Mu‘awiya I ibn Abi Sufyan
Mu‘awiya I ibn Abi Sufyan (Mu'awiyah I) (Moawiyah) (b. 602, Mecca, Arabia - d. April/May 680, Damascus). Founder of the Umayyad dynasty of caliphs based in Syria (r.661-680). He had been a crypto-Muslim since 628, and made his Islam manifest in 630. His sister Umm Habiba was married to the Prophet. He functioned as a commander against the Byzantines, and in 646 Syria and al-Jazira were under his control. Against the Byzantines, he established strong garrisons along the coast and instituted Arab maritime warfare in the Mediterranean. The Caliph ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan, while being besieged in his Medinan residence in 656, sent word to Mu‘awiya asking for help, but the relief force turned back on learning that ‘Uthman had been killed. Thereafter Mu‘awiya bided his time while the Prophet’s son-in-law ‘Ali sought to establish himself as leader. After the Battle of the Camel, ‘Ali elicited Mu‘awiya’s oath of allegiance, but, with the support of ‘Amr ibn al-‘As, Mu‘awiya decided to fight ‘Ali, alleging vengeance for ‘Uthman. After the Battle of Siffin in 656, Mu‘awiya was recognized as caliph by the Syrians and by ‘Amr ibn al-‘As, who then went to conquer Egypt. While ‘Ali’s position grew weaker in Iraq fighting the Kharijites, Mu‘awiya again bided his time. ‘Ali was murdered by a Kharijite in 661, and Mu ‘awiya became caliph. To posterity, his image is ambivalent. He was seen not just as the man who perverted the caliphate into kingship, but also as a clever and successful ruler. He is either cursed or venerated, the legitimacy of his caliphate being a far more important issue than its historical nature.
Muʿāwiyah I was an early Islamic leader and founder of the great Umayyad dynasty of caliphs. He fought against the fourth caliph, ʿAlī (Muhammad’s son-in-law), seized Egypt, and assumed the caliphate after ʿAlī’s assassination in 661. He restored unity to the Muslim empire and made Damascus its capital. He reigned from 661 to 680.
It is ironic that a man who was to become the political-religious head of Islam was born into a clan (ʿAbd Shams) that rejected the Prophet Muhammad in his home city, Mecca, and continued to oppose him on the battlefield after he had emigrated to Medina. Muʿāwiyah did not become a Muslim until Muhammad had conquered Mecca and had reconciled his former enemies by gifts. Possibly as a part of Muhammad’s policy of conciliation, Muʿāwiyah was made a scribe in his service. But Muʿāwiyah’s contributions to Islamic history are wholly associated with his career in Syria, which began shortly after the death of the Prophet, when he, along with his brother Yazīd, served in the tribal armies sent from Arabia against the Byzantine forces in Syria.
Upon the death of Yazīd in 640, Muʿāwiyah was appointed governor of Damascus by the caliph ʿUmar and gradually gained mastery over other areas of Syria. By 647 Muʿāwiyah had built a Syrian tribal army strong enough to repel a Byzantine attack and in subsequent years to take the offensive against the Byzantines in campaigns that resulted in the capture of Cyprus (649) and Rhodes (654) and a devastating defeat of the Byzantine navy off the coast of Lycia in Anatolia (655). At the same time, Muʿāwiyah periodically dispatched land expeditions into Anatolia. All these campaigns, however, came to a halt with the accession of ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib to the caliphate, when a new and decisive phase of Muʿāwiyah’s career began.
As a kinsman of the slain caliph ʿUthmān, Muʿāwiyah bore the duty of revenge. Because ʿAlī neglected to apprehend and punish ʿUthmān’s murderers, Muʿāwiyah regarded him as an accomplice to the murder and refused to acknowledge his caliphate. Thereupon ʿAlī marched to the Euphrates border of Syria and engaged Muʿāwiyah’s troops at the famous Battle of Ṣiffīn (657). Muʿāwiyah’s guile turned near defeat into a truce. Resorting to a trick that played upon the religious sensibilities of ʿAlī’s forces, he persuaded the enemy to enter into negotiations that ultimately cast doubt on the legitimacy of ʿAlī’s caliphate and alienated a sizable number of his supporters. When these former supporters—the Khārijites—rose in rebellion against ʿAlī, Muʿāwiyah took advantage of ʿAlī’s difficulties in Iraq to send a force to seize control of Egypt. Thus, when ʿAlī was assassinated in 661, Muʿāwiyah held both Syria and Egypt and, as commander of the largest force in the Muslim empire, had the strongest claim to the caliphate. ʿAlī’s son Ḥasan was persuaded to remove himself from public life in exchange for a subsidy, which Muʿāwiyah provided.
During his 20-year governorship of Syria and during the war against ʿAlī, Muʿāwiyah had succeeded in recruiting and training a large Arab tribal army that was remarkably loyal to him. It was therefore natural that he should base his caliphate in Syria, with Damascus as the new capital of Islam. But, if Muʿāwiyah’s chief support came from the tribes of Syria, the tribes of other areas posed the chief threat to his reign. It is not surprising then that early Umayyad government followed certain tribal principles as a means of retaining and winning the loyalty of the Arabs. The clearest examples of such a policy are provided by Muʿāwiyah’s adoption of two tribal institutions: the council of notables—the shūrā—which was convoked by the caliph for consultation and the delegations—wufūd—which were sent by tribes to keep the caliph informed of their interest. Within this context, Muʿāwiyah ruled as a traditional Arab chieftain. Although he may not have consciously encouraged renewed warfare against non-Muslim territory as a means of directing Bedouin aggressive tendencies into channels that would aggrandize Islam and stabilize his own power, there is no doubt that warfare served these purposes during his reign, and in this respect it is significant that Muʿāwiyah used the Syrian army only for domestic defense and for campaigns against the Byzantines, who threatened the borders of Syria.
During the civil war, Muʿāwiyah had purchased a truce with the Byzantines in order to free his army for the struggle against ʿAlī. Soon after his accession to the caliphate, however, he curtailed the payment of tribute and sent expeditions against the Byzantines almost yearly. These campaigns served both to fulfill Muʿāwiyah’s obligation to conduct holy war (jihad) against unbelievers and to keep his Syrian troops in fighting trim. Otherwise, the war against Byzantium was inconclusive. Even though two expeditions reached the vicinity of Constantinople, the Arabs never succeeded in permanently occupying territory in Asia Minor beyond the Taurus Mountains. Troops stationed in other parts of Muʿāwiyah’s empire were sent on campaigns into remote areas. In North Africa, raids were conducted as far west as Tlemcen in present-day Algeria. More permanent, however, was the conquest of Tripolitania and Ifrīqīyah, which was consolidated by the foundation in 670 of the garrison city of Kairouan, soon to become the base for further expansion later in the Umayyad period. At the same time, a vigorous campaign was being conducted in the east by means of which Muslim borders were extended to the Oxus River and Khorāsān was established as an Umayyad province.
It had become apparent during the reigns of the first caliphs that tribal tradition and the practices of Muhammad in Medina were inadequate resources for administering a vast empire. To solve this problem, Muʿāwiyah resorted to a solution that lay at hand in Syria—that is, the imitation of administrative procedures that had evolved during centuries of Roman and Byzantine rule there. Although the process by which the borrowing took place is not fully known, it is clear that Muʿāwiyah initiated certain practices that were apparently inspired by the previous tradition. Basically, he aimed at increased organization and centralization of the caliphal government in order to exert control over steadily expanding territories. This he achieved by the establishment of bureaus—dīwāns—in Damascus to conduct the affairs of government efficiently. Early Arabic sources credit two dīwāns in particular to Muʿāwiyah: the dīwān al-khatam, or chancellery, and the barīd, or postal service, both of which were obviously intended to improve communications within the empire. Prominent positions within the nascent bureaucracy were held by Christians, some of whom belonged to families that had served in Byzantine governments. The employment of Christians was part of a broader policy of religious tolerance that was necessitated by the presence of large Christian populations in the conquered provinces, especially in Syria itself.
Such administrative innovations coupled with the observance of tribal traditions caused historians of a later period to deny Muʿāwiyah the religious title of caliph and to characterize him as a king (malik) instead. As a symbol of the increasingly secular nature of the caliphate, derived in part from a non-Islamic tradition, the title is apt for Muʿāwiyah and for most of the Umayyads. It is particularly appropriate for the most startling of all of Muʿāwiyah’s innovations, the one by which he secured the allegiance of the tribes for the caliphate of his son Yazīd and thereby established the practice of hereditary rule in Islam. As an alternative to the various unreliable precedents for selecting a caliph, this measure was certainly consonant with Muʿāwiyah’s policy and achievement as caliph, which, in summary, consisted of invigorating the theocratic origins of Islamic governance with borrowings from other traditions better adapted to the demands of tribesmen and the needs of an empire.
Muʿāwiyah stands out as one of the few caliphs who is depicted both in Muslim historiography and in modern scholarship as a decisive force in Islamic history. Undoubtedly one reason for the prominence that is assigned to him is that he was a controversial figure. Pious scholars of the dominant Sunni sect of Islam, together with writers of the minority, dissenting Shīʿites, have always heaped opprobrium on Muʿāwiyah: the Sunni because of his deviations from the pattern of leadership set by the Prophet Muhammad and the “rightly guided” caliphs, the Shīʿites because he had usurped the caliphate from ʿAlī.
Although Muʿāwiyah has been and still is condemned for his sins from these two quarters, he has also been the subject of lavish praise in Arabic literature as the ideal ruler. Unlike most of the other caliphs, Muʿāwiyah looms large in Islamic history because he has consistently aroused partisanship at different extremes. But, beneath the biased portraits given in traditional Muslim historiography, there is a person whose actual accomplishments were of great magnitude quite apart from partisan value judgments and interpretations. These accomplishments lay primarily in political and military administration, through which Muʿāwiyah was able to rebuild a Muslim state that had fallen into anarchy and to renew the Arab Muslim military offensive against unbelievers.
Mu'awiyah I see Mu‘awiya I ibn Abi Sufyan
Moawiyah see Mu‘awiya I ibn Abi Sufyan
Mu‘awiya I ibn Abi Sufyan (Mu'awiyah I) (Moawiyah) (b. 602, Mecca, Arabia - d. April/May 680, Damascus). Founder of the Umayyad dynasty of caliphs based in Syria (r.661-680). He had been a crypto-Muslim since 628, and made his Islam manifest in 630. His sister Umm Habiba was married to the Prophet. He functioned as a commander against the Byzantines, and in 646 Syria and al-Jazira were under his control. Against the Byzantines, he established strong garrisons along the coast and instituted Arab maritime warfare in the Mediterranean. The Caliph ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan, while being besieged in his Medinan residence in 656, sent word to Mu‘awiya asking for help, but the relief force turned back on learning that ‘Uthman had been killed. Thereafter Mu‘awiya bided his time while the Prophet’s son-in-law ‘Ali sought to establish himself as leader. After the Battle of the Camel, ‘Ali elicited Mu‘awiya’s oath of allegiance, but, with the support of ‘Amr ibn al-‘As, Mu‘awiya decided to fight ‘Ali, alleging vengeance for ‘Uthman. After the Battle of Siffin in 656, Mu‘awiya was recognized as caliph by the Syrians and by ‘Amr ibn al-‘As, who then went to conquer Egypt. While ‘Ali’s position grew weaker in Iraq fighting the Kharijites, Mu‘awiya again bided his time. ‘Ali was murdered by a Kharijite in 661, and Mu ‘awiya became caliph. To posterity, his image is ambivalent. He was seen not just as the man who perverted the caliphate into kingship, but also as a clever and successful ruler. He is either cursed or venerated, the legitimacy of his caliphate being a far more important issue than its historical nature.
Muʿāwiyah I was an early Islamic leader and founder of the great Umayyad dynasty of caliphs. He fought against the fourth caliph, ʿAlī (Muhammad’s son-in-law), seized Egypt, and assumed the caliphate after ʿAlī’s assassination in 661. He restored unity to the Muslim empire and made Damascus its capital. He reigned from 661 to 680.
It is ironic that a man who was to become the political-religious head of Islam was born into a clan (ʿAbd Shams) that rejected the Prophet Muhammad in his home city, Mecca, and continued to oppose him on the battlefield after he had emigrated to Medina. Muʿāwiyah did not become a Muslim until Muhammad had conquered Mecca and had reconciled his former enemies by gifts. Possibly as a part of Muhammad’s policy of conciliation, Muʿāwiyah was made a scribe in his service. But Muʿāwiyah’s contributions to Islamic history are wholly associated with his career in Syria, which began shortly after the death of the Prophet, when he, along with his brother Yazīd, served in the tribal armies sent from Arabia against the Byzantine forces in Syria.
Upon the death of Yazīd in 640, Muʿāwiyah was appointed governor of Damascus by the caliph ʿUmar and gradually gained mastery over other areas of Syria. By 647 Muʿāwiyah had built a Syrian tribal army strong enough to repel a Byzantine attack and in subsequent years to take the offensive against the Byzantines in campaigns that resulted in the capture of Cyprus (649) and Rhodes (654) and a devastating defeat of the Byzantine navy off the coast of Lycia in Anatolia (655). At the same time, Muʿāwiyah periodically dispatched land expeditions into Anatolia. All these campaigns, however, came to a halt with the accession of ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib to the caliphate, when a new and decisive phase of Muʿāwiyah’s career began.
As a kinsman of the slain caliph ʿUthmān, Muʿāwiyah bore the duty of revenge. Because ʿAlī neglected to apprehend and punish ʿUthmān’s murderers, Muʿāwiyah regarded him as an accomplice to the murder and refused to acknowledge his caliphate. Thereupon ʿAlī marched to the Euphrates border of Syria and engaged Muʿāwiyah’s troops at the famous Battle of Ṣiffīn (657). Muʿāwiyah’s guile turned near defeat into a truce. Resorting to a trick that played upon the religious sensibilities of ʿAlī’s forces, he persuaded the enemy to enter into negotiations that ultimately cast doubt on the legitimacy of ʿAlī’s caliphate and alienated a sizable number of his supporters. When these former supporters—the Khārijites—rose in rebellion against ʿAlī, Muʿāwiyah took advantage of ʿAlī’s difficulties in Iraq to send a force to seize control of Egypt. Thus, when ʿAlī was assassinated in 661, Muʿāwiyah held both Syria and Egypt and, as commander of the largest force in the Muslim empire, had the strongest claim to the caliphate. ʿAlī’s son Ḥasan was persuaded to remove himself from public life in exchange for a subsidy, which Muʿāwiyah provided.
During his 20-year governorship of Syria and during the war against ʿAlī, Muʿāwiyah had succeeded in recruiting and training a large Arab tribal army that was remarkably loyal to him. It was therefore natural that he should base his caliphate in Syria, with Damascus as the new capital of Islam. But, if Muʿāwiyah’s chief support came from the tribes of Syria, the tribes of other areas posed the chief threat to his reign. It is not surprising then that early Umayyad government followed certain tribal principles as a means of retaining and winning the loyalty of the Arabs. The clearest examples of such a policy are provided by Muʿāwiyah’s adoption of two tribal institutions: the council of notables—the shūrā—which was convoked by the caliph for consultation and the delegations—wufūd—which were sent by tribes to keep the caliph informed of their interest. Within this context, Muʿāwiyah ruled as a traditional Arab chieftain. Although he may not have consciously encouraged renewed warfare against non-Muslim territory as a means of directing Bedouin aggressive tendencies into channels that would aggrandize Islam and stabilize his own power, there is no doubt that warfare served these purposes during his reign, and in this respect it is significant that Muʿāwiyah used the Syrian army only for domestic defense and for campaigns against the Byzantines, who threatened the borders of Syria.
During the civil war, Muʿāwiyah had purchased a truce with the Byzantines in order to free his army for the struggle against ʿAlī. Soon after his accession to the caliphate, however, he curtailed the payment of tribute and sent expeditions against the Byzantines almost yearly. These campaigns served both to fulfill Muʿāwiyah’s obligation to conduct holy war (jihad) against unbelievers and to keep his Syrian troops in fighting trim. Otherwise, the war against Byzantium was inconclusive. Even though two expeditions reached the vicinity of Constantinople, the Arabs never succeeded in permanently occupying territory in Asia Minor beyond the Taurus Mountains. Troops stationed in other parts of Muʿāwiyah’s empire were sent on campaigns into remote areas. In North Africa, raids were conducted as far west as Tlemcen in present-day Algeria. More permanent, however, was the conquest of Tripolitania and Ifrīqīyah, which was consolidated by the foundation in 670 of the garrison city of Kairouan, soon to become the base for further expansion later in the Umayyad period. At the same time, a vigorous campaign was being conducted in the east by means of which Muslim borders were extended to the Oxus River and Khorāsān was established as an Umayyad province.
It had become apparent during the reigns of the first caliphs that tribal tradition and the practices of Muhammad in Medina were inadequate resources for administering a vast empire. To solve this problem, Muʿāwiyah resorted to a solution that lay at hand in Syria—that is, the imitation of administrative procedures that had evolved during centuries of Roman and Byzantine rule there. Although the process by which the borrowing took place is not fully known, it is clear that Muʿāwiyah initiated certain practices that were apparently inspired by the previous tradition. Basically, he aimed at increased organization and centralization of the caliphal government in order to exert control over steadily expanding territories. This he achieved by the establishment of bureaus—dīwāns—in Damascus to conduct the affairs of government efficiently. Early Arabic sources credit two dīwāns in particular to Muʿāwiyah: the dīwān al-khatam, or chancellery, and the barīd, or postal service, both of which were obviously intended to improve communications within the empire. Prominent positions within the nascent bureaucracy were held by Christians, some of whom belonged to families that had served in Byzantine governments. The employment of Christians was part of a broader policy of religious tolerance that was necessitated by the presence of large Christian populations in the conquered provinces, especially in Syria itself.
Such administrative innovations coupled with the observance of tribal traditions caused historians of a later period to deny Muʿāwiyah the religious title of caliph and to characterize him as a king (malik) instead. As a symbol of the increasingly secular nature of the caliphate, derived in part from a non-Islamic tradition, the title is apt for Muʿāwiyah and for most of the Umayyads. It is particularly appropriate for the most startling of all of Muʿāwiyah’s innovations, the one by which he secured the allegiance of the tribes for the caliphate of his son Yazīd and thereby established the practice of hereditary rule in Islam. As an alternative to the various unreliable precedents for selecting a caliph, this measure was certainly consonant with Muʿāwiyah’s policy and achievement as caliph, which, in summary, consisted of invigorating the theocratic origins of Islamic governance with borrowings from other traditions better adapted to the demands of tribesmen and the needs of an empire.
Muʿāwiyah stands out as one of the few caliphs who is depicted both in Muslim historiography and in modern scholarship as a decisive force in Islamic history. Undoubtedly one reason for the prominence that is assigned to him is that he was a controversial figure. Pious scholars of the dominant Sunni sect of Islam, together with writers of the minority, dissenting Shīʿites, have always heaped opprobrium on Muʿāwiyah: the Sunni because of his deviations from the pattern of leadership set by the Prophet Muhammad and the “rightly guided” caliphs, the Shīʿites because he had usurped the caliphate from ʿAlī.
Although Muʿāwiyah has been and still is condemned for his sins from these two quarters, he has also been the subject of lavish praise in Arabic literature as the ideal ruler. Unlike most of the other caliphs, Muʿāwiyah looms large in Islamic history because he has consistently aroused partisanship at different extremes. But, beneath the biased portraits given in traditional Muslim historiography, there is a person whose actual accomplishments were of great magnitude quite apart from partisan value judgments and interpretations. These accomplishments lay primarily in political and military administration, through which Muʿāwiyah was able to rebuild a Muslim state that had fallen into anarchy and to renew the Arab Muslim military offensive against unbelievers.
Mu'awiyah I see Mu‘awiya I ibn Abi Sufyan
Moawiyah see Mu‘awiya I ibn Abi Sufyan
Mu’ayyad bi-‘llah Muhammad, al-
Mu’ayyad bi-‘llah Muhammad, al-. Name of two Qasimi Zaydi Imams of Yemen, the best known being al-Mansur bi’llah al-Qasim (b. 1582; r. 1620-1644). During his reign the Ottoman Turks were expelled from Yemen in 1635 after a continuous presence of a century.
Mu’ayyad bi-‘llah Muhammad, al-. Name of two Qasimi Zaydi Imams of Yemen, the best known being al-Mansur bi’llah al-Qasim (b. 1582; r. 1620-1644). During his reign the Ottoman Turks were expelled from Yemen in 1635 after a continuous presence of a century.
Mu’ayyad fi’l-Din Abu Nasr, al-
Mu’ayyad fi’l-Din Abu Nasr, al- (c.990-1077) was an eminent Isma‘ili missionary. He played a leading role as an intermediary between the Fatimids and al-Basasiri, the military commander of the Buyids, in the campaign of 1057 against the Saljuqs. He left an autobiography which is considered to be the apogee of Isma‘ili learning.
Mu’ayyad fi’l-Din Abu Nasr, al- (c.990-1077) was an eminent Isma‘ili missionary. He played a leading role as an intermediary between the Fatimids and al-Basasiri, the military commander of the Buyids, in the campaign of 1057 against the Saljuqs. He left an autobiography which is considered to be the apogee of Isma‘ili learning.
Mubarak, Hosni
Mubarak, Hosni (Muhammad Hosni Sayyid Mubarak) (Muḥammad Ḥasnī Sayyid Mubārak) (Husnī Mubārak) (b. May 4, 1928). President of Egypt (1981-2011). Mubarak became president in 1981. Mubarak was born in Kafr-al Meselha, the son of an inspector of the Ministry of Justice. Mubarak was educated at Egypt’s national Military Academy and Air Force Academy and at the Frunze General Staff Academy in Moscow in the Soviet Union.
Mubarak joined the air force in 1950, and became air force chief of staff in 1969, and commander in chief in 1972. He had several military positions under President Sadat, such as deputy minister of war, and was one of Sadat’s closest advisors.
In 1975, Mubarak was appointed vice president. Mubarak was elected president on October 13, 1981, one week after Sadat had been assassinated. Mubarak declared on his inauguration that he would continue the political line of Sadat, which had been one of reconciliation with the West, and peace with Israel inside internationally recognized borders.
Mubarak instituted a vigorous economic recovery program; remained committed to the peace treaty with Israel (signed by Sadat in 1979); mended relations with other Arab states; and initiated a policy he called “positive neutrality” toward the great powers. He was re-elected when his National Democratic Party won the October 1987 elections and was thus able to nominate him as the sole candidate for president. With serious economic problems and rising Islamic fundamentalist opposition at home, Mubarak continued to seek an end to the stalemate that had developed between Israel and Arab nations.
Mubarak supported the 1990 United Nations sanctions against Iraq when that country invaded Kuwait, orchestrated Arab League opposition to the invasion, committed about 38,500 troops to the anti-Iraq coalition in the Persian Gulf War (1991), and supported postwar efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East. Re-elected in 1993, Mubarak cracked down on Muslim fundamentalists.
Mubarak survived an assassination attempt unharmed in June 1995 in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Adaba. Five of the assailants were killed during or after the ambush and three escaped to Sudan, which is widely believed to have sponsored the attack.
In November 1995, just before parliamentary elections, Mubarak’s government accused the Muslim Brotherhood of helping violent Islamic groups. Many of the Muslim Brotherhood’s members were arrested, and several who planned to run in the elections or monitor them were tried and sentenced to prison. Critics accused the government of trying to eliminate even peaceful opponents. In the elections that followed, Mubarak’s National Democratic Party won an overwhelming victory. Mubarak was elected to a fourth six year term in 1999.
During his tenure as President, Mubarak survived six assassination attempts. In June 1995 there was an alleged assassination attempt involving noxious gases and Egyptian Islamic Jihad while he was in Ethiopia for a conference of the Organization of African Unity. Upon return Mubarak is said to have authorized bombings on Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya which by 1999 saw 20,000 persons placed in detention related to the revolutionary Islamic organizations. Another assassination attempt occurred in 1999 when he "was slightly wounded after being attacked by a knife-wielding assailant".
President Mubarak spoke out against the 2003 war on Iraq, arguing that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be resolved first. He also claimed that the war would cause "100 Bin Ladens." President Mubarak did not support an immediate United States pull out from Iraq as he believed it would lead to probable chaos.
In July 2004, Mubarak accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Atef Ebeid and most of the cabinet. He then appointed Ahmed Nazif as the new Prime Minister. The new cabinet was generally viewed with optimism. The new cabinet headed by Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif was somewhat successful in overcoming the grim economic situation. The Egyptian stock market came in first place out of all emerging markets in terms of percentage increase for the fiscal year 2004/2005. However, unemployment still persisted and Mubarak came under criticism for favoring big business and privatization as opposed to workers' rights. All this was a consequence of the wide use of privatization policy, by selling shares in most public sector companies, but it is widely believed that this reserve of previously nationalized capitals would end, leaving Nazif's government broke.
President Mubarak was re-elected by majority votes in a referendum for successive terms on four occasions: in 1987, 1993, 1999, and 2005. The results of the referendums are of questionable validity. No one could run against the President due to a restriction in the Egyptian constitution in which the People's Assembly played the main role in electing the President of the Republic.
After increased domestic and international pressure for democratic reform in Egypt, Mubarak asked the largely rubber stamp parliament on February 26, 2005 to amend the constitution to allow multi-candidate presidential elections by September 2005. Previously, Mubarak secured his position by having himself nominated by parliament, then confirmed without opposition in a referendum.
The September 2005 ballot was therefore a multiple candidate election rather than a referendum, but the electoral institutions, and security apparatus remained under the control of the President. The official state media, including the three government newspapers and state television also expressed views identical to the official line taken by Mubarak. After 2005, however, there developed a steady growth in independent news outlets, especially independent newspapers which occasionally criticized the President and his family severely. Satellite channels beaming from Egypt such as the Orbit Satellite Television and Radio Network for example, also exhibited relative openness as exhibited in their flagship program Al Qahira Al Yawm.
On July 28, 2005, Mubarak announced his candidacy, as he had been widely expected to do. The election which was scheduled for September 7, 2005 involved mass rigging activities, according to civil organizations that observed the elections. Reports have shown that Mubarak's party used government vehicles to take public employees to vote for him. Votes were bought for Mubarak in poor suburbs and rural areas. It was also reported that thousands of illegal votes were allowed for Mubarak from citizens who were not registered to vote. On September 8, 2005, Dr. Ayman Nour, a dissident and candidate for the Al-Ghad party - the Tomorrow party-- contested the election results, and demanded a repeat of the election.
In a move widely seen as political persecution, Nour was convicted of forgery and sentenced to five years at hard labor on December 24, 2005.
A dramatic drop in support for Mubarak occurred with the news that his son Alaa was favored in government tenders and privatization. With both of his sons directly and indirectly owning shares in a large number of companies and minor projects, Mubarak's corruption was leading a series of corruption cases among his cabinet of minor governmental employees.
While in office, political corruption in the Mubarak administration's Ministry of Interior rose dramatically, due to the increased power over the institutional system that was necessary to secure the prolonged presidency. Such corruption led to the frequent imprisonment of political figures and young activists without trials, illegal undocumented hidden detention facilities, and rejecting universities, mosques, newspapers staff members based on political inclination. On a personnel level, each individual officer could and would violate citizens' privacy in his area, using unconditioned arrests, common torture and abuse of power, depending on simply brute force, rather than law, to enforce order in the officer's designated area.
The rise to power of powerful business men in the NDP in the federal government and People's Assembly led to massive waves of anger during the years of Ahmed Nazif's government. As a result, frequent laws and bills were passed, with undergiant monopolists (such as Ahmed Ezz's) influence serving personal and corporational financial interests rather than the public's.
In January 2011 thousands of protesters—angered by repression, corruption, and poverty in Egypt—took to the streets, calling for Mubārak to step down as president. Those demonstrations took place shortly after a popular uprising in Tunisia, known as the Jasmine Revolution, forced Tunisian President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali from power. Mubārak made no public appearances until January 28—the fourth day of clashes between protesters and police—when he gave a speech on Egyptian state television indicating that he intended to remain in office. In the speech he acknowledged the protesters’ demand for political change by announcing that he would dissolve his cabinet and implement new social and economic reforms. Those concessions, however, were dismissed by protesters as a ploy to remain in power and did little to calm the unrest. The following day Mubārak appointed a vice president for the first time in his presidency, choosing Omar Suleiman, the director of the Egyptian General Intelligence Service. On February 1, under pressure from continued protests, Mubārak appeared on Egyptian state television and announced that he would not stand in the presidential election scheduled for September 2011.
Under continued pressure to step down immediately, Mubārak made another televised speech on February 10. Although it was widely expected that he would use the address to announce his immediate resignation, he reiterated that he would stay in office until the end of his term, delegating some of his powers to Suleiman. Mubārak promised to institute electoral reforms and vowed to lift Egypt’s emergency law, in place since 1981, when the security situation in Egypt became sufficiently stable.
On February 11, Mubārak left Cairo for Sharm el-Sheikh, a resort town on the Sinai Peninsula where he maintained a residence. Hours later Suleiman appeared on Egyptian television to announce that Mubārak had stepped down as president, leaving the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, a group of senior military officers, to govern the country. Upon learning of Mubārak’s resignation, crowds at Tahrir Square and other protest sites erupted in celebration.
Following Mubārak’s departure, the Egyptian government began to investigate allegations of corruption and abuse of power within the Mubārak regime, questioning and arresting several former officials and business leaders with close ties to Mubārak. Calls for the investigation to focus on Mubārak himself intensified, fueled by reports that the Mubārak family had amassed a fortune worth billions of dollars in overseas accounts. On April 10, the public prosecutor announced that Mubārak and his sons, Alaa and Gamal, would be questioned by investigators. Following the announcement, Mubārak made his first public statements since stepping down as president, denying the accusations of corruption. On April 12, while waiting to be questioned, Mubārak was hospitalized after reportedly suffering a heart attack. Mubārak was held in a hospital in Sharm el-Sheikh after an official medical evaluation concluded that his health was too fragile for him to be transferred to prison in Cairo. In May, the Egyptian state media reported that his condition had stabilized, although he needed to be treated for depression.
On May 24, the public prosecutor announced that Mubārak, Alaa, and Gamal would stand trial for ordering the killing of protesters as well as for corruption and abuse of power. On August 3, Mubārak appeared in public for the first time since stepping down, as his trial commenced in Cairo amid heavy security. Although Mubārak, reportedly suffering from poor health, was wheeled into court in a hospital bed, he appeared alert during the hearing, denying all charges against him.
Muhammad Hosni Sayyid Mubarak see Mubarak, Hosni
Muhammad Hasni Sayyid Mubarak see Mubarak, Hosni
Hosni Mubarak see Mubarak, Hosni
Husni Mubarak see Mubarak, Hosni
Mubarak, Muhammad Hasni Sayyid see Mubarak, Hosni
Mubarak, Muhammad Hosni Sayyid see Mubarak, Hosni
Mubarak, Hosni (Muhammad Hosni Sayyid Mubarak) (Muḥammad Ḥasnī Sayyid Mubārak) (Husnī Mubārak) (b. May 4, 1928). President of Egypt (1981-2011). Mubarak became president in 1981. Mubarak was born in Kafr-al Meselha, the son of an inspector of the Ministry of Justice. Mubarak was educated at Egypt’s national Military Academy and Air Force Academy and at the Frunze General Staff Academy in Moscow in the Soviet Union.
Mubarak joined the air force in 1950, and became air force chief of staff in 1969, and commander in chief in 1972. He had several military positions under President Sadat, such as deputy minister of war, and was one of Sadat’s closest advisors.
In 1975, Mubarak was appointed vice president. Mubarak was elected president on October 13, 1981, one week after Sadat had been assassinated. Mubarak declared on his inauguration that he would continue the political line of Sadat, which had been one of reconciliation with the West, and peace with Israel inside internationally recognized borders.
Mubarak instituted a vigorous economic recovery program; remained committed to the peace treaty with Israel (signed by Sadat in 1979); mended relations with other Arab states; and initiated a policy he called “positive neutrality” toward the great powers. He was re-elected when his National Democratic Party won the October 1987 elections and was thus able to nominate him as the sole candidate for president. With serious economic problems and rising Islamic fundamentalist opposition at home, Mubarak continued to seek an end to the stalemate that had developed between Israel and Arab nations.
Mubarak supported the 1990 United Nations sanctions against Iraq when that country invaded Kuwait, orchestrated Arab League opposition to the invasion, committed about 38,500 troops to the anti-Iraq coalition in the Persian Gulf War (1991), and supported postwar efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East. Re-elected in 1993, Mubarak cracked down on Muslim fundamentalists.
Mubarak survived an assassination attempt unharmed in June 1995 in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Adaba. Five of the assailants were killed during or after the ambush and three escaped to Sudan, which is widely believed to have sponsored the attack.
In November 1995, just before parliamentary elections, Mubarak’s government accused the Muslim Brotherhood of helping violent Islamic groups. Many of the Muslim Brotherhood’s members were arrested, and several who planned to run in the elections or monitor them were tried and sentenced to prison. Critics accused the government of trying to eliminate even peaceful opponents. In the elections that followed, Mubarak’s National Democratic Party won an overwhelming victory. Mubarak was elected to a fourth six year term in 1999.
During his tenure as President, Mubarak survived six assassination attempts. In June 1995 there was an alleged assassination attempt involving noxious gases and Egyptian Islamic Jihad while he was in Ethiopia for a conference of the Organization of African Unity. Upon return Mubarak is said to have authorized bombings on Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya which by 1999 saw 20,000 persons placed in detention related to the revolutionary Islamic organizations. Another assassination attempt occurred in 1999 when he "was slightly wounded after being attacked by a knife-wielding assailant".
President Mubarak spoke out against the 2003 war on Iraq, arguing that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be resolved first. He also claimed that the war would cause "100 Bin Ladens." President Mubarak did not support an immediate United States pull out from Iraq as he believed it would lead to probable chaos.
In July 2004, Mubarak accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Atef Ebeid and most of the cabinet. He then appointed Ahmed Nazif as the new Prime Minister. The new cabinet was generally viewed with optimism. The new cabinet headed by Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif was somewhat successful in overcoming the grim economic situation. The Egyptian stock market came in first place out of all emerging markets in terms of percentage increase for the fiscal year 2004/2005. However, unemployment still persisted and Mubarak came under criticism for favoring big business and privatization as opposed to workers' rights. All this was a consequence of the wide use of privatization policy, by selling shares in most public sector companies, but it is widely believed that this reserve of previously nationalized capitals would end, leaving Nazif's government broke.
President Mubarak was re-elected by majority votes in a referendum for successive terms on four occasions: in 1987, 1993, 1999, and 2005. The results of the referendums are of questionable validity. No one could run against the President due to a restriction in the Egyptian constitution in which the People's Assembly played the main role in electing the President of the Republic.
After increased domestic and international pressure for democratic reform in Egypt, Mubarak asked the largely rubber stamp parliament on February 26, 2005 to amend the constitution to allow multi-candidate presidential elections by September 2005. Previously, Mubarak secured his position by having himself nominated by parliament, then confirmed without opposition in a referendum.
The September 2005 ballot was therefore a multiple candidate election rather than a referendum, but the electoral institutions, and security apparatus remained under the control of the President. The official state media, including the three government newspapers and state television also expressed views identical to the official line taken by Mubarak. After 2005, however, there developed a steady growth in independent news outlets, especially independent newspapers which occasionally criticized the President and his family severely. Satellite channels beaming from Egypt such as the Orbit Satellite Television and Radio Network for example, also exhibited relative openness as exhibited in their flagship program Al Qahira Al Yawm.
On July 28, 2005, Mubarak announced his candidacy, as he had been widely expected to do. The election which was scheduled for September 7, 2005 involved mass rigging activities, according to civil organizations that observed the elections. Reports have shown that Mubarak's party used government vehicles to take public employees to vote for him. Votes were bought for Mubarak in poor suburbs and rural areas. It was also reported that thousands of illegal votes were allowed for Mubarak from citizens who were not registered to vote. On September 8, 2005, Dr. Ayman Nour, a dissident and candidate for the Al-Ghad party - the Tomorrow party-- contested the election results, and demanded a repeat of the election.
In a move widely seen as political persecution, Nour was convicted of forgery and sentenced to five years at hard labor on December 24, 2005.
A dramatic drop in support for Mubarak occurred with the news that his son Alaa was favored in government tenders and privatization. With both of his sons directly and indirectly owning shares in a large number of companies and minor projects, Mubarak's corruption was leading a series of corruption cases among his cabinet of minor governmental employees.
While in office, political corruption in the Mubarak administration's Ministry of Interior rose dramatically, due to the increased power over the institutional system that was necessary to secure the prolonged presidency. Such corruption led to the frequent imprisonment of political figures and young activists without trials, illegal undocumented hidden detention facilities, and rejecting universities, mosques, newspapers staff members based on political inclination. On a personnel level, each individual officer could and would violate citizens' privacy in his area, using unconditioned arrests, common torture and abuse of power, depending on simply brute force, rather than law, to enforce order in the officer's designated area.
The rise to power of powerful business men in the NDP in the federal government and People's Assembly led to massive waves of anger during the years of Ahmed Nazif's government. As a result, frequent laws and bills were passed, with undergiant monopolists (such as Ahmed Ezz's) influence serving personal and corporational financial interests rather than the public's.
In January 2011 thousands of protesters—angered by repression, corruption, and poverty in Egypt—took to the streets, calling for Mubārak to step down as president. Those demonstrations took place shortly after a popular uprising in Tunisia, known as the Jasmine Revolution, forced Tunisian President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali from power. Mubārak made no public appearances until January 28—the fourth day of clashes between protesters and police—when he gave a speech on Egyptian state television indicating that he intended to remain in office. In the speech he acknowledged the protesters’ demand for political change by announcing that he would dissolve his cabinet and implement new social and economic reforms. Those concessions, however, were dismissed by protesters as a ploy to remain in power and did little to calm the unrest. The following day Mubārak appointed a vice president for the first time in his presidency, choosing Omar Suleiman, the director of the Egyptian General Intelligence Service. On February 1, under pressure from continued protests, Mubārak appeared on Egyptian state television and announced that he would not stand in the presidential election scheduled for September 2011.
Under continued pressure to step down immediately, Mubārak made another televised speech on February 10. Although it was widely expected that he would use the address to announce his immediate resignation, he reiterated that he would stay in office until the end of his term, delegating some of his powers to Suleiman. Mubārak promised to institute electoral reforms and vowed to lift Egypt’s emergency law, in place since 1981, when the security situation in Egypt became sufficiently stable.
On February 11, Mubārak left Cairo for Sharm el-Sheikh, a resort town on the Sinai Peninsula where he maintained a residence. Hours later Suleiman appeared on Egyptian television to announce that Mubārak had stepped down as president, leaving the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, a group of senior military officers, to govern the country. Upon learning of Mubārak’s resignation, crowds at Tahrir Square and other protest sites erupted in celebration.
Following Mubārak’s departure, the Egyptian government began to investigate allegations of corruption and abuse of power within the Mubārak regime, questioning and arresting several former officials and business leaders with close ties to Mubārak. Calls for the investigation to focus on Mubārak himself intensified, fueled by reports that the Mubārak family had amassed a fortune worth billions of dollars in overseas accounts. On April 10, the public prosecutor announced that Mubārak and his sons, Alaa and Gamal, would be questioned by investigators. Following the announcement, Mubārak made his first public statements since stepping down as president, denying the accusations of corruption. On April 12, while waiting to be questioned, Mubārak was hospitalized after reportedly suffering a heart attack. Mubārak was held in a hospital in Sharm el-Sheikh after an official medical evaluation concluded that his health was too fragile for him to be transferred to prison in Cairo. In May, the Egyptian state media reported that his condition had stabilized, although he needed to be treated for depression.
On May 24, the public prosecutor announced that Mubārak, Alaa, and Gamal would stand trial for ordering the killing of protesters as well as for corruption and abuse of power. On August 3, Mubārak appeared in public for the first time since stepping down, as his trial commenced in Cairo amid heavy security. Although Mubārak, reportedly suffering from poor health, was wheeled into court in a hospital bed, he appeared alert during the hearing, denying all charges against him.
Muhammad Hosni Sayyid Mubarak see Mubarak, Hosni
Muhammad Hasni Sayyid Mubarak see Mubarak, Hosni
Hosni Mubarak see Mubarak, Hosni
Husni Mubarak see Mubarak, Hosni
Mubarak, Muhammad Hasni Sayyid see Mubarak, Hosni
Mubarak, Muhammad Hosni Sayyid see Mubarak, Hosni
Mubarrad, Abu’l-‘Abbas al-
Mubarrad, Abu’l-‘Abbas al- (Abu’l-‘Abbas al-Mubarrad) (Abu Al-'Abbas Muhammad ibn Yazid) (Mobarrad) (Abu Al-'Abbas Muhammad Ibn Yazid) (March 25, 826, Basra - October, 898, Baghdad). Philologist from Basra. The rivalries between him and Tha‘lab led to the formation of the two famous schools of philologists at Kufa and Basra. His most famous work deals with an extensive range of themes concerning belles-lettres.
Mubarrad was an Arabian grammarian. After studying grammar in that city, he was called to the court of the Abbasid caliph al-Mutawakkil at Samarra in 860. When the caliph was killed in 861, he went to Baghdad, remaining there most of his life as a teacher.
Al-Mubarrad became the leader of the Basran grammarians against the Kufan school. His judgment, however, was independent, as is shown by his attack on some points in the grammar of Sibawayh, the greatest writer of his own school. He died at Baghdad in 898.
His main work is the grammatical one known as the Al-Kamil ("The Perfect One"). Al-Mubarrad's writings are considered to be the first source recounting the story that Shahrbanu or Shahr Banu — eldest daughter of Yazdegerd III, the last Emperor of the Sassanid dynasty of Persia/Iran — had married Hussain ibn Ali, the Prophet Muhammad's grandson and the third Shia Imam and that she gave birth to Ali Zayn al Abidin (the fourth Shia Imam). This makes all later Shia Imams descendants of the Sassanid dynasty as well as of Islam's founder, a significant point considering that Iran has by far the largest number of Shias.
Abu’l-‘Abbas al-Mubarrad see Mubarrad, Abu’l-‘Abbas al-
Abu Al-'Abbas Muhammad ibn Yazid
- see Mubarrad, Abu’l-‘Abbas al-
Mobarrad see Mubarrad, Abu’l-‘Abbas al-
Abu Al-'Abbas Muhammad Ibn Yazid see Mubarrad, Abu’l-‘Abbas al-
Mubarrad, Abu’l-‘Abbas al- (Abu’l-‘Abbas al-Mubarrad) (Abu Al-'Abbas Muhammad ibn Yazid) (Mobarrad) (Abu Al-'Abbas Muhammad Ibn Yazid) (March 25, 826, Basra - October, 898, Baghdad). Philologist from Basra. The rivalries between him and Tha‘lab led to the formation of the two famous schools of philologists at Kufa and Basra. His most famous work deals with an extensive range of themes concerning belles-lettres.
Mubarrad was an Arabian grammarian. After studying grammar in that city, he was called to the court of the Abbasid caliph al-Mutawakkil at Samarra in 860. When the caliph was killed in 861, he went to Baghdad, remaining there most of his life as a teacher.
Al-Mubarrad became the leader of the Basran grammarians against the Kufan school. His judgment, however, was independent, as is shown by his attack on some points in the grammar of Sibawayh, the greatest writer of his own school. He died at Baghdad in 898.
His main work is the grammatical one known as the Al-Kamil ("The Perfect One"). Al-Mubarrad's writings are considered to be the first source recounting the story that Shahrbanu or Shahr Banu — eldest daughter of Yazdegerd III, the last Emperor of the Sassanid dynasty of Persia/Iran — had married Hussain ibn Ali, the Prophet Muhammad's grandson and the third Shia Imam and that she gave birth to Ali Zayn al Abidin (the fourth Shia Imam). This makes all later Shia Imams descendants of the Sassanid dynasty as well as of Islam's founder, a significant point considering that Iran has by far the largest number of Shias.
Abu’l-‘Abbas al-Mubarrad see Mubarrad, Abu’l-‘Abbas al-
Abu Al-'Abbas Muhammad ibn Yazid
- see Mubarrad, Abu’l-‘Abbas al-
Mobarrad see Mubarrad, Abu’l-‘Abbas al-
Abu Al-'Abbas Muhammad Ibn Yazid see Mubarrad, Abu’l-‘Abbas al-
Mubashshir ibn Fatik, al-
Mubashshir ibn Fatik, al-. Egyptian historian and savant of the eleventh century. His surviving work, called Choice wise sayings and fine statements, deals with ancient, almost exclusively Greek, sages. It enjoyed great popularity in the Muslim world. About 1250, it was translated into Spanish.
Mubashshir ibn Fatik, al-. Egyptian historian and savant of the eleventh century. His surviving work, called Choice wise sayings and fine statements, deals with ancient, almost exclusively Greek, sages. It enjoyed great popularity in the Muslim world. About 1250, it was translated into Spanish.
Mudejar
Mudejar. Term to designate the Muslim who, in return for the payment of tribute, continued to live in territories conquered by the Christians.
Mudéjar is the name given to individual Moors or Muslims of Al-Andalus who remained in Christian territory after the Reconquista but were not converted to Christianity. It also denotes a style of Iberian architecture and decoration, particularly of Aragon and Castile, of the 12th to 16th centuries, strongly influenced by Moorish taste and workmanship.
The word Mudéjar is a Medieval Spanish corruption of the Arabic word Mudajjan, meaning "domesticated", in a reference to the Muslims who submitted to the rule of the Christian kings.
The Treaty of Granada (1491) protected religious and cultural freedoms for Muslims and Jews in the imminent transition from the Emirate of Granada to a Province of Castile. After the fall in the Battle of Granada in January of 1492, Mudéjars, unlike the Jews' Alhambra Decree (1492) expulsion, kept the protected religious status along with Catholic converso efforts. However, in the mid-16th century, they were forced to convert to Christianity. From that time, because of suspicions that they were not truly converted, or crypto-Muslims, they were known as Moriscos. In 1610 those who refused to convert to Christianity were expelled. The distinctive Mudéjar style is still evident in regional architecture, as well as in the music, art, and crafts.
Mudejar. Term to designate the Muslim who, in return for the payment of tribute, continued to live in territories conquered by the Christians.
Mudéjar is the name given to individual Moors or Muslims of Al-Andalus who remained in Christian territory after the Reconquista but were not converted to Christianity. It also denotes a style of Iberian architecture and decoration, particularly of Aragon and Castile, of the 12th to 16th centuries, strongly influenced by Moorish taste and workmanship.
The word Mudéjar is a Medieval Spanish corruption of the Arabic word Mudajjan, meaning "domesticated", in a reference to the Muslims who submitted to the rule of the Christian kings.
The Treaty of Granada (1491) protected religious and cultural freedoms for Muslims and Jews in the imminent transition from the Emirate of Granada to a Province of Castile. After the fall in the Battle of Granada in January of 1492, Mudéjars, unlike the Jews' Alhambra Decree (1492) expulsion, kept the protected religious status along with Catholic converso efforts. However, in the mid-16th century, they were forced to convert to Christianity. From that time, because of suspicions that they were not truly converted, or crypto-Muslims, they were known as Moriscos. In 1610 those who refused to convert to Christianity were expelled. The distinctive Mudéjar style is still evident in regional architecture, as well as in the music, art, and crafts.
Mueyyed-zade
Mueyyed-zade (1456-1516). Ottoman theologian and legist. He encouraged rising young poets, historians and jurists and owned a private library of over 7,000 volumes.
Mueyyed-zade (1456-1516). Ottoman theologian and legist. He encouraged rising young poets, historians and jurists and owned a private library of over 7,000 volumes.
muezzin
muezzin (mu’adhdhin) (muzim). Person who calls other Muslims to communal worship, usually from an elevated part of a mosque (e.g., the balcony of a minaret). The muezzin issues his call -- his adhan -- to public worship on Friday and to the five daily prayers. He belongs to the personnel of the mosque.
Muezzin is the person calling out for people to come to the mosque to perform salat, the five daily prayer of Islam. Traditionally, the muezzin calls out the adhan from the minaret, but in more and more mosques there have been put up loudspeakers.
The institution of muezzin belongs to the customs of the prophet Muhammad’s own time. The first muezzin was Bilal, who walked the streets to call the believers to come to prayer.
Large parts of the custom was undecided by the death of Muhammad. Which way one should choose for the calling, where it should be performed. Trumpets, flags and lamps were all elements doing the adhan in the place of the muezzin. Had the development wanted things to go differently, these could all succeed in replacing him if the debates had ended differently.
The activities of the muezzin eventually developed into rituals by themselves. The uttering of the adhan could be heard all over the cities at certain times through the day.
The first muezzins were using the roof of the mosque, or the adjacent streets, to call for people’s attention. It is believed that the institution of the muezzin -- the public crier -- existed in pre-Islamic Arab culture.
The acts of the muezzin is also an art form, reflected in melodious chanting of the adhan.
mu'adhdhin see muezzin
muzim see muezzin
muezzin (mu’adhdhin) (muzim). Person who calls other Muslims to communal worship, usually from an elevated part of a mosque (e.g., the balcony of a minaret). The muezzin issues his call -- his adhan -- to public worship on Friday and to the five daily prayers. He belongs to the personnel of the mosque.
Muezzin is the person calling out for people to come to the mosque to perform salat, the five daily prayer of Islam. Traditionally, the muezzin calls out the adhan from the minaret, but in more and more mosques there have been put up loudspeakers.
The institution of muezzin belongs to the customs of the prophet Muhammad’s own time. The first muezzin was Bilal, who walked the streets to call the believers to come to prayer.
Large parts of the custom was undecided by the death of Muhammad. Which way one should choose for the calling, where it should be performed. Trumpets, flags and lamps were all elements doing the adhan in the place of the muezzin. Had the development wanted things to go differently, these could all succeed in replacing him if the debates had ended differently.
The activities of the muezzin eventually developed into rituals by themselves. The uttering of the adhan could be heard all over the cities at certain times through the day.
The first muezzins were using the roof of the mosque, or the adjacent streets, to call for people’s attention. It is believed that the institution of the muezzin -- the public crier -- existed in pre-Islamic Arab culture.
The acts of the muezzin is also an art form, reflected in melodious chanting of the adhan.
mu'adhdhin see muezzin
muzim see muezzin
Mufaddal al-Dabbi, al-
Mufaddal al-Dabbi, al- (d. c. 781). Arabic philologist of the Kufan school. His principal work is an anthology of early Arabic poems, mainly pre-Islamic, known as the Mufaddaliyyat. Al-Mufaddal compiled them for his pupil, the future Caliph al-Mahdi.
Mufaddal al-Dabbi, al- (d. c. 781). Arabic philologist of the Kufan school. His principal work is an anthology of early Arabic poems, mainly pre-Islamic, known as the Mufaddaliyyat. Al-Mufaddal compiled them for his pupil, the future Caliph al-Mahdi.
Mufaddal ibn Abi’l-Fada’il, al-
Mufaddal ibn Abi’l-Fada’il, al- (Moufazzal ibn Abi l-Fazil). Coptic historian of the fourteenth century. His only known work is an account of the Mameluke period from 1260 to 1348.
Al-Mufaddal was a 14th century Egyptian historian. He was a Coptic Christian. Al-Mufaddal wrote a book about the history of the Bahriyya Mamelukes, entitled al-Nahdj al-sadîd wa-l-durr al-farîd fimâ ba'd Ta'rîkh Ibn al'Amîd, covering the period from 1260 to 1340. He finished his work in 1358. Al-Mufaddal gives precise descriptions of the history of Egypt and Syria, especially the Mongol occupation of Syria. He noted down the Damascus declaration made by the Mongols, as well as the content of the letters exchanged between Ghazan and al-Nâsir.
Moufazzal ibn Abi l-Fazil see Mufaddal ibn Abi’l-Fada’il, al-
Mufaddal ibn Abi’l-Fada’il, al- (Moufazzal ibn Abi l-Fazil). Coptic historian of the fourteenth century. His only known work is an account of the Mameluke period from 1260 to 1348.
Al-Mufaddal was a 14th century Egyptian historian. He was a Coptic Christian. Al-Mufaddal wrote a book about the history of the Bahriyya Mamelukes, entitled al-Nahdj al-sadîd wa-l-durr al-farîd fimâ ba'd Ta'rîkh Ibn al'Amîd, covering the period from 1260 to 1340. He finished his work in 1358. Al-Mufaddal gives precise descriptions of the history of Egypt and Syria, especially the Mongol occupation of Syria. He noted down the Damascus declaration made by the Mongols, as well as the content of the letters exchanged between Ghazan and al-Nâsir.
Moufazzal ibn Abi l-Fazil see Mufaddal ibn Abi’l-Fada’il, al-
Mufid, Shaykh Abu ‘Abd Allah al-
Mufid, Shaykh Abu ‘Abd Allah al- (Shaykh Abu ‘Abd Allah al-Mufid) (Abu 'Abd Allah Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn al-Nu'man al-'Ukbari al-Baghdadi) (al-Shaykh al-Mufid) (Ibn al-Mu'allim) (948-1032). Imami Shi‘a theologian and jurist. He was the spokesman of the Twelver Shi‘a, and wrote refutations of treatises and views of the Mu‘tazili and Sunni traditionalist theologians.
Al-Shaykh Al-Mufid was born in 'Ukbara, a small town to the north of Baghdad and later migrated together with his father to Baghdad, where the Shiite Buwayhids were ruling. In Shi'ite tradition, he studied with the famed traditionist al-Shaykh al-Saduq Ibn Babawayh al-Qummi. Prominent students of his included Sharif al-Murtaza, al-Shaykh al-Tusi, commonly known as the leader of the Shi'a and al-Karajaki. His career coincided with that of the famous Mu'tazili theologian and leader of the Bahshamiyya school, 'Abd al-Jabbar al-Asadabadi al-Hamadhani and with the disputations and intra-sectarian conflicts in Baghdad. He was thus often attacked and his library and school was destroyed. But he remained a faithful and significant intellectual defender of Twelver Shi'ism and was respected by friends and opponents.
Al-Mufid is quite often accused of incorporating the modes of theological reasoning common in the Baghdad school of the Mu'tazila as exemplified by his teacher Abu'l-Qasim al-Ka'bi al-Balkhi into Twelver Shi'ite theology. This is however on the basis of studies relying on a Sunni interpretation of Shi'ite theological history. The Shi'ite interpretation is that the Mu'tazila borrowed from the Shi'ah long before al-Mufid and the Shi'ah doctrine was already in place at the time al-Mufid.
Al-Mufid died on the eve of Friday, 3rd of Ramadan, 1032. His student Sayyid al-Murtada led his funeral prayer (Salat-e-Mayyit), in the presence of nearly eighty thousand people, a crowd never seen before in any funeral in Baghdad..
Al-Mufid remained buried in his own house for two years, and then his body was transferred to Al Kadhimiya Mosque where it was interred near his mentor, Ja'far ibn Qawlayh's grave facing the feet of Imam Muhammad at-Taqi. His grave is still visited by those who visit the holy shrines in Kadhimayn.
The books of al-Mufid include:
* Al-Amali
* Al-Irshad
* Awa'il al-Maqalat
* Ahkam al-Nisa'
* Khulasat al-Iyjaz
* Jawabat Ahl al-Mawsul
* Risalat al-Mut`ah
* Aqsam al-Mawla
* Risalah fi al-Mahr
* Iman Abi Talib
* Al-Ikhtisas
* Al-Ifsah fi al-Imamah Amir al-Mu'minin
* Al-Ishraf
* Tashih I`tiqadat al-Imamiyah
* Tafdhil Amir al-Mu'minin
* Risalah fi Ma`na al-Mawla
* Al-Jamal
* Al-Masa'il al-Sarawiyah
* Al-Masa'il al-Saghaniyah
* Al-Masa'il al-Tusiyah
* Al-Masa'il al-Jarudiyah
* Al-Masa'il al-`Ukbariyah
* Al-Nukat al-I`tiqadiyah
* Al-Masa'il al-`Ashr fi al-Ghaybah
* Dhaba'ih Ahl al-Kitab
* Al-Mas'hu ala al-Rijlayn
* Al-Muqni`yah
* Al-I`lam bima ittafaqat alayhi al-Imamiyah min al-Ahkam
* Al-Tadhkirah bil Usul al-Fiqh
* Masar al-Shi`ah
* Al-Nukat fi al-Muqadimat al-Usul
Shaykh Abu ‘Abd Allah al-Mufid see Mufid, Shaykh Abu ‘Abd Allah al-
Abu 'Abd Allah Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn al-Nu'man al-'Ukbari al-Baghdadi see Mufid, Shaykh Abu ‘Abd Allah al-
al-Shaykh al-Mufid see Mufid, Shaykh Abu ‘Abd Allah al-
Ibn al-Mu'allim see Mufid, Shaykh Abu ‘Abd Allah al-
Mufid, Shaykh Abu ‘Abd Allah al- (Shaykh Abu ‘Abd Allah al-Mufid) (Abu 'Abd Allah Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn al-Nu'man al-'Ukbari al-Baghdadi) (al-Shaykh al-Mufid) (Ibn al-Mu'allim) (948-1032). Imami Shi‘a theologian and jurist. He was the spokesman of the Twelver Shi‘a, and wrote refutations of treatises and views of the Mu‘tazili and Sunni traditionalist theologians.
Al-Shaykh Al-Mufid was born in 'Ukbara, a small town to the north of Baghdad and later migrated together with his father to Baghdad, where the Shiite Buwayhids were ruling. In Shi'ite tradition, he studied with the famed traditionist al-Shaykh al-Saduq Ibn Babawayh al-Qummi. Prominent students of his included Sharif al-Murtaza, al-Shaykh al-Tusi, commonly known as the leader of the Shi'a and al-Karajaki. His career coincided with that of the famous Mu'tazili theologian and leader of the Bahshamiyya school, 'Abd al-Jabbar al-Asadabadi al-Hamadhani and with the disputations and intra-sectarian conflicts in Baghdad. He was thus often attacked and his library and school was destroyed. But he remained a faithful and significant intellectual defender of Twelver Shi'ism and was respected by friends and opponents.
Al-Mufid is quite often accused of incorporating the modes of theological reasoning common in the Baghdad school of the Mu'tazila as exemplified by his teacher Abu'l-Qasim al-Ka'bi al-Balkhi into Twelver Shi'ite theology. This is however on the basis of studies relying on a Sunni interpretation of Shi'ite theological history. The Shi'ite interpretation is that the Mu'tazila borrowed from the Shi'ah long before al-Mufid and the Shi'ah doctrine was already in place at the time al-Mufid.
Al-Mufid died on the eve of Friday, 3rd of Ramadan, 1032. His student Sayyid al-Murtada led his funeral prayer (Salat-e-Mayyit), in the presence of nearly eighty thousand people, a crowd never seen before in any funeral in Baghdad..
Al-Mufid remained buried in his own house for two years, and then his body was transferred to Al Kadhimiya Mosque where it was interred near his mentor, Ja'far ibn Qawlayh's grave facing the feet of Imam Muhammad at-Taqi. His grave is still visited by those who visit the holy shrines in Kadhimayn.
The books of al-Mufid include:
* Al-Amali
* Al-Irshad
* Awa'il al-Maqalat
* Ahkam al-Nisa'
* Khulasat al-Iyjaz
* Jawabat Ahl al-Mawsul
* Risalat al-Mut`ah
* Aqsam al-Mawla
* Risalah fi al-Mahr
* Iman Abi Talib
* Al-Ikhtisas
* Al-Ifsah fi al-Imamah Amir al-Mu'minin
* Al-Ishraf
* Tashih I`tiqadat al-Imamiyah
* Tafdhil Amir al-Mu'minin
* Risalah fi Ma`na al-Mawla
* Al-Jamal
* Al-Masa'il al-Sarawiyah
* Al-Masa'il al-Saghaniyah
* Al-Masa'il al-Tusiyah
* Al-Masa'il al-Jarudiyah
* Al-Masa'il al-`Ukbariyah
* Al-Nukat al-I`tiqadiyah
* Al-Masa'il al-`Ashr fi al-Ghaybah
* Dhaba'ih Ahl al-Kitab
* Al-Mas'hu ala al-Rijlayn
* Al-Muqni`yah
* Al-I`lam bima ittafaqat alayhi al-Imamiyah min al-Ahkam
* Al-Tadhkirah bil Usul al-Fiqh
* Masar al-Shi`ah
* Al-Nukat fi al-Muqadimat al-Usul
Shaykh Abu ‘Abd Allah al-Mufid see Mufid, Shaykh Abu ‘Abd Allah al-
Abu 'Abd Allah Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn al-Nu'man al-'Ukbari al-Baghdadi see Mufid, Shaykh Abu ‘Abd Allah al-
al-Shaykh al-Mufid see Mufid, Shaykh Abu ‘Abd Allah al-
Ibn al-Mu'allim see Mufid, Shaykh Abu ‘Abd Allah al-
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