Umayyads
Umayyads (Banu Umayya). Dynasty of caliphs which ruled the Islamic world (r.661-750). Their main capital was Damascus. Named after its founding father, Umayya, a member of the Prophet’s tribe. Founder of the dynasty was Muawiya I ibn Abu Sufyan (r. 661-680) who, as governor of Syria, emerged in 657 as an opponent of Caliph Ali and, following his murder, seized power, which he made inheritable. There followed ongoing conflicts with various Arab tribes and religious movements in early Islam. Political successes were the rule of Abd al-Malik (r. 685-705), who reorganized the state administration (including monetary reform) and developed Jerusalem as a religious center, and also that of al-Walid (705-715), who advanced Islamic conquests (in 711 as far as Spain in the west and Industal in the east, with Bukhara and Samarkand conquered in 715). There then followed rulers whose reigns were shortlived, as well as an increase in the number of rebellions among conquered populations protesting at the privileges enjoyed by the Arabs. Under Hisham (r. 724-743) there was consolidation, but this was followed by political instability and uprisings by Kharijite and Shi‘ite groups, who helped the Abbasids rise to power. These expelled the last Umayyad caliph, Marvan II (r. 744-750) in 750 and removed the Umayyad family. One of Hisham’s grandsons who had fled established the rule of the Spanish Umayyads in Cordoba in 756.
The Banu Umayya were the principal clan of the Quraysh of Mecca, represented by two main branches, the A‘yas and the ‘Anabisa. ‘Affan, the father of the Caliph ‘Uthman, was descended from the A‘yas, as were the Caliph Marwan I ibn al-Hakam and the caliphs who came after him until the end of the dynasty. Marwan and his descendants formed the Marwanid line of the Umayyads. The amirs, later caliphs, of Muslim Spain were also descended from the A‘yas. The most illustrious family of the ‘Anabisa branch was that of Harb, whose son Abu Sufyan was the father of the first Umayyad Caliph Mu‘awiya I. His line became extinct with the death of Caliph Mu‘awiya II, the son of the Caliph Yazid I, and was followed by the Marwanid line.
If tradition, as established after their fall under the influence of the ideas dominant in pietist circles, has cursed the memory of the Umayyads, it nevertheless remains true that it was precisely under their regime and partly under their stimulus that Islam established itself as a universalist religion. The Umayyad caliphs, as descendants of the Meccan aristocracy which had fought Islam in its early stages, must have believed in good faith that the propagation of the Muslim faith and the expansion of their temporal power were one and the same thing. They must have been convinced that the enemies of their policy, whether Shi‘a or Kharijites, were also enemies of the true tradition of the Prophet.
The Umayyad party triumphed under the third caliph ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan at the expense of the first converts, of the Prophet’s son-in-law ‘Ali in the first place. The opposition between Mu‘awiya and ‘Ali raised an exceedingly delicate constitutional problem: that of the assumption of supreme power over the believers by one who was not among the earliest Companions of the Prophet. Rather than being the continuators of the sunna of the Prophet, the Umayyads became in fact, if not in official title, “kings” or rather “tyrants” in the Greek sense of the word. The Umayyad period is marked by a strong opposition between Syria and Iraq, due to Ziyad ibn Abihi’s merciless suppression in Iraq, so different from the policy practised by Mu‘awiya himself. The Iraqi population seems to have been justified in thinking that the Umayyad caliphate really represented the hegemony of Syria over the rest of Islamic territory and the memory of ‘Ali, which legend soon seized upon, was in a way bound up with the nationalism of Iraq.
The most tangible success of Mu‘awiya’s policy was that he made the caliphate hereditary after having succeeded in extracting from the tribal chiefs the oath of allegiance (in Arabic, bay‘a) for his son Yazid. This principle was continued under Marwan I ibn al-Hakam. The caliphate of the latter’s son ‘Abd al-Malik, under the driving power of al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf al-Thaqafi, was an attempt to establish an absolute monarchy. Al-Hajjaj reduced the Kharijite movement to temporary impotence, while Shi‘ism, defeated in the open field, took refuge in secret propaganda which was only to bear fruit much later. The vast conquests of Qutayba ibn Muslim in the east, begun in 705, brought about the conversion to Islam of the Turks, while in the west the Berbers, notwithstanding their opposition to the Arab conquerors, gradually also accepted the new religion. It was to these two races, placed at the two extremes of the Arab empire, that Islam owed the greater part of its future successes but also a profound change in its civilization.
The Caliph al-Walid I was the great builder of the dynasty, and the fiscal reforms of ‘Umar II ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz paved the way for the equal treatment of Arabs and non-Arab “clients” and contributed more than anything else to the fusion of the descendants of the conquerors and conquered.
Under the Caliph Hisham ibn ‘Abd al-Malik, the Umayyad caliphate experienced another period of splendor. But Hisham had exploited to the limit the fiscal reforms of ‘Umar II and exhausted his Muslim and non-Muslim subjects alike. The scandalous conduct of the Caliph al-Walid II also played an important part in the collapse of the established order. Misery brought about a revival of Kharijism, and the Shi‘a movement began again to show itself openly in Iraq. Neither Yasid III ibn al-Walid nor his brother Ibrahim ibn al-Walid succeeded in checking the anarchy which was spreading throughout the empire. Marwan II ibn Muhammad, the governor of Armenia, proclaimed himself caliph and subdued Syria, Egypt and Iraq. But in 747, the forces of Abu Muslim rapidly conquered Khurasan and Fars, and in 748 occupied Iraw where the ‘Abbasids suddenly put forward their claims and proclaimed Abu’l-‘Abbas al-Saffah caliph at Kufa. Marwan II was killed in 750.
It can be said that the intellectual and moral unification of the Muslim world, accomplished by the ‘Abbasids, had already begun under the Umayyads.
The Umayyads were the self-described heirs to the orthodox or patriarchal caliphate which existed from 632 to 661. From their capital in Damascus, the Umayyads extended the borders of the Islamic empire to India in the east and to Spain in the west. The early Umayyad caliphs were adept military tacticians and effective bureaucrats; they also left a rich legacy in poetry, Greek to Arabic translations, and architectural monuments.
The Umayyads never solved the problem of how to deal with non-Arab converts to Islam (the mawali). The mawali, together with Arab discontents looking for a return to pristine Islam, supported the ‘Abbasid forces, who defeated the Umayyads in 750. A lone Umayyad dynast escaped to Spain and established in Spain a regional dynasty that lasted until 1031.
The Umayyad caliphs (661-750) played only a brief and rather indirect, yet nonetheless critical, role in the history of Iran and Central Asia. Generally, the Umayyad central government was more interested in affairs affecting the western portions of the empire (wars with Byzantium and expansion around the Mediterranean basin) than with the east. After consolidting the eastern areas conquered earlier by the Arabs, the Umayyads tended to entrust matters in Iraq, and its Iranian dependencies to governors and sub-governors, often chosen from prominent Arab families settled in the respective provinces, who then followed whatever policy they felt best.
One of the most effective and important of these Umayyad officials in Iran was the governor of Khurasan, Qutaiba ibn Muslim al-Bahili (705-715), a protégé of the powerful Umayyad governor of Iraq, al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf. Qutaiba effectively suppressed a revolt, led by Nizak (or Tirek) of Badghis, of the semi-autonomous princes of Tocharistan (on the eastern borders of Khurasan); conquered the city of Bukhara and its environs; invaded and subdued Sogdiana, taking its most important city, Samarkand; conquered Khwarazm and settled a colony of Arabs there; and mounted expeditions against several remote principalities along the Syr Darya as far as what is now Tashkent. All this military activity served a number of useful functions. It diverted the energies of the Arab tribesmen from factional struggles against each other into the new campaigns, thus encouraging cooperation between the Arab and Iranian military elites; it brought in much-needed booty to bolster the local economy; it provided a vehicle for re-organizing and stabilizing the provincial government; and it checked, at least temporarily, the growing power of the Turkic tribes on the far eastern borders of the Islamic empire. Unfortunately, this energetic governor fell from favor with the central government after the death of al-Hajjaj and was killed by his own former soldiers when he attempted to revolt. (Interestingly, the Sogdians he had conquered remained loyal to him to the very end.)
After Qutaiba’s death, the authority of the Umayyads in the east deteriorated steadily. The reasons for this are complex but can be reduced to three main points. First, the Umayyads failed to find a permanent means of containing the rivalries, antagonisms, and competition for political and material rewards among their Arab tribal supporters in the provinces. They were thus ultimately confronted with a bitter intra-Arab civil war in Khurasan. Second, they based their power more and more on a narrow elite of Arab tribal warriors, many of them newcomers to the east, and the indigenous Iranian military aristocracy. This alienated the non-Arab peasantry, their village leaders, and the semi-assimilated Arab colonists who had become landowners and resided permanently in the region. Third, as both Arabs and Iranians came to think more of their common Islamic, rather than their separate ethnic, identity, the Umayyads were unable to find any convincing justification for the legitimacy of their rule that could appeal to the religious sentiments of the pious-minded Muslim masses in the cities and countryside. These sources of discontent in Khurasan were shrewdly manipulated by various opponents of Umayyad rule, especially by partisans of the Abbasid family who engineered a revolutionary conspiracy in Khurasan that toppled the authority of their governor in that province and subsequently brought down the dynasty itself.
The Umayyad Caliphs at Damascus were:
* Muawiyah I ibn Abi Sufyan, 661–680
* Yazid I ibn Muawiyah, 680–683
* Muawiyah II ibn Yazid, 683–684
* Marwan I ibn al-Ḥakam, 684–685
* Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan, 685–705
* al-Walid I ibn Abd al-Malik, 705–715
* Suleiman ibn Abd al-Malik, 715–717
* Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz, 717–720
* Yazid II ibn Abd al-Malik, 720–724
* Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik, 724–743
* al-Walid II ibn Yazid II, 743–744
* Yazid III ibn al-Walid, 744
* Ibrahim ibn al-Walid, 744
* Marwan II ibn Muhammad (ruled from Harran in the Jazira) 744–750
The Umayyad Emirs of Córdoba were:
* Abd ar-Rahman I, 756–788
* Hisham I, 788–796
* al-Hakam I, 796–822
* Abd ar-Rahman II, 822–852
* Muhammad I of Córdoba, 852-886
* Al-Mundhir, 886 - 888
* Abdallah ibn Muhammad, 888–912
* Abd ar-Rahman III, 912–929
The Umayyad Caliphs at Córdoba were:
* Abd ar-Rahman III, as caliph, 929–961
* Al-Hakam II, 961–976
* Hisham II, 976–1008
* Mohammed II, 1008–1009
* Suleiman, 1009–1010
* Hisham II, restored, 1010–1012
* Suleiman, restored, 1012–1017
* Abd ar-Rahman IV, 1021–1022
* Abd ar-Rahman V, 1022–1023
* Muhammad III, 1023–1024
* Hisham III, 1027–1031
Banu Umayya see Umayyads
Umayyads (Banu Umayya). Dynasty of caliphs which ruled the Islamic world (r.661-750). Their main capital was Damascus. Named after its founding father, Umayya, a member of the Prophet’s tribe. Founder of the dynasty was Muawiya I ibn Abu Sufyan (r. 661-680) who, as governor of Syria, emerged in 657 as an opponent of Caliph Ali and, following his murder, seized power, which he made inheritable. There followed ongoing conflicts with various Arab tribes and religious movements in early Islam. Political successes were the rule of Abd al-Malik (r. 685-705), who reorganized the state administration (including monetary reform) and developed Jerusalem as a religious center, and also that of al-Walid (705-715), who advanced Islamic conquests (in 711 as far as Spain in the west and Industal in the east, with Bukhara and Samarkand conquered in 715). There then followed rulers whose reigns were shortlived, as well as an increase in the number of rebellions among conquered populations protesting at the privileges enjoyed by the Arabs. Under Hisham (r. 724-743) there was consolidation, but this was followed by political instability and uprisings by Kharijite and Shi‘ite groups, who helped the Abbasids rise to power. These expelled the last Umayyad caliph, Marvan II (r. 744-750) in 750 and removed the Umayyad family. One of Hisham’s grandsons who had fled established the rule of the Spanish Umayyads in Cordoba in 756.
The Banu Umayya were the principal clan of the Quraysh of Mecca, represented by two main branches, the A‘yas and the ‘Anabisa. ‘Affan, the father of the Caliph ‘Uthman, was descended from the A‘yas, as were the Caliph Marwan I ibn al-Hakam and the caliphs who came after him until the end of the dynasty. Marwan and his descendants formed the Marwanid line of the Umayyads. The amirs, later caliphs, of Muslim Spain were also descended from the A‘yas. The most illustrious family of the ‘Anabisa branch was that of Harb, whose son Abu Sufyan was the father of the first Umayyad Caliph Mu‘awiya I. His line became extinct with the death of Caliph Mu‘awiya II, the son of the Caliph Yazid I, and was followed by the Marwanid line.
If tradition, as established after their fall under the influence of the ideas dominant in pietist circles, has cursed the memory of the Umayyads, it nevertheless remains true that it was precisely under their regime and partly under their stimulus that Islam established itself as a universalist religion. The Umayyad caliphs, as descendants of the Meccan aristocracy which had fought Islam in its early stages, must have believed in good faith that the propagation of the Muslim faith and the expansion of their temporal power were one and the same thing. They must have been convinced that the enemies of their policy, whether Shi‘a or Kharijites, were also enemies of the true tradition of the Prophet.
The Umayyad party triumphed under the third caliph ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan at the expense of the first converts, of the Prophet’s son-in-law ‘Ali in the first place. The opposition between Mu‘awiya and ‘Ali raised an exceedingly delicate constitutional problem: that of the assumption of supreme power over the believers by one who was not among the earliest Companions of the Prophet. Rather than being the continuators of the sunna of the Prophet, the Umayyads became in fact, if not in official title, “kings” or rather “tyrants” in the Greek sense of the word. The Umayyad period is marked by a strong opposition between Syria and Iraq, due to Ziyad ibn Abihi’s merciless suppression in Iraq, so different from the policy practised by Mu‘awiya himself. The Iraqi population seems to have been justified in thinking that the Umayyad caliphate really represented the hegemony of Syria over the rest of Islamic territory and the memory of ‘Ali, which legend soon seized upon, was in a way bound up with the nationalism of Iraq.
The most tangible success of Mu‘awiya’s policy was that he made the caliphate hereditary after having succeeded in extracting from the tribal chiefs the oath of allegiance (in Arabic, bay‘a) for his son Yazid. This principle was continued under Marwan I ibn al-Hakam. The caliphate of the latter’s son ‘Abd al-Malik, under the driving power of al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf al-Thaqafi, was an attempt to establish an absolute monarchy. Al-Hajjaj reduced the Kharijite movement to temporary impotence, while Shi‘ism, defeated in the open field, took refuge in secret propaganda which was only to bear fruit much later. The vast conquests of Qutayba ibn Muslim in the east, begun in 705, brought about the conversion to Islam of the Turks, while in the west the Berbers, notwithstanding their opposition to the Arab conquerors, gradually also accepted the new religion. It was to these two races, placed at the two extremes of the Arab empire, that Islam owed the greater part of its future successes but also a profound change in its civilization.
The Caliph al-Walid I was the great builder of the dynasty, and the fiscal reforms of ‘Umar II ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz paved the way for the equal treatment of Arabs and non-Arab “clients” and contributed more than anything else to the fusion of the descendants of the conquerors and conquered.
Under the Caliph Hisham ibn ‘Abd al-Malik, the Umayyad caliphate experienced another period of splendor. But Hisham had exploited to the limit the fiscal reforms of ‘Umar II and exhausted his Muslim and non-Muslim subjects alike. The scandalous conduct of the Caliph al-Walid II also played an important part in the collapse of the established order. Misery brought about a revival of Kharijism, and the Shi‘a movement began again to show itself openly in Iraq. Neither Yasid III ibn al-Walid nor his brother Ibrahim ibn al-Walid succeeded in checking the anarchy which was spreading throughout the empire. Marwan II ibn Muhammad, the governor of Armenia, proclaimed himself caliph and subdued Syria, Egypt and Iraq. But in 747, the forces of Abu Muslim rapidly conquered Khurasan and Fars, and in 748 occupied Iraw where the ‘Abbasids suddenly put forward their claims and proclaimed Abu’l-‘Abbas al-Saffah caliph at Kufa. Marwan II was killed in 750.
It can be said that the intellectual and moral unification of the Muslim world, accomplished by the ‘Abbasids, had already begun under the Umayyads.
The Umayyads were the self-described heirs to the orthodox or patriarchal caliphate which existed from 632 to 661. From their capital in Damascus, the Umayyads extended the borders of the Islamic empire to India in the east and to Spain in the west. The early Umayyad caliphs were adept military tacticians and effective bureaucrats; they also left a rich legacy in poetry, Greek to Arabic translations, and architectural monuments.
The Umayyads never solved the problem of how to deal with non-Arab converts to Islam (the mawali). The mawali, together with Arab discontents looking for a return to pristine Islam, supported the ‘Abbasid forces, who defeated the Umayyads in 750. A lone Umayyad dynast escaped to Spain and established in Spain a regional dynasty that lasted until 1031.
The Umayyad caliphs (661-750) played only a brief and rather indirect, yet nonetheless critical, role in the history of Iran and Central Asia. Generally, the Umayyad central government was more interested in affairs affecting the western portions of the empire (wars with Byzantium and expansion around the Mediterranean basin) than with the east. After consolidting the eastern areas conquered earlier by the Arabs, the Umayyads tended to entrust matters in Iraq, and its Iranian dependencies to governors and sub-governors, often chosen from prominent Arab families settled in the respective provinces, who then followed whatever policy they felt best.
One of the most effective and important of these Umayyad officials in Iran was the governor of Khurasan, Qutaiba ibn Muslim al-Bahili (705-715), a protégé of the powerful Umayyad governor of Iraq, al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf. Qutaiba effectively suppressed a revolt, led by Nizak (or Tirek) of Badghis, of the semi-autonomous princes of Tocharistan (on the eastern borders of Khurasan); conquered the city of Bukhara and its environs; invaded and subdued Sogdiana, taking its most important city, Samarkand; conquered Khwarazm and settled a colony of Arabs there; and mounted expeditions against several remote principalities along the Syr Darya as far as what is now Tashkent. All this military activity served a number of useful functions. It diverted the energies of the Arab tribesmen from factional struggles against each other into the new campaigns, thus encouraging cooperation between the Arab and Iranian military elites; it brought in much-needed booty to bolster the local economy; it provided a vehicle for re-organizing and stabilizing the provincial government; and it checked, at least temporarily, the growing power of the Turkic tribes on the far eastern borders of the Islamic empire. Unfortunately, this energetic governor fell from favor with the central government after the death of al-Hajjaj and was killed by his own former soldiers when he attempted to revolt. (Interestingly, the Sogdians he had conquered remained loyal to him to the very end.)
After Qutaiba’s death, the authority of the Umayyads in the east deteriorated steadily. The reasons for this are complex but can be reduced to three main points. First, the Umayyads failed to find a permanent means of containing the rivalries, antagonisms, and competition for political and material rewards among their Arab tribal supporters in the provinces. They were thus ultimately confronted with a bitter intra-Arab civil war in Khurasan. Second, they based their power more and more on a narrow elite of Arab tribal warriors, many of them newcomers to the east, and the indigenous Iranian military aristocracy. This alienated the non-Arab peasantry, their village leaders, and the semi-assimilated Arab colonists who had become landowners and resided permanently in the region. Third, as both Arabs and Iranians came to think more of their common Islamic, rather than their separate ethnic, identity, the Umayyads were unable to find any convincing justification for the legitimacy of their rule that could appeal to the religious sentiments of the pious-minded Muslim masses in the cities and countryside. These sources of discontent in Khurasan were shrewdly manipulated by various opponents of Umayyad rule, especially by partisans of the Abbasid family who engineered a revolutionary conspiracy in Khurasan that toppled the authority of their governor in that province and subsequently brought down the dynasty itself.
The Umayyad Caliphs at Damascus were:
* Muawiyah I ibn Abi Sufyan, 661–680
* Yazid I ibn Muawiyah, 680–683
* Muawiyah II ibn Yazid, 683–684
* Marwan I ibn al-Ḥakam, 684–685
* Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan, 685–705
* al-Walid I ibn Abd al-Malik, 705–715
* Suleiman ibn Abd al-Malik, 715–717
* Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz, 717–720
* Yazid II ibn Abd al-Malik, 720–724
* Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik, 724–743
* al-Walid II ibn Yazid II, 743–744
* Yazid III ibn al-Walid, 744
* Ibrahim ibn al-Walid, 744
* Marwan II ibn Muhammad (ruled from Harran in the Jazira) 744–750
The Umayyad Emirs of Córdoba were:
* Abd ar-Rahman I, 756–788
* Hisham I, 788–796
* al-Hakam I, 796–822
* Abd ar-Rahman II, 822–852
* Muhammad I of Córdoba, 852-886
* Al-Mundhir, 886 - 888
* Abdallah ibn Muhammad, 888–912
* Abd ar-Rahman III, 912–929
The Umayyad Caliphs at Córdoba were:
* Abd ar-Rahman III, as caliph, 929–961
* Al-Hakam II, 961–976
* Hisham II, 976–1008
* Mohammed II, 1008–1009
* Suleiman, 1009–1010
* Hisham II, restored, 1010–1012
* Suleiman, restored, 1012–1017
* Abd ar-Rahman IV, 1021–1022
* Abd ar-Rahman V, 1022–1023
* Muhammad III, 1023–1024
* Hisham III, 1027–1031
Banu Umayya see Umayyads
Umayyads of Spain
Umayyads of Spain. Dynasty (r. 756-1031) on the Iberian peninsula with Cordoba as their capital. ‘Abd al-Rahman I al-Dakhil, “the Immigrant,” was recognized as amir in 756 in Cordoba, the traditional residence of the Arab governors. The main task of all his successors was to be the pacification of the new amirate. The Maliki law school was introduced at the end of the eighth century. Amir ‘Abd Allah gradually consolidated Umayyad authority. The most glorious period in the history of Muslim Spain was the reign of ‘Abd al-Rahman III.
The Spanish Umayyads were founded by Abd al-Rahman I (756-788), a grandson of the Umayyad caliph Hisham, the only survivor of the Abbasid massacre of the Umayyads (in 750), who fled to Spain and seized power there. He and his successors, Hisham I (788-796) and al-Hakam I (796-822), created a stable state structure, brought political conciliation to the country and conducted successful border battles against the Christians in the north. The first cultural flowering came under Abd al-Rahman II (r. 822-852) through the patronage of literature and science and the refinement of customs and traditions. Al-Andalus became the center of western Islam. Next, central power was relinquished in favor of regional government, which led to the successes of the Christian Reconquista. After government was re-centralized and the political zenith achieved under the rule of Abd al-Rahman III (r. 912-961), who assumed the title of caliph in 929 and restored sovereignty in Spain. He was able to expand the Umayyad territory towards the Fatimids in North Africa (becoming overlord of Fez and Mauritania in 932) and ruled over the Idrisid state. Al-Andalus experienced another period of cultural creativity under his learned son, al-Hakam II (r. 961-976), who was able to continue his father’s policy. During the subsequent decline of the caliph’s office under his young son Hisham II (r. 976-1013), power was transferred to the victorious Amirids under the regent at al-Mansur (r. 978-1002). The period after 1009 saw civil war and anarchy in the warring between different pretenders and also against the Hammudids of Malaga. In 1031, the last caliph, Hisham III (r. 1027-1031), resigned his position and al-Andalus split into taifa kingdoms.
The decline and fall of the Spanish Umayyads became evident under the successors of Hisham II. Between 1009 and 1031 no less than nine caliphs are listed, their reigns being continuously interrupted by the Hammudids of Malaga. From this time onwards civil war reigned in Cordoba and the caliphate, the Berber element playing a more and more disastrous part in the troubles. All the provinces of Muslim Spain proclaimed their independence under a Spanish, Slav or Berber chief. These rulers, known as Party Kings (in Arabic, muluk al-tawa’if), lasted until the end of the eleventh century, when the Almoravids conquered Muslim Spain.
The following is a list of the Spanish Umayyads:
756 ‘Abd al-Rahman I al-Dakhil
788 Hisham I
796 Hisham II
822 ‘Abd al-Rahman II
852 Muhammad I
886 al-Mundhir
888 ‘Abd Allah
912 ‘Abd al-Rahman III
961 al-Hakam II
976 Hisham II al-Mu’ayyad (first reign)
1009 Muhammad II al-Mahdi (first reign)
1009 Sulayman al-Musta‘in (first reign)
1010 Muhammad II al-Mahdi (second reign)
1010 Hisham II al-Mu’ayyad (second reign)
1013 Sulayman al-Musta‘in (second reign)
1016 Hammudid ‘Ali al-Nasir
1018 ‘Abd al-Rahman IV
1018 Hammudid al-Qasim al-Ma’mun (first time)
1021 Hammudid Yahya al-Mu‘tali (first time)
1022 Hammudid al-Qasim al-Ma’mun (second time)
1023 ‘Abd al-Rahman V
1024 Muhammad III
1025 Hammudid Yahya al-Mu‘tali (second time)
1027-1031 Hisham III
Muluk al-Tawa’if
Umayyads of Spain. Dynasty (r. 756-1031) on the Iberian peninsula with Cordoba as their capital. ‘Abd al-Rahman I al-Dakhil, “the Immigrant,” was recognized as amir in 756 in Cordoba, the traditional residence of the Arab governors. The main task of all his successors was to be the pacification of the new amirate. The Maliki law school was introduced at the end of the eighth century. Amir ‘Abd Allah gradually consolidated Umayyad authority. The most glorious period in the history of Muslim Spain was the reign of ‘Abd al-Rahman III.
The Spanish Umayyads were founded by Abd al-Rahman I (756-788), a grandson of the Umayyad caliph Hisham, the only survivor of the Abbasid massacre of the Umayyads (in 750), who fled to Spain and seized power there. He and his successors, Hisham I (788-796) and al-Hakam I (796-822), created a stable state structure, brought political conciliation to the country and conducted successful border battles against the Christians in the north. The first cultural flowering came under Abd al-Rahman II (r. 822-852) through the patronage of literature and science and the refinement of customs and traditions. Al-Andalus became the center of western Islam. Next, central power was relinquished in favor of regional government, which led to the successes of the Christian Reconquista. After government was re-centralized and the political zenith achieved under the rule of Abd al-Rahman III (r. 912-961), who assumed the title of caliph in 929 and restored sovereignty in Spain. He was able to expand the Umayyad territory towards the Fatimids in North Africa (becoming overlord of Fez and Mauritania in 932) and ruled over the Idrisid state. Al-Andalus experienced another period of cultural creativity under his learned son, al-Hakam II (r. 961-976), who was able to continue his father’s policy. During the subsequent decline of the caliph’s office under his young son Hisham II (r. 976-1013), power was transferred to the victorious Amirids under the regent at al-Mansur (r. 978-1002). The period after 1009 saw civil war and anarchy in the warring between different pretenders and also against the Hammudids of Malaga. In 1031, the last caliph, Hisham III (r. 1027-1031), resigned his position and al-Andalus split into taifa kingdoms.
The decline and fall of the Spanish Umayyads became evident under the successors of Hisham II. Between 1009 and 1031 no less than nine caliphs are listed, their reigns being continuously interrupted by the Hammudids of Malaga. From this time onwards civil war reigned in Cordoba and the caliphate, the Berber element playing a more and more disastrous part in the troubles. All the provinces of Muslim Spain proclaimed their independence under a Spanish, Slav or Berber chief. These rulers, known as Party Kings (in Arabic, muluk al-tawa’if), lasted until the end of the eleventh century, when the Almoravids conquered Muslim Spain.
The following is a list of the Spanish Umayyads:
756 ‘Abd al-Rahman I al-Dakhil
788 Hisham I
796 Hisham II
822 ‘Abd al-Rahman II
852 Muhammad I
886 al-Mundhir
888 ‘Abd Allah
912 ‘Abd al-Rahman III
961 al-Hakam II
976 Hisham II al-Mu’ayyad (first reign)
1009 Muhammad II al-Mahdi (first reign)
1009 Sulayman al-Musta‘in (first reign)
1010 Muhammad II al-Mahdi (second reign)
1010 Hisham II al-Mu’ayyad (second reign)
1013 Sulayman al-Musta‘in (second reign)
1016 Hammudid ‘Ali al-Nasir
1018 ‘Abd al-Rahman IV
1018 Hammudid al-Qasim al-Ma’mun (first time)
1021 Hammudid Yahya al-Mu‘tali (first time)
1022 Hammudid al-Qasim al-Ma’mun (second time)
1023 ‘Abd al-Rahman V
1024 Muhammad III
1025 Hammudid Yahya al-Mu‘tali (second time)
1027-1031 Hisham III
Muluk al-Tawa’if
Umayya ibn ‘Abd Shams
Umayya ibn ‘Abd Shams. Ancestor of the Umayyads, who were the principal clan of the Quraysh in Mecca. Like his father, Abd Shams ibn Abd Manaf, he commanded the Meccan army in time of war.
Abd Shams ibn Abd Manaf was a prominent member of the Quraysh (Quraish) tribe of Mecca in modern-day Saudi Arabia. The Banu Abd Shams sub-clan of the Quraish tribe and their descendants take its name from him.
Abd Shams ibn Abd Manaf was, presumably, the oldest son of Abd Manaf ibn Qusai. His younger brothers were Muttalib, Nawfal and Hashim, after whom the Banu Hashim tribe was named.
The Banu Umayyad clan was named after his son Umayya ibn Abd Shams. Abd Shams was the great-great-grandfather of the sahabi Uthman ibn Affan (d.656), the third Caliph of the Muslim Ummah (community).
Umayya ibn ‘Abd Shams. Ancestor of the Umayyads, who were the principal clan of the Quraysh in Mecca. Like his father, Abd Shams ibn Abd Manaf, he commanded the Meccan army in time of war.
Abd Shams ibn Abd Manaf was a prominent member of the Quraysh (Quraish) tribe of Mecca in modern-day Saudi Arabia. The Banu Abd Shams sub-clan of the Quraish tribe and their descendants take its name from him.
Abd Shams ibn Abd Manaf was, presumably, the oldest son of Abd Manaf ibn Qusai. His younger brothers were Muttalib, Nawfal and Hashim, after whom the Banu Hashim tribe was named.
The Banu Umayyad clan was named after his son Umayya ibn Abd Shams. Abd Shams was the great-great-grandfather of the sahabi Uthman ibn Affan (d.656), the third Caliph of the Muslim Ummah (community).
Umayya ibn Abi’l-Salt
Umayya ibn Abi’l-Salt (d. 629). Arab poet, contemporary of the Prophet. He is said to have refused to recognize the Prophet’s claim to be God’s Messenger. There are similarities, and divergences, between the Qur’an on the one hand and the recognition of one personal God, the eschatological conceptions of the Last Judgment, Hell and Paradise, and the appeals for a moral life found in Umayya’s poems on the other. The agreement between the Qur’an and Umayya’s poems may be explained from the fact that before and at the Prophet’s time currents of thought related to the concept of monotheism had attracted wide circles, especially in Mecca and Ta’if.
Umayya ibn Abi’l-Salt (d. 629). Arab poet, contemporary of the Prophet. He is said to have refused to recognize the Prophet’s claim to be God’s Messenger. There are similarities, and divergences, between the Qur’an on the one hand and the recognition of one personal God, the eschatological conceptions of the Last Judgment, Hell and Paradise, and the appeals for a moral life found in Umayya’s poems on the other. The agreement between the Qur’an and Umayya’s poems may be explained from the fact that before and at the Prophet’s time currents of thought related to the concept of monotheism had attracted wide circles, especially in Mecca and Ta’if.
Umma
Umma (Ummah). Arabic term for the political, social, and spiritual community of Muslims. The term umma refers to the whole of the brotherhood of Muslims.
The Arabic word umma means “people” or “community.” The term umma refers to the worldwid community of Muslims. Although the Arabic word jama’a is nearly synonymous with umma, the word jama’a is now associated almost exclusively with the Sunni branch of Islam, as in the expression ahl al-sunna wa-l-jama’a, “people of the custom and the community [of Muhammad],” while the word umma, both in meaning and in usage, encompasses the entire Muslim community, Shi‘ite as well as Sunni.
Umma is both a scriptural and theological concept and a descriptive historical reality. In both senses, the term has far-reaching importance.
The earliest Islamic usage of umma occurs in the Qur’an, where it is integral to Muhammad’s revelatory dicta on prophecy. Each community is defined by the presence in its midst of a prophetic or apostolic figure, whose function is to declare the divine intent for the community to which he has been sent {see Sura 6:42, 10:48, etc.}. While many of the prophets, including Muhammad, were not accepted without resistance, hostility, and often violent opposition to their teaching, it is they alone who provide the standard by which their respective communities will ultimately be judged on the Day of Reckoning.
The Qur’an extolls Muhammad as God’s chosen apostle to the Arabs; at the same time, it alludes to the intrinsic unity of all humanity as a single community {see Sura 10:19, 11:118}. The potential recovery of unitary identity is possible through common adherence to a revealed book (kitab). All People of the Book (ahl al-kitab), therefore, are esteemed because of their book, however much they may have reviled their respective prophets or distorted the true content of prophetic discourse. Muhammad is viewed as the final prophet, to whom was revealed a book without error or contradiction, the Qur’an. From a
Muslim perspective, the Qur’an surpassed all other books and Muhammad’s prophecy was the culmination of all prophecy. Nevertheless, the subsequent evolution of protected peoples in the expanding Muslim world partially derives from the Qur’anic appeal to the original social unity of mankind.
The notion of umma or community was variously interpreted by the Muslim rulers who succeeded Muhammad and tried to apply his revelatory utterances to changing circumstances. The decisive norm was established under the second Caliph, ‘Umar. At ‘Umar’s direction, a divan or register was compiled. Excluding Jews and Christians, the divan ranked members of Muhammad’s community by a strict chronological standard: the date of their profession of loyalty (bai’at) to the Prophet. Highest on the list were the Meccans who had been senior companions of Muhammad. Next were the loyal helper families of Medina, followed by later Meccan converts to Islam, and then Arab tribes, according to the date of their leaders’ profession of Islam. The Prophet’s wives and family were alos accorded a special albeit imprecise place of respect.
‘Umar’s divan was never abrogated, but it was challenged by some and ignored by others. Shi’ite Muslims, who recognize no legitimate successor to Muhammad before Ali, the fourth caliph, claim for themselves a relationship of supreme intimacy to Muhammad through Ali, the Prophet’s closest male relative among the sahaba -- the companions to the Prophet. Shi‘ites reject ‘Umar’s divan, along with ‘Umar. By contrast, the mawali, or clients to the Arabs in lands conquered beyond the peninsula, at first paired their own social ranking to an Arab tribe under the Umayyads, but then gradually came to seek an independent, regional identity under the ‘Abbasids and subsequent dynasties.
The proliferation of regional ruling groups under the later ‘Abbasids, the emergence of three major, often competing medieval Islamic empires, and finally the development of a series of Muslim nation-states in the present century -- all seem to undermine the validity of umma as a workable concern vital to the world view of Muslim peoples. Yet the ideal persists; its tenacity should not be minimized or disregarded because of historical circumstances, many of them beyond the control of Muslim leaders. The pan-Islamic movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the current widespread revival of Islamic loyalties indicate that umma as a vision of religious solidarity continues to inspire Muslims when they react to threats -- whether perceived as Western, colonialist, secular, modernist, or communist -- against the traditional norms and values of Islam.
At the present time, the demographic profile of Islam is more non-Arab than Arab, more Asian and African than Middle Eastern. The total number of Muslims worldwide is not less than 650 million and perhaps as high as one billion. There are few authoritative sources on demographic statistics, in large part because few Muslim countries conduct a periodic census with the persistent attention to detail that characterizes the census process in Western Europe and the United States.
Today it is necessary to discard the common assumption that Islam is an ethnically Arab, regionally Middle Eastern religion. Muslims do face an Arabian city, Mecca, when they pray daily; they do believe in an Arabian prophet of the Quraysh tribe, Muhammad; and they do accord a unique role to Arabic as the language of the Qur’an and ritual prayer. However, Islam itself is a transregional, multilinguistic, polyethnic, culturally varied community. Muslims bow to Mecca from many directions of the planet Earth.
Umma is the denotation for the community of Muslims, that is, the totatlity of all Muslims. The term comes from a word that simply means “people.” In the Qur’an, the word is used in several senses, but it always indicates a group of people that are a part of a divine plan and salvation. There is even an example of the word being used for an individual, Abraham (Sura 16:120).
Umma when used for a group is often to be understood as confined by ethnicity or linguistics. However, in the Qur’an, this situation was not original:
Once the community of men was one; then they disagreed; if it was not for the word that had come from the Lord, their disagreements would have been settled {Sura 10:20}.
It appears that in the early days of Islam, umma was used for the population of Mecca, but with the development of Islam, the umma of Muhammad changed to become believers, and therefore excluded Meccans that had not converted. The umma term has without being a central theologifcal concept, been crucial to the Muslim understanding of unity.
Umma is an Arabic word meaning "community" or "nation". It is commonly used to mean either the collective nation of states, or (in the context of pan-Arabism) the whole Arab world. In the context of Islam, the word umma is used to mean the diaspora or "Community of the Believers" (ummat al-mu'minin), and thus the whole Muslim world.
The phrase Umma Wahida in the Qur'an (the "One Community") refers to all of the Islamic world unified. The Quran says: “You [Muslims] are the best nation brought out for Mankind, commanding what is righteous (Ma'ruf - lit. "recognized [as good]") and forbidding what is wrong (Munkar - lit. "unrecognized [as good]")....” [3:110].
On the other hand, in Arabic Umma can also be used in the more Western sense of nation, for example: Al-Umma Al-Muttahida, the United Nations.
The Constitution of Medina, an early document said to have been negotiated by Muhammad in 622 with the leading clans of Medina, explicitly refers to Jewish and pagan citizens of Medina as members of the Umma.
The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) is the main organization representing the whole Muslim Umma.
Ummah see Umma
People see Umma
Community see Umma
The notion of umma or community was variously interpreted by the Muslim rulers who succeeded Muhammad and tried to apply his revelatory utterances to changing circumstances. The decisive norm was established under the second Caliph, ‘Umar. At ‘Umar’s direction, a divan or register was compiled. Excluding Jews and Christians, the divan ranked members of Muhammad’s community by a strict chronological standard: the date of their profession of loyalty (bai’at) to the Prophet. Highest on the list were the Meccans who had been senior companions of Muhammad. Next were the loyal helper families of Medina, followed by later Meccan converts to Islam, and then Arab tribes, according to the date of their leaders’ profession of Islam. The Prophet’s wives and family were alos accorded a special albeit imprecise place of respect.
‘Umar’s divan was never abrogated, but it was challenged by some and ignored by others. Shi’ite Muslims, who recognize no legitimate successor to Muhammad before Ali, the fourth caliph, claim for themselves a relationship of supreme intimacy to Muhammad through Ali, the Prophet’s closest male relative among the sahaba -- the companions to the Prophet. Shi‘ites reject ‘Umar’s divan, along with ‘Umar. By contrast, the mawali, or clients to the Arabs in lands conquered beyond the peninsula, at first paired their own social ranking to an Arab tribe under the Umayyads, but then gradually came to seek an independent, regional identity under the ‘Abbasids and subsequent dynasties.
The proliferation of regional ruling groups under the later ‘Abbasids, the emergence of three major, often competing medieval Islamic empires, and finally the development of a series of Muslim nation-states in the present century -- all seem to undermine the validity of umma as a workable concern vital to the world view of Muslim peoples. Yet the ideal persists; its tenacity should not be minimized or disregarded because of historical circumstances, many of them beyond the control of Muslim leaders. The pan-Islamic movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the current widespread revival of Islamic loyalties indicate that umma as a vision of religious solidarity continues to inspire Muslims when they react to threats -- whether perceived as Western, colonialist, secular, modernist, or communist -- against the traditional norms and values of Islam.
At the present time, the demographic profile of Islam is more non-Arab than Arab, more Asian and African than Middle Eastern. The total number of Muslims worldwide is not less than 650 million and perhaps as high as one billion. There are few authoritative sources on demographic statistics, in large part because few Muslim countries conduct a periodic census with the persistent attention to detail that characterizes the census process in Western Europe and the United States.
Today it is necessary to discard the common assumption that Islam is an ethnically Arab, regionally Middle Eastern religion. Muslims do face an Arabian city, Mecca, when they pray daily; they do believe in an Arabian prophet of the Quraysh tribe, Muhammad; and they do accord a unique role to Arabic as the language of the Qur’an and ritual prayer. However, Islam itself is a transregional, multilinguistic, polyethnic, culturally varied community. Muslims bow to Mecca from many directions of the planet Earth.
Umma is the denotation for the community of Muslims, that is, the totatlity of all Muslims. The term comes from a word that simply means “people.” In the Qur’an, the word is used in several senses, but it always indicates a group of people that are a part of a divine plan and salvation. There is even an example of the word being used for an individual, Abraham (Sura 16:120).
Umma when used for a group is often to be understood as confined by ethnicity or linguistics. However, in the Qur’an, this situation was not original:
Once the community of men was one; then they disagreed; if it was not for the word that had come from the Lord, their disagreements would have been settled {Sura 10:20}.
It appears that in the early days of Islam, umma was used for the population of Mecca, but with the development of Islam, the umma of Muhammad changed to become believers, and therefore excluded Meccans that had not converted. The umma term has without being a central theologifcal concept, been crucial to the Muslim understanding of unity.
Umma is an Arabic word meaning "community" or "nation". It is commonly used to mean either the collective nation of states, or (in the context of pan-Arabism) the whole Arab world. In the context of Islam, the word umma is used to mean the diaspora or "Community of the Believers" (ummat al-mu'minin), and thus the whole Muslim world.
The phrase Umma Wahida in the Qur'an (the "One Community") refers to all of the Islamic world unified. The Quran says: “You [Muslims] are the best nation brought out for Mankind, commanding what is righteous (Ma'ruf - lit. "recognized [as good]") and forbidding what is wrong (Munkar - lit. "unrecognized [as good]")....” [3:110].
On the other hand, in Arabic Umma can also be used in the more Western sense of nation, for example: Al-Umma Al-Muttahida, the United Nations.
The Constitution of Medina, an early document said to have been negotiated by Muhammad in 622 with the leading clans of Medina, explicitly refers to Jewish and pagan citizens of Medina as members of the Umma.
The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) is the main organization representing the whole Muslim Umma.
Ummah see Umma
People see Umma
Community see Umma
Ummah Ansar
Ummah Ansar (Umma Party) (Hizb al-Umma -- Nation Party) . The Sudanese Ummah (“Community”) Party was formed in February 1945 by pro-independence nationalists, most of whom were supporters of Sayyid ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, the posthumous son of Muhammad Ahmad ibn ‘Abd Allah (d. 1885) who founded the Mahdist movement in that country. The nearly four million followers of this movement, known as Ansar, constitute the bulk of the party’s membership. Although Ummah often gained the greatest number of seats voted to a single party in general elections, it was never the in a position to form an independent government and was forced to participate in coalitions.
Three main factors contributed to the formation of the Ummah Party. The first was the re-emergence of the Ansar as an influential religio-political organization under Sayyid ‘Abd al-Rahman after World War I. Its sectarian followers provided the mass basis of the Ummah Party and their hierarchical structure of command subsequently served as its backbone. Second, following the rift created between the Graduates’ Congress and the Condominium government in 1942, political control of this nationalist organization gradually passed to a militant, and later pro-unionist, faction headed by Isma‘il al-Azhari (d. 1969). This development led ‘Abd al-Rahman to discard the Congress as an instrument for advancing Sudanese independence and to promote the Ummah Party as a substitute. Third, whereas Congress in 1944 boycotted the establishment of an Advisory Council for the Sudan, ‘Abd al-Rahman realized its political significance and was determined to participate in its deliberations. Such participation, however, presupposed the formation of a political organization distinct from the Congress.
‘Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, imam of the Ansar, was the new party’s patron, while its leadership initially rested with one of his sons, Siddiq. In October 1955, in order to secure the commitment of his sectarian rival to full independence for the Sudan, ‘Abd al-Rahman accepted Sayyid ‘Ali al-Mirghani’s proposal that they pledge themselves and members of their families to refrain from seeking public office. This measure shifted control of the party to the secular wing, then led by ‘Abd Allah Khalil. However, the military regime established all political parties, thereby neutralizing the secularists and restoring the Ummah’s leadership to al-Siddiq al-Mahdi.
Sayyid ‘Abd al-Rahman died in March 1959, and al-Siddiq succeeded him as imam. Almost immediately the latter integrated the party’s hierarchy of institution with the Ansar movement. When al-Siddiq himself died in October 1961, his brother al-Hadi was elected as the new imam and his own Oxford educated son al-Sadiq was designated as leader of the Ummah Party. Thus, the party’s leadership, though retained by the Mahdi family, became essentially divided along functional lines.
This division proved crucial, for al-Hadi was conservative while al-Sadiq was liberal. By 1963, the latter had grown critical of his uncle’s tolerance of ‘Abbud’s regime, and he began to advocate that the Ummah should adopt a more democratic structure and a modern political program. With the restoration of democratic rule in October 1964, the struggle between the conservative and liberal wings intensified and in July 1966 precipitated a split within the party. In April 1969, however, dissatisfied with their reduced political role, al-Hadi and al-Sadiq came to an agreement that reunified the party and prepared it to head a new coalition government. A few weeks thereafter, and partly in reaction to this development, a second military regime was established under Colonel Ja‘far al-Nimeiri (or al-Numayri).
From the outset the Ummah-Ansar leaders were unequivocably opposed to the leftist orientation of the new junta and, failing to change it by persuasion, they resisted it forcibly. The confrontation led to a military attack on Aba Island in March 1970, in which Imam al-Hadi and thousands of his followers were killed. Al-Sadiq was first exiled to Egypt but was later returned to Sudan and kept under house arrest until his release in December 1972.
The Ummah Party participated in setting up the Sudanese National Front in exile to oppose the military regime, and in July 1976 it spearheaded an abortive coup. A year later, al-Sadiq negotiated a reconciliation agreement with Nimeiri, following which the Front was dissolved. This agreement created dissension within the Ummah-Ansar from followers of al-Hadi who were vehemently opposed to Nimeiri and who had not forgotten the bitter split of 1966. Soon, however, al-Sadiq became disillusioned with Nimeiri’s domestic and foreign policies. In 1978, he led his wing of the Ummah Party again into opposition.
In April 1985, Nimeiri’s regime was overthrown and the Ummah joined other parties in forming a transitional regime pending general elections. By March 1986, its various wings were effectively reunited, and al-Sadiq was formally re-elected as its leader. In the elections held a month later, Ummah was able to gain 100 of the 260 contested seats and to head the new coalition government formed with the Democratic Union Party and others. In May 1987, al-Sadiq was elected imam of the Ansar to succeed his uncle al-Hadi, thereby unifying in his person the leadership of the Ummah-Ansar movement.
The instability created by differences over the repeal of Nimeiri’s Islamic legal code and the resolution of conflict in the southern Sudan opened the way for the establishment, in June 1989, of a third military regime under General ‘Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir. Its fundamentalist orientation and its close association with the Muslim Brotherhood drove the Ummah and other parties to form the National Democratic Alliance to oppose it.
Ideologically, the Ummah Party draws its orientation from Sudanese Mahdist thought. Like the Sufi orders and the Muslim Brothers, it believes that Islam plays a major role in the socio-political life of Muslims. But unlike the former, it is strongly committed to political activism; and unlike the latter, it believes that a just social order can only be achieved on the basis of the widest popular participation. Accordingly, it supports the establishment of a modern Islamic state, but one that is based on a constitution that recognizes the ummah as the source of political authority and the possessor of sovereignty. Believing that the institutions of the modern state are new political phenomena with no resemblance to those of the original Islamic polity, the Ummah Party seeks to restore the functions rather than the traditional patterns of ancient Medinese society. Hence, like the Sufi orders but unlike the Muslim Brothers, it recognizes the shari‘a as the main --- but not the sole -- source for legislation. In this connection, it advocates the establishment of a shura (advisory) council vested with adequate legislative powers not only to reenact provisions of the shari‘a in the light of modern conditions, but also to validate existing modern legislation for which no precedent can be found in Islamic law. The application of such an Islamic legal system would be restricted to the Muslim population, and other religious faiths would be formally recognized rather than suppressed or simply tolerated, and their members would be guaranteed full freedom of religious conscience and practice. In this way, Ummah believes, Sudanese national unity and territorial integrity can be preserved.
The Umma Party is an Islamic centrist political party in Sudan. It was formed in 1945 as the party striving after independence of Sudan. Sadiq al Mahdi was a prominent leader of the faction through much of the last century.
Today there are five active political factions of the Umma Party each claiming political legitimacy.
The most prominent of these factions is the Umma Party (Reform and Renewal).
Another faction of the Umma Party (General Leadership). The Umma Party (General Leadership) became part of the government and agreed to continue cooperation with Sudan's ruling National Congress Party in the mid-interim period after 2008.
The third major faction of the Umma Party is the Federal Umma Party.
Community Party see Ummah Ansar
Umma Party see Ummah Ansar
Hizb al-Umma see Ummah Ansar
Nation Party see Ummah Ansar
Ummah Ansar (Umma Party) (Hizb al-Umma -- Nation Party) . The Sudanese Ummah (“Community”) Party was formed in February 1945 by pro-independence nationalists, most of whom were supporters of Sayyid ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, the posthumous son of Muhammad Ahmad ibn ‘Abd Allah (d. 1885) who founded the Mahdist movement in that country. The nearly four million followers of this movement, known as Ansar, constitute the bulk of the party’s membership. Although Ummah often gained the greatest number of seats voted to a single party in general elections, it was never the in a position to form an independent government and was forced to participate in coalitions.
Three main factors contributed to the formation of the Ummah Party. The first was the re-emergence of the Ansar as an influential religio-political organization under Sayyid ‘Abd al-Rahman after World War I. Its sectarian followers provided the mass basis of the Ummah Party and their hierarchical structure of command subsequently served as its backbone. Second, following the rift created between the Graduates’ Congress and the Condominium government in 1942, political control of this nationalist organization gradually passed to a militant, and later pro-unionist, faction headed by Isma‘il al-Azhari (d. 1969). This development led ‘Abd al-Rahman to discard the Congress as an instrument for advancing Sudanese independence and to promote the Ummah Party as a substitute. Third, whereas Congress in 1944 boycotted the establishment of an Advisory Council for the Sudan, ‘Abd al-Rahman realized its political significance and was determined to participate in its deliberations. Such participation, however, presupposed the formation of a political organization distinct from the Congress.
‘Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, imam of the Ansar, was the new party’s patron, while its leadership initially rested with one of his sons, Siddiq. In October 1955, in order to secure the commitment of his sectarian rival to full independence for the Sudan, ‘Abd al-Rahman accepted Sayyid ‘Ali al-Mirghani’s proposal that they pledge themselves and members of their families to refrain from seeking public office. This measure shifted control of the party to the secular wing, then led by ‘Abd Allah Khalil. However, the military regime established all political parties, thereby neutralizing the secularists and restoring the Ummah’s leadership to al-Siddiq al-Mahdi.
Sayyid ‘Abd al-Rahman died in March 1959, and al-Siddiq succeeded him as imam. Almost immediately the latter integrated the party’s hierarchy of institution with the Ansar movement. When al-Siddiq himself died in October 1961, his brother al-Hadi was elected as the new imam and his own Oxford educated son al-Sadiq was designated as leader of the Ummah Party. Thus, the party’s leadership, though retained by the Mahdi family, became essentially divided along functional lines.
This division proved crucial, for al-Hadi was conservative while al-Sadiq was liberal. By 1963, the latter had grown critical of his uncle’s tolerance of ‘Abbud’s regime, and he began to advocate that the Ummah should adopt a more democratic structure and a modern political program. With the restoration of democratic rule in October 1964, the struggle between the conservative and liberal wings intensified and in July 1966 precipitated a split within the party. In April 1969, however, dissatisfied with their reduced political role, al-Hadi and al-Sadiq came to an agreement that reunified the party and prepared it to head a new coalition government. A few weeks thereafter, and partly in reaction to this development, a second military regime was established under Colonel Ja‘far al-Nimeiri (or al-Numayri).
From the outset the Ummah-Ansar leaders were unequivocably opposed to the leftist orientation of the new junta and, failing to change it by persuasion, they resisted it forcibly. The confrontation led to a military attack on Aba Island in March 1970, in which Imam al-Hadi and thousands of his followers were killed. Al-Sadiq was first exiled to Egypt but was later returned to Sudan and kept under house arrest until his release in December 1972.
The Ummah Party participated in setting up the Sudanese National Front in exile to oppose the military regime, and in July 1976 it spearheaded an abortive coup. A year later, al-Sadiq negotiated a reconciliation agreement with Nimeiri, following which the Front was dissolved. This agreement created dissension within the Ummah-Ansar from followers of al-Hadi who were vehemently opposed to Nimeiri and who had not forgotten the bitter split of 1966. Soon, however, al-Sadiq became disillusioned with Nimeiri’s domestic and foreign policies. In 1978, he led his wing of the Ummah Party again into opposition.
In April 1985, Nimeiri’s regime was overthrown and the Ummah joined other parties in forming a transitional regime pending general elections. By March 1986, its various wings were effectively reunited, and al-Sadiq was formally re-elected as its leader. In the elections held a month later, Ummah was able to gain 100 of the 260 contested seats and to head the new coalition government formed with the Democratic Union Party and others. In May 1987, al-Sadiq was elected imam of the Ansar to succeed his uncle al-Hadi, thereby unifying in his person the leadership of the Ummah-Ansar movement.
The instability created by differences over the repeal of Nimeiri’s Islamic legal code and the resolution of conflict in the southern Sudan opened the way for the establishment, in June 1989, of a third military regime under General ‘Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir. Its fundamentalist orientation and its close association with the Muslim Brotherhood drove the Ummah and other parties to form the National Democratic Alliance to oppose it.
Ideologically, the Ummah Party draws its orientation from Sudanese Mahdist thought. Like the Sufi orders and the Muslim Brothers, it believes that Islam plays a major role in the socio-political life of Muslims. But unlike the former, it is strongly committed to political activism; and unlike the latter, it believes that a just social order can only be achieved on the basis of the widest popular participation. Accordingly, it supports the establishment of a modern Islamic state, but one that is based on a constitution that recognizes the ummah as the source of political authority and the possessor of sovereignty. Believing that the institutions of the modern state are new political phenomena with no resemblance to those of the original Islamic polity, the Ummah Party seeks to restore the functions rather than the traditional patterns of ancient Medinese society. Hence, like the Sufi orders but unlike the Muslim Brothers, it recognizes the shari‘a as the main --- but not the sole -- source for legislation. In this connection, it advocates the establishment of a shura (advisory) council vested with adequate legislative powers not only to reenact provisions of the shari‘a in the light of modern conditions, but also to validate existing modern legislation for which no precedent can be found in Islamic law. The application of such an Islamic legal system would be restricted to the Muslim population, and other religious faiths would be formally recognized rather than suppressed or simply tolerated, and their members would be guaranteed full freedom of religious conscience and practice. In this way, Ummah believes, Sudanese national unity and territorial integrity can be preserved.
The Umma Party is an Islamic centrist political party in Sudan. It was formed in 1945 as the party striving after independence of Sudan. Sadiq al Mahdi was a prominent leader of the faction through much of the last century.
Today there are five active political factions of the Umma Party each claiming political legitimacy.
The most prominent of these factions is the Umma Party (Reform and Renewal).
Another faction of the Umma Party (General Leadership). The Umma Party (General Leadership) became part of the government and agreed to continue cooperation with Sudan's ruling National Congress Party in the mid-interim period after 2008.
The third major faction of the Umma Party is the Federal Umma Party.
Community Party see Ummah Ansar
Umma Party see Ummah Ansar
Hizb al-Umma see Ummah Ansar
Nation Party see Ummah Ansar
Umm al-Walad
Umm al-Walad. Arabic term which means “mother of children” and which was applied to a slave girl who bore her master a child. In the Qur’an her position is not defined. According to the Law, every slave girl, even a non-Muslim, who has borne her master a child, becomes ipso iure free, and a legacy set aside by her master in her favor is therefore valid.
Umm al-Walad. Arabic term which means “mother of children” and which was applied to a slave girl who bore her master a child. In the Qur’an her position is not defined. According to the Law, every slave girl, even a non-Muslim, who has borne her master a child, becomes ipso iure free, and a legacy set aside by her master in her favor is therefore valid.
Umm Kalthum
Umm Kalthum (Umm Kulthum) (Oum Kulthoum) (Om Kalsoum) (Kawkab al-Sharq - “Star of the East”) (Umm Kulthum Ebrahim Elbeltagi) (b. May 4, 1904?, Tummāy al-Zahāyrah, Egypt - d. February 3, 1975, Cairo, Egypt). Indisputably the greatest singer of the Arab world of her generation. Stern and tragic, rigidly in control, this was a woman who, in her heyday, truly had the Arab world in the palm of her hand. With melancholy operettas that seemed to drift on for hours, she encapsulated the love lives of a nation and mesmerized millions.
Rumor had it that Umm Kalthum inhaled gulps of hashish smoke before performing and that the scarf trailing from her right hand was steeped in opium. Her stage presence was charged by a theatrical rapport with the audience. A slight nod of the head or a shake of her shoulders and they were in uproar. She learned to sing by reciting verse at cafes in her village, and sometimes dressed as a boy to escape the religious authorities. It was to her training in religious chanting that she owed her stunning vocal agility and her masterful command of the complex maqamat. She was educated in the secular field by the poet Ahmed Ramy and of her total output of 286 songs, 132 were his poems. Her voice was the epitome of the Arab ideal -- saturated with shaggan, or emotional yearning, and powerful enough on occasion to shatter a glass.
In her long career, Umm Kalthum specialized in love songs that sometimes lasted an hour, improvising and ornamenting on a theme that would bring the audience to a frenzy. She was once asked to sing a line 52 times over, which she did while developing the melody each time. Of this ability she said: “I am greatly influenced by the music found in Arabic poetry. I improvise because my heart rejoices in the richness of this music. If someone went over a song which I sang five times, he would not find any one like the other. I am not a record that repeats itself, I am a human being who is deeply touched by what I sing.” As a childless mother, her songs were her offspring given to the people. For these gifts, they returned total adoration.
Apart from Allah, it is said, that Umm Kalthum is the only subject on which all Arabs agree. This recognition has always given Umm Kalthum a special political significance. She embraced Nasser’s pan-Arab ideals and drew Arabs together by extending a pride to them during their most difficult period in history. Nasser used her nationalistic songs to keep the masses behind him, and times his major political speeches carefully around her broadcasts. The less prescient Anwar Sadat once addressed the nation on the same day as her concert, and ended up without much of an audience, a mistake he only made once.
In her last years, Umm Kalthum visited many other Arab countries and this took the shape of state visitis. Her funeral in 1975 was described as bigger than the one for President Nasser some five years earlier.
The style of Umm Kalthum was influenced by Western popular music of her time. However, her music was firmly and dominantly based upon traditional classical Arab music. She always used large orchestras, but the main force in her performances was always her own powerful voice. She recorded over 300 songs, most famous of which are al-Atlal, Raqqu al-Habib, Inta umri, and Fakarouni.
Umm Kalthum (Umm Kulthum) mesmerized Arab audiences from the Persian Gulf to Morocco for half a century. She was one of the most famous Arab singers and public personalities in the 20th century.
Umm Kulthūm’s father was a village imam who sang traditional religious songs at weddings and holidays to make ends meet. She learned to sing from him, and, when he noticed the strength of her voice, he began taking her with him, dressed as a boy to avoid the opprobrium of displaying a young daughter onstage. Egyptian society during Umm Kulthūm’s youth held singing—even of the religious variety—to be a disreputable occupation, especially for a female. Umm Kulthūm made a name for herself singing in the towns and villages of the Egyptian delta (an area throughout which she retained a great following). By the time she was a teenager, she had become the family star.
Sometime about 1923 the family moved to Cairo, a major center of the lucrative world of entertainment and emerging mass media production in the Middle East. There they were perceived as old-fashioned and countrified. To improve her image and acquire sophistication, Umm Kulthūm studied music and poetry from accomplished performers and literati and copied the manners of the ladies of wealthy homes in which she was invited to sing. She soon made a name in the homes and salons of the wealthy as well as in public venues such as theaters and cabarets. By the mid-1920s she had made her first recordings and had achieved a more polished and sophisticated musical and personal style. By the end of the 1920s, she had become a sought-after performer and was one of the best-paid musicians in Cairo. Her extremely successful career in commercial recording eventually extended to radio, film, and television. In 1936 she made her first motion picture, Wedad, in which she played the title role. It was the first of six motion pictures in which she was to act.
Beginning in 1937, she regularly gave a performance on the first Thursday (which in most Islamic countries is the last day of the workweek) of every month. By this time, she had moved from singing religious songs to performing popular tunes—often in the colloquial dialect and accompanied by a small traditional orchestra—and she became known for her emotive, passionate renditions of arrangements by the best composers, poets, and songwriters of the day. These included the poets Aḥmad Shawqī and Bayrām al-Tūnisī (who wrote many of the singer’s colloquial Egyptian songs) and, later, the noted composer Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, with whom she collaborated on 10 songs. The first of these tunes, “"Inta ʿUmrī"” (“You Are My Life”), remains a modern classic. Her strong and nuanced voice and her ability to fashion multiple iterations of single lines of text drew audiences into the emotion and meaning of the poetic lyrics and extended for hours what often had been written as relatively short compositions.
Known sometimes as Kawkab al-Sharq (“Star of the East”), Umm Kulthūm had an immense repertoire, which included religious, sentimental, and nationalistic songs. In the midst of the turmoil created by two world wars, the Great Depression of the 1930s, and the 1952 Egyptian revolution, she cultivated a public persona as a patriotic Egyptian and a devout Muslim. She sang songs in support of Egyptian independence (“"Nashīd al-Jāmiʿah"” [“"The University Anthem"” ], “"Saʾalu Qalbī"” [“"Ask My Heart"” ]) and in the 1950s sang many songs in support of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, with whom she developed a close friendship. One of her songs associated with Nasser—“"Wallāhi Zamān, Yā Silāḥī"” (“"It’s Been a Long Time, O Weapon of Mine"” )—was adopted as the Egyptian national anthem from 1960 to 1979. She served as president of the Musician’s Union for seven years and held positions on numerous government commissions on the arts. Her popularity was further enhanced by her generous donations to Arab causes. After Egypt’s defeat in the Six-Day War of June 1967, she toured Egypt and the broader Arab world, donating the proceeds of her concerts to the Egyptian government.
Health problems plagued the singer most of her life. During the late 1940s and early ’50s, she worked only on a limited basis, and on a number of occasions throughout her life she traveled to Europe and the United States for treatment of a variety of ailments. Most obviously, problems with her eyes (purportedly from years spent in front of stage lights) forced her to wear heavy sunglasses, which became a hallmark during her later life. Such was her popularity that news of her death provoked a spontaneous outpouring of hysterical grief, and millions of admirers lined the streets for her funeral procession. She remained one of the Arab world’s best-selling singers even decades after her death. In 2001 the Egyptian government established the Kawkab al-Sharq Museum in Cairo to celebrate the singer’s life and accomplishments.
Umm Kulthum see Umm Kalthum
Oum Kulthoum see Umm Kalthum
Om Kalsoum see Umm Kalthum
Kawkab al-Sharq see Umm Kalthum
Star of the East see Umm Kalthum
Umm Kulthum Ebrahim Elbeltagi see Umm Kalthum
Umm Kalthum (Umm Kulthum) (Oum Kulthoum) (Om Kalsoum) (Kawkab al-Sharq - “Star of the East”) (Umm Kulthum Ebrahim Elbeltagi) (b. May 4, 1904?, Tummāy al-Zahāyrah, Egypt - d. February 3, 1975, Cairo, Egypt). Indisputably the greatest singer of the Arab world of her generation. Stern and tragic, rigidly in control, this was a woman who, in her heyday, truly had the Arab world in the palm of her hand. With melancholy operettas that seemed to drift on for hours, she encapsulated the love lives of a nation and mesmerized millions.
Rumor had it that Umm Kalthum inhaled gulps of hashish smoke before performing and that the scarf trailing from her right hand was steeped in opium. Her stage presence was charged by a theatrical rapport with the audience. A slight nod of the head or a shake of her shoulders and they were in uproar. She learned to sing by reciting verse at cafes in her village, and sometimes dressed as a boy to escape the religious authorities. It was to her training in religious chanting that she owed her stunning vocal agility and her masterful command of the complex maqamat. She was educated in the secular field by the poet Ahmed Ramy and of her total output of 286 songs, 132 were his poems. Her voice was the epitome of the Arab ideal -- saturated with shaggan, or emotional yearning, and powerful enough on occasion to shatter a glass.
In her long career, Umm Kalthum specialized in love songs that sometimes lasted an hour, improvising and ornamenting on a theme that would bring the audience to a frenzy. She was once asked to sing a line 52 times over, which she did while developing the melody each time. Of this ability she said: “I am greatly influenced by the music found in Arabic poetry. I improvise because my heart rejoices in the richness of this music. If someone went over a song which I sang five times, he would not find any one like the other. I am not a record that repeats itself, I am a human being who is deeply touched by what I sing.” As a childless mother, her songs were her offspring given to the people. For these gifts, they returned total adoration.
Apart from Allah, it is said, that Umm Kalthum is the only subject on which all Arabs agree. This recognition has always given Umm Kalthum a special political significance. She embraced Nasser’s pan-Arab ideals and drew Arabs together by extending a pride to them during their most difficult period in history. Nasser used her nationalistic songs to keep the masses behind him, and times his major political speeches carefully around her broadcasts. The less prescient Anwar Sadat once addressed the nation on the same day as her concert, and ended up without much of an audience, a mistake he only made once.
In her last years, Umm Kalthum visited many other Arab countries and this took the shape of state visitis. Her funeral in 1975 was described as bigger than the one for President Nasser some five years earlier.
The style of Umm Kalthum was influenced by Western popular music of her time. However, her music was firmly and dominantly based upon traditional classical Arab music. She always used large orchestras, but the main force in her performances was always her own powerful voice. She recorded over 300 songs, most famous of which are al-Atlal, Raqqu al-Habib, Inta umri, and Fakarouni.
Umm Kalthum (Umm Kulthum) mesmerized Arab audiences from the Persian Gulf to Morocco for half a century. She was one of the most famous Arab singers and public personalities in the 20th century.
Umm Kulthūm’s father was a village imam who sang traditional religious songs at weddings and holidays to make ends meet. She learned to sing from him, and, when he noticed the strength of her voice, he began taking her with him, dressed as a boy to avoid the opprobrium of displaying a young daughter onstage. Egyptian society during Umm Kulthūm’s youth held singing—even of the religious variety—to be a disreputable occupation, especially for a female. Umm Kulthūm made a name for herself singing in the towns and villages of the Egyptian delta (an area throughout which she retained a great following). By the time she was a teenager, she had become the family star.
Sometime about 1923 the family moved to Cairo, a major center of the lucrative world of entertainment and emerging mass media production in the Middle East. There they were perceived as old-fashioned and countrified. To improve her image and acquire sophistication, Umm Kulthūm studied music and poetry from accomplished performers and literati and copied the manners of the ladies of wealthy homes in which she was invited to sing. She soon made a name in the homes and salons of the wealthy as well as in public venues such as theaters and cabarets. By the mid-1920s she had made her first recordings and had achieved a more polished and sophisticated musical and personal style. By the end of the 1920s, she had become a sought-after performer and was one of the best-paid musicians in Cairo. Her extremely successful career in commercial recording eventually extended to radio, film, and television. In 1936 she made her first motion picture, Wedad, in which she played the title role. It was the first of six motion pictures in which she was to act.
Beginning in 1937, she regularly gave a performance on the first Thursday (which in most Islamic countries is the last day of the workweek) of every month. By this time, she had moved from singing religious songs to performing popular tunes—often in the colloquial dialect and accompanied by a small traditional orchestra—and she became known for her emotive, passionate renditions of arrangements by the best composers, poets, and songwriters of the day. These included the poets Aḥmad Shawqī and Bayrām al-Tūnisī (who wrote many of the singer’s colloquial Egyptian songs) and, later, the noted composer Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, with whom she collaborated on 10 songs. The first of these tunes, “"Inta ʿUmrī"” (“You Are My Life”), remains a modern classic. Her strong and nuanced voice and her ability to fashion multiple iterations of single lines of text drew audiences into the emotion and meaning of the poetic lyrics and extended for hours what often had been written as relatively short compositions.
Known sometimes as Kawkab al-Sharq (“Star of the East”), Umm Kulthūm had an immense repertoire, which included religious, sentimental, and nationalistic songs. In the midst of the turmoil created by two world wars, the Great Depression of the 1930s, and the 1952 Egyptian revolution, she cultivated a public persona as a patriotic Egyptian and a devout Muslim. She sang songs in support of Egyptian independence (“"Nashīd al-Jāmiʿah"” [“"The University Anthem"” ], “"Saʾalu Qalbī"” [“"Ask My Heart"” ]) and in the 1950s sang many songs in support of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, with whom she developed a close friendship. One of her songs associated with Nasser—“"Wallāhi Zamān, Yā Silāḥī"” (“"It’s Been a Long Time, O Weapon of Mine"” )—was adopted as the Egyptian national anthem from 1960 to 1979. She served as president of the Musician’s Union for seven years and held positions on numerous government commissions on the arts. Her popularity was further enhanced by her generous donations to Arab causes. After Egypt’s defeat in the Six-Day War of June 1967, she toured Egypt and the broader Arab world, donating the proceeds of her concerts to the Egyptian government.
Health problems plagued the singer most of her life. During the late 1940s and early ’50s, she worked only on a limited basis, and on a number of occasions throughout her life she traveled to Europe and the United States for treatment of a variety of ailments. Most obviously, problems with her eyes (purportedly from years spent in front of stage lights) forced her to wear heavy sunglasses, which became a hallmark during her later life. Such was her popularity that news of her death provoked a spontaneous outpouring of hysterical grief, and millions of admirers lined the streets for her funeral procession. She remained one of the Arab world’s best-selling singers even decades after her death. In 2001 the Egyptian government established the Kawkab al-Sharq Museum in Cairo to celebrate the singer’s life and accomplishments.
Umm Kulthum see Umm Kalthum
Oum Kulthoum see Umm Kalthum
Om Kalsoum see Umm Kalthum
Kawkab al-Sharq see Umm Kalthum
Star of the East see Umm Kalthum
Umm Kulthum Ebrahim Elbeltagi see Umm Kalthum
Umm Kulthum
Umm Kulthum (Umm Kulthum bint Muhammad) (d. 630). Daughter of the Prophet. She is said to have married ‘Utba, a son of Abu Lahab, the enemy of Islam, but to have been divorced by him at his father’s orders before the marriage was consummated. After the death of her sister Ruqayya, her brother-in-law ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan, later the third caliph, married her during the battle of Badr.
Umm Kulthum is viewed as the daughter of Muhammad and Khadijah bint Khuwaylid by Sunni Muslims. Other Muslim sects such as Shia Muslims debate her being a daughter of Muhammed (or even of Khadijah).
Umm Kulthum was first married to Utaybah bin Abu Lahab. His father, Abu Lahab, forced Utbah to repudiate Umm Kulthum due to Abu Lahab's opposition to Muhammad and his teachings. She was subsequently married to Uthman ibn Affan after the death of his first wife Ruqayyah.
Umm Kulthum (Umm Kulthum bint Muhammad) (d. 630). Daughter of the Prophet. She is said to have married ‘Utba, a son of Abu Lahab, the enemy of Islam, but to have been divorced by him at his father’s orders before the marriage was consummated. After the death of her sister Ruqayya, her brother-in-law ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan, later the third caliph, married her during the battle of Badr.
Umm Kulthum is viewed as the daughter of Muhammad and Khadijah bint Khuwaylid by Sunni Muslims. Other Muslim sects such as Shia Muslims debate her being a daughter of Muhammed (or even of Khadijah).
Umm Kulthum was first married to Utaybah bin Abu Lahab. His father, Abu Lahab, forced Utbah to repudiate Umm Kulthum due to Abu Lahab's opposition to Muhammad and his teachings. She was subsequently married to Uthman ibn Affan after the death of his first wife Ruqayyah.
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