Qabid
Qabid (d.1527). Heretic mullah from Persia who was educated in Istanbul. Qabid maintained that the Qur’an depended in large measure upon the Old and New Testaments, and that Jesus was superior to the Prophet. After a trial, he was invited to recant and when he again refused, he was sentenced to death.
Qaboos ibn Said
Qaboos ibn Said (Qaboos bin Said) (Qaboos bin Said al Said) (b. November 18, 1940, Muscat and Oman). Sultan and ruler of Oman. He was born in Salalah, Oman. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, he studied in Britain, first at a college in Bury, and later at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst.
Qaboos, a member of Oman’s Āl Bū Saʿīd dynasty, was educated at Bury Saint Edmunds, Suffolk, England, and at Sandhurst, the Royal Military Academy, in Berkshire. He was called home in 1965 by his father, Saʿīd ibn Taymūr, who kept his son a virtual prisoner for six years while maintaining his subjects in a state of relative underdevelopment despite the country’s growing oil revenues.
In 1970 Qaboos took over the palace in a coup with British support and exiled his father. He immediately undertook a range of ambitious modernization projects, including constructing roads, hospitals, schools, communications systems, and industrial and port facilities. He abrogated his father’s moralistic laws and established a Council of Ministers (cabinet) and first one and later two consultative bodies. Political power, however, remained concentrated in the royal family, although Qaboos’s regime gradually allowed other Omanis (including women) to participate in the government. He also made considerable progress in ending Oman’s isolation by joining the Arab League and the United Nations, aligning his country with the moderate Arab powers.
Qaboos bin Said see Qaboos ibn Said
Qaboos bin Said al Said see Qaboos ibn Said
Qaboos ibn Said (Qaboos bin Said) (Qaboos bin Said al Said) (b. November 18, 1940, Muscat and Oman). Sultan and ruler of Oman. He was born in Salalah, Oman. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, he studied in Britain, first at a college in Bury, and later at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst.
Qaboos, a member of Oman’s Āl Bū Saʿīd dynasty, was educated at Bury Saint Edmunds, Suffolk, England, and at Sandhurst, the Royal Military Academy, in Berkshire. He was called home in 1965 by his father, Saʿīd ibn Taymūr, who kept his son a virtual prisoner for six years while maintaining his subjects in a state of relative underdevelopment despite the country’s growing oil revenues.
In 1970 Qaboos took over the palace in a coup with British support and exiled his father. He immediately undertook a range of ambitious modernization projects, including constructing roads, hospitals, schools, communications systems, and industrial and port facilities. He abrogated his father’s moralistic laws and established a Council of Ministers (cabinet) and first one and later two consultative bodies. Political power, however, remained concentrated in the royal family, although Qaboos’s regime gradually allowed other Omanis (including women) to participate in the government. He also made considerable progress in ending Oman’s isolation by joining the Arab League and the United Nations, aligning his country with the moderate Arab powers.
Qaboos bin Said see Qaboos ibn Said
Qaboos bin Said al Said see Qaboos ibn Said
Qabus ibn Wushmagir
Qabus ibn Wushmagir (Qabus ibn Wushmagir ibn Ziyar) (Qabus ibn Voshmgir) (Shams al-Mo'ali Abol-hasan Ghaboos ibn Wushmgir) (d. 1012). Ruler of the Ziyarid dynasty. Despite his reputation for cruelty, he achieved a great contemporary renown as a scholar and poet in both Arabic and Persian. He was also an expert calligrapher and an authority on astrology. Ibn Sina (Avicenna) took refuge at his court and al-Biruni, who came to Gurgan in 998, dedicated one of his works to him.
Shams al-Mo'ali Abol-hasan Ghaboos ibn Wushmgir (alt. Qabus) was the Ziyarid ruler of Gurgan and Tabaristan (977-981; 997-1012). He was the son of Vushmgir.
Upon Vushmgir's death in 967, his eldest son Bisutun marched to the capital Gurgan to take control of the Ziyarid state. A Samanid army that had arrived shortly before Vushmgir's death for a joint campaign against the Buyids, however, threw its support behind Qabus. When Bisutun gained the assistance of the Buyid Rukn al-Daula the Samanid army left for Khurasan. Qabus found a new ally in al-Hasan ibn al-Fairuzan, who ruled in Simnan, but Bisutun occupied both Gurgan and Simnan, forcing Qabus to give up his claims as his father's successor.
Bisutun's death in 977 provided Qabus with another opportunity to take control of the Ziyarids. Bisutun's governor of Tabaristan, the Gilite Dubaj ibn Bani, supported the deceased ruler's young son, and could rely on Samanid support. Qabus gained the loyalty of the Ziyarid army, however, and received assistance from the Buyid 'Adud al-Daula. Taking Gurgan from Dubaj, he captured Bisutun's son in Simnan. In 978 or 979 the caliph al-Ta'i granted Qabus the title Shams al-Ma'ali.
In 980, Qabus offered refuge to the Buyid ruler of Ray, Fakhr al-Daula, who had recently fought a losing war with 'Adud al-Daula. The latter offered the Ziyarid money and territory in exchange for the surrender of Fakhr al-Daula, but Qabus refused. 'Adud then invaded and conquered Tabaristan. In 981, 'Adud's brother Mu'ayyad al-Daula took Gurgan. Qabus and Fakhr al-Daula were forced to flee to Samanid Khurasan. The Samanids sent a force to take back the provinces, but were unsuccessful.
In 984, Fakhr al-Daula was able to recover his territories in Ray. Upon the advice of his vizier, however, he refused to give back Qabus control of Gurgan and Tabaristan. Qabus was forced to live in exile until 997, when Fakhr al-Daula died and was succeeded by his young son Majd al-Daula. Supporters of the Ziyarid gained control of Tabaristan and from there conquered Gurgan. Qabus returned there in 998 after a few Buyid attempts to expel him again failed.
Although he formally recognized the caliph as his sovereign, Qabus ruled effectively as an independent ruler for the rest of his reign. He opened up relations with Mahmud of Ghazna, setting the stage for the eventual Ghaznavid takeover of the Ziyarids, while the Buyids did not undertake any more campaigns against him. Internal troubles, however, soon cost Qabus his position. His heavy-handed approach with officials in the army eventually caused a conspiracy to be formed against him.
The army leaders failed to capture him in his castle outside Gurgan, but they took control of the capital and invited Qabus's son Manuchihr, the governor of Tabaristan, to take over. Manuchihr feared that he would lose the succession if he refused and joined the conspirators. He chased Qabus to Bistam, where the latter eventually agreed to abdicate. He retired to a castle where he could spend the rest of his life in devotion. The conspirators, however, still considered him to be a threat and had him frozen to death in 1012.
The tower of Gonbad-e Qabus was built for him as his tomb, and he is the subject of the Qabus nama, a major work of Persian literature from the eleventh century, which was written by his grandson.
His wife was the daughter of Mahmud of Ghazni of the Ghaznavid dynasty.
Qabus ibn Wushmagir ibn Ziyar see Qabus ibn Wushmagir
Qabus ibn Voshmgir see Qabus ibn Wushmagir
Shams al-Mo'ali Abol-hasan Ghaboos ibn Wushmgir see Qabus ibn Wushmagir
Qabus ibn Wushmagir (Qabus ibn Wushmagir ibn Ziyar) (Qabus ibn Voshmgir) (Shams al-Mo'ali Abol-hasan Ghaboos ibn Wushmgir) (d. 1012). Ruler of the Ziyarid dynasty. Despite his reputation for cruelty, he achieved a great contemporary renown as a scholar and poet in both Arabic and Persian. He was also an expert calligrapher and an authority on astrology. Ibn Sina (Avicenna) took refuge at his court and al-Biruni, who came to Gurgan in 998, dedicated one of his works to him.
Shams al-Mo'ali Abol-hasan Ghaboos ibn Wushmgir (alt. Qabus) was the Ziyarid ruler of Gurgan and Tabaristan (977-981; 997-1012). He was the son of Vushmgir.
Upon Vushmgir's death in 967, his eldest son Bisutun marched to the capital Gurgan to take control of the Ziyarid state. A Samanid army that had arrived shortly before Vushmgir's death for a joint campaign against the Buyids, however, threw its support behind Qabus. When Bisutun gained the assistance of the Buyid Rukn al-Daula the Samanid army left for Khurasan. Qabus found a new ally in al-Hasan ibn al-Fairuzan, who ruled in Simnan, but Bisutun occupied both Gurgan and Simnan, forcing Qabus to give up his claims as his father's successor.
Bisutun's death in 977 provided Qabus with another opportunity to take control of the Ziyarids. Bisutun's governor of Tabaristan, the Gilite Dubaj ibn Bani, supported the deceased ruler's young son, and could rely on Samanid support. Qabus gained the loyalty of the Ziyarid army, however, and received assistance from the Buyid 'Adud al-Daula. Taking Gurgan from Dubaj, he captured Bisutun's son in Simnan. In 978 or 979 the caliph al-Ta'i granted Qabus the title Shams al-Ma'ali.
In 980, Qabus offered refuge to the Buyid ruler of Ray, Fakhr al-Daula, who had recently fought a losing war with 'Adud al-Daula. The latter offered the Ziyarid money and territory in exchange for the surrender of Fakhr al-Daula, but Qabus refused. 'Adud then invaded and conquered Tabaristan. In 981, 'Adud's brother Mu'ayyad al-Daula took Gurgan. Qabus and Fakhr al-Daula were forced to flee to Samanid Khurasan. The Samanids sent a force to take back the provinces, but were unsuccessful.
In 984, Fakhr al-Daula was able to recover his territories in Ray. Upon the advice of his vizier, however, he refused to give back Qabus control of Gurgan and Tabaristan. Qabus was forced to live in exile until 997, when Fakhr al-Daula died and was succeeded by his young son Majd al-Daula. Supporters of the Ziyarid gained control of Tabaristan and from there conquered Gurgan. Qabus returned there in 998 after a few Buyid attempts to expel him again failed.
Although he formally recognized the caliph as his sovereign, Qabus ruled effectively as an independent ruler for the rest of his reign. He opened up relations with Mahmud of Ghazna, setting the stage for the eventual Ghaznavid takeover of the Ziyarids, while the Buyids did not undertake any more campaigns against him. Internal troubles, however, soon cost Qabus his position. His heavy-handed approach with officials in the army eventually caused a conspiracy to be formed against him.
The army leaders failed to capture him in his castle outside Gurgan, but they took control of the capital and invited Qabus's son Manuchihr, the governor of Tabaristan, to take over. Manuchihr feared that he would lose the succession if he refused and joined the conspirators. He chased Qabus to Bistam, where the latter eventually agreed to abdicate. He retired to a castle where he could spend the rest of his life in devotion. The conspirators, however, still considered him to be a threat and had him frozen to death in 1012.
The tower of Gonbad-e Qabus was built for him as his tomb, and he is the subject of the Qabus nama, a major work of Persian literature from the eleventh century, which was written by his grandson.
His wife was the daughter of Mahmud of Ghazni of the Ghaznavid dynasty.
Qabus ibn Wushmagir ibn Ziyar see Qabus ibn Wushmagir
Qabus ibn Voshmgir see Qabus ibn Wushmagir
Shams al-Mo'ali Abol-hasan Ghaboos ibn Wushmgir see Qabus ibn Wushmagir
Qadariyya
Qadariyya. Name commonly used by Islamists to denote a group of theologians, not in itself homogeneous who represented in one form or another the principle of free will in the early period of Islam, from about 690 to the definitive consolidation of the Mu‘tazila at the beginning of the ninth century. The word was always derogatory, never applied to oneself.
Qadariyya in Sunni terminology was a theological movement in early Islam which held that man was endowed by God with free will. Qadariyya resisted the Umayyad Caliphs' claims to be ordained rulers of all Muslims by God himself, and for that reason its proponents, the Qadarites, supported the Abbasid revolution. The Qadarites (like many early theological movements, some of which had views incompatible with Qadariyya) claimed to be ideological descendants of Hasan al-Basri.
Qadariyya in Shia terminology is the terminology used by the Prophet Muhammad for a group of people who will claim that all their Sinful/Evil actions are imposed by them by Allah's will. The Prophet Muhammad says that they are the Majuus of the Ummah.
Qadariyya. Name commonly used by Islamists to denote a group of theologians, not in itself homogeneous who represented in one form or another the principle of free will in the early period of Islam, from about 690 to the definitive consolidation of the Mu‘tazila at the beginning of the ninth century. The word was always derogatory, never applied to oneself.
Qadariyya in Sunni terminology was a theological movement in early Islam which held that man was endowed by God with free will. Qadariyya resisted the Umayyad Caliphs' claims to be ordained rulers of all Muslims by God himself, and for that reason its proponents, the Qadarites, supported the Abbasid revolution. The Qadarites (like many early theological movements, some of which had views incompatible with Qadariyya) claimed to be ideological descendants of Hasan al-Basri.
Qadariyya in Shia terminology is the terminology used by the Prophet Muhammad for a group of people who will claim that all their Sinful/Evil actions are imposed by them by Allah's will. The Prophet Muhammad says that they are the Majuus of the Ummah.
Qaddur al-‘Alami
Qaddur al-‘Alami (Sidi Kaddour El Alami) (b. 1742 in Meknes - d. 1850). Name by which the famous Moroccan popular poet ‘Abd al-Qadir al-‘Alami al-Hamdani is known. His most popular poem is devoted to the saints of Meknes.
Sidi Kaddour El Alami is one of Morocco's best known poets, especially well-known for his songs. His full name was Abd al-Qadir ibn Mohammed ibn Ahmad ibn Abi-l-Qasim al-Idrisi al-Alami al-Hamdani and he was known under the name Sayyidi Qaddur al-Alami at-Talibi al-Abd as-Salami. He was a songwriter in the genre of the malhun and founded the sufi zawiyya Alamin in Meknes. This zawiyya became one of the centers from which the malhun would spread. He grew up in Meknes, and is considered a saint and one of the greatest poets of North Africa in the neo-classical and popular style.
Sidi Kaddour El Alami see Qaddur al-‘Alami
Abd al-Qadir ibn Mohammed ibn Ahmad ibn Abi-l-Qasim al-Idrisi al-Alami al-Hamdani see Qaddur al-‘Alami
Sayyidi Qaddur al-Alami at-Talibi al-Abd as-Salami see Qaddur al-‘Alami
Qaddur al-‘Alami (Sidi Kaddour El Alami) (b. 1742 in Meknes - d. 1850). Name by which the famous Moroccan popular poet ‘Abd al-Qadir al-‘Alami al-Hamdani is known. His most popular poem is devoted to the saints of Meknes.
Sidi Kaddour El Alami is one of Morocco's best known poets, especially well-known for his songs. His full name was Abd al-Qadir ibn Mohammed ibn Ahmad ibn Abi-l-Qasim al-Idrisi al-Alami al-Hamdani and he was known under the name Sayyidi Qaddur al-Alami at-Talibi al-Abd as-Salami. He was a songwriter in the genre of the malhun and founded the sufi zawiyya Alamin in Meknes. This zawiyya became one of the centers from which the malhun would spread. He grew up in Meknes, and is considered a saint and one of the greatest poets of North Africa in the neo-classical and popular style.
Sidi Kaddour El Alami see Qaddur al-‘Alami
Abd al-Qadir ibn Mohammed ibn Ahmad ibn Abi-l-Qasim al-Idrisi al-Alami al-Hamdani see Qaddur al-‘Alami
Sayyidi Qaddur al-Alami at-Talibi al-Abd as-Salami see Qaddur al-‘Alami
Qadhafi, Mu’ammar al-
Qadhafi, Mu’ammar al- (Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi) (Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi). See Gadhafi, Mu'ammar.
Qadhafi, Mu’ammar al- (Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi) (Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi). See Gadhafi, Mu'ammar.
Qadi
Qadi. Arabic term which refers to a Muslim judge. The qadi al-qudat is an Arabic term which refers to the grand qadi. There is one qadi for each Madhhab. Typically, the qadi is the Caliph’s designated representative to adjudicate disputes on the basis of shari‘a. In theory, the judiciary in Islam was independent and the competence of the qadi extended to all fields of Islamic law, but in practice this varied, and the tribunals of the qadi were usually superseded in criminal and fiscal law by other institutions for the administration of justice. Only Muslims came under his jurisdiction; non-Muslim communities retained their own courts.
The qadi sat in a single judge tribunal and based his judgments on the authoritative texts of the school of law to which he belonged. He could impose discretionary punishments, and his decisions were final. An important and influential official, the qadi also had wide powers outside his court in functions that involved the public welfare in general.
A qadi is a judge whose responsibility is restricted to issues connected to religion. A qadi must be a man educated in Islamic science, and his performance must be totally congruent with sharia without using his own interpretation. In a trial in front of a qadi, it is the plaintiff who is responsible for bringing evidence against the defendant in order to have him or her convicted. There are no appeals to the judgments of a qadi.
A qadi must not receive gifts from participants in a trial and he must be careful in engaging himself in trade. Despite the rules for the office, Muslim history is full of complaints about qadis. Often it has been a problem, that qadis have been managers of waqfs, religious endowments.
The origin of the institution of qadi, is the old Arab arbitrator, the hakam, but qualities from officials in areas conquered by Arabs have been added to the structure.
Alcalde, one of the current Spanish terms for the mayor of a town or city, is derived from the Arabic al-qaḍi, "the judge." In Al-Andalus a single qadi was appointed to each province. To deal with issues that fell outside of the purview of sharia or to handle municipal administration (such as oversight of the police and the markets) other judicial officers with different titles were appointed by the rulers.
The term was later adopted in Portugal, Leon and Castile during the eleventh and twelfth centuries to refer to the assistant judges, who served under the principal municipal judge, the iudex or juez. Unlike the appointed Andalusian qadis, the alcaldes were elected by an assembly of the municipality's property owners. Eventually the term came to be applied to a host of positions that combined administrative and judicial functions, such as the alcaldes mayores, the alcaldes del crimen and the alcaldes de barrio. The adoption of this term, like many other Arabic ones, reflects the fact that, at least in the early phases of the Reconquista, Muslim society in the Iberian Peninsula imparted great influence on the Christian one. As Spanish Christians took over an increasing part of the Peninsula, they adapted Muslim systems and terminology for their own use.
Qadi. Arabic term which refers to a Muslim judge. The qadi al-qudat is an Arabic term which refers to the grand qadi. There is one qadi for each Madhhab. Typically, the qadi is the Caliph’s designated representative to adjudicate disputes on the basis of shari‘a. In theory, the judiciary in Islam was independent and the competence of the qadi extended to all fields of Islamic law, but in practice this varied, and the tribunals of the qadi were usually superseded in criminal and fiscal law by other institutions for the administration of justice. Only Muslims came under his jurisdiction; non-Muslim communities retained their own courts.
The qadi sat in a single judge tribunal and based his judgments on the authoritative texts of the school of law to which he belonged. He could impose discretionary punishments, and his decisions were final. An important and influential official, the qadi also had wide powers outside his court in functions that involved the public welfare in general.
A qadi is a judge whose responsibility is restricted to issues connected to religion. A qadi must be a man educated in Islamic science, and his performance must be totally congruent with sharia without using his own interpretation. In a trial in front of a qadi, it is the plaintiff who is responsible for bringing evidence against the defendant in order to have him or her convicted. There are no appeals to the judgments of a qadi.
A qadi must not receive gifts from participants in a trial and he must be careful in engaging himself in trade. Despite the rules for the office, Muslim history is full of complaints about qadis. Often it has been a problem, that qadis have been managers of waqfs, religious endowments.
The origin of the institution of qadi, is the old Arab arbitrator, the hakam, but qualities from officials in areas conquered by Arabs have been added to the structure.
Alcalde, one of the current Spanish terms for the mayor of a town or city, is derived from the Arabic al-qaḍi, "the judge." In Al-Andalus a single qadi was appointed to each province. To deal with issues that fell outside of the purview of sharia or to handle municipal administration (such as oversight of the police and the markets) other judicial officers with different titles were appointed by the rulers.
The term was later adopted in Portugal, Leon and Castile during the eleventh and twelfth centuries to refer to the assistant judges, who served under the principal municipal judge, the iudex or juez. Unlike the appointed Andalusian qadis, the alcaldes were elected by an assembly of the municipality's property owners. Eventually the term came to be applied to a host of positions that combined administrative and judicial functions, such as the alcaldes mayores, the alcaldes del crimen and the alcaldes de barrio. The adoption of this term, like many other Arabic ones, reflects the fact that, at least in the early phases of the Reconquista, Muslim society in the Iberian Peninsula imparted great influence on the Christian one. As Spanish Christians took over an increasing part of the Peninsula, they adapted Muslim systems and terminology for their own use.
qadi al-‘asker
qadi al-‘asker. Term which, in the Ottoman Empire, referred to the first juridico-religious position filled in a conquered province.
qadi al-‘asker. Term which, in the Ottoman Empire, referred to the first juridico-religious position filled in a conquered province.
Qadi al-Fadil, al-
Qadi al-Fadil, al- (Abu ‘Ali al-‘Asqalani al-Qadi al-Fadil) (1135-1200). Counselor and secretary to Saladin. His reputation is mainly based on the exceptional quality of his private and official epistolary style. Many examples of his official writings have survived.
Abu ‘Ali al-‘Asqalani al-Qadi al-Fadi see Qadi al-Fadil, al-
Qadi al-Fadil, al- (Abu ‘Ali al-‘Asqalani al-Qadi al-Fadil) (1135-1200). Counselor and secretary to Saladin. His reputation is mainly based on the exceptional quality of his private and official epistolary style. Many examples of his official writings have survived.
Abu ‘Ali al-‘Asqalani al-Qadi al-Fadi see Qadi al-Fadil, al-
Qadi Muhammad
Qadi Muhammad (Qazi Muhammad (Qazî Mihemmed) (b. c. 1893/1895, Mahabad, Kurdistan - d. March 30, 1947, Mahabad, Kurdistan). Head of the leading Kurdish family of Mahabad in Azerbaijan. On January 22, 1946, the Autonomous Kurdish Republic was proclaimed with Qadi Muhammad as president, but in December of the same year the Republic collapsed and Qadi Muhammad was put to death soon thereafter.
Qazi Muhammad was a nationalist and religious Kurdish leader and the Head of the Republic of Kurdistan, (Republic of Mahabad) the second modern Kurdish state in the Middle East (after the Republic of Ararat).
Qazi Muhammad acted as the President of the Soviet backed Republic of Mahabad, in Kurdistan of Iran, (Eastern Kurdistan) in 1946. He was also the founder of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, the PDKI, that was established after the need for a more transparent party was felt by its adherents. (Komeley Jiyanewey Kurd existed prior to that, as a secret organization). Mustafa Barzani, the father of the nationalist Kurdish movement in Iraqi Kurdistan (Southern Kurdistan), was also the commander of its army. His cousin Mohammed Hossein Saif Qazi was a minister in his cabinet. A year later, after the Soviets withdrew from Iran, the Kurdish Republic was crushed by Iran's central government. The Iranian military court sentenced Qazi and some of his associates to death, and he was hanged in Chwarchira Square, in the center of the city of Mahabad, on March 30, 1947.
[edit] Family
One of his sons, Ali Qazi, is today an active member in the Kurdish movement.
One of his daughters, Efat Ghazi, was killed by a letter bomb in Västerås, Sweden, in 1990. The bomb was addressed to her husband, the Kurdish activist Emir Ghazi. Some analysts speculated that the Iranian government might have been involved in the assassination.
Qazi Muhammad see Qadi Muhammad
Qazi Mihemmed see Qadi Muhammad
Qadi Muhammad (Qazi Muhammad (Qazî Mihemmed) (b. c. 1893/1895, Mahabad, Kurdistan - d. March 30, 1947, Mahabad, Kurdistan). Head of the leading Kurdish family of Mahabad in Azerbaijan. On January 22, 1946, the Autonomous Kurdish Republic was proclaimed with Qadi Muhammad as president, but in December of the same year the Republic collapsed and Qadi Muhammad was put to death soon thereafter.
Qazi Muhammad was a nationalist and religious Kurdish leader and the Head of the Republic of Kurdistan, (Republic of Mahabad) the second modern Kurdish state in the Middle East (after the Republic of Ararat).
Qazi Muhammad acted as the President of the Soviet backed Republic of Mahabad, in Kurdistan of Iran, (Eastern Kurdistan) in 1946. He was also the founder of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, the PDKI, that was established after the need for a more transparent party was felt by its adherents. (Komeley Jiyanewey Kurd existed prior to that, as a secret organization). Mustafa Barzani, the father of the nationalist Kurdish movement in Iraqi Kurdistan (Southern Kurdistan), was also the commander of its army. His cousin Mohammed Hossein Saif Qazi was a minister in his cabinet. A year later, after the Soviets withdrew from Iran, the Kurdish Republic was crushed by Iran's central government. The Iranian military court sentenced Qazi and some of his associates to death, and he was hanged in Chwarchira Square, in the center of the city of Mahabad, on March 30, 1947.
[edit] Family
One of his sons, Ali Qazi, is today an active member in the Kurdish movement.
One of his daughters, Efat Ghazi, was killed by a letter bomb in Västerås, Sweden, in 1990. The bomb was addressed to her husband, the Kurdish activist Emir Ghazi. Some analysts speculated that the Iranian government might have been involved in the assassination.
Qazi Muhammad see Qadi Muhammad
Qazi Mihemmed see Qadi Muhammad
Qadir bi-‘llah, al-
Qadir bi-‘llah, al- (b.947). ‘Abbasid caliph (r. 991-1031). His main preoccupation was the struggle against Shi‘ism in all its forms, against Mu‘tazilism and even against Ash‘arism. He worked effectively for the restoration of threatened Sunnism and, at his death, the caliphate had won a considerable amount of prestige.
Qadir bi-‘llah, al- (b.947). ‘Abbasid caliph (r. 991-1031). His main preoccupation was the struggle against Shi‘ism in all its forms, against Mu‘tazilism and even against Ash‘arism. He worked effectively for the restoration of threatened Sunnism and, at his death, the caliphate had won a considerable amount of prestige.
Qadiri, al-
Qadiri, al- (Abu ‘Abd Allah al-Qadiri) (1712-1773). Moroccan historian and biographer. His fame is based on his dictionaries of the celebrities of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Abu ‘Abd Allah al-Qadiri see Qadiri, al-
Qadiri, Abu ‘Abd Allah al- see Qadiri, al-
Qadiri, al- (Abu ‘Abd Allah al-Qadiri) (1712-1773). Moroccan historian and biographer. His fame is based on his dictionaries of the celebrities of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Abu ‘Abd Allah al-Qadiri see Qadiri, al-
Qadiri, Abu ‘Abd Allah al- see Qadiri, al-
Qadiriyya
Qadiriyya (Qadiriyah) (Qadiriyyah Qadri) (Qadriya) (Qadriyya) (Qadria) (also transliterated Kadri, Elkadri, Elkadry, Aladray, Adray, Kadray, Qadiri or Qadri), i. Arabic term which refers to a Muslim brotherhood which spread throughout the Muslim world. The Qadiriyya was an order of dervishes named after ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani who died in Baghdad in 1166. Theoretically both tolerant and charitable, the order spread from Baghdad to North Africa and is known for its symbols and rites.
Qādirīyah, probably the oldest of the Muslim mystic (Ṣūfī) orders, was founded by the Ḥanbalī theologian ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī (1078–1166) in Baghdad. Al-Jīlānī may have intended the few rituals he prescribed to extend only to his small circle of followers, but his sons broadened this community into an order and encouraged its spread into North Africa, Central Asia, and India. The order, which stresses philanthropy, humility, piety, and moderation, is loosely organized, allowing each regional community to develop its own ritual prayers (dhikrs). The main body (the Qādirīyah proper) maintains an orthodox and peaceful Ṣūfī system and is governed by a descendant of al-Jīlānī, who serves as the keeper of his tomb in Baghdad. A smaller group in North Africa, the Jīlālīyah, worships al-Jīlānī as a supernatural being and combines Islāmic mysticism with pre-Islāmic beliefs and practices.
Qadiriyyah Qadri, Qadriya, Qadriyya, Qadria, (also transliterated Kadri, Elkadri, Elkadry, Aladray, Adray, Kadray, Qadiri or Qadri), is one of the oldest Sufi tariqas in Sunni Islam. It derives its name from Abdul-Qadir Gilani (also transliterated as "Jil lani" or "Jailani" and "Jilali" in the Maghreb) (1077-1166), a native of the Iranian province of Gilan. In 1134 he was made principal of a Sunni Hanbalite school in Baghdad.
The Order is the most widespread of the Sufi Orders (Sunni) in the Islamic world and can be found in Afghanistan, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Turkey, the Balkans, China,[1] as well as much of the East and West Africa, like Morocco.
There are even small groups in Europe and the Americas. The famous traveler and writer Isabelle Eberhardt also belonged to the Qadiri order.
The founder of the Qadiriyyah order, Abdul-Qadir Gilani, first became publicly known in Baghdad in the late 11th century for his passionate public preaching. By this time, he was already a reputable Hanbalite scholar, having been a pupil at the madrasah of Abu Sa'id al-Mubarak Mukharrami.
After Mukharrami's death in 1119, leadership of the school passed to Gilani. Being the new shaykh, he and his large family lived comfortably in the madrasah until his death in 1166. His son, Abdul al-Wahab, succeeded his father as shaykh.
It was not until after Gilani's death that his reputation changed from a respectable Sufi to the founder of a prestigious Sufi order. At the time of Gilani's death, the Sufi tradition led by Abu Ishaq Umar al-Suhrawardi was gaining prominence. When the caliph al-Nasir came to power in 1180, al-Suhrawardi allied himself with al-Nasir. Gilani's son, Abdul al-Razzaq, then began laying the foundation that his father was the founder of a distinct Sufi order in an attempt to emphasize the independence of the Sufi tradition from the caliphal. He accomplished this by publishing a hagiography of his father.
The newly-formed Qadiriyyah order continue to flourish and grow, even surviving the Mongolian conquest of Baghdad in 1258. From hereon, the Qadiriyyah order remained an influential Sunnite institution, despite the fact control of Baghdad during this time was held by non-Muslims. During the Safavid rule of Baghdad from 1508 to 1534, the shaykh of the Qadiriyyah madrasah was appointed chief of Baghdad and the surrounding lands. Shortly after the Ottoman Turks conquered Baghdad in 1534, sultan Suleiman the Magnificent commissioned a dome to be built on the tomb of Gilani, establishing the Qadiriyyah order as his main allies in Iraq.
The legend of Abdul-Qadir Gilani was most widely spread by a text attributed to Nur al-Din 'Ali al-Shattanufi entitled Bahjat al-asrar fi ba'd manaqib 'Abd al-Qadir (The Joy of the Secrets in Abdul-Qadir's Mysterious Deeds). After the fall of the 'Abbasid caliphate in the thirteenth century, al-Shattanufi made it his goal to establish the belief that Gilani is the ultimate channel of divine grace. The deeds depicted in al-Shattanufi's work helped the Qadiriyyah order to spread far beyond the region of Baghdad.
By the end of the fifteenth century, the Qadiriyyah not only already had distinct branches within the order, but had spread into Morocco, Spain, Turkey, India, Ethiopia, Somalia, and present-day Mali. By the sixteenth century the Qadiriyyah had spread into China and Malaysia as well. Koja Abdul Alla, a shaykh of the Qadiriyyah and descendant of Muhammed, is reported to have entered China in 1674 and traveled the country preaching until his death in 1689. One of Abdul Alla's students, Qi Jingyi Hilal al-Din, is said to have permanently rooted Qadiriyyah Sufism in China through his preaching. He was buried in Linxia City, which became the center of the Qadiriyyah's presence in China. By the seventeenth century, the Qadiriyyah had stretched as far as Ottoman-occupied areas of Europe.
One of the ways in which the order spread was that the already-established shaykhs would simply adopt the Qadiriyyah tradition without abandoning leadership of their local communities.
* Qadiriyyah leadership is not centralized. Each center of Qadiriyyah thought is free to adopt its own interpretations and practices of the tradition.
* An emphasis on the struggle against the evil desires of the inner self. Gilani described it as "The greater holy war." The aim of is inner struggle is repentance, which is attained in two stages: first, repudiating evil deeds forbidden by religious law, and two, overcoming evils such as greed, vanity, and fear.
* The belief that a true seeker of God should overcome all desires other than wishing to be taken into God's custody.
* The belief that the wali (saints) are God's chosen spiritual guides for the people, but the Prophet's sunna is the ultimate source of religious guidance.
* The belief that Sufi shaykhs are not necessarily divinely inspired guides, but they responsible for guiding their disciples regardless.
Aside from the Qu'ran and Hadith, there are several texts important to the Qadirriyah order.
* Futuh al-Ghayb (Revelations from the Invisible World) - This work consists of seventy-eight of Gilani's maqalat ("essays" or "articles." Singular: maqala) compiled by his son, Abdul al-Razzaq Gilani. Despite being labeled as "articles," these pieces tend to be short statements regarding Islamic doctrines and Sufi belief.
* Fath al-Rabbani wa al-Fayd al-Rahmani (Revelation from the Lord and the Outflow of His Mercy) - This work contains sermons he delivered over a period of sixty-two sessions held in his madrasah. This text was most likely recorded by one of his disciples.
* al-Ghunya li Lalibi Tariq al-Haqq (That Which is Indispensable for the Seekers of God's Path) - Also attributed to Gilani, this if the largest of his three known books. It is separated into five parts, each dealing with a different branch of Sufi learning: fiqh (jurisprudence), 'aqa'id (tenets of the faith), majalis wa'z (preaching sessions), a'mal (works), and tasawwuf (Sufism).
This is the spiritual chain (silsilah) of the Qadiriyyah:
* Muhammad
* Caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib
* Imam Husayn
* Imam Ali Zayn al-Abidin
* Imam Muhammad Baqir
* Imam Ja'far as-Sadiq
* Imam Musa al-Kazim
* Imam Ali Musa Rida
* Ma'ruf Karkhi
* Sari Saqati
* Junayd al-Baghdadi
* Shaikh Abu Bakr Shibli
* Shaikh Abdul Aziz Bani Tamim|al-Tamīmī
* Abu al-Fadl Abu al-Wahid Bani Tamim|al-Tamīmī
* Abu al-Farah Tartusi
* Abu al-Hasan Farshi
* Abu Sa'id al-Mubarak Mukharrami
* Abdul-Qadir Gilani (founder of Qadiriyyah silsila)
After Abdul-Qadir Gilani, Qadiriyyah silsila kept on flourishing. Muslims Sufis and saints found this silsila very fertile for their spiritual practices. Due to fabulous results of recitations of this silsila Muslim saints followed it and spread it to the other parts of South Asia and the world. Inspired by Abdul-Qadir Gilani many Muslim sufi scholars and saints took the footsteps of this great Muslim saint.
Shaikh Abdul Qadir Jilani's silsilah also goes back to the Muhammad through the following chain (silsila):
* Muhammad
* Caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib
* Shaikh Hasan Basri
* Shaikh Habib Ajami
* Shaikh Dawood Taiee
* Shaikh Ma'ruf Karkhi
* Shaikh Sari Saqati
* Shaikh Junayd al-Baghdadi
* Shaikh Sheikh Abu Bakr Shibli
* Shaikh Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Tamīmī
* Shaikh Abu al-Fadl Abu al-Wahid al-Tamīmī
* Shaikh Abu al-Farah Tartusi
* Shaikh Abu al-Hasan Farshi
* Shaikh Abu Sa'id al-Mubarak Mukharrami
* Shaikh Abdul Qadir Jilani
* ArabiMuhiddini K.S.
* Seyyid-i Semseddin-i Muhammed K.S.
* Shaikh Husameddin K.S.
* Shaikh Sahabeddin K.S.
* Shaikh Huseyin Hamavih K.S.
* Haci Bayrami Veli K.S.
* Shaikh Esrefoglu Rumi K.S.
* Shaikh Haci Kazan Kaya Baba K.S.
* Shaikh Baba Kurdistani K.S.
* Seyyit Muhammed K.S.
* Shaikh Seyyid-i Halil K.S.
* Haci Hasan Baba K.S.
* Saban Baba K.S.
* Ricali Dursun Baba K.S.
* Ilhami Haci Hasan Baba K.S.
* Suleyman Caliskan K.S.
There are many siblings of Qadri order. After the era of Ghous-e-Azam (alias of Abdul Qadir Jilani) there were many Muslim sufi saints who followed him in his silsila. However, there were also many saints who, while staying in Qadri silsila, mothered their own murids (followers) by taking bayat.
This brotherhood is a branch of the Qadiriyyah order that came into being in the eighteenth century resulting from a revivalist movement led by Sidi al-Mukhtar al-Kunti, a Sufi of the western Sahara. Kunti wished to establish Qadiriyyah Sufism as the dominant religion in the western Sahara region. In contrast to other branches of the Qadiriyyah order, which do not have a centralized authority, Mukhtariyyah brotherhood was highly centralized. The leaders of this brotherhood focused on economic prosperity as well as spiritual well-being, sending their disciples on long trade caravans to places as far as Europe.
Qadiriyya (Qadiriyah) (Qadiriyyah Qadri) (Qadriya) (Qadriyya) (Qadria) (also transliterated Kadri, Elkadri, Elkadry, Aladray, Adray, Kadray, Qadiri or Qadri), i. Arabic term which refers to a Muslim brotherhood which spread throughout the Muslim world. The Qadiriyya was an order of dervishes named after ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani who died in Baghdad in 1166. Theoretically both tolerant and charitable, the order spread from Baghdad to North Africa and is known for its symbols and rites.
Qādirīyah, probably the oldest of the Muslim mystic (Ṣūfī) orders, was founded by the Ḥanbalī theologian ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī (1078–1166) in Baghdad. Al-Jīlānī may have intended the few rituals he prescribed to extend only to his small circle of followers, but his sons broadened this community into an order and encouraged its spread into North Africa, Central Asia, and India. The order, which stresses philanthropy, humility, piety, and moderation, is loosely organized, allowing each regional community to develop its own ritual prayers (dhikrs). The main body (the Qādirīyah proper) maintains an orthodox and peaceful Ṣūfī system and is governed by a descendant of al-Jīlānī, who serves as the keeper of his tomb in Baghdad. A smaller group in North Africa, the Jīlālīyah, worships al-Jīlānī as a supernatural being and combines Islāmic mysticism with pre-Islāmic beliefs and practices.
Qadiriyyah Qadri, Qadriya, Qadriyya, Qadria, (also transliterated Kadri, Elkadri, Elkadry, Aladray, Adray, Kadray, Qadiri or Qadri), is one of the oldest Sufi tariqas in Sunni Islam. It derives its name from Abdul-Qadir Gilani (also transliterated as "Jil lani" or "Jailani" and "Jilali" in the Maghreb) (1077-1166), a native of the Iranian province of Gilan. In 1134 he was made principal of a Sunni Hanbalite school in Baghdad.
The Order is the most widespread of the Sufi Orders (Sunni) in the Islamic world and can be found in Afghanistan, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Turkey, the Balkans, China,[1] as well as much of the East and West Africa, like Morocco.
There are even small groups in Europe and the Americas. The famous traveler and writer Isabelle Eberhardt also belonged to the Qadiri order.
The founder of the Qadiriyyah order, Abdul-Qadir Gilani, first became publicly known in Baghdad in the late 11th century for his passionate public preaching. By this time, he was already a reputable Hanbalite scholar, having been a pupil at the madrasah of Abu Sa'id al-Mubarak Mukharrami.
After Mukharrami's death in 1119, leadership of the school passed to Gilani. Being the new shaykh, he and his large family lived comfortably in the madrasah until his death in 1166. His son, Abdul al-Wahab, succeeded his father as shaykh.
It was not until after Gilani's death that his reputation changed from a respectable Sufi to the founder of a prestigious Sufi order. At the time of Gilani's death, the Sufi tradition led by Abu Ishaq Umar al-Suhrawardi was gaining prominence. When the caliph al-Nasir came to power in 1180, al-Suhrawardi allied himself with al-Nasir. Gilani's son, Abdul al-Razzaq, then began laying the foundation that his father was the founder of a distinct Sufi order in an attempt to emphasize the independence of the Sufi tradition from the caliphal. He accomplished this by publishing a hagiography of his father.
The newly-formed Qadiriyyah order continue to flourish and grow, even surviving the Mongolian conquest of Baghdad in 1258. From hereon, the Qadiriyyah order remained an influential Sunnite institution, despite the fact control of Baghdad during this time was held by non-Muslims. During the Safavid rule of Baghdad from 1508 to 1534, the shaykh of the Qadiriyyah madrasah was appointed chief of Baghdad and the surrounding lands. Shortly after the Ottoman Turks conquered Baghdad in 1534, sultan Suleiman the Magnificent commissioned a dome to be built on the tomb of Gilani, establishing the Qadiriyyah order as his main allies in Iraq.
The legend of Abdul-Qadir Gilani was most widely spread by a text attributed to Nur al-Din 'Ali al-Shattanufi entitled Bahjat al-asrar fi ba'd manaqib 'Abd al-Qadir (The Joy of the Secrets in Abdul-Qadir's Mysterious Deeds). After the fall of the 'Abbasid caliphate in the thirteenth century, al-Shattanufi made it his goal to establish the belief that Gilani is the ultimate channel of divine grace. The deeds depicted in al-Shattanufi's work helped the Qadiriyyah order to spread far beyond the region of Baghdad.
By the end of the fifteenth century, the Qadiriyyah not only already had distinct branches within the order, but had spread into Morocco, Spain, Turkey, India, Ethiopia, Somalia, and present-day Mali. By the sixteenth century the Qadiriyyah had spread into China and Malaysia as well. Koja Abdul Alla, a shaykh of the Qadiriyyah and descendant of Muhammed, is reported to have entered China in 1674 and traveled the country preaching until his death in 1689. One of Abdul Alla's students, Qi Jingyi Hilal al-Din, is said to have permanently rooted Qadiriyyah Sufism in China through his preaching. He was buried in Linxia City, which became the center of the Qadiriyyah's presence in China. By the seventeenth century, the Qadiriyyah had stretched as far as Ottoman-occupied areas of Europe.
One of the ways in which the order spread was that the already-established shaykhs would simply adopt the Qadiriyyah tradition without abandoning leadership of their local communities.
* Qadiriyyah leadership is not centralized. Each center of Qadiriyyah thought is free to adopt its own interpretations and practices of the tradition.
* An emphasis on the struggle against the evil desires of the inner self. Gilani described it as "The greater holy war." The aim of is inner struggle is repentance, which is attained in two stages: first, repudiating evil deeds forbidden by religious law, and two, overcoming evils such as greed, vanity, and fear.
* The belief that a true seeker of God should overcome all desires other than wishing to be taken into God's custody.
* The belief that the wali (saints) are God's chosen spiritual guides for the people, but the Prophet's sunna is the ultimate source of religious guidance.
* The belief that Sufi shaykhs are not necessarily divinely inspired guides, but they responsible for guiding their disciples regardless.
Aside from the Qu'ran and Hadith, there are several texts important to the Qadirriyah order.
* Futuh al-Ghayb (Revelations from the Invisible World) - This work consists of seventy-eight of Gilani's maqalat ("essays" or "articles." Singular: maqala) compiled by his son, Abdul al-Razzaq Gilani. Despite being labeled as "articles," these pieces tend to be short statements regarding Islamic doctrines and Sufi belief.
* Fath al-Rabbani wa al-Fayd al-Rahmani (Revelation from the Lord and the Outflow of His Mercy) - This work contains sermons he delivered over a period of sixty-two sessions held in his madrasah. This text was most likely recorded by one of his disciples.
* al-Ghunya li Lalibi Tariq al-Haqq (That Which is Indispensable for the Seekers of God's Path) - Also attributed to Gilani, this if the largest of his three known books. It is separated into five parts, each dealing with a different branch of Sufi learning: fiqh (jurisprudence), 'aqa'id (tenets of the faith), majalis wa'z (preaching sessions), a'mal (works), and tasawwuf (Sufism).
This is the spiritual chain (silsilah) of the Qadiriyyah:
* Muhammad
* Caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib
* Imam Husayn
* Imam Ali Zayn al-Abidin
* Imam Muhammad Baqir
* Imam Ja'far as-Sadiq
* Imam Musa al-Kazim
* Imam Ali Musa Rida
* Ma'ruf Karkhi
* Sari Saqati
* Junayd al-Baghdadi
* Shaikh Abu Bakr Shibli
* Shaikh Abdul Aziz Bani Tamim|al-Tamīmī
* Abu al-Fadl Abu al-Wahid Bani Tamim|al-Tamīmī
* Abu al-Farah Tartusi
* Abu al-Hasan Farshi
* Abu Sa'id al-Mubarak Mukharrami
* Abdul-Qadir Gilani (founder of Qadiriyyah silsila)
After Abdul-Qadir Gilani, Qadiriyyah silsila kept on flourishing. Muslims Sufis and saints found this silsila very fertile for their spiritual practices. Due to fabulous results of recitations of this silsila Muslim saints followed it and spread it to the other parts of South Asia and the world. Inspired by Abdul-Qadir Gilani many Muslim sufi scholars and saints took the footsteps of this great Muslim saint.
Shaikh Abdul Qadir Jilani's silsilah also goes back to the Muhammad through the following chain (silsila):
* Muhammad
* Caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib
* Shaikh Hasan Basri
* Shaikh Habib Ajami
* Shaikh Dawood Taiee
* Shaikh Ma'ruf Karkhi
* Shaikh Sari Saqati
* Shaikh Junayd al-Baghdadi
* Shaikh Sheikh Abu Bakr Shibli
* Shaikh Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Tamīmī
* Shaikh Abu al-Fadl Abu al-Wahid al-Tamīmī
* Shaikh Abu al-Farah Tartusi
* Shaikh Abu al-Hasan Farshi
* Shaikh Abu Sa'id al-Mubarak Mukharrami
* Shaikh Abdul Qadir Jilani
* ArabiMuhiddini K.S.
* Seyyid-i Semseddin-i Muhammed K.S.
* Shaikh Husameddin K.S.
* Shaikh Sahabeddin K.S.
* Shaikh Huseyin Hamavih K.S.
* Haci Bayrami Veli K.S.
* Shaikh Esrefoglu Rumi K.S.
* Shaikh Haci Kazan Kaya Baba K.S.
* Shaikh Baba Kurdistani K.S.
* Seyyit Muhammed K.S.
* Shaikh Seyyid-i Halil K.S.
* Haci Hasan Baba K.S.
* Saban Baba K.S.
* Ricali Dursun Baba K.S.
* Ilhami Haci Hasan Baba K.S.
* Suleyman Caliskan K.S.
There are many siblings of Qadri order. After the era of Ghous-e-Azam (alias of Abdul Qadir Jilani) there were many Muslim sufi saints who followed him in his silsila. However, there were also many saints who, while staying in Qadri silsila, mothered their own murids (followers) by taking bayat.
This brotherhood is a branch of the Qadiriyyah order that came into being in the eighteenth century resulting from a revivalist movement led by Sidi al-Mukhtar al-Kunti, a Sufi of the western Sahara. Kunti wished to establish Qadiriyyah Sufism as the dominant religion in the western Sahara region. In contrast to other branches of the Qadiriyyah order, which do not have a centralized authority, Mukhtariyyah brotherhood was highly centralized. The leaders of this brotherhood focused on economic prosperity as well as spiritual well-being, sending their disciples on long trade caravans to places as far as Europe.
Qadiriyah see Qadiriyya
Qadiriyyah Qadri see Qadiriyya
Qadriya see Qadiriyya
Qadriyya see Qadiriyya
Qadria see Qadiriyya
Kadri see Qadiriyya
Qaeda, al-
Qaeda, al- (al-Qaida) (“The Base”). Established by Usama bin Laden around 1990, al-Qaeda aimed to coordinate a transnational mujahideen network. Its stated goal is to “re-establish the Muslim state” throughout the world via the overthrow of corrupt regimes in the Islamic world and the removal of foreign presence -- primarily American and Israeli -- from the Middle East. Usama bin Laden has issued three anti-United States fatwas encouraging Muslims to take up arms against Washington’s “imperialism.” Al-Qaeda provides financial, manpower, transportation, and training support to extremists worldwide. In February 1998, bin Laden issued a statement under the banner of “The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders,” saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill United States citizens, civilian or military, and their allies. Al-Qaeda allegedly orchestrated the bombings of the United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on August 7, 1998. Al-Qaeda claims to have been involved in the 1993 killing of United States servicemen in Somalia and the December 1992 bombings against United States troops in Aden, Yemen. Al-Qaeda serves as the core of a loose umbrella organization that includes members of many Sunni Islamic extremist groups, including factions of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), the Gama’at al-Islamiyya (IG), and the Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM). The group is a prime suspect in the September 11, 2001, attacks as well as the U.S.S. Cole bombing.
Al-Qaeda began as a logistical network to support Muslims fighting against the Soviet Union during the Afghan War. Members were recruited throughout the Islamic world. When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the organization dispersed but continued to oppose what its leaders considered corrupt Islamic regimes and foreign (i.e., United States) presence in Islamic lands. Based in Sudan for a period in the early 1990s, the group eventually re-established its headquarters in Afghanistan (c. 1996) under the patronage of the Taliban militia.
Al-Qaeda merged with a number of other militant Islamist organizations, including Egypt’s Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group, and on several occasions its leaders declared jihad (holy war) against the United States. The organization established camps for Muslim militants from throughout the world, training tens of thousands in paramilitary skills, and its agents engaged in numerous terrorist attacks, including the destruction of the United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (1998), and a suicide bomb attack against the United States. warship Cole in Aden, Yemen (2000; see USS Cole attack). In 2001, 19 militants associated with al-Qaeda staged the September 11 attacks against the United States. Within weeks the American government responded by attacking Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan. Thousands of militants were killed or captured, among them several key members (including the militant who allegedly planned and organized the September 11 attacks), and the remainder and their leaders were driven into hiding.
The invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 challenged that country’s viability as an al-Qaeda sanctuary and training ground and compromised communication, operational, and financial linkages between al-Qaeda leadership and its militants. Rather than significantly weakening al-Qaeda, however, these realities prompted a structural evolution and the growth of “franchising.” Increasingly, attacks were orchestrated not only from above by the centralized leadership (after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, based in the Afghan-Pakistani border regions) but also by the localized, relatively autonomous cells it encouraged. Such grassroots independent groups—coalesced locally around a common agenda but subscribing to the al-Qaeda name and its broader ideology—thus meant a diffuse form of militancy, and one far more difficult to confront.
With this organizational shift, al-Qaeda was linked—whether directly or indirectly—to more attacks in the six years following September 11 than it had been in the six years prior, including attacks in Jordan, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Israel, Algeria, and elsewhere. At the same time, al-Qaeda increasingly utilized the Internet as an expansive venue for communication and recruitment and as a mouthpiece for video messages, broadcasts, and propaganda. Meanwhile, some observers expressed concern that United States strategy—centered primarily on attempts to overwhelm al-Qaeda militarily—was ineffectual, and at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, al-Qaeda was thought to have reached its greatest strength since the attacks of September 2001.
On May 2, 2011, Osama bin Laden was killed by United States military forces after United States intelligence located him residing in a secure compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, 31 miles (50 km) from Islamabad. The operation was carried out by a small team that reached the compound in Abbottabad by helicopter. After bin Laden’s death was confirmed, it was announced by United States President Barack Obama, who hailed the operation as a major success in the fight against al-Qaeda. On June 16, 2011, al-Qaeda released a statement announcing that Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s long-serving deputy, had been appointed to replace bin Laden as the organization’s leader.
The Base see Qaeda, al-
Qaida, al- see Qaeda, al-
Qaeda, al- (al-Qaida) (“The Base”). Established by Usama bin Laden around 1990, al-Qaeda aimed to coordinate a transnational mujahideen network. Its stated goal is to “re-establish the Muslim state” throughout the world via the overthrow of corrupt regimes in the Islamic world and the removal of foreign presence -- primarily American and Israeli -- from the Middle East. Usama bin Laden has issued three anti-United States fatwas encouraging Muslims to take up arms against Washington’s “imperialism.” Al-Qaeda provides financial, manpower, transportation, and training support to extremists worldwide. In February 1998, bin Laden issued a statement under the banner of “The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders,” saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill United States citizens, civilian or military, and their allies. Al-Qaeda allegedly orchestrated the bombings of the United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on August 7, 1998. Al-Qaeda claims to have been involved in the 1993 killing of United States servicemen in Somalia and the December 1992 bombings against United States troops in Aden, Yemen. Al-Qaeda serves as the core of a loose umbrella organization that includes members of many Sunni Islamic extremist groups, including factions of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), the Gama’at al-Islamiyya (IG), and the Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM). The group is a prime suspect in the September 11, 2001, attacks as well as the U.S.S. Cole bombing.
Al-Qaeda began as a logistical network to support Muslims fighting against the Soviet Union during the Afghan War. Members were recruited throughout the Islamic world. When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the organization dispersed but continued to oppose what its leaders considered corrupt Islamic regimes and foreign (i.e., United States) presence in Islamic lands. Based in Sudan for a period in the early 1990s, the group eventually re-established its headquarters in Afghanistan (c. 1996) under the patronage of the Taliban militia.
Al-Qaeda merged with a number of other militant Islamist organizations, including Egypt’s Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group, and on several occasions its leaders declared jihad (holy war) against the United States. The organization established camps for Muslim militants from throughout the world, training tens of thousands in paramilitary skills, and its agents engaged in numerous terrorist attacks, including the destruction of the United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (1998), and a suicide bomb attack against the United States. warship Cole in Aden, Yemen (2000; see USS Cole attack). In 2001, 19 militants associated with al-Qaeda staged the September 11 attacks against the United States. Within weeks the American government responded by attacking Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan. Thousands of militants were killed or captured, among them several key members (including the militant who allegedly planned and organized the September 11 attacks), and the remainder and their leaders were driven into hiding.
The invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 challenged that country’s viability as an al-Qaeda sanctuary and training ground and compromised communication, operational, and financial linkages between al-Qaeda leadership and its militants. Rather than significantly weakening al-Qaeda, however, these realities prompted a structural evolution and the growth of “franchising.” Increasingly, attacks were orchestrated not only from above by the centralized leadership (after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, based in the Afghan-Pakistani border regions) but also by the localized, relatively autonomous cells it encouraged. Such grassroots independent groups—coalesced locally around a common agenda but subscribing to the al-Qaeda name and its broader ideology—thus meant a diffuse form of militancy, and one far more difficult to confront.
With this organizational shift, al-Qaeda was linked—whether directly or indirectly—to more attacks in the six years following September 11 than it had been in the six years prior, including attacks in Jordan, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Israel, Algeria, and elsewhere. At the same time, al-Qaeda increasingly utilized the Internet as an expansive venue for communication and recruitment and as a mouthpiece for video messages, broadcasts, and propaganda. Meanwhile, some observers expressed concern that United States strategy—centered primarily on attempts to overwhelm al-Qaeda militarily—was ineffectual, and at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, al-Qaeda was thought to have reached its greatest strength since the attacks of September 2001.
On May 2, 2011, Osama bin Laden was killed by United States military forces after United States intelligence located him residing in a secure compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, 31 miles (50 km) from Islamabad. The operation was carried out by a small team that reached the compound in Abbottabad by helicopter. After bin Laden’s death was confirmed, it was announced by United States President Barack Obama, who hailed the operation as a major success in the fight against al-Qaeda. On June 16, 2011, al-Qaeda released a statement announcing that Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s long-serving deputy, had been appointed to replace bin Laden as the organization’s leader.
The Base see Qaeda, al-
Qaida, al- see Qaeda, al-
Qahir bi-‘llah
Qahir bi-‘llah (d.950). ‘Abbasid caliph (r.932-934). He had the amir Mu’nis al-Muzaffar put to death, and was deposed by his former vizier Ibn Mugla.
Qahir bi-‘llah (d.950). ‘Abbasid caliph (r.932-934). He had the amir Mu’nis al-Muzaffar put to death, and was deposed by his former vizier Ibn Mugla.
Qahtaba ibn Shabib
Qahtaba ibn Shabib (d. 749). Arab general and one of the most prominent leaders of the ‘Abbasid propaganda in Khurasan. When Abu Muslim was sent to Khurasan in 745 to organize the decisive campaign against the Umayyads, Qahtaba was appointed to lead the army. In 749, he defeated the armies of the Umayyad generals ‘Amir ibn Dubara al-Murri and Ibn Hubayra, thus sealing the fate of the Umayyads in the Near East.
Ibn Shahib, Qahtaba see Qahtaba ibn Shabib
Qahtaba ibn Shabib (d. 749). Arab general and one of the most prominent leaders of the ‘Abbasid propaganda in Khurasan. When Abu Muslim was sent to Khurasan in 745 to organize the decisive campaign against the Umayyads, Qahtaba was appointed to lead the army. In 749, he defeated the armies of the Umayyad generals ‘Amir ibn Dubara al-Murri and Ibn Hubayra, thus sealing the fate of the Umayyads in the Near East.
Ibn Shahib, Qahtaba see Qahtaba ibn Shabib
Qahtan
Qahtan. According to the consensus of opinion among Muslim genealogists, historians, and geographers, and in popular tradition, Qahtan was the ancestor of all the South-Arabian peoples. He is sometimes known as the “father of all Yemen.” He thus corresponds to ‘Adnan, the common ancestor of the northern Arabs.
Qahtan. According to the consensus of opinion among Muslim genealogists, historians, and geographers, and in popular tradition, Qahtan was the ancestor of all the South-Arabian peoples. He is sometimes known as the “father of all Yemen.” He thus corresponds to ‘Adnan, the common ancestor of the northern Arabs.
qa‘id
qa‘id. Term which refers to a tribal, district or military chief. The term qa‘id is widely used in North Africa.
qa‘id. Term which refers to a tribal, district or military chief. The term qa‘id is widely used in North Africa.
Qa’ida, Al-
Qa’ida, Al-. See Qaeda, al-.
Qa’ida, Al-. See Qaeda, al-.
Qa’im al-Muhammad
Qa’im al-Muhammad (“the Qa’im of the family of Muhammad”) is a term used in Shi‘a terminology for the member of the family of the Prophet who was expected to rise against the illegitimate regimes and restore justice on earth. Among the Imamiyya, the twelfth, the Hidden Imam, was identified with the Qa’im. In the Isma‘ili doctrine, the “Qa ‘im of the Resurrection” shall act as the judge of mankind.
Muhammad, Qa'im al- see Qa’im al-Muhammad
Qa’im al-Muhammad (“the Qa’im of the family of Muhammad”) is a term used in Shi‘a terminology for the member of the family of the Prophet who was expected to rise against the illegitimate regimes and restore justice on earth. Among the Imamiyya, the twelfth, the Hidden Imam, was identified with the Qa’im. In the Isma‘ili doctrine, the “Qa ‘im of the Resurrection” shall act as the judge of mankind.
Muhammad, Qa'im al- see Qa’im al-Muhammad
Qa’im bi-Amr Allah, al-
Qa’im bi-Amr Allah, al- (b. 1001). ‘Abbasid caliph (r. 1031-1075). His rule corresponded with the end of the Buyid period and the beginning of the Saljuk period in Iraq.
Qa’im bi-Amr Allah, al- (b. 1001). ‘Abbasid caliph (r. 1031-1075). His rule corresponded with the end of the Buyid period and the beginning of the Saljuk period in Iraq.
Qa’im bi-Amr Allah, al-
Qa’im bi-Amr Allah, al- (Abu’l-Qasim Muhammad) (Muhammad al-Qaim Bi-Amrillah) (Abd ar-Rahman) (893/895 - May 17, 946). Fatimid caliph (r. 934-946). Having re-established his authority in the south of Ifriqiya, he resumed hostilities against the ‘Abbasids in their Egyptian province and intensified “Holy War” in the Byzantine territories in eastern Sicily and Calabria. He lacked in both energy and foresight in fighting the Khariji agitation.
Muhammad al-Qaim Bi-Amrillah was the second Caliph of the Fatimids in Ifriqiya and ruled from 934 to 946. He is the 12th Imam according to Isma'ili Fatemi faith.
Al-Qaim was born in Salamya in Syria with the name Abd ar-Rahman. After his father Ubayd Allah al-Mahdi Billah (910-934) seized power in Ifriqiya he was named heir to the throne in 912, and helped put down several revolts. However, campaigns into Egypt faltered against the resistance of the Abbasids (914-915 and 919-921), with heavy casualties.
In 934, Al-Qaim succeeded his father as Caliph, after which he never again left the royal residence at Mahdia. Nevertheless, the Fatimid realm became an important power in the Mediterranean. After the re-conquest of Sicily the Byzantine province of Calabria and the coast of Italy and France were plundered.
But from 944 to 947 the realm was plunged into crisis by the revolt of Abu Yazid, who had united the Kharijite Berber tribes of the Aurès Mountains of eastern Algeria and overrun Ifriqiya.Imam Al-Qaim was able to hold out in Mahdia with the help of the navy for over a year, but died (May 17, 946) before the revolt could be put down.
He was succeeded by his son Ismail al-Mansur (r. 946-953).
Abu'l-Qasim Muhammad see Qa’im bi-Amr Allah, al-
Muhammad, Abu'l-Qasim see Qa’im bi-Amr Allah, al-
Muhammad al-Qaim Bi-Amrillah see Qa’im bi-Amr Allah, al-
Qa’im bi-Amr Allah, al- (Abu’l-Qasim Muhammad) (Muhammad al-Qaim Bi-Amrillah) (Abd ar-Rahman) (893/895 - May 17, 946). Fatimid caliph (r. 934-946). Having re-established his authority in the south of Ifriqiya, he resumed hostilities against the ‘Abbasids in their Egyptian province and intensified “Holy War” in the Byzantine territories in eastern Sicily and Calabria. He lacked in both energy and foresight in fighting the Khariji agitation.
Muhammad al-Qaim Bi-Amrillah was the second Caliph of the Fatimids in Ifriqiya and ruled from 934 to 946. He is the 12th Imam according to Isma'ili Fatemi faith.
Al-Qaim was born in Salamya in Syria with the name Abd ar-Rahman. After his father Ubayd Allah al-Mahdi Billah (910-934) seized power in Ifriqiya he was named heir to the throne in 912, and helped put down several revolts. However, campaigns into Egypt faltered against the resistance of the Abbasids (914-915 and 919-921), with heavy casualties.
In 934, Al-Qaim succeeded his father as Caliph, after which he never again left the royal residence at Mahdia. Nevertheless, the Fatimid realm became an important power in the Mediterranean. After the re-conquest of Sicily the Byzantine province of Calabria and the coast of Italy and France were plundered.
But from 944 to 947 the realm was plunged into crisis by the revolt of Abu Yazid, who had united the Kharijite Berber tribes of the Aurès Mountains of eastern Algeria and overrun Ifriqiya.Imam Al-Qaim was able to hold out in Mahdia with the help of the navy for over a year, but died (May 17, 946) before the revolt could be put down.
He was succeeded by his son Ismail al-Mansur (r. 946-953).
Abu'l-Qasim Muhammad see Qa’im bi-Amr Allah, al-
Muhammad, Abu'l-Qasim see Qa’im bi-Amr Allah, al-
Muhammad al-Qaim Bi-Amrillah see Qa’im bi-Amr Allah, al-
Qa’im-maqam
Qa’im-maqam (in Turkish, Kaymakam) (Qaim Maqam) (Kaimakam) (Caimacam). Title borne by a number of different officials in the Ottoman Empire. The kaymakam enjoyed almost all the authority of the Grand Vizier, issuing firmans and nominating functionaries, but he was not allowed to intervene in the area where the army was operating. In 1864, the kaymakam became the governor of an administrative district, called qada’, and under the Republican regime he continued to be the administrator of such a district. In Ottoman Egypt, the term was applied to the acting viceroy before Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha, and under the latter to specific grades in the military and administrative hierarchies.
Kaymakam is the title used for the governor of a provincial district in the Republic of Turkey and in Lebanon. Additionally, it was a title used for roughly the same official position in the Ottoman Empire.
The modern Turkish term kaymakam or kaimakam originally comes from two Arabic words as used in Ottoman Turkish: kâim, meaning "standing"; and makâm, originally used for "place" but, in this context, used with the sense of "office", "position", or "state". Thus, in Ottoman times, a kâim-makâm was a state officer who was considered a representative of, or "standing in place" of the sultan at a local level; today, a kaymakam is a representative of the government or state at a local level.
According to some, the first kaymakam in history was ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, who is supposed to have been appointed by the Islamic prophet, Muhammad, as the first rightful caliph. Thus, ‘Alī was considered to be serving "in the place of" Muhammad.
The term has a more specific meaning in Moldavian and Wallachian history, where it refers to a temporary replacement for a Hospodar ("prince"), in and after Phanariote rule, as well as the delegates of the Oltenian Ban in Craiova after the main office was moved to Bucharest during the same period (1761). In this context, the word may be spelled caimacam, while the Romanian term for the office is căimăcămie.
In Arabia, four hakims (native rulers) of the later emirate of Qatar held the additional Ottoman title of kaymakam in their administrative capacity since 1872 of district administrator since the establishment of Ottoman sovereignty (as kaza [district] of Sandjak al-Hasa, within the vilayet of Baghdad, from 1875 Basra vilayet) till this was exchanged on 3 November 1916 with a British protectorate (as Sheikdom of Qatar, colonially under the chief political resident of the Persian Gulf, at Bahrein). Similarly, three ruling native hakims of the later emirate of Kuwait, were also Kaymakam of a kazan in the same province, 1871 till a British protectorate, also on 3 November 1914.
In the Ottoman army, as well as in the Egypt of Muhammad Ali, the title of kaymakam came to be used for a lieutenant colonel; it was also applied to naval commanders in the same context. Mustafa Kemal, the founder of modern Turkey, also served as a kaymakam for the 57th regiment in the Battle of Gallipoli.
Kaymakam see Qa’im-maqam
Qaim Maqam see Qa’im-maqam
Kaimakam see Qa’im-maqam
Caimacam see Qa’im-maqam
Qa’im-maqam (in Turkish, Kaymakam) (Qaim Maqam) (Kaimakam) (Caimacam). Title borne by a number of different officials in the Ottoman Empire. The kaymakam enjoyed almost all the authority of the Grand Vizier, issuing firmans and nominating functionaries, but he was not allowed to intervene in the area where the army was operating. In 1864, the kaymakam became the governor of an administrative district, called qada’, and under the Republican regime he continued to be the administrator of such a district. In Ottoman Egypt, the term was applied to the acting viceroy before Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha, and under the latter to specific grades in the military and administrative hierarchies.
Kaymakam is the title used for the governor of a provincial district in the Republic of Turkey and in Lebanon. Additionally, it was a title used for roughly the same official position in the Ottoman Empire.
The modern Turkish term kaymakam or kaimakam originally comes from two Arabic words as used in Ottoman Turkish: kâim, meaning "standing"; and makâm, originally used for "place" but, in this context, used with the sense of "office", "position", or "state". Thus, in Ottoman times, a kâim-makâm was a state officer who was considered a representative of, or "standing in place" of the sultan at a local level; today, a kaymakam is a representative of the government or state at a local level.
According to some, the first kaymakam in history was ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, who is supposed to have been appointed by the Islamic prophet, Muhammad, as the first rightful caliph. Thus, ‘Alī was considered to be serving "in the place of" Muhammad.
The term has a more specific meaning in Moldavian and Wallachian history, where it refers to a temporary replacement for a Hospodar ("prince"), in and after Phanariote rule, as well as the delegates of the Oltenian Ban in Craiova after the main office was moved to Bucharest during the same period (1761). In this context, the word may be spelled caimacam, while the Romanian term for the office is căimăcămie.
In Arabia, four hakims (native rulers) of the later emirate of Qatar held the additional Ottoman title of kaymakam in their administrative capacity since 1872 of district administrator since the establishment of Ottoman sovereignty (as kaza [district] of Sandjak al-Hasa, within the vilayet of Baghdad, from 1875 Basra vilayet) till this was exchanged on 3 November 1916 with a British protectorate (as Sheikdom of Qatar, colonially under the chief political resident of the Persian Gulf, at Bahrein). Similarly, three ruling native hakims of the later emirate of Kuwait, were also Kaymakam of a kazan in the same province, 1871 till a British protectorate, also on 3 November 1914.
In the Ottoman army, as well as in the Egypt of Muhammad Ali, the title of kaymakam came to be used for a lieutenant colonel; it was also applied to naval commanders in the same context. Mustafa Kemal, the founder of modern Turkey, also served as a kaymakam for the 57th regiment in the Battle of Gallipoli.
Kaymakam see Qa’im-maqam
Qaim Maqam see Qa’im-maqam
Kaimakam see Qa’im-maqam
Caimacam see Qa’im-maqam
Qa’it Bay
Qa’it Bay (Qaytbay) (Kait Bey) (al-Malik al-Ashraf Qa’it Bay) (al-Ashraf Sayf al-Din Qa'it Bay) (ca. 1416/18 - 1496) . Mameluke sultan of Egypt and Syria (1468-1496). His chief political problem was his relations with Ottomans. He granted new privileges to the Italian merchants and made no attempt to monopolize the spice trade, but also introduced measures to protect the interests of native merchants. However, the seemingly rich and powerful Mameluke state was heading for disaster and was no match for Ottoman Turkey.
Al-Ashraf Sayf al-Din Qa'it Bay was the eighteenth Burji Mameluke Sultan of Egypt. He was Circassian by birth, and was purchased by the ninth sultan Barsbay (r.1422 to 1438) before being freed by the eleventh sultan Jaqmaq (r.1438 to 1453). During his reign he stabilized the Mameluke state and economy, consolidated the northern boundaries of the Sultanate with the Ottoman Empire, and emerged as a great patron of art and architecture. In fact, although Qaitbay fought sixteen military campaigns, he is best remembered for the spectacular building projects that he sponsored, leaving his mark as an architectural patron on Mecca, Medina, Jerusalem, Damascus, Aleppo, Alexandria, and every quarter of Cairo.
Qaitbay was born in the Circassian region of the Caucasus between 1416 and 1418. His skill in archery and horsemanship attracted the attention of a slave merchant who purchased him and brought him to Cairo when he was already over twenty years of age. He was quickly purchased by the reigning sultan Barsbay and became a member of the palace guard. He was freed by Barsbay's successor, Jaqmaq, and appointed third executive secretary. Under the reigns of Inal, Khushqadam, and Yilbay he was further promoted through the Mameluke military hierarchy, eventually becoming taqaddimat alf, commander of a thousand Mamelukes. Under the Sultan Timurbugha, finally, Qaitbay was appointed atabak, or field marshal of the entire Mameluke army. During this period, Qaitbay amassed a considerable personal fortune which would enable him to exercise substantial acts of beneficence as sultan without draining the royal treasury.
The reign of Timubugha lasted less than two months, as he was dethroned in a palace coup on January 30, 1468. Qaitbay was proposed as a compromise candidate acceptable to the various court factions, and despite some apparent reluctance was enthroned on January 31. He insisted that Timurburgha be granted an honorable retirement, instead of the enforced exile usually imposed on dethroned sovereigns. He did, however, exile the leaders of the coup, and created a new ruling council composed of his own followers and more veteran courtiers who had fallen into disgrace under his predecessors. Yashbak min Mahdi was appointed dawadar, or executive secretary, and Azbak min Tutkh was named atabak; the two men would remain Qaitbay's closest advisors until the ends of their careers, despite their profound dislike for each other. In general, Qaitbay seems to have pursued a policy of appointing rivals to posts of equal authority, thus preventing any single subordinate from acquiring too much power and maintaining the ability to settle all disputes via his own autocratic authority.
Qaitbay's first major challenge was the insurrection of Shah Suwar, leader of a small Turkmen dynasty, the Dhu'l-Qadrids, in eastern Anatolia. A first expedition against the upstart was soundly defeated, and Suwar threatened to invade Syria. A second Mameluke army was sent in 1469 under the leadership of Azbak, but was likewise defeated. Not until 1471 did a third expedition, this time commanded by Yashbak, succeed in routing Suwar's army. In 1473 Suwar was captured and led back to Cairo, together with his brothers. The prisoners were drawn and quartered and their remains were hung from Bab Zuwayla.
Following the defeat of Suwar, Qaitbay set about purging his court of the remaining factions and installing his own purchased Mamluks in all positions of power. He frequently went on excursions, ostentatiously leaving the Citadel with limited guards to display his trust of his subordinates and of the populace. He traveled throughout his reign, visiting Alexandria, Damascus, and Aleppo, among other cities, and personally inspecting his many building projects. In 1472 he performed the Hajj to Mecca. He was struck by the poverty of the citizens of Medina and devoted a substantial portion of his private fortune to the alleviation of their plight. Through such measures Qaitbay gained a reputation for piety, charity, and royal self-confidence.
In 1480, Yashbak led an army against the Ak Koyunlu dynasty in Northern Mesopotamia, but was soundly defeated while attacking Urfa, taken prisoner, and executed. These events foreshadowed a longer military engagement with the far more powerful Ottoman Empire in Anatolia. In 1485, Ottoman armies began to campaign on the Mameluke frontier, and an expedition was dispatched from Cairo to confront them. These Mameluke troops won a surprising victory in 1486 near Adana. A temporary truce ensued, but in 1487 the Ottomans reoccupied Adana, only to be defeated once more by a massive Mameluke army. In 1491, a final truce was signed that would last through the remaining reigns of Qaitbay and the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid II. Qaitbay's ability to enforce a peace with the greatest military power in the Muslim world further enhanced his prestige at home and abroad.
The end of Qaitbay's reign was marred by increasing unrest among his troops and a decline in his personal health, including a riding accident that left him comatose for days. Many of his most trusted officials died, and were replaced by far less scrupulous upstarts. A long period of palace intrigue ensued. In 1492, the plague returned to Cairo, and was reported to have claimed 200,000 lives. Qaitbay's health became markedly poor in 1494, and his court, now lacking a figure of central authority, was wracked by infighting, factionalism, and purges.
Qait Bay died on August 8 of 1496 and was interred in the spectacular mausoleum attached to his mosque in Cairo's Northern Cemetery which he had built during his lifetime. He was succeeded by his son, an-Nasir Muhammad.
Qait Bay's reign has traditionally been seen as the "happy culmination" of the Burji Mameluke dynasty. It was a period of unparalleled political stability, military success, and prosperity, and Qaitbay's contemporaries admired him as a defender of traditional Mameluke values. At the same time, he may be criticized for his conservatism, and for his failure to innovate in the face of new challenges. Following Qaitbay's death, the Mameluke state descended into a prolonged succession crisis lasting for five years until the accession of Al-Ashraf Qansuh al-Ghawri.
Today, Qaitbay is perhaps best known for his wide-ranging architectural patronage. At least 230 monuments, either surviving or mentioned in contemporary sources, are associated with his reign. In Egypt, Qaitbay's buildings were to be found throughout Cairo, as well as in Alexandria and Rosetta. In Syria, he sponsored projects in Aleppo and Damascus. In addition, he was responsible for the construction of madrasas and fountains in Jerusalem and Gaza, which still stand — most notably the Fountain of Qayt Bay and al-Ashrafiyya Madrasa. On the Arabian peninsula, Qaitbay sponsored the restoration of mosques and the construction of madrasas, fountains and hostels in Mecca and Medina. After a serious fire struck the Mosque of the Prophet in Medina in 1481, the building, including the Tomb of the Prophet, was extensively renewed through Qaitbay's patronage.
al-Malik al-Ashraf Qa’it Bay see Qa’it Bay
Qait Bay, al-Malik al-Ashraf see Qa’it Bay
Qaytbay see Qa’it Bay
Kait Bey see Qa’it Bay
al-Ashraf Sayf al-Din Qa'it Bay see Qa’it Bay
Qa’it Bay (Qaytbay) (Kait Bey) (al-Malik al-Ashraf Qa’it Bay) (al-Ashraf Sayf al-Din Qa'it Bay) (ca. 1416/18 - 1496) . Mameluke sultan of Egypt and Syria (1468-1496). His chief political problem was his relations with Ottomans. He granted new privileges to the Italian merchants and made no attempt to monopolize the spice trade, but also introduced measures to protect the interests of native merchants. However, the seemingly rich and powerful Mameluke state was heading for disaster and was no match for Ottoman Turkey.
Al-Ashraf Sayf al-Din Qa'it Bay was the eighteenth Burji Mameluke Sultan of Egypt. He was Circassian by birth, and was purchased by the ninth sultan Barsbay (r.1422 to 1438) before being freed by the eleventh sultan Jaqmaq (r.1438 to 1453). During his reign he stabilized the Mameluke state and economy, consolidated the northern boundaries of the Sultanate with the Ottoman Empire, and emerged as a great patron of art and architecture. In fact, although Qaitbay fought sixteen military campaigns, he is best remembered for the spectacular building projects that he sponsored, leaving his mark as an architectural patron on Mecca, Medina, Jerusalem, Damascus, Aleppo, Alexandria, and every quarter of Cairo.
Qaitbay was born in the Circassian region of the Caucasus between 1416 and 1418. His skill in archery and horsemanship attracted the attention of a slave merchant who purchased him and brought him to Cairo when he was already over twenty years of age. He was quickly purchased by the reigning sultan Barsbay and became a member of the palace guard. He was freed by Barsbay's successor, Jaqmaq, and appointed third executive secretary. Under the reigns of Inal, Khushqadam, and Yilbay he was further promoted through the Mameluke military hierarchy, eventually becoming taqaddimat alf, commander of a thousand Mamelukes. Under the Sultan Timurbugha, finally, Qaitbay was appointed atabak, or field marshal of the entire Mameluke army. During this period, Qaitbay amassed a considerable personal fortune which would enable him to exercise substantial acts of beneficence as sultan without draining the royal treasury.
The reign of Timubugha lasted less than two months, as he was dethroned in a palace coup on January 30, 1468. Qaitbay was proposed as a compromise candidate acceptable to the various court factions, and despite some apparent reluctance was enthroned on January 31. He insisted that Timurburgha be granted an honorable retirement, instead of the enforced exile usually imposed on dethroned sovereigns. He did, however, exile the leaders of the coup, and created a new ruling council composed of his own followers and more veteran courtiers who had fallen into disgrace under his predecessors. Yashbak min Mahdi was appointed dawadar, or executive secretary, and Azbak min Tutkh was named atabak; the two men would remain Qaitbay's closest advisors until the ends of their careers, despite their profound dislike for each other. In general, Qaitbay seems to have pursued a policy of appointing rivals to posts of equal authority, thus preventing any single subordinate from acquiring too much power and maintaining the ability to settle all disputes via his own autocratic authority.
Qaitbay's first major challenge was the insurrection of Shah Suwar, leader of a small Turkmen dynasty, the Dhu'l-Qadrids, in eastern Anatolia. A first expedition against the upstart was soundly defeated, and Suwar threatened to invade Syria. A second Mameluke army was sent in 1469 under the leadership of Azbak, but was likewise defeated. Not until 1471 did a third expedition, this time commanded by Yashbak, succeed in routing Suwar's army. In 1473 Suwar was captured and led back to Cairo, together with his brothers. The prisoners were drawn and quartered and their remains were hung from Bab Zuwayla.
Following the defeat of Suwar, Qaitbay set about purging his court of the remaining factions and installing his own purchased Mamluks in all positions of power. He frequently went on excursions, ostentatiously leaving the Citadel with limited guards to display his trust of his subordinates and of the populace. He traveled throughout his reign, visiting Alexandria, Damascus, and Aleppo, among other cities, and personally inspecting his many building projects. In 1472 he performed the Hajj to Mecca. He was struck by the poverty of the citizens of Medina and devoted a substantial portion of his private fortune to the alleviation of their plight. Through such measures Qaitbay gained a reputation for piety, charity, and royal self-confidence.
In 1480, Yashbak led an army against the Ak Koyunlu dynasty in Northern Mesopotamia, but was soundly defeated while attacking Urfa, taken prisoner, and executed. These events foreshadowed a longer military engagement with the far more powerful Ottoman Empire in Anatolia. In 1485, Ottoman armies began to campaign on the Mameluke frontier, and an expedition was dispatched from Cairo to confront them. These Mameluke troops won a surprising victory in 1486 near Adana. A temporary truce ensued, but in 1487 the Ottomans reoccupied Adana, only to be defeated once more by a massive Mameluke army. In 1491, a final truce was signed that would last through the remaining reigns of Qaitbay and the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid II. Qaitbay's ability to enforce a peace with the greatest military power in the Muslim world further enhanced his prestige at home and abroad.
The end of Qaitbay's reign was marred by increasing unrest among his troops and a decline in his personal health, including a riding accident that left him comatose for days. Many of his most trusted officials died, and were replaced by far less scrupulous upstarts. A long period of palace intrigue ensued. In 1492, the plague returned to Cairo, and was reported to have claimed 200,000 lives. Qaitbay's health became markedly poor in 1494, and his court, now lacking a figure of central authority, was wracked by infighting, factionalism, and purges.
Qait Bay died on August 8 of 1496 and was interred in the spectacular mausoleum attached to his mosque in Cairo's Northern Cemetery which he had built during his lifetime. He was succeeded by his son, an-Nasir Muhammad.
Qait Bay's reign has traditionally been seen as the "happy culmination" of the Burji Mameluke dynasty. It was a period of unparalleled political stability, military success, and prosperity, and Qaitbay's contemporaries admired him as a defender of traditional Mameluke values. At the same time, he may be criticized for his conservatism, and for his failure to innovate in the face of new challenges. Following Qaitbay's death, the Mameluke state descended into a prolonged succession crisis lasting for five years until the accession of Al-Ashraf Qansuh al-Ghawri.
Today, Qaitbay is perhaps best known for his wide-ranging architectural patronage. At least 230 monuments, either surviving or mentioned in contemporary sources, are associated with his reign. In Egypt, Qaitbay's buildings were to be found throughout Cairo, as well as in Alexandria and Rosetta. In Syria, he sponsored projects in Aleppo and Damascus. In addition, he was responsible for the construction of madrasas and fountains in Jerusalem and Gaza, which still stand — most notably the Fountain of Qayt Bay and al-Ashrafiyya Madrasa. On the Arabian peninsula, Qaitbay sponsored the restoration of mosques and the construction of madrasas, fountains and hostels in Mecca and Medina. After a serious fire struck the Mosque of the Prophet in Medina in 1481, the building, including the Tomb of the Prophet, was extensively renewed through Qaitbay's patronage.
al-Malik al-Ashraf Qa’it Bay see Qa’it Bay
Qait Bay, al-Malik al-Ashraf see Qa’it Bay
Qaytbay see Qa’it Bay
Kait Bey see Qa’it Bay
al-Ashraf Sayf al-Din Qa'it Bay see Qa’it Bay
Qajar
Qajar. Name of a dynasty of Turkic origin in Persia (r.1796-1925). The Qajar were a tribe of Turkmen which had probably been settled near Astarabad since Mongol times. The earliest extant historical references to the Qajar tribes date from the late fifteenth century and place them in Anatolia and subsequently in Azerbaijan. At the verey beginning of the sixteenth century, the Qajars were one of the Kizilbash tribes that supported the rise to power of Shah Isma ‘il and the Safavid dynasty. Under the Safavids Tahmasp I and Shah ‘Abbas I, Qajar khans held important offices. Individual Qajars held important administrative positions throughout the Safavid era (1501-1722), and by its end the Qajar tribes were centered to the east of the Caspian Sea. From this base in northeastern Iran, the Qajars were involved in both internecine struggles and battles for supremacy over greater Iran with the various eighteenth century contenders.
Fath ‘Ali Khan (d. 1726) plotted against the Safavid Tahmasp II. His grandson Aga Muhammad Khan was the real founder of the dynasty. He made himself master of Gurgan, Mazandaran and Gilan, took Isfahan and Kirman, made Tehran his capital and invaded Georgia. With the death of Karim Khan Zand in 1779 and the imminent collapse of Zand sovereignty over central and southern Iran, Aga Muhammad established Qajar hegemony. He was crowned in Tehran in 1796 but was murdered by two slaves in 1797 while marching against Georgia. By that time, the Qajar had ceased to be tribal leaders and had become absolute rulers, seeking to emphasize the high, almost sacred, character of their rule.
Having died childless (Aga Muhammad had been castrated as a youth), Aga Muhammad was succeeded by his nephew Fath ‘Ali Shah. Fath ‘Ali Shah (r. 1797-1834) decreased the power of the tribes apart from the Qajars. But rebellion was facilitated by the fact that there was no clear dividing line between the provincial governor, the tribal leader, the landowner and the military commander. Besides, the Qajars never succeeded in establishing family solidarity. The next ruler Muhammad Shah kept several Qajar princes in captivity in Ardabil. After his death, riots and disorders erupted in Tehran. His successor Nasir al-Din was supported by the merchant community of Tabriz.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the influence of the bureaucracy grew. Hostilities with Russia, which had been intermittent from about 1805, ended in 1828 with a treaty of peace that was unfavorable for Persia. The hostilities with Turkey, which had started in 1821, were first brought to an end by the Treaty of Erzurum of 1823 but a second Treaty of Erzurum had to be signed in 1847. Persia’s geographical situation on the frontiers of Russia on the one hand, and of India and the Persian Gulf on the other, involved her in the struggle between Russia and Great Britain.
Shah Nasir al-Din (r. 1848-1896) encouraged foreign powers to invest in Persia, which led to the grant of monopolies and concessions, among them the so-called Tobacco Regie of 1890 and the establishment of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1909. The increasing dominance of non-Muslim nations over Persia led to pro-Islamic and anti-foreign hostility against the government. New intellectual currents also contributed to the progressive dissolution of the old institutions of government and society.
In 1879, a Russian mission arrived to organize the Cossack Brigade, which became the most efficient regiment in the Persian army. The intrusion of France, Russia and England acted first as a stimulus to modernization, but from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, it added to the prevailing insecurity and intrigue.
Persia became the object of opposing British and Russian interests. Under Nasir al-Din Shah (1848-1896) the economy was controlled by British monopolies and concessions (railways, telegraph, etc.), which led to an ongoing conflict with the bourgeois opposition and a call for a reduction in the ruler’s power. The British tobacco monopoly led to unrest in 1890 and a parliamentary battle for a modernistic constitution, which was enforced in 1906 against Shah Muzaffar al-Din (r. 1896-1907).
The press and the ‘ulama’ played a prominent part in the events leading to the grant of the Constitution in 1906.
In 1908, there was a popular uprising in Tehran due to the storming of the parliament by the Shah’s Cossack brigade. The powerless last Qajar, Ahmed Mirza (r. 1909-1925), had to accept the occupation of further parts of Persia by the British and Russians (leading to a British protectorate in 1919), as well as revolts by the Shi‘ites in the south.
Under Russian pressure the Constitution was suspended in 1911, the leadership having passed into the hands of the bureaucracy and the landowning classes. In 1925, Reza Khan Pahlavi, the powerful prime minister, organized a coup d’etat which brought an end to the Qajar dynasty. Ahmad Shah was deposed and the crown of Persia conferred by a Constituent Assembly upon Reza Khan as Reza Shah Pahlavi.
The following is a list of the Qajar Khans and Shahs:
Tribal chiefs in Mazandaran:
1721 Fath ‘Ali Khan
1750 Muhammad Hasan Khan
1770 Husayn Quli Khan
Shah:
1796 Aga Muhammad
1797 Fath ‘Ali Shah
1834 Muhammad
1848 Nasir al-Din
1896 Muzaffar al-Din
1907 Muhammad ‘Ali
1909-25 Ahmad
Pahlavi Shahs:
The Qajar era constituted a period of significant change in Iran. In the first century of their reign the Qajars acted as traditional autocrats over a decentralized realm, according considerable autonomy to whole regions, cities, and tribes, or to locally based officials and institutions, as well as to the bureaucracy, the ulama, the military, and the landowners. (The royal family and officials, military and tribal leaders, and landowners were not wholly distinct classes.) The Qajars’ failure to develop a centralized bureaucracy and a standing army meant that they could retain power only through Russian and British support and divide-and-rule policies. Consequently, regional centers of power emerged around prince-governors in Tabriz, Isfahan, and Shiraz or around magnates, leaders of the ulama, and tribal leaders, some of whom revitalized the Bakthiyari and Qashqja’i confederations. Qajar attempts at reform were short-lived. Such attempts included military reforms under Abbas Mirza and administrative ones under Amir Kabir, who pushed for the establishment of Dar al-Fonun (1851), a technical institute. Shortcomings in the Qajar monarchy, vested interests, and the absence of an effective bureaucracy are to blame for these failures. The military, religious, and local opposition to centralization, together with Russian and British policies, were contributing factors as well.
Qajar ineffectiveness in the face of foreign domination (indeed Qajar acquiescence to it) and the increasing Russian and British interest in Iran, situated as it was between Russia and British India, constitute another major theme of this era. Such interest was first expressed diplomatically, militarily, and politically, later economically and culturally. Two wars with Russia in the first third of the nineteenth century ended with the irrevocable loss of the Caucasian provinces, and in the 1850s conflict with Britain resulted in the cession of western Afghanistan. Territorial losses, foreign political manipulation, and increasing economic domination resulted in xenophobia. By the end of the nineteenth century nationalism had become a significant political force.
The Western impact forced change and brought the new ideas accompanying it. Earlier religious disputes and dissent laid the basis for the challenges to the state inherent in Shi‘ism. Greater authority was vested in mujtahids, the highest-ranking religious leaders. The emergence of secularism and ideas of equality and progress began to challenge Muslim society. New religious and political ideas, along with internal and external pressure for change within the ulama and society as a whole, called for new roles for the ulama. The Babi challenge to religious and political authority was crushed by the middle of the century, but opposition toward the Qajars would grow into a major crisis in 1890-1891 with widespread protest against the tobacco concession granted to a British firm. For many Iranians, the concession was a symbol of the sale of Iran to Europeans, and in the end it had to be canceled. Here the ulama played an important leadership role, as it had earlier in demonstrations against Russia. With the sweeping 1871 Reuter Concession, later withdrawn, for all minerals, a state bank, and railways and communications, and with subsequent concessions, Iranian dissatisfaction had already been increasing.
Qajar ineptness, extravagance, and corruption, combined with continued European exploitation and escalating demonstrations, brought together a coalition of ulama, merchants, traditional leaders, and new nationalists, who demanded a constitution and a representative assembly. Muzaffar al-Din Shah granted a constitution in 1906 that allowed for the election of representatives to the Majlis. His death in January 1907, however, brought his anti-colonialist and pro-Russian son Muhammad Ali Shah to the throne. Muhammad Ali’s reactionary policies were defeated by Tabriz and Rasht nationalists and the Bakhtiyari confederation, and the shah abdicated in favor of his young son, Ahmad Shah. Divisions within the Majlis, ulama opposition to political and legal reforms (especially secular ones), and Russian intervention in 1911 (with British acquiescence) ended the hopes brought about by the Constitutional Revolution. Meanwhile, in this same critical period, Britain and Russia had divided Iran into spheres of influence with the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, and the newly discovered oil in Khuzistan reinforced Iran’s strategic importance and increased Iranian nationalist sentiment for national sovereignty.
Iran declared its neutrality during World War I. It was nevertheless the scene of major fighting during and after the war. The weakness of the central government notwithstanding, the Majlis rejected the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1920 that would have made Iran a British colonial dependency. Britain, however, continued to play a critical, if indirect, role through its diplomatic mission and through the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The Russian Revolution of 1917 had essentially removed the other major power as an important factor in Iran’s politics until World War II. Nevertheless, Iran appeared doomed to fragmentation by separatist movements such as the one in Gilan, initially supported by the Soviets, combined with an increasingly incapacitated government. With these conditions as background, Sayyid Ziya al-Din Tabataba’i, a nationalist journalist, and Reza Khan, commander of some 2,500 soldiers of the Iranian Cossack Brigade, successfully staged a coup d’etat in 1921. Within three months Sayyid Ziya al-Din was ousted as prime minister. Reza Khan, the new minister of war, set out to reform the military in order to re-establish the authority of the central government. In 1923, Reza Khan became prime minister. By 1925, he had convinced the Majlis to depose Ahmad Shah and to elect him shah. At his coronation as Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1926 the Qajar era was brought to an end.
As a consequence of nineteenth and twentieth century Qajar misrule and domination by the European powers, the Iranian people faced extraordinary economic changes. Iran’s integration into the world market system, while hindered by a number of geographical and political factors -- drought, earthquakes, a hostile climate, the ruggedness and isolation of the Iranian terrain, internal and ethnic divisions, the localization of the economy, the land tenure system, and the lack of an infrastructure for trade and communication -- tended to exacerbate the weaknesses inherent in the Iranian social and political sphere. For Iran, as for many other parts of the non-European world, the dominance of world markets by European financiers, merchants, and consumer tastes created a situation of economic dependency in which the Iranians had decreasing control of their economy. Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century Iran had been transformed from a subsistence-level agricultural, industrial, and commercial economy to a rather inflexible system largely dependent on imports. Despite a currency outflow, cash shortages, and rising credit demands, Iranian merchants were able to affect the number of imports and to play key roles in the face of European and Indian inroads on the economy. Increased production of cash crops such as silk, opium, tobacco, cotton, and rice did help to offset imports, but with the end result that Iran became a net importer of cereals. The revived carpet industry gained importance in the national economy, and the oil industry, a new factor, was to become significant in the Pahlavi era, although it symbolized continued British domination. The overwhelmingly negative consequences of the change from subsistence to dependency -- inefficient, unjust administration and inflation -- compounded national and political frustrations, underlining a general sense of Qajar failure.
Iran’s transformation from a traditional Islamic society to a modern nation-state took place in the Qajar period. The emergence of the new ideas and programs of nationalism, liberalism, secularism, and constitutionalism was accompanied by significant social changes, one of the most important of which was the formation of an intelligentsia, exemplified by such figures as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897) and Malkom Khan (d. 1908). Ironically, the ulama was revitalized in its opposition to such changes, but the implications of this revitalization were not to be fully realized for perhaps two generations. The subsequent centralized Pahlavi governments were to play new active, modern roles unlike those of their traditional Qajar forerunners. What is often overlooked, however, in the generally negative assessments of the 129 years of Qajar rule, is that the new social, economic, and cultural relationships of the Pahlavi period, as well as the accompanying developments in literature, journalism, art, architecture, and education, have their roots in the Qajar era.
Qajar. Name of a dynasty of Turkic origin in Persia (r.1796-1925). The Qajar were a tribe of Turkmen which had probably been settled near Astarabad since Mongol times. The earliest extant historical references to the Qajar tribes date from the late fifteenth century and place them in Anatolia and subsequently in Azerbaijan. At the verey beginning of the sixteenth century, the Qajars were one of the Kizilbash tribes that supported the rise to power of Shah Isma ‘il and the Safavid dynasty. Under the Safavids Tahmasp I and Shah ‘Abbas I, Qajar khans held important offices. Individual Qajars held important administrative positions throughout the Safavid era (1501-1722), and by its end the Qajar tribes were centered to the east of the Caspian Sea. From this base in northeastern Iran, the Qajars were involved in both internecine struggles and battles for supremacy over greater Iran with the various eighteenth century contenders.
Fath ‘Ali Khan (d. 1726) plotted against the Safavid Tahmasp II. His grandson Aga Muhammad Khan was the real founder of the dynasty. He made himself master of Gurgan, Mazandaran and Gilan, took Isfahan and Kirman, made Tehran his capital and invaded Georgia. With the death of Karim Khan Zand in 1779 and the imminent collapse of Zand sovereignty over central and southern Iran, Aga Muhammad established Qajar hegemony. He was crowned in Tehran in 1796 but was murdered by two slaves in 1797 while marching against Georgia. By that time, the Qajar had ceased to be tribal leaders and had become absolute rulers, seeking to emphasize the high, almost sacred, character of their rule.
Having died childless (Aga Muhammad had been castrated as a youth), Aga Muhammad was succeeded by his nephew Fath ‘Ali Shah. Fath ‘Ali Shah (r. 1797-1834) decreased the power of the tribes apart from the Qajars. But rebellion was facilitated by the fact that there was no clear dividing line between the provincial governor, the tribal leader, the landowner and the military commander. Besides, the Qajars never succeeded in establishing family solidarity. The next ruler Muhammad Shah kept several Qajar princes in captivity in Ardabil. After his death, riots and disorders erupted in Tehran. His successor Nasir al-Din was supported by the merchant community of Tabriz.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the influence of the bureaucracy grew. Hostilities with Russia, which had been intermittent from about 1805, ended in 1828 with a treaty of peace that was unfavorable for Persia. The hostilities with Turkey, which had started in 1821, were first brought to an end by the Treaty of Erzurum of 1823 but a second Treaty of Erzurum had to be signed in 1847. Persia’s geographical situation on the frontiers of Russia on the one hand, and of India and the Persian Gulf on the other, involved her in the struggle between Russia and Great Britain.
Shah Nasir al-Din (r. 1848-1896) encouraged foreign powers to invest in Persia, which led to the grant of monopolies and concessions, among them the so-called Tobacco Regie of 1890 and the establishment of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1909. The increasing dominance of non-Muslim nations over Persia led to pro-Islamic and anti-foreign hostility against the government. New intellectual currents also contributed to the progressive dissolution of the old institutions of government and society.
In 1879, a Russian mission arrived to organize the Cossack Brigade, which became the most efficient regiment in the Persian army. The intrusion of France, Russia and England acted first as a stimulus to modernization, but from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, it added to the prevailing insecurity and intrigue.
Persia became the object of opposing British and Russian interests. Under Nasir al-Din Shah (1848-1896) the economy was controlled by British monopolies and concessions (railways, telegraph, etc.), which led to an ongoing conflict with the bourgeois opposition and a call for a reduction in the ruler’s power. The British tobacco monopoly led to unrest in 1890 and a parliamentary battle for a modernistic constitution, which was enforced in 1906 against Shah Muzaffar al-Din (r. 1896-1907).
The press and the ‘ulama’ played a prominent part in the events leading to the grant of the Constitution in 1906.
In 1908, there was a popular uprising in Tehran due to the storming of the parliament by the Shah’s Cossack brigade. The powerless last Qajar, Ahmed Mirza (r. 1909-1925), had to accept the occupation of further parts of Persia by the British and Russians (leading to a British protectorate in 1919), as well as revolts by the Shi‘ites in the south.
Under Russian pressure the Constitution was suspended in 1911, the leadership having passed into the hands of the bureaucracy and the landowning classes. In 1925, Reza Khan Pahlavi, the powerful prime minister, organized a coup d’etat which brought an end to the Qajar dynasty. Ahmad Shah was deposed and the crown of Persia conferred by a Constituent Assembly upon Reza Khan as Reza Shah Pahlavi.
The following is a list of the Qajar Khans and Shahs:
Tribal chiefs in Mazandaran:
1721 Fath ‘Ali Khan
1750 Muhammad Hasan Khan
1770 Husayn Quli Khan
Shah:
1796 Aga Muhammad
1797 Fath ‘Ali Shah
1834 Muhammad
1848 Nasir al-Din
1896 Muzaffar al-Din
1907 Muhammad ‘Ali
1909-25 Ahmad
Pahlavi Shahs:
The Qajar era constituted a period of significant change in Iran. In the first century of their reign the Qajars acted as traditional autocrats over a decentralized realm, according considerable autonomy to whole regions, cities, and tribes, or to locally based officials and institutions, as well as to the bureaucracy, the ulama, the military, and the landowners. (The royal family and officials, military and tribal leaders, and landowners were not wholly distinct classes.) The Qajars’ failure to develop a centralized bureaucracy and a standing army meant that they could retain power only through Russian and British support and divide-and-rule policies. Consequently, regional centers of power emerged around prince-governors in Tabriz, Isfahan, and Shiraz or around magnates, leaders of the ulama, and tribal leaders, some of whom revitalized the Bakthiyari and Qashqja’i confederations. Qajar attempts at reform were short-lived. Such attempts included military reforms under Abbas Mirza and administrative ones under Amir Kabir, who pushed for the establishment of Dar al-Fonun (1851), a technical institute. Shortcomings in the Qajar monarchy, vested interests, and the absence of an effective bureaucracy are to blame for these failures. The military, religious, and local opposition to centralization, together with Russian and British policies, were contributing factors as well.
Qajar ineffectiveness in the face of foreign domination (indeed Qajar acquiescence to it) and the increasing Russian and British interest in Iran, situated as it was between Russia and British India, constitute another major theme of this era. Such interest was first expressed diplomatically, militarily, and politically, later economically and culturally. Two wars with Russia in the first third of the nineteenth century ended with the irrevocable loss of the Caucasian provinces, and in the 1850s conflict with Britain resulted in the cession of western Afghanistan. Territorial losses, foreign political manipulation, and increasing economic domination resulted in xenophobia. By the end of the nineteenth century nationalism had become a significant political force.
The Western impact forced change and brought the new ideas accompanying it. Earlier religious disputes and dissent laid the basis for the challenges to the state inherent in Shi‘ism. Greater authority was vested in mujtahids, the highest-ranking religious leaders. The emergence of secularism and ideas of equality and progress began to challenge Muslim society. New religious and political ideas, along with internal and external pressure for change within the ulama and society as a whole, called for new roles for the ulama. The Babi challenge to religious and political authority was crushed by the middle of the century, but opposition toward the Qajars would grow into a major crisis in 1890-1891 with widespread protest against the tobacco concession granted to a British firm. For many Iranians, the concession was a symbol of the sale of Iran to Europeans, and in the end it had to be canceled. Here the ulama played an important leadership role, as it had earlier in demonstrations against Russia. With the sweeping 1871 Reuter Concession, later withdrawn, for all minerals, a state bank, and railways and communications, and with subsequent concessions, Iranian dissatisfaction had already been increasing.
Qajar ineptness, extravagance, and corruption, combined with continued European exploitation and escalating demonstrations, brought together a coalition of ulama, merchants, traditional leaders, and new nationalists, who demanded a constitution and a representative assembly. Muzaffar al-Din Shah granted a constitution in 1906 that allowed for the election of representatives to the Majlis. His death in January 1907, however, brought his anti-colonialist and pro-Russian son Muhammad Ali Shah to the throne. Muhammad Ali’s reactionary policies were defeated by Tabriz and Rasht nationalists and the Bakhtiyari confederation, and the shah abdicated in favor of his young son, Ahmad Shah. Divisions within the Majlis, ulama opposition to political and legal reforms (especially secular ones), and Russian intervention in 1911 (with British acquiescence) ended the hopes brought about by the Constitutional Revolution. Meanwhile, in this same critical period, Britain and Russia had divided Iran into spheres of influence with the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, and the newly discovered oil in Khuzistan reinforced Iran’s strategic importance and increased Iranian nationalist sentiment for national sovereignty.
Iran declared its neutrality during World War I. It was nevertheless the scene of major fighting during and after the war. The weakness of the central government notwithstanding, the Majlis rejected the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1920 that would have made Iran a British colonial dependency. Britain, however, continued to play a critical, if indirect, role through its diplomatic mission and through the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The Russian Revolution of 1917 had essentially removed the other major power as an important factor in Iran’s politics until World War II. Nevertheless, Iran appeared doomed to fragmentation by separatist movements such as the one in Gilan, initially supported by the Soviets, combined with an increasingly incapacitated government. With these conditions as background, Sayyid Ziya al-Din Tabataba’i, a nationalist journalist, and Reza Khan, commander of some 2,500 soldiers of the Iranian Cossack Brigade, successfully staged a coup d’etat in 1921. Within three months Sayyid Ziya al-Din was ousted as prime minister. Reza Khan, the new minister of war, set out to reform the military in order to re-establish the authority of the central government. In 1923, Reza Khan became prime minister. By 1925, he had convinced the Majlis to depose Ahmad Shah and to elect him shah. At his coronation as Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1926 the Qajar era was brought to an end.
As a consequence of nineteenth and twentieth century Qajar misrule and domination by the European powers, the Iranian people faced extraordinary economic changes. Iran’s integration into the world market system, while hindered by a number of geographical and political factors -- drought, earthquakes, a hostile climate, the ruggedness and isolation of the Iranian terrain, internal and ethnic divisions, the localization of the economy, the land tenure system, and the lack of an infrastructure for trade and communication -- tended to exacerbate the weaknesses inherent in the Iranian social and political sphere. For Iran, as for many other parts of the non-European world, the dominance of world markets by European financiers, merchants, and consumer tastes created a situation of economic dependency in which the Iranians had decreasing control of their economy. Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century Iran had been transformed from a subsistence-level agricultural, industrial, and commercial economy to a rather inflexible system largely dependent on imports. Despite a currency outflow, cash shortages, and rising credit demands, Iranian merchants were able to affect the number of imports and to play key roles in the face of European and Indian inroads on the economy. Increased production of cash crops such as silk, opium, tobacco, cotton, and rice did help to offset imports, but with the end result that Iran became a net importer of cereals. The revived carpet industry gained importance in the national economy, and the oil industry, a new factor, was to become significant in the Pahlavi era, although it symbolized continued British domination. The overwhelmingly negative consequences of the change from subsistence to dependency -- inefficient, unjust administration and inflation -- compounded national and political frustrations, underlining a general sense of Qajar failure.
Iran’s transformation from a traditional Islamic society to a modern nation-state took place in the Qajar period. The emergence of the new ideas and programs of nationalism, liberalism, secularism, and constitutionalism was accompanied by significant social changes, one of the most important of which was the formation of an intelligentsia, exemplified by such figures as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897) and Malkom Khan (d. 1908). Ironically, the ulama was revitalized in its opposition to such changes, but the implications of this revitalization were not to be fully realized for perhaps two generations. The subsequent centralized Pahlavi governments were to play new active, modern roles unlike those of their traditional Qajar forerunners. What is often overlooked, however, in the generally negative assessments of the 129 years of Qajar rule, is that the new social, economic, and cultural relationships of the Pahlavi period, as well as the accompanying developments in literature, journalism, art, architecture, and education, have their roots in the Qajar era.
Qajar, Ahmad
Qajar, Ahmad (Ahmad Shah Qajar) (b. January 21, 1898, Tabriz, Iran - d. February 21, 1930, Neuilly-sur-Seine, Paris, France) Shah of Iran from 1909 to 1925. Born Ahmad Shah, he was also known as Sultan Ahmad and he was the last ruler of the Qajar dynasty. He was elected shah by the First Majlis (national assembly) after his father, Muhammad Ali, had been deposed and sent into exile. He was crowned in 1914 following a regency of five years. Ahmad Shah did not succeed in asserting his authority over the government and was unable to prevent the anarchic decentralization of power in Iran during and immediately after World War I. He had to acquiesce in the 1921 coup d’etat that brought Reza Khan, the future Reza Shah, to power as minister of war. As Reza Khan consolidated power, the status of Ahmad Shah was reduced to that of a mere symbol. In 1923, just after appointing Reza Khan as prime minister, Ahmad Shah departed Iran for France. He never returned to his country. In October 1925, the Majlis deposed him as shah, abolished the Qajar family as the royal dynasty, and established the Pahlavis as the new royal family.
Ahmad Shah acceded to the Peacock Throne on July 16, 1909, following the overthrow of his father and predecessor, Mohammad Ali Shah, who had attempted to reverse earlier constitutional restrictions on royal power, and thus enraged the majority of Iranians. It is alleged that Ahmad Shah was one of the most democratic-minded kings of Persia while others dismiss him as a weak ruler, uninterested in attending to the matters of government.
After removing Muhammad Ali Shah from power, the Grand Majles placed Ahmad Shah on the throne. The Grand Majles consisted of 500 delegate members who came from different backgrounds. They held a special tribunal in order to punish all those who participated in the civil war, among those executed was Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri. They also brought in new reforms that were not seen in Iran before. They abolished class representation; created five new seats for the minorities in the Majles; the Armenians got two seats, other religious minority groups such as Jews, Zoroastrians and Assyrians each got one seat in the new government; the Majles also democratized the electoral system; diminished the electoral dominance of Tehran and even lowered the voting age from twenty five to twenty. Not much is known about his early life prior to his ascendancy to the throne. He was very attached to his father and after his father left, Ahmad felt isolated and bitter. Due to his young age a regent who was his uncle Azud al-Mulk, took charge of his affairs. However, his lavish lifestyle did not gain him any favors with the Iranian people. Ahmad Shah inherited a kingdom in turmoil, and a constituency frustrated with British and Russian imperialism and the absolute rule of his father.
Ahmad Shah attempted to fix the damage done by his father by appointing the best ministers he could find. He was, however, an ineffective ruler who was faced with internal unrest and foreign intrusions, particularly by the British and Russian Empires. Russian and British troops fought against the Ottoman forces in Iran during World War I. The War led to outcries across the country because the people of Iran were not happy that they were being used as a battleground. This dissatisfaction led to local movement across the country that tried to challenge the power of Ahmad Shah Qajar and his government.
The Second Majles convened on November 1910 and just like the First Majlis, it had great ideas and reforms, but could not get much accomplished. The Majles was rendered ineffective because the central government was weak and did not have enough influence to reign in the changes that it had proposed. It is alleged that the Second Majles did not get along with Ahmad Shah.
In 1917, Britain used Persia as the springboard for an attack into Russia in an unsuccessful attempt to reverse the Russian Revolution of 1917. The newly born Soviet Union responded by annexing portions of northern Persia as buffer states much like its Tsarist predecessor. Marching on Tehran, the Soviets extracted ever more humiliating concessions from the Qajar government - whose ministers Ahmad Shah was often unable to control. The weakness of the central bureaucracy in the face of such aggression by an atheist foreign power sparked seething anger among many traditional Iranians - including the young Ruhollah Khomeini, who would later condemn both communism and monarchy as treason against Iran's sovereignty and the laws of Islam.
By 1920, the government had virtually lost all power outside its capital and Ahmad Shah had lost control and couldn't do much to fix the situation. The Anglo-Persian Agreement along with new political parties furthermore immobilized the country. The Moderates and Democrats often clashed, particularly when it came to minority rights and secularism. The debates between the two political parties led to violence and even assassinations.
The weak economic state of Persia put Ahmad Shah and his government at the mercy of foreign influence. His government had to obtain loans from the British Imperial Bank. Furthermore, the oil revenues which were owned by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company only earned Iran a small fraction of revenues. On the other hand, the Red Army along with rebels and warlords ruled much of the countryside.
On February 21, 1921, Ahmad Shah was pushed aside in a military coup by his Minister of War and commander of the Cossack garrison, Colonel Reza Khan, who subsequently seized the post of Prime Minister. During the coup, Reza Khan used three thousand men and only eighteen machine guns, a very bloodless coup that moved forward quickly. Reza Khan was a self made man who climbed his way up through the military ranks and appeared to be the right man to take back control of Persia. One of his first actions was to take back the Anglo-Iranian Treaty. This was seen as a very successful diplomatic move since the treaty was very unpopular. In addition, he signed the Iran Soviet agreement in 1921. This agreement canceled all previous treaties between the two countries and also gave Persia full and equal shipping right in the Caspian Sea.
Stripped of all his remaining powers, Ahmad Shah went into exile with his family in 1923. Ahmad Shah's apparent lack of interest in attending to the affairs of the state and poor health had prompted him to leave Iran on this extended “European Tour.” He was formally deposed on October 31, 1925, when Reza Khan was proclaimed Shah by the Founders Assembly, taking the title Reza Shah Pahlavi. Reza Shah and the Majles thus terminated the Qajar Dynasty and established the Pahlavi Dynasty.
The coup of 1921 rendered Ahmad Shah politically weaker and less relevant. In 1923, Ahmad Shah left Iran for Europe for health reasons. Later, the formal termination of the Qajar Dynasty by the Majles, turned Ahmad Shah's 1923 European tour into exile.
Shortly after the coup, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk who had just taken power in Turkey as its first president, offered to help restore Ahmad Shah to the throne. To that end, he summoned the Persian Ambassador to Turkey, Anoushirvan Sepahbody to the presidential palace and instructed him to immediately intervene on his behalf with Ahmad Shah in Paris with an offer of assistance.
Ahmad Shah politely declined this offer, possibly either due to pride or lack of interest in continuing as king. Allegedly, it was only after this rejection of Ataturk's offer that the Turkish government threw its full support behind the new government of Reza Shah Pahlavi thus recognizing him as the new sovereign of Persia.
Prior to his death, it is said that Ahmad Shah followed frequent crash diets which did not help his health. For example he lost and gained two hundred pounds within a two year span. He died in 1930 at Neuilly-sur-Seine, outside Paris, France. His brother, former crown prince Mohammad Hassan Mirza, assured the physical continuation of the dynasty through his descendants.
Ahmad Shah Qajar married five times. His first wife was Lida Jahanbani. From this marriage there was no offspring. However, he had four children from his four other wives:
* Princess Maryamdokht (1915 -10 November 2005)
* Princess Irandokht (1916–1984)
* Princess Homayoundokht (1917-)
* Prince Fereydoun Mirza (1922 -24 September 1975)
Ahmad Qajar see Qajar, Ahmad
Ahmad Shah Qajar see Qajar, Ahmad
Qajar, Ahmad (Ahmad Shah Qajar) (b. January 21, 1898, Tabriz, Iran - d. February 21, 1930, Neuilly-sur-Seine, Paris, France) Shah of Iran from 1909 to 1925. Born Ahmad Shah, he was also known as Sultan Ahmad and he was the last ruler of the Qajar dynasty. He was elected shah by the First Majlis (national assembly) after his father, Muhammad Ali, had been deposed and sent into exile. He was crowned in 1914 following a regency of five years. Ahmad Shah did not succeed in asserting his authority over the government and was unable to prevent the anarchic decentralization of power in Iran during and immediately after World War I. He had to acquiesce in the 1921 coup d’etat that brought Reza Khan, the future Reza Shah, to power as minister of war. As Reza Khan consolidated power, the status of Ahmad Shah was reduced to that of a mere symbol. In 1923, just after appointing Reza Khan as prime minister, Ahmad Shah departed Iran for France. He never returned to his country. In October 1925, the Majlis deposed him as shah, abolished the Qajar family as the royal dynasty, and established the Pahlavis as the new royal family.
Ahmad Shah acceded to the Peacock Throne on July 16, 1909, following the overthrow of his father and predecessor, Mohammad Ali Shah, who had attempted to reverse earlier constitutional restrictions on royal power, and thus enraged the majority of Iranians. It is alleged that Ahmad Shah was one of the most democratic-minded kings of Persia while others dismiss him as a weak ruler, uninterested in attending to the matters of government.
After removing Muhammad Ali Shah from power, the Grand Majles placed Ahmad Shah on the throne. The Grand Majles consisted of 500 delegate members who came from different backgrounds. They held a special tribunal in order to punish all those who participated in the civil war, among those executed was Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri. They also brought in new reforms that were not seen in Iran before. They abolished class representation; created five new seats for the minorities in the Majles; the Armenians got two seats, other religious minority groups such as Jews, Zoroastrians and Assyrians each got one seat in the new government; the Majles also democratized the electoral system; diminished the electoral dominance of Tehran and even lowered the voting age from twenty five to twenty. Not much is known about his early life prior to his ascendancy to the throne. He was very attached to his father and after his father left, Ahmad felt isolated and bitter. Due to his young age a regent who was his uncle Azud al-Mulk, took charge of his affairs. However, his lavish lifestyle did not gain him any favors with the Iranian people. Ahmad Shah inherited a kingdom in turmoil, and a constituency frustrated with British and Russian imperialism and the absolute rule of his father.
Ahmad Shah attempted to fix the damage done by his father by appointing the best ministers he could find. He was, however, an ineffective ruler who was faced with internal unrest and foreign intrusions, particularly by the British and Russian Empires. Russian and British troops fought against the Ottoman forces in Iran during World War I. The War led to outcries across the country because the people of Iran were not happy that they were being used as a battleground. This dissatisfaction led to local movement across the country that tried to challenge the power of Ahmad Shah Qajar and his government.
The Second Majles convened on November 1910 and just like the First Majlis, it had great ideas and reforms, but could not get much accomplished. The Majles was rendered ineffective because the central government was weak and did not have enough influence to reign in the changes that it had proposed. It is alleged that the Second Majles did not get along with Ahmad Shah.
In 1917, Britain used Persia as the springboard for an attack into Russia in an unsuccessful attempt to reverse the Russian Revolution of 1917. The newly born Soviet Union responded by annexing portions of northern Persia as buffer states much like its Tsarist predecessor. Marching on Tehran, the Soviets extracted ever more humiliating concessions from the Qajar government - whose ministers Ahmad Shah was often unable to control. The weakness of the central bureaucracy in the face of such aggression by an atheist foreign power sparked seething anger among many traditional Iranians - including the young Ruhollah Khomeini, who would later condemn both communism and monarchy as treason against Iran's sovereignty and the laws of Islam.
By 1920, the government had virtually lost all power outside its capital and Ahmad Shah had lost control and couldn't do much to fix the situation. The Anglo-Persian Agreement along with new political parties furthermore immobilized the country. The Moderates and Democrats often clashed, particularly when it came to minority rights and secularism. The debates between the two political parties led to violence and even assassinations.
The weak economic state of Persia put Ahmad Shah and his government at the mercy of foreign influence. His government had to obtain loans from the British Imperial Bank. Furthermore, the oil revenues which were owned by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company only earned Iran a small fraction of revenues. On the other hand, the Red Army along with rebels and warlords ruled much of the countryside.
On February 21, 1921, Ahmad Shah was pushed aside in a military coup by his Minister of War and commander of the Cossack garrison, Colonel Reza Khan, who subsequently seized the post of Prime Minister. During the coup, Reza Khan used three thousand men and only eighteen machine guns, a very bloodless coup that moved forward quickly. Reza Khan was a self made man who climbed his way up through the military ranks and appeared to be the right man to take back control of Persia. One of his first actions was to take back the Anglo-Iranian Treaty. This was seen as a very successful diplomatic move since the treaty was very unpopular. In addition, he signed the Iran Soviet agreement in 1921. This agreement canceled all previous treaties between the two countries and also gave Persia full and equal shipping right in the Caspian Sea.
Stripped of all his remaining powers, Ahmad Shah went into exile with his family in 1923. Ahmad Shah's apparent lack of interest in attending to the affairs of the state and poor health had prompted him to leave Iran on this extended “European Tour.” He was formally deposed on October 31, 1925, when Reza Khan was proclaimed Shah by the Founders Assembly, taking the title Reza Shah Pahlavi. Reza Shah and the Majles thus terminated the Qajar Dynasty and established the Pahlavi Dynasty.
The coup of 1921 rendered Ahmad Shah politically weaker and less relevant. In 1923, Ahmad Shah left Iran for Europe for health reasons. Later, the formal termination of the Qajar Dynasty by the Majles, turned Ahmad Shah's 1923 European tour into exile.
Shortly after the coup, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk who had just taken power in Turkey as its first president, offered to help restore Ahmad Shah to the throne. To that end, he summoned the Persian Ambassador to Turkey, Anoushirvan Sepahbody to the presidential palace and instructed him to immediately intervene on his behalf with Ahmad Shah in Paris with an offer of assistance.
Ahmad Shah politely declined this offer, possibly either due to pride or lack of interest in continuing as king. Allegedly, it was only after this rejection of Ataturk's offer that the Turkish government threw its full support behind the new government of Reza Shah Pahlavi thus recognizing him as the new sovereign of Persia.
Prior to his death, it is said that Ahmad Shah followed frequent crash diets which did not help his health. For example he lost and gained two hundred pounds within a two year span. He died in 1930 at Neuilly-sur-Seine, outside Paris, France. His brother, former crown prince Mohammad Hassan Mirza, assured the physical continuation of the dynasty through his descendants.
Ahmad Shah Qajar married five times. His first wife was Lida Jahanbani. From this marriage there was no offspring. However, he had four children from his four other wives:
* Princess Maryamdokht (1915 -10 November 2005)
* Princess Irandokht (1916–1984)
* Princess Homayoundokht (1917-)
* Prince Fereydoun Mirza (1922 -24 September 1975)
Ahmad Qajar see Qajar, Ahmad
Ahmad Shah Qajar see Qajar, Ahmad
Qajar, Muhammad Ali
Qajar, Muhammad Ali (Muhammad Ali Qajar) (Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar) (June 21, 1872, Tabriz, Persia [Iran] - April 5, 1925, San-Remo, Italy). Shah of Persia from January 8, 1907 to July 16, 1909. Muhammad Ali Shah’s brief reign was marked by constant conflict between the court and the constitutionalists over the respective roles of the monarch and the newly established Majlis (parliament). Muhammad Ali Shah was suspected of complicity in the assassination of the prime minister, Amin al-Sultan, in 1907, and in 1908 he ordered the Cossack Brigade to bombard the Majlis building. This led to a year long civil war during which the shah’s forces were defeated by the constitutionalists and Muhammad Ali was deposed. In 1911, Muhammad Ali made an unsuccessful attempt to regain the crown with the tacit support of Russia.
Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar was against the constitution that was ratified during the reign of his father, Mozzafar-al-Din Shah. In 1907 Mohammad Ali dissolved the Majles (the Iranian parliament/National assembly) and declared the Constitution abolished because it was contrary to Islamic law. He bombarded the Majles with the military and political support of Russia and Britain. However, he abdicated following a new Constitutional Revolution. He is remembered as a symbol of dictatorship.
Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar fled to Odessa, Russia (present day Ukraine). Mohammad Ali plotted his return to power from Odessa. In 1911, he landed at Astarabad, Iran, but his forces were defeated. Mohammad Ali Shah fled to Constantinople and died in San Remo, Italy, April 5, 1925 and was buried at the Shrine of Imam Husain, Karbala, Iraq). Ironically, every future shah of Iran since Mohammad Ali Shah would die in exile as well.
His son and successor, Ahmad Shah Qajar was the last ruler in the Qajar dynasty.
Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar had eight children from two marriages. From his first wife he had one son. From his second marriage to Princess Malekeh Jahan, daughter of Kamran Mirza Nayeb es-Saltaneh, he had seven children. The oldest child, Gholam Hossein Mirza, died in infancy.
* From Robabeh Khanoum Malih-e Saltaneh
o Prince Hossein Ali Mirza E'tezad Saltaneh
* From Malakeh Jahan daughter of Kamran Mirza
o Prince Gholam Hossein Mirza, died in infancy]
o Prince Soltan Ahmad Shah (January 21, 1898, Tabriz - February 27, 1930, Neuilly-sur-Seine, Paris, France)
o Prince Mohammad Hassan Mirza (February 20, 1899, Tabriz - January 7, 1943, Maidenhead, England)
o Prince Soltan Mahmoud Mirza (October 15, 1905, Tehran - July 2, 1988, Évian-les-Bains, France)
o Prince Soltan Majid Mirza (January 7, 1907, Tehran - May 24, 1986, Paris, France)
o Princess Khadijeh (1900, Tabriz-1956, Tehran, Iran)
o Princess Assieh (1908, Tehran-1953, Isfahan, Iran)
Qajar, Muhammad Ali (Muhammad Ali Qajar) (Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar) (June 21, 1872, Tabriz, Persia [Iran] - April 5, 1925, San-Remo, Italy). Shah of Persia from January 8, 1907 to July 16, 1909. Muhammad Ali Shah’s brief reign was marked by constant conflict between the court and the constitutionalists over the respective roles of the monarch and the newly established Majlis (parliament). Muhammad Ali Shah was suspected of complicity in the assassination of the prime minister, Amin al-Sultan, in 1907, and in 1908 he ordered the Cossack Brigade to bombard the Majlis building. This led to a year long civil war during which the shah’s forces were defeated by the constitutionalists and Muhammad Ali was deposed. In 1911, Muhammad Ali made an unsuccessful attempt to regain the crown with the tacit support of Russia.
Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar was against the constitution that was ratified during the reign of his father, Mozzafar-al-Din Shah. In 1907 Mohammad Ali dissolved the Majles (the Iranian parliament/National assembly) and declared the Constitution abolished because it was contrary to Islamic law. He bombarded the Majles with the military and political support of Russia and Britain. However, he abdicated following a new Constitutional Revolution. He is remembered as a symbol of dictatorship.
Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar fled to Odessa, Russia (present day Ukraine). Mohammad Ali plotted his return to power from Odessa. In 1911, he landed at Astarabad, Iran, but his forces were defeated. Mohammad Ali Shah fled to Constantinople and died in San Remo, Italy, April 5, 1925 and was buried at the Shrine of Imam Husain, Karbala, Iraq). Ironically, every future shah of Iran since Mohammad Ali Shah would die in exile as well.
His son and successor, Ahmad Shah Qajar was the last ruler in the Qajar dynasty.
Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar had eight children from two marriages. From his first wife he had one son. From his second marriage to Princess Malekeh Jahan, daughter of Kamran Mirza Nayeb es-Saltaneh, he had seven children. The oldest child, Gholam Hossein Mirza, died in infancy.
* From Robabeh Khanoum Malih-e Saltaneh
o Prince Hossein Ali Mirza E'tezad Saltaneh
* From Malakeh Jahan daughter of Kamran Mirza
o Prince Gholam Hossein Mirza, died in infancy]
o Prince Soltan Ahmad Shah (January 21, 1898, Tabriz - February 27, 1930, Neuilly-sur-Seine, Paris, France)
o Prince Mohammad Hassan Mirza (February 20, 1899, Tabriz - January 7, 1943, Maidenhead, England)
o Prince Soltan Mahmoud Mirza (October 15, 1905, Tehran - July 2, 1988, Évian-les-Bains, France)
o Prince Soltan Majid Mirza (January 7, 1907, Tehran - May 24, 1986, Paris, France)
o Princess Khadijeh (1900, Tabriz-1956, Tehran, Iran)
o Princess Assieh (1908, Tehran-1953, Isfahan, Iran)
Qajar, Nasir al-Din
Qajar, Nasir al-Din (Nasir al-Din Qajar) (Naser al-Din Qajar) (Nasser al-Din Shah Qajar) (Nāṣira’d-Dīn Shāh Qājār) (July 16, 1831, Tabriz - May 1, 1896, Tehran). Shah of the Qajar dynasty in Iran (r. 1848-1896). Nasir al-Din acceded to the throne upon the death of his father, Muhammad Shah. For the first three years of Nasir al-Din’s reign, real power was wielded by his prime minister, Mirza Taqi Khan Amir Kabir, who founded Iran’s first institution for higher education, the Dar al-Fonun (Polytechnic Institute), and initiated a wide range of economic and political reforms inspired mainly by European models of centralization and modernization. Nasir al-Din perceived many of these attempted reforms as a threat to his own power, and in 1851 dismissed Amir Kabir. The following year, he ordered Kabir’s assassination.
From 1852 until 1890 Nasir al-Din’s reign was a period of relative domestic stability marked by an increasing foreign involvement, chiefly British and Russian, in Iran’s economy and politics. An unsuccessful attempt to regain Herat from the British between 1856 and 1857 was the only military conflict of note in the half-century of his rule. Iran in this period had virtually no standing army, with the most important armed force being the Persian Cossack Brigade led by Russian officers, which Nasir al-Din created in 1873 following the first of three trips to Europe.
Owing to gradually worsening economic conditions in the latter half of the century, Nasir al-Din Shah initiated a practice, carried on by his successor, of raising money for the crown by selling economic concessions to foreign subjects or governments. The concessions were eagerly sought after and competed for, especially by Great Britain and Russia. In 1872, the largest of these concessions ws granted to a British subject, Baron Julius de Reuter, awarding exclusive rights for the development of Iran’s minerals, railroads, irrigation, and a host of other industrial and agricultural resources. In addition, de Reuter was conceded the right to found what was later to become the Imperial Bank of Persia, Iran’s major banking institution into the twentieth century.
Although the Reuter Concession was annulled in 1873 under pressure from both Russian and domestic opposition, significant portions of the concession were re-negotiated and continued in effect. Among other concessions granted by Nasir al-Din Shah were telegraph construction rights tot eh British, fishing rights in the Caspian to the Russians, and tobacco sales and export to a British subject. It was this last that triggered the famous Tobacco Protest of 1891, an event that marked the first concerted effort by Iranian merchants, Muslim clergy, and secular opponents of the shah’s economic policies to unite in protest and resistance. An effective national boycott of all tobacco products coupled with mass demonstrations forced Nasir al-Din Shah to cancel the concession less than a year later and expressed the increasing domestic hostility to both British and Russian influence in Iran’s internal affairs and economy.
Nasir al-Din and his prime ministers, several of whom attempted secular reforms along Western lines, increasingly became the target of anti-foreign sentiment inside Iran, most notably in the pages of a pan-Islamic, anti-British newspaper published in Paris by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. At a time when internal Iranian dissatisfaction and unrest were steadily increasing, it was a follower of al-Afghani who assassinated Nasir al-Din Shah on May 1, 1896, at a shrine near Tehran. Subsequent Qajar monarchs were unable to resolve the problems of external political and economic pressure and internal resistance that plagued the final years of Nasir al-Din Shah.
Nasser al-Din Shah Qajar was the son of Mohammad Shah Qajar and the third longest reigning monarch king in Persian history after Shapur II of the Sassanid Dynasty and Tahmasp I of the Safavid Dynasty. He had sovereign power for close to 50 years and was also the first Persian monarch to ever write and publish his diaries.
Nasir al-Din was in Tabriz when he heard of his father's death in 1848, and he ascended to the Peacock Throne with the help of Amir Kabir.
Although Nasir al-Din had early reformist tendencies, he was dictatorial in his style of government. He persecuted Bábís and Bahá'ís, and this increased when a deranged Bábí, seeking revenge for his martyred friend, attempted to assassinate him in 1852. He was the first modern Persian monarch to visit Europe in 1873 and then again in 1878 (when he saw a Royal Navy Fleet review), and finally in 1889 and was reportedly amazed with the technology he saw there. During his visit to the United Kingdom in 1873, Nasir al-Din Shah was appointed by Queen Victoria to be a Knight of the Order of the Garter, the highest English order of chivalry. He was the first Persian monarch to be so honored. His travel diary of his 1873 trip was published in Persian, German and Dutch.
During his visit, Nasir al-Din met with British Jewish leaders, including Sir Moses Montefiore. At that time, the Persian king suggested that the Jews buy land and establish a state for the Jewish people.
In 1890 he met British Gerald Talbot and signed a contract with him giving him the ownership of Iranian Tobacco Industry, but he later was forced to cancel the contract after Ayatollah Mirza Hassan Shirazi issued a Fatwa that made farming, trading and consuming tobacco as Haram (forbidden). It even affected the Shah's personal life as his wives did not allow him to smoke.
This was not the end of his attempts to give advantages to Europe because he later gave the ownership of Iranian Customs Incomes to Paul Julius Reuter.
Naser al-Din introduced a number of western innovations to Persia, including a modern postal system, train transport, a banking system and newspaper publishing. He was the first Iranian to be photographed and was a patron of photography who had himself photographed hundreds of times.
Naser al-Din was assassinated by Mirza Reza Kermani, a follower of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, when he was visiting and praying in the shrine of Shah-Abdol-Azim. He was buried in the Shah-Abdol-Azim Cemetery, in Rayy near Tehran. His one-piece marble tombstone, bearing his full effigy, is now kept in the Golestan Palace Museum in Tehran and is renowned as a master piece of Qajar era sculpture.
Naser al-Din Shah was very interested in painting and photography. He was a talented painter, and even though he had not been trained, was an expert in pen and ink drawing. Several of his pen and ink drawings survive. He was one of the first photographers in Persia and was a patron of that art. He established a photography studio in Golestan Palace.
Naser al-Din was also a poet. 200 couplets of his were recorded in the preface of Majma'ul Fusahā, a work by Reza Quli Khan Hedayat about poets of the Qajar period. He was interested in history and geography and had many books on these topics in his library. He also knew French and English, but was not fluent in either tongue.
Hekāyāt Pir Va Javān ("The Tale of the Old and the Young") was attributed to him by many; it was one of the first Persian stories written in modern European style.
The offspring of Nasir al-Din were:
Sons
* Prince Soltan Mahmoud Mirza (1847–1849) Vali Ahad of Persia, 1849
* Prince Soltan Moin al-Din Mirza (1849 – November 6, 1856) Vali Ahad of Persia, 1849–56
* Prince Soltan Mass'oud Mirza Zell-e Soltan (January 5, 1850 – July 2, 1918)
* Prince Mohammad Qassem Mirza (1850 – June 29, 1858) Vali Ahad of Persia, 1856-8
* Prince Soltan Hossein Mirza Jalal ed-Dowleh (1852–1868)
* Prince Mozaffar al-Din Shah (March 25, 1853 – January 7, 1907)
* Prince Kamran Mirza Nayeb es-Saltaneh (July 22, 1856 – 1927)
* Prince Nosrat al-Din Mirza Salar es-Saltaneh (May 2, 1882 – 1954)
* Prince Mohammad Reza Mirza Rokn es-Saltaneh (January 30, 1884 – July 8, 1951)
* Prince Hussein Ali Mirza Yamin ed-Dowleh (1890–1952)
* Prince Ahmad Mirza Azd es-Saltaneh (1891–1939)
Daughters
* Princess Afsar ed-Dowleh
* Princess Fakhr-ol-Moluk (1847 - April 9, 1878)
* Princess Esmat ed-Dowleh (1855 – September 3, 1905)
* Princess Zi'a es-Saltaneh (1856 - April 11, 1898)
* Princess Fakhr ed-Dowleh (1859–1891)
* Princess Forugh ed-Dowleh (1862–1916)
* Princess Eftekhar es-Saltaneh (1880–1941)
* Princess Farah es-Saltaneh (1882 - 17 April 1899)
* Princess Tadj es-Saltaneh (1883 – 25 January 1936)
* Princess Ezz es-Saltaneh (1888–1982)
Nasir al-Din Qajar see Qajar, Nasir al-Din
Naser al-Din Qajar see Qajar, Nasir al-Din
Nasser al-Din Shah Qajar see Qajar, Nasir al-Din
Nasira'd-Din Shah Qajar see Qajar, Nasir al-Din
Qajar, Nasir al-Din (Nasir al-Din Qajar) (Naser al-Din Qajar) (Nasser al-Din Shah Qajar) (Nāṣira’d-Dīn Shāh Qājār) (July 16, 1831, Tabriz - May 1, 1896, Tehran). Shah of the Qajar dynasty in Iran (r. 1848-1896). Nasir al-Din acceded to the throne upon the death of his father, Muhammad Shah. For the first three years of Nasir al-Din’s reign, real power was wielded by his prime minister, Mirza Taqi Khan Amir Kabir, who founded Iran’s first institution for higher education, the Dar al-Fonun (Polytechnic Institute), and initiated a wide range of economic and political reforms inspired mainly by European models of centralization and modernization. Nasir al-Din perceived many of these attempted reforms as a threat to his own power, and in 1851 dismissed Amir Kabir. The following year, he ordered Kabir’s assassination.
From 1852 until 1890 Nasir al-Din’s reign was a period of relative domestic stability marked by an increasing foreign involvement, chiefly British and Russian, in Iran’s economy and politics. An unsuccessful attempt to regain Herat from the British between 1856 and 1857 was the only military conflict of note in the half-century of his rule. Iran in this period had virtually no standing army, with the most important armed force being the Persian Cossack Brigade led by Russian officers, which Nasir al-Din created in 1873 following the first of three trips to Europe.
Owing to gradually worsening economic conditions in the latter half of the century, Nasir al-Din Shah initiated a practice, carried on by his successor, of raising money for the crown by selling economic concessions to foreign subjects or governments. The concessions were eagerly sought after and competed for, especially by Great Britain and Russia. In 1872, the largest of these concessions ws granted to a British subject, Baron Julius de Reuter, awarding exclusive rights for the development of Iran’s minerals, railroads, irrigation, and a host of other industrial and agricultural resources. In addition, de Reuter was conceded the right to found what was later to become the Imperial Bank of Persia, Iran’s major banking institution into the twentieth century.
Although the Reuter Concession was annulled in 1873 under pressure from both Russian and domestic opposition, significant portions of the concession were re-negotiated and continued in effect. Among other concessions granted by Nasir al-Din Shah were telegraph construction rights tot eh British, fishing rights in the Caspian to the Russians, and tobacco sales and export to a British subject. It was this last that triggered the famous Tobacco Protest of 1891, an event that marked the first concerted effort by Iranian merchants, Muslim clergy, and secular opponents of the shah’s economic policies to unite in protest and resistance. An effective national boycott of all tobacco products coupled with mass demonstrations forced Nasir al-Din Shah to cancel the concession less than a year later and expressed the increasing domestic hostility to both British and Russian influence in Iran’s internal affairs and economy.
Nasir al-Din and his prime ministers, several of whom attempted secular reforms along Western lines, increasingly became the target of anti-foreign sentiment inside Iran, most notably in the pages of a pan-Islamic, anti-British newspaper published in Paris by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. At a time when internal Iranian dissatisfaction and unrest were steadily increasing, it was a follower of al-Afghani who assassinated Nasir al-Din Shah on May 1, 1896, at a shrine near Tehran. Subsequent Qajar monarchs were unable to resolve the problems of external political and economic pressure and internal resistance that plagued the final years of Nasir al-Din Shah.
Nasser al-Din Shah Qajar was the son of Mohammad Shah Qajar and the third longest reigning monarch king in Persian history after Shapur II of the Sassanid Dynasty and Tahmasp I of the Safavid Dynasty. He had sovereign power for close to 50 years and was also the first Persian monarch to ever write and publish his diaries.
Nasir al-Din was in Tabriz when he heard of his father's death in 1848, and he ascended to the Peacock Throne with the help of Amir Kabir.
Although Nasir al-Din had early reformist tendencies, he was dictatorial in his style of government. He persecuted Bábís and Bahá'ís, and this increased when a deranged Bábí, seeking revenge for his martyred friend, attempted to assassinate him in 1852. He was the first modern Persian monarch to visit Europe in 1873 and then again in 1878 (when he saw a Royal Navy Fleet review), and finally in 1889 and was reportedly amazed with the technology he saw there. During his visit to the United Kingdom in 1873, Nasir al-Din Shah was appointed by Queen Victoria to be a Knight of the Order of the Garter, the highest English order of chivalry. He was the first Persian monarch to be so honored. His travel diary of his 1873 trip was published in Persian, German and Dutch.
During his visit, Nasir al-Din met with British Jewish leaders, including Sir Moses Montefiore. At that time, the Persian king suggested that the Jews buy land and establish a state for the Jewish people.
In 1890 he met British Gerald Talbot and signed a contract with him giving him the ownership of Iranian Tobacco Industry, but he later was forced to cancel the contract after Ayatollah Mirza Hassan Shirazi issued a Fatwa that made farming, trading and consuming tobacco as Haram (forbidden). It even affected the Shah's personal life as his wives did not allow him to smoke.
This was not the end of his attempts to give advantages to Europe because he later gave the ownership of Iranian Customs Incomes to Paul Julius Reuter.
Naser al-Din introduced a number of western innovations to Persia, including a modern postal system, train transport, a banking system and newspaper publishing. He was the first Iranian to be photographed and was a patron of photography who had himself photographed hundreds of times.
Naser al-Din was assassinated by Mirza Reza Kermani, a follower of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, when he was visiting and praying in the shrine of Shah-Abdol-Azim. He was buried in the Shah-Abdol-Azim Cemetery, in Rayy near Tehran. His one-piece marble tombstone, bearing his full effigy, is now kept in the Golestan Palace Museum in Tehran and is renowned as a master piece of Qajar era sculpture.
Naser al-Din Shah was very interested in painting and photography. He was a talented painter, and even though he had not been trained, was an expert in pen and ink drawing. Several of his pen and ink drawings survive. He was one of the first photographers in Persia and was a patron of that art. He established a photography studio in Golestan Palace.
Naser al-Din was also a poet. 200 couplets of his were recorded in the preface of Majma'ul Fusahā, a work by Reza Quli Khan Hedayat about poets of the Qajar period. He was interested in history and geography and had many books on these topics in his library. He also knew French and English, but was not fluent in either tongue.
Hekāyāt Pir Va Javān ("The Tale of the Old and the Young") was attributed to him by many; it was one of the first Persian stories written in modern European style.
The offspring of Nasir al-Din were:
Sons
* Prince Soltan Mahmoud Mirza (1847–1849) Vali Ahad of Persia, 1849
* Prince Soltan Moin al-Din Mirza (1849 – November 6, 1856) Vali Ahad of Persia, 1849–56
* Prince Soltan Mass'oud Mirza Zell-e Soltan (January 5, 1850 – July 2, 1918)
* Prince Mohammad Qassem Mirza (1850 – June 29, 1858) Vali Ahad of Persia, 1856-8
* Prince Soltan Hossein Mirza Jalal ed-Dowleh (1852–1868)
* Prince Mozaffar al-Din Shah (March 25, 1853 – January 7, 1907)
* Prince Kamran Mirza Nayeb es-Saltaneh (July 22, 1856 – 1927)
* Prince Nosrat al-Din Mirza Salar es-Saltaneh (May 2, 1882 – 1954)
* Prince Mohammad Reza Mirza Rokn es-Saltaneh (January 30, 1884 – July 8, 1951)
* Prince Hussein Ali Mirza Yamin ed-Dowleh (1890–1952)
* Prince Ahmad Mirza Azd es-Saltaneh (1891–1939)
Daughters
* Princess Afsar ed-Dowleh
* Princess Fakhr-ol-Moluk (1847 - April 9, 1878)
* Princess Esmat ed-Dowleh (1855 – September 3, 1905)
* Princess Zi'a es-Saltaneh (1856 - April 11, 1898)
* Princess Fakhr ed-Dowleh (1859–1891)
* Princess Forugh ed-Dowleh (1862–1916)
* Princess Eftekhar es-Saltaneh (1880–1941)
* Princess Farah es-Saltaneh (1882 - 17 April 1899)
* Princess Tadj es-Saltaneh (1883 – 25 January 1936)
* Princess Ezz es-Saltaneh (1888–1982)
Nasir al-Din Qajar see Qajar, Nasir al-Din
Naser al-Din Qajar see Qajar, Nasir al-Din
Nasser al-Din Shah Qajar see Qajar, Nasir al-Din
Nasira'd-Din Shah Qajar see Qajar, Nasir al-Din
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