Ma‘bad ibn Wahb
Ma‘bad ibn Wahb (d. 743). One of the great singers and composers in Umayyad times. He was the leading musician of the Medinan school of music and figures in Arabic poetry as a musician par excellence.
Ma Chung-ying
Ma Chung-ying (Ga Ssu-ling) (Mǎ Zhòngyīng), aka 'Big Horse' (c. 1910- 1936/1937). Youngest and best-known of the Chinese Muslim (Hui) warlords. These warlords comprised the “Mu Wa” clique which controlled much of northwest China during the latter half of the Republican Period (1911-1949).
Jin Shuren (Chin Shu-jen) came to power shortly after the assassination of Xinjiang (Sinkiang) governor, Yang Zengxin (Yang Tseng-sin), in 1928. Jin was notoriously intolerant of Muslims and Turkic peoples, and openly antagonized them. Such acts of discrimination included restrictions on travel, increased taxation, seizure of property without due process, and frequent executions for suspected espionage or disloyalty.
In 1930, Jin annexed the Kumul Khanate, a small semi-autonomous state lying within the borders of Xinjiang. The newly subjected Kumulliks' land was expropriated by the government and given to Chinese settlers. As a result, rebellion broke out on February 20, 1931, and many Chinese were massacred by the local population. The uprising threatened to spread throughout the entire province.
The Uyghur leaders of the revolt appealed for help to Ma Chung-ying, a warlord in the Gansu province. Ma was a youthful, intelligent, charismatic and popular warlord, admired by his Tungan troops, and skilled at infantry and cavalry tactics. However, he was also cruel and brutal, and his troops were known as brigands and murderers.
Ma's troops marched to Kumul and laid siege to the government forces in the garrison there. Although he was victorious elsewhere in the area, Ma was unable to capture the city and withdrew his forces back to Gansu after being wounded that October. This would temporarily leave the Xinjiang Muslims to fight Jin alone.
Although the Soviets were not directly involved in these events, it is interesting to note that the government forces included a number of White Russian troops who had taken refuge in Xinjiang after the Russian Civil War.
Ma Chung-ying's retreat seemed to indicate that Jin Shuren had successfully quelled the uprising at Kumul, but the tensions continued to brew below the surface. Rebels in the north continued to operate, albeit in a subdued fashion, and the potential for a full-scale revolt began to spread to other parts of Xinjiang.
At the same time, Jin Shuren sought revenge on the Xinjiang Mongols for not helping him suppress the Kumul rebellion by murdering their regent and "Living Buddha," Tsetsen Puntsag Gegeen, in May 1932.
Soon after, in July 1932, Jin Shuren's forces began joint operations with Soviet forces in the border regions to put down insurgency amongst the Kyrgyz.
Several months later, Ma Fu-ming, a Hui general formerly in the employment of the government, sided with the rebels still operating in the north of the province. As a result, the Muslim rebellion in the northeast centered in the Turfan Depression, midway between Urumchi and Kumul.
Isolated uprisings also began to occur in the south. With more and more of Jin Shuren's subjects alienated by his repressive measures, the stage was set for wide-spread rebellion.
The insurgency that had been simmering in the northeast began to spread and gain momentum. During the winter of 1932-1933, beginning with the capture of key cities in the Turfan Depression, the rebels advanced southward to Kashgar, gradually bringing more area under their control and recruiting local residents to their forces.
At the same time, in the south, the Muslim population began to actively revolt against the government. Here, where Islam was more influential, the religious nature of the revolt came to the forefront.
Simultaneously, rebels approached Kashgar from both the north and the south roads. The city fell in May 1933, ending government control in the south of the province.
A power struggle soon emerged in the rebel forces between the Huis, Chinese-speaking Muslims under the leadership of the Ma Chan-ts'ang, and the Turkic Muslims. At the same time, there were factions among the Turkic Muslims. Anarchy reigned throughout much of the area as different leaders attempted to seize power. Bloodshed was widespread as rival groups fought each other, captured and executed their opponents, and ambushed and massacred each other's forces. Kashgar was initially controlled by the Uyghur Temur and the Kyrgyz Osman Ali, while in Khotan a self-styled Khotan Islamic government was set up under the Amir Muhammad Amin Bughra and his associates. In this environment, Hui control of the area waned and that of the Khotan Amirs grew. As a result of continuous fighting between the Huis, Kyrgyz, and Uyghurs, morale in Kashgar plummeted. Temur was killed, Osman Ali fled, and, in the political vacuum that was left, the Khotan Amirs emerged as the undisputed rulers in southern Xinjiang in October 1933.
While all this was happening in the south, other developments were taking place in the north. In particular, a new figure had emerged to play a key role in Xinjiang for most of the rest of the Republican era: Sheng Shicai. Sheng Shicai was a well-trained military man who had first come t Xinjiang during the winter of 1929-1930. Beginning his career as Chief of Staff of the Xinjiang Frontier Army, he was promoted in 1932 to Provincial Commander-in-Chief. An ambitious man, he did not have to wait long to move into a position of unqualified power in Xinjiang. His opportunity came with the re-emergence of the Huis in the province.
Despite the fact that Ma Chung-ying had withdrawn to Gansu, Hui forces loyal to him had remained in Xinjiang. During the winter of 1932-1933, -- at the same time that the Muslim rebels were moving towards Kashgar -- these forces, under the leadership of Ma Shih-ming and supplemented by troops loyal to the defected government general Ma Fu-ming, began to advance on Urumchi. They reached the city, the gates of which had been closed in February 1933. Fierce fighting broke out, and the city was only saved by the valiant defense of the White Russian troops and the subsequent arrival of Sheng Shicai's forces. The final death toll was probably in excess of 6,000 Chinese and Muslims. The rebels withdrew to the surrounding countryside as Sheng's prestige grew.
Sheng Shicai's strength was further reinforced by the arrival in March of the Kuomintang's North-East National Salvation Army via the Soviet Union. The Soviets, concerned about the possible victory of the Muslims over Jin Shuren's weakened regime, were willing to accommodate the Chinese in this matter.
Meanwhile, Jin Shuren's corrupt and incompetent administration of Xinjiang had continued to alienate not only the native population, but also those he relied on for the maintenance of his power. The matter climaxed when the White Russians carried out a successful coup in April 1933, forcing him to flee over the Soviet border. Sheng Shih-ts'ai, who protested that he was only a common soldier (but who enjoyed the full backing of both the White Russians and the North-East National Salvation Army), was confirmed in the all-powerful position of Tupan or Border Defence Commissioner, as de facto ruler of the province.
Ma Chung-ying reappeared after a period of convalescence in Gansu, where he amassed a large army through extensive conscription. He was also appointed as Commanding Officer of the 36th Division of the National Army of China by the Kuomintang government in Nanjing. Asked to intervene against Jin on behalf of the Turkic population, Ma readily agreed.
Ma had no intention of sharing power with anyone. He dreamed of forming a Muslim state under his absolute control. This highly ambitious young warlord, who was to dream, in his wilder moments, of creating a Muslim empire which would include the whole of Soviet, as well as China, Central Asia, began his march in May 1933.
Kumul was easily taken, as well as other towns en route to the provincial capital. Sheng Shicai's forces retreated to Urumchi. Ground was alternatively gained and lost by both sides. During this time, Ma's forces acquired notoriety for their cruelty to both the Turkic and Chinese inhabitants, destroying the economy and engaging in wholesale looting and burning of villages. Once seen as a liberator by the Turkic population, who had suffered greatly under Jin Shuren, many Turkic inhabitants of the region now ardently hoped for Ma's expulsion by Sheng Shicai, and an end to the seesaw military campaigns by both sides.
Throughout the conflict, it was uncertain which side had the backing of Nanjing, since both claimed allegiance to the Kuomintang. As did his predecessors, Sheng continued to employ large numbers of White Russian officers and troops, including Cossack cavalry forces, in support of his military campaigns.
Huang Mu-sung, native of Kumul and a "Pacification Commissioner" from the Republican government, soon arrived in Urumchi on an ostensible peace mission. Sheng Shicai suspected him of conspiring with some of his opponents to overthrow him. As a result, he executed three leaders of the provincial government, accusing them of plotting his overthrow with Huang. At the same time, Sheng Shicai also forced Huang to wire Nanjing with a recommendation that he be recognized as the official Tupan of Xinjiang.
Sheng Shicai's problems at this time were not all in the north, however. As Hui armies marched on Urumchi from both sides, Ma Zhongying's forces were joined by those of Chang P'ei-yuan, the military governor of Ili, and potentially more significant events were taking place in southern Xinjiang. The Khotan Amirs were not content to merely control most of the south. Their eventual goal was the establishment of an independent Muslim state.
The Khotan Amirs had attempted to create their Islamic state first in September 1933, after wooing Khoja Niyas Hajji, a leader in the Kumul uprising who had initially agreed to recognize Sheng Shicai's administration, with the offer of presidency of the "Republic of Eastern Turkestan." However, this republic was a state in name only, and Khoja was reported to be negotiating with the Soviets, an unacceptable proposition for the Amirs. In November of the same year, they declared the establishment of the "Turkish-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan" (TIRET). The domestic policy of the TIRET was directed towards the establishment of a radical Islamic system, based on the shari'a (Islamic law) but encompassing certain educational, economic and social reforms, whilst its foreign policy was as staunchly anti-Soviet as it was anti-Hui and anti-Han.
The government was led by the Amirs, with Khoja Niyas Hajji as titular President, and the capital was at Kashgar. Their authority extended over the southern third of the province, and they soon had all the trappings of a legitimate government, including a National Assembly, a legal system, a constitution, a flag, and a national currency. However, there is no indication that Ma Chung-ying was at any time seriously interested in ceding any power to the Islamic government. All areas controlled by Ma's forces remained under military jurisdiction and subject to Ma's authority alone.
The attempt to establish a lasting Islamic government in the area was to prove a failure. Neither Britain nor potential allies in the Muslim world, including Turkey and Afghanistan, were prepared to recognize or support the fledgling republic. Furthermore, having adopted an uncompromisingly Turkic-Islamic stance, it had deprived itself of effective allies whilst ensuring the enmity of the three most powerful forces in Xinjiang -- the Huis, the provincial authorities, and the Soviet Union. It was this last force whose influence had been limited up to this time, which was now to step firmly int Xinjiang politics.
The TIRET, if allowed to survive, could have provided a base of operations for pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic sentiments to spread into Soviet Central Asia. There were also reports of contacts between TIRET officials and representatives of Japan and Nazi Germany.
At the same time, there were fears that Ma Chung-ying, a Muslim and ardently anti-Soviet, could be used by the Japanese to set up a puppet regime in Xinjiang, as they had done with Manchukuo.
In January 1934, Soviet troops crossed the border and attacked rebel positions in the Ili area. Chang P'ei-yuan's forces were defeated, and the governor committed suicide. Despite valiant resistance, Ma Chung-ying's troops were no match for the superior Soviet military machine's aerial bombing, and were pushed back from Urumchi. Soviet assistance created the curious situation of White Russian and Soviet military forces acting in cooperation in a temporary alliance against Ma.
In the south, Khoja Niyas Hajji was wooed away from the TIRET leadership by a Soviet offer of arms. On March 11, 1934, Ma's forces captured a mapping expedition sponsored by the German and Chinese Nationalist governments, and led by the famous Swedish explorer Sven Hedin. Hedin was nearly executed by one of Ma's lieutenants after refusing to hand over the expedition's vehicles. After giving into the lieutenant's demands at gunpoint, Hedin's vehicles were taken and his drivers briefly impressed into service for Ma's fleeing troops before their relief by Sheng's forces and allied Soviet and Cossack troops.
Having been unable to capture Urumchi, Ma Chung-ying now turned south toward Kashgar. In February 1934, in a development which emphasized the deeply conflicting interests of Turkic-speaking and Chinese-speaking Muslims in southern Xinjiang, the capital of the secessionist TIRET was recaptured for Nanjing not by the provincial forces of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, but by the Hui forces of Ma Chung-ying.
At the same time, Khoja Niyas Hajji was negotiating with the Soviets to dissolve the TIRET, in return for the post of "Civil Governor for Life" under Sheng's administration.
Fighting between the Huis and the forces loyal to the Khotan Amirs continued for the next several months, and by July 1934, all of the TIRET leaders had been either killed in battle, hanged or had fled to British India. Ma Chung-ying, now firmly in control of Kashgar, denounced Sheng Shicai as a Soviet puppet and reaffirmed his allegiance to the Kuomintang government.
However, Ma Chung-ying's forces had become completely isolated in southern Sinkiang. Sabit Damulla, Prime Minister of TIRET, rejected all Ma's offers to align with him against Khoja Niyaz Haji. Ma Chung-ying's bid for British support also fell on deaf ears and, in a surprising move, he turned to the Soviets for aid.
Ma commenced negotiations with the Soviet Consul-General in Kashgar, Maks Dumpis, who urged him to seek asylum in Soviet territory. Ma agreed, and on July 5, 1934, escorted by Soviet consular official M. Constantinoff, Ma crossed over the Soviet frontier near Irkeshtam. He brought with him his adjutants and secretaries, some 30 men, and 40 camels loaded with booty and gifts to Stalin. He left his army to the care of his uncle Ma Hushan, promising he would soon return to Xinjiang (Sinkiang). He was believed to have been taken to Moscow as a "guest" of the Soviet Union, where most accounts hold that he was executed in 1936 or 1937.
Chung-ying, Ma see Ma Chung-ying
Ga Ssu-ling see Ma Chung-ying
Ssu-ling, Ga see Ma Chung-ying
Ma Zhongying see Ma Chung-ying
Zhongying, Ma see Ma Chung-ying
Big Horse see Ma Chung-ying
Ma Chung-ying (Ga Ssu-ling) (Mǎ Zhòngyīng), aka 'Big Horse' (c. 1910- 1936/1937). Youngest and best-known of the Chinese Muslim (Hui) warlords. These warlords comprised the “Mu Wa” clique which controlled much of northwest China during the latter half of the Republican Period (1911-1949).
Jin Shuren (Chin Shu-jen) came to power shortly after the assassination of Xinjiang (Sinkiang) governor, Yang Zengxin (Yang Tseng-sin), in 1928. Jin was notoriously intolerant of Muslims and Turkic peoples, and openly antagonized them. Such acts of discrimination included restrictions on travel, increased taxation, seizure of property without due process, and frequent executions for suspected espionage or disloyalty.
In 1930, Jin annexed the Kumul Khanate, a small semi-autonomous state lying within the borders of Xinjiang. The newly subjected Kumulliks' land was expropriated by the government and given to Chinese settlers. As a result, rebellion broke out on February 20, 1931, and many Chinese were massacred by the local population. The uprising threatened to spread throughout the entire province.
The Uyghur leaders of the revolt appealed for help to Ma Chung-ying, a warlord in the Gansu province. Ma was a youthful, intelligent, charismatic and popular warlord, admired by his Tungan troops, and skilled at infantry and cavalry tactics. However, he was also cruel and brutal, and his troops were known as brigands and murderers.
Ma's troops marched to Kumul and laid siege to the government forces in the garrison there. Although he was victorious elsewhere in the area, Ma was unable to capture the city and withdrew his forces back to Gansu after being wounded that October. This would temporarily leave the Xinjiang Muslims to fight Jin alone.
Although the Soviets were not directly involved in these events, it is interesting to note that the government forces included a number of White Russian troops who had taken refuge in Xinjiang after the Russian Civil War.
Ma Chung-ying's retreat seemed to indicate that Jin Shuren had successfully quelled the uprising at Kumul, but the tensions continued to brew below the surface. Rebels in the north continued to operate, albeit in a subdued fashion, and the potential for a full-scale revolt began to spread to other parts of Xinjiang.
At the same time, Jin Shuren sought revenge on the Xinjiang Mongols for not helping him suppress the Kumul rebellion by murdering their regent and "Living Buddha," Tsetsen Puntsag Gegeen, in May 1932.
Soon after, in July 1932, Jin Shuren's forces began joint operations with Soviet forces in the border regions to put down insurgency amongst the Kyrgyz.
Several months later, Ma Fu-ming, a Hui general formerly in the employment of the government, sided with the rebels still operating in the north of the province. As a result, the Muslim rebellion in the northeast centered in the Turfan Depression, midway between Urumchi and Kumul.
Isolated uprisings also began to occur in the south. With more and more of Jin Shuren's subjects alienated by his repressive measures, the stage was set for wide-spread rebellion.
The insurgency that had been simmering in the northeast began to spread and gain momentum. During the winter of 1932-1933, beginning with the capture of key cities in the Turfan Depression, the rebels advanced southward to Kashgar, gradually bringing more area under their control and recruiting local residents to their forces.
At the same time, in the south, the Muslim population began to actively revolt against the government. Here, where Islam was more influential, the religious nature of the revolt came to the forefront.
Simultaneously, rebels approached Kashgar from both the north and the south roads. The city fell in May 1933, ending government control in the south of the province.
A power struggle soon emerged in the rebel forces between the Huis, Chinese-speaking Muslims under the leadership of the Ma Chan-ts'ang, and the Turkic Muslims. At the same time, there were factions among the Turkic Muslims. Anarchy reigned throughout much of the area as different leaders attempted to seize power. Bloodshed was widespread as rival groups fought each other, captured and executed their opponents, and ambushed and massacred each other's forces. Kashgar was initially controlled by the Uyghur Temur and the Kyrgyz Osman Ali, while in Khotan a self-styled Khotan Islamic government was set up under the Amir Muhammad Amin Bughra and his associates. In this environment, Hui control of the area waned and that of the Khotan Amirs grew. As a result of continuous fighting between the Huis, Kyrgyz, and Uyghurs, morale in Kashgar plummeted. Temur was killed, Osman Ali fled, and, in the political vacuum that was left, the Khotan Amirs emerged as the undisputed rulers in southern Xinjiang in October 1933.
While all this was happening in the south, other developments were taking place in the north. In particular, a new figure had emerged to play a key role in Xinjiang for most of the rest of the Republican era: Sheng Shicai. Sheng Shicai was a well-trained military man who had first come t Xinjiang during the winter of 1929-1930. Beginning his career as Chief of Staff of the Xinjiang Frontier Army, he was promoted in 1932 to Provincial Commander-in-Chief. An ambitious man, he did not have to wait long to move into a position of unqualified power in Xinjiang. His opportunity came with the re-emergence of the Huis in the province.
Despite the fact that Ma Chung-ying had withdrawn to Gansu, Hui forces loyal to him had remained in Xinjiang. During the winter of 1932-1933, -- at the same time that the Muslim rebels were moving towards Kashgar -- these forces, under the leadership of Ma Shih-ming and supplemented by troops loyal to the defected government general Ma Fu-ming, began to advance on Urumchi. They reached the city, the gates of which had been closed in February 1933. Fierce fighting broke out, and the city was only saved by the valiant defense of the White Russian troops and the subsequent arrival of Sheng Shicai's forces. The final death toll was probably in excess of 6,000 Chinese and Muslims. The rebels withdrew to the surrounding countryside as Sheng's prestige grew.
Sheng Shicai's strength was further reinforced by the arrival in March of the Kuomintang's North-East National Salvation Army via the Soviet Union. The Soviets, concerned about the possible victory of the Muslims over Jin Shuren's weakened regime, were willing to accommodate the Chinese in this matter.
Meanwhile, Jin Shuren's corrupt and incompetent administration of Xinjiang had continued to alienate not only the native population, but also those he relied on for the maintenance of his power. The matter climaxed when the White Russians carried out a successful coup in April 1933, forcing him to flee over the Soviet border. Sheng Shih-ts'ai, who protested that he was only a common soldier (but who enjoyed the full backing of both the White Russians and the North-East National Salvation Army), was confirmed in the all-powerful position of Tupan or Border Defence Commissioner, as de facto ruler of the province.
Ma Chung-ying reappeared after a period of convalescence in Gansu, where he amassed a large army through extensive conscription. He was also appointed as Commanding Officer of the 36th Division of the National Army of China by the Kuomintang government in Nanjing. Asked to intervene against Jin on behalf of the Turkic population, Ma readily agreed.
Ma had no intention of sharing power with anyone. He dreamed of forming a Muslim state under his absolute control. This highly ambitious young warlord, who was to dream, in his wilder moments, of creating a Muslim empire which would include the whole of Soviet, as well as China, Central Asia, began his march in May 1933.
Kumul was easily taken, as well as other towns en route to the provincial capital. Sheng Shicai's forces retreated to Urumchi. Ground was alternatively gained and lost by both sides. During this time, Ma's forces acquired notoriety for their cruelty to both the Turkic and Chinese inhabitants, destroying the economy and engaging in wholesale looting and burning of villages. Once seen as a liberator by the Turkic population, who had suffered greatly under Jin Shuren, many Turkic inhabitants of the region now ardently hoped for Ma's expulsion by Sheng Shicai, and an end to the seesaw military campaigns by both sides.
Throughout the conflict, it was uncertain which side had the backing of Nanjing, since both claimed allegiance to the Kuomintang. As did his predecessors, Sheng continued to employ large numbers of White Russian officers and troops, including Cossack cavalry forces, in support of his military campaigns.
Huang Mu-sung, native of Kumul and a "Pacification Commissioner" from the Republican government, soon arrived in Urumchi on an ostensible peace mission. Sheng Shicai suspected him of conspiring with some of his opponents to overthrow him. As a result, he executed three leaders of the provincial government, accusing them of plotting his overthrow with Huang. At the same time, Sheng Shicai also forced Huang to wire Nanjing with a recommendation that he be recognized as the official Tupan of Xinjiang.
Sheng Shicai's problems at this time were not all in the north, however. As Hui armies marched on Urumchi from both sides, Ma Zhongying's forces were joined by those of Chang P'ei-yuan, the military governor of Ili, and potentially more significant events were taking place in southern Xinjiang. The Khotan Amirs were not content to merely control most of the south. Their eventual goal was the establishment of an independent Muslim state.
The Khotan Amirs had attempted to create their Islamic state first in September 1933, after wooing Khoja Niyas Hajji, a leader in the Kumul uprising who had initially agreed to recognize Sheng Shicai's administration, with the offer of presidency of the "Republic of Eastern Turkestan." However, this republic was a state in name only, and Khoja was reported to be negotiating with the Soviets, an unacceptable proposition for the Amirs. In November of the same year, they declared the establishment of the "Turkish-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan" (TIRET). The domestic policy of the TIRET was directed towards the establishment of a radical Islamic system, based on the shari'a (Islamic law) but encompassing certain educational, economic and social reforms, whilst its foreign policy was as staunchly anti-Soviet as it was anti-Hui and anti-Han.
The government was led by the Amirs, with Khoja Niyas Hajji as titular President, and the capital was at Kashgar. Their authority extended over the southern third of the province, and they soon had all the trappings of a legitimate government, including a National Assembly, a legal system, a constitution, a flag, and a national currency. However, there is no indication that Ma Chung-ying was at any time seriously interested in ceding any power to the Islamic government. All areas controlled by Ma's forces remained under military jurisdiction and subject to Ma's authority alone.
The attempt to establish a lasting Islamic government in the area was to prove a failure. Neither Britain nor potential allies in the Muslim world, including Turkey and Afghanistan, were prepared to recognize or support the fledgling republic. Furthermore, having adopted an uncompromisingly Turkic-Islamic stance, it had deprived itself of effective allies whilst ensuring the enmity of the three most powerful forces in Xinjiang -- the Huis, the provincial authorities, and the Soviet Union. It was this last force whose influence had been limited up to this time, which was now to step firmly int Xinjiang politics.
The TIRET, if allowed to survive, could have provided a base of operations for pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic sentiments to spread into Soviet Central Asia. There were also reports of contacts between TIRET officials and representatives of Japan and Nazi Germany.
At the same time, there were fears that Ma Chung-ying, a Muslim and ardently anti-Soviet, could be used by the Japanese to set up a puppet regime in Xinjiang, as they had done with Manchukuo.
In January 1934, Soviet troops crossed the border and attacked rebel positions in the Ili area. Chang P'ei-yuan's forces were defeated, and the governor committed suicide. Despite valiant resistance, Ma Chung-ying's troops were no match for the superior Soviet military machine's aerial bombing, and were pushed back from Urumchi. Soviet assistance created the curious situation of White Russian and Soviet military forces acting in cooperation in a temporary alliance against Ma.
In the south, Khoja Niyas Hajji was wooed away from the TIRET leadership by a Soviet offer of arms. On March 11, 1934, Ma's forces captured a mapping expedition sponsored by the German and Chinese Nationalist governments, and led by the famous Swedish explorer Sven Hedin. Hedin was nearly executed by one of Ma's lieutenants after refusing to hand over the expedition's vehicles. After giving into the lieutenant's demands at gunpoint, Hedin's vehicles were taken and his drivers briefly impressed into service for Ma's fleeing troops before their relief by Sheng's forces and allied Soviet and Cossack troops.
Having been unable to capture Urumchi, Ma Chung-ying now turned south toward Kashgar. In February 1934, in a development which emphasized the deeply conflicting interests of Turkic-speaking and Chinese-speaking Muslims in southern Xinjiang, the capital of the secessionist TIRET was recaptured for Nanjing not by the provincial forces of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, but by the Hui forces of Ma Chung-ying.
At the same time, Khoja Niyas Hajji was negotiating with the Soviets to dissolve the TIRET, in return for the post of "Civil Governor for Life" under Sheng's administration.
Fighting between the Huis and the forces loyal to the Khotan Amirs continued for the next several months, and by July 1934, all of the TIRET leaders had been either killed in battle, hanged or had fled to British India. Ma Chung-ying, now firmly in control of Kashgar, denounced Sheng Shicai as a Soviet puppet and reaffirmed his allegiance to the Kuomintang government.
However, Ma Chung-ying's forces had become completely isolated in southern Sinkiang. Sabit Damulla, Prime Minister of TIRET, rejected all Ma's offers to align with him against Khoja Niyaz Haji. Ma Chung-ying's bid for British support also fell on deaf ears and, in a surprising move, he turned to the Soviets for aid.
Ma commenced negotiations with the Soviet Consul-General in Kashgar, Maks Dumpis, who urged him to seek asylum in Soviet territory. Ma agreed, and on July 5, 1934, escorted by Soviet consular official M. Constantinoff, Ma crossed over the Soviet frontier near Irkeshtam. He brought with him his adjutants and secretaries, some 30 men, and 40 camels loaded with booty and gifts to Stalin. He left his army to the care of his uncle Ma Hushan, promising he would soon return to Xinjiang (Sinkiang). He was believed to have been taken to Moscow as a "guest" of the Soviet Union, where most accounts hold that he was executed in 1936 or 1937.
Chung-ying, Ma see Ma Chung-ying
Ga Ssu-ling see Ma Chung-ying
Ssu-ling, Ga see Ma Chung-ying
Ma Zhongying see Ma Chung-ying
Zhongying, Ma see Ma Chung-ying
Big Horse see Ma Chung-ying
Mada’ini, ‘Ali ibn Muhammad al-
Mada’ini, ‘Ali ibn Muhammad al- (‘Ali ibn Muhammad al-Mada‘ini) (Abu'l-Hasan al-Mada'ini) (753-c. 843). Arab historian. He wrote more than 200 works, an important part of them dealing with subjects that extend from the origins of Islam until his own days.
Al-Mada'ini was born in 753 in the city of Basra, in Iraq, but spent the better part of his life in al-Mada'ini, from which comes his name, and Baghdad, where he died.
Al-Mada'ini compiled a great number of books on history, including books on the Arab conquest of Transoxiana, biographies of governors from Qutayba ibn Muslim to Nasr ibn Sayyar. Information from his books was edited around 900 by al-Tabari and incorporated into al-Tabari's History of the Prophets and the Kings.
'Ali ibn Muhammad al-Mada'ini see Mada’ini, ‘Ali ibn Muhammad al-
Abu'l-Hasan al-Mada'ini see Mada’ini, ‘Ali ibn Muhammad al-
Mada’ini, ‘Ali ibn Muhammad al- (‘Ali ibn Muhammad al-Mada‘ini) (Abu'l-Hasan al-Mada'ini) (753-c. 843). Arab historian. He wrote more than 200 works, an important part of them dealing with subjects that extend from the origins of Islam until his own days.
Al-Mada'ini was born in 753 in the city of Basra, in Iraq, but spent the better part of his life in al-Mada'ini, from which comes his name, and Baghdad, where he died.
Al-Mada'ini compiled a great number of books on history, including books on the Arab conquest of Transoxiana, biographies of governors from Qutayba ibn Muslim to Nasr ibn Sayyar. Information from his books was edited around 900 by al-Tabari and incorporated into al-Tabari's History of the Prophets and the Kings.
'Ali ibn Muhammad al-Mada'ini see Mada’ini, ‘Ali ibn Muhammad al-
Abu'l-Hasan al-Mada'ini see Mada’ini, ‘Ali ibn Muhammad al-
Madani, ‘Abbasi
Madani, ‘Abbasi ('Abbasi Madani) (Abbassi Madani) (b. 1931). Algerian Islamic activist and political leader. ‘Abbasi Madani was born in Sidi ‘Uqbah, in southeastern Algeria. The son of a religious teacher and imam, Madani committed the Qur’an to memory at an early age. He then received his Arabic and Islamic education in Biskra at one of the schools of the Association of Algerian Scholars.
In his youth, Madani joined the Colonial Gardes Champetres, but after an unknown incident, deserted and was cared for by members of the Front of National Liberation (Natioanl Liberation Front - FLN) which was fighting the French in the Algerian War of Independence.
In 1954, Madani joined the National Liberation Front (FLN) and participated in an armed operation against the French occupation. On November 1, 1954, he planted a bomb at the French radio station in Algiers, was arrested and was jailed by the French only sixteen days later. He would remain imprisoned for eight years. Following his release, Madani resumed his religious and political activism through the Qiyam (Values) Society, which was established in 1963 and advocated a reformist orientation that sought to reassert Arab and Islamic values in post-independence Algeria. The activities of the society were restricted in 1966, following a demonstration by its members protesting the execution of Sayyid Qutb of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. Eventually, in 1970, Qiyam was outlawed.
Madani grew increasingly critical of the FLN for its adoption of a socialist orientation. Deciding to continue his education, he obtained degrees in philosophy and psychology. In 1978, he received a British doctoral degree in comparative edcation and was appointed professor of educational psychology at the University of Algiers.
Madani became a public figure in 1982 during the violent clashes between the state and Islamist students at the main campus of the University of Algiers. Along with Shaykhs ‘Abd al-Latif Sultani and Ahmad Sahnun both eminent religious scholars, he signed a fourteen point statement criticizing the secular policies of the state and demanding the promotion of Islam in government and society. This statement also included positions advcating female genital mutilation and the banning of womenr rights. For these activities, Madani was again arrested and imprisoned for two years.
Subsequently, the new Algerian regime permitted a margin of freedom for the Islamists, who managed to increase their activities in the mosques, schools, and universities and to broaden their following. When a new constitution allowing the formation of political parties was adopted in February 1989, Madani announced the establishment of the Islamic Salvation Front (known by its French initials, FIS). Headed by Madani, the FIS was legalized in September of that year. Madani led the party through the June 1990 municipal and provincial elections, in which it won a large majority of the seats. He pushed for early parliamentary and presidential elections and organized a general strike in May 1991 protesting the new electoral law, which favored the FLN. In June 1991, Madani was arrested along with his deputy ‘Ali Bel Hajj. Both were tried before a military court and in July 1992 received a sentence of twelve years for leading an armed conspiracy against state security.
In 1997, Madani was released from jail and was placed under house arrest. In 2003, having served his 12 year term, he was released from house arrest and banned for life from all political activity. After that, he lived in Qatar, where allegedly he agitated for the imposition of an Islamic state and the prohibition of the Shi'a clergy, which led to him being placed under house arrest in 2005. Afterward, Madani fell ill with terminal neurosyphilis and retired from political and social life.
Politically, he was widely considered to represent the moderate wing of FIS, contrasted with Ali Belhadj's more hardline views. His positions included free markets, early Islamic education, Arabization of education and government, segregation of the sexes, and shari'a-based law. He expressed support for democracy, but with the reservation that it could not override shari'a law.
As an education specialist, Madani wrote studies on pedagogy and philosophy and contributed numerous articles to the FIS’s periodicals Al-munqidh and Al-furqan. Reflecting the concerns of an Islamic modernist, he attempted to delineate the nature of the Islamic solution to the crises of modern societies. Madani held that contemporary Western thought suffers from ideological and moral predicaments that have emanated from a misperception of the incompatibility of science and religion. Like many other Islamic revivalist intellectuals, he reagrded Islam as a humanistic and universal message that presents a worldview counter to Western ideologies.
Madani is known for his moderation and political skills. He managed to integrate into his party several Islamic groups with various orientations. In a relatively short time, he transformed the FIS into a potent political force in Algeria, challenging the historic political monopoly of the FLN and presenting itself as a viable alternative. Throughout his leadership of the FIS, Madani was able to steer his party toward effecting change from within the system through legal and constitutional processes.
'Abbasi Madani see Madani, ‘Abbasi
Abbassi Madani see Madani, ‘Abbasi
Madani, Abbassi see Madani, ‘Abbasi
Madani, ‘Abbasi ('Abbasi Madani) (Abbassi Madani) (b. 1931). Algerian Islamic activist and political leader. ‘Abbasi Madani was born in Sidi ‘Uqbah, in southeastern Algeria. The son of a religious teacher and imam, Madani committed the Qur’an to memory at an early age. He then received his Arabic and Islamic education in Biskra at one of the schools of the Association of Algerian Scholars.
In his youth, Madani joined the Colonial Gardes Champetres, but after an unknown incident, deserted and was cared for by members of the Front of National Liberation (Natioanl Liberation Front - FLN) which was fighting the French in the Algerian War of Independence.
In 1954, Madani joined the National Liberation Front (FLN) and participated in an armed operation against the French occupation. On November 1, 1954, he planted a bomb at the French radio station in Algiers, was arrested and was jailed by the French only sixteen days later. He would remain imprisoned for eight years. Following his release, Madani resumed his religious and political activism through the Qiyam (Values) Society, which was established in 1963 and advocated a reformist orientation that sought to reassert Arab and Islamic values in post-independence Algeria. The activities of the society were restricted in 1966, following a demonstration by its members protesting the execution of Sayyid Qutb of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. Eventually, in 1970, Qiyam was outlawed.
Madani grew increasingly critical of the FLN for its adoption of a socialist orientation. Deciding to continue his education, he obtained degrees in philosophy and psychology. In 1978, he received a British doctoral degree in comparative edcation and was appointed professor of educational psychology at the University of Algiers.
Madani became a public figure in 1982 during the violent clashes between the state and Islamist students at the main campus of the University of Algiers. Along with Shaykhs ‘Abd al-Latif Sultani and Ahmad Sahnun both eminent religious scholars, he signed a fourteen point statement criticizing the secular policies of the state and demanding the promotion of Islam in government and society. This statement also included positions advcating female genital mutilation and the banning of womenr rights. For these activities, Madani was again arrested and imprisoned for two years.
Subsequently, the new Algerian regime permitted a margin of freedom for the Islamists, who managed to increase their activities in the mosques, schools, and universities and to broaden their following. When a new constitution allowing the formation of political parties was adopted in February 1989, Madani announced the establishment of the Islamic Salvation Front (known by its French initials, FIS). Headed by Madani, the FIS was legalized in September of that year. Madani led the party through the June 1990 municipal and provincial elections, in which it won a large majority of the seats. He pushed for early parliamentary and presidential elections and organized a general strike in May 1991 protesting the new electoral law, which favored the FLN. In June 1991, Madani was arrested along with his deputy ‘Ali Bel Hajj. Both were tried before a military court and in July 1992 received a sentence of twelve years for leading an armed conspiracy against state security.
In 1997, Madani was released from jail and was placed under house arrest. In 2003, having served his 12 year term, he was released from house arrest and banned for life from all political activity. After that, he lived in Qatar, where allegedly he agitated for the imposition of an Islamic state and the prohibition of the Shi'a clergy, which led to him being placed under house arrest in 2005. Afterward, Madani fell ill with terminal neurosyphilis and retired from political and social life.
Politically, he was widely considered to represent the moderate wing of FIS, contrasted with Ali Belhadj's more hardline views. His positions included free markets, early Islamic education, Arabization of education and government, segregation of the sexes, and shari'a-based law. He expressed support for democracy, but with the reservation that it could not override shari'a law.
As an education specialist, Madani wrote studies on pedagogy and philosophy and contributed numerous articles to the FIS’s periodicals Al-munqidh and Al-furqan. Reflecting the concerns of an Islamic modernist, he attempted to delineate the nature of the Islamic solution to the crises of modern societies. Madani held that contemporary Western thought suffers from ideological and moral predicaments that have emanated from a misperception of the incompatibility of science and religion. Like many other Islamic revivalist intellectuals, he reagrded Islam as a humanistic and universal message that presents a worldview counter to Western ideologies.
Madani is known for his moderation and political skills. He managed to integrate into his party several Islamic groups with various orientations. In a relatively short time, he transformed the FIS into a potent political force in Algeria, challenging the historic political monopoly of the FLN and presenting itself as a viable alternative. Throughout his leadership of the FIS, Madani was able to steer his party toward effecting change from within the system through legal and constitutional processes.
'Abbasi Madani see Madani, ‘Abbasi
Abbassi Madani see Madani, ‘Abbasi
Madani, Abbassi see Madani, ‘Abbasi
Madaniyya
Madaniyya. Branch of the Shadhiliyya Sufi order named after Muhammad ibn Hasan al-Madani (d. 1847). During the nineteenth century, the order spread in Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, Tunisia, and Egypt. Al-Madani initiated the future Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II into the order.
Madaniyya. Branch of the Shadhiliyya Sufi order named after Muhammad ibn Hasan al-Madani (d. 1847). During the nineteenth century, the order spread in Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, Tunisia, and Egypt. Al-Madani initiated the future Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II into the order.
Madhara’i, al-
Madhara’i, al-. Family of high officials and revenue officers, originating from Iraq, that held important positions in Egypt and Syria between 879 and 946.
Madhara’i, al-. Family of high officials and revenue officers, originating from Iraq, that held important positions in Egypt and Syria between 879 and 946.
Madhhij
Madhhij. Large tribal group in Yemen. They played a significant role in the early Islamic conquests.
Madhhij. Large tribal group in Yemen. They played a significant role in the early Islamic conquests.
Madurese
Madurese. Less than one-third of the Madurese live on their island of Madura off the north coast of East Java. While the inhabitants of the small islands along the south coast of Madura and those living on the Sapudi and Kangean archipelagos east of Madura are also known as Madurese or Orang Madura, most Madurese are dispersed to other parts of Indonesia. The Madurese are Indonesia’s third largest ethnic group. Nearly all are Muslim.
While the Madurese have roots n Madura, the majority of Madurese do not now live on that island. The Madurese migrated out of Madura over several hundred years, mostly driven by poor agricultural resources in their home island. The Madurese were also major clients of the government transmigration programs of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, through which they settled in relatively sparsely populated areas of Indonesia's other islands, especially Kalimantan and Sumatra. As a result of this program, many regions of Indonesia have communities of former transmigrants and their descendants that maintain their Madurese identity. Some of these migrant groups have been the subject of conflict with indigenous communities. The best-publicized conflict was on Kalimantan where thousands were killed in fighting between the Madurese and the indigenous Dayaks during the late 1990s.
Family is important to the Madurese and they commonly live in villages that function around an Islamic religious center. According to Islamic law, a man may have more than one wife. Marriage proposals are usually made by the groom's parents, preferably to a first or second cousin. If the proposal is accepted, the bride's parents are then presented with the bride price, which is usually cattle. The groom's parents then set the date for the upcoming wedding. Newlywed couples often live with the bride's family.
Because the island of Madura has very poor soil, farming is not important in Madurese culture. As a result, the Madurese tend not to farm on other islands with very good soil, such as Java, and opt to herd cattle, fish, or sail instead. A common nickname for the Madurese is "cowboys" of Indonesia. Cattle are an important part of culture, and bull-racing is one of their favorite sports.
Islam is an integral part of the social, political and economic life of the Madurese. Madurese are Sunni Muslims and adhere to the tenets of the Shafi school. In the course of the sixteenth century, Islam was spread over Madura from the Islamic centers of Giri, Gresik, and Ampel in Surabaya on the north coast of Java. In contrast to the Javanese, the distinction between the abangan (nominal Muslims) and santri (those who endeavor to keep the Five Pillars of Islam) cannot be drawn among the Madurese.
Madurese. Less than one-third of the Madurese live on their island of Madura off the north coast of East Java. While the inhabitants of the small islands along the south coast of Madura and those living on the Sapudi and Kangean archipelagos east of Madura are also known as Madurese or Orang Madura, most Madurese are dispersed to other parts of Indonesia. The Madurese are Indonesia’s third largest ethnic group. Nearly all are Muslim.
While the Madurese have roots n Madura, the majority of Madurese do not now live on that island. The Madurese migrated out of Madura over several hundred years, mostly driven by poor agricultural resources in their home island. The Madurese were also major clients of the government transmigration programs of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, through which they settled in relatively sparsely populated areas of Indonesia's other islands, especially Kalimantan and Sumatra. As a result of this program, many regions of Indonesia have communities of former transmigrants and their descendants that maintain their Madurese identity. Some of these migrant groups have been the subject of conflict with indigenous communities. The best-publicized conflict was on Kalimantan where thousands were killed in fighting between the Madurese and the indigenous Dayaks during the late 1990s.
Family is important to the Madurese and they commonly live in villages that function around an Islamic religious center. According to Islamic law, a man may have more than one wife. Marriage proposals are usually made by the groom's parents, preferably to a first or second cousin. If the proposal is accepted, the bride's parents are then presented with the bride price, which is usually cattle. The groom's parents then set the date for the upcoming wedding. Newlywed couples often live with the bride's family.
Because the island of Madura has very poor soil, farming is not important in Madurese culture. As a result, the Madurese tend not to farm on other islands with very good soil, such as Java, and opt to herd cattle, fish, or sail instead. A common nickname for the Madurese is "cowboys" of Indonesia. Cattle are an important part of culture, and bull-racing is one of their favorite sports.
Islam is an integral part of the social, political and economic life of the Madurese. Madurese are Sunni Muslims and adhere to the tenets of the Shafi school. In the course of the sixteenth century, Islam was spread over Madura from the Islamic centers of Giri, Gresik, and Ampel in Surabaya on the north coast of Java. In contrast to the Javanese, the distinction between the abangan (nominal Muslims) and santri (those who endeavor to keep the Five Pillars of Islam) cannot be drawn among the Madurese.
Maghili, Muhammad al-
Maghili, Muhammad al- (Muhammad al-Maghili) (Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Karim al-Maghili) (c. 1440-1503/1505). Reformist jurisconsult of Tlemcen. He is chiefly known for his persecution of the Jewish community of Tuwat (Touat) in the Algerian Sahara and for the advice he gave to Sudanic rulers.
Muhammad al-Maghili was an Islamic scholar from Tlemcen, a Saharan city situated in modern-day Algeria. Maghili led a campaign to expel the city's Jewish community, which had migrated there after the Roman sack of Jerusalem. He was successful, many of the Jews were massacred by his followers. He also served as an advisor for Muhammad Rumfa, emir of the Hausa city-state Kano, and wrote a treatise on government, On the Obligations of Princes.
Muhammad al-Maghili see Maghili, Muhammad al-
Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Karim al-Maghili see Maghili, Muhammad al-
Maghili, Muhammad al- (Muhammad al-Maghili) (Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Karim al-Maghili) (c. 1440-1503/1505). Reformist jurisconsult of Tlemcen. He is chiefly known for his persecution of the Jewish community of Tuwat (Touat) in the Algerian Sahara and for the advice he gave to Sudanic rulers.
Muhammad al-Maghili was an Islamic scholar from Tlemcen, a Saharan city situated in modern-day Algeria. Maghili led a campaign to expel the city's Jewish community, which had migrated there after the Roman sack of Jerusalem. He was successful, many of the Jews were massacred by his followers. He also served as an advisor for Muhammad Rumfa, emir of the Hausa city-state Kano, and wrote a treatise on government, On the Obligations of Princes.
Muhammad al-Maghili see Maghili, Muhammad al-
Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Karim al-Maghili see Maghili, Muhammad al-
Maghrawa
Maghrawa (Magrawa). Major confederation of Berber tribes in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, belonging to the Butr groups and forming the most powerful branch of the family of the Zanata.
The Maghrawa, a tribe of Zanata Berbers, were one of the first Berber tribes to submit to Islam in the 7th century. They supported Uqba ibn Nafi on his campaign to the Atlantic in 683. They were Kharijites from the 8th century, and allied first with the Idrisids, and, from the tenth century onwards, with the Umayyads of Cordoba. As a result, they were caught up in the victory over the allies of the Fatimids in 924, and soon became allied with them themselves. When they switched back to the side of Cordoba, they were driven out of central Morocco by the Zirids, who ruled on behalf of the Fatimids. In 980, however, they were able to drive the Miknasa out of Sijilmasa.
Under Ziri ibn Atiyya (to 1001) the Maghrawa achieved supremacy in Fez under Umayyad suzerainty and expanded their territory at the expense of the Banu Ifran. A revolt against the Andalusian Umayyads was put down by Al-Mansur (Abi Amir), although the Maghrawa were able to regain power in Fez. Under the succeeding rulers al-Muizz (1001-1026), Hamman (1026-1039), and Dunas (1039), the Maghrawa consolidated their rule in northern and central Morocco. However, internal power struggles after 1060 enabled the Almoravids to conquer the Maghrawa in 1070 and put an end to their rule.
Magrawa see Maghrawa
Maghrawa (Magrawa). Major confederation of Berber tribes in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, belonging to the Butr groups and forming the most powerful branch of the family of the Zanata.
The Maghrawa, a tribe of Zanata Berbers, were one of the first Berber tribes to submit to Islam in the 7th century. They supported Uqba ibn Nafi on his campaign to the Atlantic in 683. They were Kharijites from the 8th century, and allied first with the Idrisids, and, from the tenth century onwards, with the Umayyads of Cordoba. As a result, they were caught up in the victory over the allies of the Fatimids in 924, and soon became allied with them themselves. When they switched back to the side of Cordoba, they were driven out of central Morocco by the Zirids, who ruled on behalf of the Fatimids. In 980, however, they were able to drive the Miknasa out of Sijilmasa.
Under Ziri ibn Atiyya (to 1001) the Maghrawa achieved supremacy in Fez under Umayyad suzerainty and expanded their territory at the expense of the Banu Ifran. A revolt against the Andalusian Umayyads was put down by Al-Mansur (Abi Amir), although the Maghrawa were able to regain power in Fez. Under the succeeding rulers al-Muizz (1001-1026), Hamman (1026-1039), and Dunas (1039), the Maghrawa consolidated their rule in northern and central Morocco. However, internal power struggles after 1060 enabled the Almoravids to conquer the Maghrawa in 1070 and put an end to their rule.
Magrawa see Maghrawa
Maghribi, Banu al-
Maghribi, Banu al- (Banu al-Maghribi). Family of Persian origin that performed, during the tenth and eleventh centuries, influential functions at several princely courts in Baghdad, Aleppo, Cairo, Mosul and Mayyafariqin.
Banu al-Maghribi see Maghribi, Banu al-
Maghribi, Banu al- (Banu al-Maghribi). Family of Persian origin that performed, during the tenth and eleventh centuries, influential functions at several princely courts in Baghdad, Aleppo, Cairo, Mosul and Mayyafariqin.
Banu al-Maghribi see Maghribi, Banu al-
Maguindanao
Maguindanao. The Maguindanao are the largest Muslim ethnic group in the Philippines. They are approximately 1.7 percent of the population. Nearly all live in the province of Cotabato on the large southern island of Mindanao. The conversion of the Maguindanao and other nearby peoples from animism to Islam is shrouded in legend. Traditional accounts attribute their conversion to the teachings of Sarip Kabungsuwan (Shariff Mohammed Kabungsuwan), a Muslim prince of Johore (Malay peninsula) who claimed direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad. Kabungsuwan is said to have arrived at Mindanao around 1500 accompanied by a small group of Sama warriors. Legends persist that through a combination of his wisdom, the force of his personality and the great appeal of his message Kabungsuwan was able to win converts peacefully. The accuracy of these legends remains unknown, but it is interesting that both the Maranao and Maguindanao families of higher rank trace their genealogical descent from Sarip Kabungsuwan.
Tradition holds that the Malay prince assumed the local title datu, which may be loosely translated as lord or chieftain. His direct successors, however, were known as sulutan (sultan). At times, there were several sultanates in Cotabato. A sulutan was advised and supported by a council of datus known as the ruma bechara, which played a significant role in the selection of an heir to the sultanate. Numerous military and civilian posts associated with the sultanate were often held by relatives of the sulutan.
The joint processes of Islamic conversion and political consolidation early in the sixteenth century appear to have initiated an expansionist phase in Maguindanao history. The Maguindanao controlled most of the trade between the sea coast and the interior of Mindanao, and at various times they dominated most of the southern part of the island from the Zamboanga peninsula on the west to the coast of Davao on the east. The powerful Muslim lowlanders were able to exact tribute and taxes from the pagan hill tribes and often took slaves from among these peoples.
When the Spanish began to colonize the northern and central Philippine islands from 1565 onward, they came into direct conflict with the Maguindanao and other Muslim people of the south. The Spaniards identified the Islamized natives with their traditional enemies, the Moors of North Africa, and thus called them Moros, a term which is now regarded as derogatory and is resented by contemporary Muslim Filipinos. Spanish attempts to conquer and subjugate these Muslims led to the prolonged, although intermittent, hostilities known as the Moro Wars, which spanned more than 300 years of Philippine history. In the notorious tradition of divide and conquer, the Spanish manned their armies for these wars with Christian converts from the northern islands. This was to have profound and lasting consequences, for it led to a bitter enmity between Christian and Muslim Filipinos, even though these peoples probably shared a similar cultural heritage in pre-Islamic, pre-Christian times.
The Spanish never fully subdued the Maguindanao, although they were able to contain them from about 1850 until the end of their colonial rule in 1898. The Americans finally ended major armed resistance in Cotabato with the defeat of the Muslim hero Datu Ali in 1905. From that time on, the major effort of the American colonial government, and later the Philippine government, was to integrate the Maguindanao into the rest of the nation politically and to encourage resettlement in Cotabato by non-Muslim Filipinos.
The political future of the Maguindanao and other Muslim peoples of Mindanao and Sulu has remained uncertain for several years. A secessionist movement which came to be known as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) emerged in the early 1970s and became militarily active after the declaration of martial law in 1972. The armed conflict between MNLF forces and government troops caused considerable social disruption in Cotabato and elsewhere during the 1970s and into the 1980s. Like the Spanish and American colonial governments, the Philippine government experienced difficulty in bringing lasting peace to this region and ensuring harmonious relations among its numerous ethnic groups, including the Maguindanao.
Moros see Maguindanao.
Maguindanao. The Maguindanao are the largest Muslim ethnic group in the Philippines. They are approximately 1.7 percent of the population. Nearly all live in the province of Cotabato on the large southern island of Mindanao. The conversion of the Maguindanao and other nearby peoples from animism to Islam is shrouded in legend. Traditional accounts attribute their conversion to the teachings of Sarip Kabungsuwan (Shariff Mohammed Kabungsuwan), a Muslim prince of Johore (Malay peninsula) who claimed direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad. Kabungsuwan is said to have arrived at Mindanao around 1500 accompanied by a small group of Sama warriors. Legends persist that through a combination of his wisdom, the force of his personality and the great appeal of his message Kabungsuwan was able to win converts peacefully. The accuracy of these legends remains unknown, but it is interesting that both the Maranao and Maguindanao families of higher rank trace their genealogical descent from Sarip Kabungsuwan.
Tradition holds that the Malay prince assumed the local title datu, which may be loosely translated as lord or chieftain. His direct successors, however, were known as sulutan (sultan). At times, there were several sultanates in Cotabato. A sulutan was advised and supported by a council of datus known as the ruma bechara, which played a significant role in the selection of an heir to the sultanate. Numerous military and civilian posts associated with the sultanate were often held by relatives of the sulutan.
The joint processes of Islamic conversion and political consolidation early in the sixteenth century appear to have initiated an expansionist phase in Maguindanao history. The Maguindanao controlled most of the trade between the sea coast and the interior of Mindanao, and at various times they dominated most of the southern part of the island from the Zamboanga peninsula on the west to the coast of Davao on the east. The powerful Muslim lowlanders were able to exact tribute and taxes from the pagan hill tribes and often took slaves from among these peoples.
When the Spanish began to colonize the northern and central Philippine islands from 1565 onward, they came into direct conflict with the Maguindanao and other Muslim people of the south. The Spaniards identified the Islamized natives with their traditional enemies, the Moors of North Africa, and thus called them Moros, a term which is now regarded as derogatory and is resented by contemporary Muslim Filipinos. Spanish attempts to conquer and subjugate these Muslims led to the prolonged, although intermittent, hostilities known as the Moro Wars, which spanned more than 300 years of Philippine history. In the notorious tradition of divide and conquer, the Spanish manned their armies for these wars with Christian converts from the northern islands. This was to have profound and lasting consequences, for it led to a bitter enmity between Christian and Muslim Filipinos, even though these peoples probably shared a similar cultural heritage in pre-Islamic, pre-Christian times.
The Spanish never fully subdued the Maguindanao, although they were able to contain them from about 1850 until the end of their colonial rule in 1898. The Americans finally ended major armed resistance in Cotabato with the defeat of the Muslim hero Datu Ali in 1905. From that time on, the major effort of the American colonial government, and later the Philippine government, was to integrate the Maguindanao into the rest of the nation politically and to encourage resettlement in Cotabato by non-Muslim Filipinos.
The political future of the Maguindanao and other Muslim peoples of Mindanao and Sulu has remained uncertain for several years. A secessionist movement which came to be known as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) emerged in the early 1970s and became militarily active after the declaration of martial law in 1972. The armed conflict between MNLF forces and government troops caused considerable social disruption in Cotabato and elsewhere during the 1970s and into the 1980s. Like the Spanish and American colonial governments, the Philippine government experienced difficulty in bringing lasting peace to this region and ensuring harmonious relations among its numerous ethnic groups, including the Maguindanao.
Moros see Maguindanao.
No comments:
Post a Comment