‘Omar al-Khayyam
‘Omar al-Khayyam (‘Umar Khayyam) (Omar Khayyám) (b, May 18, 1048, Neyshapur, Iran — d. 1131, Neyshapur, Iran). Mathematician and astronomer. He was also well known as a poet, philosopher, and physician. In the History of Western Philosophy, Bertrand Russell remarks that Omar Khayyam was the only man known to him who was both a noted poet and a noted mathematician. Omar Khayyam reformed the solar calendar in 1079; his work on algebra was highly valued throughout Europe during the Middle Ages; and, in the West, he is best known for his poetic work Rubaiyat which was translated by Edward Fitzgerald in 1859. His full name was Ghiyath al-Din Abul Fateh Omar ibn Ibrahim al-Khayyam.
Omar Khayyam was born in 1044 at Nishapur, the provincial capital of Khurasan. He is generally known as a Persian. However, it has been suggested that his ancestors (from the Arab Khayyami tribe) migrated and settled in Persia. Omar Khayyam was educated at Nishapur. He also traveled to several reputed institutions of learning, including those at Bukhara, Balkh, Samarkand and Isfahan. His fame as a mathematician prompted the Seljuq Sultan Malik Shah and his vizier Nizam al-Mulk to invite him in 1074 to undertake astronomical research at a new observatory and to serve on a commission for calendar reform. He lived in Nishapur and Samarkand (Central Asia) for most of his life. Omar Khayyam was a contemporary of Nizam al-Mulk Tusi. He died in 1123 in Nishapur.
‘Omar Khayyam was a famous Persian scientist and poet from Nishapur. His name means “’Omar the Tentmaker.” As astronomer to the royal court, he was engaged with several other scientists to reform the calendar; their work resulted in the adoption of a new era, called the Jalalian or the Seljuk. As a writer on algebra, geometry, and related subjects, ‘Omar was one of the most notable mathematicians of his time. He is, however, most famous as the author of the Ruba‘iyat. About 1000 of these epigrammatic four-line stanzas, which reflect upon nature and humanity, are ascribed to him.
‘Omar’s ruba‘is (quatrains) were composed perhaps as the outlet for a pessimistic and cynical rationalism which ‘Omar’s strictly orthodox day it was not politic to teach openly. The English poet and translator Edward Fitzgerald was the first to introduce ‘Omar to the West through an 1859 version of 100 of the quatrains. This version is a paraphrase, often very close, that despite its flowery rhymed verse captures the spirit of the original.
‘Omar Khayyam was appreciated by the Great Saljuq Malik-Shah I but Sanjar had a grudge against him. He met Abut Hamid al-Ghazali. As a scientist, he worked on the reform of the calendar and wrote on algebra and physics. As a poet, he became very popular in the west after Edward FitzGerald (d.1883) published his free translation of the Quatrains. Of the 1,000 quatrains originally attributed to him, 102 are considered authentic, the rest being added in the manuscripts over the course of time.
Omar Khayyam was a great mathematician. He made major contributions in mathematics, particularly in algebra. His book Maqalat fi al-Jabr wa al-Muqabila, a treatise on algebra, provided great advancement in the field. He classified many algebraic equations based on their complexity and recognized thirteen different forms of cubic equation. Omar Khayyam developed a geometrical approach to solving equations, which involved an ingenious selection of proper comics. He solved cubic equations by intersecting a parabola with a circle. Omar Khayyam was the first to develop the binomial theorem and determine binomial coefficients. He developed the binomial expansion for the case when the exponent is a positive integer. Omar Khayyam refers in his algebra book to another work on what we now know as Pascal’s triangle. This work is now lost.
Al-Khayyam extended Euclid’s work giving a new definition of rations and included the multiplication of ratios. He contributed to the theory of parallel lines.
Omar al-Khayyam is famous for another work which he contributed when he worked for the Seljuk Sultan, Malik Shah Jalal al-Din. He was asked to develop an accurate solar calendar to be used for revenue collections and various administrative matters. To accomplish this task, Omar Khayyam began his work at the new observatory at Ray in 1074. His calendar Al-Tarikh al-Jalali is superior to the Gregorian calendar and is accurate to within one day in 3770 years. Specifically, he measured the length of the year as 365.24219858156 days. It shows that he recognized the importance of accuracy by giving his result to eleven decimal places. As a comparison, the length of the year in the twentieth century was calculated at 365.242190 days. This number changes slightly each century in the sixth decimal place, e.g., in the nineteenth century it was 365.242196 days.
Al-Khayyam contributed also to other fields of science. He developed for accurate determination of the specific gravity. He wrote two books in metaphysics, Risala Dar Wujud and Nauruz Namah. As a poet, Omar Khayyam is well known for his Rubaiyat. His themes involved complex mystical and philosophical thoughts.
Omar al-Khayyam’s ten books and thirty monographs have survived. These include four books on mathematics, one on algebra, one on geometry, three on physics, and three books on metaphysics. He made great contributions in the development of mathematics and analytical geometry, which benefited Europe several centuries later.
Khayyam, 'Omar al- see ‘Omar al-Khayyam
'Umar Khayyam see ‘Omar al-Khayyam
Khayyam, 'Umar see ‘Omar al-Khayyam
Omar Khayyam see ‘Omar al-Khayyam
Khayyam, Omar see ‘Omar al-Khayyam
Omar the Tentmaker see ‘Omar al-Khayyam
‘Omar al-Khayyam (‘Umar Khayyam) (Omar Khayyám) (b, May 18, 1048, Neyshapur, Iran — d. 1131, Neyshapur, Iran). Mathematician and astronomer. He was also well known as a poet, philosopher, and physician. In the History of Western Philosophy, Bertrand Russell remarks that Omar Khayyam was the only man known to him who was both a noted poet and a noted mathematician. Omar Khayyam reformed the solar calendar in 1079; his work on algebra was highly valued throughout Europe during the Middle Ages; and, in the West, he is best known for his poetic work Rubaiyat which was translated by Edward Fitzgerald in 1859. His full name was Ghiyath al-Din Abul Fateh Omar ibn Ibrahim al-Khayyam.
Omar Khayyam was born in 1044 at Nishapur, the provincial capital of Khurasan. He is generally known as a Persian. However, it has been suggested that his ancestors (from the Arab Khayyami tribe) migrated and settled in Persia. Omar Khayyam was educated at Nishapur. He also traveled to several reputed institutions of learning, including those at Bukhara, Balkh, Samarkand and Isfahan. His fame as a mathematician prompted the Seljuq Sultan Malik Shah and his vizier Nizam al-Mulk to invite him in 1074 to undertake astronomical research at a new observatory and to serve on a commission for calendar reform. He lived in Nishapur and Samarkand (Central Asia) for most of his life. Omar Khayyam was a contemporary of Nizam al-Mulk Tusi. He died in 1123 in Nishapur.
‘Omar Khayyam was a famous Persian scientist and poet from Nishapur. His name means “’Omar the Tentmaker.” As astronomer to the royal court, he was engaged with several other scientists to reform the calendar; their work resulted in the adoption of a new era, called the Jalalian or the Seljuk. As a writer on algebra, geometry, and related subjects, ‘Omar was one of the most notable mathematicians of his time. He is, however, most famous as the author of the Ruba‘iyat. About 1000 of these epigrammatic four-line stanzas, which reflect upon nature and humanity, are ascribed to him.
‘Omar’s ruba‘is (quatrains) were composed perhaps as the outlet for a pessimistic and cynical rationalism which ‘Omar’s strictly orthodox day it was not politic to teach openly. The English poet and translator Edward Fitzgerald was the first to introduce ‘Omar to the West through an 1859 version of 100 of the quatrains. This version is a paraphrase, often very close, that despite its flowery rhymed verse captures the spirit of the original.
‘Omar Khayyam was appreciated by the Great Saljuq Malik-Shah I but Sanjar had a grudge against him. He met Abut Hamid al-Ghazali. As a scientist, he worked on the reform of the calendar and wrote on algebra and physics. As a poet, he became very popular in the west after Edward FitzGerald (d.1883) published his free translation of the Quatrains. Of the 1,000 quatrains originally attributed to him, 102 are considered authentic, the rest being added in the manuscripts over the course of time.
Omar Khayyam was a great mathematician. He made major contributions in mathematics, particularly in algebra. His book Maqalat fi al-Jabr wa al-Muqabila, a treatise on algebra, provided great advancement in the field. He classified many algebraic equations based on their complexity and recognized thirteen different forms of cubic equation. Omar Khayyam developed a geometrical approach to solving equations, which involved an ingenious selection of proper comics. He solved cubic equations by intersecting a parabola with a circle. Omar Khayyam was the first to develop the binomial theorem and determine binomial coefficients. He developed the binomial expansion for the case when the exponent is a positive integer. Omar Khayyam refers in his algebra book to another work on what we now know as Pascal’s triangle. This work is now lost.
Al-Khayyam extended Euclid’s work giving a new definition of rations and included the multiplication of ratios. He contributed to the theory of parallel lines.
Omar al-Khayyam is famous for another work which he contributed when he worked for the Seljuk Sultan, Malik Shah Jalal al-Din. He was asked to develop an accurate solar calendar to be used for revenue collections and various administrative matters. To accomplish this task, Omar Khayyam began his work at the new observatory at Ray in 1074. His calendar Al-Tarikh al-Jalali is superior to the Gregorian calendar and is accurate to within one day in 3770 years. Specifically, he measured the length of the year as 365.24219858156 days. It shows that he recognized the importance of accuracy by giving his result to eleven decimal places. As a comparison, the length of the year in the twentieth century was calculated at 365.242190 days. This number changes slightly each century in the sixth decimal place, e.g., in the nineteenth century it was 365.242196 days.
Al-Khayyam contributed also to other fields of science. He developed for accurate determination of the specific gravity. He wrote two books in metaphysics, Risala Dar Wujud and Nauruz Namah. As a poet, Omar Khayyam is well known for his Rubaiyat. His themes involved complex mystical and philosophical thoughts.
Omar al-Khayyam’s ten books and thirty monographs have survived. These include four books on mathematics, one on algebra, one on geometry, three on physics, and three books on metaphysics. He made great contributions in the development of mathematics and analytical geometry, which benefited Europe several centuries later.
Khayyam, 'Omar al- see ‘Omar al-Khayyam
'Umar Khayyam see ‘Omar al-Khayyam
Khayyam, 'Umar see ‘Omar al-Khayyam
Omar Khayyam see ‘Omar al-Khayyam
Khayyam, Omar see ‘Omar al-Khayyam
Omar the Tentmaker see ‘Omar al-Khayyam
Omar, Mohammad
Muhammad (Mohammad) Omar, also called Mullah Omar (born c. 1950–62?, near Kandahār, Afghanistan—died April, 2013, Pakistan), Afghan militant and leader of the Taliban (Pashto: Ṭālebān [“Students”]) who was the emir of Afghanistan (1996–2001). Mullah Omar’s refusal to extradite al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden prompted the United States invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 that overthrew the Taliban government there.
Biographical details about Mullah Omar are sparse and conflicting. He was an ethnic Pashtun of the Ghilzay branch who, reportedly, was born near Kandahar, Afghanistan. He is believed to have been illiterate and — aside from his madrasah studies — to have had minimal schooling. He fought with the mujahideen against the Soviets during the Afghan War (1978–92), and during that time he suffered the loss of his right eye in an explosion.
After the Soviet withdrawal, Mullah Omar established and taught at a small village madrasah in the province of Kandahār. The end of the war did not bring calm, however, and political and ethnic violence escalated thereafter. Claiming to have had a vision instructing him to restore peace, Mullah Omar led a group of madrasah students in the takeover of cities throughout the mid-1990s, including Kandahar, Herat, Kabul and Mazar-e Sharif. In 1996 a shura (council) recognized Mullah Omar as amīr al-muʾminīn(“commander of the faithful”), a deeply significant title in the Muslim world that had been in disuse since the abolition of the caliphate in 1924. That designation also made him emir of Afghanistan, which from October 1997 until the fall of the Taliban was known as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Mullah Omar marked the occasion by removing what was held to be the cloak of the Prophet Muhammad from the mosque in Kandahār where it was housed and donning the relic, effectively symbolizing himself as Muhammad’s successor. The swift takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban under Mullah Omar is believed to have been funded at least in part by bin Laden, who had moved his base to Afghanistan after his expulsion from Sudan in the mid-1990s.
Under Mullah Omar’s leadership, Pashtun social codes were paramount, and strict Islamic principles were enforced. Education and employment for women all but ceased; capital punishment was enacted for transgressions such as adultery and conversion away from Islam; and music, television, and other forms of popular entertainment were prohibited. Among his most-infamous decisions was an order to demolish the colossal Buddha statues at Bamiyan, culturally significant relics of Afghanistan’s pre-Islamic history. To the outspoken regret of the international community, they were destroyed in 2001.
In the wake of al-Qaeda’s, September 11, 2001, attacks on New York City and Washington, D. C., Mullah Omar’s refusal to extradite bin Laden prompted the United States to launch a series of military operations in Afghanistan. The Taliban government was overthrown, and Mullah Omar fled; his location was undetermined.
Mullah Omar was long notoriously reclusive. Meetings with non-Muslims or with Westerners were almost never granted, and it was unclear whether any of the photographs that purportedly depict him were authentic—circumstances that made the pursuit of him even more difficult. At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, it was believed that Mullah Omar continued to direct Taliban operations from the sanctuary of Pakistan, although the Taliban denied that supposition.
On July 29, 2015, the Afghan government announced that its intelligence service had learned that Mullah Omar had died in April 2013 in Pakistan. The report of Mullah Omar’s death was confirmed by a Taliban representative the next day, and his deputy, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, was announced as his successor.
‘Omer Efendi
‘Omer Efendi. Eighteenth century Ottoman historian from Bosnia. He wrote a vivid account of the events in Bosnia between 1738 and 1739.
‘Omer Efendi. Eighteenth century Ottoman historian from Bosnia. He wrote a vivid account of the events in Bosnia between 1738 and 1739.
Oncle Alufa
Oncle Alufa. In Brazil, a god who heads a family of malevolent spirits worshipped by Muslim slaves in the colonial period.
Alufa, Oncle see Oncle Alufa.
Oncle Alufa. In Brazil, a god who heads a family of malevolent spirits worshipped by Muslim slaves in the colonial period.
Alufa, Oncle see Oncle Alufa.
Onn bin Ja’afar, Dato
Onn bin Ja’afar, Dato (1895-January 19, 1962). Malay statesman and political leader, recognized as the father of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the first political party to represent purely Malay interests. The son of a politically prominent Johor family, he had become the chief minister of Johor by the 1940s. Following World War II, he organized opposition to the Malayan Union plan. With others, he formed the UMNO in 1946 and was named its first president. In 1951, after his attempt to broaden the party’s base by admitting non-Malays was opposed, Dato Onn resigned from the UMNO and formed the Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) with a multi-racial membership. While it gained some initial support, the IMP lost most of the offices in the first municipal elections to the communal parties. Thereafter he remained on the fringes of Malay political life. His son, Hussein bin Onn, was prime minister of the Federation of Malaysia between 1976 and 1981.
Onn bin Ja'afar was a Malay politician and a Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) of Johore in Malaysia, then Malaya. He was the founder of United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and was also responsible for the social economic welfare of the Malays by setting up the Rural Industrial Development Authority (RIDA). His son was Tun Hussein Onn, the third Prime Minister of Malaysia and his grandson was Hishammuddin Hussein.
Onn was born in 1895 at Johor Bahru, the capital of the Sultanate of Johore. His father Dato Jaafar Haji Muhammad was the first Menteri Besar of Johore while his mother, Hanim Rogayah was from Scarcia, Turkey. Onn was sent by Sultan Ibrahim to be educated in England and upon his return, was sent by his father for studies at the Malay College Kuala Kangsar. He served for a time as a government official in Johore. Turning then to journalism, he edited two Malay newspapers, the Lembaga Melayu and the Warta Malaya, the first independent Malay daily. When he was a member of the Majlis Mesyuarat Negeri Johor, he made two important political contributions to the people of Johore, which are the setting up of the Sultan Ibrahim Scholarship and issuance of free air fares to perform the pilgrimage in Mecca (Makkah) for Islamic officers serving the Johore government. After World War II, he became extremely active in Malayan politics.
Onn was very active in the Malaya nationalist movement and along with his companions, Haji Anwar bin Abdul Malik, Haji Syed Alwi bin Syed Sheikh al-Hadi and Mohd Haji Noah Omar was active in the founding of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) as a means to rally the Malays against the Malayan Union, which was perceived as threatening Malay privileges and the position of the Malaya rulers. Onn took up the role of UMNO's president on May 1, 1946. When plans for the union were withdrawn, Onn was made Menteri Besar by the Sultan of Johor.
Later, Onn was disgusted with what he considered to be UMNO's communalist policies, and called for party membership to be opened to all Malayans, and for UMNO to be renamed as the United Malayans National Organization. When his recommendations went unheeded, he left the party on August 26, 1951, to form the Independence of Malaya Party (IMP). However, the IMP failed to receive sufficient backing from Malayans, and eventually Onn left it to form the Parti Negara, which placed membership restrictions on non-Malays in an attempt to woo the Malays.
Neither party gained popular support against Tunku Abdul Rahman's new Alliance coalition and he was eventually eclipsed from Malayan political life.
Onn's character was portrayed in a 2007 Malaysian movie 1957: Hati Malaya which was directed by a popular Malaysian film director, Shuhaimi Baba. His role is played by Zaefrul Nadzarine Nordin.
Dato Onn bin Ja'afar see Onn bin Ja’afar, Dato
Onn bin Ja’afar, Dato (1895-January 19, 1962). Malay statesman and political leader, recognized as the father of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the first political party to represent purely Malay interests. The son of a politically prominent Johor family, he had become the chief minister of Johor by the 1940s. Following World War II, he organized opposition to the Malayan Union plan. With others, he formed the UMNO in 1946 and was named its first president. In 1951, after his attempt to broaden the party’s base by admitting non-Malays was opposed, Dato Onn resigned from the UMNO and formed the Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) with a multi-racial membership. While it gained some initial support, the IMP lost most of the offices in the first municipal elections to the communal parties. Thereafter he remained on the fringes of Malay political life. His son, Hussein bin Onn, was prime minister of the Federation of Malaysia between 1976 and 1981.
Onn bin Ja'afar was a Malay politician and a Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) of Johore in Malaysia, then Malaya. He was the founder of United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and was also responsible for the social economic welfare of the Malays by setting up the Rural Industrial Development Authority (RIDA). His son was Tun Hussein Onn, the third Prime Minister of Malaysia and his grandson was Hishammuddin Hussein.
Onn was born in 1895 at Johor Bahru, the capital of the Sultanate of Johore. His father Dato Jaafar Haji Muhammad was the first Menteri Besar of Johore while his mother, Hanim Rogayah was from Scarcia, Turkey. Onn was sent by Sultan Ibrahim to be educated in England and upon his return, was sent by his father for studies at the Malay College Kuala Kangsar. He served for a time as a government official in Johore. Turning then to journalism, he edited two Malay newspapers, the Lembaga Melayu and the Warta Malaya, the first independent Malay daily. When he was a member of the Majlis Mesyuarat Negeri Johor, he made two important political contributions to the people of Johore, which are the setting up of the Sultan Ibrahim Scholarship and issuance of free air fares to perform the pilgrimage in Mecca (Makkah) for Islamic officers serving the Johore government. After World War II, he became extremely active in Malayan politics.
Onn was very active in the Malaya nationalist movement and along with his companions, Haji Anwar bin Abdul Malik, Haji Syed Alwi bin Syed Sheikh al-Hadi and Mohd Haji Noah Omar was active in the founding of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) as a means to rally the Malays against the Malayan Union, which was perceived as threatening Malay privileges and the position of the Malaya rulers. Onn took up the role of UMNO's president on May 1, 1946. When plans for the union were withdrawn, Onn was made Menteri Besar by the Sultan of Johor.
Later, Onn was disgusted with what he considered to be UMNO's communalist policies, and called for party membership to be opened to all Malayans, and for UMNO to be renamed as the United Malayans National Organization. When his recommendations went unheeded, he left the party on August 26, 1951, to form the Independence of Malaya Party (IMP). However, the IMP failed to receive sufficient backing from Malayans, and eventually Onn left it to form the Parti Negara, which placed membership restrictions on non-Malays in an attempt to woo the Malays.
Neither party gained popular support against Tunku Abdul Rahman's new Alliance coalition and he was eventually eclipsed from Malayan political life.
Onn's character was portrayed in a 2007 Malaysian movie 1957: Hati Malaya which was directed by a popular Malaysian film director, Shuhaimi Baba. His role is played by Zaefrul Nadzarine Nordin.
Dato Onn bin Ja'afar see Onn bin Ja’afar, Dato
OPEC
OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries). Group formed in 1960 to maintain a minimum price for oil.
OPEC, in full Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, was a multinational organization that was established to coordinate the petroleum policies of its members and to provide member states with technical and economic aid.
OPEC was established at a conference held in Baghdad September 10–14, 1960, and was formally constituted in January 1961 by five countries: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Venezuela. Members admitted afterward include Qatar (1961), Indonesia and Libya (1962), Abū Dhabī (1967), Algeria (1969), Nigeria (1971), Ecuador (1973), and Angola (2007). The United Arab Emirates—which includes Abū Dhabī (the largest of the emirates), Dubayy, ʿAjmān, Al-Shāriqah, Umm al-Qaywayn, Raʾs al-Khaymah, and Al-Fujayrah—assumed Abū Dhabī’s membership in the 1970s. Gabon, which had joined in 1975, withdrew in January 1995, but it had relatively insignificant oil reserves. Ecuador suspended its membership from OPEC from December 1992 until October 2007, while Indonesia suspended its membership beginning in January 2009.
OPEC’s headquarters, first located in Geneva, was moved to Vienna in 1965. OPEC members coordinate policies on oil prices, production, and related matters at semi-annual and special meetings of the OPEC Conference. The Board of Governors, which is responsible for managing the organization, convening the Conference, and drawing up the annual budget, contains representatives appointed by each member country; its chair is elected to a one-year term by the Conference. OPEC also possesses a Secretariat, headed by a secretary-general appointed by the Conference for a three-year term. The Secretariat includes research and energy-studies divisions.
OPEC members collectively own about two-thirds of the world’s proven petroleum reserves and account for two-fifths of world oil production. Members differ in a variety of ways, including the size of oil reserves, geography, religion, and economic and political interests. Four members—Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—have very large per capita oil reserves; they also are relatively strong financially and thus have considerable flexibility in adjusting their production. Saudi Arabia, which has the largest reserves and a relatively small (but fast-growing) population, has traditionally played a dominant role in determining overall production and prices.
Because OPEC has been beset by numerous conflicts throughout its history, some experts have concluded that it is not a cartel—or at least not an effective one—and that it has little, if any, influence over the amount of oil produced or its price. Other experts believe that OPEC is an effective cartel, though it has not been equally effective at all times. The debate largely centers on semantics and the definition of what constitutes a cartel. Those who argue that OPEC is not a cartel emphasize the sovereignty of each member country, the inherent problems of coordinating price and production policies, and the tendency of countries to renege on prior agreements at ministerial meetings. Those who claim that OPEC is a cartel argue that production costs in the Persian Gulf are generally less than 10 percent of the price charged and that prices would decline toward those costs in the absence of coordination by OPEC.
The influence of individual OPEC members on the organization and on the oil market usually depends on their levels of reserves and production. Saudi Arabia, which controls about one-third of OPEC’s total oil reserves, plays a leading role in the organization. Other important members are Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, whose combined reserves are significantly greater than those of Saudi Arabia. Kuwait, which has a very small population, has shown a willingness to cut production relative to the size of its reserves, whereas Iran and Iraq, both with large and growing populations, have generally produced at high levels relative to reserves. Revolutions and wars have impaired the ability of some OPEC members to maintain high levels of production.
When OPEC was formed in 1960, its main goal was to prevent its concessionaires—the world’s largest oil producers, refiners, and marketers—from lowering the price of oil, which they had always specified, or “posted.” OPEC members sought to gain greater control over oil prices by coordinating their production and export policies, though each member retained ultimate control over its own policy. OPEC managed to prevent price reductions during the 1960s, but its success encouraged increases in production, resulting in a gradual decline in nominal prices (not adjusted for inflation) from $1.93 per barrel in 1955 to $1.30 per barrel in 1970. During the 1970s the primary goal of OPEC members was to secure complete sovereignty over their petroleum resources. Accordingly, several OPEC members nationalized their oil reserves and altered their contracts with major oil companies.
In October 1973, OPEC raised oil prices by 70 percent. In December, two months after the Yom Kippur War, prices were raised by an additional 130 percent, and the organization’s Arab members, which had formed OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) in 1968, curtailed production and placed an embargo on oil shipments to the United States and the Netherlands, the main supporters of Israel during the war. The result throughout the West was severe oil shortages and spiraling inflation. As OPEC continued to raise prices through the rest of the decade (prices increased 10-fold from 1973 to 1980), its political and economic power grew. Flush with petrodollars, many OPEC members began large-scale domestic economic and social development programs and invested heavily overseas, particularly in the United States and Europe. OPEC also established an international fund to aid developing countries.
Although oil-importing countries reacted slowly to the price increases, eventually they reduced their overall energy consumption, found other sources of oil (e.g., in Norway, the United Kingdom, and Mexico), and developed alternative sources of energy, such as coal, natural gas, and nuclear power. In response, OPEC members—particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait—reduced their production levels in the early 1980s in what proved to be a futile effort to defend their posted prices.
Production and prices continued to fall in the 1980s. Although the brunt of the production cuts were borne by Saudi Arabia, whose oil revenues shrank by some four-fifths by 1986, the revenues of all producers, including non-OPEC countries, fell by some two-thirds in the same period as the price of oil dropped to less than $10 per barrel. The decline in revenues and the ruinous Iran-Iraq War (1980–88), which pitted two OPEC members against each other, undermined the unity of the organization and precipitated a major policy shift by Saudi Arabia, which decided that it no longer would defend the price of oil but would defend its market share instead. Following Saudi Arabia’s lead, other OPEC members soon decided to maintain production quotas. Saudi Arabia’s influence within OPEC also was evident during the Persian Gulf War (1990–91)—which resulted from the invasion of one OPEC member (Kuwait) by another (Iraq)—when the kingdom agreed to increase production to stabilize prices and minimize any disruption in the international oil market.
During the 1990s OPEC continued to emphasize production quotas. Oil prices, which collapsed at the end of the decade, began to increase again in the early 21st century, owing to greater unity among OPEC members and better cooperation with nonmembers (such as Mexico, Norway, Oman, and Russia), increased tensions in the Middle East, and a political crisis in Venezuela. As the 21st century began, international efforts to reduce the burning of fossil fuels (which has contributed significantly to global warming) made it likely that the world demand for oil would inevitably decline. In response, OPEC attempted to develop a coherent environmental policy.
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries see OPEC
OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries). Group formed in 1960 to maintain a minimum price for oil.
OPEC, in full Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, was a multinational organization that was established to coordinate the petroleum policies of its members and to provide member states with technical and economic aid.
OPEC was established at a conference held in Baghdad September 10–14, 1960, and was formally constituted in January 1961 by five countries: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Venezuela. Members admitted afterward include Qatar (1961), Indonesia and Libya (1962), Abū Dhabī (1967), Algeria (1969), Nigeria (1971), Ecuador (1973), and Angola (2007). The United Arab Emirates—which includes Abū Dhabī (the largest of the emirates), Dubayy, ʿAjmān, Al-Shāriqah, Umm al-Qaywayn, Raʾs al-Khaymah, and Al-Fujayrah—assumed Abū Dhabī’s membership in the 1970s. Gabon, which had joined in 1975, withdrew in January 1995, but it had relatively insignificant oil reserves. Ecuador suspended its membership from OPEC from December 1992 until October 2007, while Indonesia suspended its membership beginning in January 2009.
OPEC’s headquarters, first located in Geneva, was moved to Vienna in 1965. OPEC members coordinate policies on oil prices, production, and related matters at semi-annual and special meetings of the OPEC Conference. The Board of Governors, which is responsible for managing the organization, convening the Conference, and drawing up the annual budget, contains representatives appointed by each member country; its chair is elected to a one-year term by the Conference. OPEC also possesses a Secretariat, headed by a secretary-general appointed by the Conference for a three-year term. The Secretariat includes research and energy-studies divisions.
OPEC members collectively own about two-thirds of the world’s proven petroleum reserves and account for two-fifths of world oil production. Members differ in a variety of ways, including the size of oil reserves, geography, religion, and economic and political interests. Four members—Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—have very large per capita oil reserves; they also are relatively strong financially and thus have considerable flexibility in adjusting their production. Saudi Arabia, which has the largest reserves and a relatively small (but fast-growing) population, has traditionally played a dominant role in determining overall production and prices.
Because OPEC has been beset by numerous conflicts throughout its history, some experts have concluded that it is not a cartel—or at least not an effective one—and that it has little, if any, influence over the amount of oil produced or its price. Other experts believe that OPEC is an effective cartel, though it has not been equally effective at all times. The debate largely centers on semantics and the definition of what constitutes a cartel. Those who argue that OPEC is not a cartel emphasize the sovereignty of each member country, the inherent problems of coordinating price and production policies, and the tendency of countries to renege on prior agreements at ministerial meetings. Those who claim that OPEC is a cartel argue that production costs in the Persian Gulf are generally less than 10 percent of the price charged and that prices would decline toward those costs in the absence of coordination by OPEC.
The influence of individual OPEC members on the organization and on the oil market usually depends on their levels of reserves and production. Saudi Arabia, which controls about one-third of OPEC’s total oil reserves, plays a leading role in the organization. Other important members are Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, whose combined reserves are significantly greater than those of Saudi Arabia. Kuwait, which has a very small population, has shown a willingness to cut production relative to the size of its reserves, whereas Iran and Iraq, both with large and growing populations, have generally produced at high levels relative to reserves. Revolutions and wars have impaired the ability of some OPEC members to maintain high levels of production.
When OPEC was formed in 1960, its main goal was to prevent its concessionaires—the world’s largest oil producers, refiners, and marketers—from lowering the price of oil, which they had always specified, or “posted.” OPEC members sought to gain greater control over oil prices by coordinating their production and export policies, though each member retained ultimate control over its own policy. OPEC managed to prevent price reductions during the 1960s, but its success encouraged increases in production, resulting in a gradual decline in nominal prices (not adjusted for inflation) from $1.93 per barrel in 1955 to $1.30 per barrel in 1970. During the 1970s the primary goal of OPEC members was to secure complete sovereignty over their petroleum resources. Accordingly, several OPEC members nationalized their oil reserves and altered their contracts with major oil companies.
In October 1973, OPEC raised oil prices by 70 percent. In December, two months after the Yom Kippur War, prices were raised by an additional 130 percent, and the organization’s Arab members, which had formed OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) in 1968, curtailed production and placed an embargo on oil shipments to the United States and the Netherlands, the main supporters of Israel during the war. The result throughout the West was severe oil shortages and spiraling inflation. As OPEC continued to raise prices through the rest of the decade (prices increased 10-fold from 1973 to 1980), its political and economic power grew. Flush with petrodollars, many OPEC members began large-scale domestic economic and social development programs and invested heavily overseas, particularly in the United States and Europe. OPEC also established an international fund to aid developing countries.
Although oil-importing countries reacted slowly to the price increases, eventually they reduced their overall energy consumption, found other sources of oil (e.g., in Norway, the United Kingdom, and Mexico), and developed alternative sources of energy, such as coal, natural gas, and nuclear power. In response, OPEC members—particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait—reduced their production levels in the early 1980s in what proved to be a futile effort to defend their posted prices.
Production and prices continued to fall in the 1980s. Although the brunt of the production cuts were borne by Saudi Arabia, whose oil revenues shrank by some four-fifths by 1986, the revenues of all producers, including non-OPEC countries, fell by some two-thirds in the same period as the price of oil dropped to less than $10 per barrel. The decline in revenues and the ruinous Iran-Iraq War (1980–88), which pitted two OPEC members against each other, undermined the unity of the organization and precipitated a major policy shift by Saudi Arabia, which decided that it no longer would defend the price of oil but would defend its market share instead. Following Saudi Arabia’s lead, other OPEC members soon decided to maintain production quotas. Saudi Arabia’s influence within OPEC also was evident during the Persian Gulf War (1990–91)—which resulted from the invasion of one OPEC member (Kuwait) by another (Iraq)—when the kingdom agreed to increase production to stabilize prices and minimize any disruption in the international oil market.
During the 1990s OPEC continued to emphasize production quotas. Oil prices, which collapsed at the end of the decade, began to increase again in the early 21st century, owing to greater unity among OPEC members and better cooperation with nonmembers (such as Mexico, Norway, Oman, and Russia), increased tensions in the Middle East, and a political crisis in Venezuela. As the 21st century began, international efforts to reduce the burning of fossil fuels (which has contributed significantly to global warming) made it likely that the world demand for oil would inevitably decline. In response, OPEC attempted to develop a coherent environmental policy.
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries see OPEC
Orhan
Orhan (Orkhan ibn ‘Othman) (Orhan Gazi) (1288-1360). Ottoman bey (r.1324-1360). Orhan is often referred to as sultan, but this title was not introduced in the empire until 1394.
Orhan was the second ruler of the Ottoman dynasty, which had been founded by his father, Osman I. Orhan’s reign (1324–60) marked the beginning of Ottoman expansion into the Balkans.
Under Orhan’s leadership, the small Ottoman principality in northwestern Anatolia continued to attract Ghazis (warriors for the Islāmic faith) from surrounding Turkish emirates fighting against Byzantium. In 1324 the Byzantine town of Brusa (later Bursa) fell to the Ottomans, followed by Nicaea (modern İznik) in 1331 and Nicomedia (modern İzmit) in 1337.
Turning to the neighboring Turkmen states, Orhan annexed the principality of Karası, which had been weakened by dynastic struggles (c. 1345), and he extended his control to the extreme northwest corner of Anatolia. In 1346 the Ottomans became the principal ally of the future Byzantine emperor John VI Cantacuzenus by crossing over into the Balkans to assist him against his rival John V Palaeologus.
As John VI’s ally, Orhan married Theodora, John’s daughter, and acquired the right to conduct raids in the Balkans. His campaigns provided the Ottomans with an intimate knowledge of the area, and in 1354 they seized Gallipoli as a permanent foothold in Europe.
Orhan’s reign also marked the beginning of the institutions that transformed the Ottoman principality into a powerful state. In 1327 the first silver Ottoman coins were minted in Orhan’s name, while the Anatolian conquests were consolidated and the army was reorganized on a more permanent basis. Finally, Orhan built mosques, medreses (theological colleges), and caravansaries in the newly conquered towns, particularly the Ottoman capital, Bursa, which later became a major Islāmic center.
Orkhan ibn 'Othman see Orhan
Orhan Gazi see Orhan
Gazi, Orhan see Orhan
Orhan (Orkhan ibn ‘Othman) (Orhan Gazi) (1288-1360). Ottoman bey (r.1324-1360). Orhan is often referred to as sultan, but this title was not introduced in the empire until 1394.
Orhan was the second ruler of the Ottoman dynasty, which had been founded by his father, Osman I. Orhan’s reign (1324–60) marked the beginning of Ottoman expansion into the Balkans.
Under Orhan’s leadership, the small Ottoman principality in northwestern Anatolia continued to attract Ghazis (warriors for the Islāmic faith) from surrounding Turkish emirates fighting against Byzantium. In 1324 the Byzantine town of Brusa (later Bursa) fell to the Ottomans, followed by Nicaea (modern İznik) in 1331 and Nicomedia (modern İzmit) in 1337.
Turning to the neighboring Turkmen states, Orhan annexed the principality of Karası, which had been weakened by dynastic struggles (c. 1345), and he extended his control to the extreme northwest corner of Anatolia. In 1346 the Ottomans became the principal ally of the future Byzantine emperor John VI Cantacuzenus by crossing over into the Balkans to assist him against his rival John V Palaeologus.
As John VI’s ally, Orhan married Theodora, John’s daughter, and acquired the right to conduct raids in the Balkans. His campaigns provided the Ottomans with an intimate knowledge of the area, and in 1354 they seized Gallipoli as a permanent foothold in Europe.
Orhan’s reign also marked the beginning of the institutions that transformed the Ottoman principality into a powerful state. In 1327 the first silver Ottoman coins were minted in Orhan’s name, while the Anatolian conquests were consolidated and the army was reorganized on a more permanent basis. Finally, Orhan built mosques, medreses (theological colleges), and caravansaries in the newly conquered towns, particularly the Ottoman capital, Bursa, which later became a major Islāmic center.
Orkhan ibn 'Othman see Orhan
Orhan Gazi see Orhan
Gazi, Orhan see Orhan
Orissans
Orissans. The Muslims of the Indian state of Orissa call themselves Mahomedan or Muslim. Non-Muslims call them Musalman or Pathan. Orissans comprise about 1.5 percent of the state’s population. Orissan Muslims were converted from among the local population during the days of Moghul rule in India, beginning in the sixteenth century. As Moghul power was primarily along the coast (an area called Moghul Bandi) most Muslims are concentrated in the districts of Balasore, Cuttack and Puri. Nearly all speak Urdu as their mother tongue, although many speak Oriyan as a second language, especially if they attend regional secular schools instead of Muslim madrasas. The overwhelming majority of Orissan Muslims are Sunni.
Orissans. The Muslims of the Indian state of Orissa call themselves Mahomedan or Muslim. Non-Muslims call them Musalman or Pathan. Orissans comprise about 1.5 percent of the state’s population. Orissan Muslims were converted from among the local population during the days of Moghul rule in India, beginning in the sixteenth century. As Moghul power was primarily along the coast (an area called Moghul Bandi) most Muslims are concentrated in the districts of Balasore, Cuttack and Puri. Nearly all speak Urdu as their mother tongue, although many speak Oriyan as a second language, especially if they attend regional secular schools instead of Muslim madrasas. The overwhelming majority of Orissan Muslims are Sunni.
Oromo
Oromo (Oromoo -- The Powerful). The Oromo occupy a substantial part of the land from northeastern Ethiopia to east central Kenya, and between the borders of Sudan and Somalia. They share a common language and growing common identity.
The Oromo, commonly called the Galla, enter historical records in the middle of the sixteenth century, when they expanded to the north and northeast from an original homeland in what is today southern Ethiopia. For some reason, perhaps related to the wars and weakness of the Abyssinian/Ethiopian states at that time, Oromo began a series of raids which carried them, within a few decades, well into northern Ethiopia. During succeeding centuries they came to occupy much of the best land of highland Ethiopia, while other Oromo groups spread across the more barren lowland areas of southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya. When they began their great movements in the sixteenth century, they were apparently primarily pastoral and egalitarian and practiced their own religion. Over the past four centuries they have become remarkably diversified in social and political structure, economy and religion, although certain common underlying patterns are discernible among many of the Oromo groups.
Linguistic evidence suggests that the Oromo had long resided in southern Ethiopia before their sixteenth century expansion, and no other place of origin is indicated for them. As the Oromo conquered new territories, their lives were modified. They moved into new environments and encountered new neighbors, political forces and religions. In the far north, the Wollo, Raya and Yejju became a prominent force in the politics of the Abyssinian state and played vital roles in the competition for power in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is said that today members of these groups are more likely to speak Amharic and Tigrinya than the Oromo language. Their leaders converted to Islam in the nineteenth century, and the people followed.
In Wellega and in the Gibe River region of southwest Ethiopia, the Oromo developed six kingdoms of their own. The rulers of the new state in Wellega, formed about 1850, became Ethiopian Christians, while the kings of the five Gibe states, Jimma, Limmu, Gera, Guma and Gomma, all converted to Islam in the first half of the eighteenth century. Islam was brought to this region primarily by merchants from northern Ethiopia. (All of these states were incorporated into the expanding Ethiopian empire by the 1890s.)
Most of the other Oromo groups, whether pastoral or sedentary agriculturalists, retain important elements of the original Oromo sociopolitical system and religion, subject, however, to many modifications and to control by the Ethiopian state. In the Harar area, however, the Oromo were heavily affected by the Muslim city-state of Harar and by the Egyptian occupation of that area in the period 1875-1885. The Oromo became Muslim at that time, either as a result of forced conversion or by choice. To the west and south of Harar, many Arsi and Bale Oromo also converted to Islam.
Islam spread fastest in the nineteenth century as a result of the conversion of rulers and their courts, whose people subsequently followed them. Then, and now, it also spread as individuals responded to the influence or missionary efforts of other Muslims, especially traders. Conversion is particularly marked among those Oromo who desire to join the community of merchants, since Muslims tend to dominate trade in many areas of Ethiopia.
Oromoo see Oromo
The Powerful see Oromo
The Powerful see Oromo
Orthodox Jews
Orthodox Jews. Jews having an orientation in Judaism that is strictly based upon a traditional understanding of their religion. As they see it, all values and regulations of Judaism are just as valid in modern times, as they ever have been. Orthodox Judaism is not so much a protest against modern orientations in Judaism as it is a strict continuation of traditional Judaism. As the Orthodox see it, only well educated theologians can interpret the scriptures. Hence there is little room for the modern interpretations that often have come from secular or secular-inspired authorities, like what is the case for Reform Judaism.
The Orthodox believe that the content of both the Written Law (the Torah, the first five books of the Old Testament) and Oral Law (codified in the Mishnah and interpreted in the Talmud) are eternal and cannot be changed or omitted.
The Orthodox practice their religion daily. They study the Torah, follow the dietary injunctions, and respect all aspects of the celebration of the Sabbath.
Despite its conservatism, there have been some changes inside Orthodox Judaism, as evidenced by the changes wrought by Samson Raphael Hirsch in the 19th century. In the 19th century, the German thinker Samson Raphael Hirsch introduced modifications to Orthodox Judaism which allowed modern dress, vernacular language in ceremonies and more openness towards modern society.
In the early twentieth century, Orthodox leaders opposed the ideas and work of Zionists for a Jewish state in Palestine. This was mainly because they were afraid that the secular orientation of the Zionists would reduce the importance of Judaism in the future Jewish state.
However, in 1948, when the state of Israel was formed, the Orthodox politicians managed to make their orientation the official state sanctioned form of Judaism. Indeed, over time, Orthodox Jews became very active in Israeli politics, and they even formed their own party, the Shas (Shomrei Torah Sephardim), which won 17 of the 120 seats in the Knesset in 1999.
Although there have been some modernizing changes amongst the Orthodox, in their synagogues there is a clear division between men and women, and there are no sorts of music during the communal service.
Orthodox Jews. Jews having an orientation in Judaism that is strictly based upon a traditional understanding of their religion. As they see it, all values and regulations of Judaism are just as valid in modern times, as they ever have been. Orthodox Judaism is not so much a protest against modern orientations in Judaism as it is a strict continuation of traditional Judaism. As the Orthodox see it, only well educated theologians can interpret the scriptures. Hence there is little room for the modern interpretations that often have come from secular or secular-inspired authorities, like what is the case for Reform Judaism.
The Orthodox believe that the content of both the Written Law (the Torah, the first five books of the Old Testament) and Oral Law (codified in the Mishnah and interpreted in the Talmud) are eternal and cannot be changed or omitted.
The Orthodox practice their religion daily. They study the Torah, follow the dietary injunctions, and respect all aspects of the celebration of the Sabbath.
Despite its conservatism, there have been some changes inside Orthodox Judaism, as evidenced by the changes wrought by Samson Raphael Hirsch in the 19th century. In the 19th century, the German thinker Samson Raphael Hirsch introduced modifications to Orthodox Judaism which allowed modern dress, vernacular language in ceremonies and more openness towards modern society.
In the early twentieth century, Orthodox leaders opposed the ideas and work of Zionists for a Jewish state in Palestine. This was mainly because they were afraid that the secular orientation of the Zionists would reduce the importance of Judaism in the future Jewish state.
However, in 1948, when the state of Israel was formed, the Orthodox politicians managed to make their orientation the official state sanctioned form of Judaism. Indeed, over time, Orthodox Jews became very active in Israeli politics, and they even formed their own party, the Shas (Shomrei Torah Sephardim), which won 17 of the 120 seats in the Knesset in 1999.
Although there have been some modernizing changes amongst the Orthodox, in their synagogues there is a clear division between men and women, and there are no sorts of music during the communal service.
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