Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai (Pashto: اشرف غني احمدزی, Persian: اشرف غنی احمدزی) (b. February 12, 1949) became the President of Afghanistan on September 21, 2014. He was an economist and anthropologist. Usually referred to as Ashraf Ghani, he previously served as Finance Minister and as the chancellor of Kabul University.
Before returning to Afghanistan in 2002, Ghani, worked with the World Bank. As the Finance Minister of Afghanistan between July 2002 and December 2004, he led Afghanistan's attempted economic recovery after the collapse of the Taliban government.
Before returning to Afghanistan in 2002, Ghani, worked with the World Bank. As the Finance Minister of Afghanistan between July 2002 and December 2004, he led Afghanistan's attempted economic recovery after the collapse of the Taliban government.
He is the co-founder of the Institute for State Effectiveness, an organization set up in 2005 to improve the ability of states to serve their citizens. In 2005 he gave a TED talk, in which he discussed how to rebuild a broken state such as Afghanistan. Ghani is a member of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, an independent initiative hosted by the United Nations Development Programme. In 2013, he was ranked second in an online poll to name the world's top 100 intellectuals conducted by Foreign Policy and Prospect magazines, ranking just behind Richard Dawkins. He previously was named in the same poll in 2010.
Ghani came in fourth in the 2009 presidential election, behind Hamid Karzai, Abdullah Abdullah, and Ramazan Bashardost.
In 2014 Afghanistan held a presidential election to pick a successor to Hamid Karzai, who was constitutionally barred from seeking another term in office. As was widely expected, the start of the presidential campaign in February was met with an upsurge of insurgent violence, but the first round of voting was held on schedule in April. A runoff between the two leading candidates, Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani, followed in June. A preliminary count placed Ghani ahead, but Abdullah demanded a recount, charging that as many as two million of the ballots for Ghani were fraudulent. With both candidates claiming victory, a period of deadlock followed. In July, under pressure from the United States, both sides agreed in principle to accept the results of an internationally supervised audit of the vote and to form a national unity government in which the winner would take the position of president and the losing side would nominate someone to occupy a newly created office with powers similar to those of a prime minister. The situation, however, remained delicate; disagreements between the two sides threatened to derail the process before a final agreement could be reached.
On September 21 Ghani and Abdullah signed an agreement under which Ghani would become president and Abdullah or a nominee from his party would take the new, prime minister-like position of chief executive officer. Abdullah ultimately took the post. The position had more of an advisory role; constitutionally, its authority derived from the power of the president to delegate some presidential duties to other government members. The Loya Jirga would have to amend the constitution to formalize the post or grant it powers independent of the president.
Ghani’s presidency faced a new set of issues. The end of NATO’s combat mission was in December 2014, only months into his presidency. U.S. troops remained, however, to focus on training Afghan forces and assist in counterterrorism operations. At the same time, a resurgent Taliban continued to present a challenge for the central government in asserting control over Afghanistan. In an effort to stabilize the country, Ghani’s administration began pursuing peace negotiations with the Taliban and other militant groups in 2015. The first formal meeting between the central government and the Taliban was held in July. In 2016 Hizb-i Islami, the largest militant group after the Taliban, agreed to accept the country’s constitution and renounce violence in a peace deal with the central government. Many observers hoped the deal would pave the way for an agreement with the Taliban down the road. In 2017 the United States increased its troop presence from 8,400 to 14,000 at the request of its top commander in Afghanistan, boosting support to the central government against the Taliban and other insurgents. The surge failed to halt the advance of the Taliban, however.
As the 2018 parliamentary elections approached, the Taliban sought to undermine the legitimacy of the elections. They called on Afghans to boycott the elections and threatened violence at the polls. Two days before the elections set for October 20, the Taliban killed the police chief of Kandahār. The elections in Kandahār were delayed by a week, but the rest of the country held elections on time, despite attacks on polling places and on Afghans heading to them. In the weeks that followed, the country’s election commission released the results slowly. On December 6 an election complaints committee declared votes in Kabul to be invalid, citing fraud and mismanagement, but the election commission rejected the invalidation. With about one-fourth of all votes nationwide cast in Kabul, the dispute over the city’s vote endangered the legitimacy of the poll altogether. Nonetheless, despite the many challenges to the election and its outcome, a good case remained for its legitimacy: turnout was high at an estimated 4 million voters (out of 8.8 million registered), and preliminary results for the elections in Kabul were released in mid-January. Still, the election commission was dismissed for its handling of the elections, and its members were replaced by commissioners selected by the upcoming presidential election candidates. Final election results were released in May 2019.
Meanwhile, in the midst of the electoral count, the push for peace talks was renewed in mid-December 2018. On December 17 the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan met with the Taliban in Abu Dhabi to discuss how to advance the peace process. Just days later the United States announced its intention to withdraw thousands of its troops from Afghanistan, a move interpreted by many as signaling the United States’ seriousness in reaching a peace deal and ending the war. Afghanistan’s central government had not been informed of the decision before it was announced, however, and Afghan officials expressed shock at the United States’ lack of coordination with the government but noted that Afghan forces already handled most security operations anyway. Talks with the Taliban, although shaky at times, continued into 2019, and U.S. troop levels were sustained during the negotiations.
Because of the many problems that had plagued the parliamentary elections as well as the renewed attempt toward peace talks with the Taliban, the presidential election originally set for April was pushed back twice. The election was finally held on September 28, but, amid threats from the Taliban and lack of trust in the electoral process, turnout was significantly lower than in previous presidential elections. Shortly after the election, top contenders Ghani and Abdullah both declared that they had received the majority of votes. The official vote tally released in early 2020 showed that Ghani had received more than 50 percent of the vote, while Abdullah had received less than 40 percent, which Abdullah initially contested before agreeing to a new power-sharing deal in May.
Days after the results of the election were released, the United States and the Taliban announced that they had reached an agreement: the United States would withdraw its troops over 14 months on the condition that the Taliban would pursue peace negotiations with the Afghan government and prevent al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL; also called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria [ISIS]) from operating within Afghanistan. The deal was signed on February 29, 2020, after a weeklong reduction of violence from both sides. In August the Afghan government agreed to a prisoner swap with the Taliban, fulfilling a key precondition, promised in February’s U.S.-Taliban deal, for peace talks between the government and the Taliban to begin.
Negotiations between the Taliban and the central government showed little progress, however, even as the United States resumed the withdrawal of its troops in May 2021 after several months’ delay. As an emboldened Taliban made rapid gains amid the withdrawal, lack of coordination among the government’s armed forces and their lack of responsiveness to the insurgency dealt the central government a crippling blow. By mid-August the Taliban controlled virtually all of Afghanistan, including Kabul.
Ghani is the brother of Hashmat Ghani Ahmadzai, Grand Council Chieftain of the Kuchis.
Ghani was born in 1949 in the Logar Province of Afghanistan. He is an ethnic Pashtun of the Ahmadzai tribe. He completed his primary and secondary education in Habibia High School in Kabul. He attended the American University in Beirut, where he earned his bachelors degree in 1973. Ghani met his future wife, Rula Ghani while studying at the American University of Beirut. He returned to Afghanistan in 1977 to teach anthropology at Kabul University before receiving a government scholarship in 1977 to pursue his Master's degree in anthropology at Columbia University in the United States.
Ghani initially wanted to study Law at Columbia University but then changed his major to Cultural Anthropology. He applied to teach at the University of California, Berkeley in 1983, and then at Johns Hopkins University from 1983 to 1991. During this period he became a frequent commentator on the BBC Farsi/Persian and Pashto services, broadcast in Afghanistan. He has also attended the Harvard-INSEAD and World Bank-Stanford Graduate School of Business' leadership training program. He served on the faculty of Kabul University (1973–77), Aarhus University in Denmark (1977), University of California, Berkeley (1983), and Johns Hopkins University (1983–1991). His academic research was on state-building and social transformation. In 1985 he completed a year of fieldwork researching Pakistani madrasas as a Fulbright Scholar.
Ashraf Ghani married Rula Saade, a citizen with dual Lebanese and American nationality. Rula Saade Ghani was born in a Lebanese Maronite Christian family. The couple married after they met during their studies at the American University of Beirut, Lebanon during the 1970s. There is no confirmation or otherwise for her conversion to Islam to marry Ashraf Ghani. Mrs. Ghani is reportedly fluent in English, French, Arabic, Persian and Pashto.
Ashraf and Rula Ghani have two children, a daughter, Miriam Ghani, and a son, Tariq. Both were born in the United States and carry United States citizenship and passports. In an unusual move for a politician in a traditional Islamic country, Mr. Ghani at his presidential inauguration in 2014 publicly thanked his wife, acknowledging her with an Afghan name, Bibi Gul.
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