Shefiq Mehmed Efendi
Shefiq Mehmed Efendi (Musarrif-zade) (d.1715). Ottoman imperial historian and stylist. He describes only the events of the year 1703, which witnessed the fall of Sultan Mustafa II and the accession to the throne of Sultan Ahmed III.
Musarrif-zade see Shefiq Mehmed Efendi
Shefiq Mehmed Efendi (Musarrif-zade) (d.1715). Ottoman imperial historian and stylist. He describes only the events of the year 1703, which witnessed the fall of Sultan Mustafa II and the accession to the throne of Sultan Ahmed III.
Musarrif-zade see Shefiq Mehmed Efendi
Shehu, Umaru
Umaru Shehu (b. December 8, 1930, Maiduguri, Nigeria) was a Nigerian Professor of Medicine who served as the 11th Vice Chancellor of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Shehu was a Professor Emeritus, Community Health, University of Maiduguri and a former President of the Nigerian Academy of Science.
Shehu received a Bachelor of Medicine degree (MBBS) from the University of London. He was the first head of department, Department of Community Medicine ABU Zaria. He was also the former vice-chancellor of the University of Nigeria Nsukka; the former sole administrator of the University of Maiduguri; the former Pro-chancellor and Chairman of the governing council of Bayero University Kano and the University of Lagos. Furthermore, Shehu was a professor emeritus, community health, university of Maiduguri; a former president of the Nigerian Academy of Science and former president, medical schools in Africa.
Shehu received the Centenary award from President Goodluck Jonathan.
Shehu earned his first degree in Medicine (MBBS) from the University of London and capped the feat with a fellowship from the institute of cancer research while serving as the editor-in-chief of the British Medical.
Shehu was appointed vice chancellor, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, from 1978-1980. He also worked with the World Health Organization (WHO). He was a national WHO program coordinator/representative in Nigeria, from 1980-1985; director, WHO sub-regional health development office 111, from 1985-1989 and WHO representative to Ethiopia, in 1990. At the University of Maiduguri, Shehu was appointed as an honorary consultant physician, from 1991 to date, and became Professor Emeritus in 2000.
Shehu was also the provost, college of medical sciences, from 1991-1993 and became the sole administrator of the University of Maiduguri, from 1993-1994. At the university college hospital in Ibadan, Shehu was appointed the chairman, board of management, from 1991-1994.
At Bayero University in Kano, Shehnu was the Pro-chancellor and chairman of the governing council from 1993-1996, and he also served as Pro-chancellor and chairman of the governing council of the University of Lagos from 1996-1999.
Shehu was the chairman of the board of governors of the STOPAIDS organization; and was chairman of the governing board of the National Agency for the Control of AIDS, (NACA).
Sher Shah
Sher Shah (Sher Shah Suri) (Farid Khan) (Farid al-Din Sher Shah) (Farid al-Din Shir Shah Sur)
(Sher Khan) (Sir Sah Suri) (b. 1486, Sasaram, India - d. May 22, 1545, Kalinjar, India). Founder of the Afghan Suri dynasty. He was unique among India sultans, for he rose from the rank of petty landholder to ruler of North India. Establishing his power base in eastern India, the seat of his landholdings, Sher Shah temporarily supplanted Mughal authority in India. Impressing the sultan of Bihar with his administrative ability, Sher Shah was appointed the guardian of the next king, a minor, and eventually became the de facto ruler of Bihar. Capitalizing on the unstable political situation in North India, Sher Shah, with the consolidated support of the generally divided Indian Afghan tribes, assumed the title of sultan in 1538, acquiring the sultanate of Bengal and gaining victories against the Mughal emperor Humayun. In 1540, Sher Shah decisively defeated Humayun, expelling the Mughals from India. The next five years of his reign were spent in constant warfare, annexing new territories and consolidating his rule. By the time of his death, most of North India was under Suri control.
Sher Shah’s fame rests not only on his military prowess but on his administrative ability and execution of justice. His reforms included the branding of cavalry horses and taxation based on measurement of land, measures adopted by the Mughals as well. In spite of Sher Shah’s military preoccupations, be constructed roads, serais (inns or palaces), wells, mosques, forts, and imperial mausoleums, the most famous being his own tomb at Sasaram (Bihar). All of these, built between 1540 and his death, appear to be part of a planned propagandistic campaign aimed at projecting his image as an ideal Islamic ruler born with the preferred high-ranking qualifications for kingship.
Sher Shah organized a long-lived bureaucracy responsible to the ruler and created a carefully calculated revenue system. For the first time during the Islamic conquest the relationship between the people and the ruler was systematized, with little oppression or corruption.
One of eight sons of Ḥasan Khan, a horse breeder, Farīd rebelled against his father and left home to enlist as a soldier in the service of Jamāl Khan, the governor of Jaunpur. He later worked for the Mughal king of Bihar, who rewarded him for bravery with the title of Shēr Khan. After he defeated a Bengal army, he took over the rule of Bihar. In early 1539 he conquered Bengal and, through clever deception, the Rohtas stronghold southwest of Bengal. At the Battle of Chausa on June 26, 1539, he defeated the Mughal emperor Humāyūn and assumed the royal title of Farīd al-Dīn Shēr Shah. In May 1540 at Kannauj he again defeated Humāyūn; he had driven his foes from Bengal, Bihar, Hindustan, and the Punjab and also suppressed the Baluch chiefs on the northwestern frontier. Intent on expanding the sultanate of Delhi, he captured Gwalior and Malwa but was killed during the siege of Kalinjar.
One of the great Muslim rulers of India, Shēr Shah rose from the rank of private to become emperor, efficiently administered the army and tax collections, and built roads, rest houses, and wells for his people. He was generally tolerant of non-Muslims, except in his massacre of Hindus after the surrender of Raisen. His tomb at Sasaram is one of the most magnificent in India.
Sher Shah Suri, also known as Sher Khan (The Lion King), proved himself a gifted administrator as well as an able general.His reorganization of the empire laid the foundations for the later Mughal emperors, notably Akbar, son of Humayun. During his short five year rule from 1540 to 1545, he set up a new template for civic and military administration, issued the first Rupiya in use until the 20th century and re-organized the postal system of India . He further developed Humayun's Dina-panah city and named it Shergarh and revived the historic city of Patna which had been in decline since the 7th century of the Christian calendar. He is also famously remembered for killing a fully-grown tiger with his bare hands in the Indian jungle.
Sher Shah Suri see Sher Shah
Farid Khan see Sher Shah
Sher Khan see Sher Shah
The Lion King see Sher Shah
Sir Sah Suri see Sher Shah
Farid al-Din Sher Shah see Sher Shah
Sher Shah (Sher Shah Suri) (Farid Khan) (Farid al-Din Sher Shah) (Farid al-Din Shir Shah Sur)
(Sher Khan) (Sir Sah Suri) (b. 1486, Sasaram, India - d. May 22, 1545, Kalinjar, India). Founder of the Afghan Suri dynasty. He was unique among India sultans, for he rose from the rank of petty landholder to ruler of North India. Establishing his power base in eastern India, the seat of his landholdings, Sher Shah temporarily supplanted Mughal authority in India. Impressing the sultan of Bihar with his administrative ability, Sher Shah was appointed the guardian of the next king, a minor, and eventually became the de facto ruler of Bihar. Capitalizing on the unstable political situation in North India, Sher Shah, with the consolidated support of the generally divided Indian Afghan tribes, assumed the title of sultan in 1538, acquiring the sultanate of Bengal and gaining victories against the Mughal emperor Humayun. In 1540, Sher Shah decisively defeated Humayun, expelling the Mughals from India. The next five years of his reign were spent in constant warfare, annexing new territories and consolidating his rule. By the time of his death, most of North India was under Suri control.
Sher Shah’s fame rests not only on his military prowess but on his administrative ability and execution of justice. His reforms included the branding of cavalry horses and taxation based on measurement of land, measures adopted by the Mughals as well. In spite of Sher Shah’s military preoccupations, be constructed roads, serais (inns or palaces), wells, mosques, forts, and imperial mausoleums, the most famous being his own tomb at Sasaram (Bihar). All of these, built between 1540 and his death, appear to be part of a planned propagandistic campaign aimed at projecting his image as an ideal Islamic ruler born with the preferred high-ranking qualifications for kingship.
Sher Shah organized a long-lived bureaucracy responsible to the ruler and created a carefully calculated revenue system. For the first time during the Islamic conquest the relationship between the people and the ruler was systematized, with little oppression or corruption.
One of eight sons of Ḥasan Khan, a horse breeder, Farīd rebelled against his father and left home to enlist as a soldier in the service of Jamāl Khan, the governor of Jaunpur. He later worked for the Mughal king of Bihar, who rewarded him for bravery with the title of Shēr Khan. After he defeated a Bengal army, he took over the rule of Bihar. In early 1539 he conquered Bengal and, through clever deception, the Rohtas stronghold southwest of Bengal. At the Battle of Chausa on June 26, 1539, he defeated the Mughal emperor Humāyūn and assumed the royal title of Farīd al-Dīn Shēr Shah. In May 1540 at Kannauj he again defeated Humāyūn; he had driven his foes from Bengal, Bihar, Hindustan, and the Punjab and also suppressed the Baluch chiefs on the northwestern frontier. Intent on expanding the sultanate of Delhi, he captured Gwalior and Malwa but was killed during the siege of Kalinjar.
One of the great Muslim rulers of India, Shēr Shah rose from the rank of private to become emperor, efficiently administered the army and tax collections, and built roads, rest houses, and wells for his people. He was generally tolerant of non-Muslims, except in his massacre of Hindus after the surrender of Raisen. His tomb at Sasaram is one of the most magnificent in India.
Sher Shah Suri, also known as Sher Khan (The Lion King), proved himself a gifted administrator as well as an able general.His reorganization of the empire laid the foundations for the later Mughal emperors, notably Akbar, son of Humayun. During his short five year rule from 1540 to 1545, he set up a new template for civic and military administration, issued the first Rupiya in use until the 20th century and re-organized the postal system of India . He further developed Humayun's Dina-panah city and named it Shergarh and revived the historic city of Patna which had been in decline since the 7th century of the Christian calendar. He is also famously remembered for killing a fully-grown tiger with his bare hands in the Indian jungle.
Sher Shah Suri see Sher Shah
Farid Khan see Sher Shah
Sher Khan see Sher Shah
The Lion King see Sher Shah
Sir Sah Suri see Sher Shah
Farid al-Din Sher Shah see Sher Shah
Sheykhi
Sheykhi. Pen-name of a considerable number of Turkish poets. The most important was Sheykhi Celebi, alias Mevlana Yusuf Sinan Germiyani (of the fifteenth century). His best-known poem is the Turkish version of Abu Muhammad Nizami’s Khusraw and Shirin.
Sheykhi. Pen-name of a considerable number of Turkish poets. The most important was Sheykhi Celebi, alias Mevlana Yusuf Sinan Germiyani (of the fifteenth century). His best-known poem is the Turkish version of Abu Muhammad Nizami’s Khusraw and Shirin.
Sheykh-oghlu
Sheykh-oghlu (Shaykh-zade). Patronym used for several Turkish writers. One is that of the author of the Khurshid-name, who was born around 1340. The work describes the loves of Khurshid, the daughter of the king of Persia Siyawush and of Ferahshad, son of the king of the Maghrib. Another is that of the author, or rather the translator (of the fifteenth century) of the History of the Forty Viziers, related to the History of the Seven Viziers (Sindibad-name).
Shaykh-zade see Sheykh-oghlu
Sheykh-oghlu (Shaykh-zade). Patronym used for several Turkish writers. One is that of the author of the Khurshid-name, who was born around 1340. The work describes the loves of Khurshid, the daughter of the king of Persia Siyawush and of Ferahshad, son of the king of the Maghrib. Another is that of the author, or rather the translator (of the fifteenth century) of the History of the Forty Viziers, related to the History of the Seven Viziers (Sindibad-name).
Shaykh-zade see Sheykh-oghlu
Shi‘a
Shi‘a (Shi'i) (Shiite) (Shī‘ah). Shi'as form the second largest denomination of Islam, after Sunni Islam. The followers of Shia Islam are called Shi'as but the terms Shiites or Shi'ites are common Anglicisations. "Shia" is the short form of the historic phrase Shī‘atu ‘Alī, meaning "the followers of Ali" or "the faction of Ali".As a term, Shi'a means “party,” in particular “party of ‘Ali” (shi‘at ‘Ali), and is used as the general name for a large group of very different Muslim sects, the starting point of all of which is the recognition of the Prophet’s son-in-law ‘Ali as the legitimate caliph after the death of the Prophet. Much more than the blood of ‘Ali, who was murdered in 661, it was that of his son al-Husayn, killed in 681 by government troops, that was the seed of the Shi‘a. It restored to religion the motive of passion, which has thoroughly penetrated Shi‘ism. To this was added the idea of the manifestation of the divine in man, namely in the Imam, who is especially chosen by God as the bearer of a part of the divine being and the leader to salvation. His death is rendered void by the idea of “return” (in Arabic, raj’), by belief in “concealment,” and by parousia, which led to the concept of the Mahdi.
The particular character of the Shi‘a offered so much incentive to dogmatic speculation that it never, like the Sunna, attained any far-reaching uniformity. In general, three main forms may be distinguished: (1) the Zaydis, who limit the manifestation of God in the Imam to mere divine “right guidance;” (2) the extremists, the so-called Ghulat (i.e., “those who go beyond all bounds” in maintaining that the mortal in the Imam is entirely swallowed up by union with God (in Arabic, hulul); and (3) the intermediate Imamis, for whom the Imam remains mortal but who believe that a divine light-substance is inherent in him by partial union with God.
Each of these three groups knew many sub-divisions. The Zaydis, who believe in five Imams, formed small principalities in Tabaristan and Daylam (from 864) and in Yemen (from 901); the Ghulat found very varied expression in the Carmathians, the Isma‘ilis (Seveners), the Druzes, the Nusayris and many other groups; the Imamis (Twelvers), finally, who believe in twelve Imams.
The consolidation of the separate groups began with the separation of the Isma‘ilis from the Imamis (c.800), followed by the Zaydis (of the ninth century) and various dynasties like the Bawandids, the Musafirids, the Fatimids and the Carmathians (of the early tenth century).
Political aspirations were further opened up by the Samanids, who were themselves not Shi‘is, the Hamdanids of Mosul, the Buyids, the Mazyadids, the Mirdasids, the Sulayhids, the Kakuyids, the Isma‘ilis at Alamut and in Syria. In later time there were the Safavids, the Qajars and now the Islamic Republic in Iran. In India, the first Shi‘i state was that of the ‘Adil Shahs of Bijapur, and, the most important, that of the Qutb Shahs of Golkonda. Growing influence was exercised by the mujtahids of Lakhnaw during the period of the Nawwabs of Awadh (Oudh).
The Arabic word, shi‘a, means “separate or distinct party.” The term Shi‘a refers to a branch of Islam composed of those sects that are followers of Ali and upholders of his direct succession to the office of Imam after Muhammad. The Shi‘a refuse to accept the imamate of Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, and ‘Uthman -- those who preceded Ali as caliph.
The origins of the Shi‘a (also known as Shi‘ites) are difficult to reconstruct. Due to the unfair presentation of Shi‘a positions by Sunni authors and biased reporting by later Shi‘ites, the origins of the Shi‘a have become clouded.
A consistent picture of the early Islamic community and its attitude toward the questions of leadership (imama) is indispensable for understanding the Shi‘a movement. Muhammad’s message, as embodied in the Qur’an, provided tremendous spiritual as well as socio-political impetus for the establishment of the ideal community -- the umma -- of Islam. Muhammad himself was not only the founder of a new religion but also the guardian of a new social order. Consequently the question of leadership was the crucial issue which divided Muslims into various factions in the decades after his death. The early years of Islam were characterized by constant victories of the Muslim armies under the first three caliphs. But as this period came to an end and civil war broke out in 656 of the Christian calendar, discussion arose over the necessity of a qualified leadership to assume the office the imam. Most of these early discussions on the imamate dealt with political issues, but eventually they took on religious implications as well. The rise of several imams and the sympathetic, even enthusiastic, following that they attracted clearly shows a desire to order Muslim society so as to fulfill its historic responsibility -- the formation of a just society with an appropriate political organization.
The Shi‘a, from the early days of the civil war in 656, thought of the imamate in both religious and political terms. They maintained that Muhammad was a charismatic leader who held both spiritual and temporal power. His spiritual authority included the power to interpret the message in the Qur’an without corrupting the revelation. Islam, in order to continue its function of directing the faithful toward a more just social order, was in need of a leader who could perform the Prophet’s role authoritatively. The exaltation of the Prophet and his rightful successor gave rise to the concept of an imam from among the descendants of the Prophet who could create an ideal Islamic community. The entire spiritual edifice of the Shi‘a was built on the walaya -- the love and devotion -- to Ali, who became the first Shi‘ite imam. In fact, walaya to Ali became the sole criterion for judging true faith.
The Shi‘ite concept of the imamate was bound to meet with strong resistance, since it not only demanded the recognition of Ali and his descendants as the succession of rightful imams, but also was a challenge to the rule of the Umayyad caliphate and a rallying point for all who felt discriminated against or maltreated by the ruling house. The early Shi‘a were united in their recognition of Ali and in their aspiration for a just order. Consequently, from its inception, Shi‘ism was an opposition party.
Several protest movements arose under a wide range of leaders from among Ali’s descendants who were able to arouse in their followers a genuine religious urge to achieve political goals. However, Shi‘ite attempts at direct political action met with strong resistance
from the ruling dynasty, and very early their efforts met with failure. The resultant frustration produced further Shi‘ite factions. The radical Shi‘ites insisted on armed resistance to the oppressive rule of the caliphate. These were known as ghulat -- extremists -- because of the extravagant claims they made for their imams. Moderate Shi‘ites, having seen the futility of direct political action, were prepared to postpone indefinitely the establishment of true Islamic rule.
It was probably the murder of al-Husayn by Umayyad troops at Karbala in 680 and later the failure of the revolt of al-Husayn’s grandson, Zayd, in 739, which marked the turn toward a quietist attitude by the Shi‘a, who until then had been willing to fight for their ideals. But they continued to lack a specific ideology as late as the ‘Abbasid victory in 750. It was then that the great imam, Ja‘far al-Sadiq, who had been largely responsible for the moderation and discipline of the radical elements, provided Shi‘ism with a sectarian ideology. Moderate Shi‘ites continued to uphold the imamate of the descendants of al-Husayn through Ja‘far al-Sadiq until the line reached the twelfth imam, who was believed to be the Mahdi and the “hidden imam,” and whose return they awaited. These were the Imamiyya or “Twelvers.”
By the middle of the eighth century of the Christian calendar, the radical Shi‘ites had become so strong that one of their sects was able to help organize the revolution which established the ‘Abbasid caliphate. These rulers, however, disappointed their Shi‘ite followers by abandoning the messianic role and embracing Sunnism. It was at this time that the idea arose of a divinely guided savior imam, the Mahdi, who was believed to be endowed with divine knowledge like that of the Prophet himself. This idea stirred the imaginations of all who had been deprived of their rights under the existing regimes. Ambitious men found that they could manipulate the genuine religious devotion of ordinary people in the name of the descendants of Ali. But the failure of these individuals to establish the rule of justice gave rise to the two central beliefs in the idea of the Imam Mahdi: the concealment (ghayba) and return (raj‘a) of the Messianic Imam at the appropriate time. These beliefs helped the Shi‘ites endure under difficult circumstances. Lack of information on the exact time when the hidden imam would appear required them to be alert at all times.
In the political turmoil of the period, al-Sadiq had the opportunity to propagate Shi‘ite viewpoints without inhibition and to modify the radical tone of early Shi‘ism into a more sober and tolerant school of Islamic thought. Al-Sadiq was accepted by all Shi‘ites as their imam, including those of radical bent who attempted to establish the political power of Ali’s descendants. Al-Sadiq was also accepted as an authentic transmitter of the hadith in the Sunnite compilation. This indicates that it was almost certainly under his leadership that moderate Shi‘ism, with its veneration of the Prophet’s family, came to be accepted by the Sunnite majority as a permissible interpretation of Islamic piety.
Al-Sadiq’s attitude toward politics became the cornerstone of the imamite political theory, which, in the absence of political guidance from the hidden imam, did not teach its followers to overthrow tyrannical rulers and replace them by the imam. Instead, the leadership of the community was divided into temporal and spiritual spheres. The former was vested in the ruling dynasty, which in theory required designation (nass) by the Prophet, but was acceptable as long as its sphere of action was limited to the execution of the law. The spiritual sphere also required a clear designation by the Prophet, passed on through his descendants, since the holder of spiritual authority resided in Ali, duly designated by the Prophet. This leadership was handed on through a line of imams, each of whom was designated by his predecessor. When the Messianic Imam appears, temporal and spiritual authority will merge in his person, and he, like the Prophet, will uniquely unite the two spheres of ideal Islamic rule. Thus, the idea of imamate by designation among Ali’s descendants, continuing through all political circumstances, was complemented by that of an imamate based not primarily on political claims, but on the special privilege of possessing prophetic knowledge.
Aside from many failed rebellions, the Shi‘i played critical roles in ending the Umayyad dynasty, and the Shi‘i Buwayhid, a Persian dynasty, actually succeeded in controlling the Abbasid Caliphate for over 100 years.
The Shi‘i Fatimid dynasty was a competitor to the Baghdad Caliphate, and was located first in Tunisia and later in Egypt. The Almohads in the Maghrib were another Shi‘i group that succeeded. More dramatically, the Nizari Cult of the Assassins, founded by Hassan Sabbah and centered at the mountain fortress of Alamut, terrorized both Christian and Muslim leaders during the Crusades and gave Europe the word assassin (corruption of Hashish, which was used in their rituals.
However, the fortunes of the Shi‘a were very precarious until their establishment as the state religion of the Safavid dynasty in Persia in the sixteenth century. From this point on, the Twelver Shi‘a received significant support, protection and funding from the Persian state, and major theological centers were built up in Esfahan, Najaf, Qom and Meshed.
It has been particularly since the sixteenth century of the Christian calendar that the Twelver Shi‘a have become the dominant Shi‘a sect and developed a very distinct character from the Sunni majority. Here, the Twelver cause has taken on a strong identification with Iranian foreign policy and Twelver minorities in other countries have looked to Iran for support. And Iran has viewed Twelvers abroad as the country’s clients.
In the first few centuries of the Islamic era, any of Ali’s descendants (called Alids) were considered as acceptable candidates to be leaders of the Shi‘a, but as time went on it became more important for the Shi‘a leader to be descended from Ali through Husayn along a designated line.
Unlike the Sunni, the Shi‘a normally use the term imam to refer only to Ali and those descendants of his who lead the Shi‘a faction. The most significant divide among the Shi‘a today is among those recognizing twelve imams known as Twelvers, and those recognizing seven, known as Seveners, or more commonly Isma‘ilis, after Isma‘il, their seventh Imam, and the Zaydis who differ after the fourth Imam, and who accept any Alid who is learned and who asserts his rule through force of arms.
A significant feature of Twelver Shi‘a belief is their expectation of the return of the last Imam, called the Mahdi, to lead the faithful in establishing the Shi‘a belief on Islam in preparation for the Judgment Day. This ideology has many similarities with the Messiah ideology of Judaism and Christianity.
Other features with roots in Judeo-Christian tradition are the focus on the trials of the martyrs (rawda kani) and exultation of martyrdom in general, the use of self-flagellation as part of religious ritual and the commemoration of the ten days ending in the events of Karbala (ta’ziya) which are the central event of the Shi‘a calendar and bear significant similarities to the passion of Christ.
One interesting element in Shi‘a Islam is the permission to dissimulate (taqiyya), that is to deny ones faith in public in order to avoid social problems, while one maintains it in private. Another element is the principle of temporary marriage (in Arabic, mut‘a, in Persian, sigheh), in which a marriage contract can be entered for a set time, for any period of time between one day and ninety-nine years. The woman entering the mut‘a is paid a set amount of money. According to some Shi‘a traditions, a man performing four mut‘as is secured a place in Paradise. With the Iranian revolution, the system of mut‘a was re-installed as a part of the total Muslim practice.
While the Sunni consider the Shi‘a as innovators who introduced new and unorthodox elements into Islam, the Shi‘a view themselves as the true fundamentalists of Islam by retaining the leadership of Muhammad’s household.
This dilemma can be understood in the context of the methods with which the early Muslims sought guidance in matters not explicitly covered in the Qur’an. The Shi‘a relied upon the opinions of their imams, who as descendants of Muhammad and ‘Ali were viewed as having a closer connection to the divine. The Sunni relied on traditions based in theological and juridical schools which involved drawing analogies from the Qur’an and hadith, as well as from the consensus of theologians where analogies were not possible.
The four imams agreed upon by almost all currently existing branches of Shi‘a Islam are Ali, Hassan, Husayn, and Ali Zayn al-Abidin.
The Zaydis of northern Yemen recognize Ali Zayn al-Abidin’s son Zayd as the rightful imam. Following this they recognize a multitude of imams at different times and in different places. The most significant line of imams was founded in Yemen in 893 of the Christian calendar and lasted until the 1960s.
The Isma‘ilis and Twelvers both recognize Muhammad al-Baqir and Jafar as Sadiq. After this, the Isma‘ilis consider Jafar’s son Isma‘il as the truthful imam. The various Isma‘ili traditions then recognize different lines of imams which reach all the way up until modern time.
The Twelvers continue with Musa al-Kazim, Ali ar Rida, Muhammad at Taqi, Ali al-Hadi, Hassan al-Askari and Muhammad al-Mahdi, their last Imam whom they believe went into occultation. Hence, the last imam never died.
The Twelver Shi‘a are also sometimes referred to as Rafidi, Jafari, Mutawahi, Qizilbash, Imami, Ithna Ashari, and al-Khassa.
Some offshoots of Shi‘a Islam include the Druze, Alawites and the Baha’i.
The following is an outline of the Shi‘a imams and their derivative sects:
‘Ali (d. 661)
* Saba ‘iyya (who claim that ‘Ali is God, and that he went into occultation)
Hassan (d. 669)
* Kaysaniyya
* Karibiyya
* Hashimiyya
* Abbasiyya
* Rizaniyya/Muslimiyya
* Mukhtariyya
* Bayaniyya
Husayn (d. 680)
Ali Zayn al-Abidin (d. 712 or 713)
* Zaydiyya (Zayd claimed to be the fifth imam)
* Jarudiyya
* Sulaymaniyya/Jaririyya
* Butriyya/Salihiyya
Muhammad al-Baqir (d. 743)
* Janahiyya (God incarnated in the prophets/imams)
* Mughiriyya (anthropomorph God)
* Munsiriyya (symbolic understanding of the Qur’an. First, God created Jesus, then ‘Ali)
* Khattabiyya (Abdul Khattab claimed to be the imam, and hence the Prophet)
* Bazighiyya
* Mu’ammariyya
* Umayriyya
* Mufaddaliyya
* Ghurabiyya (‘Ali is above the Prophet)
* Baqiriyya
Jafar as-Sadiq (d. 765)
* Jafariyya (“Jafar is not dead!”)
* Aftahiyya
* Shumaytiyya
* Isma‘iliyya
* Mubarakiyya
* Fatimid Isma‘iliyya
* Mustalia
* Nizari
* Druze
Musa al-Kazim (d. 799)
* Musawiyya (“Imam Musa is not dead!”)
* Bajaliyya
* Bashariyya (Only perform sawm and salat)
Ali ar-Rida (d. 818)
* Ahmadiyya
* Mualifa
* Muhadditha
Muhammad at-Taqi (d. 835)
Ali al-Hadi (d. 868)
* Alawiyya
* Muhammadiyya
* Jafariyya
Hassan al-Askari (d. 873)
Muhammad al-Mahdi (occultation 941)
Similar to other schools of thought in Islam, Shia Islam is based on the teachings of the Islamic holy book, the Qur'an and the message of the final prophet of Islam, Muhammad. In contrast to other schools of thought, Shia Islam holds that Muhammad's family, the Ahl al-Bayt ("the People of the House"), and certain individuals among his descendants, who are known as Imams, have special spiritual and political authority over the community. Shia Muslims further believe that Ali, Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, was the first of these Imams and was the rightful successor to Muhammad and thus reject the legitimacy of the first three caliphs.
Shias regard Ali as the second most important figure after the Prophet Muhammad. According to them, Muhammad suggested on various occasions during his lifetime that Ali should be the leader of Muslims after his demise. According to this view, Ali as the successor of Muhammad not only ruled over the community in justice, but also interpreted the Sharia Law and its esoteric meaning. Hence he was regarded as being free from error and sin (infallible), and appointed by God by divine decree (Nass) to be the first Imam. Ali is known as "perfect man" (al-insan al-kamil) similar to Muhammad according to Shia viewpoint. As a result, Shias exclusively use sermons attributed to Ali, in contrast to the Sunni traditions where the sunnah is largely narrated by companions. Subsequently, the Shi'a have their own form of hadith.
Early in the history of Islam, the Shīʿites were a political faction (Arabic shīʿat ʿAlī, “party of ʿAlī”) that supported the power of ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib (the fourth caliph [khalīfah, successor of Muhammad]) and, later, of his descendants. Starting as a political faction, this group gradually developed into a religious movement, Shīʿism, which not only influenced Sunni Islam but also produced a number of important sects to which the term Shīʿah is applied.
The Prophet Muhammad died in 632 without an heir, none of his sons having survived to adulthood, and a broad consensus of those present at Medina nominated his longtime companion Abū Bakr as his successor. Abū Bakr died two years later and was succeeded in the caliphate by his assistant and adviser, ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭab. When ʿUmar was assassinated by a disgruntled Persian slave in 644, ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān was selected by a committee to become the third caliph. ʿUthmān was killed by rebels in 656.
From the time of the first caliph, a number of those within the Muslim community felt that ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, who was Muhammad’s first cousin and close confidant as well as his son-in-law and the father of Muhammad’s grandsons Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn (by Muhammad’s daughter Fāṭimah), was the natural choice to succeed the Prophet. In 656, ʿAlī was raised to the caliphate, partly with the support of those who had murdered the third caliph, ʿUthmān.
ʿAlī never quite received the allegiance of all the Muslims, however, and, in an effort to consolidate power, he was forced to wage a series of campaigns in an insurrection that came to be known as the first fitnah (“trial”). ʿAlī’s main opponent was the Muslim governor of Syria, Muʿāwiyah ibn Abī Sufyān, who was a kinsman of the murdered ʿUthmān (both men were members of the Umayyad clan—founders of the Umayyad dynasty—whose leaders had been fierce adversaries of Muhammad before their conversion to Islam). The antagonism between ʿAlī and Muʿāwiyah culminated in the Battle of Ṣiffīn (657), a conflict that ʿAlī appeared to be winning until he agreed to Muʿāwiyah’s demand for arbitration. ʿAlī’s concession angered a large faction within his forces, and the malcontents soon seceded (and were henceforth known as the Khārijites, “Seceders”), which ultimately weakened ʿAlī’s position. ʿAlī was murdered by a Khārijite in 661.
Muʿāwiyah became the next generally acknowledged caliph, and for some time ʿAlī was officially cursed from the pulpits of Islam. However, many Muslims, especially those of the garrison cities of southern Iraq, hoped for a restoration of the ʿAlids (i.e., lineage of ʿAlī). ʿAlī’s son Ḥasan made a short-lived bid for the caliphate soon after his father’s death, but he met with no success and retired. Later al-Ḥusayn refused to recognize the legitimacy of Muʿāwiyah’s son and successor, Yazīd I, as caliph. The Muslims of Al-Kūfah in Iraq, ʿAlī’s former headquarters, invited al-Ḥusayn to come there and offered to support his bid for the caliphate. The broader Muslim community in Iraq generally failed to support al-Ḥusayn, however, and he and his small band of followers were cut down in 680 by Umayyad troops near the town of Karbalāʾ (the Battle of Karbalāʾ), which is now a pilgrimage destination in central Iraq for Shīʿites.
Swearing vengeance against the triumphant Umayyad government, the remorseful residents of Al-Kūfah soon engaged in a series of unsuccessful insurrections against Umayyad rule. These were put down with great brutality, notably by the Umayyad provincial governor al-Ḥajjāj. In one such insurrection, the Shīʿite leader al-Mukhtār ibn Abī ʿUbayd al-Thaqafī put forward Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafiyyah, a son of ʿAlī from a wife other than Fāṭimah, as caliph. Such revolts tended to have a strong millenarian element, and, in the turbulent social and political circumstances of the late 7th and early 8th centuries, political differences slowly began to take on theological proportions. Extremist (ghulāt) groups began to proliferate, often attributing miraculous, even divine, status to ʿAlī and his family.
The people of Al-Kūfah ultimately gained support from other groups that opposed the status quo of the Umayyad dynasty. These included aristocratic Muslim families of Medina, pious men protesting what they considered too worldly an interpretation of Islam, and non-Arab Muslims (mawālī, “clients”), especially in Iraq, who demanded an equality denied them by the ruling Arabs.
The subsequent revolt, which ended in 750, finally put an end to Umayyad power. However, rather than an ʿAlid rising to the caliphate, the appointment went to a scion of another branch of the Prophet’s family, one descended from Muhammad’s uncle al-ʿAbbās. Under the ʿAbbāsid dynasty (750–1258), the theological, philosophical, and legal superstructure of what was to become the Sunni community developed and flourished. The insurrections of the Umayyad period died down, but a counterculture developed in the form of several diverse groups promoting Shīʿite candidates to leadership. One such group, the Zaydiyyah (named for Zayd ibn ʿAlī, a grandson of al-Ḥusayn), formulated its principles in the 9th century. The Zaydīs (members of the Zaydiyyah) demanded, sometimes with sword in hand, that the ruler be whichever descendant of Ḥasan or al-Ḥusayn (that is, the sons of ʿAlī by Fāṭimah) was proved qualified, at a given time, by his religious knowledge and his practical ability. Zaydī devotees set up several small states along the Caspian littoral in what is now northern Iran and in Yemen in southern Arabia, where Zaydī imams have since been spiritual leaders and where they ruled politically until 1962.
Zaydīs differed only marginally from mainstream Sunnis in their views on political leadership, but it is possible in this sect to see a refinement of Shīʿite doctrine. Early Sunnis traditionally held that the political leader must come from the tribe of the Prophet—namely, the Quraysh. The Zaydīs narrowed the political claims of the ʿAlids, claiming that not just any descendant of ʿAlī would be eligible to lead the Muslim community (ummah) but only those males directly descended from Muḥammad through the union of ʿAlī and Fāṭimah (the sect of Muhammad ibn al-Ḥanafiyyah died out in the 9th century).
Other Shīʿites, who came to be known as imāmiyyah (followers of the imams [religious leaders]), narrowed the pool of potential leaders even further and asserted a more exalted religious role for the ʿAlid claimants. They insisted that, at any given time, whether in power or not, a single male descendant of ʿAlī and Fāṭimah was the divinely appointed imam and the sole authority, in his time, on all matters of faith and law. The more speculative among them, the ghulāt, sometimes bestowed practically divine honors on the imams. The more moderate came, in time, to claim that at least a supernatural “Muhammadan light” embodied in the imams gave them superhuman knowledge and power and that their sufferings were a means of divine grace to their devotees. To those Shīʿites, love of the imams and of their persecuted cause became as important as belief in God’s oneness and the mission of Muhammad. Under Sunni rule, the imāmiyyah often were violently persecuted and sometimes protected themselves by dissimulating their faith (taqiyyah), but Shīʿite doctrine eventually came to hold that the imam, as mahdi (a divine savior), would deliver the faithful and punish their enemies.
Most Shīʿites eventually came to acknowledge one of two family lines (the imamate passing from father to son) stemming from ʿAlī but diverging at al-Ḥusayn’s great-grandson Jaʿfar ibn Muhammad (also called Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq). After Jaʿfar’s death (765), one group opted to follow his son Ismāʿīl. They became known as the Ismāʿīliyyah or the Seveners, because Ismāʿīl was the seventh and final imam in their lineage. The Ismāʿīlīs developed a unique religious system and established a caliphate of their own, ruled by the Fāṭimid dynasty (909–1171), in North Africa, which later spread to Egypt and briefly took power in the Levant. Ismāʿīlī devotees (notably the Assassins) also proselytized in Iraq, Iran, and other parts of the Mashriq (the region between the western border of Egypt and the western border of Iran).
This brand of Shīʿism was extremely esoteric and never developed a mass following in its realms. Most Fāṭimid subjects remained Sunni, but the sect survived in the offshoot Druze faith of Lebanon and Syria and in the present-day Khoja and Bohra merchant communities of India and eastern Africa. The Khojas, who are descended from the Nizārī branch of the Ismāʿīlīs, continue to follow the aga khans, a lineage of Muslim spiritual leaders who claim direct descent from ʿAlī. Another Ismāʿīlī dynasty, the Qarmatians, was active in eastern Arabia from the 9th through the 11th century.
Most Shīʿites now acknowledge another line, one descended from a second son of Jaʿfar, Mūsā al-Kāẓim. This lineage ended with the Twelfth Imam, Muḥammad al-Mahdī al-Ḥujjah, when he purportedly went into occultation (ghaybah) in 878. Consequently, this branch of Shīʿism is referred to as the Ithnā ʿAshariyyah (“Twelvers”). As his name might suggest, the Twelfth Imam, or Hidden Imam, as he is often known, took on eschatological significance for the followers of this branch of Shīʿism. He is expected to return as the mahdi before the Last Judgment to establish justice on earth.
Other groups associated with the Ithnā ʿAshariyyah are the ʿAlawites (Nuṣayriyyah) of Syria (the dominant political group in Syria in the late 20th and early 21st centuries); the ʿAlī Ilāhīs or Ahl-e Haqq, who are mostly scattered herdsmen and farmers of Kurdistan, Turkey, and Iran; and the Bektāshī order of dervishes in Turkey and Albania.
In addition to the Ismāʿīlī dynasties mentioned above, several other Shīʿite dynasties played important roles in Islamic history. The emirs of the Shīʿite Ḥamdānid dynasty (905–1004) were notable patrons of the arts. One of their renowned leaders, Sayf al-Dawlah (916–967), who fought a long series of campaigns against the Byzantine Empire, was a patron of the great Arab poet al-Mutanabbī, among others. Overlapping the Ḥamdānids chronologically, the Būyid dynasty (945–1055) dominated much of Iraq and western Iran, occupied Baghdad, and for many years effectively controlled the ʿAbbāsid caliphate. Such was the scope of Shīʿite political power during the 10th century that often it has been referred to as the Shīʿite Century.
Despite the prominence of great Shīʿite polities, however, Shīʿism remained almost everywhere a minority faith until the start of the 16th century, when Ismāʿīl I founded the Ṣafavid dynasty (1502–1736) in what is now Iran and made Shīʿism the official creed of his realm. ʿAbbās I (1571–1629) later moved the Ṣafavid capital to Eṣfahān and established a series of madrasahs (religious schools), effectively shifting the intellectual center of Shīʿism from Iraq to Iran and adding rigor to Shīʿite doctrine in that country. Extreme (ghuluww) religious viewpoints and activities were mollified, and the more excessive groups—including those who were important in supporting early Ṣafavid dynastic claims—were sidelined. Over the next several centuries the empire spread, and conversion to Shīʿism steadily continued. By the early 18th century the Twelver Shīʿites had built a large and vibrant following among the Turks of Azerbaijan, the Persians of Iran, and the Arabs of southern Iraq.
By the time of the Ṣafavids, Shīʿite theological and legal doctrine had expanded and matured, precipitating doctrinal disputes that often became vitriolic between factions within the Ithnā ʿAsharī religious community. One faction, known as the Akhbāriyyah, felt that the only sound source of legal interpretation was the direct teachings of the 12 infallible imams, in the form of their written and oral testaments (akhbār). Their opponents, known as the Uṣūliyyah, held that a number of fundamental sources (uṣūl) should be consulted but that the final source for legal conclusions rested in the reasoned judgment of a qualified scholar, a mujtahid (i.e., one who is empowered to interpret legal issues not explicitly addressed in the Qurʾān). The eventual victory of the Uṣūliyyah in this debate during the turbulent years at the end of the Ṣafavid empire (early 18th century) was to have resounding effects on both the shape of Shīʿism and the course of Islamic history. The study of legal theory (fiqh; the purview of the mujtahids) became the primary field of scholarship in the Shīʿite world, and the concomitant rise of the mujtahids as a distinctive body signaled the development of a politically conscious and influential religious class not previously seen in the Muslim world.
Among the Ithnā ʿAsharī ʿulamāʾ (religious scholars), a consensus began to form that, in the absence of the Hidden Imam, the ʿulamāʾ themselves should act as his general representatives, performing such duties as administering income tax (khums, “one-fifth”) and the tax to benefit the poor (zakāt), leading prayer, and running Sharīʿah courts. Such doctrines were refined over the centuries, and in the late 20th century a Shīʿite scholar in Iran, Ruhollah Khomeini, expanded that concept, arguing that the ʿulamāʾ as a group were in fact the direct representatives of the Hidden Imam, pending his return. Although many Shīʿite divines continued to eschew the mixing of religion and politics, Khomeini’s theory of velāyat-e faqīh provided the framework for the establishment of a mixed democratic and theocratic regime in Iran in 1979.
Over time, Shīʿites became a distinct collection of sects, alike in their recognition of ʿAlī and his descendants as the legitimate leaders of the Muslim community. Although the Shīʿites’ conviction that the ʿAlids should be the leaders of the Islamic world was never fulfilled, ʿAlī himself was rehabilitated as a major hero of Sunni Islam, and his descendants by Fāṭimah—who is venerated among Sunnis and Shīʿites alike—received the courtesy titles of sayyids and sharifs.
Shīʿites have come to account for roughly one-tenth of the Muslim population worldwide. The largest Shīʿite sect in the early 21st century was the Ithnā ʿAshariyyah, which formed a majority in Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Bahrain. The sect also constituted a significant minority in eastern Saudi Arabia and the other Arab states of the Persian Gulf region, as well as in parts of Syria, South Asia, and eastern Africa. The Ithnā ʿAshariyyah was the largest Shīʿite group in Lebanon, and Shīʿites in that country, as well as in Iran and Iraq, were among the most vocal representatives of militant Islamism. Smaller Shīʿite sects included the Ismāʿīliyyah, who formed the bulk of the Shīʿite community in parts of Pakistan, India, and eastern Africa, and the Zaydiyyah, who lived almost exclusively in northwestern Yemen. Various subsects of Shīʿism were also found in other parts of the Muslim world.
Shi'i see Shi‘a
Shi'ite see Shi‘a
Shi'atu 'Ali see Shi‘a
The Followers of 'Ali see Shi‘a
The Faction of 'Ali see Shi‘a
Shi'at 'Ali see Shi‘a
It was probably the murder of al-Husayn by Umayyad troops at Karbala in 680 and later the failure of the revolt of al-Husayn’s grandson, Zayd, in 739, which marked the turn toward a quietist attitude by the Shi‘a, who until then had been willing to fight for their ideals. But they continued to lack a specific ideology as late as the ‘Abbasid victory in 750. It was then that the great imam, Ja‘far al-Sadiq, who had been largely responsible for the moderation and discipline of the radical elements, provided Shi‘ism with a sectarian ideology. Moderate Shi‘ites continued to uphold the imamate of the descendants of al-Husayn through Ja‘far al-Sadiq until the line reached the twelfth imam, who was believed to be the Mahdi and the “hidden imam,” and whose return they awaited. These were the Imamiyya or “Twelvers.”
By the middle of the eighth century of the Christian calendar, the radical Shi‘ites had become so strong that one of their sects was able to help organize the revolution which established the ‘Abbasid caliphate. These rulers, however, disappointed their Shi‘ite followers by abandoning the messianic role and embracing Sunnism. It was at this time that the idea arose of a divinely guided savior imam, the Mahdi, who was believed to be endowed with divine knowledge like that of the Prophet himself. This idea stirred the imaginations of all who had been deprived of their rights under the existing regimes. Ambitious men found that they could manipulate the genuine religious devotion of ordinary people in the name of the descendants of Ali. But the failure of these individuals to establish the rule of justice gave rise to the two central beliefs in the idea of the Imam Mahdi: the concealment (ghayba) and return (raj‘a) of the Messianic Imam at the appropriate time. These beliefs helped the Shi‘ites endure under difficult circumstances. Lack of information on the exact time when the hidden imam would appear required them to be alert at all times.
In the political turmoil of the period, al-Sadiq had the opportunity to propagate Shi‘ite viewpoints without inhibition and to modify the radical tone of early Shi‘ism into a more sober and tolerant school of Islamic thought. Al-Sadiq was accepted by all Shi‘ites as their imam, including those of radical bent who attempted to establish the political power of Ali’s descendants. Al-Sadiq was also accepted as an authentic transmitter of the hadith in the Sunnite compilation. This indicates that it was almost certainly under his leadership that moderate Shi‘ism, with its veneration of the Prophet’s family, came to be accepted by the Sunnite majority as a permissible interpretation of Islamic piety.
Al-Sadiq’s attitude toward politics became the cornerstone of the imamite political theory, which, in the absence of political guidance from the hidden imam, did not teach its followers to overthrow tyrannical rulers and replace them by the imam. Instead, the leadership of the community was divided into temporal and spiritual spheres. The former was vested in the ruling dynasty, which in theory required designation (nass) by the Prophet, but was acceptable as long as its sphere of action was limited to the execution of the law. The spiritual sphere also required a clear designation by the Prophet, passed on through his descendants, since the holder of spiritual authority resided in Ali, duly designated by the Prophet. This leadership was handed on through a line of imams, each of whom was designated by his predecessor. When the Messianic Imam appears, temporal and spiritual authority will merge in his person, and he, like the Prophet, will uniquely unite the two spheres of ideal Islamic rule. Thus, the idea of imamate by designation among Ali’s descendants, continuing through all political circumstances, was complemented by that of an imamate based not primarily on political claims, but on the special privilege of possessing prophetic knowledge.
Aside from many failed rebellions, the Shi‘i played critical roles in ending the Umayyad dynasty, and the Shi‘i Buwayhid, a Persian dynasty, actually succeeded in controlling the Abbasid Caliphate for over 100 years.
The Shi‘i Fatimid dynasty was a competitor to the Baghdad Caliphate, and was located first in Tunisia and later in Egypt. The Almohads in the Maghrib were another Shi‘i group that succeeded. More dramatically, the Nizari Cult of the Assassins, founded by Hassan Sabbah and centered at the mountain fortress of Alamut, terrorized both Christian and Muslim leaders during the Crusades and gave Europe the word assassin (corruption of Hashish, which was used in their rituals.
However, the fortunes of the Shi‘a were very precarious until their establishment as the state religion of the Safavid dynasty in Persia in the sixteenth century. From this point on, the Twelver Shi‘a received significant support, protection and funding from the Persian state, and major theological centers were built up in Esfahan, Najaf, Qom and Meshed.
It has been particularly since the sixteenth century of the Christian calendar that the Twelver Shi‘a have become the dominant Shi‘a sect and developed a very distinct character from the Sunni majority. Here, the Twelver cause has taken on a strong identification with Iranian foreign policy and Twelver minorities in other countries have looked to Iran for support. And Iran has viewed Twelvers abroad as the country’s clients.
In the first few centuries of the Islamic era, any of Ali’s descendants (called Alids) were considered as acceptable candidates to be leaders of the Shi‘a, but as time went on it became more important for the Shi‘a leader to be descended from Ali through Husayn along a designated line.
Unlike the Sunni, the Shi‘a normally use the term imam to refer only to Ali and those descendants of his who lead the Shi‘a faction. The most significant divide among the Shi‘a today is among those recognizing twelve imams known as Twelvers, and those recognizing seven, known as Seveners, or more commonly Isma‘ilis, after Isma‘il, their seventh Imam, and the Zaydis who differ after the fourth Imam, and who accept any Alid who is learned and who asserts his rule through force of arms.
A significant feature of Twelver Shi‘a belief is their expectation of the return of the last Imam, called the Mahdi, to lead the faithful in establishing the Shi‘a belief on Islam in preparation for the Judgment Day. This ideology has many similarities with the Messiah ideology of Judaism and Christianity.
Other features with roots in Judeo-Christian tradition are the focus on the trials of the martyrs (rawda kani) and exultation of martyrdom in general, the use of self-flagellation as part of religious ritual and the commemoration of the ten days ending in the events of Karbala (ta’ziya) which are the central event of the Shi‘a calendar and bear significant similarities to the passion of Christ.
One interesting element in Shi‘a Islam is the permission to dissimulate (taqiyya), that is to deny ones faith in public in order to avoid social problems, while one maintains it in private. Another element is the principle of temporary marriage (in Arabic, mut‘a, in Persian, sigheh), in which a marriage contract can be entered for a set time, for any period of time between one day and ninety-nine years. The woman entering the mut‘a is paid a set amount of money. According to some Shi‘a traditions, a man performing four mut‘as is secured a place in Paradise. With the Iranian revolution, the system of mut‘a was re-installed as a part of the total Muslim practice.
While the Sunni consider the Shi‘a as innovators who introduced new and unorthodox elements into Islam, the Shi‘a view themselves as the true fundamentalists of Islam by retaining the leadership of Muhammad’s household.
This dilemma can be understood in the context of the methods with which the early Muslims sought guidance in matters not explicitly covered in the Qur’an. The Shi‘a relied upon the opinions of their imams, who as descendants of Muhammad and ‘Ali were viewed as having a closer connection to the divine. The Sunni relied on traditions based in theological and juridical schools which involved drawing analogies from the Qur’an and hadith, as well as from the consensus of theologians where analogies were not possible.
The four imams agreed upon by almost all currently existing branches of Shi‘a Islam are Ali, Hassan, Husayn, and Ali Zayn al-Abidin.
The Zaydis of northern Yemen recognize Ali Zayn al-Abidin’s son Zayd as the rightful imam. Following this they recognize a multitude of imams at different times and in different places. The most significant line of imams was founded in Yemen in 893 of the Christian calendar and lasted until the 1960s.
The Isma‘ilis and Twelvers both recognize Muhammad al-Baqir and Jafar as Sadiq. After this, the Isma‘ilis consider Jafar’s son Isma‘il as the truthful imam. The various Isma‘ili traditions then recognize different lines of imams which reach all the way up until modern time.
The Twelvers continue with Musa al-Kazim, Ali ar Rida, Muhammad at Taqi, Ali al-Hadi, Hassan al-Askari and Muhammad al-Mahdi, their last Imam whom they believe went into occultation. Hence, the last imam never died.
The Twelver Shi‘a are also sometimes referred to as Rafidi, Jafari, Mutawahi, Qizilbash, Imami, Ithna Ashari, and al-Khassa.
Some offshoots of Shi‘a Islam include the Druze, Alawites and the Baha’i.
The following is an outline of the Shi‘a imams and their derivative sects:
‘Ali (d. 661)
* Saba ‘iyya (who claim that ‘Ali is God, and that he went into occultation)
Hassan (d. 669)
* Kaysaniyya
* Karibiyya
* Hashimiyya
* Abbasiyya
* Rizaniyya/Muslimiyya
* Mukhtariyya
* Bayaniyya
Husayn (d. 680)
Ali Zayn al-Abidin (d. 712 or 713)
* Zaydiyya (Zayd claimed to be the fifth imam)
* Jarudiyya
* Sulaymaniyya/Jaririyya
* Butriyya/Salihiyya
Muhammad al-Baqir (d. 743)
* Janahiyya (God incarnated in the prophets/imams)
* Mughiriyya (anthropomorph God)
* Munsiriyya (symbolic understanding of the Qur’an. First, God created Jesus, then ‘Ali)
* Khattabiyya (Abdul Khattab claimed to be the imam, and hence the Prophet)
* Bazighiyya
* Mu’ammariyya
* Umayriyya
* Mufaddaliyya
* Ghurabiyya (‘Ali is above the Prophet)
* Baqiriyya
Jafar as-Sadiq (d. 765)
* Jafariyya (“Jafar is not dead!”)
* Aftahiyya
* Shumaytiyya
* Isma‘iliyya
* Mubarakiyya
* Fatimid Isma‘iliyya
* Mustalia
* Nizari
* Druze
Musa al-Kazim (d. 799)
* Musawiyya (“Imam Musa is not dead!”)
* Bajaliyya
* Bashariyya (Only perform sawm and salat)
Ali ar-Rida (d. 818)
* Ahmadiyya
* Mualifa
* Muhadditha
Muhammad at-Taqi (d. 835)
Ali al-Hadi (d. 868)
* Alawiyya
* Muhammadiyya
* Jafariyya
Hassan al-Askari (d. 873)
Muhammad al-Mahdi (occultation 941)
Similar to other schools of thought in Islam, Shia Islam is based on the teachings of the Islamic holy book, the Qur'an and the message of the final prophet of Islam, Muhammad. In contrast to other schools of thought, Shia Islam holds that Muhammad's family, the Ahl al-Bayt ("the People of the House"), and certain individuals among his descendants, who are known as Imams, have special spiritual and political authority over the community. Shia Muslims further believe that Ali, Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, was the first of these Imams and was the rightful successor to Muhammad and thus reject the legitimacy of the first three caliphs.
Shias regard Ali as the second most important figure after the Prophet Muhammad. According to them, Muhammad suggested on various occasions during his lifetime that Ali should be the leader of Muslims after his demise. According to this view, Ali as the successor of Muhammad not only ruled over the community in justice, but also interpreted the Sharia Law and its esoteric meaning. Hence he was regarded as being free from error and sin (infallible), and appointed by God by divine decree (Nass) to be the first Imam. Ali is known as "perfect man" (al-insan al-kamil) similar to Muhammad according to Shia viewpoint. As a result, Shias exclusively use sermons attributed to Ali, in contrast to the Sunni traditions where the sunnah is largely narrated by companions. Subsequently, the Shi'a have their own form of hadith.
Early in the history of Islam, the Shīʿites were a political faction (Arabic shīʿat ʿAlī, “party of ʿAlī”) that supported the power of ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib (the fourth caliph [khalīfah, successor of Muhammad]) and, later, of his descendants. Starting as a political faction, this group gradually developed into a religious movement, Shīʿism, which not only influenced Sunni Islam but also produced a number of important sects to which the term Shīʿah is applied.
The Prophet Muhammad died in 632 without an heir, none of his sons having survived to adulthood, and a broad consensus of those present at Medina nominated his longtime companion Abū Bakr as his successor. Abū Bakr died two years later and was succeeded in the caliphate by his assistant and adviser, ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭab. When ʿUmar was assassinated by a disgruntled Persian slave in 644, ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān was selected by a committee to become the third caliph. ʿUthmān was killed by rebels in 656.
From the time of the first caliph, a number of those within the Muslim community felt that ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, who was Muhammad’s first cousin and close confidant as well as his son-in-law and the father of Muhammad’s grandsons Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn (by Muhammad’s daughter Fāṭimah), was the natural choice to succeed the Prophet. In 656, ʿAlī was raised to the caliphate, partly with the support of those who had murdered the third caliph, ʿUthmān.
ʿAlī never quite received the allegiance of all the Muslims, however, and, in an effort to consolidate power, he was forced to wage a series of campaigns in an insurrection that came to be known as the first fitnah (“trial”). ʿAlī’s main opponent was the Muslim governor of Syria, Muʿāwiyah ibn Abī Sufyān, who was a kinsman of the murdered ʿUthmān (both men were members of the Umayyad clan—founders of the Umayyad dynasty—whose leaders had been fierce adversaries of Muhammad before their conversion to Islam). The antagonism between ʿAlī and Muʿāwiyah culminated in the Battle of Ṣiffīn (657), a conflict that ʿAlī appeared to be winning until he agreed to Muʿāwiyah’s demand for arbitration. ʿAlī’s concession angered a large faction within his forces, and the malcontents soon seceded (and were henceforth known as the Khārijites, “Seceders”), which ultimately weakened ʿAlī’s position. ʿAlī was murdered by a Khārijite in 661.
Muʿāwiyah became the next generally acknowledged caliph, and for some time ʿAlī was officially cursed from the pulpits of Islam. However, many Muslims, especially those of the garrison cities of southern Iraq, hoped for a restoration of the ʿAlids (i.e., lineage of ʿAlī). ʿAlī’s son Ḥasan made a short-lived bid for the caliphate soon after his father’s death, but he met with no success and retired. Later al-Ḥusayn refused to recognize the legitimacy of Muʿāwiyah’s son and successor, Yazīd I, as caliph. The Muslims of Al-Kūfah in Iraq, ʿAlī’s former headquarters, invited al-Ḥusayn to come there and offered to support his bid for the caliphate. The broader Muslim community in Iraq generally failed to support al-Ḥusayn, however, and he and his small band of followers were cut down in 680 by Umayyad troops near the town of Karbalāʾ (the Battle of Karbalāʾ), which is now a pilgrimage destination in central Iraq for Shīʿites.
Swearing vengeance against the triumphant Umayyad government, the remorseful residents of Al-Kūfah soon engaged in a series of unsuccessful insurrections against Umayyad rule. These were put down with great brutality, notably by the Umayyad provincial governor al-Ḥajjāj. In one such insurrection, the Shīʿite leader al-Mukhtār ibn Abī ʿUbayd al-Thaqafī put forward Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafiyyah, a son of ʿAlī from a wife other than Fāṭimah, as caliph. Such revolts tended to have a strong millenarian element, and, in the turbulent social and political circumstances of the late 7th and early 8th centuries, political differences slowly began to take on theological proportions. Extremist (ghulāt) groups began to proliferate, often attributing miraculous, even divine, status to ʿAlī and his family.
The people of Al-Kūfah ultimately gained support from other groups that opposed the status quo of the Umayyad dynasty. These included aristocratic Muslim families of Medina, pious men protesting what they considered too worldly an interpretation of Islam, and non-Arab Muslims (mawālī, “clients”), especially in Iraq, who demanded an equality denied them by the ruling Arabs.
The subsequent revolt, which ended in 750, finally put an end to Umayyad power. However, rather than an ʿAlid rising to the caliphate, the appointment went to a scion of another branch of the Prophet’s family, one descended from Muhammad’s uncle al-ʿAbbās. Under the ʿAbbāsid dynasty (750–1258), the theological, philosophical, and legal superstructure of what was to become the Sunni community developed and flourished. The insurrections of the Umayyad period died down, but a counterculture developed in the form of several diverse groups promoting Shīʿite candidates to leadership. One such group, the Zaydiyyah (named for Zayd ibn ʿAlī, a grandson of al-Ḥusayn), formulated its principles in the 9th century. The Zaydīs (members of the Zaydiyyah) demanded, sometimes with sword in hand, that the ruler be whichever descendant of Ḥasan or al-Ḥusayn (that is, the sons of ʿAlī by Fāṭimah) was proved qualified, at a given time, by his religious knowledge and his practical ability. Zaydī devotees set up several small states along the Caspian littoral in what is now northern Iran and in Yemen in southern Arabia, where Zaydī imams have since been spiritual leaders and where they ruled politically until 1962.
Zaydīs differed only marginally from mainstream Sunnis in their views on political leadership, but it is possible in this sect to see a refinement of Shīʿite doctrine. Early Sunnis traditionally held that the political leader must come from the tribe of the Prophet—namely, the Quraysh. The Zaydīs narrowed the political claims of the ʿAlids, claiming that not just any descendant of ʿAlī would be eligible to lead the Muslim community (ummah) but only those males directly descended from Muḥammad through the union of ʿAlī and Fāṭimah (the sect of Muhammad ibn al-Ḥanafiyyah died out in the 9th century).
Other Shīʿites, who came to be known as imāmiyyah (followers of the imams [religious leaders]), narrowed the pool of potential leaders even further and asserted a more exalted religious role for the ʿAlid claimants. They insisted that, at any given time, whether in power or not, a single male descendant of ʿAlī and Fāṭimah was the divinely appointed imam and the sole authority, in his time, on all matters of faith and law. The more speculative among them, the ghulāt, sometimes bestowed practically divine honors on the imams. The more moderate came, in time, to claim that at least a supernatural “Muhammadan light” embodied in the imams gave them superhuman knowledge and power and that their sufferings were a means of divine grace to their devotees. To those Shīʿites, love of the imams and of their persecuted cause became as important as belief in God’s oneness and the mission of Muhammad. Under Sunni rule, the imāmiyyah often were violently persecuted and sometimes protected themselves by dissimulating their faith (taqiyyah), but Shīʿite doctrine eventually came to hold that the imam, as mahdi (a divine savior), would deliver the faithful and punish their enemies.
Most Shīʿites eventually came to acknowledge one of two family lines (the imamate passing from father to son) stemming from ʿAlī but diverging at al-Ḥusayn’s great-grandson Jaʿfar ibn Muhammad (also called Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq). After Jaʿfar’s death (765), one group opted to follow his son Ismāʿīl. They became known as the Ismāʿīliyyah or the Seveners, because Ismāʿīl was the seventh and final imam in their lineage. The Ismāʿīlīs developed a unique religious system and established a caliphate of their own, ruled by the Fāṭimid dynasty (909–1171), in North Africa, which later spread to Egypt and briefly took power in the Levant. Ismāʿīlī devotees (notably the Assassins) also proselytized in Iraq, Iran, and other parts of the Mashriq (the region between the western border of Egypt and the western border of Iran).
This brand of Shīʿism was extremely esoteric and never developed a mass following in its realms. Most Fāṭimid subjects remained Sunni, but the sect survived in the offshoot Druze faith of Lebanon and Syria and in the present-day Khoja and Bohra merchant communities of India and eastern Africa. The Khojas, who are descended from the Nizārī branch of the Ismāʿīlīs, continue to follow the aga khans, a lineage of Muslim spiritual leaders who claim direct descent from ʿAlī. Another Ismāʿīlī dynasty, the Qarmatians, was active in eastern Arabia from the 9th through the 11th century.
Most Shīʿites now acknowledge another line, one descended from a second son of Jaʿfar, Mūsā al-Kāẓim. This lineage ended with the Twelfth Imam, Muḥammad al-Mahdī al-Ḥujjah, when he purportedly went into occultation (ghaybah) in 878. Consequently, this branch of Shīʿism is referred to as the Ithnā ʿAshariyyah (“Twelvers”). As his name might suggest, the Twelfth Imam, or Hidden Imam, as he is often known, took on eschatological significance for the followers of this branch of Shīʿism. He is expected to return as the mahdi before the Last Judgment to establish justice on earth.
Other groups associated with the Ithnā ʿAshariyyah are the ʿAlawites (Nuṣayriyyah) of Syria (the dominant political group in Syria in the late 20th and early 21st centuries); the ʿAlī Ilāhīs or Ahl-e Haqq, who are mostly scattered herdsmen and farmers of Kurdistan, Turkey, and Iran; and the Bektāshī order of dervishes in Turkey and Albania.
In addition to the Ismāʿīlī dynasties mentioned above, several other Shīʿite dynasties played important roles in Islamic history. The emirs of the Shīʿite Ḥamdānid dynasty (905–1004) were notable patrons of the arts. One of their renowned leaders, Sayf al-Dawlah (916–967), who fought a long series of campaigns against the Byzantine Empire, was a patron of the great Arab poet al-Mutanabbī, among others. Overlapping the Ḥamdānids chronologically, the Būyid dynasty (945–1055) dominated much of Iraq and western Iran, occupied Baghdad, and for many years effectively controlled the ʿAbbāsid caliphate. Such was the scope of Shīʿite political power during the 10th century that often it has been referred to as the Shīʿite Century.
Despite the prominence of great Shīʿite polities, however, Shīʿism remained almost everywhere a minority faith until the start of the 16th century, when Ismāʿīl I founded the Ṣafavid dynasty (1502–1736) in what is now Iran and made Shīʿism the official creed of his realm. ʿAbbās I (1571–1629) later moved the Ṣafavid capital to Eṣfahān and established a series of madrasahs (religious schools), effectively shifting the intellectual center of Shīʿism from Iraq to Iran and adding rigor to Shīʿite doctrine in that country. Extreme (ghuluww) religious viewpoints and activities were mollified, and the more excessive groups—including those who were important in supporting early Ṣafavid dynastic claims—were sidelined. Over the next several centuries the empire spread, and conversion to Shīʿism steadily continued. By the early 18th century the Twelver Shīʿites had built a large and vibrant following among the Turks of Azerbaijan, the Persians of Iran, and the Arabs of southern Iraq.
By the time of the Ṣafavids, Shīʿite theological and legal doctrine had expanded and matured, precipitating doctrinal disputes that often became vitriolic between factions within the Ithnā ʿAsharī religious community. One faction, known as the Akhbāriyyah, felt that the only sound source of legal interpretation was the direct teachings of the 12 infallible imams, in the form of their written and oral testaments (akhbār). Their opponents, known as the Uṣūliyyah, held that a number of fundamental sources (uṣūl) should be consulted but that the final source for legal conclusions rested in the reasoned judgment of a qualified scholar, a mujtahid (i.e., one who is empowered to interpret legal issues not explicitly addressed in the Qurʾān). The eventual victory of the Uṣūliyyah in this debate during the turbulent years at the end of the Ṣafavid empire (early 18th century) was to have resounding effects on both the shape of Shīʿism and the course of Islamic history. The study of legal theory (fiqh; the purview of the mujtahids) became the primary field of scholarship in the Shīʿite world, and the concomitant rise of the mujtahids as a distinctive body signaled the development of a politically conscious and influential religious class not previously seen in the Muslim world.
Among the Ithnā ʿAsharī ʿulamāʾ (religious scholars), a consensus began to form that, in the absence of the Hidden Imam, the ʿulamāʾ themselves should act as his general representatives, performing such duties as administering income tax (khums, “one-fifth”) and the tax to benefit the poor (zakāt), leading prayer, and running Sharīʿah courts. Such doctrines were refined over the centuries, and in the late 20th century a Shīʿite scholar in Iran, Ruhollah Khomeini, expanded that concept, arguing that the ʿulamāʾ as a group were in fact the direct representatives of the Hidden Imam, pending his return. Although many Shīʿite divines continued to eschew the mixing of religion and politics, Khomeini’s theory of velāyat-e faqīh provided the framework for the establishment of a mixed democratic and theocratic regime in Iran in 1979.
Over time, Shīʿites became a distinct collection of sects, alike in their recognition of ʿAlī and his descendants as the legitimate leaders of the Muslim community. Although the Shīʿites’ conviction that the ʿAlids should be the leaders of the Islamic world was never fulfilled, ʿAlī himself was rehabilitated as a major hero of Sunni Islam, and his descendants by Fāṭimah—who is venerated among Sunnis and Shīʿites alike—received the courtesy titles of sayyids and sharifs.
Shīʿites have come to account for roughly one-tenth of the Muslim population worldwide. The largest Shīʿite sect in the early 21st century was the Ithnā ʿAshariyyah, which formed a majority in Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Bahrain. The sect also constituted a significant minority in eastern Saudi Arabia and the other Arab states of the Persian Gulf region, as well as in parts of Syria, South Asia, and eastern Africa. The Ithnā ʿAshariyyah was the largest Shīʿite group in Lebanon, and Shīʿites in that country, as well as in Iran and Iraq, were among the most vocal representatives of militant Islamism. Smaller Shīʿite sects included the Ismāʿīliyyah, who formed the bulk of the Shīʿite community in parts of Pakistan, India, and eastern Africa, and the Zaydiyyah, who lived almost exclusively in northwestern Yemen. Various subsects of Shīʿism were also found in other parts of the Muslim world.
Shi'i see Shi‘a
Shi'ite see Shi‘a
Shi'atu 'Ali see Shi‘a
The Followers of 'Ali see Shi‘a
The Faction of 'Ali see Shi‘a
Shi'at 'Ali see Shi‘a
Shibli, Abu Bakr Dulaf al-
Shibli, Abu Bakr Dulaf al- (Abu Bakr Dulaf al-Shibli) (861-945). Sunni mystic of Baghdad. After the execution of his friend al-Hallaj in 922, he led an eccentric life. His tomb was venerated at Baghdad.
Abu Bakr Dulaf al-Shibli see Shibli, Abu Bakr Dulaf al-
Shibli, Abu Bakr Dulaf al- (Abu Bakr Dulaf al-Shibli) (861-945). Sunni mystic of Baghdad. After the execution of his friend al-Hallaj in 922, he led an eccentric life. His tomb was venerated at Baghdad.
Abu Bakr Dulaf al-Shibli see Shibli, Abu Bakr Dulaf al-
Shibli al-Dawla Nasr I
Shibli al-Dawla Nasr I. Member of the Midrasid dynasty of Aleppo and northern Syria (r.1029-1038). He defeated the Byzantines, but came to terms with the emperor. His reign ended with a temporary conquest by the Fatimids.
Shibli al-Dawla Nasr I. Member of the Midrasid dynasty of Aleppo and northern Syria (r.1029-1038). He defeated the Byzantines, but came to terms with the emperor. His reign ended with a temporary conquest by the Fatimids.
Shibli Nu’mani, Muhammad
Shibli Nu’mani, Muhammad (Shibli Nomani) (Allama Shibli Nomani) (June 3, 1857 - November 18, 1914, Azamgarh) (1857-1916). Indian scholar of Persian literature and Islamic history. The son of a wealthy landholder of Azamgarh (eastern Uttar Pradesh), Shibli pursued a peripatetic Islamic education in a variety of North Indian centers of learning. In 1883, he was appointed professor of Persian in the newly founded Aligarh College, later shifting to the professorship of Arabic. At Aligarh, his interests shifted from literature to Islamic history. Influenced by his British colleague T. W. Arnold, Shibli set out to write a series of works in Urdu, particularly of the early history of Islam. In 1893, he traveled to Istanbul to be honored by the Ottoman sultan. Upon his return, Shibli helped found the Nadwa’t al-Ulama, first a voluntary association of Islamic scholars and later a theological academy in Lucknow. In 1898, following the death of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, the founder of Aligarh College, Shibli resigned and devoted himself to his research and to establishing the leadership of the ulama in the political concerns of Indian Muslims.
Allama Shibli Nomani was an Indian scholar on Islam. He was born at Bindwal in Azamgarh district of present-day Uttar Pradesh. He is known for the founding of the Shibli National College in 1883 and the Darul Mussanifin in Azamgarh. Shibli was a versatile scholar in Arabic, Persian, Hindi, Turkish and Urdu. He was also a poet. He collected much material on the life of the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad but could write only the first two volumes of the planned work the Sirat-un-Nabi. His disciple, Syed Sulaiman Nadvi, made use of this material and added his own and wrote the remaining five volumes of the Sirat-un-Nabi after the death of his mentor.
Shibli was born to Shaikh Habibullah and Moqeema Khatoon. Although his younger brothers went to Aligarh for their education, Shibli received a traditional Islamic education. His teacher was Maulana Muhammad Farooq Chirayakoti, a rationalist scholar. He went to Mecca for the Hajj and there he devoted his time to furthering his studies in Islamic theology, history, philosophy and Sufism from different scholars in Arabia. An orthodox Hanafi Muslim, he was a staunch supporter of Shari’a.
When he returned to India, Shibli met Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817–1898) who had just established Aligarh Muslim University. Nomani was offered and accepted a teaching position at the university on February 1, 1882. He taught Persian and Arabic languages at Aligarh for sixteen years where he met Thomas Arnold and other British scholars from whom he learned first hand modern Western ideas and thoughts. He traveled with Thomas Arnold in 1892 to Syria, Egypt, Turkey and other countries of the Middle East and got direct and practical experience of their societies. His scholarship influenced Thomas Arnold on one hand and on the other he was influenced by Thomas Arnold to a great extent, and this explains the modern touch in his ideas. In Cairo, he met noted Islamic scholar Sheikh Muhammad Abduh.
After the death of Sir Syed Ahmed in 1898, he left Aligarh and became an advisor in the Education Department of Hyderabad State. He initiated many reforms in the Hyderabad education system. From his policy, the Osmania University of Hyderabad adopted Urdu as the medium of instruction. Before that no other university of India had adopted any vernacular language as the medium of instruction in higher studies. In 1908 he left Hyderabad and went to Lucknow to become the principal of Nadwat tul-‘Ulum (Nadwa). He introduced reforms in the school's teaching and curriculum. He stayed at the school for five years but the orthodox class of scholars became hostile towards him, and he had to leave Lucknow for his birthplace, Azamgarh, in 1913.
Earlier at Nadwa he wanted to establish Darul Musannifin or the House of Writers but there he could not do this. He bequeathed his bungalow and mango orchard and motivated the members of his clan and relatives to do the same and succeeded. He wrote letters to his disciples and other eminent persons and sought their cooperation. Eventually one of his disciples, Syed Sulaiman Nadvi fulfilled his dream and established Darul Musannifin at Azamgarh. The first formal meeting of the institution was held on November 21, 1914, within three days of Shibli's death.
Shibli’s genius had its flowering in Aligarh University when he came into contact with Sir Syed Ahmed and British scholars. Both Shibli and Sir Syed Ahmed wished for the welfare of Muslims, and wanted to have Western thinking and style come along with it. However, Sir Syed wanted to save the Muslims from the wrath of the British rulers after their active participation in the War of Independence, called the "Sepoy Mutiny" by the British colonialist rulers, whereas, Shibli wanted to make them self-reliant and self-respecting by regaining their lost heritage and tradition.
Shibli was a staunch supporter of Pan-Islamism. He wrote poems and articles decrying the British and other Western powers when Turkey was defeated in the Balkan Wars and he urged the world Muslims to unite. In 1913, when the British Administration in India stormed the Kanpur Mosque, Shibli condemned them.
Shibli Nomani – whose ancestor converted from Hindu Rajput to Islam - also had a caste mindset. On occasion, he humiliated his own step mother by calling her names like “chhawni / arbabe chhawni” because she was from low caste. However, later in life, Shibli asked for forgiveness from his stepmother mother and she forgave him.
Allama Shibli had two daughters, Rabia Khatoon and Fatima Jannutul , and one son, Hamid Hassan Nu'mani.
Shibli was well aware of the progress of science and education in the West. He wanted to inspire the Muslims to make similar progress by having recourse to their lost heritage and culture, and warned them against getting lost in Western culture. In keeping with this goal, he wrote the following books:
* Sirat-un-Nabi
* Sirat an-Nu'man,
* Al-Faruq,
* Al-Ma’mun,
* Al-Ghazali,
* Imam Ibn-e-Tamia (Edited by Mohammad Tanzeel-ul-siddiqi al-husaini ),
* Mawlana Rumi
* Aurangzeb Alamgir Par Ek Nazar
* Shiʾr al-ʻAjam, a history of Persian poetry
* "Ilm-Kalam", The best book on the history of Muslim theology
Muhammad Shibli Nu'mani see Shibli Nu’mani, Muhammad
Shibli Nomani see Shibli Nu’mani, Muhammad
Alama Shibli Nomani see Shibli Nu’mani, Muhammad
Shibli Nu’mani, Muhammad (Shibli Nomani) (Allama Shibli Nomani) (June 3, 1857 - November 18, 1914, Azamgarh) (1857-1916). Indian scholar of Persian literature and Islamic history. The son of a wealthy landholder of Azamgarh (eastern Uttar Pradesh), Shibli pursued a peripatetic Islamic education in a variety of North Indian centers of learning. In 1883, he was appointed professor of Persian in the newly founded Aligarh College, later shifting to the professorship of Arabic. At Aligarh, his interests shifted from literature to Islamic history. Influenced by his British colleague T. W. Arnold, Shibli set out to write a series of works in Urdu, particularly of the early history of Islam. In 1893, he traveled to Istanbul to be honored by the Ottoman sultan. Upon his return, Shibli helped found the Nadwa’t al-Ulama, first a voluntary association of Islamic scholars and later a theological academy in Lucknow. In 1898, following the death of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, the founder of Aligarh College, Shibli resigned and devoted himself to his research and to establishing the leadership of the ulama in the political concerns of Indian Muslims.
Allama Shibli Nomani was an Indian scholar on Islam. He was born at Bindwal in Azamgarh district of present-day Uttar Pradesh. He is known for the founding of the Shibli National College in 1883 and the Darul Mussanifin in Azamgarh. Shibli was a versatile scholar in Arabic, Persian, Hindi, Turkish and Urdu. He was also a poet. He collected much material on the life of the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad but could write only the first two volumes of the planned work the Sirat-un-Nabi. His disciple, Syed Sulaiman Nadvi, made use of this material and added his own and wrote the remaining five volumes of the Sirat-un-Nabi after the death of his mentor.
Shibli was born to Shaikh Habibullah and Moqeema Khatoon. Although his younger brothers went to Aligarh for their education, Shibli received a traditional Islamic education. His teacher was Maulana Muhammad Farooq Chirayakoti, a rationalist scholar. He went to Mecca for the Hajj and there he devoted his time to furthering his studies in Islamic theology, history, philosophy and Sufism from different scholars in Arabia. An orthodox Hanafi Muslim, he was a staunch supporter of Shari’a.
When he returned to India, Shibli met Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817–1898) who had just established Aligarh Muslim University. Nomani was offered and accepted a teaching position at the university on February 1, 1882. He taught Persian and Arabic languages at Aligarh for sixteen years where he met Thomas Arnold and other British scholars from whom he learned first hand modern Western ideas and thoughts. He traveled with Thomas Arnold in 1892 to Syria, Egypt, Turkey and other countries of the Middle East and got direct and practical experience of their societies. His scholarship influenced Thomas Arnold on one hand and on the other he was influenced by Thomas Arnold to a great extent, and this explains the modern touch in his ideas. In Cairo, he met noted Islamic scholar Sheikh Muhammad Abduh.
After the death of Sir Syed Ahmed in 1898, he left Aligarh and became an advisor in the Education Department of Hyderabad State. He initiated many reforms in the Hyderabad education system. From his policy, the Osmania University of Hyderabad adopted Urdu as the medium of instruction. Before that no other university of India had adopted any vernacular language as the medium of instruction in higher studies. In 1908 he left Hyderabad and went to Lucknow to become the principal of Nadwat tul-‘Ulum (Nadwa). He introduced reforms in the school's teaching and curriculum. He stayed at the school for five years but the orthodox class of scholars became hostile towards him, and he had to leave Lucknow for his birthplace, Azamgarh, in 1913.
Earlier at Nadwa he wanted to establish Darul Musannifin or the House of Writers but there he could not do this. He bequeathed his bungalow and mango orchard and motivated the members of his clan and relatives to do the same and succeeded. He wrote letters to his disciples and other eminent persons and sought their cooperation. Eventually one of his disciples, Syed Sulaiman Nadvi fulfilled his dream and established Darul Musannifin at Azamgarh. The first formal meeting of the institution was held on November 21, 1914, within three days of Shibli's death.
Shibli’s genius had its flowering in Aligarh University when he came into contact with Sir Syed Ahmed and British scholars. Both Shibli and Sir Syed Ahmed wished for the welfare of Muslims, and wanted to have Western thinking and style come along with it. However, Sir Syed wanted to save the Muslims from the wrath of the British rulers after their active participation in the War of Independence, called the "Sepoy Mutiny" by the British colonialist rulers, whereas, Shibli wanted to make them self-reliant and self-respecting by regaining their lost heritage and tradition.
Shibli was a staunch supporter of Pan-Islamism. He wrote poems and articles decrying the British and other Western powers when Turkey was defeated in the Balkan Wars and he urged the world Muslims to unite. In 1913, when the British Administration in India stormed the Kanpur Mosque, Shibli condemned them.
Shibli Nomani – whose ancestor converted from Hindu Rajput to Islam - also had a caste mindset. On occasion, he humiliated his own step mother by calling her names like “chhawni / arbabe chhawni” because she was from low caste. However, later in life, Shibli asked for forgiveness from his stepmother mother and she forgave him.
Allama Shibli had two daughters, Rabia Khatoon and Fatima Jannutul , and one son, Hamid Hassan Nu'mani.
Shibli was well aware of the progress of science and education in the West. He wanted to inspire the Muslims to make similar progress by having recourse to their lost heritage and culture, and warned them against getting lost in Western culture. In keeping with this goal, he wrote the following books:
* Sirat-un-Nabi
* Sirat an-Nu'man,
* Al-Faruq,
* Al-Ma’mun,
* Al-Ghazali,
* Imam Ibn-e-Tamia (Edited by Mohammad Tanzeel-ul-siddiqi al-husaini ),
* Mawlana Rumi
* Aurangzeb Alamgir Par Ek Nazar
* Shiʾr al-ʻAjam, a history of Persian poetry
* "Ilm-Kalam", The best book on the history of Muslim theology
Muhammad Shibli Nu'mani see Shibli Nu’mani, Muhammad
Shibli Nomani see Shibli Nu’mani, Muhammad
Alama Shibli Nomani see Shibli Nu’mani, Muhammad
Shihab, Fuad
Shihab, Fuad (Fuad Shihab) (Fuad Chehab) (Fouad Shihab) (b. March 19, 1902, Lebanon - d. April 25, 1973, Beirut). Lebanese army officer and statesman who served as president of Lebanon in 1958–64. Noted for his honesty and integrity, he brought a measure of stability to the government and to the nation.
Chehab received a military education in Syria and France and served with French mandatory forces in Syria after World War I. In 1945 he became commander of the Lebanese army. He first became prominent in the internal affairs of Lebanon in 1952, when violent opposition to the presidency of Bishara al-Khuri emerged. Chehab believed that his role as commander required him to defend the country against external aggression but not to maintain politicians in office, and he refused to give Khuri military support. Khuri was forced to resign and was succeeded by Camille Chamoun. In 1958, when open rebellion broke out against Chamoun’s regime, Chehab prevented the rebellion from spreading but again refused to give positive support. Chamoun left office when his term ended that September, and Chehab was elected to the presidency.
Chehab was considered to be the one person who could ease the tensions that accompanied the termination of Chamoun’s administration. He maintained a balance between the myriad sectarian, economic, and geographic interests that filled the Lebanese political scene. Working closely and harmoniously with the Cabinet, he kept basic power in his own hands and exercised direct control of the ministries of defense and the interior.
Chehab saw that the 1960 elections for the Chamber of Deputies were carried out with fairness. Taking the successful elections as an indication that the country had returned to normal, he announced his intention to resign. He was widely felt to be indispensable, however, and, bowing to popular pressure, he agreed to remain in office. He easily suppressed an attempted coup by the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (a small group trying to realize pan-Syrian unity) in 1961. Despite a proposal in the Chamber of Deputies for a constitutional amendment to allow him a second term, Chehab left office when his term ended in September 1964.
In 1964, Chehab, whose presence at the head of the country was still seen by many as the best option for stability and future reforms, refused to allow the Constitution to be amended to permit him to run for another presidential term. He backed the candidacy of Charles Helou who became the next president. Chehab later became dissatisfied with Helou's presidency over the perceived mishandling of the armed presence of Palestinian guerrillas in Southern Lebanon and over Helou's maneuvers to pave the way for the traditional feudal politicians to regain power.
Chehab was widely expected to contest the presidential election of 1970, but in a historical declaration he said that his experience in office convinced him that the people of his country were not ready to put aside feudal traditional politics and support him in building a modern state. He chose to endorse his protégé Elias Sarkis instead. In the closest vote in Lebanese history, Sarkis lost the election to the feudal leader Suleiman Frangieh by a single vote in the National Assembly. The election was regarded as a defeat for the old statesman and marked the end of the Chehabist reforms and era.
The first months of the Frangieh mandate saw the dismantling of the country’s intelligence and security services built by Chehab. They were feared and accused of still having a strong hold on political life. But this allowed rapidly multiple foreign interferences in the internal affairs of the country, soon manifesting as a Palestinian military presence in 1973 and the start of civil war in 1975. Fouad Chehab died in Beirut in April 1973 at the age of 71.
In 1976, Elias Sarkis, the Chehabist heir, was unanimously elected as President of the country in a hope to stop the civil war that had erupted and to reunite the nation. But such an attempt was too late as the Palestinian, Syrian, Israeli and other international direct interferences had by then taken full control of the political and security powers in the country. Without the support of domestic strong security services, Sarkis failed to create any impact or succeed in any of his initiatives.
Fuad Shihab see Shihab, Fuad
Fuad Chehab see Shihab, Fuad
Chehab, Fuad see Shihab, Fuad
Fouad Shihab see Shihab, Fuad
Shihab, Fouad see Shihab, Fuad
Shihab, Fuad (Fuad Shihab) (Fuad Chehab) (Fouad Shihab) (b. March 19, 1902, Lebanon - d. April 25, 1973, Beirut). Lebanese army officer and statesman who served as president of Lebanon in 1958–64. Noted for his honesty and integrity, he brought a measure of stability to the government and to the nation.
Chehab received a military education in Syria and France and served with French mandatory forces in Syria after World War I. In 1945 he became commander of the Lebanese army. He first became prominent in the internal affairs of Lebanon in 1952, when violent opposition to the presidency of Bishara al-Khuri emerged. Chehab believed that his role as commander required him to defend the country against external aggression but not to maintain politicians in office, and he refused to give Khuri military support. Khuri was forced to resign and was succeeded by Camille Chamoun. In 1958, when open rebellion broke out against Chamoun’s regime, Chehab prevented the rebellion from spreading but again refused to give positive support. Chamoun left office when his term ended that September, and Chehab was elected to the presidency.
Chehab was considered to be the one person who could ease the tensions that accompanied the termination of Chamoun’s administration. He maintained a balance between the myriad sectarian, economic, and geographic interests that filled the Lebanese political scene. Working closely and harmoniously with the Cabinet, he kept basic power in his own hands and exercised direct control of the ministries of defense and the interior.
Chehab saw that the 1960 elections for the Chamber of Deputies were carried out with fairness. Taking the successful elections as an indication that the country had returned to normal, he announced his intention to resign. He was widely felt to be indispensable, however, and, bowing to popular pressure, he agreed to remain in office. He easily suppressed an attempted coup by the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (a small group trying to realize pan-Syrian unity) in 1961. Despite a proposal in the Chamber of Deputies for a constitutional amendment to allow him a second term, Chehab left office when his term ended in September 1964.
In 1964, Chehab, whose presence at the head of the country was still seen by many as the best option for stability and future reforms, refused to allow the Constitution to be amended to permit him to run for another presidential term. He backed the candidacy of Charles Helou who became the next president. Chehab later became dissatisfied with Helou's presidency over the perceived mishandling of the armed presence of Palestinian guerrillas in Southern Lebanon and over Helou's maneuvers to pave the way for the traditional feudal politicians to regain power.
Chehab was widely expected to contest the presidential election of 1970, but in a historical declaration he said that his experience in office convinced him that the people of his country were not ready to put aside feudal traditional politics and support him in building a modern state. He chose to endorse his protégé Elias Sarkis instead. In the closest vote in Lebanese history, Sarkis lost the election to the feudal leader Suleiman Frangieh by a single vote in the National Assembly. The election was regarded as a defeat for the old statesman and marked the end of the Chehabist reforms and era.
The first months of the Frangieh mandate saw the dismantling of the country’s intelligence and security services built by Chehab. They were feared and accused of still having a strong hold on political life. But this allowed rapidly multiple foreign interferences in the internal affairs of the country, soon manifesting as a Palestinian military presence in 1973 and the start of civil war in 1975. Fouad Chehab died in Beirut in April 1973 at the age of 71.
In 1976, Elias Sarkis, the Chehabist heir, was unanimously elected as President of the country in a hope to stop the civil war that had erupted and to reunite the nation. But such an attempt was too late as the Palestinian, Syrian, Israeli and other international direct interferences had by then taken full control of the political and security powers in the country. Without the support of domestic strong security services, Sarkis failed to create any impact or succeed in any of his initiatives.
Fuad Shihab see Shihab, Fuad
Fuad Chehab see Shihab, Fuad
Chehab, Fuad see Shihab, Fuad
Fouad Shihab see Shihab, Fuad
Shihab, Fouad see Shihab, Fuad
Shilluh
Shilluh (Chleuh) (Shleuh) (Shluh</I). Name given to the Berber speaking peoples of Sus, of the High and
Anti-Atlas in Morocco, renowned for their poets.
The Chleuh people are a Berber ethnic group. They live mainly in Morocco's Atlas Mountains and Souss Valley. The Chleuh population is estimated to be approximately 10,000,000. They speak the Tachelhiyt language in several regional varieties. The indigenous peoples of the central Moroccan coast, noted by the early Phoenician explorers, would have been the Chleuh. The first millennium voyages of Hanno described the Phoenicians' methods of peacefully trading with the native peoples of the Mogador area.
The Chleuh are associated with Berber music of Morocco and dance.
Through a process of linguistic transference, which is not completely clear but evidently dates from the period of French colonial rule in North Africa, the name "Chleuh" also came to be a French pejorative term for Germans.
Chleuh see Shilluh Shleuh see Shilluh Shluh see Shilluh
The Chleuh people are a Berber ethnic group. They live mainly in Morocco's Atlas Mountains and Souss Valley. The Chleuh population is estimated to be approximately 10,000,000. They speak the Tachelhiyt language in several regional varieties. The indigenous peoples of the central Moroccan coast, noted by the early Phoenician explorers, would have been the Chleuh. The first millennium voyages of Hanno described the Phoenicians' methods of peacefully trading with the native peoples of the Mogador area.
The Chleuh are associated with Berber music of Morocco and dance.
Through a process of linguistic transference, which is not completely clear but evidently dates from the period of French colonial rule in North Africa, the name "Chleuh" also came to be a French pejorative term for Germans.
Chleuh see Shilluh Shleuh see Shilluh Shluh see Shilluh
Shinasi
Shinasi.. Pen-name of a number of Turkish poets, the best-known of whom is Ibrahim Efendi (1826-1871). While in Paris, he is said to have hung the Republican flag on the Pantheon during the Revolution of 1848. In 1860, he founded a journal, which was to exist until its suppression in 1925. He attempted to write a poem with Turkish words only, tried his hand at a comedy, and collected Turkish proverbs.
Shinasi.. Pen-name of a number of Turkish poets, the best-known of whom is Ibrahim Efendi (1826-1871). While in Paris, he is said to have hung the Republican flag on the Pantheon during the Revolution of 1848. In 1860, he founded a journal, which was to exist until its suppression in 1925. He attempted to write a poem with Turkish words only, tried his hand at a comedy, and collected Turkish proverbs.
Shina-speaking peoples
Shina-speaking peoples. Speakers of the Shina language are distributed throughout the mountainous regions of the upper Indus River and its tributaries, the Gilgit, lower Hunza, Tangir, Kishenganga, Astor and Dras rivers, an area which is now approximately bisected by the cease-fire line between Pakistan and India. Owing to an ambiguity in the distinction between ethnicity and linguistic affiliation among these people, an accurate estimate of their numbers is difficult to obtain, and census data are unreliable. Nearly all Shina-speaking peoples are Muslim.
Shina-speaking peoples. Speakers of the Shina language are distributed throughout the mountainous regions of the upper Indus River and its tributaries, the Gilgit, lower Hunza, Tangir, Kishenganga, Astor and Dras rivers, an area which is now approximately bisected by the cease-fire line between Pakistan and India. Owing to an ambiguity in the distinction between ethnicity and linguistic affiliation among these people, an accurate estimate of their numbers is difficult to obtain, and census data are unreliable. Nearly all Shina-speaking peoples are Muslim.
Shir ‘Ali, Barakzay
Shir ‘Ali, Barakzay (Sher 'Ali) (Shir 'Ali Khan)(Barakzay Shir ‘Ali) (Sher Ali Khan) (1825–February 21, 1879). Amir of Afghanistan (r.1863-1865 and 1867-1879). In 1865, his eldest brother Afdal Khan was proclaimed amir at Kabul, but he died almost immediately. In 1867, Shir ‘Ali returned from Afghan Turkestan where he had fled, and entered Herat, Qandahar, and Kabul. He sought assistance from the British against the Russians in 1873 had conquered Khiva. Rebuffed, he entered into relations with Russia. In 1878, the British government declared the second Afghan War. Shir ‘Ali placed his son Muhammad Ya‘qub Khan on the throne (r.1879-1880) and fled to Turkestan but died during the journey.
Sher Ali Khan was the son of Dost Mohammed Khan, founder of the Barakzai Dynasty in Afghanistan.
Sher Ali Khan initially seized power when his father died, but was quickly ousted by his older brother, Mohammad Afzal Khan. Internecine warfare followed until Sher Ali defeated his brother and regained the title of Emir. His rule was hindered by pressure from both Britain and Russia though Sher Ali attempted to keep Afghanistan neutral in their conflict. In 1878, the neutrality fell apart and the Second Anglo-Afghan War erupted. As British forces marched on Kabul, Sher Ali Khan decided to leave Kabul to seek political asylum in Russia. He died in Mazar-e Sharif, leaving the throne to his son Mohammad Yaqub Khan.
Sher Ali was closely affiliated to the modern day region of Potohar in Pakistan. He married one of his daughters to a prominent Tribal Chief of Gakhars, Khan Bahadur Raja Jahandad Khan. After independence, Gakhars became part of Pakistan.
Sher 'Ali see Shir ‘Ali, Barakzay Barakzay Shir ‘Ali see Shir ‘Ali, Barakzay Shir 'Ali Khan see Shir ‘Ali, Barakzay Sher Ali Khan see Shir ‘Ali, Barakzay
Shir ‘Ali, Barakzay (Sher 'Ali) (Shir 'Ali Khan)(Barakzay Shir ‘Ali) (Sher Ali Khan) (1825–February 21, 1879). Amir of Afghanistan (r.1863-1865 and 1867-1879). In 1865, his eldest brother Afdal Khan was proclaimed amir at Kabul, but he died almost immediately. In 1867, Shir ‘Ali returned from Afghan Turkestan where he had fled, and entered Herat, Qandahar, and Kabul. He sought assistance from the British against the Russians in 1873 had conquered Khiva. Rebuffed, he entered into relations with Russia. In 1878, the British government declared the second Afghan War. Shir ‘Ali placed his son Muhammad Ya‘qub Khan on the throne (r.1879-1880) and fled to Turkestan but died during the journey.
Sher Ali Khan was the son of Dost Mohammed Khan, founder of the Barakzai Dynasty in Afghanistan.
Sher Ali Khan initially seized power when his father died, but was quickly ousted by his older brother, Mohammad Afzal Khan. Internecine warfare followed until Sher Ali defeated his brother and regained the title of Emir. His rule was hindered by pressure from both Britain and Russia though Sher Ali attempted to keep Afghanistan neutral in their conflict. In 1878, the neutrality fell apart and the Second Anglo-Afghan War erupted. As British forces marched on Kabul, Sher Ali Khan decided to leave Kabul to seek political asylum in Russia. He died in Mazar-e Sharif, leaving the throne to his son Mohammad Yaqub Khan.
Sher Ali was closely affiliated to the modern day region of Potohar in Pakistan. He married one of his daughters to a prominent Tribal Chief of Gakhars, Khan Bahadur Raja Jahandad Khan. After independence, Gakhars became part of Pakistan.
Sher 'Ali see Shir ‘Ali, Barakzay Barakzay Shir ‘Ali see Shir ‘Ali, Barakzay Shir 'Ali Khan see Shir ‘Ali, Barakzay Sher Ali Khan see Shir ‘Ali, Barakzay
Shirazi, Abu Ishaq Ibrahim al-
Shirazi, Abu Ishaq Ibrahim al- (1003-1083). was a Shafi‘i jurist. He was greatly honored during his lifetime and wrote a legal compendium on which commentaries have frequently been written.
Abu Ishaq Ibrahim al-Shirazi see Shirazi, Abu Ishaq Ibrahim al-
Shirazi, Abu Ishaq Ibrahim al- (1003-1083). was a Shafi‘i jurist. He was greatly honored during his lifetime and wrote a legal compendium on which commentaries have frequently been written.
Abu Ishaq Ibrahim al-Shirazi see Shirazi, Abu Ishaq Ibrahim al-
Shirazi, Abu’l-Husayn ‘Abd al-Malik al-
Shirazi, Abu’l-Husayn ‘Abd al-Malik al- (Abu’l-Husayn ‘Abd al-Malik Shirazi). Mathematician from Shiraz who lived during the middle of the twelfth century. He prepared a synopsis of the Conic Sections of Apolloniu of Perge, which is of great value since the last three of the seven books of this work only survive in Arabic.
Abu'l-Husayn 'Abd al-Malik al-Shirazi see Shirazi, Abu’l-Husayn ‘Abd al-Malik al-
Shirazi, Abu’l-Husayn ‘Abd al-Malik al- (Abu’l-Husayn ‘Abd al-Malik Shirazi). Mathematician from Shiraz who lived during the middle of the twelfth century. He prepared a synopsis of the Conic Sections of Apolloniu of Perge, which is of great value since the last three of the seven books of this work only survive in Arabic.
Abu'l-Husayn 'Abd al-Malik al-Shirazi see Shirazi, Abu’l-Husayn ‘Abd al-Malik al-
Shirazis
Shirazis (c.957). Name of a dynasty established at Kilwa by ‘Ali ibn Husayn. They were immigrants from Persia, known as Banadir (literally, “seaports”), who intermarried with Bantu-speaking groups on the east coast of Africa. A second so-called Shirazi dynasty was founded by Shehe (Shaykh) Mvita, who gave the island and town of Mombasa their Swahili name. This dynasty died out in the late sixteenth century and was followed by another Shirazi dynasty, which ruled from 1631 until 1698, when the Ya‘rubids from Oman began to extend their influence over the towns on the east coast of Africa.
Shirazis (c.957). Name of a dynasty established at Kilwa by ‘Ali ibn Husayn. They were immigrants from Persia, known as Banadir (literally, “seaports”), who intermarried with Bantu-speaking groups on the east coast of Africa. A second so-called Shirazi dynasty was founded by Shehe (Shaykh) Mvita, who gave the island and town of Mombasa their Swahili name. This dynasty died out in the late sixteenth century and was followed by another Shirazi dynasty, which ruled from 1631 until 1698, when the Ya‘rubids from Oman began to extend their influence over the towns on the east coast of Africa.
Shirbini, Yusuf ibn Muhammad al-
Shirbini, Yusuf ibn Muhammad al- (Yusuf ibn Muhammad al-Shirbini). Egyptian moralist and poet of the seventeenth century. He describes the peasants of the Nile valley.
Yusuf ibn Muhammad al-Shirbini see Shirbini, Yusuf ibn Muhammad al-
Shirbini, Yusuf ibn Muhammad al- (Yusuf ibn Muhammad al-Shirbini). Egyptian moralist and poet of the seventeenth century. He describes the peasants of the Nile valley.
Yusuf ibn Muhammad al-Shirbini see Shirbini, Yusuf ibn Muhammad al-
Shirkuh
Shirkuh (Abu’l-Harith Asad al-Din Shirkuh) (Asad ad-Din Shirkuh bin Shadhi) (d. 1169). Uncle of Saladin. He entered the service of the Zangid Nur al-Din Mahmud of Aleppo, who in 1163 sent him to Egypt to assist Shawar in gaining the vizierate. Dirgham, the vizier of the Fatimid Caliph al-Adid li-Din Allah, was defeated, but then Shawar turned against Shirkuh. With the help of the Franks, Shirkuh was defeated in 1164 and returned to Damascus. In 1167, he again invaded Egypt, installed Saladin as governor in Alexandria, but was ousted by Shawar. In 1169, he was recalled to Egypt, this time by the caliph himself. After Shawar had been assassinated, Shirkuh became vizier, but died after only two months.
Asad ad-Din Shirkuh bin Shadhi (Shêr-guh literally means lion-ear in Kurdish), also known as Shêrko or "Shêrgo", was an important Muslim military commander, and uncle of Saladin. He was originally from a Kurdish village in Armenia near the town of Dvin. He was the son of Shadhi ibn Marwan, a Kurdish ruler, and was the brother of Najm ad-Din Ayyub, the ancestor of the Ayyubid dynasty. The family was closely connected to the Shaddadid dynasty, and when the last Shaddadid was deposed in Dvin in 1130, Shahdi moved the family first to Baghdad and then to Tikrit, where he was appointed governor by the regional administrator Bihruz. Ayyub succeeded his father as governor of Tikrit when Shahdi died soon afterwards. When Shirkuh killed a Christian with whom he was quarrelling in Tikrit in 1138, the brothers were exiled (Shirkuh's nephew Yusuf, later known as Saladin, was supposedly born the night they left). They joined Zengi's army, and Shirkuh served under Nur ad-Din who succeeded Zengi in Mosul. Shirkuh was later given Homs as a vassal state of Mosul. Ayyub served as governor of Baalbek and later Damascus, and the two brothers negotiated the surrender of Damascus to Nur ad-Din in 1154.
In 1163 Shirkuh convinced Nur ad-Din to send him to Egypt to settle a dispute between Shawar and Dirgham over the Fatimid vizierate. Saladin accompanied him as an advisor. Shawar was restored and Dirgham was killed. However, after quarrelling with Shirkuh, Shawar allied with Amalric I of Jerusalem, who marched into Egypt in 1164 and besieged Shirkuh at Bilbeis. In response Nur ad-Din attacked the Crusader states and almost captured the Principality of Antioch.
Shirkuh was sent back into Egypt in 1167, with Shawar once again allying with Amalric, who besieged Shirkuh in Alexandria until he agreed to leave. However, a Crusader garrison remained in Egypt and Amalric allied with the Byzantine Empire, planning to conquer it entirely. To destroy the garrison, Shawar switched alliances, from Amalric to Shirkuh. The Muslims fought a pitched battle with the Crusaders, who did not have the resources to conquer Egypt and were forced to retreat.
In January of 1169 Shirkuh entered Cairo and had the untrustworthy Shawar executed. He set himself up as vizier, but died two months later on March 22. He was succeeded as vizier by his nephew Saladin, who had served with him on his campaigns in Egypt. Saladin eventually succeeded Nur ad-Din as well, uniting Egypt and Syria, which enabled him to almost completely drive out the Crusaders from Syria and Palestine.
Shirkuh is a Kurdish-Persian name which literally means "the lion (of the) mountain". His Arabic honorific Asad ad-Din similarly means "the lion of faith".
Abu’l-Harith Asad al-Din Shirkuh see Shirkuh Shirkuh, Abu’l-Harith Asad al-Din see Shirkuh Asad ad-Din Shirkuh bin Shadhi see Shirkuh The Lion of the Mountain see Shirkuh The Lion of Faith see Shirkuh
Shirkuh (Abu’l-Harith Asad al-Din Shirkuh) (Asad ad-Din Shirkuh bin Shadhi) (d. 1169). Uncle of Saladin. He entered the service of the Zangid Nur al-Din Mahmud of Aleppo, who in 1163 sent him to Egypt to assist Shawar in gaining the vizierate. Dirgham, the vizier of the Fatimid Caliph al-Adid li-Din Allah, was defeated, but then Shawar turned against Shirkuh. With the help of the Franks, Shirkuh was defeated in 1164 and returned to Damascus. In 1167, he again invaded Egypt, installed Saladin as governor in Alexandria, but was ousted by Shawar. In 1169, he was recalled to Egypt, this time by the caliph himself. After Shawar had been assassinated, Shirkuh became vizier, but died after only two months.
Asad ad-Din Shirkuh bin Shadhi (Shêr-guh literally means lion-ear in Kurdish), also known as Shêrko or "Shêrgo", was an important Muslim military commander, and uncle of Saladin. He was originally from a Kurdish village in Armenia near the town of Dvin. He was the son of Shadhi ibn Marwan, a Kurdish ruler, and was the brother of Najm ad-Din Ayyub, the ancestor of the Ayyubid dynasty. The family was closely connected to the Shaddadid dynasty, and when the last Shaddadid was deposed in Dvin in 1130, Shahdi moved the family first to Baghdad and then to Tikrit, where he was appointed governor by the regional administrator Bihruz. Ayyub succeeded his father as governor of Tikrit when Shahdi died soon afterwards. When Shirkuh killed a Christian with whom he was quarrelling in Tikrit in 1138, the brothers were exiled (Shirkuh's nephew Yusuf, later known as Saladin, was supposedly born the night they left). They joined Zengi's army, and Shirkuh served under Nur ad-Din who succeeded Zengi in Mosul. Shirkuh was later given Homs as a vassal state of Mosul. Ayyub served as governor of Baalbek and later Damascus, and the two brothers negotiated the surrender of Damascus to Nur ad-Din in 1154.
In 1163 Shirkuh convinced Nur ad-Din to send him to Egypt to settle a dispute between Shawar and Dirgham over the Fatimid vizierate. Saladin accompanied him as an advisor. Shawar was restored and Dirgham was killed. However, after quarrelling with Shirkuh, Shawar allied with Amalric I of Jerusalem, who marched into Egypt in 1164 and besieged Shirkuh at Bilbeis. In response Nur ad-Din attacked the Crusader states and almost captured the Principality of Antioch.
Shirkuh was sent back into Egypt in 1167, with Shawar once again allying with Amalric, who besieged Shirkuh in Alexandria until he agreed to leave. However, a Crusader garrison remained in Egypt and Amalric allied with the Byzantine Empire, planning to conquer it entirely. To destroy the garrison, Shawar switched alliances, from Amalric to Shirkuh. The Muslims fought a pitched battle with the Crusaders, who did not have the resources to conquer Egypt and were forced to retreat.
In January of 1169 Shirkuh entered Cairo and had the untrustworthy Shawar executed. He set himself up as vizier, but died two months later on March 22. He was succeeded as vizier by his nephew Saladin, who had served with him on his campaigns in Egypt. Saladin eventually succeeded Nur ad-Din as well, uniting Egypt and Syria, which enabled him to almost completely drive out the Crusaders from Syria and Palestine.
Shirkuh is a Kurdish-Persian name which literally means "the lion (of the) mountain". His Arabic honorific Asad ad-Din similarly means "the lion of faith".
Abu’l-Harith Asad al-Din Shirkuh see Shirkuh Shirkuh, Abu’l-Harith Asad al-Din see Shirkuh Asad ad-Din Shirkuh bin Shadhi see Shirkuh The Lion of the Mountain see Shirkuh The Lion of Faith see Shirkuh
Shishakli, Adib
Shishakli, Adib (Adib Shishakli) (Adib ibn Hasan Shishakli). (b. 1909, Hama, Syria - d. September 27, 1964 Ceres, Brazil). President of Syria (r.1949-1954).
Adib ibn Hasan Shishaki was born to a Syrian father and a Kurdish mother in the city of Hama. Shishakli served with the French Army during the mandate era. He studied at the Military Academy of Damascus (which later was relocated to Homs) and became an early member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) of Antun Saadeh, promoting the concept of a Greater Syria. His brother Salah was also a prominent member of the SSNP. After independence, Shishakli fought in a volunteer Arab army, known as the Army of Deliverance, against the Zionist militias in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.
The Arab defeat in that war was a motivating factor for the military coup d'état of Husni al-Za'im which had taken place soon after in 1949, shattering Syria's weak parliamentary system. Only months after al-Za'im's takeover, the weak ruler was overthrown by a group of officers connected to the SSNP, including Shishakli and Colonel Sami al-Hinnawi, who led the new military junta. Za'im had betrayed the SSNP leader Antun Saadeh, giving him to Lebanese authorities where he was tried and executed for wanting to destroy the modern state of Lebanon. An infuriated Shishakli co-launched the coup of 1949 to revenge Saadeh's killing, and reportedly ripped off Za'im's bloodstained shirt and took it to Saadeh's widow, who was still in Syria, telling her: "We have avenged his murder!"
Shishakli worked with Sami al-Hinnawi, the new de facto ruler of Syria who refused to assume power on his own and restored Syria's parliamentary system. Hinnawi became chief-of-staff of the Syrian Army and the veteran nationalist Hashem al-Atassi, who had been president in the 1930s, became prime minister, and then president of Syria. Atassi wanted to create union with Hashemite Iraq, something which Shishakli greatly opposed, claiming that Hinnawi was the driving force behind pro-Hashemite sentiment in Syria.
In December 1949, Shishakli launched another coup, the third in 1949, arresting Hinnawi to break Hashemite influence in Syria, but keeping Atassi at his post. He then ordered the assassination of Colonel Mohammad Nasser, the Air Force Commander, because he threatened Shishakli's popularity in the Syrian Army. All of this greatly weakened the pro-union elements in Syria but they continued to try working for the union through the cabinets of Prime Minister Nazim al-Kudsi. Shishakli conditioned that all governments must include his right-hand-man Fawzi Selu as minister of defense, to curb Hashemite influence in the Syrian government. When Prime Minister Maarouf al-Dawalibi, a pro-Iraq politician from Aleppo, refused, Shishakli responded on November 28, 1951. He arrested Dawalibi and his entire cabinet, in addition to all pro-Iraq politicians in Syria, including the leaders of the People's Party, Nazim al-Kudsi and Rushdi al-Kikhya. In protest, Atassi resigned from office and moved into the opposition. Pleased to get rid of this stubborn nationalist, who rejected officer intervention in political affairs, Shishakli made his comrade Selu the Chief-of-Staff of the Army, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, and the Head of State. But in effect, Selu was nothing but a figurehead. Real powers lay in the hands of Adib al-Shishakli.
Shishakli then dissolved all political parties and banned many newspapers, in a return to military rule. Among those to suffer persecution under his rule were the National Party of Damascus, the People's Party of Aleppo, the Communist Party, the Baath Party, and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. He also outlawed all newspapers that were not pro-Shishakli, and banished the Baath leaders Akram al-Hawrani, Michel Aflaq, and Salah al-Bitar to Lebanon, where they then actively worked against his regime. He was a skilled public speaker, however, and relied greatly on the radio to transmit his speeches to every-day Syrians. In August 1952 he established an official government party, the Arab Liberation Movement, but it was boycotted by powerful representatives of the civilian political society, such as Hashim al-Atassi. The party was progressive, accepting women among its ranks and calling for a limited degree of socialism. Some said that he viewed himself as "an Arab Caesar." In mid-1953 Shishakli staged a referendum to elect himself President, but he was by then facing mounting dissent.
As leader of Syria, Shishakli sought good relations with Western countries, and maintained Syria's uncompromising stance towards Israel. Syrian relations with the Hashemite monarchies of Jordan and Iraq were poor during his presidency, but he also looked with distrust at the rapid spread of Nasserism. Many believe that Nasser's Free Officer Revolution of 1952 in Egypt had been modeled after Shishakli's own coups of 1949 and 1951. Shishakli's relations were strong, however, with King Abdul-Aziz of Saudi Arabia, his son King Saud, and King Talal of Jordan. Shishakli greatly liked King Talal, saying that he had no ambitions in Syria, unlike his grand-father King Abdullah I or his grandson, King Hussein. Despite this, and in contrast with his pro-Western outlook and some Kurdish background, Shishakli recognized the desires of Syria's Arab majority, and accordingly adopted a policy of pan-Arabism. He clashed frequently with the independent-minded Druze minority on the Jabal Druze mountain, accusing them of wanting to topple his regime using funds from Jordan, and in 1954 resorted to shelling Druze strongholds to put down resistance to his rule.
His relations with both Britain and the US ran hot and cold. Britain courted Shishakli during the early period of his rule in the hope that Syria would join plans for a British-led Middle East Defense Organization. The United States offered Shishakli considerable sums of money to settle Palestinian refugees in Syria and turn them into Syrians. Shishakli, although tempted by these offers of Western arms and money, did not take them. The Palestinian situation had soured Syrians on relations with the West. Syria wanted revenge rather than to accept defeat and repair Syria's damaged relations with the West and make peace with Israel.
Growing discontent eventually led to another coup, in which Shishakli was overthrown in February 1954. The plotters included members of the Syrian Communist Party, Druze officers, Baath Party members, and possibly had Iraqi backing. He had also arrested a lot of active officers in the Syrian Army, including the rising young Adnan al-Malki, also a prominent Baathist. Leading the anti-Shishakli movement were former President Atassi and the veteran Druze leader Sultan al-Atrash. The largest anti-Shishakli conference had been held in Atassi's home in Homs. Shishakli had responded by arresting Atassi and Atrash's sons, Adnan and Mansur (both of whom were ranking politicians in Syria).
When the insurgency reached its peak, Shishakli backed down, refusing to drag Syria into civil war. He fled to Lebanon, but when the Druze leader Kamal Jumblat threatened to have him killed, he fled to Brazil. Prior to the union between Syria and Egypt in 1958, Shishakli toyed with the idea of returning to Syria to launch a coup d'état, using funds provided by Iraq. The coup was foiled by Syrian intelligence and Shishakli was sentenced to death in absentia, although he never attended its hearings.
On September 27, 1964, Shishakli was assassinated at Ceres, Brazil by Nawaf Ghazaleh, a Syrian Druze who sought revenge for the bombardments of Jabal Druze.
Adib Shishakli see Shishakli, Adib Adib ibn Hasan Shishakli see Shishakli, Adib
Shishakli, Adib (Adib Shishakli) (Adib ibn Hasan Shishakli). (b. 1909, Hama, Syria - d. September 27, 1964 Ceres, Brazil). President of Syria (r.1949-1954).
Adib ibn Hasan Shishaki was born to a Syrian father and a Kurdish mother in the city of Hama. Shishakli served with the French Army during the mandate era. He studied at the Military Academy of Damascus (which later was relocated to Homs) and became an early member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) of Antun Saadeh, promoting the concept of a Greater Syria. His brother Salah was also a prominent member of the SSNP. After independence, Shishakli fought in a volunteer Arab army, known as the Army of Deliverance, against the Zionist militias in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.
The Arab defeat in that war was a motivating factor for the military coup d'état of Husni al-Za'im which had taken place soon after in 1949, shattering Syria's weak parliamentary system. Only months after al-Za'im's takeover, the weak ruler was overthrown by a group of officers connected to the SSNP, including Shishakli and Colonel Sami al-Hinnawi, who led the new military junta. Za'im had betrayed the SSNP leader Antun Saadeh, giving him to Lebanese authorities where he was tried and executed for wanting to destroy the modern state of Lebanon. An infuriated Shishakli co-launched the coup of 1949 to revenge Saadeh's killing, and reportedly ripped off Za'im's bloodstained shirt and took it to Saadeh's widow, who was still in Syria, telling her: "We have avenged his murder!"
Shishakli worked with Sami al-Hinnawi, the new de facto ruler of Syria who refused to assume power on his own and restored Syria's parliamentary system. Hinnawi became chief-of-staff of the Syrian Army and the veteran nationalist Hashem al-Atassi, who had been president in the 1930s, became prime minister, and then president of Syria. Atassi wanted to create union with Hashemite Iraq, something which Shishakli greatly opposed, claiming that Hinnawi was the driving force behind pro-Hashemite sentiment in Syria.
In December 1949, Shishakli launched another coup, the third in 1949, arresting Hinnawi to break Hashemite influence in Syria, but keeping Atassi at his post. He then ordered the assassination of Colonel Mohammad Nasser, the Air Force Commander, because he threatened Shishakli's popularity in the Syrian Army. All of this greatly weakened the pro-union elements in Syria but they continued to try working for the union through the cabinets of Prime Minister Nazim al-Kudsi. Shishakli conditioned that all governments must include his right-hand-man Fawzi Selu as minister of defense, to curb Hashemite influence in the Syrian government. When Prime Minister Maarouf al-Dawalibi, a pro-Iraq politician from Aleppo, refused, Shishakli responded on November 28, 1951. He arrested Dawalibi and his entire cabinet, in addition to all pro-Iraq politicians in Syria, including the leaders of the People's Party, Nazim al-Kudsi and Rushdi al-Kikhya. In protest, Atassi resigned from office and moved into the opposition. Pleased to get rid of this stubborn nationalist, who rejected officer intervention in political affairs, Shishakli made his comrade Selu the Chief-of-Staff of the Army, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, and the Head of State. But in effect, Selu was nothing but a figurehead. Real powers lay in the hands of Adib al-Shishakli.
Shishakli then dissolved all political parties and banned many newspapers, in a return to military rule. Among those to suffer persecution under his rule were the National Party of Damascus, the People's Party of Aleppo, the Communist Party, the Baath Party, and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. He also outlawed all newspapers that were not pro-Shishakli, and banished the Baath leaders Akram al-Hawrani, Michel Aflaq, and Salah al-Bitar to Lebanon, where they then actively worked against his regime. He was a skilled public speaker, however, and relied greatly on the radio to transmit his speeches to every-day Syrians. In August 1952 he established an official government party, the Arab Liberation Movement, but it was boycotted by powerful representatives of the civilian political society, such as Hashim al-Atassi. The party was progressive, accepting women among its ranks and calling for a limited degree of socialism. Some said that he viewed himself as "an Arab Caesar." In mid-1953 Shishakli staged a referendum to elect himself President, but he was by then facing mounting dissent.
As leader of Syria, Shishakli sought good relations with Western countries, and maintained Syria's uncompromising stance towards Israel. Syrian relations with the Hashemite monarchies of Jordan and Iraq were poor during his presidency, but he also looked with distrust at the rapid spread of Nasserism. Many believe that Nasser's Free Officer Revolution of 1952 in Egypt had been modeled after Shishakli's own coups of 1949 and 1951. Shishakli's relations were strong, however, with King Abdul-Aziz of Saudi Arabia, his son King Saud, and King Talal of Jordan. Shishakli greatly liked King Talal, saying that he had no ambitions in Syria, unlike his grand-father King Abdullah I or his grandson, King Hussein. Despite this, and in contrast with his pro-Western outlook and some Kurdish background, Shishakli recognized the desires of Syria's Arab majority, and accordingly adopted a policy of pan-Arabism. He clashed frequently with the independent-minded Druze minority on the Jabal Druze mountain, accusing them of wanting to topple his regime using funds from Jordan, and in 1954 resorted to shelling Druze strongholds to put down resistance to his rule.
His relations with both Britain and the US ran hot and cold. Britain courted Shishakli during the early period of his rule in the hope that Syria would join plans for a British-led Middle East Defense Organization. The United States offered Shishakli considerable sums of money to settle Palestinian refugees in Syria and turn them into Syrians. Shishakli, although tempted by these offers of Western arms and money, did not take them. The Palestinian situation had soured Syrians on relations with the West. Syria wanted revenge rather than to accept defeat and repair Syria's damaged relations with the West and make peace with Israel.
Growing discontent eventually led to another coup, in which Shishakli was overthrown in February 1954. The plotters included members of the Syrian Communist Party, Druze officers, Baath Party members, and possibly had Iraqi backing. He had also arrested a lot of active officers in the Syrian Army, including the rising young Adnan al-Malki, also a prominent Baathist. Leading the anti-Shishakli movement were former President Atassi and the veteran Druze leader Sultan al-Atrash. The largest anti-Shishakli conference had been held in Atassi's home in Homs. Shishakli had responded by arresting Atassi and Atrash's sons, Adnan and Mansur (both of whom were ranking politicians in Syria).
When the insurgency reached its peak, Shishakli backed down, refusing to drag Syria into civil war. He fled to Lebanon, but when the Druze leader Kamal Jumblat threatened to have him killed, he fled to Brazil. Prior to the union between Syria and Egypt in 1958, Shishakli toyed with the idea of returning to Syria to launch a coup d'état, using funds provided by Iraq. The coup was foiled by Syrian intelligence and Shishakli was sentenced to death in absentia, although he never attended its hearings.
On September 27, 1964, Shishakli was assassinated at Ceres, Brazil by Nawaf Ghazaleh, a Syrian Druze who sought revenge for the bombardments of Jabal Druze.
Adib Shishakli see Shishakli, Adib Adib ibn Hasan Shishakli see Shishakli, Adib
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