the khans of Samarkand and Herat in their eastern territories, were building up a base of strength in western Iran. The Safavid Ismail I clinched his victory over his Akkoyunlu rivals at about the same time that Muhammad Shaiban marched into Samarkand and Bukhara.
In much the same way that military harassment by the Uzbek khans had prevented true unification of the Timurid realm from the mid-fifteenth century, Uzbek military pressure in the east, exerted primarily against Khurasan and particularly Herat, which changed hands many times, substantially weakened the effectiveness of Safavid rule. Throughout the sixteenth century the Uzbeks prevented a lasting consolidation of Safavid power over Iran, whose eastern and western portions were only securely and thoroughly united in the next century. In the latter day age of Sunni internationalism, a revival of earlier Seljuk policy led by the Ottoman sultan Suleiman (1520-1566) and continued under his successors, the Shaibanids were formally approached with proposals for a mutual alliance aimed at dismantling Shi‘ite Safavid control of Iran. These overtures were intensified during the reign of the Shaibanid khan Abdullah II (1583-1598), but no truly coordinated attack resulted, and soon afterward the Shaibanids were displaced from rule over their home territories in Transoxiana by a rival collateral branch of the Chinggisids.
The Shaybanid dynasty was an Uzbek dynasty, whose members ruled the Khanate of Bukhara (1505–1598), the Khanate of Khwarezm (Khiva) (1511–1695) and the Khanate of Sibir (1563–1598).
The Shaybanid dynasty traces its origins generally to the Shaybanids, descendants of Genghis Khan through his grandson Shayban (Shiban). By the 15th century, one branch of the Shaybanids moved south into Transoxiana, from whence, after a century of conflict, they managed to oust the Timurids. Abu'l-Khayr Khan (who led the Shaybanids from 1428 to 1468) began consolidating disparate Uzbek tribes, first in the area around Tyumen and the Tura River and then down into the Syr Darya region. His grandson Muhammad Shaybani (r. 1500-10), who gave his name to the Shaybanid dynasty, wrested Samarkand, Herat and Bukhara from Babur's control and established the short-lived Shaybanid Empire. After his death at the hands of Shah Ismail I, he was followed successively by an uncle, a cousin, and a brother, whose Shaybanid descendants would rule the Khanate of Bukhara until 1598 and the Khanate of Khwarezm (Khiva) until 1695.
Another state ruled by the Shaybanids was the Khanate of Sibir, whose last khan Kuchum was deposed by the Russians in 1598. He escapted to Bukhara, but his sons and grandsons were taken by the Tsar to Moscow, where they eventually assumed the surname of Sibirsky. Apart from this famous branch, several other noble families from Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan (e.g., Princes Valikhanov) petitioned the Russian imperial authorities to recognize their Shaybanid roots, but mostly in vain.
Shaybanids see Shaibanids
shaikh
shaikh (shaykh) (sheik) (sheikh) (sjeik) (sheyh) (seih) (sejh) (seyh). Arabic term which refers to an Arab tribal leader, elder, head, chief, Sufi leader, or teacher. A shaykh is also an Arab ruler or a learned Muslim.
The Arabic word shaikh means “old man.” There are generally three references for which the term shaikh apply: (1) As Shaikh al-Islam, the chief Muslim religious functionary of a particular city or province; (2) as Shaikh al-balad, the headman of a town or village; or (3) as a spiritual master in the Sufi tradition.
The principal literary and popular reference to shaikh is the third one -- a reference to a spiritual master in the Sufi tradition. Usually someone becomes a Sufi shaikh or murshid only by submitting to the discipline of another shaikh. There is an alternative route of initiation, however: Khidr, who in the Qur’an instructed Moses, can also confer the cloak of investiture on Muslims possessed of signal spiritual prowess. The most famous example of such an initiation is Shaikh al-Akbar, “the greatest Shaikh,” a title given to the Andalusian mystic Muhyi’d-din ibn ‘Arabi. Even while allowing for the possibility of self-initiates, however, Sufis reaffirm the exceptionality of this deviation from the path -- the tariqa --, a popular tradition, ascribed to Muhammad, bluntly warns: “When someone has no shaikh, then Satan becomes his shaikh.”
For Sufis, there are few limits to the authority vested in the shaikh. Like a king among his courtiers or a general at the head of his troops, the shaikh has absolute power over initiates in the Sufi path who bind themselves to him by an oath of allegiance. The disciple, according to one Sufi dictum, is analogous to a corpse in the hands of a washerman. The disciple moves wherever he is moved; he is dead to himself. The granting of such awesome power to the shaikh was not limited to this life; it extended to the life beyond, which was though populated by deceased shaiks, ranked hierarchically according to their cosmological powers, with the qutb or pole at the top. Shaikhs, therefore, were inevitably compared with prophets -- nabi --, and for the disciples of a pir or murshid the theological space separating their master from the Prophet was perilously narrow. In the modern decline in influence of organized Sufism it has been suggested that veneration of the shaikh has often surpassed veneration of the Prophet.
Among the Bedouins, the word shaykh indicated one who bore the marks of old age, i.e., one who was over fifty. The shaykh was the patriarch of the tribe or family, and had a considerable moral influence. It was also the title of the governor of Medina. At present, the title is a term of polite address, given to high dignitaries of religion and to all persons respected for their office. In the Muslim religious orders, the title indicates the master of the order.
In the form shehu, the term was the title taken by al-Kanemi of Bornu in the beginning of the nineteenth century, and which was retained by his descendants.
The Arabic title of sheik strictly means a venerable man of more than 50 years of age. The title sheikh is especially borne by heads of religious orders, heads of colleges, such as Al-Azhar University in Cairo, chiefs of tribes, and headmen of villages and of separate quarters of towns. It is also applied to learned men, especially members of the class of ulamas (theologians), and has been applied to anyone who has memorized the whole Qur’ān, however young he might be.
Shaykh al-jabal (“the mountain chief”) was a popular term for the head of the Assassins and was mistranslated by the crusaders as “the old man of the mountain.” By far the most important title was shaykh al-islām, which by the 11th century was given to eminent ulamas and mystics and by the 15th century was open to any outstanding mufti (canonical lawyer). In the Ottoman Empire the use of this title was restricted by Süleyman I (1520–66) to the mufti of Istanbul, who, equal in rank to the grand vizier, was head of the religious institutions that controlled law, justice, religion, and education. Because of his right to issue binding fatwās (Islāmic legal opinions), this official came to wield great power. In 1924, under the Turkish Republic, the last vestiges of the institution were abolished.
Throughout the Muslim era, the term shaykh al-din (“leader of the faith”) has been applied to men who possess scriptural learning. Leaders of religious orders are called shaykhs, as are Sufi adepts, Qur’anic scholars, jurists, and those who preach and lead prayers in the mosques. Muslim scholars have paid close attention to the careers of prominent religious shaykhs, the intellectual and genealogical pedigrees of these learned men have been accumulating in biographical dictionaries (known as tarajim or tabaqat) for centuries. The majority of shaykhs, both now and in the past, have not been religious functionaries. Instead, they have belonged to a more secular and much older political elite consisting of clan leaders, village headmen, and tribal chiefs.
The shaykh al-din is associated with a metropolitan culture of great antiquity and richness, whereas the tribal shaykh has long been associated with the agricultural and pastoral hinterland and particularly with remote areas beyond state control. The contrast is overdrawn. Shaykhs have always been caught up in the political economy of urban society -- at times, they have taxed and controlled the trade of cities -- and the most powerful shaykhs keep residences in both town and country. The base of the shaykh’s power, however, has traditionally been in the countryside, where most tribes people and peasants have lived even into modern times. The shaykh’s influence in outlying regions, which cannot always be easily controlled from the urban center, makes him an important resource to the state. Historically, the most influential shaykhs have acted as middlemen between governed and ungoverned space, and it is their relationship to the latter that has distinguished them over time as a recognizable political type.
Ibn Khaldun argued that tribal shaykhs, because they do not possess “royal authority,” are unable to coerce their followers or compel their allegiance. In the absence of “governmental and educational laws,” shaykhs can only exercise a “restraining influence,” and this they can accomplish only insofar as they are venerated and respected by fellow tribesmen. Such respect is seldom won on the basis of a shaykh’s piety or erudition. Indeed, until recent decades, most tribal shaykhs were illiterate, and their understanding of Islam was rarely orthodox. A shaykh’s reputation depends instead on four important characteristics: his ability to resolve disputes, which requires a detailed knowledge of customary law (‘urf or ‘awayid), a legal system that is often at odds with Islamic law. His ability to dispense hospitality on a grand scale and to offer gifts and financial support to followers; his ability to lead in times of raiding and warfare; and his ability to deal with state governments in ways that advance his own interests while preserving, as much as possible, the autonomy of the tribespeople he represents.
Since tribal shaykhs do not control the military and administrative apparatus of the state, their capacity to dominate tribal affairs is often attributed to personal charisma. They are commonly (and somewhat romantically) depicted as eloquent, shrewd, persuasive, brave, and wise. Among tribes people, the title is not inherited by right -- ideally, anyone can attain or fall from that rank -- and the urge to portray shaykhs as “first among equals” is especially strong in the West. This egalitarian view, thoug popular, is exaggerated. In many tribes, the shaykhdom has remained in the same family for centuries. Such concentrations of power and influence are not based on charisma alone. Until the establishment of modern nation-states in the twentieth century, tribal shaykhs were able to impose protection taxes (known as khawa, or “brotherhood”) on peasant communities; they extracted escort fees from caravans that passed through their territories; and in settled areas, they frequently owned sizeable tracts of land. These financial resources gave the shaykhs’ families a distinct political advantage over ordinary tribesmen. Moreover, shaykhs exercised this advantage in the contested zones between urban centers. By playing regional governments against each other, shaykhs could generate a reliable flow of stipends from rulers who competed for their loyalty.
In the modern era, as domains of state control have grown to encompass tribal areas, the status of these families has changed. Many of the most powerful shaykhs have been successfully incorporated by national regimes. In Jordan, for instance, tribal leaders sit in legislative assemblies, serve as government ministers, and control the upper ranks of the military. Throughout the Arab world, shaykhs have preserved their role as judges of tribal law, which, although many countries have officially delegitimized it, continues to be practiced in both urban and rural settings. Shaykhs have fared best, however, on the Arabian Peninsula, where they found themselves in possession of vast oil reserves. The emirates and kingdoms of the Gulf region are ruled today by families who in the nineteenth century were known simply as tribal shaykhs. In Yemen, where government control of the hinterland is comparatively weak, shaykhs take an active part in foreign and domestic affairs of state, and their political power has at times rivaled that of the central government.
It is now common for both Middle Eastern and Western intellectuals to identify shaykhs with parochialism and reactionary politics. The conservative social and economic agendas of the Gulf states, for example, are often ascribed to the “traditional mentality” of their ruling shaykhs. Given the value nationalist ideology sets on progress, unity, and allegiance, it was perhaps inevitable that shaykhs would assume the place they now occupy in the political imagination of the region. Long before nationalism arrived, tribal shaykhs were associated with “backward” domains, fratricidal politics, and resistance to the laws of God and the state. This view, so obviously colored by the attitudes of the urban elite, has been slow to change. The shaykhly families themselves, however, have proven remarkably adaptable. Despite confident predictions that they will soon disappear, the shaykhs and the tribes they lead remain prominent features of the political landscape of the Middle East and North Africa.
shaykh see shaikh
sheik see shaikh
sheikh see shaikh
sjeik see shaikh
sheyh see shaikh
seih see shaikh
shaikh (shaykh) (sheik) (sheikh) (sjeik) (sheyh) (seih) (sejh) (seyh). Arabic term which refers to an Arab tribal leader, elder, head, chief, Sufi leader, or teacher. A shaykh is also an Arab ruler or a learned Muslim.
The Arabic word shaikh means “old man.” There are generally three references for which the term shaikh apply: (1) As Shaikh al-Islam, the chief Muslim religious functionary of a particular city or province; (2) as Shaikh al-balad, the headman of a town or village; or (3) as a spiritual master in the Sufi tradition.
The principal literary and popular reference to shaikh is the third one -- a reference to a spiritual master in the Sufi tradition. Usually someone becomes a Sufi shaikh or murshid only by submitting to the discipline of another shaikh. There is an alternative route of initiation, however: Khidr, who in the Qur’an instructed Moses, can also confer the cloak of investiture on Muslims possessed of signal spiritual prowess. The most famous example of such an initiation is Shaikh al-Akbar, “the greatest Shaikh,” a title given to the Andalusian mystic Muhyi’d-din ibn ‘Arabi. Even while allowing for the possibility of self-initiates, however, Sufis reaffirm the exceptionality of this deviation from the path -- the tariqa --, a popular tradition, ascribed to Muhammad, bluntly warns: “When someone has no shaikh, then Satan becomes his shaikh.”
For Sufis, there are few limits to the authority vested in the shaikh. Like a king among his courtiers or a general at the head of his troops, the shaikh has absolute power over initiates in the Sufi path who bind themselves to him by an oath of allegiance. The disciple, according to one Sufi dictum, is analogous to a corpse in the hands of a washerman. The disciple moves wherever he is moved; he is dead to himself. The granting of such awesome power to the shaikh was not limited to this life; it extended to the life beyond, which was though populated by deceased shaiks, ranked hierarchically according to their cosmological powers, with the qutb or pole at the top. Shaikhs, therefore, were inevitably compared with prophets -- nabi --, and for the disciples of a pir or murshid the theological space separating their master from the Prophet was perilously narrow. In the modern decline in influence of organized Sufism it has been suggested that veneration of the shaikh has often surpassed veneration of the Prophet.
Among the Bedouins, the word shaykh indicated one who bore the marks of old age, i.e., one who was over fifty. The shaykh was the patriarch of the tribe or family, and had a considerable moral influence. It was also the title of the governor of Medina. At present, the title is a term of polite address, given to high dignitaries of religion and to all persons respected for their office. In the Muslim religious orders, the title indicates the master of the order.
In the form shehu, the term was the title taken by al-Kanemi of Bornu in the beginning of the nineteenth century, and which was retained by his descendants.
The Arabic title of sheik strictly means a venerable man of more than 50 years of age. The title sheikh is especially borne by heads of religious orders, heads of colleges, such as Al-Azhar University in Cairo, chiefs of tribes, and headmen of villages and of separate quarters of towns. It is also applied to learned men, especially members of the class of ulamas (theologians), and has been applied to anyone who has memorized the whole Qur’ān, however young he might be.
Shaykh al-jabal (“the mountain chief”) was a popular term for the head of the Assassins and was mistranslated by the crusaders as “the old man of the mountain.” By far the most important title was shaykh al-islām, which by the 11th century was given to eminent ulamas and mystics and by the 15th century was open to any outstanding mufti (canonical lawyer). In the Ottoman Empire the use of this title was restricted by Süleyman I (1520–66) to the mufti of Istanbul, who, equal in rank to the grand vizier, was head of the religious institutions that controlled law, justice, religion, and education. Because of his right to issue binding fatwās (Islāmic legal opinions), this official came to wield great power. In 1924, under the Turkish Republic, the last vestiges of the institution were abolished.
Throughout the Muslim era, the term shaykh al-din (“leader of the faith”) has been applied to men who possess scriptural learning. Leaders of religious orders are called shaykhs, as are Sufi adepts, Qur’anic scholars, jurists, and those who preach and lead prayers in the mosques. Muslim scholars have paid close attention to the careers of prominent religious shaykhs, the intellectual and genealogical pedigrees of these learned men have been accumulating in biographical dictionaries (known as tarajim or tabaqat) for centuries. The majority of shaykhs, both now and in the past, have not been religious functionaries. Instead, they have belonged to a more secular and much older political elite consisting of clan leaders, village headmen, and tribal chiefs.
The shaykh al-din is associated with a metropolitan culture of great antiquity and richness, whereas the tribal shaykh has long been associated with the agricultural and pastoral hinterland and particularly with remote areas beyond state control. The contrast is overdrawn. Shaykhs have always been caught up in the political economy of urban society -- at times, they have taxed and controlled the trade of cities -- and the most powerful shaykhs keep residences in both town and country. The base of the shaykh’s power, however, has traditionally been in the countryside, where most tribes people and peasants have lived even into modern times. The shaykh’s influence in outlying regions, which cannot always be easily controlled from the urban center, makes him an important resource to the state. Historically, the most influential shaykhs have acted as middlemen between governed and ungoverned space, and it is their relationship to the latter that has distinguished them over time as a recognizable political type.
Ibn Khaldun argued that tribal shaykhs, because they do not possess “royal authority,” are unable to coerce their followers or compel their allegiance. In the absence of “governmental and educational laws,” shaykhs can only exercise a “restraining influence,” and this they can accomplish only insofar as they are venerated and respected by fellow tribesmen. Such respect is seldom won on the basis of a shaykh’s piety or erudition. Indeed, until recent decades, most tribal shaykhs were illiterate, and their understanding of Islam was rarely orthodox. A shaykh’s reputation depends instead on four important characteristics: his ability to resolve disputes, which requires a detailed knowledge of customary law (‘urf or ‘awayid), a legal system that is often at odds with Islamic law. His ability to dispense hospitality on a grand scale and to offer gifts and financial support to followers; his ability to lead in times of raiding and warfare; and his ability to deal with state governments in ways that advance his own interests while preserving, as much as possible, the autonomy of the tribespeople he represents.
Since tribal shaykhs do not control the military and administrative apparatus of the state, their capacity to dominate tribal affairs is often attributed to personal charisma. They are commonly (and somewhat romantically) depicted as eloquent, shrewd, persuasive, brave, and wise. Among tribes people, the title is not inherited by right -- ideally, anyone can attain or fall from that rank -- and the urge to portray shaykhs as “first among equals” is especially strong in the West. This egalitarian view, thoug popular, is exaggerated. In many tribes, the shaykhdom has remained in the same family for centuries. Such concentrations of power and influence are not based on charisma alone. Until the establishment of modern nation-states in the twentieth century, tribal shaykhs were able to impose protection taxes (known as khawa, or “brotherhood”) on peasant communities; they extracted escort fees from caravans that passed through their territories; and in settled areas, they frequently owned sizeable tracts of land. These financial resources gave the shaykhs’ families a distinct political advantage over ordinary tribesmen. Moreover, shaykhs exercised this advantage in the contested zones between urban centers. By playing regional governments against each other, shaykhs could generate a reliable flow of stipends from rulers who competed for their loyalty.
In the modern era, as domains of state control have grown to encompass tribal areas, the status of these families has changed. Many of the most powerful shaykhs have been successfully incorporated by national regimes. In Jordan, for instance, tribal leaders sit in legislative assemblies, serve as government ministers, and control the upper ranks of the military. Throughout the Arab world, shaykhs have preserved their role as judges of tribal law, which, although many countries have officially delegitimized it, continues to be practiced in both urban and rural settings. Shaykhs have fared best, however, on the Arabian Peninsula, where they found themselves in possession of vast oil reserves. The emirates and kingdoms of the Gulf region are ruled today by families who in the nineteenth century were known simply as tribal shaykhs. In Yemen, where government control of the hinterland is comparatively weak, shaykhs take an active part in foreign and domestic affairs of state, and their political power has at times rivaled that of the central government.
It is now common for both Middle Eastern and Western intellectuals to identify shaykhs with parochialism and reactionary politics. The conservative social and economic agendas of the Gulf states, for example, are often ascribed to the “traditional mentality” of their ruling shaykhs. Given the value nationalist ideology sets on progress, unity, and allegiance, it was perhaps inevitable that shaykhs would assume the place they now occupy in the political imagination of the region. Long before nationalism arrived, tribal shaykhs were associated with “backward” domains, fratricidal politics, and resistance to the laws of God and the state. This view, so obviously colored by the attitudes of the urban elite, has been slow to change. The shaykhly families themselves, however, have proven remarkably adaptable. Despite confident predictions that they will soon disappear, the shaykhs and the tribes they lead remain prominent features of the political landscape of the Middle East and North Africa.
shaykh see shaikh
sheik see shaikh
sheikh see shaikh
sjeik see shaikh
sheyh see shaikh
seih see shaikh
Shaikh al-Islam
Shaikh al-Islam (Sheikh ul-Islam) (Shaykh al-Islam) (Seyhulislam). Important religious title used in several Muslim societies from the tenth century onward. The functions of the shaikh al-Islams varied, but their growing importance marks the absorption of religious roles into government bureaucracies. The title first appears in eastern Iran to designate a community’s paramount religious scholar and educational official. In crisis, such officials, sometimes with the synonymous title sadr al-sudur, sought to become autonomous urban leaders. In the twelfth century the title spread widely and gradually gained the connotation of an imperial official with religious responsibilities. In the Delhi sultanate, he distributed largesse to religious figures. Under the Ottomans, he was the sultan’s chief juris-consult and headed a hierarchy of religious officials. Under the Safavids the shaikh al-Islam remained the paramount local official; the imperial official comparable to the Ottoman shaikh al-Islam was called the sadr al-sudur.
Shaikh al-Islam is a title of superior authority in the issues of Islam. The title is given to those followers of the Qur'an who acquired deep knowledge of its principles as well as of different views of prominent scholars and thus may carry over the laws extracted from the text unto others. It was also given to people of age, wise in Islam and reputable among peers.
Since the 8th century this title has been given to great numbers of people, even without due merit, neither with age nor wisdom, who governed Islamic affairs in larger communities or simply were High Judges kadis, e.g., in towns. Later it became a prestigious position in the Caliphate state of the Ottoman Empire, that governed religious affairs of the state.
The title shaikh al-Islam was more particularly applied to the Mufti of Istanbul, whose office acquired religious and political importance from Sultan Selim I onwards. The last Mufti who held this position for a long series of years was Abu’l-Su‘ud (1545-1574). After that time, the Muftis succeeded one another at intervals averaging three to four years. The eminence of the position of the Shaykh al-Islam is found in the ceremonial, only the Grand Vizier being higher in rank. Great importance was attached to the fatwas or legal opinions issued by the Shaykh al-Islam relating to questions of policy and public discipline.
After the National Assembly of Turkey was established in 1920, this office was in the Shar’iyya wa Awqaf Ministry until 1924, when the Ministry was abolished due to separation of religion from state. The office was replaced by the Presidency of Religious Affairs. As the successor entity to the Office of the Shaykh al-Islam, the Presidency of Religious Affairs, is the most authoritative entity in Turkey in relation to Sunni Islam.
Sheikh ul-Islam see Shaikh al-Islam
Shaykh al-Islam see Shaikh al-Islam
Seyhulislam see Shaikh al-Islam
Shaikh al-Islam (Sheikh ul-Islam) (Shaykh al-Islam) (Seyhulislam). Important religious title used in several Muslim societies from the tenth century onward. The functions of the shaikh al-Islams varied, but their growing importance marks the absorption of religious roles into government bureaucracies. The title first appears in eastern Iran to designate a community’s paramount religious scholar and educational official. In crisis, such officials, sometimes with the synonymous title sadr al-sudur, sought to become autonomous urban leaders. In the twelfth century the title spread widely and gradually gained the connotation of an imperial official with religious responsibilities. In the Delhi sultanate, he distributed largesse to religious figures. Under the Ottomans, he was the sultan’s chief juris-consult and headed a hierarchy of religious officials. Under the Safavids the shaikh al-Islam remained the paramount local official; the imperial official comparable to the Ottoman shaikh al-Islam was called the sadr al-sudur.
Shaikh al-Islam is a title of superior authority in the issues of Islam. The title is given to those followers of the Qur'an who acquired deep knowledge of its principles as well as of different views of prominent scholars and thus may carry over the laws extracted from the text unto others. It was also given to people of age, wise in Islam and reputable among peers.
Since the 8th century this title has been given to great numbers of people, even without due merit, neither with age nor wisdom, who governed Islamic affairs in larger communities or simply were High Judges kadis, e.g., in towns. Later it became a prestigious position in the Caliphate state of the Ottoman Empire, that governed religious affairs of the state.
The title shaikh al-Islam was more particularly applied to the Mufti of Istanbul, whose office acquired religious and political importance from Sultan Selim I onwards. The last Mufti who held this position for a long series of years was Abu’l-Su‘ud (1545-1574). After that time, the Muftis succeeded one another at intervals averaging three to four years. The eminence of the position of the Shaykh al-Islam is found in the ceremonial, only the Grand Vizier being higher in rank. Great importance was attached to the fatwas or legal opinions issued by the Shaykh al-Islam relating to questions of policy and public discipline.
After the National Assembly of Turkey was established in 1920, this office was in the Shar’iyya wa Awqaf Ministry until 1924, when the Ministry was abolished due to separation of religion from state. The office was replaced by the Presidency of Religious Affairs. As the successor entity to the Office of the Shaykh al-Islam, the Presidency of Religious Affairs, is the most authoritative entity in Turkey in relation to Sunni Islam.
Sheikh ul-Islam see Shaikh al-Islam
Shaykh al-Islam see Shaikh al-Islam
Seyhulislam see Shaikh al-Islam
Shaikhi
Shaikhi. See Shaykhi.
Shaikhi. See Shaykhi.
Shaikh Muhyi’l-Din al-Waili
Shaikh Muhyi’l-Din al-Waili (1778-1869). Swahili poet. He was kadhi (qadi) or chief judge, of Zanzibar. He wrote the copy of the Kitab al-Sulwa and many Swahili poems, the best known of which is perhaps Dua ya Kuombea Mvua (“Prayer for Rain”).
Waili, Shaikh Muhyi'l-Din al- see Shaikh Muhyi’l-Din al-Waili
Shaikh Muhyi’l-Din al-Waili (1778-1869). Swahili poet. He was kadhi (qadi) or chief judge, of Zanzibar. He wrote the copy of the Kitab al-Sulwa and many Swahili poems, the best known of which is perhaps Dua ya Kuombea Mvua (“Prayer for Rain”).
Waili, Shaikh Muhyi'l-Din al- see Shaikh Muhyi’l-Din al-Waili
Shajar al-Durr
Shajar al-Durr (Shajar ad-Durr) (al-Malikah Ismat ad-Din Umm-Khalil Shajar al-Durr) (Umm Khalil) (d. 1257, Cairo). Only woman to rule Egypt in her own name during the Muslim period (r.1250-1257). Shajar al-Durr was the widow of as-Salih, the last major Ayyubid Sultan. Originally a courtesan, Shajar al-Durr was remarkable woman who caught the eye of the Sultan and ultimately married him. At the time of her husband’s death in 1250, he was preparing to meet the Crusaders in a crucial battle at Mansura. His son and successor Turan Shah was on campaign in Iraq. Shajar al-Durr’s role in keeping her husband’s death a secret until Turan Shah could return and take charge of the army was invaluable. After leading the army to victory in the battle of Masura, Turan Shah proved incapable of satisfying the Mamelukes. When he began to displace as-Salih’s commanders with his own Mamelukes, he was assassinated.
Shajar al-Durr, who was carrying as-Salih’s child at the time (the child died soon after birth), was proclaimed by the Mamelukes, but the Caliph al-Musta‘sim in Baghdad refused to accept a woman as ruler. To satisfy him and elements of her own court, Shajar al-Durr married one of her husband’s Mamelukes, Aybak. However, the relationship was far from easy. Although Shajar al-Durr controlled the treasury, Aybak began to assume royal prerogatives that Shajar felt were rightly hers. At one point (around 1253), Aybak tried to gain ascendancy by declaring Egypt a province of the ‘Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad and himself the Caliph’s Viceroy. Aybak’s decision to take another wife (Shajar had forced Aybak to divorce his first wife at the time of their marriage), compelled Shajar to have Aybak assassinated in 1257. But this, in turn, led to Shajar’s own demise. Aybak’s Mamelukes seized her and imprisoned her. Eventually, the handed Shajar over to Aybak’s ex-wife and harem, who summarily executed Shajar.
Shajar al-Durr (Arabic for "String of Pearls") was the widow of the Ayyubid Sultan as-Salih Ayyub who played a crucial role after his death during the Seventh Crusade against Egypt (1249-1250). She was regarded by Muslim historians and chroniclers of the Mameluke time as being of Turkic origin. She became the Sultana of Egypt on May 2, 1250, marking the end of the Ayyubid reign and the starting of the Mameluke era.
Durr, Shajar al- see Shajar al-Durr
Shajar ad-Durr see Shajar al-Durr
Durr, Shajar ad- see Shajar al-Durr
al-Malikah Ismat ad-Din Umm-Khalil Shajar al-Durr see Shajar al-Durr
Umm Khalil see Shajar al-Durr
String of Pearls see Shajar al-Durr
Shajar al-Durr (Shajar ad-Durr) (al-Malikah Ismat ad-Din Umm-Khalil Shajar al-Durr) (Umm Khalil) (d. 1257, Cairo). Only woman to rule Egypt in her own name during the Muslim period (r.1250-1257). Shajar al-Durr was the widow of as-Salih, the last major Ayyubid Sultan. Originally a courtesan, Shajar al-Durr was remarkable woman who caught the eye of the Sultan and ultimately married him. At the time of her husband’s death in 1250, he was preparing to meet the Crusaders in a crucial battle at Mansura. His son and successor Turan Shah was on campaign in Iraq. Shajar al-Durr’s role in keeping her husband’s death a secret until Turan Shah could return and take charge of the army was invaluable. After leading the army to victory in the battle of Masura, Turan Shah proved incapable of satisfying the Mamelukes. When he began to displace as-Salih’s commanders with his own Mamelukes, he was assassinated.
Shajar al-Durr, who was carrying as-Salih’s child at the time (the child died soon after birth), was proclaimed by the Mamelukes, but the Caliph al-Musta‘sim in Baghdad refused to accept a woman as ruler. To satisfy him and elements of her own court, Shajar al-Durr married one of her husband’s Mamelukes, Aybak. However, the relationship was far from easy. Although Shajar al-Durr controlled the treasury, Aybak began to assume royal prerogatives that Shajar felt were rightly hers. At one point (around 1253), Aybak tried to gain ascendancy by declaring Egypt a province of the ‘Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad and himself the Caliph’s Viceroy. Aybak’s decision to take another wife (Shajar had forced Aybak to divorce his first wife at the time of their marriage), compelled Shajar to have Aybak assassinated in 1257. But this, in turn, led to Shajar’s own demise. Aybak’s Mamelukes seized her and imprisoned her. Eventually, the handed Shajar over to Aybak’s ex-wife and harem, who summarily executed Shajar.
Shajar al-Durr (Arabic for "String of Pearls") was the widow of the Ayyubid Sultan as-Salih Ayyub who played a crucial role after his death during the Seventh Crusade against Egypt (1249-1250). She was regarded by Muslim historians and chroniclers of the Mameluke time as being of Turkic origin. She became the Sultana of Egypt on May 2, 1250, marking the end of the Ayyubid reign and the starting of the Mameluke era.
Durr, Shajar al- see Shajar al-Durr
Shajar ad-Durr see Shajar al-Durr
Durr, Shajar ad- see Shajar al-Durr
al-Malikah Ismat ad-Din Umm-Khalil Shajar al-Durr see Shajar al-Durr
Umm Khalil see Shajar al-Durr
String of Pearls see Shajar al-Durr
Shaltut, Mahmud
Shaltut, Mahmud (1893-1963). One of a celebrated number of Azhari shaykhs who undertook the reform of al-Azhar, reversing its decline, which occurred during the nineteenth century, and recapturing its old role as an active participant in Egypt’s educational, cultural, and political destiny. Although best known and esteemed for his vast knowledge of Islamic fiqh (jurisprudence) and Qur’anic interpretation, Shaltut really made his mark as the shaykh of al-Azhar (1958-1963). During his tenure, al-Azhar began to take its modern shape. This transformation was complicated by the Nasser government, which sought direct control of the mosque/university. Although compromising with the state over administrative control, Shaltut managed to bring about the partial realization of the dreams of past religious reformers of al-Azhar, including Shaykhs Rifa’ah al-Tahrawi, Muhammad ‘Abduh, and Mustafa al-Maraghi.
Born in 1893, in the small village of Minyat Bani Mansur (Buhayrah Province), in Lower Egypt, Shaltut memorized the Qur’an as a child, entered the Alexandria Religious Institute in 1906, and later joined al-Azhar, where he received the ‘Alamiyah degree in 1918. After teaching at the Alexandria Religious Institute for a number of years, Shaltut joined al-Azhar through the auspices of Shaykh Mustafa al-Maraghi. The association between the two shaykhs would be a long lasting one of cooperation in both the national and Azhari spheres. When al-Maraghi was fired by King Fu‘ad in 1930, Shaltut and seventy other Azharis who supported his reform plans for al-Azhar were also dismissed. Shaltut had also supported al-Maraghi’s opposition to Fu’ad’s efforts to have himself elected the new Islamic caliph following the 1924 Ataturk cancellation of the Ottoman caliphate.
On his return to the leadership of al-Azhar in 1935, al-Maraghi asked Shaltut, who had turned to practicing law, to rejoin the university. He did so, rising through the hierarchy to become accepted as one of al-Azhar’s chief ‘ulama’ (religious scholars) after presenting a highly acclaimed study, “Civil and Criminal Responsibility in the Islamic Shari‘ah” at the International Law Conference at the Hague in 1937. In his study, Shaltut outlined his vision of a reformed Islam and of a shari‘a that could become one of the sources for modern legislation.
In 1946, Shaltut was one of the few intellectuals selected as a member of the newly formed Majma’ al-Lughah al-‘Arabiyah (Arab Language Organization. He was also invited to teach fiqh and sunnah (Prophetic traditions) at Cairo University’s Faculty of Law and became general supervisor for Muraqabat al-Buhuth al-Islamiyah (Inspectorate/Control of Islamic Research) an office that allowed him to travel widely throughout the Islamic world to promote better relations between Islamic nations. In 1957, he became the secretary general of the Islamic Conference and under secretary general of the Islamic Conference and under secretary of al-Azhar. In the following year he was chosen to be shaykh of al-Azhar, a position he held until his death in 1963.
Shaltut became the head of al-Azhar during the most radical phase of Egypt’s 1952 revolution. Most standing institutions were undergoing fundamental reorganization at the time. By 1961, the law reorganizing al-Azhar was passed by an extremely reluctant Majlis al-Ummah. Even though Shaltut shared credit as architect of the law, he was not entirely happy with it, because it brought al-Azhar under the direct domination of the state. Since 1958, power over al-Azhar had been shared with a secular authority in the shape of a minister of al-Azhar and religious affairs. The 1961 law came at a critical time in Egypt’s history, just before the imposition of Nasserist socialist laws and the declaration of the National Charter. It was a time of strong nationalist feelings and revolutionary actions that touched all areas of life. Al-Azhar was to be remolded into an instrument of a new Egyptian dominated Arab nationalist and socialist order. It was expected to fulfill this role through reorganization, reform, and a wider national and international role.
Shaltut may have had mixed feelings about the 1961 law, but it should be remembered that he came from the generation that had participated in the 1919 revolution. His 1964 book, The Azhar in a Thousand Years, shows that he had long stood for an activist al-Azhar that could play a greater international role in fighting religious fanaticism and uniting the Islamic ummah (community) with its various schools of thought. Reorganization, and the budgetary allowances that came with it, meant the partial fulfillment of the goals of his teacher, Shaykh Muhammad (Abduh, and his collaborator, al-Maraghi: reopening the door of ijtihad (individual inquiry in legal matters); reforming education at al-Azhar through the introduction of modern subjects; and ending the religious fanaticism that kept the Islamic world divided by narrowing the differences between different Muslim madhhabs (legal schools).
The reformed al-Azhar was to graduate ‘ulama’ with an all-around education. Thus to the university’s traditional religious education were added modern faculties for graduating doctors, engineers, scientists, and even a college for women. A new division, Idarat al-Thaqafah wa al-Bu‘uth al-Islamiyah (Department of Culture and Islamic Missions), delegated al-Azhar graduates to teach and preach in Islamic countries and supervised foreign students studying at al-Azhar. Cairo’s Madinat al-Bu‘uth al-Islamiyah (City of Islamic Missions) enabled thousands of students from all over the Islamic world to study at al-Azhar. Primary and secondary ma‘ahid Azhariyah (Islamic institutions) became active in graduating da‘is (missionaries) to work throughout the Islamic world. Even women graduates of the ma‘ahid and al-Azhar’s Kulliyat al-Banat (Girl’s College) could act as future da‘is among Egyptian and Arab women.
Other achievements of Shaltut’s tenure with a long term impact on Egypt and the Islamic world included the formation of al-Majlis al-A‘la lil-Shu’un al-Islamiyah (High Council for Islamic Affairs), which brought together for the first time representatives of eight Islamic madhhabs (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi‘i, Hanbali, Ja‘fari, Zaydi, ‘Ibadi, and Zahiri) to meet in Cairo in 1962 for theological discussions. The meeting resulted in the publication of the first encyclopedia to cover the different interpretations of mu‘amalat (acts concerned with humna intercourse) according to the eight sects, Mawsu‘at Nasir lil-fiqh al-Islami.
One other institution attributed to Shaltut, Majma’ al-Buhuth al-Islamiyah (Islamic Research Center), has had a deep impact on Egyptian intellectual life. Meant as a scholarly center to assure the accuracy of religious works, it has turned into an organ of censorship that monitors the purity of literature, declaring what is heretical, demanding the removal of publications from the market and libraries, as well as calling for the punishment of authors it considers “innovators” and “heretical enemies of Islam.” For Shaltut, a man famous for his innovative ten volume Tafsir al-Qur’an (Interpretation of the Qur’an and for his resourceful Al-fatawah (Formal Legal Opinion), this would hardly have been acceptable.
Maḥműd Shaltűt spent many years at Al-Azhar Islamic Institute in Cairo, Egypt, and rose to become rector or shaykh or grand imam and served in that position from 1958 to 1963. Although not as well known in the West as many other Islamic scholars, Shaltut was a prolific writer on the sharia and on tafsir, and is known for introducing the teaching of the fiqh (jurisprudence) of Zaydi and Twelver Shi'a Islam to the university alongside the fiqh of the four Sunni madhhabs (traditions of jurisprudence).
Maḥműd Shaltűt received his religious elementary education in Alexandria, Egypt. He has been described as an Islamic modernist.
Mahmud Shaltut see Shaltut, Mahmud
Shaltut, Mahmud (1893-1963). One of a celebrated number of Azhari shaykhs who undertook the reform of al-Azhar, reversing its decline, which occurred during the nineteenth century, and recapturing its old role as an active participant in Egypt’s educational, cultural, and political destiny. Although best known and esteemed for his vast knowledge of Islamic fiqh (jurisprudence) and Qur’anic interpretation, Shaltut really made his mark as the shaykh of al-Azhar (1958-1963). During his tenure, al-Azhar began to take its modern shape. This transformation was complicated by the Nasser government, which sought direct control of the mosque/university. Although compromising with the state over administrative control, Shaltut managed to bring about the partial realization of the dreams of past religious reformers of al-Azhar, including Shaykhs Rifa’ah al-Tahrawi, Muhammad ‘Abduh, and Mustafa al-Maraghi.
Born in 1893, in the small village of Minyat Bani Mansur (Buhayrah Province), in Lower Egypt, Shaltut memorized the Qur’an as a child, entered the Alexandria Religious Institute in 1906, and later joined al-Azhar, where he received the ‘Alamiyah degree in 1918. After teaching at the Alexandria Religious Institute for a number of years, Shaltut joined al-Azhar through the auspices of Shaykh Mustafa al-Maraghi. The association between the two shaykhs would be a long lasting one of cooperation in both the national and Azhari spheres. When al-Maraghi was fired by King Fu‘ad in 1930, Shaltut and seventy other Azharis who supported his reform plans for al-Azhar were also dismissed. Shaltut had also supported al-Maraghi’s opposition to Fu’ad’s efforts to have himself elected the new Islamic caliph following the 1924 Ataturk cancellation of the Ottoman caliphate.
On his return to the leadership of al-Azhar in 1935, al-Maraghi asked Shaltut, who had turned to practicing law, to rejoin the university. He did so, rising through the hierarchy to become accepted as one of al-Azhar’s chief ‘ulama’ (religious scholars) after presenting a highly acclaimed study, “Civil and Criminal Responsibility in the Islamic Shari‘ah” at the International Law Conference at the Hague in 1937. In his study, Shaltut outlined his vision of a reformed Islam and of a shari‘a that could become one of the sources for modern legislation.
In 1946, Shaltut was one of the few intellectuals selected as a member of the newly formed Majma’ al-Lughah al-‘Arabiyah (Arab Language Organization. He was also invited to teach fiqh and sunnah (Prophetic traditions) at Cairo University’s Faculty of Law and became general supervisor for Muraqabat al-Buhuth al-Islamiyah (Inspectorate/Control of Islamic Research) an office that allowed him to travel widely throughout the Islamic world to promote better relations between Islamic nations. In 1957, he became the secretary general of the Islamic Conference and under secretary general of the Islamic Conference and under secretary of al-Azhar. In the following year he was chosen to be shaykh of al-Azhar, a position he held until his death in 1963.
Shaltut became the head of al-Azhar during the most radical phase of Egypt’s 1952 revolution. Most standing institutions were undergoing fundamental reorganization at the time. By 1961, the law reorganizing al-Azhar was passed by an extremely reluctant Majlis al-Ummah. Even though Shaltut shared credit as architect of the law, he was not entirely happy with it, because it brought al-Azhar under the direct domination of the state. Since 1958, power over al-Azhar had been shared with a secular authority in the shape of a minister of al-Azhar and religious affairs. The 1961 law came at a critical time in Egypt’s history, just before the imposition of Nasserist socialist laws and the declaration of the National Charter. It was a time of strong nationalist feelings and revolutionary actions that touched all areas of life. Al-Azhar was to be remolded into an instrument of a new Egyptian dominated Arab nationalist and socialist order. It was expected to fulfill this role through reorganization, reform, and a wider national and international role.
Shaltut may have had mixed feelings about the 1961 law, but it should be remembered that he came from the generation that had participated in the 1919 revolution. His 1964 book, The Azhar in a Thousand Years, shows that he had long stood for an activist al-Azhar that could play a greater international role in fighting religious fanaticism and uniting the Islamic ummah (community) with its various schools of thought. Reorganization, and the budgetary allowances that came with it, meant the partial fulfillment of the goals of his teacher, Shaykh Muhammad (Abduh, and his collaborator, al-Maraghi: reopening the door of ijtihad (individual inquiry in legal matters); reforming education at al-Azhar through the introduction of modern subjects; and ending the religious fanaticism that kept the Islamic world divided by narrowing the differences between different Muslim madhhabs (legal schools).
The reformed al-Azhar was to graduate ‘ulama’ with an all-around education. Thus to the university’s traditional religious education were added modern faculties for graduating doctors, engineers, scientists, and even a college for women. A new division, Idarat al-Thaqafah wa al-Bu‘uth al-Islamiyah (Department of Culture and Islamic Missions), delegated al-Azhar graduates to teach and preach in Islamic countries and supervised foreign students studying at al-Azhar. Cairo’s Madinat al-Bu‘uth al-Islamiyah (City of Islamic Missions) enabled thousands of students from all over the Islamic world to study at al-Azhar. Primary and secondary ma‘ahid Azhariyah (Islamic institutions) became active in graduating da‘is (missionaries) to work throughout the Islamic world. Even women graduates of the ma‘ahid and al-Azhar’s Kulliyat al-Banat (Girl’s College) could act as future da‘is among Egyptian and Arab women.
Other achievements of Shaltut’s tenure with a long term impact on Egypt and the Islamic world included the formation of al-Majlis al-A‘la lil-Shu’un al-Islamiyah (High Council for Islamic Affairs), which brought together for the first time representatives of eight Islamic madhhabs (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi‘i, Hanbali, Ja‘fari, Zaydi, ‘Ibadi, and Zahiri) to meet in Cairo in 1962 for theological discussions. The meeting resulted in the publication of the first encyclopedia to cover the different interpretations of mu‘amalat (acts concerned with humna intercourse) according to the eight sects, Mawsu‘at Nasir lil-fiqh al-Islami.
One other institution attributed to Shaltut, Majma’ al-Buhuth al-Islamiyah (Islamic Research Center), has had a deep impact on Egyptian intellectual life. Meant as a scholarly center to assure the accuracy of religious works, it has turned into an organ of censorship that monitors the purity of literature, declaring what is heretical, demanding the removal of publications from the market and libraries, as well as calling for the punishment of authors it considers “innovators” and “heretical enemies of Islam.” For Shaltut, a man famous for his innovative ten volume Tafsir al-Qur’an (Interpretation of the Qur’an and for his resourceful Al-fatawah (Formal Legal Opinion), this would hardly have been acceptable.
Maḥműd Shaltűt spent many years at Al-Azhar Islamic Institute in Cairo, Egypt, and rose to become rector or shaykh or grand imam and served in that position from 1958 to 1963. Although not as well known in the West as many other Islamic scholars, Shaltut was a prolific writer on the sharia and on tafsir, and is known for introducing the teaching of the fiqh (jurisprudence) of Zaydi and Twelver Shi'a Islam to the university alongside the fiqh of the four Sunni madhhabs (traditions of jurisprudence).
Maḥműd Shaltűt received his religious elementary education in Alexandria, Egypt. He has been described as an Islamic modernist.
Mahmud Shaltut see Shaltut, Mahmud
