Safadi, Salah al-Din Khalil ibn Aybak al-
Safadi, Salah al-Din Khalil ibn Aybak al- (Salah al-Din Khalil ibn Aybak al-Safadi) (d.1362). Head of the treasury at Damascus and a prolific author. All of his works practically are compilations from earlier authors, a fact which he frequently states faithfully.
Salah al-Din Khalil ibn Aybak al-Safadi see Safadi, Salah al-Din Khalil ibn Aybak al-
Safadi, Salah al-Din Khalil ibn Aybak al- (Salah al-Din Khalil ibn Aybak al-Safadi) (d.1362). Head of the treasury at Damascus and a prolific author. All of his works practically are compilations from earlier authors, a fact which he frequently states faithfully.
Salah al-Din Khalil ibn Aybak al-Safadi see Safadi, Salah al-Din Khalil ibn Aybak al-
Safavi
Safavi (Safaviya) (Safaviyya). Name given by Shaikh Safi al-Din Ishaq to a Sufi order (tariqa) located in the province of Gilan in northern Persia. The order was known as the Zahidiyya up to the year 1301, when Shaikh Safi became its head. Shaikh Safi transformed what had been a Sufi order of purely local significance into a religious movement whose influence was felt throughout Persia, Syria, and Asia Minor.
The Persia of Shaikh Safi’s time was under the rule of the Mongol Ilkhans. Under Shaikh Safi’s son and successor, Sadr al-Din (d. 1391/1392), the Safavid da’wa, or religious propaganda, was said to have made converts among the Mongol military commanders. Sadr al-Din selected the town of Ardabil in eastern Azerbaijan as the new headquarters of the order and, from this center, lieutenants of the shaikh, known as khalifas, carried out proselytizing missions in eastern Anatolia, northern Syria and Iraq, the Armenian highlands, and in Persia itself. This network of adherents to the order was controlled by an official known as khalifat al-khulafa; his office has been called by Vladimir Minorsky the “special secretariat for Sufi affairs.”
The early shaikhs of the order were Sunni Muslims, but at some point, probably when Khwaja Ali was its head (1391/1392-1427), Ithna Ashari (Twelver) Shi‘ite tendencies became apparent, and, under Junaid (1447-1460), the order became an openly militant movement aiming at temporal power. This aspiration brought the order into conflict with the political rulers of the day, and three successive leaders of the order were killed in battle (Junaid in 1460, Haidar in 1488, and Ali in 1494). Yet the order survived. Three factors enabled it to do so: (1) its tightly knit organization, compared by Minorsky to the single-party organization of a modern totalitarian state; (2) the military prowess of the disciples of the order, drawn largely from the Turkish tribes living in areas affected by Safavid propaganda; and (3) the fanatical devotion of these disciples to their leader (commented on with astonishment by contemporary Italian merchants visiting Persia). This devotion stemmed from the belief that their leader possessed quasi-divine powers or was even a manifestation of God incarnate. In 1501, the Safavi order achieved its goal of political power when its leader, Isma’il, became shah of Persia and established the new Safavid dynasty.
The Safaviyya was a Sufi order founded by the Persian mystic Sheikh Safi-ad-din Ardabili (1252-1334). It held a prominent place in the society and politics of northwestern Iran in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, but today it is best known for having given rise to the Safavid dynasty.
Safi al-Din grew up in Ardabil, but left it, for lack of adequate teachers, and traveled to Shiraz and then Gilan. In Gilan he became the disciple of Sheikh Zahid, leader of the Zahidi Sufi order. He eventually became Sheikh Zahid's chief disciple and married his daughter. Upon Zahid's death, The Zahidiyya came under Safi al-Din's leadership and was renamed the Safaviyya.
Safi al-Din's importance is attested in two letters by Rashid al-Din. In one, Rashid al-Din pledges an annual offering of foodstuffs. In the other, Rashid al-Din writes to his son, the governor of Ardabil, advising him to show proper consideration to the sheikh.
After Safi al-Din's death, leadership of the order passed to his son Sadr al-Dīn Mūsā, and subsequently passed down from father to son. In the mid-fifteenth century the Safaviyya changed in character and became militant under sheikh Junayd Safavi and Sheikh Haydar, launching jihads against the Christians of Georgia. Haydar's grandson, Isma'il, further altered the nature of the order when he founded the Safavid empire in 1501 and proclaimed Twelver Shi'ism the state religion.
Safaviya see Safavi
Safaviyya see Safavi
Safavi (Safaviya) (Safaviyya). Name given by Shaikh Safi al-Din Ishaq to a Sufi order (tariqa) located in the province of Gilan in northern Persia. The order was known as the Zahidiyya up to the year 1301, when Shaikh Safi became its head. Shaikh Safi transformed what had been a Sufi order of purely local significance into a religious movement whose influence was felt throughout Persia, Syria, and Asia Minor.
The Persia of Shaikh Safi’s time was under the rule of the Mongol Ilkhans. Under Shaikh Safi’s son and successor, Sadr al-Din (d. 1391/1392), the Safavid da’wa, or religious propaganda, was said to have made converts among the Mongol military commanders. Sadr al-Din selected the town of Ardabil in eastern Azerbaijan as the new headquarters of the order and, from this center, lieutenants of the shaikh, known as khalifas, carried out proselytizing missions in eastern Anatolia, northern Syria and Iraq, the Armenian highlands, and in Persia itself. This network of adherents to the order was controlled by an official known as khalifat al-khulafa; his office has been called by Vladimir Minorsky the “special secretariat for Sufi affairs.”
The early shaikhs of the order were Sunni Muslims, but at some point, probably when Khwaja Ali was its head (1391/1392-1427), Ithna Ashari (Twelver) Shi‘ite tendencies became apparent, and, under Junaid (1447-1460), the order became an openly militant movement aiming at temporal power. This aspiration brought the order into conflict with the political rulers of the day, and three successive leaders of the order were killed in battle (Junaid in 1460, Haidar in 1488, and Ali in 1494). Yet the order survived. Three factors enabled it to do so: (1) its tightly knit organization, compared by Minorsky to the single-party organization of a modern totalitarian state; (2) the military prowess of the disciples of the order, drawn largely from the Turkish tribes living in areas affected by Safavid propaganda; and (3) the fanatical devotion of these disciples to their leader (commented on with astonishment by contemporary Italian merchants visiting Persia). This devotion stemmed from the belief that their leader possessed quasi-divine powers or was even a manifestation of God incarnate. In 1501, the Safavi order achieved its goal of political power when its leader, Isma’il, became shah of Persia and established the new Safavid dynasty.
The Safaviyya was a Sufi order founded by the Persian mystic Sheikh Safi-ad-din Ardabili (1252-1334). It held a prominent place in the society and politics of northwestern Iran in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, but today it is best known for having given rise to the Safavid dynasty.
Safi al-Din grew up in Ardabil, but left it, for lack of adequate teachers, and traveled to Shiraz and then Gilan. In Gilan he became the disciple of Sheikh Zahid, leader of the Zahidi Sufi order. He eventually became Sheikh Zahid's chief disciple and married his daughter. Upon Zahid's death, The Zahidiyya came under Safi al-Din's leadership and was renamed the Safaviyya.
Safi al-Din's importance is attested in two letters by Rashid al-Din. In one, Rashid al-Din pledges an annual offering of foodstuffs. In the other, Rashid al-Din writes to his son, the governor of Ardabil, advising him to show proper consideration to the sheikh.
After Safi al-Din's death, leadership of the order passed to his son Sadr al-Dīn Mūsā, and subsequently passed down from father to son. In the mid-fifteenth century the Safaviyya changed in character and became militant under sheikh Junayd Safavi and Sheikh Haydar, launching jihads against the Christians of Georgia. Haydar's grandson, Isma'il, further altered the nature of the order when he founded the Safavid empire in 1501 and proclaimed Twelver Shi'ism the state religion.
Safaviya see Safavi
Safaviyya see Safavi
Safavids
Safavids. Turkoman dynasty of the shahs of Persia (r.1501-1736). Their main capitals were Tabriz, Qazvin (in 1548), and Isfahan (from 1598). The Sufi order founded around 1300 by Sheik Sufi (Shaykh Safi al-Din al-Ardabili) (1252-1334) in Ardabil (eastern Azerbaijan) soon acquired significance as a religious and political focus. In the mid-15th century, the Safavids became converts to Shi‘ism. Their rise to power came under the spiritual sheikhs Junaid (r. 1447-1460) and Haidar (r. 1460-1488), who created a rigid political organization and gathered together their own troops (named “Qizilbash” or “Red Heads/Caps” after their headgear) to spread their doctrine. Shah Isma‘il (r. 1501-1524), successor to Haidar after 1494 and a fervent Shi‘ite propagandist, seized power in Iran (1499-1501), starting with the province of Gilan, by driving out the related dynasty of the Qara Qoyunlu. It was Shah Isma‘il who made Shi‘ism the state religion and who virtually extinguished the Sunnis in Persia.
In 1507, he occupied Iraq, immediately elevated Twelver Shi‘ism to the national religion, and sought political reconciliation between the Turkomans (the Qizilbash, the military) and the Iranian population (the administration). A defeat by the Ottomans at Chaldiran in 1514 was followed by ongoing conflict with the Ottomans in the west and the Uzbeks in the east.
Under Tahmasp (r. 1524-1576) there was substantial diplomatic neutralization of the enemy, normalization of religious policy, and the beginning of patronage of the arts. Following subsequent troubles, there was a re-consolidation of the state under Abbas I the Great (r. 1587-1629). He annexed Bahrain in 1601, occupied Azerbaijan in 1603, and conquered Shirwan, Armenia, Georgia, and parts of Afghanistan in 1608. In 1623-1624, he was able to re-annexed Kurdistan and Iraq to the Safavid Empire. Internally, he undertook army reform with Christian military slaves, developed Isfahan into the “Pearl of the World,” and generated prosperity through skillful economic policy and control of the Persian Gulf. His successors were often weak personalities, yet complicated court rituals were developed and a shah cult. The last high point was the rule of Abbas II (r. 1642-1666) through an intensive exchange of goods and European trading partners and internal political reforms. In 1648, he annexed parts of Afghanistan.
A rapid economic decline began under the last Safavid, Sultan Husain (r. 1694-1722), who, through religious intolerance and compulsory conversion to the Shi‘ite faith, provoked the Sunnite parts of the empire. As a result, the Sunnite Afghans (the Ghalzal) moved into Persia from 1719, beleaguered and conquered Isfahan in 1722 and deposed Husain, who was executed in 1726. Up until 1736, (in some provinces 1773) Safavid shadow rulers were installed. Power was transferred to the Afsharids and Zand, and finally to the Qajars.
The Safavids were rulers of Iran (Persia) effectively from 1501 to 1722 and, through two rois faineants, to 1736. The first king of this dynasty, Shah Isma’il I, came to power in 1501. His accession marked the culmination of two hundred years of preparation, initially by means of quiet propaganda on behalf of the Safavid family, ultimately through revolutionary activity. After the establishment of the Safavid state, its rulers deliberately tampered with historical evidence that showed that the early Safavid leaders were Sunnis, and consequently the origins of the family remain obscure.
It seems certain that Isma’il’s ancestors were of native Iranian stock and probably hailed from Kurdistan, although some scholars have claimed that the was a Turk. It is true that Isma’il, and most if not all of his successors, spoke Azeri, the dialect of Turkish used in Azerbaijan, but this was necessitated by the fact that the vast majority of their supporters, both during the revolutionary phase of the Safavi movement and during the formative period of the Safavid state, were Turkmen tribesmen from eastern Anatolia, the Armenian highlands, and norther Syria and Iraq, who became known as Kizilbash (“red heads”) because of their distinctive headgear commemorating the twelve Ithna Ashari Shi’ite imams.
At the time of his accession, Isma’il was master only of the province of Azerbaijan in northwestern Persia. During the first decade of his reign, Safavid power was consolidated throughout the rest of Persia. This process culminated with the withdrawal of the Uzbeks from the important northeastern frontier province of Khurasan following their defeat in a great battle outside Merv on November 22, 1510. Isma’il also extended Safavid sovereignty over two regions outside Persia proper: the province of Diyar Bakr (corresponding today to northern Iraq), and the principality of Shirvan in the southern Caucasus, an area in which both his grandfather and great-grandfather had met their end in battle.
Isma’il attempted to find solutions to a number of urgent problems that faced him at his accession. Both he and his successors devised short-term solutions, but their failure to solve them permanently played its part in the eventual decline and fall of the dynasty. In 1501, Isma’il I promulgated the Ithna Ashari form of Islam, which had been espoused by supporters of the Safavids during the fifteenth century, as the official religion of the newly established Safavid state. This decision, taken primarily for political reasons, was designed to create a sense of national identity among his subjects and to differentiate his realm from that of the Sunni Ottoman Empire. Many Persians had adopted the Ithna Ashari form of Islam in early Islamic times as a form of protest against political and social domination by their Arab conquerors. In 1258, the caliphate, the symbol of the unity of the Islamic world and of the dominance of that world by the Sunni form of Islam, was destroyed by the Mongols as they swept through the region. Thereafter, Shi’ism steadily increased its influence and power in Persia and elsewhere, often using Sufi orders (tariqas) as a vehicle for its propaganda.
Unfortunately, Isma’il’s decision institutionalized another problem that has remained unsolved to this day, namely, the problem of government in such a state. According to Ithna Ashari political theory, the only legitimate ruler of an Ithna Ashari Shi‘ite state is the twelfth imam, known as the Hidden Imam or the Mahdi. Since 940, when Ithna Ashari Shi‘ites ceased to hope for the imminent return to earth of the Mahdi, and the period of the “Greater Occultation” began, they have accepted the claim of the mujtahids (leading scholars in religious jurisprudence and theology) to act as the representatives on earth of the Mahdi. Isma’il’s decision thus made inevitable a struggle for power between the mujtahids, endowed with the aura of infallibility of the imams and aspiring to establish theocratic government, and the shahs, representing secular government.
The Safavid shahs attempted to defuse this potentially explosive situation by claiming that they, and not the mujtahids, were the legitimate representatives on earth of the Mahdi. This claim, based on a spurious genealogy linking the Safavid family with the seventh imam, was largely accepted by the common people but not, of course, by the religious classes. In effect, Isma’il preempted the role claimed by the mutahids by himself establishing a theocratic state. He attempted to secure political control over the religious classes by appointing as their head an official termed the sadr, who was answerable to himself for their good behavior. Isma’il’s aura of infallibility and invincibility was shattered by the crushing defeat inflicted on him by the Ottomans at the battle of Chaldiran on August 23, 1514. Henceforth, the shahs were able to stave off the challenge to their authority from the mujtahids only if they were strong and effective rulers.
A second problem that faced Isma’il was how to incorporate the revolutionary organization of the Safavi tariqa into the fabric of the state. Isma’il tried to solve the problem by creating the office of vakil-i nafs-i nafis-i humayun. This officer was to act as the shah’s viceregent in both temporal and spiritual matters, and his office was intended to constitute an umbrella under which the khalifat al-khulafa, the head of the Sufi order, could find shelter. The latter, however, resented the diminution of his authority implicit in the creation of the office of vakil, and he and his successors remained a thorn in the flesh of the shahs at least until the time of Abbas I. Isma’il also hoped that the vakil would act as a bridge between the two rival ethnic groups in the early Safavid state: the Turkish military elite and the Persian bureaucratic and religious classes. This idea also failed. If a Kizilbash chief was vakil, he became too powerful. If the office was held by a Persian, the jealousy of the Kizilbash was such that on several occasions they assassinated a Persian vakil.
Tahmasp was only ten and a half years of age when he succeeded his father Isma’il as shah. This gave the Kizilbash chiefs, no longer constrained by their mystical loyalty to a semi-divine leader, the opportunity to challenge the shah’s authority in a turbulent manner reminiscent of the behavior of the barons of medieval England. For the first ten years of Tahmasp’s reign, power was taken away from him by successive groups of Kizilbash chiefs. In 1533, a group of seditious Kizilbash had the temerity to pursue their private quarrel into the shah’s apartments, and an arrow shot by one of them struck the shah’s hat. Tahmasp managed to quell the mutiny and assert his authority as ruler. Between 1533 and 1574, when the serious illness of Tahmasp prompted a recrudescence of factionalism, the shah walked a precarious tightrope between the various internal factions. Despite Kizilbash disloyalty, and the treachery of two of his own brothers, he succeeded in holding the state together but was not able to keep inviolate its boundaries. Between 1524 and 1538, the Uzbeks launched five major attacks on Khurasan. Between 1533 and 1553, Sulaiman the Magnificent, the greatest of the Ottoman sultans, made four large-scale invasions of Persia. Baghdad was recaptured by the Ottomans. Tabriz, the Safavid capital, was occupied on several occasions, and Tahmasp transferred his capital to Qazvin, a city farther from the Ottoman frontier. Tahmasp has not been given sufficient credit for the way in which, with numerically far inferior forces, he kept these powerful enemies at bay. In 1555, he negotiated with the Ottomans the Treaty of Amasya, which was not totally unfavorable to Persia, and gave it a much needed respite from war for more than thirty years.
Between 1540 and 1553, Tahmasp waged four campaigns in the sourthern Caucasus against the “infidel” Georgian, Circassian, and Armenian populations of that region. From the last of these campaigns, thirty thousand prisoners were brought back to Persia, but it is not clear whether Tahmasp intended to use these new ethnic elements to offset the power of the Kizilbash in the formal, institutionalized manner later devised by Abbas I.
When the illness of Tahmasp in 1574 led to a further struggle for power, the new “third force” in the state, the Georgians, Circassians, and Armenians, made its presence felt for the first time. Those Georgian and Circassian women in the royal harem who were mothers of princes engaged in constant intrigue, assisted by ambitious bureaucrats and members of the royal household, in order to secure the throne for their favorite son. The Kizilbash awoke rather belatedly to the realization that their hitherto dominant position in the state was threatened. Their problem was that only two of Tahmasp’s nine sons were the offspring of Turkmen mothers, and one of these, Muhammad Khudabanda, was purblind and was initially considered ineligible for kingship.
Following the death of Tahmasp in 1576, the Kizilbash, in order to block the accession of a Caucasian candidate, were thus obliged to place on the throne as Shah Isma’il II the only remaining Turkmen candidate. It soon became clear that Isma’il II’s mind had been impaired by nearly twenty years of incarceration in the fortress-prison of Qahqaha, and his brief and bloody reign was terminated by his assassination by the Kizilbash in November 1577. The Kizilbash now had no alternative but to put on the throne Isma’il’s elder brother Muhammad Khudabanda. Subject to the physical disability already mentioned, and of a mild and scholarly disposition, Sultan Muhammad Shah, as he was styled, was a puppet in the hands of two ambitious and ruthless women: his own wife, Mahd’i Ulya, and his sister Pari Khan Khanum, who had assisted the assassins in murdering his younger brother Isma’il II. Mahd-i Ulya had her rival, Pari Khan Khanum, strangled. She then directed the affairs of state for eighteen months until she, too, was murdered by the Kizilbash because she had, in their view, acted contrary to the considered opinions of the Kizilbash elders, and had constantly attempted to humiliate them by giving appointments to Persians. A turbulent period followed the assassination of Mahd-i Ulya, and the Ottomans seized the opportunity to occupy Tabriz in 1585. In 1588, a Kizilbash coup d’etat deposed Sultan Muhammad Shah and placed his son, Abbas, on the throne.
Abbas I did not come to the throne at an auspicious moment in the history of the Safavid state. Rent by Kizilbash factionalism, it appeared to be powerless before the attacks of its traditional enemies, the Ottomans and the Uzbeks. However, Abbas approached his task with strength and determination. In order to free his hands to deal with pressing internal problems of restoring law and order and the machinery of government, Abbas signed with the Ottomans in 1589-1590 a peace treaty that ceded to them large areas of Ottoman occupied Persian territory. Among Abbas’ achievements were the creation of a standing army, of which regiments drawn from “third force” elements formed a conspicuous part, and the sequestration to the crown of a number of provinces formerly under the jurisdiction of Kizilbash military governors. The provinces thus sequestered were placed under the administration of royal intendants, and their revenues were remitted to the royal treasury to pay for the new standing army. Abbas also opened the highest offices of the state to “third force” elements by means of a training system designed especially for them, and he reorganized the administrative system in ways designed to effect a greater degree of centralization. He was responsible for the development of diplomatic and commercial relations with the West and the fostering of a climate of religious tolerance that encouraged Armenian and Jewish merchants to trade freely, a policy that in turn increased the economic prosperity of the country. During his reign arts and crafts were patronized on a large scale, and a new capital at Isfahan remarkable for its beauty and imaginative planning was created; roads and bridges were constructed and improved, and caravansaries were built along the main highways for the benefit of the wayfarer. The considered opinion of the shrewd Huguenot jeweler Chardin, who spent much time in Persia in the seventeenth century, was that, “When this great prince ceased to live, Persia ceased to prosper!”
The decline of Safavid fortunes indeed begins with the reign of Abbas’ successor, his grandson Shah Safi. This decline, checked by Abbas II (1642-1666), began again and accelerated during the second half of the seventeenth century. Forty years ago, Vladimir Minorsky listed the basic causes of the decline of the Safavid dynasty: (1) the disappearance of the “basic theocratic nucleus” of the state and the failure to substitute for it “some other dynamic ideology”; (2) the antipathy between Turkish and Persian officers in the military command structure; (3) the practice of converting “state” into “crown” provinces, which solved the immediate problem of finding funds with which to pay the newly created standing army, but in the long term reduced the fighting efficiency of the army; (4) “the irresponsible character of the ‘shadow government’ represented by the harem, the Queen Mother and the eunuchs”; (5) “the degeneration of the dynasty whose scions were brought up in the atmosphere of the harem, in complete ignorance of the outside world.” This analysis is still valid, but to it should be added (6) the breakdown of the concordat between the ruler and the religious leaders. As noted earlier, the latter regarded any form of secular government as illegitimate, but, since they had benefitted from the promulgation of Ithna Ashari Shi’ism as the official religion of the Safavid state, they had tolerated, though grudgingly, the rule of strong Safavid kings. Weak kings, however, gave them the opportunity to increase their power, and an important feature of the last half-century of Safavid rule is the greatly enhanced authority of the religious classes, as they freed themselves progressively from political control. Ithna Ashari Shi’ism was formulated in ever more dogmatic terms by powerful theologians, whose religious bigotry eroded the multi-cultural society developed by Abbas I.
The military weakness of the state was dramatically demonstrated in 1699 and again in 1709, when marauding bands of Baluchi and Afghan tribesmen, respectively, penetrated deep into southeastern Persia. The Afghans were not the only neighbors of Persia to sense that the collapse of the Safavid state was near. In 1715, a Russian ambassador reported to Tsar Peter the Great that the Persian army was so demoralized and inefficient that the country could easily be conquered by a small Russian army. In 1721, the Afghan chief Mahmud invaded Persia, reaching Isfahan, the Safavid capital. After defeating a Persian army outside Isfahan on March 8, 1722, he laid siege to the city and starved it into surrender on October 12, 1722. At least eighty thousand people are said to have perished from starvation and disease. Mahmud assumed the throne of Persia, and he and his cousin and successor Ashraf controlled central and southern Persia until 1729. The last substantive Safavid shah, Sultan Husain, was put to death by Ashraf in 1726. One of the shah’s sons, Tahmasp, who was as weak and ineffectual as his father, escaped to Qazvin, and former Safavid capital, where he proclaimed himself Shah Tahmasp II.
Effective resistance to the Afghans, however, was organized by a Kizilbash chief, Nadir Khan Afshar, who offered his services to Tahmasp II. Together they drove the Afghans out of Isfahan in November 1729, and shortly afterwards from Persian territory. Nadir Khan placed Tahmasp II on the throne but was himself the de facto ruler. In 1732, in order to increase his power still further, he deposed Tahmasp II in favor of the latter’s infant son, who was crowned as Abbas III. Finally, on March 8, 1736, Nadir Khan abandoned the fiction of Safavid rule and installed himself on the throne as Nadir Shah, the first ruler of the new Afsharid dynasty. Although the Safavid state no longer existed as a political reality, the mystique that had surrounded its shahs and its institutions was so strong that Safavid pretenders continued to appear until 1773.
A brief chronology of the Safavids reads as follows:
In the fourteenth century, Sheikh Safi ud-Din formed a Sufi order in Ardabil, Azerbaijan.
In 1399, the Safavid sect changed their Sunni orientation for a Shi‘a.
In the fifteenth century, Junayd Safavi lost a succession dispute in the order, and travels with his supporters to eastern Anatolia. They gained more members among Turkoman nomads, and through marriage Junayd Safavid was able to reach large areas in western and central Iran controlled by the Ay Qoyunlu Turkoman Confederation.
In July of 1501, Junayd’s grandson, Isma’il took control over Tabriz with the help of local Turkomen tribes. He was crowned as shah, and declared Shi’ism the state religion.
In 1502, Isma’il declared himself an infallible Shi ‘a imam, and a descendant of the seventh Shi‘a imam, Musa al-Kazim.
During the 1500s, the Safavids conquered Mosul and Baghdad. In these cities, Shi’ism was also declared to be the state religion.
In August of 1514, Isma’il lost to the Ottoman sultan Selim I at Chaldiran. This battle destroyed the claim of the shah that he was infallible and semi-divine.
During the 1510s, the Safavids lost the region of Kurdistan.
In 1533, Baghdad was conquered by the Ottomans. Esfahan became the temporary capital.
In the middle sixteenth century, Iran became weaker due to bad leadership and attacked from neighbor peoples. Some territorial advances were made in an eastern direction.
In the 1580s, Qizilbash chiefs had the heir to the crown murdered together with other important members of the royal family. But the chiefs soon started fighting against each other.
In 1588, Abbas I became the shah, after hiding in the province of Khurasan, surviving the battle of power of the preceding years.
In 1590, Abbas I forged peace with the Ottoman Empire on unfavorable terms, and attacked the Uzbeks in the northeast instead, but without much success.
In 1599, Abbas I received European aid in reforming his army. The army was reorganized, and divided into slaves, musketeers and artillerymen. They were supplied with European type arms and paid out of the royal treasury.
In 1602, Abbas I drove the Portuguese from the island of Bahrain in the Persian Gulf.
In 1603, Abbas I defeated the Ottomans, winning back all the territory they had gained from earlier Safavid shahs. Abbas I even captured Baghdad.
In 1623, with help from British officers and troops, Abbas I drove the Portuguese from the island of Hormuz, which controlled the entrance to the Persian Gulf.
In the early seventeenth century, Esfahan became permanent capital.
In 1624, the Safavids took back control over Baghdad.
In 1629, Abbas I died, and a period of slow decline starts.
In 1638, Safavid control over Baghdad was again lost.
In 1639, the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin regulated the border between the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid state. This border corresponded in most fields to today’s Iran’s western border.
In 1722, Esfahan was captured by the Ghilzai Afghans ruling from Kandahar.
In 1729, Shah Tahmasp II won back Esfahan.
In 1732, Tahmasp II was deposed by his own troops, under the leadership of Nader Qoli Beg (the future Nader Shah).
The following is a list of the Safavid rulers:
* Ismail I (Isma'il I) 1501–1524
* Tahmasp I 1524–1576
* Ismail II (Isma'il II) 1576–1578
* Mohammed Khodabanda (Muhammad Khudabanda) 1578–1587
* Abbas I ('Abbas I) 1587–1629
* Safi I 1629–1642
* Abbas II ('Abbas II) 1642–1666
* Suleiman I (Sulayman I) (Safi II) 1666–1694
* Sultan Hoseyn I (Husayn I) 1694–1722
* Tahmasp II 1722–1732
* Abbas III ('Abbas III) 1732–1736
Nominal rulers in certain parts of Persia only:
1732 ‘Abbas III
1749 Sulayman II
1750 Isma‘il III
1753 Husayn II
1786 Muhammad
Qajar rule
Safavids. Turkoman dynasty of the shahs of Persia (r.1501-1736). Their main capitals were Tabriz, Qazvin (in 1548), and Isfahan (from 1598). The Sufi order founded around 1300 by Sheik Sufi (Shaykh Safi al-Din al-Ardabili) (1252-1334) in Ardabil (eastern Azerbaijan) soon acquired significance as a religious and political focus. In the mid-15th century, the Safavids became converts to Shi‘ism. Their rise to power came under the spiritual sheikhs Junaid (r. 1447-1460) and Haidar (r. 1460-1488), who created a rigid political organization and gathered together their own troops (named “Qizilbash” or “Red Heads/Caps” after their headgear) to spread their doctrine. Shah Isma‘il (r. 1501-1524), successor to Haidar after 1494 and a fervent Shi‘ite propagandist, seized power in Iran (1499-1501), starting with the province of Gilan, by driving out the related dynasty of the Qara Qoyunlu. It was Shah Isma‘il who made Shi‘ism the state religion and who virtually extinguished the Sunnis in Persia.
In 1507, he occupied Iraq, immediately elevated Twelver Shi‘ism to the national religion, and sought political reconciliation between the Turkomans (the Qizilbash, the military) and the Iranian population (the administration). A defeat by the Ottomans at Chaldiran in 1514 was followed by ongoing conflict with the Ottomans in the west and the Uzbeks in the east.
Under Tahmasp (r. 1524-1576) there was substantial diplomatic neutralization of the enemy, normalization of religious policy, and the beginning of patronage of the arts. Following subsequent troubles, there was a re-consolidation of the state under Abbas I the Great (r. 1587-1629). He annexed Bahrain in 1601, occupied Azerbaijan in 1603, and conquered Shirwan, Armenia, Georgia, and parts of Afghanistan in 1608. In 1623-1624, he was able to re-annexed Kurdistan and Iraq to the Safavid Empire. Internally, he undertook army reform with Christian military slaves, developed Isfahan into the “Pearl of the World,” and generated prosperity through skillful economic policy and control of the Persian Gulf. His successors were often weak personalities, yet complicated court rituals were developed and a shah cult. The last high point was the rule of Abbas II (r. 1642-1666) through an intensive exchange of goods and European trading partners and internal political reforms. In 1648, he annexed parts of Afghanistan.
A rapid economic decline began under the last Safavid, Sultan Husain (r. 1694-1722), who, through religious intolerance and compulsory conversion to the Shi‘ite faith, provoked the Sunnite parts of the empire. As a result, the Sunnite Afghans (the Ghalzal) moved into Persia from 1719, beleaguered and conquered Isfahan in 1722 and deposed Husain, who was executed in 1726. Up until 1736, (in some provinces 1773) Safavid shadow rulers were installed. Power was transferred to the Afsharids and Zand, and finally to the Qajars.
The Safavids were rulers of Iran (Persia) effectively from 1501 to 1722 and, through two rois faineants, to 1736. The first king of this dynasty, Shah Isma’il I, came to power in 1501. His accession marked the culmination of two hundred years of preparation, initially by means of quiet propaganda on behalf of the Safavid family, ultimately through revolutionary activity. After the establishment of the Safavid state, its rulers deliberately tampered with historical evidence that showed that the early Safavid leaders were Sunnis, and consequently the origins of the family remain obscure.
It seems certain that Isma’il’s ancestors were of native Iranian stock and probably hailed from Kurdistan, although some scholars have claimed that the was a Turk. It is true that Isma’il, and most if not all of his successors, spoke Azeri, the dialect of Turkish used in Azerbaijan, but this was necessitated by the fact that the vast majority of their supporters, both during the revolutionary phase of the Safavi movement and during the formative period of the Safavid state, were Turkmen tribesmen from eastern Anatolia, the Armenian highlands, and norther Syria and Iraq, who became known as Kizilbash (“red heads”) because of their distinctive headgear commemorating the twelve Ithna Ashari Shi’ite imams.
At the time of his accession, Isma’il was master only of the province of Azerbaijan in northwestern Persia. During the first decade of his reign, Safavid power was consolidated throughout the rest of Persia. This process culminated with the withdrawal of the Uzbeks from the important northeastern frontier province of Khurasan following their defeat in a great battle outside Merv on November 22, 1510. Isma’il also extended Safavid sovereignty over two regions outside Persia proper: the province of Diyar Bakr (corresponding today to northern Iraq), and the principality of Shirvan in the southern Caucasus, an area in which both his grandfather and great-grandfather had met their end in battle.
Isma’il attempted to find solutions to a number of urgent problems that faced him at his accession. Both he and his successors devised short-term solutions, but their failure to solve them permanently played its part in the eventual decline and fall of the dynasty. In 1501, Isma’il I promulgated the Ithna Ashari form of Islam, which had been espoused by supporters of the Safavids during the fifteenth century, as the official religion of the newly established Safavid state. This decision, taken primarily for political reasons, was designed to create a sense of national identity among his subjects and to differentiate his realm from that of the Sunni Ottoman Empire. Many Persians had adopted the Ithna Ashari form of Islam in early Islamic times as a form of protest against political and social domination by their Arab conquerors. In 1258, the caliphate, the symbol of the unity of the Islamic world and of the dominance of that world by the Sunni form of Islam, was destroyed by the Mongols as they swept through the region. Thereafter, Shi’ism steadily increased its influence and power in Persia and elsewhere, often using Sufi orders (tariqas) as a vehicle for its propaganda.
Unfortunately, Isma’il’s decision institutionalized another problem that has remained unsolved to this day, namely, the problem of government in such a state. According to Ithna Ashari political theory, the only legitimate ruler of an Ithna Ashari Shi‘ite state is the twelfth imam, known as the Hidden Imam or the Mahdi. Since 940, when Ithna Ashari Shi‘ites ceased to hope for the imminent return to earth of the Mahdi, and the period of the “Greater Occultation” began, they have accepted the claim of the mujtahids (leading scholars in religious jurisprudence and theology) to act as the representatives on earth of the Mahdi. Isma’il’s decision thus made inevitable a struggle for power between the mujtahids, endowed with the aura of infallibility of the imams and aspiring to establish theocratic government, and the shahs, representing secular government.
The Safavid shahs attempted to defuse this potentially explosive situation by claiming that they, and not the mujtahids, were the legitimate representatives on earth of the Mahdi. This claim, based on a spurious genealogy linking the Safavid family with the seventh imam, was largely accepted by the common people but not, of course, by the religious classes. In effect, Isma’il preempted the role claimed by the mutahids by himself establishing a theocratic state. He attempted to secure political control over the religious classes by appointing as their head an official termed the sadr, who was answerable to himself for their good behavior. Isma’il’s aura of infallibility and invincibility was shattered by the crushing defeat inflicted on him by the Ottomans at the battle of Chaldiran on August 23, 1514. Henceforth, the shahs were able to stave off the challenge to their authority from the mujtahids only if they were strong and effective rulers.
A second problem that faced Isma’il was how to incorporate the revolutionary organization of the Safavi tariqa into the fabric of the state. Isma’il tried to solve the problem by creating the office of vakil-i nafs-i nafis-i humayun. This officer was to act as the shah’s viceregent in both temporal and spiritual matters, and his office was intended to constitute an umbrella under which the khalifat al-khulafa, the head of the Sufi order, could find shelter. The latter, however, resented the diminution of his authority implicit in the creation of the office of vakil, and he and his successors remained a thorn in the flesh of the shahs at least until the time of Abbas I. Isma’il also hoped that the vakil would act as a bridge between the two rival ethnic groups in the early Safavid state: the Turkish military elite and the Persian bureaucratic and religious classes. This idea also failed. If a Kizilbash chief was vakil, he became too powerful. If the office was held by a Persian, the jealousy of the Kizilbash was such that on several occasions they assassinated a Persian vakil.
Tahmasp was only ten and a half years of age when he succeeded his father Isma’il as shah. This gave the Kizilbash chiefs, no longer constrained by their mystical loyalty to a semi-divine leader, the opportunity to challenge the shah’s authority in a turbulent manner reminiscent of the behavior of the barons of medieval England. For the first ten years of Tahmasp’s reign, power was taken away from him by successive groups of Kizilbash chiefs. In 1533, a group of seditious Kizilbash had the temerity to pursue their private quarrel into the shah’s apartments, and an arrow shot by one of them struck the shah’s hat. Tahmasp managed to quell the mutiny and assert his authority as ruler. Between 1533 and 1574, when the serious illness of Tahmasp prompted a recrudescence of factionalism, the shah walked a precarious tightrope between the various internal factions. Despite Kizilbash disloyalty, and the treachery of two of his own brothers, he succeeded in holding the state together but was not able to keep inviolate its boundaries. Between 1524 and 1538, the Uzbeks launched five major attacks on Khurasan. Between 1533 and 1553, Sulaiman the Magnificent, the greatest of the Ottoman sultans, made four large-scale invasions of Persia. Baghdad was recaptured by the Ottomans. Tabriz, the Safavid capital, was occupied on several occasions, and Tahmasp transferred his capital to Qazvin, a city farther from the Ottoman frontier. Tahmasp has not been given sufficient credit for the way in which, with numerically far inferior forces, he kept these powerful enemies at bay. In 1555, he negotiated with the Ottomans the Treaty of Amasya, which was not totally unfavorable to Persia, and gave it a much needed respite from war for more than thirty years.
Between 1540 and 1553, Tahmasp waged four campaigns in the sourthern Caucasus against the “infidel” Georgian, Circassian, and Armenian populations of that region. From the last of these campaigns, thirty thousand prisoners were brought back to Persia, but it is not clear whether Tahmasp intended to use these new ethnic elements to offset the power of the Kizilbash in the formal, institutionalized manner later devised by Abbas I.
When the illness of Tahmasp in 1574 led to a further struggle for power, the new “third force” in the state, the Georgians, Circassians, and Armenians, made its presence felt for the first time. Those Georgian and Circassian women in the royal harem who were mothers of princes engaged in constant intrigue, assisted by ambitious bureaucrats and members of the royal household, in order to secure the throne for their favorite son. The Kizilbash awoke rather belatedly to the realization that their hitherto dominant position in the state was threatened. Their problem was that only two of Tahmasp’s nine sons were the offspring of Turkmen mothers, and one of these, Muhammad Khudabanda, was purblind and was initially considered ineligible for kingship.
Following the death of Tahmasp in 1576, the Kizilbash, in order to block the accession of a Caucasian candidate, were thus obliged to place on the throne as Shah Isma’il II the only remaining Turkmen candidate. It soon became clear that Isma’il II’s mind had been impaired by nearly twenty years of incarceration in the fortress-prison of Qahqaha, and his brief and bloody reign was terminated by his assassination by the Kizilbash in November 1577. The Kizilbash now had no alternative but to put on the throne Isma’il’s elder brother Muhammad Khudabanda. Subject to the physical disability already mentioned, and of a mild and scholarly disposition, Sultan Muhammad Shah, as he was styled, was a puppet in the hands of two ambitious and ruthless women: his own wife, Mahd’i Ulya, and his sister Pari Khan Khanum, who had assisted the assassins in murdering his younger brother Isma’il II. Mahd-i Ulya had her rival, Pari Khan Khanum, strangled. She then directed the affairs of state for eighteen months until she, too, was murdered by the Kizilbash because she had, in their view, acted contrary to the considered opinions of the Kizilbash elders, and had constantly attempted to humiliate them by giving appointments to Persians. A turbulent period followed the assassination of Mahd-i Ulya, and the Ottomans seized the opportunity to occupy Tabriz in 1585. In 1588, a Kizilbash coup d’etat deposed Sultan Muhammad Shah and placed his son, Abbas, on the throne.
Abbas I did not come to the throne at an auspicious moment in the history of the Safavid state. Rent by Kizilbash factionalism, it appeared to be powerless before the attacks of its traditional enemies, the Ottomans and the Uzbeks. However, Abbas approached his task with strength and determination. In order to free his hands to deal with pressing internal problems of restoring law and order and the machinery of government, Abbas signed with the Ottomans in 1589-1590 a peace treaty that ceded to them large areas of Ottoman occupied Persian territory. Among Abbas’ achievements were the creation of a standing army, of which regiments drawn from “third force” elements formed a conspicuous part, and the sequestration to the crown of a number of provinces formerly under the jurisdiction of Kizilbash military governors. The provinces thus sequestered were placed under the administration of royal intendants, and their revenues were remitted to the royal treasury to pay for the new standing army. Abbas also opened the highest offices of the state to “third force” elements by means of a training system designed especially for them, and he reorganized the administrative system in ways designed to effect a greater degree of centralization. He was responsible for the development of diplomatic and commercial relations with the West and the fostering of a climate of religious tolerance that encouraged Armenian and Jewish merchants to trade freely, a policy that in turn increased the economic prosperity of the country. During his reign arts and crafts were patronized on a large scale, and a new capital at Isfahan remarkable for its beauty and imaginative planning was created; roads and bridges were constructed and improved, and caravansaries were built along the main highways for the benefit of the wayfarer. The considered opinion of the shrewd Huguenot jeweler Chardin, who spent much time in Persia in the seventeenth century, was that, “When this great prince ceased to live, Persia ceased to prosper!”
The decline of Safavid fortunes indeed begins with the reign of Abbas’ successor, his grandson Shah Safi. This decline, checked by Abbas II (1642-1666), began again and accelerated during the second half of the seventeenth century. Forty years ago, Vladimir Minorsky listed the basic causes of the decline of the Safavid dynasty: (1) the disappearance of the “basic theocratic nucleus” of the state and the failure to substitute for it “some other dynamic ideology”; (2) the antipathy between Turkish and Persian officers in the military command structure; (3) the practice of converting “state” into “crown” provinces, which solved the immediate problem of finding funds with which to pay the newly created standing army, but in the long term reduced the fighting efficiency of the army; (4) “the irresponsible character of the ‘shadow government’ represented by the harem, the Queen Mother and the eunuchs”; (5) “the degeneration of the dynasty whose scions were brought up in the atmosphere of the harem, in complete ignorance of the outside world.” This analysis is still valid, but to it should be added (6) the breakdown of the concordat between the ruler and the religious leaders. As noted earlier, the latter regarded any form of secular government as illegitimate, but, since they had benefitted from the promulgation of Ithna Ashari Shi’ism as the official religion of the Safavid state, they had tolerated, though grudgingly, the rule of strong Safavid kings. Weak kings, however, gave them the opportunity to increase their power, and an important feature of the last half-century of Safavid rule is the greatly enhanced authority of the religious classes, as they freed themselves progressively from political control. Ithna Ashari Shi’ism was formulated in ever more dogmatic terms by powerful theologians, whose religious bigotry eroded the multi-cultural society developed by Abbas I.
The military weakness of the state was dramatically demonstrated in 1699 and again in 1709, when marauding bands of Baluchi and Afghan tribesmen, respectively, penetrated deep into southeastern Persia. The Afghans were not the only neighbors of Persia to sense that the collapse of the Safavid state was near. In 1715, a Russian ambassador reported to Tsar Peter the Great that the Persian army was so demoralized and inefficient that the country could easily be conquered by a small Russian army. In 1721, the Afghan chief Mahmud invaded Persia, reaching Isfahan, the Safavid capital. After defeating a Persian army outside Isfahan on March 8, 1722, he laid siege to the city and starved it into surrender on October 12, 1722. At least eighty thousand people are said to have perished from starvation and disease. Mahmud assumed the throne of Persia, and he and his cousin and successor Ashraf controlled central and southern Persia until 1729. The last substantive Safavid shah, Sultan Husain, was put to death by Ashraf in 1726. One of the shah’s sons, Tahmasp, who was as weak and ineffectual as his father, escaped to Qazvin, and former Safavid capital, where he proclaimed himself Shah Tahmasp II.
Effective resistance to the Afghans, however, was organized by a Kizilbash chief, Nadir Khan Afshar, who offered his services to Tahmasp II. Together they drove the Afghans out of Isfahan in November 1729, and shortly afterwards from Persian territory. Nadir Khan placed Tahmasp II on the throne but was himself the de facto ruler. In 1732, in order to increase his power still further, he deposed Tahmasp II in favor of the latter’s infant son, who was crowned as Abbas III. Finally, on March 8, 1736, Nadir Khan abandoned the fiction of Safavid rule and installed himself on the throne as Nadir Shah, the first ruler of the new Afsharid dynasty. Although the Safavid state no longer existed as a political reality, the mystique that had surrounded its shahs and its institutions was so strong that Safavid pretenders continued to appear until 1773.
A brief chronology of the Safavids reads as follows:
In the fourteenth century, Sheikh Safi ud-Din formed a Sufi order in Ardabil, Azerbaijan.
In 1399, the Safavid sect changed their Sunni orientation for a Shi‘a.
In the fifteenth century, Junayd Safavi lost a succession dispute in the order, and travels with his supporters to eastern Anatolia. They gained more members among Turkoman nomads, and through marriage Junayd Safavid was able to reach large areas in western and central Iran controlled by the Ay Qoyunlu Turkoman Confederation.
In July of 1501, Junayd’s grandson, Isma’il took control over Tabriz with the help of local Turkomen tribes. He was crowned as shah, and declared Shi’ism the state religion.
In 1502, Isma’il declared himself an infallible Shi ‘a imam, and a descendant of the seventh Shi‘a imam, Musa al-Kazim.
During the 1500s, the Safavids conquered Mosul and Baghdad. In these cities, Shi’ism was also declared to be the state religion.
In August of 1514, Isma’il lost to the Ottoman sultan Selim I at Chaldiran. This battle destroyed the claim of the shah that he was infallible and semi-divine.
During the 1510s, the Safavids lost the region of Kurdistan.
In 1533, Baghdad was conquered by the Ottomans. Esfahan became the temporary capital.
In the middle sixteenth century, Iran became weaker due to bad leadership and attacked from neighbor peoples. Some territorial advances were made in an eastern direction.
In the 1580s, Qizilbash chiefs had the heir to the crown murdered together with other important members of the royal family. But the chiefs soon started fighting against each other.
In 1588, Abbas I became the shah, after hiding in the province of Khurasan, surviving the battle of power of the preceding years.
In 1590, Abbas I forged peace with the Ottoman Empire on unfavorable terms, and attacked the Uzbeks in the northeast instead, but without much success.
In 1599, Abbas I received European aid in reforming his army. The army was reorganized, and divided into slaves, musketeers and artillerymen. They were supplied with European type arms and paid out of the royal treasury.
In 1602, Abbas I drove the Portuguese from the island of Bahrain in the Persian Gulf.
In 1603, Abbas I defeated the Ottomans, winning back all the territory they had gained from earlier Safavid shahs. Abbas I even captured Baghdad.
In 1623, with help from British officers and troops, Abbas I drove the Portuguese from the island of Hormuz, which controlled the entrance to the Persian Gulf.
In the early seventeenth century, Esfahan became permanent capital.
In 1624, the Safavids took back control over Baghdad.
In 1629, Abbas I died, and a period of slow decline starts.
In 1638, Safavid control over Baghdad was again lost.
In 1639, the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin regulated the border between the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid state. This border corresponded in most fields to today’s Iran’s western border.
In 1722, Esfahan was captured by the Ghilzai Afghans ruling from Kandahar.
In 1729, Shah Tahmasp II won back Esfahan.
In 1732, Tahmasp II was deposed by his own troops, under the leadership of Nader Qoli Beg (the future Nader Shah).
The following is a list of the Safavid rulers:
* Ismail I (Isma'il I) 1501–1524
* Tahmasp I 1524–1576
* Ismail II (Isma'il II) 1576–1578
* Mohammed Khodabanda (Muhammad Khudabanda) 1578–1587
* Abbas I ('Abbas I) 1587–1629
* Safi I 1629–1642
* Abbas II ('Abbas II) 1642–1666
* Suleiman I (Sulayman I) (Safi II) 1666–1694
* Sultan Hoseyn I (Husayn I) 1694–1722
* Tahmasp II 1722–1732
* Abbas III ('Abbas III) 1732–1736
Nominal rulers in certain parts of Persia only:
1732 ‘Abbas III
1749 Sulayman II
1750 Isma‘il III
1753 Husayn II
1786 Muhammad
Qajar rule
Safdar Jang
Safdar Jang (Safdarjung) (Muhammad Muqim) (b. 1708, Nishapur, Khurasan, Persia - d. October 5, 1754, Sultanpur, India). Second nawab, or ruler, of the North Indian state of Awadh (Oudh) from 1739 until his death. Nephew, son-in-law, and successor to Sa’adat Khan, and like him an immigrant from Nishapur, he expanded his territory in the Ganges River valley while retaining as much power as possible within the declining Mughal empire. He fought a civil war in and around Delhi in 1753 over the control of imperial offices, which by then were virtually powerless but invested with residual authority throughout India. Although his reign marks the emergence of Awadh as an autonomous successor state, his tomb, a splendid example of late Mughal architecture, stands in what is now New Delhi.
Safdarjung was the Subadar Nawab of Oudh from March 19, 1739 to October 5, 1754. Safdarjung was born as Muhammad Muqim in Khurasan, Persia and migrated to India in 1722. He succeeded his father-in-law and maternal uncle Burhan ul Mulk Sa'adat Khan to the throne of Oudh, apparently by paying Nadir Shah two crores of rupees. The Mughal Emperor Muhammad Shah (Ahmad Shah) gave him the title of "Safdarjung" in 1748.
Safdarjung was an able administrator. He was not only effective in keeping control of Oudh, but also managed to render valuable assistance to the weakened Muhammad Shah. He was soon given governorship of Kashmir as well, and became a central figure at the Delhi court. During the later years of Muhammad Shah, he gained complete control of the administration in the Mughal Empire. When Ahmad Shah Bahadur ascended the throne at Delhi, Safdarjung became his Wazir ul-Mamalik-i-Hindustan or Chief Minister of India. However, court politics eventually overtook him and he was dismissed in 1753.
Safdarjung went to Oudh in December 1753. He died there on October 5, 1754.
The Safdarjung's Tomb, built in 1754 is now situated on a road known as Safdarjung Road, in New Delhi.
There are several other structures that carry his name today in the area, like Safdarjung Airport, Safdarjang Hospital, Safdarjung Terminal, and a nearby residential neighborhood of Safdarjung (colony).
Jang, Safdar see Safdar Jang
Safdarjung see Safdar Jang
Muhammad Muqim see Safdar Jang
Muqim, Muhammad see Safdar Jang
Safdar Jang (Safdarjung) (Muhammad Muqim) (b. 1708, Nishapur, Khurasan, Persia - d. October 5, 1754, Sultanpur, India). Second nawab, or ruler, of the North Indian state of Awadh (Oudh) from 1739 until his death. Nephew, son-in-law, and successor to Sa’adat Khan, and like him an immigrant from Nishapur, he expanded his territory in the Ganges River valley while retaining as much power as possible within the declining Mughal empire. He fought a civil war in and around Delhi in 1753 over the control of imperial offices, which by then were virtually powerless but invested with residual authority throughout India. Although his reign marks the emergence of Awadh as an autonomous successor state, his tomb, a splendid example of late Mughal architecture, stands in what is now New Delhi.
Safdarjung was the Subadar Nawab of Oudh from March 19, 1739 to October 5, 1754. Safdarjung was born as Muhammad Muqim in Khurasan, Persia and migrated to India in 1722. He succeeded his father-in-law and maternal uncle Burhan ul Mulk Sa'adat Khan to the throne of Oudh, apparently by paying Nadir Shah two crores of rupees. The Mughal Emperor Muhammad Shah (Ahmad Shah) gave him the title of "Safdarjung" in 1748.
Safdarjung was an able administrator. He was not only effective in keeping control of Oudh, but also managed to render valuable assistance to the weakened Muhammad Shah. He was soon given governorship of Kashmir as well, and became a central figure at the Delhi court. During the later years of Muhammad Shah, he gained complete control of the administration in the Mughal Empire. When Ahmad Shah Bahadur ascended the throne at Delhi, Safdarjung became his Wazir ul-Mamalik-i-Hindustan or Chief Minister of India. However, court politics eventually overtook him and he was dismissed in 1753.
Safdarjung went to Oudh in December 1753. He died there on October 5, 1754.
The Safdarjung's Tomb, built in 1754 is now situated on a road known as Safdarjung Road, in New Delhi.
There are several other structures that carry his name today in the area, like Safdarjung Airport, Safdarjang Hospital, Safdarjung Terminal, and a nearby residential neighborhood of Safdarjung (colony).
Jang, Safdar see Safdar Jang
Safdarjung see Safdar Jang
Muhammad Muqim see Safdar Jang
Muqim, Muhammad see Safdar Jang
Saffarids
Saffarids. Ruling dynasty in Persia, Afghanistan, and parts of Transoxiana (r.861-903). Their main capital was Merv. The adventurer Yaqub ibn Lait (r. 861-878), known as al-Saffar (“The Coppersmith”), built strong troop units from urban self-defense groups and gangs of robbers from the local region and made himself lord of his home town of Sistan (in eastern Persia). From 8677, onwards he took possession of the territory of the Tahirids (Herat and Fars with Shiraz in 868, then Balkh and Tokharistan), whom he finally drove out of Khorasan in 873, as well as Afghanistan. Recognized in 871 by the caliph as governor of the entire eastern half of the Abbasid Empire, he conducted a campaign against Baghdad in 876. His brother, Amr (r. 878-900), was initially able to hold onto power and was even recognized as governor of Transoxiana in 895, but he was defeated by the Samanids in 900 and taken prisoner. An attempt made by his grandson, Tahir (r. 900-903), to win back power from Satan proved unsuccessful. His descendants ruled Sistan as governors from 921 (main capital, Nimruz), under Seljuk sovereignty from 1068, until removed by Timur in 1383.
Saffarids were a significant power in the Islamic world for only half a century (867-911), but they existed as a minor dynasty in the province of Sistan (essentially the Helmand River valley in Iran and Afghanistan) until the fifteenth century. The dynasty was founded by a military adventurer named Ya’qub ibn Laith. Ya’qub was of common origin, by profession a saffar, or coppersmith, from which term the name of the dynasty was derived. He began his career as a member of a band of ayyar operating near the town of Bust. The ayyar were at best a kind of popular militia that enforced some semblance of order during times of political weakness and protected local interests against outside powers. At worst, they were little more than brigands. In any event, Ya’qub managed to become the leader of the ayyar in Sistan and by 861 was the de facto ruler of the province.
Once in power, Ya’qub launched a series of military operations, each of which served quite different purposes. His first efforts were aimed primarily at breaking the strength of the Kharijite groups in Sistan. The Kharijites, who were mostly Arab tribesmen, had endorsed an unconventional variety of Islam that held, among other things, that legitimate political power should be held by the most pious person in the community. According to their view, Muslims who had committed a “grave sin” forfeited their status as believers and could be killed or dispossessed by the true, Kharijite, Muslims. Some of the Kharijites had fled to remote Sistan to evade the authority of the caliphs and the hostility of the Sunni Muslims. They thus came to play a major, if turbulent, role in the politics that province. Ya’qub seems to have attacked them primarily in order to tame them rather than out of dislike for their religious views. Once he defeated them, he incorporated them into his own forces.
Ya’qub initiated a second series of campaigns directed against the remaining pagan areas of Afghanistan and the Indian frontier. He was able to crush the Zunbil of Zamindavar and to capture and plunder Kabul. His seizure of many gold and silver idols from the pagan temples (along with the silver mines of central Afghanistan) contributed to the financial success of the early Saffarids and temporarily helped them capture the imagination and respect of the Muslim world, particularly since Ya’qub sent a portion of the spoils to the caliph, a deed required by Islamic law. Thus, some sources refer to Ya’qub and his forces as “volunteer fighters for the faith,” and in this capacity they might be compared to the ghazis of later times. However, the Saffarid reputation as champions of the faith suffered considerably when Ya’qub began a third series of wars, this time against the Muslim areas to the north and west of Sistan. In the course of these campaigns, Ya’qub wrested control of the important province of Khurasan from the Tahirids and in 876 attempted unsuccessfully to occupy Baghdad. Although the Abbasid caliphs were thus compelled to recognize the rule of the early Saffarids over southern Iran, they were always distrustful of Saffarid intentions, attempting to stir up popular resistance to them and withdrawing the certificates of investiture they had granted whenever possible.
Upon the death of Ya’qub in 879, leadership of the dynasty was assumed by his brother Amr. Amr attempted to expand Saffarid territories at the expense of another favored client of the Abbasids, the Samanids of Transoxiana. He first appointed his own governor of Khwarazm and the, in 898, invaded Samanid territory directly. However, his army was decisively defeated, and Amr himself was taken prisoner (to be sent to the caliph and executed in 902). Amr’s death marked the final collapse of the Saffarids as a regional power. The Samanids took Khurasan, representatives of the caliph gradually reclaimed Fars and Kerman, and Sistan itself was occupied twice by the Samanid forces. Yet the dynasty itself survived all these calamities, in addition to later invasions by the Ghaznavids (1003) and the Mongols (1221), until it finally disappeared around 1480.
The essentially popular and local character of the Saffarid dynasty is attested in the copious anecdotal material about Ya’qub and Amr as well as by what little we know of the society and culture they represented. Although one important source gives the Saffarids a glorious genealogy tracing their descent from ancient Iranian kings, the family does not appear to have made a concerted effort to disguise their humble origins. The Saffarids certainly made some attempt to copy the traditions, institutions, and etiquette of Islamic courts, but they are just as often depicted on campaign, sharing the simple diet and rough life of their military comrades. They were often praised for their zeal in protecting the poor and weak in matters of taxation and water supply as well as for championing local interests against outside exploitation. Saffarid culture was essentially unpretentious. Ya’qub is famous for having been unimpressed by praise of his accomplishments in Arabic verse and instead promoted the use of the Persian vernacular for his “court” poetry.
In short, the Saffarids are something of an anomaly in Islamic history. They broke virtually all of the rules of conventional political behavior in their dealings with the caliphs and their subjects, and yet their dynasty survived for more than six hundred years -- one of the longest dynastic successions in all of Islamic and Iranian history. This longevity is extremely difficult to explain on the basis of anything other than their genuine popularity and their ability to represent, “the national interests and aspirations of the people of Sistan, from whose ranks they themselves had sprung.”
The rulers of the Saffarid dynasty were:
* Ya`qûb ibn Layth as-Saffâr (867-879)
* Amr I (Saffarides) (`Amr ibn Layth) (879-901)
* Tâhir ibn Muhammad ibn `Amr (901-908)
* Layth ibn `Alî (908-910)
* Muhammad ibn `Alî (910-912)
* `Amr ibn Ya`qûb ibn Muhammad ibn `Amr (912-913)
* Ahmad ibn Muhammed ibn Khalaf ibn Layth ibn `Alî (922-963)
* Walî ad-Dawlah Khalaf ibn Ahmad (963-1003)
The Saffarids were Iranian dynasty of lower class origins that ruled a large area in eastern Iran. The dynasty’s founder, Yaʿqūb ibn Leys̄ aṣ-Ṣaffār (“the coppersmith”), took control of his native province, Seistan, around 866. By 869 he had extended his control into northeastern India, adding the Kābul Valley, Sind, Tocharistan, Makran (Baluchistan), Kermān, and Fārs to his possessions. With the overthrow of the Ṭāhirids and the annexation of Khorāsān in 873 the Ṣaffārid Empire reached its greatest extent. Yaʿqūb then ventured to march against Baghdad in 876, but was defeated by the forces of the caliph al-Muʿtamid at Dayr al-ʿĀqūl.
The Caliph then acknowledged Yaʿqūb’s brother and successor (879), ʿAmr ibn Leys̄, as governor of Khorāsān, Isfahan, Fārs, Seistan, and Sind. But the Ṣaffārid Empire collapsed when ʿAmr, trying to wrest Transoxania from the Sāmānids, was defeated by Ismāʿīl ibn Aḥmad near Balkh in 900. Thereafter, few of the Ṣaffārids had any wide authority, though they maintained their position in Seistan intermittently at least until the 16th century, despite Sāmānid, Ghaznavid, and Mongol conquests.
Saffarids. Ruling dynasty in Persia, Afghanistan, and parts of Transoxiana (r.861-903). Their main capital was Merv. The adventurer Yaqub ibn Lait (r. 861-878), known as al-Saffar (“The Coppersmith”), built strong troop units from urban self-defense groups and gangs of robbers from the local region and made himself lord of his home town of Sistan (in eastern Persia). From 8677, onwards he took possession of the territory of the Tahirids (Herat and Fars with Shiraz in 868, then Balkh and Tokharistan), whom he finally drove out of Khorasan in 873, as well as Afghanistan. Recognized in 871 by the caliph as governor of the entire eastern half of the Abbasid Empire, he conducted a campaign against Baghdad in 876. His brother, Amr (r. 878-900), was initially able to hold onto power and was even recognized as governor of Transoxiana in 895, but he was defeated by the Samanids in 900 and taken prisoner. An attempt made by his grandson, Tahir (r. 900-903), to win back power from Satan proved unsuccessful. His descendants ruled Sistan as governors from 921 (main capital, Nimruz), under Seljuk sovereignty from 1068, until removed by Timur in 1383.
Saffarids were a significant power in the Islamic world for only half a century (867-911), but they existed as a minor dynasty in the province of Sistan (essentially the Helmand River valley in Iran and Afghanistan) until the fifteenth century. The dynasty was founded by a military adventurer named Ya’qub ibn Laith. Ya’qub was of common origin, by profession a saffar, or coppersmith, from which term the name of the dynasty was derived. He began his career as a member of a band of ayyar operating near the town of Bust. The ayyar were at best a kind of popular militia that enforced some semblance of order during times of political weakness and protected local interests against outside powers. At worst, they were little more than brigands. In any event, Ya’qub managed to become the leader of the ayyar in Sistan and by 861 was the de facto ruler of the province.
Once in power, Ya’qub launched a series of military operations, each of which served quite different purposes. His first efforts were aimed primarily at breaking the strength of the Kharijite groups in Sistan. The Kharijites, who were mostly Arab tribesmen, had endorsed an unconventional variety of Islam that held, among other things, that legitimate political power should be held by the most pious person in the community. According to their view, Muslims who had committed a “grave sin” forfeited their status as believers and could be killed or dispossessed by the true, Kharijite, Muslims. Some of the Kharijites had fled to remote Sistan to evade the authority of the caliphs and the hostility of the Sunni Muslims. They thus came to play a major, if turbulent, role in the politics that province. Ya’qub seems to have attacked them primarily in order to tame them rather than out of dislike for their religious views. Once he defeated them, he incorporated them into his own forces.
Ya’qub initiated a second series of campaigns directed against the remaining pagan areas of Afghanistan and the Indian frontier. He was able to crush the Zunbil of Zamindavar and to capture and plunder Kabul. His seizure of many gold and silver idols from the pagan temples (along with the silver mines of central Afghanistan) contributed to the financial success of the early Saffarids and temporarily helped them capture the imagination and respect of the Muslim world, particularly since Ya’qub sent a portion of the spoils to the caliph, a deed required by Islamic law. Thus, some sources refer to Ya’qub and his forces as “volunteer fighters for the faith,” and in this capacity they might be compared to the ghazis of later times. However, the Saffarid reputation as champions of the faith suffered considerably when Ya’qub began a third series of wars, this time against the Muslim areas to the north and west of Sistan. In the course of these campaigns, Ya’qub wrested control of the important province of Khurasan from the Tahirids and in 876 attempted unsuccessfully to occupy Baghdad. Although the Abbasid caliphs were thus compelled to recognize the rule of the early Saffarids over southern Iran, they were always distrustful of Saffarid intentions, attempting to stir up popular resistance to them and withdrawing the certificates of investiture they had granted whenever possible.
Upon the death of Ya’qub in 879, leadership of the dynasty was assumed by his brother Amr. Amr attempted to expand Saffarid territories at the expense of another favored client of the Abbasids, the Samanids of Transoxiana. He first appointed his own governor of Khwarazm and the, in 898, invaded Samanid territory directly. However, his army was decisively defeated, and Amr himself was taken prisoner (to be sent to the caliph and executed in 902). Amr’s death marked the final collapse of the Saffarids as a regional power. The Samanids took Khurasan, representatives of the caliph gradually reclaimed Fars and Kerman, and Sistan itself was occupied twice by the Samanid forces. Yet the dynasty itself survived all these calamities, in addition to later invasions by the Ghaznavids (1003) and the Mongols (1221), until it finally disappeared around 1480.
The essentially popular and local character of the Saffarid dynasty is attested in the copious anecdotal material about Ya’qub and Amr as well as by what little we know of the society and culture they represented. Although one important source gives the Saffarids a glorious genealogy tracing their descent from ancient Iranian kings, the family does not appear to have made a concerted effort to disguise their humble origins. The Saffarids certainly made some attempt to copy the traditions, institutions, and etiquette of Islamic courts, but they are just as often depicted on campaign, sharing the simple diet and rough life of their military comrades. They were often praised for their zeal in protecting the poor and weak in matters of taxation and water supply as well as for championing local interests against outside exploitation. Saffarid culture was essentially unpretentious. Ya’qub is famous for having been unimpressed by praise of his accomplishments in Arabic verse and instead promoted the use of the Persian vernacular for his “court” poetry.
In short, the Saffarids are something of an anomaly in Islamic history. They broke virtually all of the rules of conventional political behavior in their dealings with the caliphs and their subjects, and yet their dynasty survived for more than six hundred years -- one of the longest dynastic successions in all of Islamic and Iranian history. This longevity is extremely difficult to explain on the basis of anything other than their genuine popularity and their ability to represent, “the national interests and aspirations of the people of Sistan, from whose ranks they themselves had sprung.”
The rulers of the Saffarid dynasty were:
* Ya`qûb ibn Layth as-Saffâr (867-879)
* Amr I (Saffarides) (`Amr ibn Layth) (879-901)
* Tâhir ibn Muhammad ibn `Amr (901-908)
* Layth ibn `Alî (908-910)
* Muhammad ibn `Alî (910-912)
* `Amr ibn Ya`qûb ibn Muhammad ibn `Amr (912-913)
* Ahmad ibn Muhammed ibn Khalaf ibn Layth ibn `Alî (922-963)
* Walî ad-Dawlah Khalaf ibn Ahmad (963-1003)
The Saffarids were Iranian dynasty of lower class origins that ruled a large area in eastern Iran. The dynasty’s founder, Yaʿqūb ibn Leys̄ aṣ-Ṣaffār (“the coppersmith”), took control of his native province, Seistan, around 866. By 869 he had extended his control into northeastern India, adding the Kābul Valley, Sind, Tocharistan, Makran (Baluchistan), Kermān, and Fārs to his possessions. With the overthrow of the Ṭāhirids and the annexation of Khorāsān in 873 the Ṣaffārid Empire reached its greatest extent. Yaʿqūb then ventured to march against Baghdad in 876, but was defeated by the forces of the caliph al-Muʿtamid at Dayr al-ʿĀqūl.
The Caliph then acknowledged Yaʿqūb’s brother and successor (879), ʿAmr ibn Leys̄, as governor of Khorāsān, Isfahan, Fārs, Seistan, and Sind. But the Ṣaffārid Empire collapsed when ʿAmr, trying to wrest Transoxania from the Sāmānids, was defeated by Ismāʿīl ibn Aḥmad near Balkh in 900. Thereafter, few of the Ṣaffārids had any wide authority, though they maintained their position in Seistan intermittently at least until the 16th century, despite Sāmānid, Ghaznavid, and Mongol conquests.
Safi al-Din, ‘Abd al-Mu’min ibn Yusuf
Safi al-Din, ‘Abd al-Mu’min ibn Yusuf ('Abd al-Mu'min ibn Yusuf Safi al-Din) (Safi al-Din al-Urmawi) (Sufi al-Din al-Urmawi) (Abd al-Muʾmin ibn Yusuf ibn Fakhir al-Urmawi Baghdadi) (b. 1216, Urmia - d. 1294). One of the best known Arabic writers on the theory of music. He was at the service of the last ‘Abbasid Caliph of Baghdad al-Musta‘sim bi-llah. Because of his performances on the lute, his life and that of his family was spared by the Mongol Il-Khan Huleguu when he conquered Baghdad in 1258.
Safi al-Din al-Urmawi was a renowned musician and writer on the theory of music. He is perhaps best known for developing in the thirteenth century the widely used seventeen tone scale later expanded to the Arabic scale of twenty-four quarter tones.
In his youth, Safi al-Din al-Urmawi went to Baghdad and was educated in the Arabic language, literature, history and penmanship. He made a name for himself as an excellent calligrapher and was appointed copyist at the new library built by the Abbassid caliph al-Mustaṣim.
Safi al-Din also studied Shafii law and comparative law (Khilaf Fiqh ) at the Mustansiriyya Madrasa. This qualified him to assume a post in al-Mustaʿsim's juridical administration and, after 1258, to head the supervision of the foundations (naẓariyyat al-waqf) in Iraq until 665/1267, when Nasir al-Din Tusi took over.
Al-Urmawi became known as a musician and an excellent lute (‘Ud) player. He was accepted as a member of the private circle of boon companions, thanks to one of his music students, the caliph's favored songstress Luḥaẓ. His musical talent allowed him to survive the fall of Baghdad, by generously accommodating one of Hulaku’s officers. Hulagu, the Mongol ruler, was impressed by al-Urmawi and doubled his income relative to the Abbasid era.
Al-Urmawi's musical career, however, seems to have been supported mainly by the Juvayni family, especially by Shams al-Din Muḥammad and his son Sharaf Din Harun (put to death in 1285). After the demise of his patrons, al-Urmawi fell into oblivion and poverty. He was placed under arrest on account of a debt of 300 dinars. He died in the Shafii Madrasat al-Khalil in Baghdad.
As a composer, al-Urmawi cultivated the vocal forms of ṣawt, ḳawl and nawba. In the anonymous Persian Kanz al-tuḥaf, he is also credited with the invention of two stringed musical instruments, the nuzha and the mughnī.
Al-Urmawi's most important works are two books in Arabic Language on music theory, the Kitab al-Adwār and Risāla al-Sharafiyya fi 'l-nisab al-taʾlifiyya. The former was written while he still worked in the library of al-Mustasim. The Abbasid caliph was well-known for his fondness of music.
The Kitab al-Adwār is the first extant work on scientific music theory after the writings on music of Ibn Sina (Avicenna). It contains valuable information on the practice and theory of music in the Perso-ʿIraqi area, such as the factual establishment of the five-stringed lute (still an exception in Ibn Sina’s time), the final stage in the division of the octave into 17 steps, the complete nomenclature and definition of the scales constituting the system of the twelve Makams (called shudūd) and the six Awāz modes. It also contains precise depictions of contemporary musical metres, and the use of letters and numbers for the notation of melodies. It is the first time that this occurs in history, making it a unique work of great value. Al-Urmawi's 'international' modal system was intended to represent the predominant Arab and Persian local musical traditions.
By its conciseness, al-Urmawi's work became the most popular and influential book on music for centuries. No other Arabic (Persian or Ottoman Turkish) music treatise was so often copied, commented upon and translated into Asian (and Western) languages. The Kitab al-Adwār was conceived as a compendium (mukhtasar) of the standard musical knowledge of its time.
The Kitab al-Adwār was translated several times into the Persian language and there also exists an Ottoman Turkish translation.
Al-Urmawi’s second book, Risāla al-Sharafiyya, was written around 1267. It is dedicated to his student and later patron, Sharaf Din Juvayni (Juvayn is a town in Khorasan). He was part of the scientific, literary and artistic circle of the Juvayni family. Through these gatherings, al-Urmawi was in contact with the Persian scholar Nasir al-Din Tusi. Nasir al-Din Tusi, who left a short treatise on the proportions of musical intervals perceivable in the pulse may have stimulated al-Urmawī's interest in Greek science and music theory.
Al-Urmawi's two major books became the foundation of academic discourse on Arabic music. Commentaries on these theoretical works were written as early as the 1370s.
'Abd al-Mu'min ibn Yusuf Safi al-Din see Safi al-Din, ‘Abd al-Mu’min ibn Yusuf
Safi al-Din al-Urmawi see Safi al-Din, ‘Abd al-Mu’min ibn Yusuf
Urmawi, Safi al-Din al- see Safi al-Din, ‘Abd al-Mu’min ibn Yusuf
Abd al-Muʾmin ibn Yusuf ibn Fakhir al-Urmawi Baghdadi see Safi al-Din, ‘Abd al-Mu’min ibn Yusuf
Safi al-Din, ‘Abd al-Mu’min ibn Yusuf ('Abd al-Mu'min ibn Yusuf Safi al-Din) (Safi al-Din al-Urmawi) (Sufi al-Din al-Urmawi) (Abd al-Muʾmin ibn Yusuf ibn Fakhir al-Urmawi Baghdadi) (b. 1216, Urmia - d. 1294). One of the best known Arabic writers on the theory of music. He was at the service of the last ‘Abbasid Caliph of Baghdad al-Musta‘sim bi-llah. Because of his performances on the lute, his life and that of his family was spared by the Mongol Il-Khan Huleguu when he conquered Baghdad in 1258.
Safi al-Din al-Urmawi was a renowned musician and writer on the theory of music. He is perhaps best known for developing in the thirteenth century the widely used seventeen tone scale later expanded to the Arabic scale of twenty-four quarter tones.
In his youth, Safi al-Din al-Urmawi went to Baghdad and was educated in the Arabic language, literature, history and penmanship. He made a name for himself as an excellent calligrapher and was appointed copyist at the new library built by the Abbassid caliph al-Mustaṣim.
Safi al-Din also studied Shafii law and comparative law (Khilaf Fiqh ) at the Mustansiriyya Madrasa. This qualified him to assume a post in al-Mustaʿsim's juridical administration and, after 1258, to head the supervision of the foundations (naẓariyyat al-waqf) in Iraq until 665/1267, when Nasir al-Din Tusi took over.
Al-Urmawi became known as a musician and an excellent lute (‘Ud) player. He was accepted as a member of the private circle of boon companions, thanks to one of his music students, the caliph's favored songstress Luḥaẓ. His musical talent allowed him to survive the fall of Baghdad, by generously accommodating one of Hulaku’s officers. Hulagu, the Mongol ruler, was impressed by al-Urmawi and doubled his income relative to the Abbasid era.
Al-Urmawi's musical career, however, seems to have been supported mainly by the Juvayni family, especially by Shams al-Din Muḥammad and his son Sharaf Din Harun (put to death in 1285). After the demise of his patrons, al-Urmawi fell into oblivion and poverty. He was placed under arrest on account of a debt of 300 dinars. He died in the Shafii Madrasat al-Khalil in Baghdad.
As a composer, al-Urmawi cultivated the vocal forms of ṣawt, ḳawl and nawba. In the anonymous Persian Kanz al-tuḥaf, he is also credited with the invention of two stringed musical instruments, the nuzha and the mughnī.
Al-Urmawi's most important works are two books in Arabic Language on music theory, the Kitab al-Adwār and Risāla al-Sharafiyya fi 'l-nisab al-taʾlifiyya. The former was written while he still worked in the library of al-Mustasim. The Abbasid caliph was well-known for his fondness of music.
The Kitab al-Adwār is the first extant work on scientific music theory after the writings on music of Ibn Sina (Avicenna). It contains valuable information on the practice and theory of music in the Perso-ʿIraqi area, such as the factual establishment of the five-stringed lute (still an exception in Ibn Sina’s time), the final stage in the division of the octave into 17 steps, the complete nomenclature and definition of the scales constituting the system of the twelve Makams (called shudūd) and the six Awāz modes. It also contains precise depictions of contemporary musical metres, and the use of letters and numbers for the notation of melodies. It is the first time that this occurs in history, making it a unique work of great value. Al-Urmawi's 'international' modal system was intended to represent the predominant Arab and Persian local musical traditions.
By its conciseness, al-Urmawi's work became the most popular and influential book on music for centuries. No other Arabic (Persian or Ottoman Turkish) music treatise was so often copied, commented upon and translated into Asian (and Western) languages. The Kitab al-Adwār was conceived as a compendium (mukhtasar) of the standard musical knowledge of its time.
The Kitab al-Adwār was translated several times into the Persian language and there also exists an Ottoman Turkish translation.
Al-Urmawi’s second book, Risāla al-Sharafiyya, was written around 1267. It is dedicated to his student and later patron, Sharaf Din Juvayni (Juvayn is a town in Khorasan). He was part of the scientific, literary and artistic circle of the Juvayni family. Through these gatherings, al-Urmawi was in contact with the Persian scholar Nasir al-Din Tusi. Nasir al-Din Tusi, who left a short treatise on the proportions of musical intervals perceivable in the pulse may have stimulated al-Urmawī's interest in Greek science and music theory.
Al-Urmawi's two major books became the foundation of academic discourse on Arabic music. Commentaries on these theoretical works were written as early as the 1370s.
'Abd al-Mu'min ibn Yusuf Safi al-Din see Safi al-Din, ‘Abd al-Mu’min ibn Yusuf
Safi al-Din al-Urmawi see Safi al-Din, ‘Abd al-Mu’min ibn Yusuf
Urmawi, Safi al-Din al- see Safi al-Din, ‘Abd al-Mu’min ibn Yusuf
Abd al-Muʾmin ibn Yusuf ibn Fakhir al-Urmawi Baghdadi see Safi al-Din, ‘Abd al-Mu’min ibn Yusuf
Safi al-Din al-Ardabili, Shaykh
Safi al-Din al-Ardabili, Shaykh (Shaykh Safi al-Din al-Ardabili) (1252-1334). Ancestor of the Safavids. He was the founder of the dervish order of the Safawis, whose members later wore as a badge a twelve-gored cap of scarlet wool, from which comes the Turkish name Qizil-Bash.
The Safvat as-safa is a hagiography (a biography of a venerated person) of the Sufi shaykh Safi ad-Din al-Ardabili (1252-1334), founder of the Safawiyya Sufi order.
The Safvat as-safa was written by Ibn Bazzaz (d. 1391-2), a disciple of Safi ad-Din's son and successor, Sadr ad-Din, who prompted him to write the work. He probably completed it in 1358. Little else is known of his life.
The Safwat as-safa is divided into an introduction, 12 chapters, and a conclusion. Only two of the chapters (chapters 2 and 11) deal with the circumstances of his life. Most of the rest of the book recounts numerous episodes of the shaykh performing miraculous feats. The work also includes Shaykh Safi's commentaries on various passages of the Qur'an and hadith. The contents may be summarized as follows:
* Introduction: Prophecies by the Prophet Muhammad and various holy men foretelling the coming of Sheikh Safi.
* Chapter 1: Safi ad-Din's genealogy, childhood, discipleship under Sheikh Zahid, and succession to leadership of the order.
* Chapter 2: Miracles in which Shaykh Safi saved people from perilous situations in the sea, the mountains, or from enemies or illness.
* Chapter 3: Miracles motivated either by Shaykh Safi's grace or displeasure.
* Chapter 4: Safi ad-Din's explanations of difficult passages or apparent contradictions in the Qur'an and hadith.
* Chapter 5: Miracles of Safi ad-Din involving jinn, animals, and non-living things.
* Chapter 6: Safi ad-Din's practice of dhikr.
* Chapter 7: Various miracles performed by Safi ad-Din, such as reading minds, predicting the future, and contact with the dead.
* Chapter 8: Safi ad-Din's virtues and pious acts.
* Chapter 9: Safi ad-Din's final illness and death.
* Chapter 10: Miracles Safi ad-Din performed after he died.
* Chapter 11: The shaykh's greatness and fame throughout the world.
* Chapter 12: Miracles performed by Safi ad-Din's disciples.
Safavid-era revisions
Shaykh Safi ad-Din was a Sunni and an adherent of the Shafi`i school of law. In 1501, members of the Sufi order he founded became the ruling family in the Safavid empire. However, they converted to Shi`ism while at the same time continuing their role as head of the order. Certain elements in the Safvat as-safa, particularly Shaykh Safi's genealogy and his religious views, became inconsistent with the Safavid dynasty's self-image. Therefore in 1542, Shah Tahmasp commissioned Mir Abu al-Fat'h Husayni to revise the Safvat as-safa to give it an explicit Shi`i tone. Shaykh Safi ad-Din's genealogy was extended back to the Imam Musa al-Kazim, and his remarks on his religious affiliation were changed to make him sound Shi`i.
There have been two published editions of the Safvat as-Safa. The first was a lithographed edition prepared by Mirza Ahmad ibn Hajj Karim Tabrizi and published in Bombay in 1911. This has traditionally been the standard edition used by scholars, who call it the Bombay lithograph. The second published edition appeared in 1994 in Tehran, edited by Ghulam Reza Tabataba'i Majd. Since Majd based his edition on a larger set of manuscripts of better quality, it may become the new scholarly standard.
Shaykh Safi al-Din al-Ardabili see Safi al-Din al-Ardabili, Shaykh
Safvat as-safa see Safi al-Din al-Ardabili, Shaykh
Safvat al-safa see Safi al-Din al-Ardabili, Shaykh
Safwat al-safa see Safi al-Din al-Ardabili, Shaykh
Safi al-Din al-Ardabili, Shaykh (Shaykh Safi al-Din al-Ardabili) (1252-1334). Ancestor of the Safavids. He was the founder of the dervish order of the Safawis, whose members later wore as a badge a twelve-gored cap of scarlet wool, from which comes the Turkish name Qizil-Bash.
The Safvat as-safa is a hagiography (a biography of a venerated person) of the Sufi shaykh Safi ad-Din al-Ardabili (1252-1334), founder of the Safawiyya Sufi order.
The Safvat as-safa was written by Ibn Bazzaz (d. 1391-2), a disciple of Safi ad-Din's son and successor, Sadr ad-Din, who prompted him to write the work. He probably completed it in 1358. Little else is known of his life.
The Safwat as-safa is divided into an introduction, 12 chapters, and a conclusion. Only two of the chapters (chapters 2 and 11) deal with the circumstances of his life. Most of the rest of the book recounts numerous episodes of the shaykh performing miraculous feats. The work also includes Shaykh Safi's commentaries on various passages of the Qur'an and hadith. The contents may be summarized as follows:
* Introduction: Prophecies by the Prophet Muhammad and various holy men foretelling the coming of Sheikh Safi.
* Chapter 1: Safi ad-Din's genealogy, childhood, discipleship under Sheikh Zahid, and succession to leadership of the order.
* Chapter 2: Miracles in which Shaykh Safi saved people from perilous situations in the sea, the mountains, or from enemies or illness.
* Chapter 3: Miracles motivated either by Shaykh Safi's grace or displeasure.
* Chapter 4: Safi ad-Din's explanations of difficult passages or apparent contradictions in the Qur'an and hadith.
* Chapter 5: Miracles of Safi ad-Din involving jinn, animals, and non-living things.
* Chapter 6: Safi ad-Din's practice of dhikr.
* Chapter 7: Various miracles performed by Safi ad-Din, such as reading minds, predicting the future, and contact with the dead.
* Chapter 8: Safi ad-Din's virtues and pious acts.
* Chapter 9: Safi ad-Din's final illness and death.
* Chapter 10: Miracles Safi ad-Din performed after he died.
* Chapter 11: The shaykh's greatness and fame throughout the world.
* Chapter 12: Miracles performed by Safi ad-Din's disciples.
Safavid-era revisions
Shaykh Safi ad-Din was a Sunni and an adherent of the Shafi`i school of law. In 1501, members of the Sufi order he founded became the ruling family in the Safavid empire. However, they converted to Shi`ism while at the same time continuing their role as head of the order. Certain elements in the Safvat as-safa, particularly Shaykh Safi's genealogy and his religious views, became inconsistent with the Safavid dynasty's self-image. Therefore in 1542, Shah Tahmasp commissioned Mir Abu al-Fat'h Husayni to revise the Safvat as-safa to give it an explicit Shi`i tone. Shaykh Safi ad-Din's genealogy was extended back to the Imam Musa al-Kazim, and his remarks on his religious affiliation were changed to make him sound Shi`i.
There have been two published editions of the Safvat as-Safa. The first was a lithographed edition prepared by Mirza Ahmad ibn Hajj Karim Tabrizi and published in Bombay in 1911. This has traditionally been the standard edition used by scholars, who call it the Bombay lithograph. The second published edition appeared in 1994 in Tehran, edited by Ghulam Reza Tabataba'i Majd. Since Majd based his edition on a larger set of manuscripts of better quality, it may become the new scholarly standard.
Shaykh Safi al-Din al-Ardabili see Safi al-Din al-Ardabili, Shaykh
Safvat as-safa see Safi al-Din al-Ardabili, Shaykh
Safvat al-safa see Safi al-Din al-Ardabili, Shaykh
Safwat al-safa see Safi al-Din al-Ardabili, Shaykh
Safi, Fakhr al-Din ‘Ali
Safi, Fakhr al-Din ‘Ali (Fakhr al-Din ‘Ali Safi) (d. after 1533). Persian author. Among other works, he wrote a narrative work which contains anecdotes regarding individuals of various classes of society.
Fakhr al-Din ‘Ali Safi see Safi, Fakhr al-Din ‘Ali
Safi, Fakhr al-Din ‘Ali (Fakhr al-Din ‘Ali Safi) (d. after 1533). Persian author. Among other works, he wrote a narrative work which contains anecdotes regarding individuals of various classes of society.
Fakhr al-Din ‘Ali Safi see Safi, Fakhr al-Din ‘Ali
Safi, Wadih El
The discography of Wadih El Safi as a sideman includes the following:
Wadih El Safi (Arabic: وديع الصافي, born Wadi' Francis) (November 1, 1921 – October 11, 2013) was a Lebanese singer songwriter, and actor. He became a Lebanese cultural icon, and was often called the "Voice of Lebanon". Born in Niha, Lebanon, Wadih El Safi started his artistic journey at the age of seventeen when he took part in a singing contest held by Lebanese Radio and was chosen the winner among fifty other competitors.
Wadih El Safi was a classically trained tenor, having studied at the Beirut National Conservatory of Music. He became nationally known when, at seventeen, he won a vocal competition sponsored by the Lebanese Broadcasting Network. El Safi began composing and performing songs that drew upon his rural upbringing and love of traditional melodies, blended with an urban sound, and creating a new style of modernized Lebanese folk music.
In 1947, El Safi traveled to Brazil, where he remained until 1950.
El Safi toured the world, singing in many languages, including Arabic, Syriac, French, Portuguese and Italian.
In the spring of 1973, El Safi recorded and released a vinyl single with the songs "Grishlah Idi" (lyrics by Ninos Aho) and "Iman Ya Zawna" (lyrics by Amanuel Salamon), first one in Western Syriac and second one in Eastern Syriac. The music arrangements were done by Nuri Iskandar and the songs were produced especially for an Aramean Festival, which occurred in the UNESCO building in Beirut at that time where El Safi participated as a singer.
El Safi has written over 3000 songs. He is well known for his mawawil (an improvised singing style) of 'ataba, mijana, and Abu el Zuluf. He has performed and recorded with many well-known Lebanese musicians, including , Fairouz, and Sabah.
In 1990, Wadih El Safi underwent open heart surgery. In 2012, he broke his leg and had to have surgery to mend the fracture. After the surgery, his health declined quickly. In 2013, he was admitted to hospital, suffering from pulmonary consolidation. On October 11, 2013, he fell ill at his son's home and was rushed to the Bellevue Medical Center where he died. His funeral was held at Saint George Maronite Cathedral, Beirut on October 14, 2013.
The discography of Wadih El Safi as a singer includes the following:
- Best of Wadi – Vol. 1
- Best of Wadi – Vol. 2
- Best of Wadi – Vol. 3
- Inta Omri
- The Two Tenors:Wadi Al Safi Aad Sabah Fakhri
- Wadih El-Safi and José Fernandez
- Wetdallou Bkheir
- Rouh ya zaman al madi atfal qana
- Chante Le Liban
- Wadi El Safi / Legends Of The 20th Century
- Mersal El Hawa
- Mahrajan Al Anwar
- Youghani Loubnan
- Ajmal El Aghani
The discography of Wadih El Safi as a composer includes the following:
- Cantiques de l'Orient
- Psaumes Pour Le 3ème Millénaire
The discography of Wadih El Safi as a sideman includes the following:
- Music of Arabia, Hanaan and her ensemble (withWadih El-Safi on oud)
Safiye
Safiye (b. c. 1550 - d. 1605). Ottoman Sultana. The intriguing career of the Sultana Safiye is a remarkable chapter in the history of the Ottoman harem and the role that women played in the governance of the Ottoman Empire.
Some historians note that the interference of the harem women in Ottoman state politics was instrumental in the decline and all of the Ottoman Empire. Ironically, such meddling began during the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-1566), the most powerful period in the empire’s history. It was during Suleiman’s reign (in 1541) that the women of the harem moved with Roxalena from the Old Palace, built by Muhammad the Conqueror, to the Seraglio harem, near the seat of power. This move marked the beginning of the Sultanate, or the Reign of Women, which would last almost one hundred years, only ending with the struggle between Kosem and Turhan in 1651.
After Suleiman’s death, the Ottoman sultans no longer led their armies into battle. Instead, the sultans retired to the confines of the Seraglio and the womb of the harem. The sultans detached themselves from world affairs and spent most of their time in the company of women. This royal seclusion greatly diminished the sultans’ ability to govern and, in varying degrees, the sultanas began exerting influence over the sultans and other state officials. Soon bribery and patronage supplanted promotion on the basis of merit. A succession of child sultans and mentally infirm ones after the death of Muhammad III in 1603 would only increase the power of the women behind the throne.
As for the Sultana Safiye, she was a Venetian from the influential and noble Baffa family. Safiye was captured by Turkish corsairs while en route to Corfu, where her father was the governor. Sold to the harem of Murad III, Safiye made it her goal in life to undermine the Ottoman Empire in favor of her beloved Venice.
Safiye ultimately became a favorite of Murad and, indeed, in time became the favorite. Murad would become one of the rare sultans who was faithful to one wife. As the sultana -- the head woman -- Safiye wielded considerable influence and considerable power.
When Venetian naval vessels insulted Turkish merchants, Safiye was able to dissuade the sultan from retaliating against the Venetians and to instead grant Venice especially favorable commercial advantages. Both the Venetian ambassador and Catherine de Medici communicated with Baffa through a Jewess, Chiarezza (Kira), who posed as a bundle woman, bringing cloth and jewels to the Seraglio.
Seduced by the gifts sent to her by Queen Elizabeth I, Safiye pledged assistance to the English, both in state and trade affairs. Even though it was an act of treason to do so, Safiye maintained a correspondence with the English queen.
Safiye’s son, Sultan Muhammad III (Mehmed III), became aware of his mother’s treasonous activities. However, he revered her too much to interfere. Nevertheless, Safiye’s days came to end in rather gruesome fashion. She was found strangled in the bed.
A Genoese paper reported the death of Safiye, a notable personage from the rival city state of Venice in this manner: “La stata assasine aquella Sultana, che si chiama La Sporca, che le fu una vecchia materola.” (“That wicked old woman, the filthy Sultana, has been assassinated.”)
Safiye Sultan was the spouse of Ottoman Sultan Murad III and mother of Sultan Mehmed III. It is believed she was of Venetian descent. Her name "Safiye" means "the pure one". She was born about 1550, but her date of death is uncertain between 1605 and 1619. Born as Sofia Baffo, daughter of the Venetian Governor of Corfu and a relative of Giorgio Baffo, she was also related to the mother of Nurbanu Sultan.
Safiye Sultan was captured by corsairs and presented to the Ottoman harem sometime in the 1560s. She became chief wife of the Sultan after the death of her stepmother in 1574. Following in the steps of her cousin Nur Banu, Safiye Sultan played an important political role during the reigns of the next two Sultans after this year.
With Nur Banu, Safiye Sultan was one of the most influential Valide Sultans, a position Safiye held between 1583 and 1594.
Safiye followed Nur Banu's pro-Venetian policy and corresponded by letter with England's Queen Elizabeth I. In 1599, Elizabeth I presented Safiye with a carriage. Safiye had the carriage covered, and used it to go on excursions in the town, which was considered scandalous at the time.
Safiye Sultan is believed to have been strongly influenced by her kira, an agent employed to handle the economic affairs of the harem women. Kiras were typically Jewish women, who as non-Muslims were permitted an active life outside the harem. Safiye's kira was Esperanza Malchi. The two women were said to have been so close that people believed them to have been lovers. Esperanza was killed by a lynch mob in 1600.
Safiye Sultan is also famous for starting the construction of the Yeni Valide Mosque (New Mosque) in Istanbul in 1598. (The construction took more than half a century and is completed by another valide sultan Turhan Hatice.) The Al-Malika Safiyya Mosque (Malika Safiya) in Cairo is named in her honor. All the succeeding Sultans descended from Safiye Sultan.
Safiye was the favorite consort of the Ottoman sultan Murad III (r. 1574–95) and the mother of his son Mehmed III (r. 1595–1603). She exercised a strong influence on Ottoman affairs during the reigns of both sultans.
The name Safiye means “pure one". Until the death in 1583 of Nur Banu, the valide sultan (mother of the sultan on the throne), Safiye’s influence was limited. Thereafter, as haseki sultan (mother of the heir to the throne), and after 1595 as valide sultan, she wielded great influence at the Ottoman court. Among those who enjoyed her favor was the thrice grand vizier (chief minister) İbrahim Paşa. During the years of her greatest influence, she is said to have been partial to the interests of Venice. She was sent into retirement after the death of Mehmed III.
A mosque at Cairo, the Malikah Ṣafīyah, bears her name. Another mosque, in Istanbul, the Yeni Valide Cami, was begun on her orders and completed under Sultan Mehmed IV (reigned 1648–87).
Safiye (b. c. 1550 - d. 1605). Ottoman Sultana. The intriguing career of the Sultana Safiye is a remarkable chapter in the history of the Ottoman harem and the role that women played in the governance of the Ottoman Empire.
Some historians note that the interference of the harem women in Ottoman state politics was instrumental in the decline and all of the Ottoman Empire. Ironically, such meddling began during the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-1566), the most powerful period in the empire’s history. It was during Suleiman’s reign (in 1541) that the women of the harem moved with Roxalena from the Old Palace, built by Muhammad the Conqueror, to the Seraglio harem, near the seat of power. This move marked the beginning of the Sultanate, or the Reign of Women, which would last almost one hundred years, only ending with the struggle between Kosem and Turhan in 1651.
After Suleiman’s death, the Ottoman sultans no longer led their armies into battle. Instead, the sultans retired to the confines of the Seraglio and the womb of the harem. The sultans detached themselves from world affairs and spent most of their time in the company of women. This royal seclusion greatly diminished the sultans’ ability to govern and, in varying degrees, the sultanas began exerting influence over the sultans and other state officials. Soon bribery and patronage supplanted promotion on the basis of merit. A succession of child sultans and mentally infirm ones after the death of Muhammad III in 1603 would only increase the power of the women behind the throne.
As for the Sultana Safiye, she was a Venetian from the influential and noble Baffa family. Safiye was captured by Turkish corsairs while en route to Corfu, where her father was the governor. Sold to the harem of Murad III, Safiye made it her goal in life to undermine the Ottoman Empire in favor of her beloved Venice.
Safiye ultimately became a favorite of Murad and, indeed, in time became the favorite. Murad would become one of the rare sultans who was faithful to one wife. As the sultana -- the head woman -- Safiye wielded considerable influence and considerable power.
When Venetian naval vessels insulted Turkish merchants, Safiye was able to dissuade the sultan from retaliating against the Venetians and to instead grant Venice especially favorable commercial advantages. Both the Venetian ambassador and Catherine de Medici communicated with Baffa through a Jewess, Chiarezza (Kira), who posed as a bundle woman, bringing cloth and jewels to the Seraglio.
Seduced by the gifts sent to her by Queen Elizabeth I, Safiye pledged assistance to the English, both in state and trade affairs. Even though it was an act of treason to do so, Safiye maintained a correspondence with the English queen.
Safiye’s son, Sultan Muhammad III (Mehmed III), became aware of his mother’s treasonous activities. However, he revered her too much to interfere. Nevertheless, Safiye’s days came to end in rather gruesome fashion. She was found strangled in the bed.
A Genoese paper reported the death of Safiye, a notable personage from the rival city state of Venice in this manner: “La stata assasine aquella Sultana, che si chiama La Sporca, che le fu una vecchia materola.” (“That wicked old woman, the filthy Sultana, has been assassinated.”)
Safiye Sultan was the spouse of Ottoman Sultan Murad III and mother of Sultan Mehmed III. It is believed she was of Venetian descent. Her name "Safiye" means "the pure one". She was born about 1550, but her date of death is uncertain between 1605 and 1619. Born as Sofia Baffo, daughter of the Venetian Governor of Corfu and a relative of Giorgio Baffo, she was also related to the mother of Nurbanu Sultan.
Safiye Sultan was captured by corsairs and presented to the Ottoman harem sometime in the 1560s. She became chief wife of the Sultan after the death of her stepmother in 1574. Following in the steps of her cousin Nur Banu, Safiye Sultan played an important political role during the reigns of the next two Sultans after this year.
With Nur Banu, Safiye Sultan was one of the most influential Valide Sultans, a position Safiye held between 1583 and 1594.
Safiye followed Nur Banu's pro-Venetian policy and corresponded by letter with England's Queen Elizabeth I. In 1599, Elizabeth I presented Safiye with a carriage. Safiye had the carriage covered, and used it to go on excursions in the town, which was considered scandalous at the time.
Safiye Sultan is believed to have been strongly influenced by her kira, an agent employed to handle the economic affairs of the harem women. Kiras were typically Jewish women, who as non-Muslims were permitted an active life outside the harem. Safiye's kira was Esperanza Malchi. The two women were said to have been so close that people believed them to have been lovers. Esperanza was killed by a lynch mob in 1600.
Safiye Sultan is also famous for starting the construction of the Yeni Valide Mosque (New Mosque) in Istanbul in 1598. (The construction took more than half a century and is completed by another valide sultan Turhan Hatice.) The Al-Malika Safiyya Mosque (Malika Safiya) in Cairo is named in her honor. All the succeeding Sultans descended from Safiye Sultan.
Safiye was the favorite consort of the Ottoman sultan Murad III (r. 1574–95) and the mother of his son Mehmed III (r. 1595–1603). She exercised a strong influence on Ottoman affairs during the reigns of both sultans.
The name Safiye means “pure one". Until the death in 1583 of Nur Banu, the valide sultan (mother of the sultan on the throne), Safiye’s influence was limited. Thereafter, as haseki sultan (mother of the heir to the throne), and after 1595 as valide sultan, she wielded great influence at the Ottoman court. Among those who enjoyed her favor was the thrice grand vizier (chief minister) İbrahim Paşa. During the years of her greatest influence, she is said to have been partial to the interests of Venice. She was sent into retirement after the death of Mehmed III.
A mosque at Cairo, the Malikah Ṣafīyah, bears her name. Another mosque, in Istanbul, the Yeni Valide Cami, was begun on her orders and completed under Sultan Mehmed IV (reigned 1648–87).
Safiyya bint Huyayy ibn Akhtab
Safiyya bint Huyayy ibn Akhtab (d. c. 670). The Prophet’s eleventh wife. She belonged to the Jewish tribe of the Banu’l-Nadir and was married to the Prophet after the fall of Khaybar in 628.
Safiyya bint Huyayy ibn Akhtab (d. c. 670). The Prophet’s eleventh wife. She belonged to the Jewish tribe of the Banu’l-Nadir and was married to the Prophet after the fall of Khaybar in 628.
Sagabamo
Sagabamo. An assistant judge among Muslim Hausa slaves in Brazil.
Sagabamo. An assistant judge among Muslim Hausa slaves in Brazil.
Sahaba
Sahaba (Sahabah) (Ashab). The Arabic word sahaba means “companions.” The term sahaba refers to the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad. Since the time of the second caliph, ‘Umar, and in large part due to his register -- his divan --, the sahaba have occupied the position of highest prestige among Sunni Muslims. They were the first Meccans to accept Muhammad’s ecstatic utterances as divine revelation and to become members of his community. To the sahaba are attributed most of the hadith used to gauge the Prophet’s exemplary behavior -- the Sunna. Ten of them, including the first four caliphs, were promised admission into Paradise -- Janna -- by Muhammad himself.
Resenting Ali’s exclusion from the caliphate, Shi‘ites curse rather than praise all the sahaba except, of course, Ali. They therefore reject the six Sunni collections of hadith as deliberate distortions of the Prophet’s conduct and discourse; they rely instead on hadith that omit mention of the sahaba and are traceable to Ali, his immediate family, and his most prominent descendants, the imams.
In Islām, the sahaba were followers of Muḥammad who had personal contact with him, however slight. In fact, any Muslim who was alive in any part of the Prophet’s lifetime and saw him may be reckoned among the Companions. The first four caliphs, who are the saḥāba held in highest esteem among Sunnite Muslims, are part of a group of 10 Companions to whom Muḥammad promised paradise. The muhājirūn (those who followed the Prophet from Mecca to Medina), the anṣār (the Medinese believers), and the badrīyūn (those who fought at the Battle of Badr) are all considered Companions of the Prophet. There are differing accounts of who belonged to the various groups.
The Companions, being eyewitnesses, are the most important sources of Ḥadīth, the record of Muḥammad’s sayings and activities.
Shīʿite Muslims disregard the ṣaḥāba, whom they consider responsible for the loss of the caliphate by the family of ʿAlī.
Some of the Sahaba were:
* Abu Bakr
* Umar bin Khattab
* Uthman bin Affan
* Ali bin Abu Talib
* Musab bin Umair
* Muadh bin Jabal
* Abu Huraira
* Hasan bin Ali
* Husayn ibn Ali
* Abdur Rahman bin Awf
* Talha ibn Ubayd-Allah
* Zubayr ibn al-Awam
* Sa`d ibn Abi Waqqas
* Abu Ubaidah ibn al Jarrah
* Saeed bin Zaid
Sahabah see Sahaba
Ashab see Sahaba
Sahaba (Sahabah) (Ashab). The Arabic word sahaba means “companions.” The term sahaba refers to the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad. Since the time of the second caliph, ‘Umar, and in large part due to his register -- his divan --, the sahaba have occupied the position of highest prestige among Sunni Muslims. They were the first Meccans to accept Muhammad’s ecstatic utterances as divine revelation and to become members of his community. To the sahaba are attributed most of the hadith used to gauge the Prophet’s exemplary behavior -- the Sunna. Ten of them, including the first four caliphs, were promised admission into Paradise -- Janna -- by Muhammad himself.
Resenting Ali’s exclusion from the caliphate, Shi‘ites curse rather than praise all the sahaba except, of course, Ali. They therefore reject the six Sunni collections of hadith as deliberate distortions of the Prophet’s conduct and discourse; they rely instead on hadith that omit mention of the sahaba and are traceable to Ali, his immediate family, and his most prominent descendants, the imams.
In Islām, the sahaba were followers of Muḥammad who had personal contact with him, however slight. In fact, any Muslim who was alive in any part of the Prophet’s lifetime and saw him may be reckoned among the Companions. The first four caliphs, who are the saḥāba held in highest esteem among Sunnite Muslims, are part of a group of 10 Companions to whom Muḥammad promised paradise. The muhājirūn (those who followed the Prophet from Mecca to Medina), the anṣār (the Medinese believers), and the badrīyūn (those who fought at the Battle of Badr) are all considered Companions of the Prophet. There are differing accounts of who belonged to the various groups.
The Companions, being eyewitnesses, are the most important sources of Ḥadīth, the record of Muḥammad’s sayings and activities.
Shīʿite Muslims disregard the ṣaḥāba, whom they consider responsible for the loss of the caliphate by the family of ʿAlī.
Some of the Sahaba were:
* Abu Bakr
* Umar bin Khattab
* Uthman bin Affan
* Ali bin Abu Talib
* Musab bin Umair
* Muadh bin Jabal
* Abu Huraira
* Hasan bin Ali
* Husayn ibn Ali
* Abdur Rahman bin Awf
* Talha ibn Ubayd-Allah
* Zubayr ibn al-Awam
* Sa`d ibn Abi Waqqas
* Abu Ubaidah ibn al Jarrah
* Saeed bin Zaid
Sahabah see Sahaba
Ashab see Sahaba
sahib al-khabar
sahib al-khabar. Arabic term which refers to the civil servant in charge of informing the ruler of everything that happens in the district. The sahib al-khabar is often aided by the sahib al-barid.
khabar, sahib al- see sahib al-khabar.
Sahinkaya, Tahsin
sahib al-khabar. Arabic term which refers to the civil servant in charge of informing the ruler of everything that happens in the district. The sahib al-khabar is often aided by the sahib al-barid.
khabar, sahib al- see sahib al-khabar.
Sahinkaya, Tahsin
Tahsin Şahinkaya (b. 1925 – d. July 9, 2015) was a Turkish Air Force general. He was Commander of the Turkish Air Force from 1978 to 1983, and previously Secretary-General of the National Security Council (1977-1978). He was one of the five leaders of the 1980 military coup, and after the coup he was a member of the Presidential Council.
In 2012, a court case was launched against Şahinkaya and Kenan Evren (President of Turkey from 1980 to 1989) relating to the 1980 military coup. Both were sentenced to life imprisonment on June 18, 2014 by a court in Ankara, the capital of Turkey.
Şahinkaya died at age 90 in the military "Haydarpaşa GATA Hospital" in Istanbul on July 9, 2015. He was interred at Karacaahmet Cemetery on July 11 following a memorial ceremony held at the Turkish First Army headquarters in the Selimiye Barracks and subsequent religious funeral service at the nearby Buyuk Selimiye Mosque in Uskudar. He was survived by his wife Sema, son Serdar, daughter Sevgi Kartal and son-in-law Mustafa Kartal.
Sahir, Jelal
Sahir, Jelal (Jelal Sahir) (b.1883). Ottoman poet and author. He actively championed the simplification of the language, but in prosody he adhered strictly to the classical form. His main theme was women and love, in a noble and ideal way, and with the Turkish constitution he became a champion of women’s rights.
Jelal Sahir see Sahir, Jelal
Sahir, Jelal (Jelal Sahir) (b.1883). Ottoman poet and author. He actively championed the simplification of the language, but in prosody he adhered strictly to the classical form. His main theme was women and love, in a noble and ideal way, and with the Turkish constitution he became a champion of women’s rights.
Jelal Sahir see Sahir, Jelal
Sahl al-Tustari, Abu Muhammad
Sahl al-Tustari, Abu Muhammad (Abu Muhammad Sahl al-Tustari) (Abu Muhammed Sahl ibn 'Abd Allah) (b. 818, Shushtar, Iraq - d. 896, Basra, Iraq). Arab Sunni theologian and mystic. His Thousand Saying gave rise to the theological school of the Salimiyya.
Sahl al-Tustari was a Persian Muslim scholar and early classical Sufi mystic. He founded the Salimiyah Muslim theological school, which was named after his disciple Muhammad ibn Salim.
Tustari is most famous for his controversial claim that "I am the Proof of God for the created beings and I am a proof for the saints (awliya) of my time" and for his well-known Tafsir, a commentary on and interpretation of the Qur'an.
Sahl Al-Tustari was born in the fortress town of Tustar (Arabic) or Shushtar (Persian) in Khūzestān Province in what is now southwestern Iran.
From an early age he led an ascetic life with frequent fasting and study of the Qur'an and Hadith, the oral traditions, of the Prophet Muhammad. He practiced repentance (tawbah) and, above all, constant remembrance of God (dhikr). This eventually culminated in a direct and intimate rapport with God with whom he considered himself a special friend and one of the spiritual elect.
Tustari was under the direction of the Sufi saint Dhul-Nun al-Misri for a time, and Tustari in his turn was one of the Sufi mystic and later martyr Mansur Al-Hallaj's early teachers. In these early days when the Sufis were becoming established mostly in Baghdad (the capital of modern Iraq), the most notable Sufis of the time elsewhere were: Tustari in southwestern Iran, Al-Tirmidhi in Central Asia and the Malamatiyya or "People of Blame".
An Islamic scholar who commented on and interpreted the Qur'an, Tustari maintained that the Qur'an "contained several levels of meaning", which included the outer or zahir and the inner or batin. Another key idea that he unraveled was the meaning of the Prophet Muhammad's saying "I am He and He is I, save that I am I, and He is He", explaining it "as a mystery of union and realization at the center of the Saint's personality, called the sirr ('the secret'), or the heart, where existence joins Being." Tustari also "was the first to put" the Sufi exercise of remembrance of God, Dhikr, "on a firm theoretical basis."
Tustari maintained that ultimately it became clear to the recollector that the true agent of recollection was not the believer engaged in recollection but God Himself, who commemorated Himself in the heart of the believer. This realization of God's control over the heart led the believer to the state of complete trust in the Divine.
Abu Muhammad Sahl al-Tustari see Sahl al-Tustari, Abu Muhammad
Abu Muhammed Sahl ibn 'Abd Allah see Sahl al-Tustari, Abu Muhammad
Sahl al-Tustari, Abu Muhammad (Abu Muhammad Sahl al-Tustari) (Abu Muhammed Sahl ibn 'Abd Allah) (b. 818, Shushtar, Iraq - d. 896, Basra, Iraq). Arab Sunni theologian and mystic. His Thousand Saying gave rise to the theological school of the Salimiyya.
Sahl al-Tustari was a Persian Muslim scholar and early classical Sufi mystic. He founded the Salimiyah Muslim theological school, which was named after his disciple Muhammad ibn Salim.
Tustari is most famous for his controversial claim that "I am the Proof of God for the created beings and I am a proof for the saints (awliya) of my time" and for his well-known Tafsir, a commentary on and interpretation of the Qur'an.
Sahl Al-Tustari was born in the fortress town of Tustar (Arabic) or Shushtar (Persian) in Khūzestān Province in what is now southwestern Iran.
From an early age he led an ascetic life with frequent fasting and study of the Qur'an and Hadith, the oral traditions, of the Prophet Muhammad. He practiced repentance (tawbah) and, above all, constant remembrance of God (dhikr). This eventually culminated in a direct and intimate rapport with God with whom he considered himself a special friend and one of the spiritual elect.
Tustari was under the direction of the Sufi saint Dhul-Nun al-Misri for a time, and Tustari in his turn was one of the Sufi mystic and later martyr Mansur Al-Hallaj's early teachers. In these early days when the Sufis were becoming established mostly in Baghdad (the capital of modern Iraq), the most notable Sufis of the time elsewhere were: Tustari in southwestern Iran, Al-Tirmidhi in Central Asia and the Malamatiyya or "People of Blame".
An Islamic scholar who commented on and interpreted the Qur'an, Tustari maintained that the Qur'an "contained several levels of meaning", which included the outer or zahir and the inner or batin. Another key idea that he unraveled was the meaning of the Prophet Muhammad's saying "I am He and He is I, save that I am I, and He is He", explaining it "as a mystery of union and realization at the center of the Saint's personality, called the sirr ('the secret'), or the heart, where existence joins Being." Tustari also "was the first to put" the Sufi exercise of remembrance of God, Dhikr, "on a firm theoretical basis."
Tustari maintained that ultimately it became clear to the recollector that the true agent of recollection was not the believer engaged in recollection but God Himself, who commemorated Himself in the heart of the believer. This realization of God's control over the heart led the believer to the state of complete trust in the Divine.
Abu Muhammad Sahl al-Tustari see Sahl al-Tustari, Abu Muhammad
Abu Muhammed Sahl ibn 'Abd Allah see Sahl al-Tustari, Abu Muhammad
Sahl ibn Harun
Sahl ibn Harun. Arab author and poet of the ninth century. He held high offices in the chancellery at the court of several caliphs. He was a fanatical adherent of the so-called Shu‘ubiyya. His greatest admirer was his younger contemporary al-Jahiz, and his name often occurs in the Thousand and One Nights.
Ibn Harun, Sahl see Sahl ibn Harun.
Sahl ibn Harun. Arab author and poet of the ninth century. He held high offices in the chancellery at the court of several caliphs. He was a fanatical adherent of the so-called Shu‘ubiyya. His greatest admirer was his younger contemporary al-Jahiz, and his name often occurs in the Thousand and One Nights.
Ibn Harun, Sahl see Sahl ibn Harun.
Sahnun, ‘Abd al-Salam
Sahnun, ‘Abd al-Salam (‘Abd al-Salam Sahnun) (Sahnun ibn Sa'id ibn Habib at-Tanukhi) (b. 776-777- d. 854/855). Maliki jurist from Qayrawan. He was responsible for the spread of the Maliki school of law in the West, to which his monumental work, called Mudawwana, made a large contribution.
Sahnun ibn Sa'id ibn Habib at-Tanukhi was a jurist in the Maliki school from Qayrawan in modern-day Tunisia.
His original name was 'Abd al Salam. 'Sahnun' was a nickname given to him, meaning a type of sharp bird. This is said to have referred to his quickness of mind. His father was a soldier from Homs in Syria. The family claimed descent from Tanukh, a tribal confederation that originated in the south of the Arabian Peninsula.
In his youth Sahnun studied under the scholars of Qayrawan and Tunis. In particular, he learned from `Ali ibn Ziyad, who had learned from Imam Malik. In 795, he traveled to Egypt to study under other pupils of Malik, who died before Sahnun had the financial means to reach them. Later on, he continued to Medina and studied under other prominent scholars, returning to North Africa in 807.
At the age of 74, Sahnun was appointed Qadi (judge) of North Africa by the Aghlabid emir Muhammad I Abul-Abbas. He had refused the appointment for a year, only accepting after the emir swore to give him a free hand in matters of justice, even if this involved prosecuting members of the emir's family and court. He was known to be scrupulous in his judgments and courteous towards litigants and witnesses, but strict towards the men surrounding the emir. He refused to allow them to send representatives on their behalf in litigation, and refused a request from the emir not to interfere in their illegal ventures.
Sahnun died in Rajab. The men surrounding the emir famously refused to join his funeral prayer, due to his harshness against them. Nonetheless the emir conducted the funeral prayers in person, and the people of Qayrawan were greatly upset by his passing.
Sahnun was known for his strong orthodoxy, even to the point of refusing to pray behind a Mu'tazilite imam. He excluded heretical sects from the mosque, including the Ibadi, Mu'tazilites and others.
Sahnun's greatest contribution to Muslim scholarship was al-Mudawwana, a compendium of the legal opinions of the school of Medina as stated by Imam Malik, after the death of the Imam. The compilation and revision process involved four mujtahid imams of the Maliki school: Asad ibn al Furat (d. 829); Ibn al-Ashab (d. 820); Abu `Abd Allah `Abd al-Rahman Ibn al-Qasim al-`Utaqi, known as Ibn Qasim (d. 807), and Sahnun himself. It is referred to as "al Umm", or "the Mother", of the Maliki school. Sahnun's revision and transmission of the Mudawwana was the major factor in the spread of the Maliki school across the West of the Muslim world.
‘Abd al-Salam Sahnun see Sahnun, ‘Abd al-Salam
Sahnun, ‘Abd al-Salam (‘Abd al-Salam Sahnun) (Sahnun ibn Sa'id ibn Habib at-Tanukhi) (b. 776-777- d. 854/855). Maliki jurist from Qayrawan. He was responsible for the spread of the Maliki school of law in the West, to which his monumental work, called Mudawwana, made a large contribution.
Sahnun ibn Sa'id ibn Habib at-Tanukhi was a jurist in the Maliki school from Qayrawan in modern-day Tunisia.
His original name was 'Abd al Salam. 'Sahnun' was a nickname given to him, meaning a type of sharp bird. This is said to have referred to his quickness of mind. His father was a soldier from Homs in Syria. The family claimed descent from Tanukh, a tribal confederation that originated in the south of the Arabian Peninsula.
In his youth Sahnun studied under the scholars of Qayrawan and Tunis. In particular, he learned from `Ali ibn Ziyad, who had learned from Imam Malik. In 795, he traveled to Egypt to study under other pupils of Malik, who died before Sahnun had the financial means to reach them. Later on, he continued to Medina and studied under other prominent scholars, returning to North Africa in 807.
At the age of 74, Sahnun was appointed Qadi (judge) of North Africa by the Aghlabid emir Muhammad I Abul-Abbas. He had refused the appointment for a year, only accepting after the emir swore to give him a free hand in matters of justice, even if this involved prosecuting members of the emir's family and court. He was known to be scrupulous in his judgments and courteous towards litigants and witnesses, but strict towards the men surrounding the emir. He refused to allow them to send representatives on their behalf in litigation, and refused a request from the emir not to interfere in their illegal ventures.
Sahnun died in Rajab. The men surrounding the emir famously refused to join his funeral prayer, due to his harshness against them. Nonetheless the emir conducted the funeral prayers in person, and the people of Qayrawan were greatly upset by his passing.
Sahnun was known for his strong orthodoxy, even to the point of refusing to pray behind a Mu'tazilite imam. He excluded heretical sects from the mosque, including the Ibadi, Mu'tazilites and others.
Sahnun's greatest contribution to Muslim scholarship was al-Mudawwana, a compendium of the legal opinions of the school of Medina as stated by Imam Malik, after the death of the Imam. The compilation and revision process involved four mujtahid imams of the Maliki school: Asad ibn al Furat (d. 829); Ibn al-Ashab (d. 820); Abu `Abd Allah `Abd al-Rahman Ibn al-Qasim al-`Utaqi, known as Ibn Qasim (d. 807), and Sahnun himself. It is referred to as "al Umm", or "the Mother", of the Maliki school. Sahnun's revision and transmission of the Mudawwana was the major factor in the spread of the Maliki school across the West of the Muslim world.
‘Abd al-Salam Sahnun see Sahnun, ‘Abd al-Salam
Sahrawi
Sahrawi (Saharaui) (Saharaoui) (Saharawi) (Sahraoui) (Saharaui). People of the western Sahara. They represent the original population in southern Morocco, the region that is internationally recognized as the sovereign state of Western Sahara.
Originally they were nomads, but due to drought, many have sought refuge in towns like Laayoune or emigrated to Morocco or other countries. Many Sahrawis in Laayoune live under very basic conditions, in refugee camps set up in the middle of the town, while a majority live in normal houses.
Sahrawis have been invited by Moroccan authorities to join the Moroccan society, and they enjoy the same rights as other citizens, but Moroccan occupation is probably only accepted by a minority of the population.
Their lifestyles are marked by strong families and tribes, and women enjoy an important position in the society. The Sahrawi men have simple clothes, designed to ward off desert sand and summer heat -- women wear colorful garments.
The Arabic word Sahrāwī literally means "of Sahara", and should be understood as "inhabitant of the Sahara" (Saharan). There are several transliterations of the word, several of which are used in English:
Western Saharan, pro-independence groups have tended to utilize the term Sahrawi (Saharan) in a manner as to give a nationalist connotation, specific to the Western Sahara Territory. Common Moroccan governmental and popular usage has tended to apply the term somewhat more broadly, to include Hassani speaking Saharan populations in regions under undisputed Moroccan rule, but with similar connotations. It is now routine to describe these same populations as (Moroccan) Sahrawi. The term Sahrawi includes both Beni Hassan, Haratin (dark skinned population) and other groups, and is not confined to nomadic populations.
Nomadic Berbers, mainly of the Sanhaja tribal confederation, inhabited the areas now known as Western Sahara, southern Morocco, Mauritania and western Algeria, before Islam arrived in the 8th century of the Christian calendar. The new faith achieved quick expansion, but Arab immigrants initially only blended superficially with the population, mostly confining themselves to the cities of present-day Morocco and Spain. However, they introduced the camel to the region, revolutionizing the traditional trade routes of North Africa. Caravans transported salt, gold and slaves between North Africa and West Africa, and the control of trade routes became a major ingredient in the constant power struggles between various tribes and sedentary peoples. On more than one occasion, the Berber tribes of Western Sahara/Mauritania would unite behind religious leaders to sweep the surrounding governments from power, then founding dynasties of their own. This was the case with the Almoravid dynasty of Morocco and Andalusia, and several emirates in Mauritania.
In the 11th century, the Arab Beni Hilal and Beni Sulaym tribes emigrated westwards from Egypt (the Fatimid Caliphate) and gained control of most of present-day Morocco, but Western Sahara remained largely unpenetrated by the Arab advances. However, in the early 13th century, the Yemeni Maqil tribes migrated westwards across the entirety of Arabia and northern Africa, to finally settle around today's Morocco. They were badly received by the Zenata Berber descendants of the Merinid dynasty, and among the tribes pushed out of the territory, were the Beni Hassan.
This tribe entered the domains of the Sanhaja, and over the following centuries imposed itself upon them, intermixing with the population in the process. Berber attempts to shake off the rule of Arab warrior tribes occurred sporadically, but assimilation gradually won out, and after the failed Char Bouba uprising (1644–74), the Berber tribes would virtually without exception embrace Arab culture and even claim Arab heritage. The Arabic dialect of the Beni Hassan, Hassaniya, remains the mother-tongue of Western Sahara and Mauritania to this day, and is also spoken in southern Morocco and western Algeria, among affiliated tribes. Berber vocabulary and cultural traits remain common, despite the fact that most if not all of the Sahrawi/Moorish tribes today claim Arab ancestry; several are even claiming to be descendants of Muhammad, so-called sharifian tribes (pl. shurfa or chorfa).
The modern ethnic group is thus an Arab and Berber people inhabiting the westernmost Sahara desert, in the area of modern Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria and, at its core, the Western Sahara (some tribes would also traditionally migrate into northern Mali and Niger, or even further along the Saharan caravan routes). As with most Saharan peoples, the tribes reflect a highly mixed heritage, combining Arab, Berber, and other influences, including black African ethnic and cultural characteristics. The latter were primarily acquired through mixing with Wolof, Soninke and other populations of the southern Sahel, and through the acquisition of slaves by wealthier nomad families.
In pre-colonial times, the Sahara was generally considered bled es-Siba or "the land of dissidence" by the authorities of the established Islamic states of North Africa, such as the Sultan of Morocco and the Deys of Algeria. The Islamic governments of the pre-colonial sub-Saharan empires of Mali and Songhai appear to have had a similar relationship with the tribal territories, which were once the home of undisciplined raiding tribes and the main trade route for the Saharan caravan trade. Central governments had little control over the region, although the Hassaniya tribes would occasionally extend "beya" or allegiance to prestigious rulers, to gain their political backing or, in some cases, as a religious ceremony. The Moorish populations of today's north Mauritania established a number of emirates, claiming the loyalty of several different tribes and through them exercising semi-sovereignty over traditional grazing lands. This could be considered the closest thing to centralized government that was ever achieved by the Hassaniya tribes, but even these emirates were weak, conflict-ridden and rested more on the willing consent of the subject tribes than on any capacity to enforce loyalty.
Modern distinctions drawn between the various Hassaniya speaking Sahrawi-Moorish groups are primarily political, but cultural differences dating from different colonial and post-colonial histories are also apparent. An important divider is whether the tribal confederations fell under French or Spanish colonial rule. France conquered most of North and West Africa largely during the late 19th century. This included Algeria and Mauritania, and, from 1912, Morocco. But Western Sahara and scattered minor parts of Morocco fell to Spain, and were named Spanish Sahara (subdivided into Río de Oro and Saguia el-Hamra) and Spanish Morocco respectively. These colonial intrusions brought the Muslim Saharan peoples under Christian European rule for the first time, and created lasting cultural and political divides between and within existing populations, as well as upsetting traditional balances of power in differing ways.
The Sahrawi-Moorish areas, then still undefined as to exact territorial boundaries, proved troublesome for the colonizers, just as they had for neighboring dynasties in previous centuries. The political loyalty of these populations were first and foremost to their respective tribes, and supra-tribal allegiances and alliances would shift rapidly and unexpectedly. Their nomadic lifestyle made direct control over the territories hard to achieve, as did general lawlessness, an absence of prior central authority, and a widely held contempt for the kind of settled life that the colonizers sought to bring about. Centuries of intra-tribal warfare and raids for loot (ghazzu) guaranteed that the populations were well armed and versed in guerrilla-style warfare. Tribes allied to hostile European powers would now also be considered fair game for cattle raids on those grounds, which tied the struggle against France and Spain into the traditional power play of the nomads, aggravating the internal struggles.
Uprisings and violent tribal clashes therefore took place with increasing frequency as European encroachment increased, and on occasion took the form of anti-European holy war, or Jihad, as in the case of the Ma el-Ainin uprising in the first years of the 20th century. It was not until the 1930s that Spain was able to finally subdue the interior of present-day Western Sahara, and then only with strong French military assistance. Mauritania's raiding Moors had been brought under control in the previous decades, partly through skillful exploitation by the French of traditional rivalries and social divisions between the tribes. In these encounters, the large Reguibat tribe proved especially resistant to the new rulers, and its fighters would regularly slip in and out of French and Spanish territory, similarly exploiting the rivalries between European powers. The last major Reguibat raid took place in 1934, after which the Spanish authorities occupied Smara, finally gaining control over the last unpatroled border territories.
The Sahrawi-Moorish tribes remained largely nomadic until the early to mid-20th century, when Franco-Spanish rivalries (as well as disagreements between different wings of the French colonial regime) managed to impose rigid, if arbitrary, borders on the previously fluid Sahara. The wide-ranging grazing lands of the nomads were split apart, and their traditional economies, based on trans-Saharan caravan trade and raiding of each other and the northern and southern sahel neighbors, were broken. Little attention was paid to existing tribal confederations and zones of influence, when dividing up the Saharan inlands.
French and Spanish colonial governments would gradually, and with varying force, impose their own systems of government and education over these territories, exposing the native populations to differing colonial experiences. The populations in Algeria were subjected to direct French rule, which was organized to enable the massive settlement of French and European immigrants. In Mauritania, they experienced a French non-settler colonial administration which, if light in its demands on the nomads, also deliberately overturned the existing social order, allying itself with lower-ranking marabout and zenaga tribes against the powerful warrior clans of the Hassane Arabs. In southern Morocco, France upheld indirect rule through the sultanate in some areas, while Spain exercised direct administration in others. The Spanish Sahara was treated first as a colony, and later as an overseas province, with gradually tightening political conditions, and, in later years, a rapid influx of Spanish settlers (making Spaniards about 20% of the population in 1975). By the time of decolonization in the 1950s-1970s, Sahrawi tribes in all these different territories had experienced roughly a generation or more of distinct experiences. Often, however, their nomadic lifestyle had guaranteed that they were subjected to less interference than what afflicted sedentary populations in the same areas.
The period of colonization destroyed existing power structures, leaving a confused legacy of contradictory political affiliations, European-drawn borders with little resemblance to ethnic and tribal realities, and the foundations of modern political conflict.
For example, both sides in the Western Sahara conflict (Morocco vs. the Polisario Front) draw heavily on colonial history to prove their version of reality. Proponents of the Greater Morocco ideology point to some Sahrawi tribes calling upon the Moroccan Sultan, who until 1912 remained the last independent Islamic ruler of the area, for assistance against the Europeans. Pro-independence Sahrawis, on the other hand, point out that such statements of allegiance were almost routinely given by various tribal leaders to create short-term alliances, and that other heads of tribes indeed similarly proclaimed allegiance to Spain, to France, to Mauritanian emirates, and indeed to each other; they argue that such arrangements always proved temporary, and that the tribal confederations always maintained de facto independence of central authority, and would even fight to maintain this independence.
The International Court of Justice issued a ruling on the matter in 1975, stating that there had existed ties between the Moroccan Sultan and some (mainly northernly Tekna) tribes in then-Spanish Sahara, but that these ties were not sufficient to abrogate Western Sahara's right to self-determination. The same kind of ruling was issued with regard to Mauritania, where the court found that there were indeed strong tribal and cultural links between the Sahrawis and Mauritanian populations, including historical allegiance to some Moorish emirates, but that these were not ties of a state or government character, and did not constitute formal bonds of sovereignty. Thus, the court recommended the United Nations to continue to pursue self-determination for the Sahrawis, enabling them to choose for themselves whether they wanted Spanish Sahara to turn into an independent state, or to be annexed to Morocco or Mauritania.
The area today referred to as Western Sahara, remains according to the United Nations one of the world's last remaining major non-self governing territories. Morocco controls most of the territory as its Southern Provinces, but the legality of this is not internationally recognized by any country, and disputed militarily by the Polisario Front, an Algerian-backed movement claiming independence for the territory as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). After 1991, there was a cease-fire between Morocco and Polisario, but disturbances in Moroccan-held territories as well as the ongoing dispute over the legal status of the territory, guarantees continued United Nations involvement and occasional international attention to the issue.
The Polisario Front was the Western Sahara's national liberation movement, militating for the independence of the Western Sahara after 1973 - originally against Spanish rule, but after 1975 against Mauritania and Morocco and after 1979 against Morocco only. The organization was based in Algeria, where it was responsible for the Tindouf refugee camps. The organization maintained a cease-fire with Morocco after 1991, but continued to strive for the territory's independence as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) through peaceful negotiations. The Polisario restricted its claims to the colonially-defined Western Sahara, holding no claim to, for example, the Sahrawi-populated Tarfaya Strip in Morocco, or any part of Mauritania.
Saharaui see Sahrawi
Saharaoui see Sahrawi
Saharawi see Sahrawi
Sahraoui see Sahrawi
Saharaui see Sahrawi
Sahrawi (Saharaui) (Saharaoui) (Saharawi) (Sahraoui) (Saharaui). People of the western Sahara. They represent the original population in southern Morocco, the region that is internationally recognized as the sovereign state of Western Sahara.
Originally they were nomads, but due to drought, many have sought refuge in towns like Laayoune or emigrated to Morocco or other countries. Many Sahrawis in Laayoune live under very basic conditions, in refugee camps set up in the middle of the town, while a majority live in normal houses.
Sahrawis have been invited by Moroccan authorities to join the Moroccan society, and they enjoy the same rights as other citizens, but Moroccan occupation is probably only accepted by a minority of the population.
Their lifestyles are marked by strong families and tribes, and women enjoy an important position in the society. The Sahrawi men have simple clothes, designed to ward off desert sand and summer heat -- women wear colorful garments.
The Arabic word Sahrāwī literally means "of Sahara", and should be understood as "inhabitant of the Sahara" (Saharan). There are several transliterations of the word, several of which are used in English:
Western Saharan, pro-independence groups have tended to utilize the term Sahrawi (Saharan) in a manner as to give a nationalist connotation, specific to the Western Sahara Territory. Common Moroccan governmental and popular usage has tended to apply the term somewhat more broadly, to include Hassani speaking Saharan populations in regions under undisputed Moroccan rule, but with similar connotations. It is now routine to describe these same populations as (Moroccan) Sahrawi. The term Sahrawi includes both Beni Hassan, Haratin (dark skinned population) and other groups, and is not confined to nomadic populations.
Nomadic Berbers, mainly of the Sanhaja tribal confederation, inhabited the areas now known as Western Sahara, southern Morocco, Mauritania and western Algeria, before Islam arrived in the 8th century of the Christian calendar. The new faith achieved quick expansion, but Arab immigrants initially only blended superficially with the population, mostly confining themselves to the cities of present-day Morocco and Spain. However, they introduced the camel to the region, revolutionizing the traditional trade routes of North Africa. Caravans transported salt, gold and slaves between North Africa and West Africa, and the control of trade routes became a major ingredient in the constant power struggles between various tribes and sedentary peoples. On more than one occasion, the Berber tribes of Western Sahara/Mauritania would unite behind religious leaders to sweep the surrounding governments from power, then founding dynasties of their own. This was the case with the Almoravid dynasty of Morocco and Andalusia, and several emirates in Mauritania.
In the 11th century, the Arab Beni Hilal and Beni Sulaym tribes emigrated westwards from Egypt (the Fatimid Caliphate) and gained control of most of present-day Morocco, but Western Sahara remained largely unpenetrated by the Arab advances. However, in the early 13th century, the Yemeni Maqil tribes migrated westwards across the entirety of Arabia and northern Africa, to finally settle around today's Morocco. They were badly received by the Zenata Berber descendants of the Merinid dynasty, and among the tribes pushed out of the territory, were the Beni Hassan.
This tribe entered the domains of the Sanhaja, and over the following centuries imposed itself upon them, intermixing with the population in the process. Berber attempts to shake off the rule of Arab warrior tribes occurred sporadically, but assimilation gradually won out, and after the failed Char Bouba uprising (1644–74), the Berber tribes would virtually without exception embrace Arab culture and even claim Arab heritage. The Arabic dialect of the Beni Hassan, Hassaniya, remains the mother-tongue of Western Sahara and Mauritania to this day, and is also spoken in southern Morocco and western Algeria, among affiliated tribes. Berber vocabulary and cultural traits remain common, despite the fact that most if not all of the Sahrawi/Moorish tribes today claim Arab ancestry; several are even claiming to be descendants of Muhammad, so-called sharifian tribes (pl. shurfa or chorfa).
The modern ethnic group is thus an Arab and Berber people inhabiting the westernmost Sahara desert, in the area of modern Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria and, at its core, the Western Sahara (some tribes would also traditionally migrate into northern Mali and Niger, or even further along the Saharan caravan routes). As with most Saharan peoples, the tribes reflect a highly mixed heritage, combining Arab, Berber, and other influences, including black African ethnic and cultural characteristics. The latter were primarily acquired through mixing with Wolof, Soninke and other populations of the southern Sahel, and through the acquisition of slaves by wealthier nomad families.
In pre-colonial times, the Sahara was generally considered bled es-Siba or "the land of dissidence" by the authorities of the established Islamic states of North Africa, such as the Sultan of Morocco and the Deys of Algeria. The Islamic governments of the pre-colonial sub-Saharan empires of Mali and Songhai appear to have had a similar relationship with the tribal territories, which were once the home of undisciplined raiding tribes and the main trade route for the Saharan caravan trade. Central governments had little control over the region, although the Hassaniya tribes would occasionally extend "beya" or allegiance to prestigious rulers, to gain their political backing or, in some cases, as a religious ceremony. The Moorish populations of today's north Mauritania established a number of emirates, claiming the loyalty of several different tribes and through them exercising semi-sovereignty over traditional grazing lands. This could be considered the closest thing to centralized government that was ever achieved by the Hassaniya tribes, but even these emirates were weak, conflict-ridden and rested more on the willing consent of the subject tribes than on any capacity to enforce loyalty.
Modern distinctions drawn between the various Hassaniya speaking Sahrawi-Moorish groups are primarily political, but cultural differences dating from different colonial and post-colonial histories are also apparent. An important divider is whether the tribal confederations fell under French or Spanish colonial rule. France conquered most of North and West Africa largely during the late 19th century. This included Algeria and Mauritania, and, from 1912, Morocco. But Western Sahara and scattered minor parts of Morocco fell to Spain, and were named Spanish Sahara (subdivided into Río de Oro and Saguia el-Hamra) and Spanish Morocco respectively. These colonial intrusions brought the Muslim Saharan peoples under Christian European rule for the first time, and created lasting cultural and political divides between and within existing populations, as well as upsetting traditional balances of power in differing ways.
The Sahrawi-Moorish areas, then still undefined as to exact territorial boundaries, proved troublesome for the colonizers, just as they had for neighboring dynasties in previous centuries. The political loyalty of these populations were first and foremost to their respective tribes, and supra-tribal allegiances and alliances would shift rapidly and unexpectedly. Their nomadic lifestyle made direct control over the territories hard to achieve, as did general lawlessness, an absence of prior central authority, and a widely held contempt for the kind of settled life that the colonizers sought to bring about. Centuries of intra-tribal warfare and raids for loot (ghazzu) guaranteed that the populations were well armed and versed in guerrilla-style warfare. Tribes allied to hostile European powers would now also be considered fair game for cattle raids on those grounds, which tied the struggle against France and Spain into the traditional power play of the nomads, aggravating the internal struggles.
Uprisings and violent tribal clashes therefore took place with increasing frequency as European encroachment increased, and on occasion took the form of anti-European holy war, or Jihad, as in the case of the Ma el-Ainin uprising in the first years of the 20th century. It was not until the 1930s that Spain was able to finally subdue the interior of present-day Western Sahara, and then only with strong French military assistance. Mauritania's raiding Moors had been brought under control in the previous decades, partly through skillful exploitation by the French of traditional rivalries and social divisions between the tribes. In these encounters, the large Reguibat tribe proved especially resistant to the new rulers, and its fighters would regularly slip in and out of French and Spanish territory, similarly exploiting the rivalries between European powers. The last major Reguibat raid took place in 1934, after which the Spanish authorities occupied Smara, finally gaining control over the last unpatroled border territories.
The Sahrawi-Moorish tribes remained largely nomadic until the early to mid-20th century, when Franco-Spanish rivalries (as well as disagreements between different wings of the French colonial regime) managed to impose rigid, if arbitrary, borders on the previously fluid Sahara. The wide-ranging grazing lands of the nomads were split apart, and their traditional economies, based on trans-Saharan caravan trade and raiding of each other and the northern and southern sahel neighbors, were broken. Little attention was paid to existing tribal confederations and zones of influence, when dividing up the Saharan inlands.
French and Spanish colonial governments would gradually, and with varying force, impose their own systems of government and education over these territories, exposing the native populations to differing colonial experiences. The populations in Algeria were subjected to direct French rule, which was organized to enable the massive settlement of French and European immigrants. In Mauritania, they experienced a French non-settler colonial administration which, if light in its demands on the nomads, also deliberately overturned the existing social order, allying itself with lower-ranking marabout and zenaga tribes against the powerful warrior clans of the Hassane Arabs. In southern Morocco, France upheld indirect rule through the sultanate in some areas, while Spain exercised direct administration in others. The Spanish Sahara was treated first as a colony, and later as an overseas province, with gradually tightening political conditions, and, in later years, a rapid influx of Spanish settlers (making Spaniards about 20% of the population in 1975). By the time of decolonization in the 1950s-1970s, Sahrawi tribes in all these different territories had experienced roughly a generation or more of distinct experiences. Often, however, their nomadic lifestyle had guaranteed that they were subjected to less interference than what afflicted sedentary populations in the same areas.
The period of colonization destroyed existing power structures, leaving a confused legacy of contradictory political affiliations, European-drawn borders with little resemblance to ethnic and tribal realities, and the foundations of modern political conflict.
For example, both sides in the Western Sahara conflict (Morocco vs. the Polisario Front) draw heavily on colonial history to prove their version of reality. Proponents of the Greater Morocco ideology point to some Sahrawi tribes calling upon the Moroccan Sultan, who until 1912 remained the last independent Islamic ruler of the area, for assistance against the Europeans. Pro-independence Sahrawis, on the other hand, point out that such statements of allegiance were almost routinely given by various tribal leaders to create short-term alliances, and that other heads of tribes indeed similarly proclaimed allegiance to Spain, to France, to Mauritanian emirates, and indeed to each other; they argue that such arrangements always proved temporary, and that the tribal confederations always maintained de facto independence of central authority, and would even fight to maintain this independence.
The International Court of Justice issued a ruling on the matter in 1975, stating that there had existed ties between the Moroccan Sultan and some (mainly northernly Tekna) tribes in then-Spanish Sahara, but that these ties were not sufficient to abrogate Western Sahara's right to self-determination. The same kind of ruling was issued with regard to Mauritania, where the court found that there were indeed strong tribal and cultural links between the Sahrawis and Mauritanian populations, including historical allegiance to some Moorish emirates, but that these were not ties of a state or government character, and did not constitute formal bonds of sovereignty. Thus, the court recommended the United Nations to continue to pursue self-determination for the Sahrawis, enabling them to choose for themselves whether they wanted Spanish Sahara to turn into an independent state, or to be annexed to Morocco or Mauritania.
The area today referred to as Western Sahara, remains according to the United Nations one of the world's last remaining major non-self governing territories. Morocco controls most of the territory as its Southern Provinces, but the legality of this is not internationally recognized by any country, and disputed militarily by the Polisario Front, an Algerian-backed movement claiming independence for the territory as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). After 1991, there was a cease-fire between Morocco and Polisario, but disturbances in Moroccan-held territories as well as the ongoing dispute over the legal status of the territory, guarantees continued United Nations involvement and occasional international attention to the issue.
The Polisario Front was the Western Sahara's national liberation movement, militating for the independence of the Western Sahara after 1973 - originally against Spanish rule, but after 1975 against Mauritania and Morocco and after 1979 against Morocco only. The organization was based in Algeria, where it was responsible for the Tindouf refugee camps. The organization maintained a cease-fire with Morocco after 1991, but continued to strive for the territory's independence as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) through peaceful negotiations. The Polisario restricted its claims to the colonially-defined Western Sahara, holding no claim to, for example, the Sahrawi-populated Tarfaya Strip in Morocco, or any part of Mauritania.
Saharaui see Sahrawi
Saharaoui see Sahrawi
Saharawi see Sahrawi
Sahraoui see Sahrawi
Saharaui see Sahrawi
Sa’ib, Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali
Sa’ib, Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali (Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali Sa’ib) (1601/1602/1603, Tabriz, Iran - 1677). One of the most prolific poets of his time. He is highly praised by critics.
Mīrzā Muḥammad ʿAlī Ṣāʾib, also called Ṣāʾib of Tabriz, or Ṣāʾib of Eṣfahān, was a Persian poet and one of the greatest masters of a form of classical Arabic and Persian lyric poetry characterized by rhymed couplets and known as the ghazel.
Ṣāʾib was educated in Eṣfahān, and in about 1626/27 he traveled to India, where he was received into the court of Shāh Jahān. He stayed for a time in Kabul and in Kashmir, returning home after several years abroad. After his return Shāh ʿAbbas II bestowed upon him the title King of Poets.
Ṣāʾib’s reputation is based primarily on some 300,000 couplets, including his epic poem Qandahār-nāma (“The Campaign Against Qandahār”). His “Indian style” verses reveal an elegant wit, a gift for the aphorism and the proverb, and a keen appreciation of philosophical and intellectual exercise. In addition to his remarkable output of Persian verse, Ṣāʾib wrote poetry in Turkish.
Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali Sa’ib see Sa’ib, Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali
Sa'ib of Tabriz see Sa’ib, Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali
Sa'ib of Esfahan see Sa’ib, Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali
King of Poets see Sa’ib, Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali
Sa’ib, Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali (Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali Sa’ib) (1601/1602/1603, Tabriz, Iran - 1677). One of the most prolific poets of his time. He is highly praised by critics.
Mīrzā Muḥammad ʿAlī Ṣāʾib, also called Ṣāʾib of Tabriz, or Ṣāʾib of Eṣfahān, was a Persian poet and one of the greatest masters of a form of classical Arabic and Persian lyric poetry characterized by rhymed couplets and known as the ghazel.
Ṣāʾib was educated in Eṣfahān, and in about 1626/27 he traveled to India, where he was received into the court of Shāh Jahān. He stayed for a time in Kabul and in Kashmir, returning home after several years abroad. After his return Shāh ʿAbbas II bestowed upon him the title King of Poets.
Ṣāʾib’s reputation is based primarily on some 300,000 couplets, including his epic poem Qandahār-nāma (“The Campaign Against Qandahār”). His “Indian style” verses reveal an elegant wit, a gift for the aphorism and the proverb, and a keen appreciation of philosophical and intellectual exercise. In addition to his remarkable output of Persian verse, Ṣāʾib wrote poetry in Turkish.
Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali Sa’ib see Sa’ib, Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali
Sa'ib of Tabriz see Sa’ib, Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali
Sa'ib of Esfahan see Sa’ib, Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali
King of Poets see Sa’ib, Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali
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