Deccan Sultans
Deccan Sultans. Rulers of six Indo-Muslim sultanates between the fourteenth and late seventeenth centuries in the Deccan plateau of India. Each of the Deccan sultanates evolved distinctive cultures that absorbed and modified cultural elements deriving from both Indian and Southwest Asian traditions.
The Deccan plateau comprises the upper portion of peninsular India, stretching from the range of mountains just inland from the west coast to the Bay of Bengal in the east, and from the Vindhya Mountains in the north to the Tungabhadra River in the south. This area had already been substantially hinduized before the arrival of Muslim influences, with three vernacular language regions -- Marathi, Telugu, and Kannada -- clearly emerging from about the twelfth century. Islamic influence in the plateau proper commenced in 1296 when Ala ud-Din Khalji, a Turkish officer serving the Delhi sultanate, raided and sacked the Yadava capital of Devagiri in the Marathi country. This was followed by a series of military incursions in the early fourteenth century, culminating in the Delhi sultanate’s formal annexation of the Marathi-speaking northern Deccan in 1318. The whole period from 1296 to 1347 was thus one in which Turkish or Indo-Turkish settlers, adventurers, soldiers, saints, and scholars migrated into the Deccan, forming as it were the cutting edge of the Delhi sultanate’s expanding military and cultural frontier.
By the middle of the fourteenth century, however, the Delhi sultanate ceased to exercise its authority over the class of transplanted northerners in the Deccan who, settled in a region far from their homelands, began to feel a sense of their own cultural and political autonomy. Led by one Isma‘il Mukh, these settlers declared their independence from the Delhi sultanate in 1345, and two years later they established the first independent sultanate in the Deccan. This was the Bahmani kingdom, named after its first sultan, Ala ud-Din Bahman Shah. Lasting from 1347 to 1526, this dynasty of kings managed to establish its hegemony over the entire Deccan plateau, at its height extending its domain from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal. This was accomplished in part from an efficient administrative system that used the same basic formula of success that was found in most Indo-Muslim sultanates: on the civil side, the Bahmani rulers managed to appropriate the services of the existing class of Hindu land revenue collectors, while on the military side, it combined a central body of crack troops personally loyal to the sultan with a decentralized network of officer-nobles who were assigned territorial administration in return for maintaining irregular troops.
This combination of military systems, especially when backed up by infusions of cavalry horses from Central Asia or through the port of Goa, proved extremely effective in dislodging local Hindu princes from power. But the system also contained the seeds of its own demise, as local commanders possessing local bases of power could, like Isma‘il Mukh, entertain the possibility of rebelling against the center and establishing new, independent sultanates. In time, in fact, the governors of the more important Bahmani provinces did just that, and by the late fifteenth century five independent sultanates had broken off from the disintegrating parent Bahmani sultanate. These were the Imad Shahi kingdom of Berar (1460-1574) in the northern part of the former Bahmani domain, the Barid Shahi kingdom of Bidar (1487-1619) in the central Deccan, the Nizam Shahi kingdom of Ahmadnagar (1490-1633) in the northwest, the Adil Shahi kingdom of Bijapur (1490-1686) in the southwest, and the Qutb Shahi kingdom of Golconda (1496-1687) in the eastern Deccan. The first two, smaller and weaker, were absorbed by their neighbors, whereas the last three were more powerful and were each in turn eventually absorbed by the supreme power of seventeenth century India, the Mughal Empire.
One of the central social problems of the Bahmani sultans, inherited too by each of the successor kingdoms, stemmed from administrative necessity. Reluctant to entrust their upper civil and military bureaucracies to Hindus, most sultanates sought Muslim immigrants from either North India or Southwest Asia to meet their staffing needs. But once recruited, these fresh immigrants tended not to assimilate easily with older classes descended from earlier migrants, and in fact often affected a sense of superiority over the latter. Thus, in the course of the fifteenth century two rival social groups emerged within the ranks of the ruling class: the “foreigners” (called afaqi) and the Deccanis. Whereas the former were often Iranian, spoke Persian, and were Shi‘a Muslims, the latter considered themselves natives of the Deccan, spoke a proto-Urdu language called Dakhni, and were usually Sunni Muslims. The poisonous animosity that existed between these two classes of ruling Muslims occasionally erupted in armed conflict and formed another cause of the political decline of the Deccan sultanates. Moreover, the Shi‘a orientation of the foreigners was ultimately to provide the Mughal emperor Aurangzib, a devout Sunni, with a pretext for waging disastrous wars against the last surviving sultanates, Bijapur and Golconda, in the late seventeenth century.
The contemporary Persian chronicles that form our primary sources for the history of these sultanates are replete with narratives of their various military affairs and political intrigues. First, there were the wars waged by two sultanates, Bijapur and Ahmadnagar, against the Portuguese in the early sixteenth century. Vastly superior Portuguese naval power decided most conflicts in the Europeans’ favor, resulting in the establishment of Portuguese coastal enclaves such as in Goa, which was seized from Bijapur in 1511. More typical were the civil wars that plagued all five successor sultanates throughout their history. Rulers owed their political existence to their sheer military capacity to wrest independence from former overlords and to maintain that independence against the encroachments of their neighbors. Consequently, the sultanates were always jockeying for position, with challenges to the control of key hill-forts typically touching off costly wars between them. The most disastrous wars for those sultanates that survived into the seventeenth century, however, were those waged against the Mughal Empire. After absorbing Malwa and Gujarat into the Mughal Empire, the emperor Akbar began putting pressure on the Nizam Shahi kingdom of Ahmadnagar in the 1590s, and, though heroically defended first by the queen Chand Bibi and later by the Abyssinian Malik Ambar, the kingdom eventually fell to Mughal arms in 1633. The same fate was to befall Bijapur and Golconda later in that century.
Additionally, there were the wars waged by the Deccan sultanates against the powerful Hindu state to the south, Vijayanagara. Ever since 1296, Indo-Turkish pressure from North India had forced Telugu and Marathi speaking Hindu warrior groups from the northern Deccan to migrate to the south, where they re-established themselves as warrior states armed with an explicitly Hindu ideological orientation. The most important of these, Vijayanagara, was founded in 1336 and established an immense capital city of the same name along the banks of the Tungabhadra River, which formed a bulwark against the further southward expansion of Indo-Turkish power. Eight major wars were fought between Bahmani and Vijayanagara armies between 1349 and 1481. After the fall of the Bahmani dynasty, its successor states continued this tradition of hostility until 1565, when Sultan Ali Adil Shah I of Bijapur forged an alliance of Deccan sultanates that managed to defeat the Hindu state and sack its great capital city in the Battle of Talikota.
The cultural traditions of the Deccan sultanates were shaped by two factors: their desire to recruit Muslim administrators, soldiers, Sufis, and scholars from Iran and Arab Southwest Asia, to which they looked for cultural inspiration, and their tendency over time to adopt local Marathi, Telugu, or Kannada customs in the area of speech, dress, diet, art, and architecture. Thus, for example, in the reigns of Sultan Firuz Bahmani (r. 1397-1422) and especially his son Ahmad Bahmani (r. 1422-1436), foreigners, mainly Persians, were actively recruited and rapidly filled ranking social and political positions. By the sixteenth and, especially, the seventeenth centuries, however, when European naval power and Mughal land power had cut off the Deccan’s access to Southwest Asia, the Deccan sultanates were forced to rely upon local Muslims (Deccanis) and Hindus to run their kingdoms. In fact, from the mid-1500s, Bijapur had turned over the major part of its revenue bureaucracy to local Marathi speaking Hindu classes, and the other sultanates were to follow suit. At the same time, the defeat of Vijayanagara in1565 prompted the exodus of thousands of artists, masons, artisans, singers, and dancers formerly dependent upon Vijayanagara patronage to move northward and seek such patronage in the “Muslim” courts of Bijapur and Golconda.
The net result was the gradual indianization of the Deccan sultanates, a process most vividly seen in the court patronage of Dakhni, the local lingua franca that borrowed freely from the indigenous languages of the Deccan, and in the miniature painting and architectural projects sponsored by these same courts. The two richest Deccan sultanates, Bijapur and Golconda, carried these artistic traditions the furthest, with Golconda’s Charminar gate in modern Hyderabad and Bijapur’s Ibrahim Rauza and Mihtar Mahal being perhaps the most outstanding architectural manifestations of a composite cultural tradition beautifully combining elements from Southwest Asia and the Deccan plateau.
Deccan Sultans. Rulers of six Indo-Muslim sultanates between the fourteenth and late seventeenth centuries in the Deccan plateau of India. Each of the Deccan sultanates evolved distinctive cultures that absorbed and modified cultural elements deriving from both Indian and Southwest Asian traditions.
The Deccan plateau comprises the upper portion of peninsular India, stretching from the range of mountains just inland from the west coast to the Bay of Bengal in the east, and from the Vindhya Mountains in the north to the Tungabhadra River in the south. This area had already been substantially hinduized before the arrival of Muslim influences, with three vernacular language regions -- Marathi, Telugu, and Kannada -- clearly emerging from about the twelfth century. Islamic influence in the plateau proper commenced in 1296 when Ala ud-Din Khalji, a Turkish officer serving the Delhi sultanate, raided and sacked the Yadava capital of Devagiri in the Marathi country. This was followed by a series of military incursions in the early fourteenth century, culminating in the Delhi sultanate’s formal annexation of the Marathi-speaking northern Deccan in 1318. The whole period from 1296 to 1347 was thus one in which Turkish or Indo-Turkish settlers, adventurers, soldiers, saints, and scholars migrated into the Deccan, forming as it were the cutting edge of the Delhi sultanate’s expanding military and cultural frontier.
By the middle of the fourteenth century, however, the Delhi sultanate ceased to exercise its authority over the class of transplanted northerners in the Deccan who, settled in a region far from their homelands, began to feel a sense of their own cultural and political autonomy. Led by one Isma‘il Mukh, these settlers declared their independence from the Delhi sultanate in 1345, and two years later they established the first independent sultanate in the Deccan. This was the Bahmani kingdom, named after its first sultan, Ala ud-Din Bahman Shah. Lasting from 1347 to 1526, this dynasty of kings managed to establish its hegemony over the entire Deccan plateau, at its height extending its domain from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal. This was accomplished in part from an efficient administrative system that used the same basic formula of success that was found in most Indo-Muslim sultanates: on the civil side, the Bahmani rulers managed to appropriate the services of the existing class of Hindu land revenue collectors, while on the military side, it combined a central body of crack troops personally loyal to the sultan with a decentralized network of officer-nobles who were assigned territorial administration in return for maintaining irregular troops.
This combination of military systems, especially when backed up by infusions of cavalry horses from Central Asia or through the port of Goa, proved extremely effective in dislodging local Hindu princes from power. But the system also contained the seeds of its own demise, as local commanders possessing local bases of power could, like Isma‘il Mukh, entertain the possibility of rebelling against the center and establishing new, independent sultanates. In time, in fact, the governors of the more important Bahmani provinces did just that, and by the late fifteenth century five independent sultanates had broken off from the disintegrating parent Bahmani sultanate. These were the Imad Shahi kingdom of Berar (1460-1574) in the northern part of the former Bahmani domain, the Barid Shahi kingdom of Bidar (1487-1619) in the central Deccan, the Nizam Shahi kingdom of Ahmadnagar (1490-1633) in the northwest, the Adil Shahi kingdom of Bijapur (1490-1686) in the southwest, and the Qutb Shahi kingdom of Golconda (1496-1687) in the eastern Deccan. The first two, smaller and weaker, were absorbed by their neighbors, whereas the last three were more powerful and were each in turn eventually absorbed by the supreme power of seventeenth century India, the Mughal Empire.
One of the central social problems of the Bahmani sultans, inherited too by each of the successor kingdoms, stemmed from administrative necessity. Reluctant to entrust their upper civil and military bureaucracies to Hindus, most sultanates sought Muslim immigrants from either North India or Southwest Asia to meet their staffing needs. But once recruited, these fresh immigrants tended not to assimilate easily with older classes descended from earlier migrants, and in fact often affected a sense of superiority over the latter. Thus, in the course of the fifteenth century two rival social groups emerged within the ranks of the ruling class: the “foreigners” (called afaqi) and the Deccanis. Whereas the former were often Iranian, spoke Persian, and were Shi‘a Muslims, the latter considered themselves natives of the Deccan, spoke a proto-Urdu language called Dakhni, and were usually Sunni Muslims. The poisonous animosity that existed between these two classes of ruling Muslims occasionally erupted in armed conflict and formed another cause of the political decline of the Deccan sultanates. Moreover, the Shi‘a orientation of the foreigners was ultimately to provide the Mughal emperor Aurangzib, a devout Sunni, with a pretext for waging disastrous wars against the last surviving sultanates, Bijapur and Golconda, in the late seventeenth century.
The contemporary Persian chronicles that form our primary sources for the history of these sultanates are replete with narratives of their various military affairs and political intrigues. First, there were the wars waged by two sultanates, Bijapur and Ahmadnagar, against the Portuguese in the early sixteenth century. Vastly superior Portuguese naval power decided most conflicts in the Europeans’ favor, resulting in the establishment of Portuguese coastal enclaves such as in Goa, which was seized from Bijapur in 1511. More typical were the civil wars that plagued all five successor sultanates throughout their history. Rulers owed their political existence to their sheer military capacity to wrest independence from former overlords and to maintain that independence against the encroachments of their neighbors. Consequently, the sultanates were always jockeying for position, with challenges to the control of key hill-forts typically touching off costly wars between them. The most disastrous wars for those sultanates that survived into the seventeenth century, however, were those waged against the Mughal Empire. After absorbing Malwa and Gujarat into the Mughal Empire, the emperor Akbar began putting pressure on the Nizam Shahi kingdom of Ahmadnagar in the 1590s, and, though heroically defended first by the queen Chand Bibi and later by the Abyssinian Malik Ambar, the kingdom eventually fell to Mughal arms in 1633. The same fate was to befall Bijapur and Golconda later in that century.
Additionally, there were the wars waged by the Deccan sultanates against the powerful Hindu state to the south, Vijayanagara. Ever since 1296, Indo-Turkish pressure from North India had forced Telugu and Marathi speaking Hindu warrior groups from the northern Deccan to migrate to the south, where they re-established themselves as warrior states armed with an explicitly Hindu ideological orientation. The most important of these, Vijayanagara, was founded in 1336 and established an immense capital city of the same name along the banks of the Tungabhadra River, which formed a bulwark against the further southward expansion of Indo-Turkish power. Eight major wars were fought between Bahmani and Vijayanagara armies between 1349 and 1481. After the fall of the Bahmani dynasty, its successor states continued this tradition of hostility until 1565, when Sultan Ali Adil Shah I of Bijapur forged an alliance of Deccan sultanates that managed to defeat the Hindu state and sack its great capital city in the Battle of Talikota.
The cultural traditions of the Deccan sultanates were shaped by two factors: their desire to recruit Muslim administrators, soldiers, Sufis, and scholars from Iran and Arab Southwest Asia, to which they looked for cultural inspiration, and their tendency over time to adopt local Marathi, Telugu, or Kannada customs in the area of speech, dress, diet, art, and architecture. Thus, for example, in the reigns of Sultan Firuz Bahmani (r. 1397-1422) and especially his son Ahmad Bahmani (r. 1422-1436), foreigners, mainly Persians, were actively recruited and rapidly filled ranking social and political positions. By the sixteenth and, especially, the seventeenth centuries, however, when European naval power and Mughal land power had cut off the Deccan’s access to Southwest Asia, the Deccan sultanates were forced to rely upon local Muslims (Deccanis) and Hindus to run their kingdoms. In fact, from the mid-1500s, Bijapur had turned over the major part of its revenue bureaucracy to local Marathi speaking Hindu classes, and the other sultanates were to follow suit. At the same time, the defeat of Vijayanagara in1565 prompted the exodus of thousands of artists, masons, artisans, singers, and dancers formerly dependent upon Vijayanagara patronage to move northward and seek such patronage in the “Muslim” courts of Bijapur and Golconda.
The net result was the gradual indianization of the Deccan sultanates, a process most vividly seen in the court patronage of Dakhni, the local lingua franca that borrowed freely from the indigenous languages of the Deccan, and in the miniature painting and architectural projects sponsored by these same courts. The two richest Deccan sultanates, Bijapur and Golconda, carried these artistic traditions the furthest, with Golconda’s Charminar gate in modern Hyderabad and Bijapur’s Ibrahim Rauza and Mihtar Mahal being perhaps the most outstanding architectural manifestations of a composite cultural tradition beautifully combining elements from Southwest Asia and the Deccan plateau.
Delhi Sultans
Delhi Sultans (Delhi Sultanate). Members of the major Islamic dynasties of India 1206-1526/1556. The sultans of Delhi were the successors of the Ghaznavids and Ghurids in the Punjab and northern India. During the decline of the Ghurids, their Turkish general Qutb al-Din Aibak (1206-1210) declared his independence and established the realm of the so-called “slave sultans” of Delhi. Among these Iltutmish (1210-1236) was the most prominent. The conquest of Sind earned him a reputation as the main architect of Islamic rule in India. In 1290, the “slave sultans” were toppled by the Khalji dynasty (1290-1320). Ala al-Din Khalji (1296-1316) repelled the Mongols and conquered the Deccan (central India) for Islam. From the Tughluq dynasty that followed (1320-1414), Firuz (1351-1388) was able to consolidate its rule in northern India, yet following his death various sultanates defected from Delhi (Bengal, Deccan, Gujarat, Jaunpur, Malwa). In 1398, Delhi was occupied by Timur. The Sayyid dynasty (1414-1451) was followed by the Afghan Lodis (1451-1526), who were removed in 1526 by the first Great Mughal, Babur. With the expulsion of Babur’s son, Humayun, by Sher Shah Suri (1540-1545) and his successors (up to 1556), the sultanate of Delhi was re-established for a short period.
The establishment of the Delhi sultanate, which followed the overthrow of the Rajput kingdoms of northern India, led to vital changes in the political, social, and economic life of the country. It liquidated the multistate system and the feudal polity of the Rajputs and paved the way for a centralized monarchy with a pan-Indian administrative service. The land grants given by the sultans were essentially bureaucratic assignments and proved an effective local apparatus for the integration of the country. The Rajput cities, as described by al-Biruni in his Kitab al-Hind, were planned on the basis of caste. The Early Turkish sultans initiated an urban revolution by throwing open these cities to all types of people and converting them from “caste cities” into “cosmopolitan cities.” These new cities led to readjustment in social relationship and changed the entire milieu. The Turkish power was sustained and stabilized by these cities. The sultans restored India’s broken contact with the outside world and gave a new impetus to commercial activity. In place of a limited market, conditioned by caste and feudal situation, there appeared an international market stretching from Baghdad to Lakhnauti. One other important impact of the establishment of the sultanate was that throughout the entire territory Persian became the language of administration, replacing the innumerable languages and dialects that were spoken from one part of the country to another.
The rise of the Delhi sultanate was synchronous with the rise of Jenghiz Khan in Central Asia. Iltutmish tactfully avoided confrontation with the Mongols. His successors, until the time of Nasir ud-Din Mahmud (1246-1266), followed a policy of appeasement and aloofness, so much so that in 1260, barely two years after the sack of Baghdad by Hulegu and the murder of the legal sovereign of the Delhi sultanate (the khalifa of Baghdad), the Delhi court received the Mongol emissaries with great enthusiasm. Balban (1266-1287) changed the Mongol policy of the sultanate and garrisoned the frontier region to meet the Mongol challenge. But this affected his expansionist ambitions and he could only maintain a status quo so far as territorial growth was concerned. He succeeded in his objective to a large extent but the assassination of his eldest son, Prince Muhammad, at the hands of the Mongols shattered his position.
Ala ud-Din Khalji (1296-1316) followed a policy of firm resistance toward the Mongols but he also initiated an era of imperialism and forced the rajas of the Deccan to accept his overlordship. Mubarak Khalji (1316-1320) appointed a viceroy in the Deccan and attempted annexation of the region. Muhammad ibn Tughluq (1325-1351) completed the process of integration of the South with the North, and created a second administrative city in the Deccan, renaming it Daulatabad. Under Muhammad ibn Tughluq the frontiers of the Delhi sultanate reached their greatest extent, as the sultan vigorously pursued his policy of completing the political and administrative unification of the country. When the Delhi sultanate began to disintegrate under Firuz and his successors, provincial kingdoms rose up at Jaunpur, Malwa, Gujarat, and other places. In 1526, when Babur defeated the last sultan of Delhi, the empire was confined to some parts of the Punjab and the Ganges valley.
Legally, the Delhi sultanate was a part of the Abbasid caliphate and the rulers did not claim for themselves a position higher than that of “lieutenant of the khalifa”. Iltutmish was the first to obtain an investiture from the caliph at Baghdad. Even after the fall of the caliphate (in 1258), the sultans of Delhi continued to pronounce their affiliation with the khalifat. Muhammad ibn Tughluq received recognition from the caliph in Cairo. In 1517, when Ibrahim Lodi ascended to the throne, the Abbasid caliphate had long been overthrown by the Ottomans.
The early sultans of Delhi believed in the Iranian theory of kingship and attributed divine source to their authority. Ala ud-Din Khalji introduced the element of force and claimed obedience on the basis of his power to rule. The Tughluqs, the Sayyids, and the Lodis made lofty claims about their genealogy, but after the Ilbaris the principle of legitimacy could never effectively be applied. Under the influence of Ibn Taimiya, Muhammad ibn Tughluq propounded the theory that “state and religion are twins”. The position of the monarchy received a serious setback under the Lodi Afghans, who considered their sultan as primus inter pares within the Afghan elite.
The polity of the Delhi sultanate passed through different phases. The early Turkish sultans created Turkish nobility as the main prop of their power and the sultanate became a Turkish state. The Khaljis broadened the base and converted it into an Indo-Muslim state. Under Muhammad ibn Tughluq, an effort was made to make it an Indian state, coterminous with all Indian people, in which the nobility came to be recruited from all sections of the population. This policy no doubt broadened the base of the state but destroyed its compactness and homogeneity, making the governing class a promiscuous mass of people without any common ideal or loyalty. Tribal traditions of the Lodi nobility further weakened the position of monarchy.
The administrative structure of the Delhi sultanate was an amalgam of four traditions: (1) Islamic traditions as evolved during the Abbasid period and transmitted to the Delhi sultans through the Samanids and the Ghaznavids, (2) Iranian traditions as imbibed and articulated by the Minor Dynasties, (3) Indian traditions as continued from generation to generation throughout the ages, and (4) Mongol traditions as adopted by the sultans on the basis of expediency or experience. In nomenclature, many of the institutions showed either Abbasid or Iranian influence. The taxation system had all the terms of the classical period “kharaj (land tax), ushr (a one-tenth land tax from Muslims), zakat (payment by Muslims on a year’s accumulated income), jizya (tax from non-Muslims), khams (war booty), and so forth -- but their connotations had undergone great change. The term jizya, for example, came to be used for kharaj in general, and the distinction between the Muslim and non-Muslim holders of land ceased to operate in the taxation system. The army of the sultans was organized on the decimal system and was directly recruited and paid by the center. From the footman and the bowman of the Rajput period the emphasis now shifted to the mounted horseman. The Turks are therefore referred to in Indian literature as “lords of the horse.”
The sultan was assisted by ministers in carrying on the administration of the empire. The vazir was the chief minister, whose powers and functions varied with the attitude of the sultans. Other important ministries were diwan-i risalat (which dealt with religious matters, trusts, stipends, etc.) diwan-i arz (army department), and diwan-i insha (royal correspondence). The provinces were administered and looked after by the governors. In the rural areas the khuts, muqaddams, and chaudhris constituted the local administrative apparatus. Many of the officers of the Hindu period were allowed to continue, although their duties and functions underwent some change with the policies of the sultans. The land tax varied from time to time, with the maximum realized during the reign of Ala ud-Din Khalji being 50 percent of the produce.
The Tughluq sultans initiated an elaborate agrarian policy. Muhammad ibn Tughluq adopted different methods to encourage agriculture, such as collective farming and farming by contract. A department called the diwan-i amir kohi looked after the promotion of agriculture. The power of the state to control essential commodities and fix prices was accepted. Ala ud-Din Khalji successfully implemented his policy of market control. The state undertook many welfare activities. It founded colleges and hospitals, dug canals, provided assistance for the elderly, and laid out gardens and orchards.
Judicial administration of the sultanate was run by the qazis, Islamic legal officers. In rural areas, the Hindu inhabitants enjoyed a kind of autonomy under the Hindu local officers. The muhtasib (censor of public morals) was responsible for suppressing immoral activities.
The secular nature of the institutions of the Delhi sultanate has been well brought out by the historian Zia ud-Din Barani (1285-1357). He reports that the sultanate had to frame laws that had no sanction in Islamic law (shari’a), but without which no government could be run. Religious attitudes of the individual rulers did in certain measure influence the general spirit of the government but the general policies of the sultanate were not decided on the basis of religion. Ala ud-Din is reported to have said, “I do not know what is lawful or unlawful; whatever I consider in the interest of the state, that I decree.”
A principle of religious co-existence evolved in the Delhi sultanate, Hindus were not obstructed in the performance of their religious duties and temples were not destroyed in times of peace. Iltutmish and Ala ud-Din Khalji brushed aside the suggestions of orthodox theologians to deal strictly with the Hindus and stop their religious practices. Some rulers took interest in Hindu festivals. Muhammad ibn Tughluq celebrated Holi and made huge endowments to Hindu gao maths (cow centers).
The sultanate encouraged trade, and while large numbers of foreign traders visited India, many Indian merchants went to Central Asia, Iran, and West Asian countries. Writers of the period refer to the affluent condition of Khurasani merchants in India. Muhammad ibn Tughluq abolished import duty in order to encourage trade with foreign lands, and during his time gold could be taken out of India in any quantity. It is said that the Delhi sultanate was the root, and the Mughal Empire, the fruit, of Muslim statesmanship in India.
Delhi Sultans (Delhi Sultanate). Members of the major Islamic dynasties of India 1206-1526/1556. The sultans of Delhi were the successors of the Ghaznavids and Ghurids in the Punjab and northern India. During the decline of the Ghurids, their Turkish general Qutb al-Din Aibak (1206-1210) declared his independence and established the realm of the so-called “slave sultans” of Delhi. Among these Iltutmish (1210-1236) was the most prominent. The conquest of Sind earned him a reputation as the main architect of Islamic rule in India. In 1290, the “slave sultans” were toppled by the Khalji dynasty (1290-1320). Ala al-Din Khalji (1296-1316) repelled the Mongols and conquered the Deccan (central India) for Islam. From the Tughluq dynasty that followed (1320-1414), Firuz (1351-1388) was able to consolidate its rule in northern India, yet following his death various sultanates defected from Delhi (Bengal, Deccan, Gujarat, Jaunpur, Malwa). In 1398, Delhi was occupied by Timur. The Sayyid dynasty (1414-1451) was followed by the Afghan Lodis (1451-1526), who were removed in 1526 by the first Great Mughal, Babur. With the expulsion of Babur’s son, Humayun, by Sher Shah Suri (1540-1545) and his successors (up to 1556), the sultanate of Delhi was re-established for a short period.
The establishment of the Delhi sultanate, which followed the overthrow of the Rajput kingdoms of northern India, led to vital changes in the political, social, and economic life of the country. It liquidated the multistate system and the feudal polity of the Rajputs and paved the way for a centralized monarchy with a pan-Indian administrative service. The land grants given by the sultans were essentially bureaucratic assignments and proved an effective local apparatus for the integration of the country. The Rajput cities, as described by al-Biruni in his Kitab al-Hind, were planned on the basis of caste. The Early Turkish sultans initiated an urban revolution by throwing open these cities to all types of people and converting them from “caste cities” into “cosmopolitan cities.” These new cities led to readjustment in social relationship and changed the entire milieu. The Turkish power was sustained and stabilized by these cities. The sultans restored India’s broken contact with the outside world and gave a new impetus to commercial activity. In place of a limited market, conditioned by caste and feudal situation, there appeared an international market stretching from Baghdad to Lakhnauti. One other important impact of the establishment of the sultanate was that throughout the entire territory Persian became the language of administration, replacing the innumerable languages and dialects that were spoken from one part of the country to another.
The rise of the Delhi sultanate was synchronous with the rise of Jenghiz Khan in Central Asia. Iltutmish tactfully avoided confrontation with the Mongols. His successors, until the time of Nasir ud-Din Mahmud (1246-1266), followed a policy of appeasement and aloofness, so much so that in 1260, barely two years after the sack of Baghdad by Hulegu and the murder of the legal sovereign of the Delhi sultanate (the khalifa of Baghdad), the Delhi court received the Mongol emissaries with great enthusiasm. Balban (1266-1287) changed the Mongol policy of the sultanate and garrisoned the frontier region to meet the Mongol challenge. But this affected his expansionist ambitions and he could only maintain a status quo so far as territorial growth was concerned. He succeeded in his objective to a large extent but the assassination of his eldest son, Prince Muhammad, at the hands of the Mongols shattered his position.
Ala ud-Din Khalji (1296-1316) followed a policy of firm resistance toward the Mongols but he also initiated an era of imperialism and forced the rajas of the Deccan to accept his overlordship. Mubarak Khalji (1316-1320) appointed a viceroy in the Deccan and attempted annexation of the region. Muhammad ibn Tughluq (1325-1351) completed the process of integration of the South with the North, and created a second administrative city in the Deccan, renaming it Daulatabad. Under Muhammad ibn Tughluq the frontiers of the Delhi sultanate reached their greatest extent, as the sultan vigorously pursued his policy of completing the political and administrative unification of the country. When the Delhi sultanate began to disintegrate under Firuz and his successors, provincial kingdoms rose up at Jaunpur, Malwa, Gujarat, and other places. In 1526, when Babur defeated the last sultan of Delhi, the empire was confined to some parts of the Punjab and the Ganges valley.
Legally, the Delhi sultanate was a part of the Abbasid caliphate and the rulers did not claim for themselves a position higher than that of “lieutenant of the khalifa”. Iltutmish was the first to obtain an investiture from the caliph at Baghdad. Even after the fall of the caliphate (in 1258), the sultans of Delhi continued to pronounce their affiliation with the khalifat. Muhammad ibn Tughluq received recognition from the caliph in Cairo. In 1517, when Ibrahim Lodi ascended to the throne, the Abbasid caliphate had long been overthrown by the Ottomans.
The early sultans of Delhi believed in the Iranian theory of kingship and attributed divine source to their authority. Ala ud-Din Khalji introduced the element of force and claimed obedience on the basis of his power to rule. The Tughluqs, the Sayyids, and the Lodis made lofty claims about their genealogy, but after the Ilbaris the principle of legitimacy could never effectively be applied. Under the influence of Ibn Taimiya, Muhammad ibn Tughluq propounded the theory that “state and religion are twins”. The position of the monarchy received a serious setback under the Lodi Afghans, who considered their sultan as primus inter pares within the Afghan elite.
The polity of the Delhi sultanate passed through different phases. The early Turkish sultans created Turkish nobility as the main prop of their power and the sultanate became a Turkish state. The Khaljis broadened the base and converted it into an Indo-Muslim state. Under Muhammad ibn Tughluq, an effort was made to make it an Indian state, coterminous with all Indian people, in which the nobility came to be recruited from all sections of the population. This policy no doubt broadened the base of the state but destroyed its compactness and homogeneity, making the governing class a promiscuous mass of people without any common ideal or loyalty. Tribal traditions of the Lodi nobility further weakened the position of monarchy.
The administrative structure of the Delhi sultanate was an amalgam of four traditions: (1) Islamic traditions as evolved during the Abbasid period and transmitted to the Delhi sultans through the Samanids and the Ghaznavids, (2) Iranian traditions as imbibed and articulated by the Minor Dynasties, (3) Indian traditions as continued from generation to generation throughout the ages, and (4) Mongol traditions as adopted by the sultans on the basis of expediency or experience. In nomenclature, many of the institutions showed either Abbasid or Iranian influence. The taxation system had all the terms of the classical period “kharaj (land tax), ushr (a one-tenth land tax from Muslims), zakat (payment by Muslims on a year’s accumulated income), jizya (tax from non-Muslims), khams (war booty), and so forth -- but their connotations had undergone great change. The term jizya, for example, came to be used for kharaj in general, and the distinction between the Muslim and non-Muslim holders of land ceased to operate in the taxation system. The army of the sultans was organized on the decimal system and was directly recruited and paid by the center. From the footman and the bowman of the Rajput period the emphasis now shifted to the mounted horseman. The Turks are therefore referred to in Indian literature as “lords of the horse.”
The sultan was assisted by ministers in carrying on the administration of the empire. The vazir was the chief minister, whose powers and functions varied with the attitude of the sultans. Other important ministries were diwan-i risalat (which dealt with religious matters, trusts, stipends, etc.) diwan-i arz (army department), and diwan-i insha (royal correspondence). The provinces were administered and looked after by the governors. In the rural areas the khuts, muqaddams, and chaudhris constituted the local administrative apparatus. Many of the officers of the Hindu period were allowed to continue, although their duties and functions underwent some change with the policies of the sultans. The land tax varied from time to time, with the maximum realized during the reign of Ala ud-Din Khalji being 50 percent of the produce.
The Tughluq sultans initiated an elaborate agrarian policy. Muhammad ibn Tughluq adopted different methods to encourage agriculture, such as collective farming and farming by contract. A department called the diwan-i amir kohi looked after the promotion of agriculture. The power of the state to control essential commodities and fix prices was accepted. Ala ud-Din Khalji successfully implemented his policy of market control. The state undertook many welfare activities. It founded colleges and hospitals, dug canals, provided assistance for the elderly, and laid out gardens and orchards.
Judicial administration of the sultanate was run by the qazis, Islamic legal officers. In rural areas, the Hindu inhabitants enjoyed a kind of autonomy under the Hindu local officers. The muhtasib (censor of public morals) was responsible for suppressing immoral activities.
The secular nature of the institutions of the Delhi sultanate has been well brought out by the historian Zia ud-Din Barani (1285-1357). He reports that the sultanate had to frame laws that had no sanction in Islamic law (shari’a), but without which no government could be run. Religious attitudes of the individual rulers did in certain measure influence the general spirit of the government but the general policies of the sultanate were not decided on the basis of religion. Ala ud-Din is reported to have said, “I do not know what is lawful or unlawful; whatever I consider in the interest of the state, that I decree.”
A principle of religious co-existence evolved in the Delhi sultanate, Hindus were not obstructed in the performance of their religious duties and temples were not destroyed in times of peace. Iltutmish and Ala ud-Din Khalji brushed aside the suggestions of orthodox theologians to deal strictly with the Hindus and stop their religious practices. Some rulers took interest in Hindu festivals. Muhammad ibn Tughluq celebrated Holi and made huge endowments to Hindu gao maths (cow centers).
The sultanate encouraged trade, and while large numbers of foreign traders visited India, many Indian merchants went to Central Asia, Iran, and West Asian countries. Writers of the period refer to the affluent condition of Khurasani merchants in India. Muhammad ibn Tughluq abolished import duty in order to encourage trade with foreign lands, and during his time gold could be taken out of India in any quantity. It is said that the Delhi sultanate was the root, and the Mughal Empire, the fruit, of Muslim statesmanship in India.
Demirel
Demirel (Suleyman Demirel) (Sami Süleyman Gündoğdu Demirel) (b. November 1, 1924). Turkish politician and prime minister of Turkey (1965-1971 and 1975-1977).
Demirel was born in Islamskoy (Islamkoy) into a peasant family. In 1948, he graduated from the Technical University of Istanbul as an engineer.
In 1961, Demirel was elected to the National Assembly as a member of the Justice Party, and in 1964, he became the leader of the Justice Party.
On October 27, 1965, following the general elections, Demirel became the youngest prime minister in Turkey’s history. Demirel won re-election in 1969. In March of 1971, Demirel was forced to resign by the military commanders who were dissatisfied with his low profile in combating terrorist actions around the country.
In March of 1975, Demirel’s Justice Party and a coalition of small parties called Nationalist Front won the general elections. Demirel returned to the position of prime minister.
Demirel’s government fell in June of 1977 forcing Demirel to form a new government in July of 1977, but this new government also fell within only six months of its creation.
In November 1979, Demirel formed his sixth government. But with unemployment at 20 percent, Demirel was unable to stop the political terrorism that continued to plague the country, and in September of 1980 a military government replaced him.
In 1982, with a new Turkish constitution, Demirel was banned from politics for ten years.
In November 1991, following the defeat of the Motherland Party in the general elections, and the success of Demirel’s True Path Party, Demirel returned to politics and formed his seventh government.
In May 1993, President Turgut Ozal died. Demirel stepped down from his position as prime minister in order to become the new president.
In January 1996, Demirel asked the Islamist politician Necmettin Erbakan to form a new government. In May of the same year, Demirel escaped assassination by a militant Islamist.
In December 1999, Demirel appealed to the parliament to suspend the death sentence passed on the Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan.
In May 2000, as his constitutionally allowed period as president came to an end, Demirel stepped down as president and was succeeded by Ahmet Necdet Sezer. Later that same year, in December, Demirel was appointed to the Mitchell Committee to investigate the wave of violence in Southwest Asia and North Africa.
During his political career, Demirel was active in forging closer ties with NATO, and he instituted development programs for the peasantry. He was much concerned with aiding economical growth, but faced huge problems with inflation and a trade deficit, as well as civil violence and terrorism. During his time as president, Demirel opposed a plan for a customs union with the European Union.
Demirel had to find a balance between his politics and the interests of the military, but was removed from power twice. Another problem of his was that some of the governments he formed were too weak to allow proper implementation of his politics.
He married Nazmiye Demirel. The couple had no children.
Following retirement from politics, Demirel was frequently a panelist and speaker at several universities in Turkey.
The Suleyman Demirel Airport and Suleyman Demirel University, both of which are in Isparta are named after him. So are the Süleyman Demirel Stadium in Antalya and Süleyman Demirel Medical Centre of Ataturk University in Erzurum.
Suleyman Demirel see Demirel
Demirel (Suleyman Demirel) (Sami Süleyman Gündoğdu Demirel) (b. November 1, 1924). Turkish politician and prime minister of Turkey (1965-1971 and 1975-1977).
Demirel was born in Islamskoy (Islamkoy) into a peasant family. In 1948, he graduated from the Technical University of Istanbul as an engineer.
In 1961, Demirel was elected to the National Assembly as a member of the Justice Party, and in 1964, he became the leader of the Justice Party.
On October 27, 1965, following the general elections, Demirel became the youngest prime minister in Turkey’s history. Demirel won re-election in 1969. In March of 1971, Demirel was forced to resign by the military commanders who were dissatisfied with his low profile in combating terrorist actions around the country.
In March of 1975, Demirel’s Justice Party and a coalition of small parties called Nationalist Front won the general elections. Demirel returned to the position of prime minister.
Demirel’s government fell in June of 1977 forcing Demirel to form a new government in July of 1977, but this new government also fell within only six months of its creation.
In November 1979, Demirel formed his sixth government. But with unemployment at 20 percent, Demirel was unable to stop the political terrorism that continued to plague the country, and in September of 1980 a military government replaced him.
In 1982, with a new Turkish constitution, Demirel was banned from politics for ten years.
In November 1991, following the defeat of the Motherland Party in the general elections, and the success of Demirel’s True Path Party, Demirel returned to politics and formed his seventh government.
In May 1993, President Turgut Ozal died. Demirel stepped down from his position as prime minister in order to become the new president.
In January 1996, Demirel asked the Islamist politician Necmettin Erbakan to form a new government. In May of the same year, Demirel escaped assassination by a militant Islamist.
In December 1999, Demirel appealed to the parliament to suspend the death sentence passed on the Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan.
In May 2000, as his constitutionally allowed period as president came to an end, Demirel stepped down as president and was succeeded by Ahmet Necdet Sezer. Later that same year, in December, Demirel was appointed to the Mitchell Committee to investigate the wave of violence in Southwest Asia and North Africa.
During his political career, Demirel was active in forging closer ties with NATO, and he instituted development programs for the peasantry. He was much concerned with aiding economical growth, but faced huge problems with inflation and a trade deficit, as well as civil violence and terrorism. During his time as president, Demirel opposed a plan for a customs union with the European Union.
Demirel had to find a balance between his politics and the interests of the military, but was removed from power twice. Another problem of his was that some of the governments he formed were too weak to allow proper implementation of his politics.
He married Nazmiye Demirel. The couple had no children.
Following retirement from politics, Demirel was frequently a panelist and speaker at several universities in Turkey.
The Suleyman Demirel Airport and Suleyman Demirel University, both of which are in Isparta are named after him. So are the Süleyman Demirel Stadium in Antalya and Süleyman Demirel Medical Centre of Ataturk University in Erzurum.
Suleyman Demirel see Demirel
Demokrat Parti
Demokrat Parti (DP). Ruling party of Turkey from 1950 until its overthrow by a military coup on May 27, 1960. Its founders, Celal Bayar (1884-1986), Mehmet Fuat Koprulu (1890-1966), Refik Koraltan (1891-1974), and Adnan Menderes (1899-1961), were all ranking members of the governing Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party, CHP). Bayar, a banker in his early life, had played a critical role during the Kemalist period in the liberal, anti-statist wing of the party and had served as prime minister in 1937-1938. Koprulu, a historian and Turcologist, had proposed a reformation that would turkify Islam; his proposal, however, was not taken seriously. Koraltan was a bureaucrat, and Menderes a large landowner from the prosperous Aegean region. Together they represented the liberal wing of the CHP; in forming the DP, they responded to the rising bourgeoisie’s demand fro political and economic liberalization and an end to the state’s hegemony over civil society. The Turkish people had also come to hate the single-party regime, which had become increasingly repressive, especially during World War II. The imposition of militant secularism was especially resented by the sullen population. The pressure for political change that came from a victorious America, which encouraged pluralism and a free-market economy, ought not to be discounted either.
The introduction of multi-party politics and the lively competition for votes made Islam a burning issue and forced all parties to re-evaluate their religious policy. Between 1945 and the 1950 elections, the CHP abandoned its militant secularism and made concessions to Islamic sentiment. When the Democrats won power in May 1950, they merely accelerated the process, realizing that the overwhelmingly Muslim population had been alienated by state interference in religious life.
The Democrats’ first concession was quite dramatic: in June, 1950, they lifted the ban on the call to prayer (ezan) being made in Arabic and permitted muezzins to sing the ezan in either Arabic or Turkish. Most chose Arabic, and the impact of this reform resounded throughout the country. On July 5, 1950, they permitted the broadcasting of religious programs over the radio, and the Qur’an was heard over the airwaves. In October, religious lesson in schools (introduced by the CHP) became virtually obligatory when parents were asked to inform the authorities in writing if they did not want their children to attend such lessons. Few Muslim parents did so.
There was a bipartisan consensus on religious policy as long as the secular reforms of Ataturk were not threatened. In fact, both parties welcomed the Director of Religious Affairs’ pronouncement against communism. “Islam,” declared Ahmed Hamdi Akseki, “rejects communism absolutely, its ideology in any form and all its practices. Faith and spirit are the most powerful weapons against communism. It is not possible for a genuine believer to reconcile himself to the ideas and practices of communism.”
The more liberal atmosphere marked by an emphasis on populist politics also led to the reappearance of a variety of religious orders popular with the masses. Their leaders believed that Islamist political pressure would compel the DP government to reverse some of the major reforms of the republic, notably the Western code of law and the Latin script. In the DP’s congress in Konya in 1951, there were demands for the restoration of the fez, the headwear banned in 1925, and the veiling of women. Politics also entered the mosque, and the Friday sermon was often used to denounce the opposition for being anti-Islam. Even Ataturk’s busts and statues, found in every village and town, were vandalized.
The CHP, founded by Ataturk and claiming his mantle, blamed the Democrats for failing to protect the Kemalism to which both parties were constitutionally committed. Prime Minister Menderes responded by taking stern measures against the reactionaries. In March 1951 orders were issued to protect Ataturk’s statues, and men like Necip Fazil Kisakurek, who led to Islamic resurgence, were prosecuted. Islamist publications were proscribed. In June 1951, members of the Tijani order, who were agitating for the restoration of a theocratic monarchy (also a violation of the constitution), were arrested. Their shaykh, Kemal Pilavoglu, was sentenced to ten years at hard labor. The “Ataturk Bill” passed by the Assembly on July 25, 1951, gave the state greater powers to prosecute those who threatened the secular republic. Under this law, the Islamic Democrat Party was dissolved in March 1952, Kisakurek was sent to jail, and Said Nursi (Nurculuk), the leader of the Nurists, was put on trial. Finally, the “Law to protect the Freedom of Conscience” was passed in July 1953 to prevent Islam from being used for political ends. Under this law, when the Nation Party, founded in July 1948 by a right wing splinter group in the DP, made Islam a part of its political platform, it was dissolved by court order on January 27, 1954.
In the 1954, election, however, all parties exploited religion to attract votes, though with little success. The DP’s victory was even more resounding than in 1950, its triumph being based on its economic policies, which initially brought the country prosperity as well as a great sense of dynamism and hope. Only in Kirsehir was Islam’s role criticial; there the Republican Nation Party, supported by the Bektashi order, won all seats.
After 1955 the DP too began to exploit Islam more openly. There were two principal reasons for the change. First, the liberal Kemalist wing broke away and formed the Freedom Party, strengthening the right wing. Second, the economy began to stall, leading the Democrats to flout their religious image as a distraction. They cultivated the religious orders because they controlled local voting blocs. More money was spent on mosques, and the Democrats boasted that they had spent 37.5 million liras (over thirteen million dollars) in seven years, while the CHP had spent only 6.5 million liras in their twenty-seven years.
The decline of the DP’s vote from 56.6 percent in 1954 to 47.3 percent in 1957 suggests that its religious voters were drawn away, and religious appeal was a poor substitute. Religious activity flourished in 1958, a disastrous year for the economy with the lira devalued by almost four hundred percent. Radio was now allowed to devote more airtime to religious programs, and the Nurists were left freed to spread their propaganda.
The Democrats had become identified with the resurgence of Islam. After Menderes survived an airplane crash in London in February 1959, that identification became more explicit; the hand of providence was seen in the escape, described as miraculous. The myth of Menderes’s immortality emerged, and it has been suggested that the junta that overthrew him executed Menderes to destroy this myth.
The Demokrat Parti facilitated the Islamic resurgence as any ruling party would have done to survive the challenge of competitive politics. In fact, the resurgence was more the consequence of the mass politics that replaced the politics of elites in 1945. The center of political gravity shifted to provinces largely untouched by Kemalist reforms or modern secular culture. This was recognized after the fall of the Democrats, and any party that has won power since has had to cope with this element of political life.
DP see Demokrat Parti
Demokrat Parti (DP). Ruling party of Turkey from 1950 until its overthrow by a military coup on May 27, 1960. Its founders, Celal Bayar (1884-1986), Mehmet Fuat Koprulu (1890-1966), Refik Koraltan (1891-1974), and Adnan Menderes (1899-1961), were all ranking members of the governing Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party, CHP). Bayar, a banker in his early life, had played a critical role during the Kemalist period in the liberal, anti-statist wing of the party and had served as prime minister in 1937-1938. Koprulu, a historian and Turcologist, had proposed a reformation that would turkify Islam; his proposal, however, was not taken seriously. Koraltan was a bureaucrat, and Menderes a large landowner from the prosperous Aegean region. Together they represented the liberal wing of the CHP; in forming the DP, they responded to the rising bourgeoisie’s demand fro political and economic liberalization and an end to the state’s hegemony over civil society. The Turkish people had also come to hate the single-party regime, which had become increasingly repressive, especially during World War II. The imposition of militant secularism was especially resented by the sullen population. The pressure for political change that came from a victorious America, which encouraged pluralism and a free-market economy, ought not to be discounted either.
The introduction of multi-party politics and the lively competition for votes made Islam a burning issue and forced all parties to re-evaluate their religious policy. Between 1945 and the 1950 elections, the CHP abandoned its militant secularism and made concessions to Islamic sentiment. When the Democrats won power in May 1950, they merely accelerated the process, realizing that the overwhelmingly Muslim population had been alienated by state interference in religious life.
The Democrats’ first concession was quite dramatic: in June, 1950, they lifted the ban on the call to prayer (ezan) being made in Arabic and permitted muezzins to sing the ezan in either Arabic or Turkish. Most chose Arabic, and the impact of this reform resounded throughout the country. On July 5, 1950, they permitted the broadcasting of religious programs over the radio, and the Qur’an was heard over the airwaves. In October, religious lesson in schools (introduced by the CHP) became virtually obligatory when parents were asked to inform the authorities in writing if they did not want their children to attend such lessons. Few Muslim parents did so.
There was a bipartisan consensus on religious policy as long as the secular reforms of Ataturk were not threatened. In fact, both parties welcomed the Director of Religious Affairs’ pronouncement against communism. “Islam,” declared Ahmed Hamdi Akseki, “rejects communism absolutely, its ideology in any form and all its practices. Faith and spirit are the most powerful weapons against communism. It is not possible for a genuine believer to reconcile himself to the ideas and practices of communism.”
The more liberal atmosphere marked by an emphasis on populist politics also led to the reappearance of a variety of religious orders popular with the masses. Their leaders believed that Islamist political pressure would compel the DP government to reverse some of the major reforms of the republic, notably the Western code of law and the Latin script. In the DP’s congress in Konya in 1951, there were demands for the restoration of the fez, the headwear banned in 1925, and the veiling of women. Politics also entered the mosque, and the Friday sermon was often used to denounce the opposition for being anti-Islam. Even Ataturk’s busts and statues, found in every village and town, were vandalized.
The CHP, founded by Ataturk and claiming his mantle, blamed the Democrats for failing to protect the Kemalism to which both parties were constitutionally committed. Prime Minister Menderes responded by taking stern measures against the reactionaries. In March 1951 orders were issued to protect Ataturk’s statues, and men like Necip Fazil Kisakurek, who led to Islamic resurgence, were prosecuted. Islamist publications were proscribed. In June 1951, members of the Tijani order, who were agitating for the restoration of a theocratic monarchy (also a violation of the constitution), were arrested. Their shaykh, Kemal Pilavoglu, was sentenced to ten years at hard labor. The “Ataturk Bill” passed by the Assembly on July 25, 1951, gave the state greater powers to prosecute those who threatened the secular republic. Under this law, the Islamic Democrat Party was dissolved in March 1952, Kisakurek was sent to jail, and Said Nursi (Nurculuk), the leader of the Nurists, was put on trial. Finally, the “Law to protect the Freedom of Conscience” was passed in July 1953 to prevent Islam from being used for political ends. Under this law, when the Nation Party, founded in July 1948 by a right wing splinter group in the DP, made Islam a part of its political platform, it was dissolved by court order on January 27, 1954.
In the 1954, election, however, all parties exploited religion to attract votes, though with little success. The DP’s victory was even more resounding than in 1950, its triumph being based on its economic policies, which initially brought the country prosperity as well as a great sense of dynamism and hope. Only in Kirsehir was Islam’s role criticial; there the Republican Nation Party, supported by the Bektashi order, won all seats.
After 1955 the DP too began to exploit Islam more openly. There were two principal reasons for the change. First, the liberal Kemalist wing broke away and formed the Freedom Party, strengthening the right wing. Second, the economy began to stall, leading the Democrats to flout their religious image as a distraction. They cultivated the religious orders because they controlled local voting blocs. More money was spent on mosques, and the Democrats boasted that they had spent 37.5 million liras (over thirteen million dollars) in seven years, while the CHP had spent only 6.5 million liras in their twenty-seven years.
The decline of the DP’s vote from 56.6 percent in 1954 to 47.3 percent in 1957 suggests that its religious voters were drawn away, and religious appeal was a poor substitute. Religious activity flourished in 1958, a disastrous year for the economy with the lira devalued by almost four hundred percent. Radio was now allowed to devote more airtime to religious programs, and the Nurists were left freed to spread their propaganda.
The Democrats had become identified with the resurgence of Islam. After Menderes survived an airplane crash in London in February 1959, that identification became more explicit; the hand of providence was seen in the escape, described as miraculous. The myth of Menderes’s immortality emerged, and it has been suggested that the junta that overthrew him executed Menderes to destroy this myth.
The Demokrat Parti facilitated the Islamic resurgence as any ruling party would have done to survive the challenge of competitive politics. In fact, the resurgence was more the consequence of the mass politics that replaced the politics of elites in 1945. The center of political gravity shifted to provinces largely untouched by Kemalist reforms or modern secular culture. This was recognized after the fall of the Democrats, and any party that has won power since has had to cope with this element of political life.
DP see Demokrat Parti
Deobandis
Deobandis. ‘Ulama’ associated with the Indo-Pakistani reformist movement centered in the Dar al-‘Ulum of Deoband. The school at Deoband, a country town some ninety miles northeast of Delhi, was founded in 1867. It was a pioneer effort to transmit the religious sciences, specifically the dars-i nizami identified with the Lucknow-based ‘ulama’ of Farangi Mahall, by utilizing institutional forms derived from British schools. The goal of the school was to preserve the teachings of the faith in a period of non-Muslim rule and considerable social change by holding Muslims to a standard of correct practice. Central to that goal was the creation of a class of formally trained and popularly supported ‘ulama’. The school had classrooms, a bureaucratically organized faculty, formal examinations, and an annual convocation. The founders, knowing princely patronage and waqf no longer to be dependable sources of financing, created a system of popular contributions utilizing the mail and money orders. Donors, many from the ashraf classes involved in government service and trade, were listed in an annual report.
Several men central to the foundation of the school were educated in Delhi in the 1840s and participated in two critically important institutions: the reformist milieu of ‘ulama’ linked to the family of Shah Wali Allah and Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi, and Delhi College, founded by the British to teach both European and “Oriental” subjects through the medium of Urdu rather than in the former court language Persian or the religious languages Sanskrit and Arabic. Among those later active at Deoband were the son and the nephew of a teacher at Delhi College, Maulana Mamluk ‘Ali Muhammad Ya ‘qub Nanautawi, the first principal or sadr mudarris (1867-1888) and a revered murshid or spiritual guide at the school, and Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi (1833-1877), the school’s sarparast (rector) and also a spiritual guide. Also present in Delhi were Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (1829-1905), and early muhtamim (chancellor) and a scholar of hadith and fiqh, and Hajji Imdadullah (1817-1899), who departed for Mecca after the Mutiny of 1857 and served as the beloved pir of the early Deobandi ‘ulama’.
Starting with only a dozen students, the school enrolled several hundred by the end of the century. By its first centenary in 1967, it counted a total of 3,795 graduates from throughout India, 3,191 from what was then East and West Pakistan, and 431 from foreign countries. The students, whatever their geographic origin, were united by the use of standard Urdu and shared accommodation in dormitories. The school soon became a metropolitan center, with students coming in the early years from Central Asia, Afghanistan, and all of India. In the twentieth century, there have been students from the diaspora populations in East and South Africa, and from Europe and North America as well.
In its six-year course, the school emphasized hadith and the Hanafi legal tradition, using both as a framework to scrutinize customary practices and to enjoin correct observance of ritual and life-cycle events. Students typically sought the personal transformation of sober Sufism with the help of a spiritual guide. Multiple initiation into various silsilahs was common but occurred at the hands of a single murshid or pir. Those tied to Hajji Imdadullah were primarily Chishti Sabiri. The influence of the Naqshbandi Mujaddidi was also strong. Hallmarks of Deobandi practice included opposition to ‘urs (annual death anniversary celebrations) at the graves of saints, to the so-called fatihah food offerings for the dead (distributed after reciting the Fatihah Chapter of the Qur’an), and to the elaborate ceremonies associated with birth, marriage, and death often typical of local non-Muslims as well. By emphasizing individual responsibility for correct belief and practice, the Deobandis provided an alternative to an intercessory religion focused on the Sufi shrines and elaborate customary celebrations.
Deobandis served as imams, guardians and trustees of mosques and tombs, preachers, writers, and publishers of religious works. Some joined in the public debates that began in response to Christian missionary initiative in the nineteenth century. Many offered fatwas to provide spiritual counsel and guidance on legal matters apart from state institutions. Many were teachers. Among the most celebrated early graduates of the school was the prolific writer and revered spiritual guide Maulana Ashraf ‘Ali Thanvi (1864-1943). His guide for Muslim girls, the Bihishti zevar, written at the turn of the century, has been widely circulated both in Urdu and in translations into many regional languages.
The Deobandis from the beginning envisaged a network of schools; the multiple ties of education, Sufi affiliation, and family linked many teachers among them. By the end of the nineteenth century there were more than a dozen schools known as Deobandi from Peshawar to Chittagong to Madras. In the calculations made for the school’s centenary, Deobandis were credited with founding 8,934 schools, both primary and advanced. Among the early schools, and most important down to the present, was the Mazahir-i ‘Ulum, founded in nearby Saharanpur. For a time, Maulana Rashid Ahmad served as chancellor of that school as well. Today there are Deobandi schools throughout the sub-continent, and the term Deobandi still characterizes one of the main divisions (maslak) of sub-continental ‘ulama’.
Originally quiescent politically, individual Deobandis, if not the school itself, began to act politically in the period before World War I. Maulana ‘Ubaidullah Sindhi (1872-1944) was one of the first to forge links between the ‘ulama’ and those educated at Aligarh. During the war he went to Afghanistan to work with German and Turkish agents there. Maulana Mahmudulhasan (1851-1920), traditionally counted as Deoband’s first student and later a celebrated teacher at the school, worked on behalf of the Ottomans in the Hejaz (Hijaz), as a result of which he was exiled to Malta. He became known as the “Shaykh al-Hind.”
As the nationalist movement gained strength, many Deobandis participated in the organization of the Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Hind in 1919. The movement allied with the Congress Party but clearly envisaged independence as leading to a federation of religious communities with little common social and political life. As independence approached, most Deobandis opposed the partition of India and saw Pakistan as the creation of westernized forces and an enforced confinement of Muslim influence. Foremost among the politically active was Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani (1879-1957), who engaged in an exchange with Muhammad Iqbal over the priority of regional and religious identity for statehood. A minority of Deobandis, led by Maulana Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani (1887-1949) and including Mufti Muhammad Shafi‘, Maulana Ihtishamul Haqq Thanvi, and Maulana ‘Abdulhamid Bada’uni (d. 1969), supported the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan. In 1945, in Calcutta they founded the Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Islam, which continued as a political party in Pakistan. In 1967, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited Deoband on its centenary, and a commemorative stamp depicting the school was issued. In the early 1980s, the school was torn by factional strife linked to national political affiliation. Those associated with the family of the rector, Qari’ Muhammad Tayyib Qasimi, a grandson of Maulana Muhammad Qasim, were ousted. The central school, and the Deobandi schools throughout the subcontinent, continue to teach many students. The apolitical strand within the school’s teaching has taken shape for many in the widespread, now transnational, movement known since the 1920s as Tablighi Jama‘at. The movement has particularly cherished the hadith-based writings of Maulana Muhammad Zakariya Kandhalavi, long linked to Deoband’s sister school, the Mazahir-i ‘Ulum.
Deobandis. ‘Ulama’ associated with the Indo-Pakistani reformist movement centered in the Dar al-‘Ulum of Deoband. The school at Deoband, a country town some ninety miles northeast of Delhi, was founded in 1867. It was a pioneer effort to transmit the religious sciences, specifically the dars-i nizami identified with the Lucknow-based ‘ulama’ of Farangi Mahall, by utilizing institutional forms derived from British schools. The goal of the school was to preserve the teachings of the faith in a period of non-Muslim rule and considerable social change by holding Muslims to a standard of correct practice. Central to that goal was the creation of a class of formally trained and popularly supported ‘ulama’. The school had classrooms, a bureaucratically organized faculty, formal examinations, and an annual convocation. The founders, knowing princely patronage and waqf no longer to be dependable sources of financing, created a system of popular contributions utilizing the mail and money orders. Donors, many from the ashraf classes involved in government service and trade, were listed in an annual report.
Several men central to the foundation of the school were educated in Delhi in the 1840s and participated in two critically important institutions: the reformist milieu of ‘ulama’ linked to the family of Shah Wali Allah and Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi, and Delhi College, founded by the British to teach both European and “Oriental” subjects through the medium of Urdu rather than in the former court language Persian or the religious languages Sanskrit and Arabic. Among those later active at Deoband were the son and the nephew of a teacher at Delhi College, Maulana Mamluk ‘Ali Muhammad Ya ‘qub Nanautawi, the first principal or sadr mudarris (1867-1888) and a revered murshid or spiritual guide at the school, and Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi (1833-1877), the school’s sarparast (rector) and also a spiritual guide. Also present in Delhi were Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (1829-1905), and early muhtamim (chancellor) and a scholar of hadith and fiqh, and Hajji Imdadullah (1817-1899), who departed for Mecca after the Mutiny of 1857 and served as the beloved pir of the early Deobandi ‘ulama’.
Starting with only a dozen students, the school enrolled several hundred by the end of the century. By its first centenary in 1967, it counted a total of 3,795 graduates from throughout India, 3,191 from what was then East and West Pakistan, and 431 from foreign countries. The students, whatever their geographic origin, were united by the use of standard Urdu and shared accommodation in dormitories. The school soon became a metropolitan center, with students coming in the early years from Central Asia, Afghanistan, and all of India. In the twentieth century, there have been students from the diaspora populations in East and South Africa, and from Europe and North America as well.
In its six-year course, the school emphasized hadith and the Hanafi legal tradition, using both as a framework to scrutinize customary practices and to enjoin correct observance of ritual and life-cycle events. Students typically sought the personal transformation of sober Sufism with the help of a spiritual guide. Multiple initiation into various silsilahs was common but occurred at the hands of a single murshid or pir. Those tied to Hajji Imdadullah were primarily Chishti Sabiri. The influence of the Naqshbandi Mujaddidi was also strong. Hallmarks of Deobandi practice included opposition to ‘urs (annual death anniversary celebrations) at the graves of saints, to the so-called fatihah food offerings for the dead (distributed after reciting the Fatihah Chapter of the Qur’an), and to the elaborate ceremonies associated with birth, marriage, and death often typical of local non-Muslims as well. By emphasizing individual responsibility for correct belief and practice, the Deobandis provided an alternative to an intercessory religion focused on the Sufi shrines and elaborate customary celebrations.
Deobandis served as imams, guardians and trustees of mosques and tombs, preachers, writers, and publishers of religious works. Some joined in the public debates that began in response to Christian missionary initiative in the nineteenth century. Many offered fatwas to provide spiritual counsel and guidance on legal matters apart from state institutions. Many were teachers. Among the most celebrated early graduates of the school was the prolific writer and revered spiritual guide Maulana Ashraf ‘Ali Thanvi (1864-1943). His guide for Muslim girls, the Bihishti zevar, written at the turn of the century, has been widely circulated both in Urdu and in translations into many regional languages.
The Deobandis from the beginning envisaged a network of schools; the multiple ties of education, Sufi affiliation, and family linked many teachers among them. By the end of the nineteenth century there were more than a dozen schools known as Deobandi from Peshawar to Chittagong to Madras. In the calculations made for the school’s centenary, Deobandis were credited with founding 8,934 schools, both primary and advanced. Among the early schools, and most important down to the present, was the Mazahir-i ‘Ulum, founded in nearby Saharanpur. For a time, Maulana Rashid Ahmad served as chancellor of that school as well. Today there are Deobandi schools throughout the sub-continent, and the term Deobandi still characterizes one of the main divisions (maslak) of sub-continental ‘ulama’.
Originally quiescent politically, individual Deobandis, if not the school itself, began to act politically in the period before World War I. Maulana ‘Ubaidullah Sindhi (1872-1944) was one of the first to forge links between the ‘ulama’ and those educated at Aligarh. During the war he went to Afghanistan to work with German and Turkish agents there. Maulana Mahmudulhasan (1851-1920), traditionally counted as Deoband’s first student and later a celebrated teacher at the school, worked on behalf of the Ottomans in the Hejaz (Hijaz), as a result of which he was exiled to Malta. He became known as the “Shaykh al-Hind.”
As the nationalist movement gained strength, many Deobandis participated in the organization of the Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Hind in 1919. The movement allied with the Congress Party but clearly envisaged independence as leading to a federation of religious communities with little common social and political life. As independence approached, most Deobandis opposed the partition of India and saw Pakistan as the creation of westernized forces and an enforced confinement of Muslim influence. Foremost among the politically active was Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani (1879-1957), who engaged in an exchange with Muhammad Iqbal over the priority of regional and religious identity for statehood. A minority of Deobandis, led by Maulana Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani (1887-1949) and including Mufti Muhammad Shafi‘, Maulana Ihtishamul Haqq Thanvi, and Maulana ‘Abdulhamid Bada’uni (d. 1969), supported the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan. In 1945, in Calcutta they founded the Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Islam, which continued as a political party in Pakistan. In 1967, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited Deoband on its centenary, and a commemorative stamp depicting the school was issued. In the early 1980s, the school was torn by factional strife linked to national political affiliation. Those associated with the family of the rector, Qari’ Muhammad Tayyib Qasimi, a grandson of Maulana Muhammad Qasim, were ousted. The central school, and the Deobandi schools throughout the subcontinent, continue to teach many students. The apolitical strand within the school’s teaching has taken shape for many in the widespread, now transnational, movement known since the 1920s as Tablighi Jama‘at. The movement has particularly cherished the hadith-based writings of Maulana Muhammad Zakariya Kandhalavi, long linked to Deoband’s sister school, the Mazahir-i ‘Ulum.
dervish
dervish (in Persian, darwish). The word “dervish” is the Persian (Farsi) word for “poor” or “beggar”. A dervish is a member of a Sufi order -- the Tariqa -- and is usually a mendicant or beggar. Paradoxically, the true beggar is one who does not beg at all but relies completely on God for the fulfillment of every material and spiritual need. In the Sufi classification of mendicancy, one kind of beggar goes from door to door, publicly asking for alms. The other sits in his corner, hypocritically giving the impression even to himself that he is busy with God, but secretly he moves from door to door.
The term “dervish” was also applied to a group of non-affiliated, itinerant Sufis, sometimes known as Malamatis or Qalandars or Hyderis. In the company of others, the dervishes would engage in bizarre, deliberately offensive behavior, but because they claimed total reliance on God, they were often tolerated, and even rewarded, by domiciled, organizational Sufis.
“Dervish” entered the English language from association with the “Whirling Dervishes.” The name “Whirling Dervish” is derived from the frenzied yet orderly dance which they performed during musical assemblies. The real name of this group is the Mawlawis, since they were members of the order loyal to the Mawlana -- Jalal al-Din Rumi.
Under the Mamelukes, the standing of the dervishes was much higher than it is now in the eyes of canon lawyers and professed theologians. Women dervishes have their own religious services.
Dervishes constitute a class of Muslim devotees similar in some ways to Christian monks. Brotherhoods of dervishes are numerous, and each has its own rule, garb, rites, and methods of receiving novices and of initiating them. Not all orders conform strictly to the Muslim ceremonial and ritual law, and the occupations required by the different brotherhoods vary. Some dervishes are wanderers, depending on alms. Some are settled in monasteries, called takyas or khankas, where they observe special rites or devote themselves to mediation and penance. Other dervishes are ordinary tradesmen and laborers, performing the ceremonies of their order only on specific occasions. Still others form a class of religious entertainers who are hired to chant their dirge, or zikr, at public and private festivals. Frequently the devotees work themselves into a frenzy, becoming capable of remarkable acts of strength, then falling into a state of convulsion.
Although Muhammad was an advocate of poverty, it was after his time, when Islamic thought came into contact with other religions, such as Hinduism and those of Persia, that the dervish orders developed. Hadith ascribes the founding of these orders to the caliphs Abu Bakr and 'Ali in the seventh century of the Christian calendar.
Among the most widely known and perhaps the earliest of the dervishes are the Kadiris, whose order was founded in 1165 and who are known in Europe as the howling dervishes because of their peculiar chant. Also celebrated are the Rifais (1182), famous for their feats of eating glass and live coals and of swallowing swords; the order of Mawlaw or Mevlevi, the whirling, or dancing, dervishes, founded in 1273 by followers of the Persian mystic and poet Jalal ad-Din Muhammad Din ar-Rumi; and the Kalenderis, the calenders of the Arabian Nights, who must vow to travel perpetually.
darwish see dervish
Kadiris see dervish
Mawlawis see dervish
Malamatis see dervish
Qalandars see dervish
Hyderis see dervish
dervish (in Persian, darwish). The word “dervish” is the Persian (Farsi) word for “poor” or “beggar”. A dervish is a member of a Sufi order -- the Tariqa -- and is usually a mendicant or beggar. Paradoxically, the true beggar is one who does not beg at all but relies completely on God for the fulfillment of every material and spiritual need. In the Sufi classification of mendicancy, one kind of beggar goes from door to door, publicly asking for alms. The other sits in his corner, hypocritically giving the impression even to himself that he is busy with God, but secretly he moves from door to door.
The term “dervish” was also applied to a group of non-affiliated, itinerant Sufis, sometimes known as Malamatis or Qalandars or Hyderis. In the company of others, the dervishes would engage in bizarre, deliberately offensive behavior, but because they claimed total reliance on God, they were often tolerated, and even rewarded, by domiciled, organizational Sufis.
“Dervish” entered the English language from association with the “Whirling Dervishes.” The name “Whirling Dervish” is derived from the frenzied yet orderly dance which they performed during musical assemblies. The real name of this group is the Mawlawis, since they were members of the order loyal to the Mawlana -- Jalal al-Din Rumi.
Under the Mamelukes, the standing of the dervishes was much higher than it is now in the eyes of canon lawyers and professed theologians. Women dervishes have their own religious services.
Dervishes constitute a class of Muslim devotees similar in some ways to Christian monks. Brotherhoods of dervishes are numerous, and each has its own rule, garb, rites, and methods of receiving novices and of initiating them. Not all orders conform strictly to the Muslim ceremonial and ritual law, and the occupations required by the different brotherhoods vary. Some dervishes are wanderers, depending on alms. Some are settled in monasteries, called takyas or khankas, where they observe special rites or devote themselves to mediation and penance. Other dervishes are ordinary tradesmen and laborers, performing the ceremonies of their order only on specific occasions. Still others form a class of religious entertainers who are hired to chant their dirge, or zikr, at public and private festivals. Frequently the devotees work themselves into a frenzy, becoming capable of remarkable acts of strength, then falling into a state of convulsion.
Although Muhammad was an advocate of poverty, it was after his time, when Islamic thought came into contact with other religions, such as Hinduism and those of Persia, that the dervish orders developed. Hadith ascribes the founding of these orders to the caliphs Abu Bakr and 'Ali in the seventh century of the Christian calendar.
Among the most widely known and perhaps the earliest of the dervishes are the Kadiris, whose order was founded in 1165 and who are known in Europe as the howling dervishes because of their peculiar chant. Also celebrated are the Rifais (1182), famous for their feats of eating glass and live coals and of swallowing swords; the order of Mawlaw or Mevlevi, the whirling, or dancing, dervishes, founded in 1273 by followers of the Persian mystic and poet Jalal ad-Din Muhammad Din ar-Rumi; and the Kalenderis, the calenders of the Arabian Nights, who must vow to travel perpetually.
darwish see dervish
Kadiris see dervish
Mawlawis see dervish
Malamatis see dervish
Qalandars see dervish
Hyderis see dervish
Destour
Destour. At the beginning of the twentieth century, an organization known as the Young Tunisians cradled a new sense of Tunisian nationalism. Drawn primarily from the Turkish Mameluke aristocracy that ruled Tunisia prior to the French protectorate, the French-educated Young Tunisians aspired simply to make Tunisia modern. Anti-colonial sentiments grew after World War I, and in 1920 many of those who had belonged to the elite Young Tunisians joined with urban merchants and notables to form a more expressly political organization. As its name suggests, the Destour (Dustur, or Constitution) party sought a voice in the colonial government through a constitution and duly elected parliament. It did not, however, call for political independence.
Modern secularists of the next generation – including the young lawyer Habib Bourguiba – were initially attracted to the Destour but soon found their energies frustrated by its underlying conservatism. In 1934, they founded the Neo-Destour and rapidly captured the support of a rising middle class and the rural masses, whose hardships during two decades of economic depression had been ignored by both the French and earlier nationalist groups. The Neo-Destour led the drive to independence, and the new government was shaped under its direction in 1957.
Political opposition was not outlawed until 1962, but from the outset the government of independent Tunisia was dominated by a single party. In 1958, the Neo-Destour was restructured to parallel the administrative units at every level of government, and the distinction between state and party became progressively blurred. Through the Neo-Destour and the national organizations it controlled, the government disseminated its message and enacted its programs. In return for their loyalty, the party faithful could expect access to state patronage.
As president and “Supreme Combatant,” Bourguiba capitalized on his popularity within the party to promote a program of modernity and progress. With the tacit support of party leadership, he brought the religious establishment under the state’s control and introduced broad social reforms. On the economic front, a 1962 commitment to state-led development planning inspired the party to rename itself the Parti Socialiste Destourien (PSD, Destourian Socialist Party). Strong popular resistance, however, forced the program of agricultural cooperatives it had endorsed to be abandoned in 1969.
By this juncture, it was apparent that the PSD’s hold on society had slipped. From the late 1970s, an Islamist movement first known as the Mouvement de lat Tendance Islamique (Islamic Tendency Movement; later renamed Hizb al-Nahdah or Renaissance Party) gained popular appeal, and the PSD’s efforts to revive its own flagging support were unsuccessful. Its pool of patronage had shrunk, and it had few satisfying answers for those who criticized its pro-Western secularism.
Prime Minister Zine el Abidine Ben Ali (b. 1936) toppled the government of the aging Bourguiba in November 1987, and as a sign of new commitment to republican rule and intent to rejuvenate the party, he rechristened it the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Democratique (RCD, Democratic Constitutional Rally) . When the 1989 legislative elections were opened to opposition parties, however, only Islamists running as independents made an effective showing against the RCD. Ben Ali’s government refused to authorize an Islamist party, and Tunisia continued to operate as a single-party state without benefit of the popular mandate it once could claim.
Dustur see Destour.
Constitution see Destour.
PSD see Destour.
Parti Socialiste Destourien see Destour.
Destourian Socialist Party see Destour.
Rassemblement Constitutionnel Democratique see Destour.
Destour. At the beginning of the twentieth century, an organization known as the Young Tunisians cradled a new sense of Tunisian nationalism. Drawn primarily from the Turkish Mameluke aristocracy that ruled Tunisia prior to the French protectorate, the French-educated Young Tunisians aspired simply to make Tunisia modern. Anti-colonial sentiments grew after World War I, and in 1920 many of those who had belonged to the elite Young Tunisians joined with urban merchants and notables to form a more expressly political organization. As its name suggests, the Destour (Dustur, or Constitution) party sought a voice in the colonial government through a constitution and duly elected parliament. It did not, however, call for political independence.
Modern secularists of the next generation – including the young lawyer Habib Bourguiba – were initially attracted to the Destour but soon found their energies frustrated by its underlying conservatism. In 1934, they founded the Neo-Destour and rapidly captured the support of a rising middle class and the rural masses, whose hardships during two decades of economic depression had been ignored by both the French and earlier nationalist groups. The Neo-Destour led the drive to independence, and the new government was shaped under its direction in 1957.
Political opposition was not outlawed until 1962, but from the outset the government of independent Tunisia was dominated by a single party. In 1958, the Neo-Destour was restructured to parallel the administrative units at every level of government, and the distinction between state and party became progressively blurred. Through the Neo-Destour and the national organizations it controlled, the government disseminated its message and enacted its programs. In return for their loyalty, the party faithful could expect access to state patronage.
As president and “Supreme Combatant,” Bourguiba capitalized on his popularity within the party to promote a program of modernity and progress. With the tacit support of party leadership, he brought the religious establishment under the state’s control and introduced broad social reforms. On the economic front, a 1962 commitment to state-led development planning inspired the party to rename itself the Parti Socialiste Destourien (PSD, Destourian Socialist Party). Strong popular resistance, however, forced the program of agricultural cooperatives it had endorsed to be abandoned in 1969.
By this juncture, it was apparent that the PSD’s hold on society had slipped. From the late 1970s, an Islamist movement first known as the Mouvement de lat Tendance Islamique (Islamic Tendency Movement; later renamed Hizb al-Nahdah or Renaissance Party) gained popular appeal, and the PSD’s efforts to revive its own flagging support were unsuccessful. Its pool of patronage had shrunk, and it had few satisfying answers for those who criticized its pro-Western secularism.
Prime Minister Zine el Abidine Ben Ali (b. 1936) toppled the government of the aging Bourguiba in November 1987, and as a sign of new commitment to republican rule and intent to rejuvenate the party, he rechristened it the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Democratique (RCD, Democratic Constitutional Rally) . When the 1989 legislative elections were opened to opposition parties, however, only Islamists running as independents made an effective showing against the RCD. Ben Ali’s government refused to authorize an Islamist party, and Tunisia continued to operate as a single-party state without benefit of the popular mandate it once could claim.
Dustur see Destour.
Constitution see Destour.
PSD see Destour.
Parti Socialiste Destourien see Destour.
Destourian Socialist Party see Destour.
Rassemblement Constitutionnel Democratique see Destour.
Devil
Devil (in Arabic, Iblis). In the Qur’an, Iblis refuses to bow down before Adam and is accursed by God. He also tempts Adam and Eve in the Garden. His punishment is deferred until the Day of Judgment and he is allowed to tempt men, but not the true believers. At the end of time, he is to be thrown into the fire of Hell. Muslim tradition remains undecided as to whether Iblis was an angel or a jinn, but does not hesitate to consider him as the enemy of God and mankind.
In Islam, the Devil is known as Iblis (or Shayṭān or Shaitan). According to the Qur'an, God created Iblis out of "smokeless fire" (along with all of the other djinn) and created man out of clay. The primary characteristic of the Devil, besides hubris, is that he has no power other than the power to cast evil suggestions into the heart of men and women.
The word "Iblis" may be derived from the Arabic verbal root balasa, meaning "he despaired"; therefore, the linguistic meaning of Iblis would be "he/it that causes despair". However, some maintain an etymological derivation from the Greek "Diabolos".
"Shayṭān" or "Satan" is both a noun and an adjective. As a noun, it means "adversary", "enemy", "opponent," or "rebel" and as an adjective it means "adversarial," "opposing," or "evil." In popular Islamic culture, Shaitan is often simply translated as "The Devil," but can refer to any of the beings who rebelled against Allah. Shaytan has a similar meaning and origin to the Christian word Satan.
According to basic Islamic teachings, God created three intelligent races: Angels, jinns, and humans, of which the latter two have been granted free will to choose between good and evil.
Iblis was a jinn and a devoted servant of God. He attained a very high status and was brought close with the angels. God knew Iblis harbored ill intentions, however, and this was the reason for his name, Iblis "Desperate," or "despair."
The angels do not have free will and simply do not sin because they were not granted the freedom by God to disobey. When God created Adam, He commanded all the angels and jinn to prostrate to him as Adam was deemed "the Best of Creation". All the angels and jinn did so, except Iblis, who refused to obey.
Iblis was proud and arrogant and considered himself superior to Adam, since Adam was made from clay and Iblis was created from smokeless fire. For this act of disobedience, God cursed him to Hell for eternity, but gave him respite until the Day of Judgment, after Iblis requested it. Iblis obtained permission from God and vowed that he would use this time to lead all human men and women astray to Hell as a way of revenge against them. By refusing to obey God’s order he was thrown out of Paradise and thereafter he was called “Shaitan”.
In Islamic theology, the Shaytan and his minions are "whisperers", who whisper into the hearts of men and women, urging them to commit sin. This is where the desire to sin comes from, according to Islam.
The Qur'an provides a supplication for mankind, aimed at fighting the tempting of ash-Shaytan and his minions:
In the Qur'an's version of the story of Adam and Eve, Shaytan tempted them in the Garden of Eden, to eat of the forbidden tree - thereby exposing to them their nakedness and awakening man's modesty, shyness and sexuality. As they became suddenly aware of these things, they attempted to cover their modesty with leaves.
Adam and Eve, upon being questioned by God, apologized for falling for temptation, and were forgiven. After that God placed them on earth (in accordance with his plan, that he communicated to the angels before creating Adam) to live out their lives and spawn the continuing family tree which eventually lead to the Human race as it is today. For Shaitan, this was a major victory. Now also living on earth, God granted him eternal life until day of judgment to continue to misguide man, as per Islamic theology, in an attempt to reduce man to filth and corruption.
Iblis see Devil
Shaytan see Devil
Shaitan see Devil
Satan see Devil
Diabolos see Devil
Devil (in Arabic, Iblis). In the Qur’an, Iblis refuses to bow down before Adam and is accursed by God. He also tempts Adam and Eve in the Garden. His punishment is deferred until the Day of Judgment and he is allowed to tempt men, but not the true believers. At the end of time, he is to be thrown into the fire of Hell. Muslim tradition remains undecided as to whether Iblis was an angel or a jinn, but does not hesitate to consider him as the enemy of God and mankind.
In Islam, the Devil is known as Iblis (or Shayṭān or Shaitan). According to the Qur'an, God created Iblis out of "smokeless fire" (along with all of the other djinn) and created man out of clay. The primary characteristic of the Devil, besides hubris, is that he has no power other than the power to cast evil suggestions into the heart of men and women.
The word "Iblis" may be derived from the Arabic verbal root balasa, meaning "he despaired"; therefore, the linguistic meaning of Iblis would be "he/it that causes despair". However, some maintain an etymological derivation from the Greek "Diabolos".
"Shayṭān" or "Satan" is both a noun and an adjective. As a noun, it means "adversary", "enemy", "opponent," or "rebel" and as an adjective it means "adversarial," "opposing," or "evil." In popular Islamic culture, Shaitan is often simply translated as "The Devil," but can refer to any of the beings who rebelled against Allah. Shaytan has a similar meaning and origin to the Christian word Satan.
According to basic Islamic teachings, God created three intelligent races: Angels, jinns, and humans, of which the latter two have been granted free will to choose between good and evil.
Iblis was a jinn and a devoted servant of God. He attained a very high status and was brought close with the angels. God knew Iblis harbored ill intentions, however, and this was the reason for his name, Iblis "Desperate," or "despair."
The angels do not have free will and simply do not sin because they were not granted the freedom by God to disobey. When God created Adam, He commanded all the angels and jinn to prostrate to him as Adam was deemed "the Best of Creation". All the angels and jinn did so, except Iblis, who refused to obey.
Iblis was proud and arrogant and considered himself superior to Adam, since Adam was made from clay and Iblis was created from smokeless fire. For this act of disobedience, God cursed him to Hell for eternity, but gave him respite until the Day of Judgment, after Iblis requested it. Iblis obtained permission from God and vowed that he would use this time to lead all human men and women astray to Hell as a way of revenge against them. By refusing to obey God’s order he was thrown out of Paradise and thereafter he was called “Shaitan”.
In Islamic theology, the Shaytan and his minions are "whisperers", who whisper into the hearts of men and women, urging them to commit sin. This is where the desire to sin comes from, according to Islam.
The Qur'an provides a supplication for mankind, aimed at fighting the tempting of ash-Shaytan and his minions:
In the Qur'an's version of the story of Adam and Eve, Shaytan tempted them in the Garden of Eden, to eat of the forbidden tree - thereby exposing to them their nakedness and awakening man's modesty, shyness and sexuality. As they became suddenly aware of these things, they attempted to cover their modesty with leaves.
Adam and Eve, upon being questioned by God, apologized for falling for temptation, and were forgiven. After that God placed them on earth (in accordance with his plan, that he communicated to the angels before creating Adam) to live out their lives and spawn the continuing family tree which eventually lead to the Human race as it is today. For Shaitan, this was a major victory. Now also living on earth, God granted him eternal life until day of judgment to continue to misguide man, as per Islamic theology, in an attempt to reduce man to filth and corruption.
Iblis see Devil
Shaytan see Devil
Shaitan see Devil
Satan see Devil
Diabolos see Devil
Devil Worshippers
Devil Worshippers (Yazidis). Practitioners of a religion with around 700,000 members worldwide. The largest group of Yazidis lives in Iraq, near Mosul, but there are small communities in Syria, Turkey, Georgia, and Armenia. Researchers believe that the Yazidi creed has elements from Zoroastrianism, Manicheism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The two religious books of the Yazidis have Arabic text: The Book of Revelation and The Black Book. The Yazidis call themselves Dasin, while the term “Yazidism” probably comes from the Persian word "ized" -- “angel.” The name Yazidism is connected to the sixth caliph, Yazid (680-683). From a Shi'a perspective, Yazid was one of world history’s most hated men. Yazid was highly disliked by most Sunnis as well. However, there is little evidence showing what role Yazid played in the founding, or development, of Yazidism.
The Yazidi pantheon has God on top, but God is only the Creator, and is no longer an acting force. The acting force is represented by Malak Ta’us and Shaykh Adii. Shaykh Adii may have been caliph Yazid, but in any event, he was a man who rose to divinity through transmigration, and is now an acting and good deity. Shaykh Adii acts in cooperation with Malak Ta’us, the peacock angel that had fallen into disgrace, but who repented. Malak Ta’us filled seven jars of tears through 7,000 years. His tears were used to extinguish the fires of Hell. Therefore, there is no longer a Hell in the theology of Malak Ta’us. Yazidism has six other minor deities, which are also honored.
The prayer in Yazidism must be performed in good distance from non-Yazidis, twice a day, and in the direction of the sun. The prayer is dedicated to Malak Ta’us. Saturday is the day of rest, but it is Wednesday that is the holy day. In December, a three day fast is performed. There is an annual pilgrimage to the tomb of Shaykh Adii, north of Mosul in Iraq, through six days in late August. This pilgrimage is the most important ritual of Yazidism. Central to this celebration are bathing in the river, washing of figures of Malak Ta’us, processions, music, hymns, ecstatic songs, and dances performed by the priests. Other elements are lighting of hundreds of oil lamps at the tombs of Shaykh Adii and other saints’ tombs, offerings of special foods and cooking of a sacrificed ox. Important parts of the rituals here have never been seen by outsiders, and are therefore unknown.
Childhood baptism is important, and is performed by a Shaykh, a religious leader. Circumcision for boys is performed soon after the baptism, but is not compulsory. Burials are done immediately after death, and the hands are crossed.
The Yazidis are organized much like the Kurds, with tribes headed by a chief. There are very strong ties between the laity and the religious leaders. Almost all Yazidis speak Kurdish. The Yazidis practice no intermarrying with other Kurds, and have no communion with them.
The Yazidis believe that they are the descendants of Adam only, while the rest of the world descended from Eve, and are hence inferior. It is impossible to convert to Yazidism, you must be born one. The strongest punishment among Yazidis is expulsion, which means that your soul is lost forever. Monogamy is practiced, but the chief has the right to take several wives. Divorce is difficult to get, as this only comes from adultery, and three witnesses are needed. However, if a husband stays abroad for more than a year, he is automatically divorced from his wife, and has also lost the right to remarry inside the Yazidi community.
The reason for the Yazidis reputation of being devil worshippers is connected to the other name of Malak Ta’us, Shaytan, the same name as the Qur’an’s for Satan. However, there is little suggesting that the Yazidis worship Malak Ta’us as if he was equal to the Qur’an’s or the Bible’s devil. The Yazidis have never been regarded as Ahl al-Kitab (People of the Book) and they have suffered much hardship at the hands of their Muslim neighbors.
Yazidis see Devil Worshippers
Dasin see Devil Worshippers
Devil Worshippers (Yazidis). Practitioners of a religion with around 700,000 members worldwide. The largest group of Yazidis lives in Iraq, near Mosul, but there are small communities in Syria, Turkey, Georgia, and Armenia. Researchers believe that the Yazidi creed has elements from Zoroastrianism, Manicheism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The two religious books of the Yazidis have Arabic text: The Book of Revelation and The Black Book. The Yazidis call themselves Dasin, while the term “Yazidism” probably comes from the Persian word "ized" -- “angel.” The name Yazidism is connected to the sixth caliph, Yazid (680-683). From a Shi'a perspective, Yazid was one of world history’s most hated men. Yazid was highly disliked by most Sunnis as well. However, there is little evidence showing what role Yazid played in the founding, or development, of Yazidism.
The Yazidi pantheon has God on top, but God is only the Creator, and is no longer an acting force. The acting force is represented by Malak Ta’us and Shaykh Adii. Shaykh Adii may have been caliph Yazid, but in any event, he was a man who rose to divinity through transmigration, and is now an acting and good deity. Shaykh Adii acts in cooperation with Malak Ta’us, the peacock angel that had fallen into disgrace, but who repented. Malak Ta’us filled seven jars of tears through 7,000 years. His tears were used to extinguish the fires of Hell. Therefore, there is no longer a Hell in the theology of Malak Ta’us. Yazidism has six other minor deities, which are also honored.
The prayer in Yazidism must be performed in good distance from non-Yazidis, twice a day, and in the direction of the sun. The prayer is dedicated to Malak Ta’us. Saturday is the day of rest, but it is Wednesday that is the holy day. In December, a three day fast is performed. There is an annual pilgrimage to the tomb of Shaykh Adii, north of Mosul in Iraq, through six days in late August. This pilgrimage is the most important ritual of Yazidism. Central to this celebration are bathing in the river, washing of figures of Malak Ta’us, processions, music, hymns, ecstatic songs, and dances performed by the priests. Other elements are lighting of hundreds of oil lamps at the tombs of Shaykh Adii and other saints’ tombs, offerings of special foods and cooking of a sacrificed ox. Important parts of the rituals here have never been seen by outsiders, and are therefore unknown.
Childhood baptism is important, and is performed by a Shaykh, a religious leader. Circumcision for boys is performed soon after the baptism, but is not compulsory. Burials are done immediately after death, and the hands are crossed.
The Yazidis are organized much like the Kurds, with tribes headed by a chief. There are very strong ties between the laity and the religious leaders. Almost all Yazidis speak Kurdish. The Yazidis practice no intermarrying with other Kurds, and have no communion with them.
The Yazidis believe that they are the descendants of Adam only, while the rest of the world descended from Eve, and are hence inferior. It is impossible to convert to Yazidism, you must be born one. The strongest punishment among Yazidis is expulsion, which means that your soul is lost forever. Monogamy is practiced, but the chief has the right to take several wives. Divorce is difficult to get, as this only comes from adultery, and three witnesses are needed. However, if a husband stays abroad for more than a year, he is automatically divorced from his wife, and has also lost the right to remarry inside the Yazidi community.
The reason for the Yazidis reputation of being devil worshippers is connected to the other name of Malak Ta’us, Shaytan, the same name as the Qur’an’s for Satan. However, there is little suggesting that the Yazidis worship Malak Ta’us as if he was equal to the Qur’an’s or the Bible’s devil. The Yazidis have never been regarded as Ahl al-Kitab (People of the Book) and they have suffered much hardship at the hands of their Muslim neighbors.
Yazidis see Devil Worshippers
Dasin see Devil Worshippers
Dhahabi
Dhahabi (Shams al-Din al-Dhahabi) (1274-1348). Arab historian and theologian from Damascus. He was a compiler, but his works are distinguished by careful composition and constant references to his authorities. His greatest work is a History of Islam, which begins with the genealogy of the Prophet and ends with the year 1300. {See also Muhammad.}
Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn `Uthman ibn Qaymaz ibn `Abd Allah, Shams al-Din Abu `Abd Allah al-Turkmani al-Diyarbakri al-Fariqi al-Dimashqi al-Dhahabi al-Shafi`i, known as Al-Dhahabi, was a Shafi'i Muhaddith and historian of Islam. Al-Dhahabi was born in Damascus in 1274 C.C./673 AH, where his family had lived from the time of his grandfather `Uthman. He sometimes identified himself as Ibn al-Dhahabi (son of the goldsmith) in reference to his father's profession. He began his study of hadith at age eighteen, travelling from Damascus to Baalbek, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, Nabulus, Cairo, Alexandria, Jerusalem, Hijaz, and elsewhere, after which he returned to Damascus, where he taught and authored many works and achieved wide renown as a critic and expert examiner of the hadith, encyclopedic historian and biographer, and foremost authority in the canonical readings of the Qur'an. He lost his sight two years before he died, leaving three children: his eldest daughter Amat al-`Aziz and his two sons `Abd Allah and Abu Hurayra `Abd al-Rahman. The latter taught the hadith masters Ibn Nasir al-Din al-Dimashqi and Ibn Hajar, to whom he transmitted several works authored or narrated by his father.
Al-Dhahabi authored nearly a hundred works, some of them of considerable size. Among his works are:
* Tarikh al-Islam al-kabir (Major History of Islam), 36 volumes, the largest biographical encyclopedia in Islam;
* Siyar a`lam al-nubala (The Lives of Noble Figures), 23 volumes, a unique encyclopedia of biographical history;
* Tadhhib Tahdhib al-Kamal, an abridgement of al-Mizzi's abridgement of al-Maqdisee's Al-Kamal fi Asma' al-Rijal, a compendium of historical biographies for hadith narrators cited in the six major hadith collections;
o Al-Kashif fi Ma`rifa Man Lahu Riwaya fi al-Kutub al-Sitta, an abridgment of the Tadhhib;
+ Al-Mujarrad fi Asma' Rijal al-Kutub al-Sitta, an abridgment of the Kashif;
* Mukhtasar Kitab al-Wahm wa al-Iham li Ibn al-Qattan;
* Mukhtasar Sunan al-Bayhaqi, an abridgement of Bayhaqi's Sunan;
* Mukhtasar al-Mustadrak li al-Hakim, an abdridgement of Hakim's Al-Mustadrak alaa al-Sahihain;
* Al-Amsar Dhawat al-Athar (Cities Rich in Historical Relics), which begins with the description of Madina al-Munawwara;
* Al-Tajrid fi Asma' al-Sahaba, a dictionary of the Companions;
* Tadhkirat al-huffaz (The Memorial of the Hadith Masters), a chronological history of the biography of hadith masters;
* Al-Mu`in fi Tabaqat al-Muhaddithin, a compendium of hadith scholars (Muhaddithin);
* Tabaqat al-Qurra (Biography-Layers of the Qur'anic Scholars);
* Duwal al-Islam, a condensed biographical history with emphasis on political figures and events; and
* Al-Kaba'ir (The Enormities), his most widely circulated book.
Shams al-Din al-Dhahabi see Dhahabi
Dhahabi (Shams al-Din al-Dhahabi) (1274-1348). Arab historian and theologian from Damascus. He was a compiler, but his works are distinguished by careful composition and constant references to his authorities. His greatest work is a History of Islam, which begins with the genealogy of the Prophet and ends with the year 1300. {See also Muhammad.}
Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn `Uthman ibn Qaymaz ibn `Abd Allah, Shams al-Din Abu `Abd Allah al-Turkmani al-Diyarbakri al-Fariqi al-Dimashqi al-Dhahabi al-Shafi`i, known as Al-Dhahabi, was a Shafi'i Muhaddith and historian of Islam. Al-Dhahabi was born in Damascus in 1274 C.C./673 AH, where his family had lived from the time of his grandfather `Uthman. He sometimes identified himself as Ibn al-Dhahabi (son of the goldsmith) in reference to his father's profession. He began his study of hadith at age eighteen, travelling from Damascus to Baalbek, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, Nabulus, Cairo, Alexandria, Jerusalem, Hijaz, and elsewhere, after which he returned to Damascus, where he taught and authored many works and achieved wide renown as a critic and expert examiner of the hadith, encyclopedic historian and biographer, and foremost authority in the canonical readings of the Qur'an. He lost his sight two years before he died, leaving three children: his eldest daughter Amat al-`Aziz and his two sons `Abd Allah and Abu Hurayra `Abd al-Rahman. The latter taught the hadith masters Ibn Nasir al-Din al-Dimashqi and Ibn Hajar, to whom he transmitted several works authored or narrated by his father.
Al-Dhahabi authored nearly a hundred works, some of them of considerable size. Among his works are:
* Tarikh al-Islam al-kabir (Major History of Islam), 36 volumes, the largest biographical encyclopedia in Islam;
* Siyar a`lam al-nubala (The Lives of Noble Figures), 23 volumes, a unique encyclopedia of biographical history;
* Tadhhib Tahdhib al-Kamal, an abridgement of al-Mizzi's abridgement of al-Maqdisee's Al-Kamal fi Asma' al-Rijal, a compendium of historical biographies for hadith narrators cited in the six major hadith collections;
o Al-Kashif fi Ma`rifa Man Lahu Riwaya fi al-Kutub al-Sitta, an abridgment of the Tadhhib;
+ Al-Mujarrad fi Asma' Rijal al-Kutub al-Sitta, an abridgment of the Kashif;
* Mukhtasar Kitab al-Wahm wa al-Iham li Ibn al-Qattan;
* Mukhtasar Sunan al-Bayhaqi, an abridgement of Bayhaqi's Sunan;
* Mukhtasar al-Mustadrak li al-Hakim, an abdridgement of Hakim's Al-Mustadrak alaa al-Sahihain;
* Al-Amsar Dhawat al-Athar (Cities Rich in Historical Relics), which begins with the description of Madina al-Munawwara;
* Al-Tajrid fi Asma' al-Sahaba, a dictionary of the Companions;
* Tadhkirat al-huffaz (The Memorial of the Hadith Masters), a chronological history of the biography of hadith masters;
* Al-Mu`in fi Tabaqat al-Muhaddithin, a compendium of hadith scholars (Muhaddithin);
* Tabaqat al-Qurra (Biography-Layers of the Qur'anic Scholars);
* Duwal al-Islam, a condensed biographical history with emphasis on political figures and events; and
* Al-Kaba'ir (The Enormities), his most widely circulated book.
Shams al-Din al-Dhahabi see Dhahabi
Dhakir
Dhakir (Qasim Bey Dhakir) (c.1786-1857). Foremost Azerbaijani poet and satirist. He relentlessly criticized the religious fanaticism of the mullahs, the corruption of the local aristocracy and the Czarist administration officials.
Qasim Bey Dhakir see Dhakir
Dhakir (Qasim Bey Dhakir) (c.1786-1857). Foremost Azerbaijani poet and satirist. He relentlessly criticized the religious fanaticism of the mullahs, the corruption of the local aristocracy and the Czarist administration officials.
Qasim Bey Dhakir see Dhakir
Dhimmi
Dhimmi. Muslim juridical term for Christians and Jews, sometimes Zoroastrians, Mandeans, or even Hindus, living in a society governed by Muslim rulers and law. Dhimmis have limited autonomy, but have full rights to practice their religion and are secured by the full protection of the rulers. Earlier there was a specific tax, a jizya (see Qur’an, Sura 9:29), that dhimmis had to pay to receive these benefits. Dhimmis who did not pay this tax would either convert to Islam or face the death penalty. This tax, higher than the tax Muslims had to pay, was in several occasions one of the most important sources of income for the rulers, and therefore they were often little inclined to encourage conversion to Islam, as this would represent a decrease in their income.
It was an early endeavor of the shari'a that added details to the regulations of the jizya. These new regulations established that Christians could keep all of their churches and convents, but they were not allowed to erect new structures nor to restore ruined buildings. The dhimmis had to give lodging to Muslims for up to three days and they had to show Muslims respect. Dhimmis could not perform public ceremonies and no crosses could be used in Muslim quarters. They could not ride on horseback with saddles, they could neither carry weapons nor sell alcoholic beverages to Muslims.
Christians were not allowed to build houses taller than their neighbors houses. In public, they had to carry visible tokens of the religion to which they belonged. If there was a case at the court, Muslim statements were considered of more value than the ones from Christians. However, there were no limitations to the professions which could be pursued.
Later, there were more regulations imposed. For example, in 853, when Caliph al-Mutawakkil forbade dhimmis to ride on horses, they had to stick to donkeys and mules. In fourteenth century Egypt, Jews had to carry a yellow turban, Christians a blue one.
Nevertheless, there was less distance between the people of the different religions. People lived side by side. Non-Muslims could hold the highest positions in Islamic society at a time when Jews in Europe had few or no social rights.
Another term for dhimmis is ahl al-kitab -- “People of the Book”. However, this is more of a theological term than a juridical one.
ahl al-kitab see Dhimmi.
People of the Book see Dhimmi.
Dhimmi. Muslim juridical term for Christians and Jews, sometimes Zoroastrians, Mandeans, or even Hindus, living in a society governed by Muslim rulers and law. Dhimmis have limited autonomy, but have full rights to practice their religion and are secured by the full protection of the rulers. Earlier there was a specific tax, a jizya (see Qur’an, Sura 9:29), that dhimmis had to pay to receive these benefits. Dhimmis who did not pay this tax would either convert to Islam or face the death penalty. This tax, higher than the tax Muslims had to pay, was in several occasions one of the most important sources of income for the rulers, and therefore they were often little inclined to encourage conversion to Islam, as this would represent a decrease in their income.
It was an early endeavor of the shari'a that added details to the regulations of the jizya. These new regulations established that Christians could keep all of their churches and convents, but they were not allowed to erect new structures nor to restore ruined buildings. The dhimmis had to give lodging to Muslims for up to three days and they had to show Muslims respect. Dhimmis could not perform public ceremonies and no crosses could be used in Muslim quarters. They could not ride on horseback with saddles, they could neither carry weapons nor sell alcoholic beverages to Muslims.
Christians were not allowed to build houses taller than their neighbors houses. In public, they had to carry visible tokens of the religion to which they belonged. If there was a case at the court, Muslim statements were considered of more value than the ones from Christians. However, there were no limitations to the professions which could be pursued.
Later, there were more regulations imposed. For example, in 853, when Caliph al-Mutawakkil forbade dhimmis to ride on horses, they had to stick to donkeys and mules. In fourteenth century Egypt, Jews had to carry a yellow turban, Christians a blue one.
Nevertheless, there was less distance between the people of the different religions. People lived side by side. Non-Muslims could hold the highest positions in Islamic society at a time when Jews in Europe had few or no social rights.
Another term for dhimmis is ahl al-kitab -- “People of the Book”. However, this is more of a theological term than a juridical one.
ahl al-kitab see Dhimmi.
People of the Book see Dhimmi.
Dhu’l-Faqar
Dhu’l-Faqar. Name of the famous sword which the Prophet obtained as booty in the battle of Badr. The term has often been inscribed on finely engraved swords.
Dhu’l-Faqar. Name of the famous sword which the Prophet obtained as booty in the battle of Badr. The term has often been inscribed on finely engraved swords.
Dhu’l-Himma
Dhu’l-Himma (Dhat al-Himma). Name of the principal heroine of a romance of Arab chivalry. The main subject is the Arab war against the Byzantines during the first three centuries of Islam.
Dhat al-Himma see Dhu’l-Himma
Dhu’l-Himma (Dhat al-Himma). Name of the principal heroine of a romance of Arab chivalry. The main subject is the Arab war against the Byzantines during the first three centuries of Islam.
Dhat al-Himma see Dhu’l-Himma
Dhu’l-Khalsa
Dhu’l-Khalsa. Name of the sacred stone which was worshipped by several tribes in a place some 190 kilometers south of Mecca.
Dhu’l-Khalsa. Name of the sacred stone which was worshipped by several tribes in a place some 190 kilometers south of Mecca.
Dhu’l-Nunids
Dhu’l-Nunids. See Dhun-Nunids.
Dhun-Nunids see Dhu’l-Nunids.
Dhu’l-Nunids. See Dhun-Nunids.
Dhun-Nunids see Dhu’l-Nunids.
Dhu’l-nun Misr
Dhu’l-nun Misr (796-859). Ninth century Egyptian Sufi master. The name Dhu’l-nun Misri means “the Egyptian man of the fish”.
Imprisoned by the Mu’tazilites during their brief rule, Dhu’l-nun Misri was later set free and acquired fame for his penetrating scholarship in several fields, including philosophy and alchemy. His status as an exemplary Sufi was secured by numerous anecdotes ascribed to him. He composed lucid Arabic poetry and prayers of unsurpassed beauty. Whether or not he originated the doctrinal views which later Sufis attributed to him, Dhu’l-nun Misri seems to have been fond of intimating the kernel of mystical truth through opposite yet complementary concepts, e.g., knowledge and insight, fear and shame, and God’s beauty and wrath, which together comprise perfection.
Dhul-Nun al-Misri was considered the Patron Saint of the Physicians in the early Islamic era of Egypt, and is credited with having introduced the concept of Gnosis into Islam. His full name is Dhul-Nun Abu Faid Thawban ibn Ibrahim.
Dhul-Nun, literately "Of the Nun", is a name that is also given to Jonah in Islamic folklore, as "nun" in ancient Arabic meant "big fish"/"whale", as it did in Aramaic where it also means "snake".
His nickname al-Misri means 'the Egyptian', a name apparently given to him by his fellows who were not themselves of Coptic decent as he was, or during his travels outside of Egypt.
Dhul-Nun al-Misri is considered among the most prominent saints of early Sufism and holds a position in the Sufi chronicles as high as Junayd (d.910) and Bayazid (d.874). He studied under various teachers and travelled extensively in Arabia and Syria. The Muslim scholar and Sufi Sahl al-Tustari was one of Dhul-Nun al-Misri's students. In 829, he was arrested on a charge of heresy and sent to prison in Baghdad, but after examination he was released on the caliph's orders to return to Cairo, where he died in 859. His tombstone has been preserved.
A legendary alchemist, Dhul-Nun al-Misri is supposed to have known the secret of the Egyptian hieroglyphs. His sayings and poems, which are extremely dense and rich in mystical imagery, emphasize knowledge or gnosis (marifah) more than fear (makhafah) or love (mahabbah), the other two major paths of spiritual realization in Sufism. None of his written works have survived, but a vast collection of poems, sayings, and aphorisms attributed to him continues to live on in oral tradition.
Egyptian man of the fish see Dhu’l-nun Misr
Dhul-Nun Abu Faid Thawban ibn Ibrahim see Dhu’l-nun Misr
Dhu’l-nun Misr (796-859). Ninth century Egyptian Sufi master. The name Dhu’l-nun Misri means “the Egyptian man of the fish”.
Imprisoned by the Mu’tazilites during their brief rule, Dhu’l-nun Misri was later set free and acquired fame for his penetrating scholarship in several fields, including philosophy and alchemy. His status as an exemplary Sufi was secured by numerous anecdotes ascribed to him. He composed lucid Arabic poetry and prayers of unsurpassed beauty. Whether or not he originated the doctrinal views which later Sufis attributed to him, Dhu’l-nun Misri seems to have been fond of intimating the kernel of mystical truth through opposite yet complementary concepts, e.g., knowledge and insight, fear and shame, and God’s beauty and wrath, which together comprise perfection.
Dhul-Nun al-Misri was considered the Patron Saint of the Physicians in the early Islamic era of Egypt, and is credited with having introduced the concept of Gnosis into Islam. His full name is Dhul-Nun Abu Faid Thawban ibn Ibrahim.
Dhul-Nun, literately "Of the Nun", is a name that is also given to Jonah in Islamic folklore, as "nun" in ancient Arabic meant "big fish"/"whale", as it did in Aramaic where it also means "snake".
His nickname al-Misri means 'the Egyptian', a name apparently given to him by his fellows who were not themselves of Coptic decent as he was, or during his travels outside of Egypt.
Dhul-Nun al-Misri is considered among the most prominent saints of early Sufism and holds a position in the Sufi chronicles as high as Junayd (d.910) and Bayazid (d.874). He studied under various teachers and travelled extensively in Arabia and Syria. The Muslim scholar and Sufi Sahl al-Tustari was one of Dhul-Nun al-Misri's students. In 829, he was arrested on a charge of heresy and sent to prison in Baghdad, but after examination he was released on the caliph's orders to return to Cairo, where he died in 859. His tombstone has been preserved.
A legendary alchemist, Dhul-Nun al-Misri is supposed to have known the secret of the Egyptian hieroglyphs. His sayings and poems, which are extremely dense and rich in mystical imagery, emphasize knowledge or gnosis (marifah) more than fear (makhafah) or love (mahabbah), the other two major paths of spiritual realization in Sufism. None of his written works have survived, but a vast collection of poems, sayings, and aphorisms attributed to him continues to live on in oral tradition.
Egyptian man of the fish see Dhu’l-nun Misr
Dhul-Nun Abu Faid Thawban ibn Ibrahim see Dhu’l-nun Misr
Dhu’l-Qadr
Dhu’l-Qadr. Turkmen dynasty which ruled from Elbistan, in Turkey, over the region Mar‘ash-Malatya (r. 1337-1522) as clients first of the Mamelukes, then of the Ottomans.
Dhu’l-Qadr. Turkmen dynasty which ruled from Elbistan, in Turkey, over the region Mar‘ash-Malatya (r. 1337-1522) as clients first of the Mamelukes, then of the Ottomans.
Dhu’l-Rumma
Dhu’l-Rumma (d. 735). Nickname of the famous Arab poet Ghaylan ibn ‘Ukba. His prestige was high with the grammarians of the Basra school, and with the lexicographers, for the profuse richness of his descriptions of the camel, the onager, the oryx, and the desert in general.
Dhu’l-Rumma (d. 735). Nickname of the famous Arab poet Ghaylan ibn ‘Ukba. His prestige was high with the grammarians of the Basra school, and with the lexicographers, for the profuse richness of his descriptions of the camel, the onager, the oryx, and the desert in general.
Dhun-Nunids
Dhun-Nunids (Dhu’l-Nunids). Prominent family of Berber origin who ruled in Toledo from the early eleventh century until 1085 during the period of the Muluk al-Tawa’if. The Dhun-Nunids were the rulers of the taifa kingdoms of Toledo (r.1028/1029-1085), and Valencia (1065-1076 and 1085-1092). The Banu Dhun-Nun, an arabized Hispano-Berber dynasty, already had control over Toledo (852-930), before it became subject to the caliph of Cordoba. In 1028/1029 Ismail al-Zafir (1028/29-1043) was able to regain control of Toledo. His successors, Yahya I al-Mamun (1043-1075) and Yahya II al-Qadir (1075-1085) expanded the realm and occupied Valencia from 1065 to 1076, but paid taxes to Castile. When Alfonso VI conquered Toledo in 1085, he helped his vassal, al-Qadir, to regain control over Valencia. Valencia fell to “El Cid”, Rodrigo de Vivar, and was not conquered by the Almoravids until 1102.
Dhu’l-Nunids see Dhun-Nunids
Dhun-Nunids (Dhu’l-Nunids). Prominent family of Berber origin who ruled in Toledo from the early eleventh century until 1085 during the period of the Muluk al-Tawa’if. The Dhun-Nunids were the rulers of the taifa kingdoms of Toledo (r.1028/1029-1085), and Valencia (1065-1076 and 1085-1092). The Banu Dhun-Nun, an arabized Hispano-Berber dynasty, already had control over Toledo (852-930), before it became subject to the caliph of Cordoba. In 1028/1029 Ismail al-Zafir (1028/29-1043) was able to regain control of Toledo. His successors, Yahya I al-Mamun (1043-1075) and Yahya II al-Qadir (1075-1085) expanded the realm and occupied Valencia from 1065 to 1076, but paid taxes to Castile. When Alfonso VI conquered Toledo in 1085, he helped his vassal, al-Qadir, to regain control over Valencia. Valencia fell to “El Cid”, Rodrigo de Vivar, and was not conquered by the Almoravids until 1102.
Dhu’l-Nunids see Dhun-Nunids
Dhu Nuwas
Dhu Nuwas (Yusuf Dhu Nuwas) (Yusuf Asar Dhu Nuwas) (Yusuf Asar Dunaan). Pre-Islamic king (r. 517-525) of the Yemen of the sixth century. After his conversion to Judaism he took the name Yusuf. He persecuted the Christians of Najran, perhaps in 523, and his name is connected with the invasion of Yemen by Ethiopian troops under Abraha. After his defeat, he threw himself into the sea.
Yūsuf Dhū Nuwas was the last king of the Himyarite kingdom of Yemen. Some sources state that he was the successor of Rabia ibn Mudhar, a member of the same dynasty, while other sources claim that he was an usurper. According to a number of medieval historians, who depend on the account of John of Ephesus, Dhū Nuwas, who was a convert to Judaism, announced that he would persecute the Christians living in his kingdom because Christian states persecuted his fellow co-religionists in their realms. A letter survives written by Simon, the bishop of Beth Arsham in 524 C.C., recounts Dhū Nuwas' (where he is called Dimnon) persecution in Najran (modern al-Ukhdud in Saudi Arabia). The persecution is apparently described and condemned in the Qur'an (al-Buruj:4).
According to the contemporary sources, after seizing the throne of the Himyarites, around 523, Dhū Nuwas attacked the Aksumite (mainly Christian) garrison at Zafar, capturing them and burning their churches. He then moved against Najran, a Christian and Aksumite stronghold. After accepting the city's capitulation, he massacred those inhabitants who would not renounce Christianity. Estimates of the death toll from this event range up to 20,000 in some sources.
Dhū Nuwas then proceeded to write a letter to the Lakhmid king Mundhir of al-Ħīra and King Kavadh I of Persia, informing them of his deed and encouraging them to do likewise to the Christians under their dominion. Al-Mundhir received this letter as he was receiving an embassy from Constantinople seeking to forge a peace between the Roman Empire and Hira. He revealed the contents of the letter to the Roman ambassadors who were horrified at its contents. Word of the slaughter quickly spread throughout the Roman and Persian realms, and refugees from Najran even reached the court of the Roman emperor Justin I himself, begging him to avenge the martyred Christians.
The slaughter of the Axumite garrison in Zafar also provoked a response from Kaleb, King of Axum. Procopius reports that Kaleb (whom he calls Hellesthaeus) with the help of Justin, the Roman Emperor, collected a fleet and crossed from Africa to Yemen, where he defeated Dhū Nuwas about the year 525. Kaleb then appointed his Christian South Arabian follower Sumuafa' Ashawa' to rule Yemen as his viceroy.
Arab tradition states that Dhū Nuwas committed suicide by riding his horse into the Red Sea. However, some reports state that Dhu Nuwas was actually killed in battle fighting against Kaleb's army.
Yusuf Dhu Nuwas see Dhu Nuwas
Yusuf Asar Dhu Nuwas see Dhu Nuwas
Yusuf Asar Dunaan see Dhu Nuwas
Dunaan, Yusuf Asar see Dhu Nuwas
Dimnon see Dhu Nuwas
Dhu Nuwas (Yusuf Dhu Nuwas) (Yusuf Asar Dhu Nuwas) (Yusuf Asar Dunaan). Pre-Islamic king (r. 517-525) of the Yemen of the sixth century. After his conversion to Judaism he took the name Yusuf. He persecuted the Christians of Najran, perhaps in 523, and his name is connected with the invasion of Yemen by Ethiopian troops under Abraha. After his defeat, he threw himself into the sea.
Yūsuf Dhū Nuwas was the last king of the Himyarite kingdom of Yemen. Some sources state that he was the successor of Rabia ibn Mudhar, a member of the same dynasty, while other sources claim that he was an usurper. According to a number of medieval historians, who depend on the account of John of Ephesus, Dhū Nuwas, who was a convert to Judaism, announced that he would persecute the Christians living in his kingdom because Christian states persecuted his fellow co-religionists in their realms. A letter survives written by Simon, the bishop of Beth Arsham in 524 C.C., recounts Dhū Nuwas' (where he is called Dimnon) persecution in Najran (modern al-Ukhdud in Saudi Arabia). The persecution is apparently described and condemned in the Qur'an (al-Buruj:4).
According to the contemporary sources, after seizing the throne of the Himyarites, around 523, Dhū Nuwas attacked the Aksumite (mainly Christian) garrison at Zafar, capturing them and burning their churches. He then moved against Najran, a Christian and Aksumite stronghold. After accepting the city's capitulation, he massacred those inhabitants who would not renounce Christianity. Estimates of the death toll from this event range up to 20,000 in some sources.
Dhū Nuwas then proceeded to write a letter to the Lakhmid king Mundhir of al-Ħīra and King Kavadh I of Persia, informing them of his deed and encouraging them to do likewise to the Christians under their dominion. Al-Mundhir received this letter as he was receiving an embassy from Constantinople seeking to forge a peace between the Roman Empire and Hira. He revealed the contents of the letter to the Roman ambassadors who were horrified at its contents. Word of the slaughter quickly spread throughout the Roman and Persian realms, and refugees from Najran even reached the court of the Roman emperor Justin I himself, begging him to avenge the martyred Christians.
The slaughter of the Axumite garrison in Zafar also provoked a response from Kaleb, King of Axum. Procopius reports that Kaleb (whom he calls Hellesthaeus) with the help of Justin, the Roman Emperor, collected a fleet and crossed from Africa to Yemen, where he defeated Dhū Nuwas about the year 525. Kaleb then appointed his Christian South Arabian follower Sumuafa' Ashawa' to rule Yemen as his viceroy.
Arab tradition states that Dhū Nuwas committed suicide by riding his horse into the Red Sea. However, some reports state that Dhu Nuwas was actually killed in battle fighting against Kaleb's army.
Yusuf Dhu Nuwas see Dhu Nuwas
Yusuf Asar Dhu Nuwas see Dhu Nuwas
Yusuf Asar Dunaan see Dhu Nuwas
Dunaan, Yusuf Asar see Dhu Nuwas
Dimnon see Dhu Nuwas
Di‘bil
Di‘bil. Nickname of Abu ‘Ali Muhammad al-Khuza‘i (765-860), a satirical poet. A Shi‘a, who was famous for his poems praising the eighth Imam ‘Ali al-Rida. Di'bil generally attacked the ‘Abbasid caliphs.
Abu ‘Ali Muhammad al-Khuza‘i see Di‘bil.
Khuza'i, Abu ‘Ali Muhammad al see Di‘bil.
Di‘bil. Nickname of Abu ‘Ali Muhammad al-Khuza‘i (765-860), a satirical poet. A Shi‘a, who was famous for his poems praising the eighth Imam ‘Ali al-Rida. Di'bil generally attacked the ‘Abbasid caliphs.
Abu ‘Ali Muhammad al-Khuza‘i see Di‘bil.
Khuza'i, Abu ‘Ali Muhammad al see Di‘bil.
Dihlawi
Dihlawi (Shah Wali Allah al-Dihlawi) (1703-1762). Revolutionary Indian thinker, theologian, and pioneer Persian translator of the Qur’an and hadith. He is considered the founder of Islamic modernism.
Shah Wali Allah al-Dihlawi see Dihlawi
Dihlawi (Shah Wali Allah al-Dihlawi) (1703-1762). Revolutionary Indian thinker, theologian, and pioneer Persian translator of the Qur’an and hadith. He is considered the founder of Islamic modernism.
Shah Wali Allah al-Dihlawi see Dihlawi
Dihqan
Dihqan. Term which is applied primarily to proprietors of small landholdings in Sasanid and early Islamic Iran. Muslim lexicographers understood it to denote “chiefs, proprietors of land and villages” or more precisely, owners of large estates (day’a) or “enclosed gardens” (kurum). Some were only village headmen or peasant district representatives; others lived on relatively large estates; still others were quite wealthy, lived in the cities, and were often associated with the merchants. This is reflected by Mas’udi, who reported that the dihqans were divided into five subclasses, each distinguished by a particular form of dress.
The dihqans first appeared as a distinct social group during the Sasanid period (226-641). They were not members of the privileged aristocracy (shahrdaran, vaspuhran) but rather the azadhan, free functionaries responsible for some military service, assisting in the assessment and collection of taxes, and mediating between the peasantry and the central government. Some high officials such as the shahrigh (representative of the king in a district) were also chosen from among the dihqans. The dihqans provided the Sasanid monarchs with a useful counterbalance to the power of the provincial nobility. Thus, Khusrau Anushirvan praised the dihqans and used the folklore that all the dihqans were descended from Vehghard, brother of the legendary King Hoshang, to emphasize that the dihqans and the monarchs were “brothers.”
The Arab-Muslim conquest of the Sasanid empire actually enhanced the position of the dihqans in eastern Iran. When some of the Umayyad governors of Khurasan allied themselves with the provincial aristocracy and attempted to humiliate and degrade the dihqans, the latter threw their support to anti-Umayyad movements in the region and were instrumental in winning rural support for the Abbasid revolutionary coalition (c. 747-750). The dihqans remained politically important until the eleventh century and also helped achieve the synthesis of Islamic and Iranian cultural traditions represented by Firdausi’s Shahnama. They were gradually supplanted by the class of holders of iqta (“fief”). Today, the term is often used for a common peasant or rustic character.
Dihqan. Term which is applied primarily to proprietors of small landholdings in Sasanid and early Islamic Iran. Muslim lexicographers understood it to denote “chiefs, proprietors of land and villages” or more precisely, owners of large estates (day’a) or “enclosed gardens” (kurum). Some were only village headmen or peasant district representatives; others lived on relatively large estates; still others were quite wealthy, lived in the cities, and were often associated with the merchants. This is reflected by Mas’udi, who reported that the dihqans were divided into five subclasses, each distinguished by a particular form of dress.
The dihqans first appeared as a distinct social group during the Sasanid period (226-641). They were not members of the privileged aristocracy (shahrdaran, vaspuhran) but rather the azadhan, free functionaries responsible for some military service, assisting in the assessment and collection of taxes, and mediating between the peasantry and the central government. Some high officials such as the shahrigh (representative of the king in a district) were also chosen from among the dihqans. The dihqans provided the Sasanid monarchs with a useful counterbalance to the power of the provincial nobility. Thus, Khusrau Anushirvan praised the dihqans and used the folklore that all the dihqans were descended from Vehghard, brother of the legendary King Hoshang, to emphasize that the dihqans and the monarchs were “brothers.”
The Arab-Muslim conquest of the Sasanid empire actually enhanced the position of the dihqans in eastern Iran. When some of the Umayyad governors of Khurasan allied themselves with the provincial aristocracy and attempted to humiliate and degrade the dihqans, the latter threw their support to anti-Umayyad movements in the region and were instrumental in winning rural support for the Abbasid revolutionary coalition (c. 747-750). The dihqans remained politically important until the eleventh century and also helped achieve the synthesis of Islamic and Iranian cultural traditions represented by Firdausi’s Shahnama. They were gradually supplanted by the class of holders of iqta (“fief”). Today, the term is often used for a common peasant or rustic character.
Dimashqi
Shams al-Din al-Ansari al-Dimashqi or simply al-Dimashqi (Arabic: شمس الدين الأنصاري الدمشقي) (1256–1327) was a medieval Arab geographer, completing his main work in 1300. Born in Damascus — as his name "Dimashqi" implies—he mostly wrote of his native land, the Greater Syria (Bilad ash-Sham), upon the complete withdrawal of the Crusaders. He became a contemporary of the Mamluk sultan Baibars, the general who led the Muslims in war against the Crusaders. His work is of value in connection with the Crusader Chronicles. He died while in Safad, in 1327.
Al-Dimashqi (1325) gives very detailed accounts of each island in the Malay archipelago, its population, flora, fauna and customs. He mentions "the country of Champa ... is inhabited by Muslims and idolaters. The Islam came there during the time of Caliph Uthman ... and Ali, many Muslims who were expelled by the Umayyads and by Al-Hajjaj, fled there, and since then a majority of the Cham have embraced Islam."
Of their rivals the Khmer, Al-Dimashqi (1325) mentions they inhabit the island of Komor (Khmer), also called Malay Island, a land of many towns and cities, rich-dense forests with huge, tall trees, and white elephants; they supplemented their income from the trade routes not only by exporting ivory and aloe, but also by engaging in piracy and raiding on Muslim and Chinese shipping.
Dinawari
Dinawari (Abu Hanifa al-Dinawari) (Abu Hanifah Ahmad ibn Dawud Dinawari) (828-896). Arab scholar of Iranian origin. Among other works, he wrote a well-known history [Akhbâr al-tiwâl ("General History")] from a Persian point of view.
Ābu Ḥanīfah Āḥmad ibn Dawūd Dīnawarī was a Persian polymath excelling as much in astronomy, agriculture, botany and metallurgy and as he did in geography, mathematics and history. He was born in Dinawar, (halfway between Hamadan and Kermanshah in western Iran). He studied astronomy, mathematics and mechanics in Isfahan and philology and poetry in Kufa and Basra. He died on July 24, 896 at Dinawar. His most renowned contribution is Book of Plants, for which he is considered the founder of Arabic botany. He is also considered among the very first writers to discuss the ancestry of the Kurds. He wrote a book about this subject called Ansâb al-Akrâd (Ancestry of the Kurds).
Dinawari's Akhbâr al-tiwâl ("General History") has been edited and published numerous times, but has not been translated into a Western language.
On the other hand, al-Dinawari is considered the founder of Arabic botany for his Kitab al-Nabat (Book of Plants), which consisted of six volumes. Only the third and fifth volumes have survived, though the sixth volume has partly been reconstructed based on citations from later works. In the surviving portions of his works, 637 plants are described. He also discusses plant evolution from its birth to its death, describing the phases of plant growth and the production of flowers and fruit.
Parts of al-Dinawari's Book of Plants deals with the applications of Islamic astronomy and meteorology to agriculture. It describes the astronomical and meteorological character of the sky, the planets and constellations, the sun and moon, the lunar phases indicating seasons and rain, the anwa (heavenly bodies of rain), and atmospheric phenomena such as winds, thunder, lightning, snow, floods, valleys, rivers, lakes, wells and other sources of water.
Parts of al-Dinawari's Book of Plants deals with the Earth sciences in the context of agriculture. He considers the Earth, stone and sands, and describes different types of ground, indicating which types are more convenient for plants and the qualities and properties of good ground.
The works al-Dinawari include:
In mathematics and the natural sciences:
1. Kitâb al-jabr wa'l-muqâbila ("Book of Algebra")
2. Kitâb al-nabât ("Book of Plants")
3. Kitâb al-kusuf ("Book of Solar Eclipses")
4. Kitâb al-radd alâ rasad al-Isfahâni ("Refutation of al-Isfahani's Astronomical Observations")
5. Kitâb al-hisâb ("Book of Arithmetics")
6. Bahth fi hisâb al-Hind ("Analysis of Indian Arithmetics")
7. Kitâb al-jam' wa'l-tafriq ("Book of Arithmetics")
8. Kitab al-qibla wa'l-ziwal ("Book of Astral Orientations")
9. Kitâb al-anwâ' ("Book of Weather")
10. Islâh al-mantiq ("Improvement upon Logic")
In the social sciences and humanities:
1. Akhbâr al-tiwâl ("General History")
2. Kitâb al-kabir ("Grand Book" in history of sciences)
3. Kitâb al-fisâha ("Book of Rhetorics")
4. Kitâb al-buldân ("Book of Geography")
5. Kitâb al-shi'r wa'l-shu'arâ ("Book of Poetry and Poets")
6. Ansâb al-Akrâd ("Ancestry of the Kurds").
Abu Hanifa al-Dinawari see Dinawari
Abu Hanifah Ahmad ibn Dawud Dinawari see Dinawari
Dinawari (Abu Hanifa al-Dinawari) (Abu Hanifah Ahmad ibn Dawud Dinawari) (828-896). Arab scholar of Iranian origin. Among other works, he wrote a well-known history [Akhbâr al-tiwâl ("General History")] from a Persian point of view.
Ābu Ḥanīfah Āḥmad ibn Dawūd Dīnawarī was a Persian polymath excelling as much in astronomy, agriculture, botany and metallurgy and as he did in geography, mathematics and history. He was born in Dinawar, (halfway between Hamadan and Kermanshah in western Iran). He studied astronomy, mathematics and mechanics in Isfahan and philology and poetry in Kufa and Basra. He died on July 24, 896 at Dinawar. His most renowned contribution is Book of Plants, for which he is considered the founder of Arabic botany. He is also considered among the very first writers to discuss the ancestry of the Kurds. He wrote a book about this subject called Ansâb al-Akrâd (Ancestry of the Kurds).
Dinawari's Akhbâr al-tiwâl ("General History") has been edited and published numerous times, but has not been translated into a Western language.
On the other hand, al-Dinawari is considered the founder of Arabic botany for his Kitab al-Nabat (Book of Plants), which consisted of six volumes. Only the third and fifth volumes have survived, though the sixth volume has partly been reconstructed based on citations from later works. In the surviving portions of his works, 637 plants are described. He also discusses plant evolution from its birth to its death, describing the phases of plant growth and the production of flowers and fruit.
Parts of al-Dinawari's Book of Plants deals with the applications of Islamic astronomy and meteorology to agriculture. It describes the astronomical and meteorological character of the sky, the planets and constellations, the sun and moon, the lunar phases indicating seasons and rain, the anwa (heavenly bodies of rain), and atmospheric phenomena such as winds, thunder, lightning, snow, floods, valleys, rivers, lakes, wells and other sources of water.
Parts of al-Dinawari's Book of Plants deals with the Earth sciences in the context of agriculture. He considers the Earth, stone and sands, and describes different types of ground, indicating which types are more convenient for plants and the qualities and properties of good ground.
The works al-Dinawari include:
In mathematics and the natural sciences:
1. Kitâb al-jabr wa'l-muqâbila ("Book of Algebra")
2. Kitâb al-nabât ("Book of Plants")
3. Kitâb al-kusuf ("Book of Solar Eclipses")
4. Kitâb al-radd alâ rasad al-Isfahâni ("Refutation of al-Isfahani's Astronomical Observations")
5. Kitâb al-hisâb ("Book of Arithmetics")
6. Bahth fi hisâb al-Hind ("Analysis of Indian Arithmetics")
7. Kitâb al-jam' wa'l-tafriq ("Book of Arithmetics")
8. Kitab al-qibla wa'l-ziwal ("Book of Astral Orientations")
9. Kitâb al-anwâ' ("Book of Weather")
10. Islâh al-mantiq ("Improvement upon Logic")
In the social sciences and humanities:
1. Akhbâr al-tiwâl ("General History")
2. Kitâb al-kabir ("Grand Book" in history of sciences)
3. Kitâb al-fisâha ("Book of Rhetorics")
4. Kitâb al-buldân ("Book of Geography")
5. Kitâb al-shi'r wa'l-shu'arâ ("Book of Poetry and Poets")
6. Ansâb al-Akrâd ("Ancestry of the Kurds").
Abu Hanifa al-Dinawari see Dinawari
Abu Hanifah Ahmad ibn Dawud Dinawari see Dinawari
Dinet
Dinet (Alphonse Dinet) (1861-1929). French author and a painter of Asian subjects. He assumed the name Nacir Ed Dine (Nasir al-Din) when he became a convert to Islam.
Alphonse Dinet see Dinet
Nacir Ed Dine see Dinet
Dine, Nacir Ed see Dinet
Nasir al-Din see Dinet
Din, Nasir al- see Dinet
Dinet (Alphonse Dinet) (1861-1929). French author and a painter of Asian subjects. He assumed the name Nacir Ed Dine (Nasir al-Din) when he became a convert to Islam.
Alphonse Dinet see Dinet
Nacir Ed Dine see Dinet
Dine, Nacir Ed see Dinet
Nasir al-Din see Dinet
Din, Nasir al- see Dinet
Diola
Diola. The major ethnic group in the Lower Casamance region of southwestern Senegal. The Diola comprise several subgroups which are distinguished from one another by linguistic and cultural variations. The isolation of these subgroups is reflected in the fact that, until the mid-nineteenth century, the Diola had no single word to identify themselves. From the late fifteenth century, the term “Floups” or “Felupes” was used by European travelers to refer to them. The term “Diola,” apparently of Wolof origin came into common usage during the mid-1800s. Some nineteenth century sources spell the term, Yola. The Senegalese government has adopted the simplified spelling, Jola.
Islam attracted its first Diola converts during the 1890s. The early Muslims were men who had traveled to the Gambia to trade rubber and palm produce. Within a few years, several northwestern Diola communities, which maintained the closest commercial contact with the Manding, were predominantly Muslim. Also, beginning in the 1890s, the establishment of French colonial administration over the Diola fostered increased communications between local populations and the outside world. Dyula (Manding) traders, some of whom served as marabouts, began to circulate through the region. In addition, about 1900, the Mauritanian marabout Sharif Mahfuz established himself among the Diola. All of these factors fostered conversion.
During the 1920s, roads were constructed throughout the Lower Casamance, encouraging continued urban migration. The resulting partial integration into colonial society stimulated the rapid spread of Islam.
Floups see Diola.
Felupes see Diola.
Yola see Diola.
Jola see Diola.
Diola. The major ethnic group in the Lower Casamance region of southwestern Senegal. The Diola comprise several subgroups which are distinguished from one another by linguistic and cultural variations. The isolation of these subgroups is reflected in the fact that, until the mid-nineteenth century, the Diola had no single word to identify themselves. From the late fifteenth century, the term “Floups” or “Felupes” was used by European travelers to refer to them. The term “Diola,” apparently of Wolof origin came into common usage during the mid-1800s. Some nineteenth century sources spell the term, Yola. The Senegalese government has adopted the simplified spelling, Jola.
Islam attracted its first Diola converts during the 1890s. The early Muslims were men who had traveled to the Gambia to trade rubber and palm produce. Within a few years, several northwestern Diola communities, which maintained the closest commercial contact with the Manding, were predominantly Muslim. Also, beginning in the 1890s, the establishment of French colonial administration over the Diola fostered increased communications between local populations and the outside world. Dyula (Manding) traders, some of whom served as marabouts, began to circulate through the region. In addition, about 1900, the Mauritanian marabout Sharif Mahfuz established himself among the Diola. All of these factors fostered conversion.
During the 1920s, roads were constructed throughout the Lower Casamance, encouraging continued urban migration. The resulting partial integration into colonial society stimulated the rapid spread of Islam.
Floups see Diola.
Felupes see Diola.
Yola see Diola.
Jola see Diola.
Diouf
Diouf (Abdou Diouf) (Wolof: Abdu Juuf) (b. September 7, 1935). Prime minister of Senegal (r.1970-1981) who became president in 1981. Diouf was born in Louga and educated at the Lycee Faidherbe in Saint Louis and at the University of Dakar. In 1960, he received a law degree from the University of Paris. Upon his return, he held increasingly important government positions, and became known as President Leopold Sedar Senghor’s protégé. In 1964, Diouf was named secretary-general to the presidency. In 1970, Senghor revived the post of prime minister -- previously abolished when the incumbent Mamadou Dia had challenged Senghor’s authority -- and named Diouf to the position. Diouf was viewed by many as the embodiment of Senghor’s attempt to establish a technocratically oriented administration.
In 1981, Senghor, approaching his seventy-fifth year, stepped down from the presidency in favor of Diouf. The latter immediately lifted many of his mentor’s restrictions on political opposition parties. In the same year, Diouf responded to a plea from Gambian president Dauda Jawara for assistance against an apparently successful coup. Senegal’s intervention restored Jawara, and shortly afterward the two countries agreed to form the Confederation of Senegambia, which stressed military cooperation.
In 1983, Diouf was elected president in his own right with 84 percent of the vote, the opposition parties being badly fragmented. He then took steps to replace the old-line politicians with younger men, which created some tension within the government and the party. During Diouf's tenure, Senegal remained closely allied with France, both politically and culturally. In 1985, Diouf was elected head of the OAU (Organization of African Unity).
Abdou Diouf was the second President of Senegal, serving from 1981 to 2000. Diouf is notable both for coming to power by peaceful succession, and leaving willingly after losing the 2000 presidential election to Abdoulaye Wade. He also became the Secretary-General of La Francophonie in 2003.
Diouf was born in Louga, Senegal, the child of an Hal Pulaar mother and a Serere father. He went to primary and secondary school at the Lycée Faidherbe in Saint-Louis, and studied law at Dakar University and then at the Sorbonne, Paris. Diouf graduated in 1959.
After graduation, Diouf returned to Senegal, where in September 1960 he was appointed Director of International Technical Cooperation. In November 1960 he became assistant of the Secretary-General of the Government, and in June 1961 he became Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defense. In 1961 he joined the Senegalese Progressive Union (Union Progressiste Sénégalaise, UPS), which later became the Socialist Party of Senegal. In December 1961 he became Governor of the Sine-Saloum Region, serving in that position until December 1962, when he became Director of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In May 1963 he was moved to the position of Director of the Cabinet of President Léopold Senghor, where he remained until December 1965. In January 1964 he became Secretary-General of the Presidency, serving in that post until March 1968, when he became Minister of Planning and Industry. He remained in the latter position until February 1970, when he was named Prime Minister.
In 1970, Senghor reinstated the post of prime minister, giving it to Diouf, his protégé. Senghor trusted Diouf, Diouf had administrative experience, and also no independent power base of his own. This was important, for Senghor's last prime minister had used the position to launch a coup d’état. On January 1, 1981, Senghor resigned in favor of Diouf, who became president of Senegal.
Diouf continued the political liberalization Senghor had begun by holding elections in 1983. He allowed fourteen opposition parties to run, instead of the four Senghor had allowed. The practical effect of this was to fragment the opposition, and Diouf won with 83.5 percent of the vote.
In 1985, opposing parties tried to form a coalition. It was broken up on the grounds that coalitions were forbidden by the constitution. Also in 1985, Abdoulaye Wade, Diouf's main political opponent, was temporarily arrested for unlawful demonstration.
In February, 1988, elections were held again. Diouf won 72.3 percent of the vote to Wade's 25.8 percent, and opposing parties alleged electoral fraud. Disturbances followed, and Diouf declared a state of emergency, detaining Wade again until May of that year.
Under Diouf, Senegal agreed to form a confederation called Senegambia with neighboring Gambia on December 12, 1981. This union took place on February 1, 1982. In April 1989, the Mauritania-Senegal Border War developed, leading to an outbreak of ethnic violence and the severing of diplomatic relations with Mauritania. As the region destabilized, Senegambia was dissolved.
In 1986, Diouf began an anti-AIDS program in Senegal, before the virus was able to take off in earnest. He used the media and schools to promote safe-sex messages, and required prostitutes to be registered. He also encouraged civic organizations and both Christian and Muslim religious leaders to raise awareness about AIDS. The result was that while AIDS was decimating much of Africa, the infection rate for Senegal stayed below 2 per cent.
Diouf was re-elected in February 1993 with 58% of the vote to a 7-year term. Presidential term lengths had been extended by two years in 1991. In the first round of the 2000 elections, on February 27, he took 41.3% of the vote against 30.1% for the long-time opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade, but in the second round on March 19 he received only 41.5% against 58.5% for Wade. Diouf conceded defeat and left office on April 1.
From this electoral defeat came one of Diouf's greatest contributions to African peace, for he gracefully surrendered power to Abdoulaye Wade, his long-time rival. When Diouf left office Wade said he should receive a Nobel Peace Prize for leaving without violence.
Both during and after his presidency, Diouf was active in international organizations. He was elected President of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for 1985 to 1986. Soon after his election, he made a personal plea to François Mitterrand, the President of France, resulting in France speaking strongly for sanctions against South Africa. In 1992, he was re-elected President of the OAU again for another year-long term.
After leaving office as President of Senegal, he was unanimously elected as Secretary-General of La Francophonie at that organization's Ninth Summit on October 20, 2002 in Beirut, following the withdrawal of the only other candidate, Henri Lopes of the Republic of the Congo. Diouf took office as Secretary-General on January 1, 2003. He was re-elected as Secretary-General for another four years at the organization's summit in Bucharest in September 2006.
Abdou Diouf see Diouf
Wolof Abdu Juuf see Diouf
Juuf, Wolof Abdu see Diouf
Diouf (Abdou Diouf) (Wolof: Abdu Juuf) (b. September 7, 1935). Prime minister of Senegal (r.1970-1981) who became president in 1981. Diouf was born in Louga and educated at the Lycee Faidherbe in Saint Louis and at the University of Dakar. In 1960, he received a law degree from the University of Paris. Upon his return, he held increasingly important government positions, and became known as President Leopold Sedar Senghor’s protégé. In 1964, Diouf was named secretary-general to the presidency. In 1970, Senghor revived the post of prime minister -- previously abolished when the incumbent Mamadou Dia had challenged Senghor’s authority -- and named Diouf to the position. Diouf was viewed by many as the embodiment of Senghor’s attempt to establish a technocratically oriented administration.
In 1981, Senghor, approaching his seventy-fifth year, stepped down from the presidency in favor of Diouf. The latter immediately lifted many of his mentor’s restrictions on political opposition parties. In the same year, Diouf responded to a plea from Gambian president Dauda Jawara for assistance against an apparently successful coup. Senegal’s intervention restored Jawara, and shortly afterward the two countries agreed to form the Confederation of Senegambia, which stressed military cooperation.
In 1983, Diouf was elected president in his own right with 84 percent of the vote, the opposition parties being badly fragmented. He then took steps to replace the old-line politicians with younger men, which created some tension within the government and the party. During Diouf's tenure, Senegal remained closely allied with France, both politically and culturally. In 1985, Diouf was elected head of the OAU (Organization of African Unity).
Abdou Diouf was the second President of Senegal, serving from 1981 to 2000. Diouf is notable both for coming to power by peaceful succession, and leaving willingly after losing the 2000 presidential election to Abdoulaye Wade. He also became the Secretary-General of La Francophonie in 2003.
Diouf was born in Louga, Senegal, the child of an Hal Pulaar mother and a Serere father. He went to primary and secondary school at the Lycée Faidherbe in Saint-Louis, and studied law at Dakar University and then at the Sorbonne, Paris. Diouf graduated in 1959.
After graduation, Diouf returned to Senegal, where in September 1960 he was appointed Director of International Technical Cooperation. In November 1960 he became assistant of the Secretary-General of the Government, and in June 1961 he became Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defense. In 1961 he joined the Senegalese Progressive Union (Union Progressiste Sénégalaise, UPS), which later became the Socialist Party of Senegal. In December 1961 he became Governor of the Sine-Saloum Region, serving in that position until December 1962, when he became Director of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In May 1963 he was moved to the position of Director of the Cabinet of President Léopold Senghor, where he remained until December 1965. In January 1964 he became Secretary-General of the Presidency, serving in that post until March 1968, when he became Minister of Planning and Industry. He remained in the latter position until February 1970, when he was named Prime Minister.
In 1970, Senghor reinstated the post of prime minister, giving it to Diouf, his protégé. Senghor trusted Diouf, Diouf had administrative experience, and also no independent power base of his own. This was important, for Senghor's last prime minister had used the position to launch a coup d’état. On January 1, 1981, Senghor resigned in favor of Diouf, who became president of Senegal.
Diouf continued the political liberalization Senghor had begun by holding elections in 1983. He allowed fourteen opposition parties to run, instead of the four Senghor had allowed. The practical effect of this was to fragment the opposition, and Diouf won with 83.5 percent of the vote.
In 1985, opposing parties tried to form a coalition. It was broken up on the grounds that coalitions were forbidden by the constitution. Also in 1985, Abdoulaye Wade, Diouf's main political opponent, was temporarily arrested for unlawful demonstration.
In February, 1988, elections were held again. Diouf won 72.3 percent of the vote to Wade's 25.8 percent, and opposing parties alleged electoral fraud. Disturbances followed, and Diouf declared a state of emergency, detaining Wade again until May of that year.
Under Diouf, Senegal agreed to form a confederation called Senegambia with neighboring Gambia on December 12, 1981. This union took place on February 1, 1982. In April 1989, the Mauritania-Senegal Border War developed, leading to an outbreak of ethnic violence and the severing of diplomatic relations with Mauritania. As the region destabilized, Senegambia was dissolved.
In 1986, Diouf began an anti-AIDS program in Senegal, before the virus was able to take off in earnest. He used the media and schools to promote safe-sex messages, and required prostitutes to be registered. He also encouraged civic organizations and both Christian and Muslim religious leaders to raise awareness about AIDS. The result was that while AIDS was decimating much of Africa, the infection rate for Senegal stayed below 2 per cent.
Diouf was re-elected in February 1993 with 58% of the vote to a 7-year term. Presidential term lengths had been extended by two years in 1991. In the first round of the 2000 elections, on February 27, he took 41.3% of the vote against 30.1% for the long-time opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade, but in the second round on March 19 he received only 41.5% against 58.5% for Wade. Diouf conceded defeat and left office on April 1.
From this electoral defeat came one of Diouf's greatest contributions to African peace, for he gracefully surrendered power to Abdoulaye Wade, his long-time rival. When Diouf left office Wade said he should receive a Nobel Peace Prize for leaving without violence.
Both during and after his presidency, Diouf was active in international organizations. He was elected President of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for 1985 to 1986. Soon after his election, he made a personal plea to François Mitterrand, the President of France, resulting in France speaking strongly for sanctions against South Africa. In 1992, he was re-elected President of the OAU again for another year-long term.
After leaving office as President of Senegal, he was unanimously elected as Secretary-General of La Francophonie at that organization's Ninth Summit on October 20, 2002 in Beirut, following the withdrawal of the only other candidate, Henri Lopes of the Republic of the Congo. Diouf took office as Secretary-General on January 1, 2003. He was re-elected as Secretary-General for another four years at the organization's summit in Bucharest in September 2006.
Abdou Diouf see Diouf
Wolof Abdu Juuf see Diouf
Juuf, Wolof Abdu see Diouf
Divehi
Divehi. The Divehi people, or Maldivians, occupy the whole of the Maldive Islands, an archipelago of coral atolls in the Indian Ocean about 400 miles west of Sri Lanka. There are some 1,000 little islands and islets, stretching for 475 miles and grouped into a score of atolls. Most islands have fresh water because rainfall is abundant, and vegetation is lush on islands where enough humus is mixed with the coral sand. Coconut palms predominate. The Divehis are 100 percent Muslim. It is believed that in 1154 a saint from Morocco dispelled an apparition in Male harbor, converted the king and designated him sultan. Thereafter, all his subjects were compelled to accept Islam. The Tarikh, a chronicle in Arabic, records the reigns of 92 sultans (and a few sultanas). Ibn Battuta, the famed Arab traveler and chronicler, appeared in Male in 1343 and stayed for a year and a half as qadi (qazi), as there was no judge there trained in Islamic law.
The Portuguese ruled the Maldives for fifteen years in the mid-sixteenth century but were overthrown by a hero, Muhammad Takurufan, whose epic deeds as narrated today show the antipathy of the Divehis to outsiders and to Christians in particular. The British signed an agreement to “protect” the Maldives in 1887, but did not administer it internally and left no colonial stamp. They withdrew in 1965, and in 1968 a republic was proclaimed and the sultanate abolished. The government today, however, is still highly centralized.
Maldivians see Divehi.
Divehi. The Divehi people, or Maldivians, occupy the whole of the Maldive Islands, an archipelago of coral atolls in the Indian Ocean about 400 miles west of Sri Lanka. There are some 1,000 little islands and islets, stretching for 475 miles and grouped into a score of atolls. Most islands have fresh water because rainfall is abundant, and vegetation is lush on islands where enough humus is mixed with the coral sand. Coconut palms predominate. The Divehis are 100 percent Muslim. It is believed that in 1154 a saint from Morocco dispelled an apparition in Male harbor, converted the king and designated him sultan. Thereafter, all his subjects were compelled to accept Islam. The Tarikh, a chronicle in Arabic, records the reigns of 92 sultans (and a few sultanas). Ibn Battuta, the famed Arab traveler and chronicler, appeared in Male in 1343 and stayed for a year and a half as qadi (qazi), as there was no judge there trained in Islamic law.
The Portuguese ruled the Maldives for fifteen years in the mid-sixteenth century but were overthrown by a hero, Muhammad Takurufan, whose epic deeds as narrated today show the antipathy of the Divehis to outsiders and to Christians in particular. The British signed an agreement to “protect” the Maldives in 1887, but did not administer it internally and left no colonial stamp. They withdrew in 1965, and in 1968 a republic was proclaimed and the sultanate abolished. The government today, however, is still highly centralized.
Maldivians see Divehi.
Dongxiang
Dongxiang. Three Muslim ethnic groups live in the villages and towns along the rivers flowing out of the Qilian and other mountains in north central China. The largest is the Dongxiang (the others, the Bonans and Salars), most of whom live in the Dongxiang Autonomous County in Gansu Province. This county, established in 1950, is in Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture and borders on the Tao River in the east, the Daxia River in the west and the Huang (Yellow) River in the north. Smaller groups form compact communities in Hezheng County and Linxia City, both also in Gansu Province. Still smaller groups live in the provincial capital of Lanzhou and are scattered throughout Dingxi District as well as the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region.
Before 1950, the Dongxiang were known as Dongxiang Hui or Mongolian Huihui, but the Dongxiang referred to themselves simply by what is now their official designation. The word is Chinese and means “the eastern village,” that is, a village located east of Linxia, the nearest major city. Some foreign observers have called the Dongxiang “Santa,” but in its present usage this word refers only to a Dongxiang who is a practicing Muslim, and it is thus strictly a religious term.
Historical records reveal that when, in 1226, Jenghiz Khan attacked the Tangut state of Xixia for a second time, the Hezhou area became an important staging area where a military farm (tunitan) was established. During Monghe’s reign Hezhou was used as a major strongpoint in the campaign against the Tibetans. After Kublai Khan conquered the Tangzang area of northern Tibet, he established in Hezhou three different kinds of offices. The incumbent of one of these, Ananda, one of Kublai’s many grandsons, adopted Islam during Timur’s reign (1295-1307), and most of his troops followed suit.
Another theory sees the Dongxiang as part of the Chagatai khanate, which flourished during the Yuan period in what is now Chinese (Xinjiang) and Soviet Central Asia. There they converted to Islam but were promptly discriminated against by other Mongols who resisted conversion. To avoid further friction, the Islamized Mongols moved eastward by way of Xingxingxia. When they reached Zhenfan (today’s Minqin County in Gansu) they split into two routes. One group crossed the Helan Mountains and went to Hetao, where their descendants are today Muslim Mongols of the Alashan Left Banner in Inner Mongolia. The other group turned south, crossed the Huang River and settled in the Hezhou area.
A third notion, held by only a few persons, claims that the Dongxiang were originally Hui living in the present Dongxiang area who over the centuries mingled with Han and Mongols. Judging by linguistic and other evidence, this theory is probably incorrect. There is a general consensus that the main stock of the original Dongxiang was Mongol, not Hui. Later, during the Ming and Qing dynasties, these Mongols began to intermarry with Hui, Han and Tibetans living in the area.
Dongxiang Hui see Dongxiang.
Mongolian Huihui see Dongxiang.
“the eastern village” see Dongxiang.
Santa see Dongxiang.
Dongxiang. Three Muslim ethnic groups live in the villages and towns along the rivers flowing out of the Qilian and other mountains in north central China. The largest is the Dongxiang (the others, the Bonans and Salars), most of whom live in the Dongxiang Autonomous County in Gansu Province. This county, established in 1950, is in Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture and borders on the Tao River in the east, the Daxia River in the west and the Huang (Yellow) River in the north. Smaller groups form compact communities in Hezheng County and Linxia City, both also in Gansu Province. Still smaller groups live in the provincial capital of Lanzhou and are scattered throughout Dingxi District as well as the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region.
Before 1950, the Dongxiang were known as Dongxiang Hui or Mongolian Huihui, but the Dongxiang referred to themselves simply by what is now their official designation. The word is Chinese and means “the eastern village,” that is, a village located east of Linxia, the nearest major city. Some foreign observers have called the Dongxiang “Santa,” but in its present usage this word refers only to a Dongxiang who is a practicing Muslim, and it is thus strictly a religious term.
Historical records reveal that when, in 1226, Jenghiz Khan attacked the Tangut state of Xixia for a second time, the Hezhou area became an important staging area where a military farm (tunitan) was established. During Monghe’s reign Hezhou was used as a major strongpoint in the campaign against the Tibetans. After Kublai Khan conquered the Tangzang area of northern Tibet, he established in Hezhou three different kinds of offices. The incumbent of one of these, Ananda, one of Kublai’s many grandsons, adopted Islam during Timur’s reign (1295-1307), and most of his troops followed suit.
Another theory sees the Dongxiang as part of the Chagatai khanate, which flourished during the Yuan period in what is now Chinese (Xinjiang) and Soviet Central Asia. There they converted to Islam but were promptly discriminated against by other Mongols who resisted conversion. To avoid further friction, the Islamized Mongols moved eastward by way of Xingxingxia. When they reached Zhenfan (today’s Minqin County in Gansu) they split into two routes. One group crossed the Helan Mountains and went to Hetao, where their descendants are today Muslim Mongols of the Alashan Left Banner in Inner Mongolia. The other group turned south, crossed the Huang River and settled in the Hezhou area.
A third notion, held by only a few persons, claims that the Dongxiang were originally Hui living in the present Dongxiang area who over the centuries mingled with Han and Mongols. Judging by linguistic and other evidence, this theory is probably incorrect. There is a general consensus that the main stock of the original Dongxiang was Mongol, not Hui. Later, during the Ming and Qing dynasties, these Mongols began to intermarry with Hui, Han and Tibetans living in the area.
Dongxiang Hui see Dongxiang.
Mongolian Huihui see Dongxiang.
“the eastern village” see Dongxiang.
Santa see Dongxiang.
Druze
Druze (in Arabic, Duruz; in singular form, Durzi). The secret religion, practiced by some Arabs in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel, was founded by Shaykh Darazi, who preached that the Fatimid Caliph al-Hakim was the last of a series of emanations from God. The Druze are, thus, an esoteric Isma‘ili sect dating from the eleventh century of the Christian calendar.
The Druze are a Syrian people professing a faith derived from the Isma'iliyya sect of Shi’ism. The name comes from Muhammad al-Darazi (d. 1019), a non-Arab leader of the movement, which originated in the last years of the reign of al-Hakim, Caliph of the Fatimid dynasty of Egypt (996-1021).
The Druze religion was first established in Cairo around 1017. It is believed that it soon spread to many regions in Southwest Asia and North Africa.
In the Isma'ili religious hierarchy, al-Hakim was regarded as the infallible Imam and was also an absolute monarch, exercising spiritual supremacy as possessor of the “active intellect,” transmitted by the divine will through a divinely ordained family. Al-Hakim, an eccentric ruler in the exercise of his authority as both temporal and spiritual head of the Isma'ilis, seems to have wished to be regarded as an incarnation of divinity. Out of the resulting confusion over his claims, which greatly weakened the Fatimid establishment, the Druze movement arose in 1017.
Hamza ibn 'Ali, a Persian, was responsible for establishing al-Hakim’s standing among the Druze as the embodiment of the ultimate One who created the first cosmic principle, the intellect. The Hakim cult in this sense became the worship of the One alone, manifested in al-Hakim. From this belief comes the appellation muwahhidun (“unitarians”), which the Druze applied to themselves. Hamza’s teaching was founded on extremist Ismailism in its descriptions of the spiritual hierarchy which embodies cosmic principles. According to Hamza, there were five great cosmic ranks, each embodied in a human leader: the intellect, which was Hamza; the universal soul, Isma'il ibn Muhammad al-Tamimi; the word, Muhammad ibn Wahb al-Qurashi; the preceder, Salama ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab; and the follower, Baha’ al-Din al-Muqtana. Below these were a number of missionaries and preachers embodying cosmic effort, and subordinate to them were the ordinary believers. In opposition to these cosmic ranks were a series of false ones, also created by the One, al-Hakim, and these embodied the evil side of the cosmos. The latter will be abandoned by al-Hakim in the Last Days, when the messianic culmination of the era will be marked by the establishment of the worship of the One, revealed in al-Hakim.
The Druze await the return of both al-Hakim and Hamza, who are believed to be in “occultation,” like that of the Imamite twelfth imam. During the occultation of Hamza, al-Muqtana became the link between Hamza and his followers, and it was under him that Druze orthodoxy was established.
In 1033, al-Muqtana also went into occultation, a state corresponding to the “complete” occultation of the Imamites. From then on the Druze became a closed community, keeping their religious doctrines secret. Those who know the system are known as “the wise;” the others in the community are the “ignorant”. The wise alone take part in the religious services on Thursday evening, although the ignorant may be admitted to the least secret of these services.
In 1516, the Druze came under Turkish pressure as the Levant was conquered by the Ottomans. The Druze offered strong opposition to the Ottomans and kept a higher level of independence than their neighbors. Under the Jumblat, the Druze would cause trouble for the Ottomans until the beginning of the twentieth century.
In 1918, the Druze participated in the army of Faisal, thereby breaking a principle of non-participation outside their own community.
On March 4, 1921, the Druze were granted autonomy in the region of Jabal al-Duruz, from the the League of Nations.
In 1925, the Druze revolted, as Druze leaders protested against the liberalization of the society as promoted by the French governor of Jabal al-Duruz. The revolt ended with the arrest of the Druze leaders, and their being exiled to Palmyra.
By 1927, the Druze revolt was over, and the French began a political program that was intended to keep the Druze away from Arab nationalism, and hence dependent upon the safety offered by the French.
Today, the Druze live primarily in Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and Jordan, often in mountainous regions. There are also important Druze communities abroad, including in Europe and the United States.
While the Druze are not regarded as Muslims by other Muslims, they regard themselves as Muslims as well as carriers of the core of Muslim faith. The origin of the Druze is to a large extent from a group of Shi'a, the Isma'ilis, but they have diverged much, and the Qur’an does not seem to be a part of their religious exercises. Nevertheless, the Druze do call themselves muwahhidun – “monotheists.”
The theology of Druze religion is called hikma and its main theme is that God incarnated himself in the Fatimid caliph al-Hakim, who disappeared in 1021. While most Muslims believe he died in 1021, the Druze disagree and believe that al-Hakim is awaiting to return to the world in order to bring a new golden age to true believers.
The Druze believe in one God and claim that the qualities of God cannot be understood or defined by humans. Al-Hakim is worshipped in Druze religion, he is called “Our Lord” and his cruelties and eccentricities are all interpreted symbolically.
However, while God incarnated himself in al-Hakim in his unity, other aspects of God can be incarnated in other human beings. These aspects are represented with five superior ministers. Under the ministers one finds three other groups: functionaries, preachers, and heads of communities. The knowledge of this hierarchical system is the highest knowledge in the Druze religion.
Frequently, one hears about a calf in Druze religion. It is believed that the calf is a central symbol which represents the negative forces in the world.
The moral system of Druze religion consists of seven principles:
Love of truth
Taking care of one another
Renouncing all other religions
Avoiding the demon (the calf?) and all wrongdoers
Accepting divine unity in humanity
Accepting all of al-Hakim’s acts
Acting in total accord with al-Hakim’s will
Central in the Druze world system is the belief in reincarnation, where all souls are reborn as humans, good as well as bad. Good people have a more fortunate rebirth than bad people. Behind this system is the belief that man cannot reach perfection and unite with God. Hell and heaven in this world view differ from most other Southwest Asian religions, and bear clear resemblances with Gnostic philosophy and religion, as heaven is only spiritual, where man stops being man and is saved from more rebirths. Hell is just as spiritual and is the distance from, and the longing to, unity with God which goes on in life time after life time for the bad.
The Druze star symbolizes the five wise superior ministers, each with his quality. Green is for “the mind,” ‘al-‘akl, which is necessary for understanding the truth. Red is for “the soul,” ‘an-nafs. Yellow is for “the word,” ‘al-kalima, which is the purest form of expression of the truth. Blue, ‘as-sabik, is for the mental power of the will. White, ‘al-tali, is the realization of Blue, where its power has been materialized in the world of matter.
The hikma is only known to an elite of religiously trained men, the uqqal. Most Druze know only parts of their religion’s theology, and they are referred to as juhhal, “ignorants.” One out of 50 members of the uqqal, reach as high as perfection, and are called ‘ajawid, “noble,” and work as the real leaders of the Druze religion.
The uqqal take care of the religion for the juhhal, and they alone attend the religious meetings taking place at the night between Thursday and Friday, in ordinary buildings in the outskirts of Druze villages. For the Druze, the center of religious activities is located in the mountainous region called Jabalu Duruz in Syria.
The juhhal perform few of the typical Muslim rituals. Prayer is not performed in mosques, fast is not performed during the Muslim month of Ramadan, and there are no obligations for performing the hajj, -- the Muslim pilgrimage.
The Druze follow a life style of isolation where no conversion is allowed, neither out of, nor into, the religion. When the Druze live among people of other religions, they try to blend in, in order to protect their religion and their own safety. They can pray as Muslims, or as Christians, depending on where they are.
This flexible assimilation is apparently changing in modern times, where more security has allowed Druze to be more open about their religious belonging.
The Druze have been reported to practice polygamy. However, there is no evidence of such a practice among Druze today.
The Druze abstain from wine and tobacco. There are clear prohibitions against any practice that could involve profanity of the religion.
The Druze have a strong community feeling, where they identify themselves as related even across borders of countries.
There are sources suggesting that the Druze were a people of their own even before conversion to the faith of al-Hakim. Unsubstantiated theories point in the direction of the Druze being descendants of Persian colonists, while another theory says they are descendants of Christians from the time of the Crusades. The latter is not very likely, due to the fact that the first Crusade came about 80 years after al-Hakim’s disappearance.
Despite their practice of blending with dominant groups in order to avoid persecution, the Druze have had a history of brave resistance to occupying powers, and they have at times enjoyed more freedom than most other groups living in the Levant.
Duruz see Druze
Durzi see Druze
Druze (in Arabic, Duruz; in singular form, Durzi). The secret religion, practiced by some Arabs in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel, was founded by Shaykh Darazi, who preached that the Fatimid Caliph al-Hakim was the last of a series of emanations from God. The Druze are, thus, an esoteric Isma‘ili sect dating from the eleventh century of the Christian calendar.
The Druze are a Syrian people professing a faith derived from the Isma'iliyya sect of Shi’ism. The name comes from Muhammad al-Darazi (d. 1019), a non-Arab leader of the movement, which originated in the last years of the reign of al-Hakim, Caliph of the Fatimid dynasty of Egypt (996-1021).
The Druze religion was first established in Cairo around 1017. It is believed that it soon spread to many regions in Southwest Asia and North Africa.
In the Isma'ili religious hierarchy, al-Hakim was regarded as the infallible Imam and was also an absolute monarch, exercising spiritual supremacy as possessor of the “active intellect,” transmitted by the divine will through a divinely ordained family. Al-Hakim, an eccentric ruler in the exercise of his authority as both temporal and spiritual head of the Isma'ilis, seems to have wished to be regarded as an incarnation of divinity. Out of the resulting confusion over his claims, which greatly weakened the Fatimid establishment, the Druze movement arose in 1017.
Hamza ibn 'Ali, a Persian, was responsible for establishing al-Hakim’s standing among the Druze as the embodiment of the ultimate One who created the first cosmic principle, the intellect. The Hakim cult in this sense became the worship of the One alone, manifested in al-Hakim. From this belief comes the appellation muwahhidun (“unitarians”), which the Druze applied to themselves. Hamza’s teaching was founded on extremist Ismailism in its descriptions of the spiritual hierarchy which embodies cosmic principles. According to Hamza, there were five great cosmic ranks, each embodied in a human leader: the intellect, which was Hamza; the universal soul, Isma'il ibn Muhammad al-Tamimi; the word, Muhammad ibn Wahb al-Qurashi; the preceder, Salama ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab; and the follower, Baha’ al-Din al-Muqtana. Below these were a number of missionaries and preachers embodying cosmic effort, and subordinate to them were the ordinary believers. In opposition to these cosmic ranks were a series of false ones, also created by the One, al-Hakim, and these embodied the evil side of the cosmos. The latter will be abandoned by al-Hakim in the Last Days, when the messianic culmination of the era will be marked by the establishment of the worship of the One, revealed in al-Hakim.
The Druze await the return of both al-Hakim and Hamza, who are believed to be in “occultation,” like that of the Imamite twelfth imam. During the occultation of Hamza, al-Muqtana became the link between Hamza and his followers, and it was under him that Druze orthodoxy was established.
In 1033, al-Muqtana also went into occultation, a state corresponding to the “complete” occultation of the Imamites. From then on the Druze became a closed community, keeping their religious doctrines secret. Those who know the system are known as “the wise;” the others in the community are the “ignorant”. The wise alone take part in the religious services on Thursday evening, although the ignorant may be admitted to the least secret of these services.
In 1516, the Druze came under Turkish pressure as the Levant was conquered by the Ottomans. The Druze offered strong opposition to the Ottomans and kept a higher level of independence than their neighbors. Under the Jumblat, the Druze would cause trouble for the Ottomans until the beginning of the twentieth century.
In 1918, the Druze participated in the army of Faisal, thereby breaking a principle of non-participation outside their own community.
On March 4, 1921, the Druze were granted autonomy in the region of Jabal al-Duruz, from the the League of Nations.
In 1925, the Druze revolted, as Druze leaders protested against the liberalization of the society as promoted by the French governor of Jabal al-Duruz. The revolt ended with the arrest of the Druze leaders, and their being exiled to Palmyra.
By 1927, the Druze revolt was over, and the French began a political program that was intended to keep the Druze away from Arab nationalism, and hence dependent upon the safety offered by the French.
Today, the Druze live primarily in Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and Jordan, often in mountainous regions. There are also important Druze communities abroad, including in Europe and the United States.
While the Druze are not regarded as Muslims by other Muslims, they regard themselves as Muslims as well as carriers of the core of Muslim faith. The origin of the Druze is to a large extent from a group of Shi'a, the Isma'ilis, but they have diverged much, and the Qur’an does not seem to be a part of their religious exercises. Nevertheless, the Druze do call themselves muwahhidun – “monotheists.”
The theology of Druze religion is called hikma and its main theme is that God incarnated himself in the Fatimid caliph al-Hakim, who disappeared in 1021. While most Muslims believe he died in 1021, the Druze disagree and believe that al-Hakim is awaiting to return to the world in order to bring a new golden age to true believers.
The Druze believe in one God and claim that the qualities of God cannot be understood or defined by humans. Al-Hakim is worshipped in Druze religion, he is called “Our Lord” and his cruelties and eccentricities are all interpreted symbolically.
However, while God incarnated himself in al-Hakim in his unity, other aspects of God can be incarnated in other human beings. These aspects are represented with five superior ministers. Under the ministers one finds three other groups: functionaries, preachers, and heads of communities. The knowledge of this hierarchical system is the highest knowledge in the Druze religion.
Frequently, one hears about a calf in Druze religion. It is believed that the calf is a central symbol which represents the negative forces in the world.
The moral system of Druze religion consists of seven principles:
Love of truth
Taking care of one another
Renouncing all other religions
Avoiding the demon (the calf?) and all wrongdoers
Accepting divine unity in humanity
Accepting all of al-Hakim’s acts
Acting in total accord with al-Hakim’s will
Central in the Druze world system is the belief in reincarnation, where all souls are reborn as humans, good as well as bad. Good people have a more fortunate rebirth than bad people. Behind this system is the belief that man cannot reach perfection and unite with God. Hell and heaven in this world view differ from most other Southwest Asian religions, and bear clear resemblances with Gnostic philosophy and religion, as heaven is only spiritual, where man stops being man and is saved from more rebirths. Hell is just as spiritual and is the distance from, and the longing to, unity with God which goes on in life time after life time for the bad.
The Druze star symbolizes the five wise superior ministers, each with his quality. Green is for “the mind,” ‘al-‘akl, which is necessary for understanding the truth. Red is for “the soul,” ‘an-nafs. Yellow is for “the word,” ‘al-kalima, which is the purest form of expression of the truth. Blue, ‘as-sabik, is for the mental power of the will. White, ‘al-tali, is the realization of Blue, where its power has been materialized in the world of matter.
The hikma is only known to an elite of religiously trained men, the uqqal. Most Druze know only parts of their religion’s theology, and they are referred to as juhhal, “ignorants.” One out of 50 members of the uqqal, reach as high as perfection, and are called ‘ajawid, “noble,” and work as the real leaders of the Druze religion.
The uqqal take care of the religion for the juhhal, and they alone attend the religious meetings taking place at the night between Thursday and Friday, in ordinary buildings in the outskirts of Druze villages. For the Druze, the center of religious activities is located in the mountainous region called Jabalu Duruz in Syria.
The juhhal perform few of the typical Muslim rituals. Prayer is not performed in mosques, fast is not performed during the Muslim month of Ramadan, and there are no obligations for performing the hajj, -- the Muslim pilgrimage.
The Druze follow a life style of isolation where no conversion is allowed, neither out of, nor into, the religion. When the Druze live among people of other religions, they try to blend in, in order to protect their religion and their own safety. They can pray as Muslims, or as Christians, depending on where they are.
This flexible assimilation is apparently changing in modern times, where more security has allowed Druze to be more open about their religious belonging.
The Druze have been reported to practice polygamy. However, there is no evidence of such a practice among Druze today.
The Druze abstain from wine and tobacco. There are clear prohibitions against any practice that could involve profanity of the religion.
The Druze have a strong community feeling, where they identify themselves as related even across borders of countries.
There are sources suggesting that the Druze were a people of their own even before conversion to the faith of al-Hakim. Unsubstantiated theories point in the direction of the Druze being descendants of Persian colonists, while another theory says they are descendants of Christians from the time of the Crusades. The latter is not very likely, due to the fact that the first Crusade came about 80 years after al-Hakim’s disappearance.
Despite their practice of blending with dominant groups in order to avoid persecution, the Druze have had a history of brave resistance to occupying powers, and they have at times enjoyed more freedom than most other groups living in the Levant.
Duruz see Druze
Durzi see Druze
Dunama
Dunama (d. 1820). Ruler of the Kanuri state of Bornu (in Niger and Nigeria) (r.1808-1809 and 1813-1820). Dunama ultimately yielded power to al-Kanemi, thereby ending effective rule of the thousand year old Sefawa dynasty. Dunama succeeded his father, Ahmad Alimi, in 1808 when the latter, old and blind, abdicated in the face of devastating attacks by the Fula Islamic revolutionaries of ‘Uthman dan Fodio. The abdication factionalized the Bornu court, already beset with external problems. Dumana, desperate for a victory against the Fula, solicited the help of al-Kanemi, an Islamic scholar and warrior living nearby who had recently defeated the Fula in battle. Their combined forces overcame the Fula and liberated the Bornu capital. Dunama lavishly rewarded al-Kanemi, who returned home.
In 1809, Dunama recalled al-Kanemi to help ward off new Fula attacks. This time al-Kanemi was awarded a large land grant in gratitude. Dunama’s reliance on al-Kanemi, his inability to defeat the Fula, and the unusual circumstance of his accession caused the members of his court to depose him in favor of his uncle, Muhammad Ngileruma (c. 1809). But Muhammad did not get on well with al-Kanemi, who joined forces with Dunama’s supporters to depose Muhammad and reinstate Dunama in 1813.
However, while Dunama was king, al-Kanemi was actually the most powerful man in Bornu. Dunama found himself having to rely increasingly on al-Kanemi to ward off the Fula. The two had been friends, but al-Kanemi posed a threat to the dynasty. Dunama conceived a plan whereby he would invite Burgomanda, ruler of Baghirmi, to invade Bornu. Dunama and al-Kanemi’s forces would respond, and the Burgomanda and Dunama would turn on al-Kanemi. But al-Kanemi learned of the plan and repositioned his troops, causing Burgomanda mistakenly to attack his ally. Dunama was killed in the battle in 1820. He was succeeded by his younger brother, Ibrahim, who was by then only the titular ruler of Bornu.
Dunama (d. 1820). Ruler of the Kanuri state of Bornu (in Niger and Nigeria) (r.1808-1809 and 1813-1820). Dunama ultimately yielded power to al-Kanemi, thereby ending effective rule of the thousand year old Sefawa dynasty. Dunama succeeded his father, Ahmad Alimi, in 1808 when the latter, old and blind, abdicated in the face of devastating attacks by the Fula Islamic revolutionaries of ‘Uthman dan Fodio. The abdication factionalized the Bornu court, already beset with external problems. Dumana, desperate for a victory against the Fula, solicited the help of al-Kanemi, an Islamic scholar and warrior living nearby who had recently defeated the Fula in battle. Their combined forces overcame the Fula and liberated the Bornu capital. Dunama lavishly rewarded al-Kanemi, who returned home.
In 1809, Dunama recalled al-Kanemi to help ward off new Fula attacks. This time al-Kanemi was awarded a large land grant in gratitude. Dunama’s reliance on al-Kanemi, his inability to defeat the Fula, and the unusual circumstance of his accession caused the members of his court to depose him in favor of his uncle, Muhammad Ngileruma (c. 1809). But Muhammad did not get on well with al-Kanemi, who joined forces with Dunama’s supporters to depose Muhammad and reinstate Dunama in 1813.
However, while Dunama was king, al-Kanemi was actually the most powerful man in Bornu. Dunama found himself having to rely increasingly on al-Kanemi to ward off the Fula. The two had been friends, but al-Kanemi posed a threat to the dynasty. Dunama conceived a plan whereby he would invite Burgomanda, ruler of Baghirmi, to invade Bornu. Dunama and al-Kanemi’s forces would respond, and the Burgomanda and Dunama would turn on al-Kanemi. But al-Kanemi learned of the plan and repositioned his troops, causing Burgomanda mistakenly to attack his ally. Dunama was killed in the battle in 1820. He was succeeded by his younger brother, Ibrahim, who was by then only the titular ruler of Bornu.
Dunama Dibbalemi
Dunama Dibbalemi (Dunama Dabbalemi) (d. c. 1259). Ruler of the Kanuri Empire of Kanem during its apogee (r. c. 1221-1259). Dunama Dibbalemi succeeded his father, and according to Arabic and local sources greatly augmented the empire when he captured the important oasis of Tragham, nearly 1300 kilometers from the capital. He performed this feat with his extensive use of cavalry, which included 41,000 horses. Military commanders “ probably his sons “ administered the conquered territories, but later broke away to establish their own states. He was also troubled by a major war with the Bulala people, a nomadic group. Dunama violated a traditional religious prohibition by opening a sacred talisman which symbolized all the power of the old religion. He may have been attempting to precipitate a conflict between Islamic and traditional factions, or, according to another interpretation, between his Sefawa dynasty and all other factions, in order to establish Sefawa superiority. Arabic sources such as al-Maqrizi attest to Dunama’s preference for Islam. He is said to have conducted jihad and other Islamic good works. It was probably Dunama who established mosque colleges in Cairo for Kanuri students. The conflict which he initiated continued for many years after his death and nearly caused the overthrow of the Sefawa dynasty. His son and successor, Kadai, was assassinated and civil war broke out at the beginning of the fourteenth century.
A fervent Muslim, Dibbalemi initiated diplomatic exchanges with sultans in North Africa and apparently arranged for the establishment of a special hostel in Cairo to facilitate pilgrimages to Mecca. In particular the historian Ibn Khaldun, who remembers him as "King of Kanem and Lord of Bornu", reports a Kanem embassy in 1257 to Tunisia. During his reign, he declared jihad against the surrounding tribes and initiated an extended period of conquest, allegedly coming to have under his command a cavalry 40,000 strong. After consolidating the territory around Lake Chad, the Fezzan region (in present-day Libya) fell under Kanem's authority, and the empire's influence extended westward to Kano (in present-day Nigeria), eastward to Ouaddaï, and southward to the Adamawa grasslands (in present-day Cameroon). Through his wars he captured many slaves that he sold to the northern kingdoms, thus enriching his country.
Dibbalemi is also credited with destroying the mune, a mysterious object believed to possess unknown powers, possibly a symbol of divine kingship. It was probably destroyed to cancel an important symbol of pre-Muslim beliefs, and to prove his determination in contrasting what he saw as the lax faith of his predecessors. The action generated some reprobation, as it is reported that the destruction opened a period of hardship for the kingdom.
Dibbalemi devised a system to reward military commanders with authority over the people they conquered. This system, however, tempted military officers to pass their positions to their sons, thus transforming the office from one based on achievement and loyalty to the mai into one based on hereditary nobility. Dibbalemi was able to suppress this tendency, but it was to erupt after his death, provoking the loss of most of Dibbalemi's conquests.
Dunama Dabbalemi see Dunama Dibbalemi
Dabbalemi, Dunama see Dunama Dibbalemi
Dunama Dibbalemi (Dunama Dabbalemi) (d. c. 1259). Ruler of the Kanuri Empire of Kanem during its apogee (r. c. 1221-1259). Dunama Dibbalemi succeeded his father, and according to Arabic and local sources greatly augmented the empire when he captured the important oasis of Tragham, nearly 1300 kilometers from the capital. He performed this feat with his extensive use of cavalry, which included 41,000 horses. Military commanders “ probably his sons “ administered the conquered territories, but later broke away to establish their own states. He was also troubled by a major war with the Bulala people, a nomadic group. Dunama violated a traditional religious prohibition by opening a sacred talisman which symbolized all the power of the old religion. He may have been attempting to precipitate a conflict between Islamic and traditional factions, or, according to another interpretation, between his Sefawa dynasty and all other factions, in order to establish Sefawa superiority. Arabic sources such as al-Maqrizi attest to Dunama’s preference for Islam. He is said to have conducted jihad and other Islamic good works. It was probably Dunama who established mosque colleges in Cairo for Kanuri students. The conflict which he initiated continued for many years after his death and nearly caused the overthrow of the Sefawa dynasty. His son and successor, Kadai, was assassinated and civil war broke out at the beginning of the fourteenth century.
A fervent Muslim, Dibbalemi initiated diplomatic exchanges with sultans in North Africa and apparently arranged for the establishment of a special hostel in Cairo to facilitate pilgrimages to Mecca. In particular the historian Ibn Khaldun, who remembers him as "King of Kanem and Lord of Bornu", reports a Kanem embassy in 1257 to Tunisia. During his reign, he declared jihad against the surrounding tribes and initiated an extended period of conquest, allegedly coming to have under his command a cavalry 40,000 strong. After consolidating the territory around Lake Chad, the Fezzan region (in present-day Libya) fell under Kanem's authority, and the empire's influence extended westward to Kano (in present-day Nigeria), eastward to Ouaddaï, and southward to the Adamawa grasslands (in present-day Cameroon). Through his wars he captured many slaves that he sold to the northern kingdoms, thus enriching his country.
Dibbalemi is also credited with destroying the mune, a mysterious object believed to possess unknown powers, possibly a symbol of divine kingship. It was probably destroyed to cancel an important symbol of pre-Muslim beliefs, and to prove his determination in contrasting what he saw as the lax faith of his predecessors. The action generated some reprobation, as it is reported that the destruction opened a period of hardship for the kingdom.
Dibbalemi devised a system to reward military commanders with authority over the people they conquered. This system, however, tempted military officers to pass their positions to their sons, thus transforming the office from one based on achievement and loyalty to the mai into one based on hereditary nobility. Dibbalemi was able to suppress this tendency, but it was to erupt after his death, provoking the loss of most of Dibbalemi's conquests.
Dunama Dabbalemi see Dunama Dibbalemi
Dabbalemi, Dunama see Dunama Dibbalemi
Dungans
Dungans. Small Chinese Muslim population in Russia. They have lived there for about 100 years. The Dungans originally lived mainly in Gansu and Shaanxi provinces in northwest China, although some also came from Xinjiang in the far west near the Russian border. The question of their precise origin has never been settled satisfactorily. According to various Western, Chinese, Dungan, and Russian scholars, the ancestors of the Chinese speaking Muslims of China could have come from one or two or a mixture of several of the following groups: Persians, Arabs, Mongols, Manchus, Turks, Tanguts, Kitans, Uygurs or Tibetans.
The Dungans migrated to Central Asia in two movements. The first movement was the gradual emigration from the Ili River valley in Xinjiang, where they had been settled by Emperor Zianlong in the eighteenth century. In this movement, there were two major migrations: that of 1867, after an outburst of racial conflict between Dungans and the Taranchi (Turks); and that of 1881, when part of the Ili River valley was returned by Russia to the Chinese government. The second movement was the headlong flight in 1877 of those who had supported the autonomous state of Kashgaria.
Dungans. Small Chinese Muslim population in Russia. They have lived there for about 100 years. The Dungans originally lived mainly in Gansu and Shaanxi provinces in northwest China, although some also came from Xinjiang in the far west near the Russian border. The question of their precise origin has never been settled satisfactorily. According to various Western, Chinese, Dungan, and Russian scholars, the ancestors of the Chinese speaking Muslims of China could have come from one or two or a mixture of several of the following groups: Persians, Arabs, Mongols, Manchus, Turks, Tanguts, Kitans, Uygurs or Tibetans.
The Dungans migrated to Central Asia in two movements. The first movement was the gradual emigration from the Ili River valley in Xinjiang, where they had been settled by Emperor Zianlong in the eighteenth century. In this movement, there were two major migrations: that of 1867, after an outburst of racial conflict between Dungans and the Taranchi (Turks); and that of 1881, when part of the Ili River valley was returned by Russia to the Chinese government. The second movement was the headlong flight in 1877 of those who had supported the autonomous state of Kashgaria.
Durani, Maryam
Maryam Durani (Arabic: مَریَم دورانی), is an Afghan activist. Daughter of Haji Mohammad Eisa Durani, Maryam Durani was born in 1987. Hailing from the Muhammadzai tribe, Maryam is a graduate of the business department of American University of Afghanistan and currently she is a third class student of Law and Political Science at Noor University. Maryam Durani was also Kandahar people’s representative in the provincial council. She has served in different positions such as director of Khadijatul Kubra women's association for culture, owner of Merman Radio (special women radio) and as founder of the Kandahar woman advocacy network. She received the World Ten Brave Women’s award on March 8, 2012 as well as a World 100 Influential Figure’s award on April 20, 2012. She has also received the Brave Woman award from the State of Pennsylvania, the Women Rights Protector’s award from Washington and an Iraq and Afghanistan Female Peace Activist’s appreciation letter from Turkey. She is a broadcaster and the manager of the Merman Radio of Kandahar. On April 6, 2013, she founded the Women's Network (Advocacy) in Kandahar. Maryam also established the Malalai Maiwandi Internet cafe a free women's internet cafe to connect more women to the world in a safe and comfortable space. she opened Malali Maiwandi internet cafe on September 25, 2013 which is the first of its kind in the Afghanistan. There Afghan women could use the cafe for getting information about current affairs and obtain educational material, which is the main reason why she established the women's cafe. In 2012, she was chosen by Time Magazine as "The 100 Most Influential People in the World". According to Time, "As the owner and operator of a radio station (Merman Radio) that focuses on women's issues and as a member of the Kandahar provincial council, Durani stands up for the region's women with remarkable bravery." On March 8, 2012, she became a recipient of the prestigious United States Secretary of State’s International Women of Courage Award.
Durayd
Durayd (Durayd ibn al-Simma) (c.530-630). Ancient Arabic poet and one of the most powerful Bedouin opponents of the Prophet.
Durayd ibn al-Simma see Durayd
Durayd (Durayd ibn al-Simma) (c.530-630). Ancient Arabic poet and one of the most powerful Bedouin opponents of the Prophet.
Durayd ibn al-Simma see Durayd
Duri (‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Duri) (b. 1919). Iraqi educator and Arabist social historian. Born in Baghdad, he was educated there and at London University. He taught history at the Higher Teachers’ College and the Faculty of Arts, was translation and publications director at the ministry of education, and was dean of Arts and then rector of Baghdad University, ending his working career as professor of history at the University of Jordan in Amman. Al-Duri’s publications include two studies on the political and financial history of the Meso-‘Abbasid era, a study of the economic history of Mesopotamia in the tenth century, a study on the origins of Arab historiography, and studies on the history of the Arab nationalism, anti-Arab nationalisms (shu‘ubiyah) and Arab Socialism.
In addition to his valuable studies on Iraqi history, al-Duri has contributed significantly in the field of the socioeconomic history of the Arab world. His suggestion that the emergence of an “Arab Nation,” although closely tied to the unity of language, was in many ways molded by a unified, or at least similar, socioeconomic historical pattern, is particularly pioneering. As do most influential Arab nationalists, al-Duri regards language as the major factor in forming an Arab identity, thus making Arabism a cultural, rather than an ethnic or regional or religious, matter. Like many Arab nationalists and some cultural Islamists, he tends to subsume Islam into Arabism: Islam unified the Arabs, giving them an intellectual and ideological basis by means of which they formed a state. Through the latter they were to spread Islam even further afield, to the extent that to non-Arabs Islam and Arabism became virtually indistinguishable.
Unlike the most influential Arabist, Abu Khaldun Sati‘ al-Husri, who refused to consider economic interests among the main components in forming a nation, al-Duri always had implied that one of the bases of the Arab nation was the emergence of one path in the development of the Arab economy. For example, historically there has been a unified Islamic position toward the ownership (mainly public) of national resources such as land, water, and minerals and a comprehensive system of taxation and tribute with similar features, coinciding with distinct urban development, some improvement of agriculture, and great expansion in trade. This pattern gradually led to the emergence of a semi-feudal system of a distinct bureaucratic nature (iqta‘ ‘askari) and the state’s crucial role in the economic affairs of the society.
Al-Duri emphasized the social and economic processes through which the various peoples conquered by the Arabian Muslims were arabized in language and culture (as the conquerors
and the conquered mingled in various activities in town and country) and how, following the consequent decline in tribalism, one nation, which he defined as an Arab (rather than an Islamic) nation, then emerged. He paid special attention to the “popular classes” and to various social movements (for example, al-‘ammah, al-‘ayyarun, al-futuwah) often overlooked in conventional historical studies.
Al-Duri saw the re-emergence of Arabist ideas in the nineteenth century as an attempt to revive an earlier cultural heritage that had been abused by non-Arab rulers. The emphasis on Arabic (the language and the culture) as a nationalist link “had its roots in the Arab heritage and historical conscience, and was not being developed as part of the Arabs’ self-consciousness vis-à-vis the West,” and increasingly expressed in a more comprehensive (Pan-)Arabist fashion. Unlike some other authors, al-Duri contends that there is no observable influence or frequent reference to Western national theories in Arabic writings on the subject. Arabist concepts on nationalism are, he believes, authentic but still incomplete: they have not reached the level of forming “a general theory of Arab nationalism”; they have not linked their idea of the Arab nation to any distinct concept of the state; nor have they clarified the groups or classes that “embody the Arabist idea” and, hence, the socioeconomic orientation that the Arabist movement is bound to follow.
‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Duri see Duri
Al-Duri saw the re-emergence of Arabist ideas in the nineteenth century as an attempt to revive an earlier cultural heritage that had been abused by non-Arab rulers. The emphasis on Arabic (the language and the culture) as a nationalist link “had its roots in the Arab heritage and historical conscience, and was not being developed as part of the Arabs’ self-consciousness vis-à-vis the West,” and increasingly expressed in a more comprehensive (Pan-)Arabist fashion. Unlike some other authors, al-Duri contends that there is no observable influence or frequent reference to Western national theories in Arabic writings on the subject. Arabist concepts on nationalism are, he believes, authentic but still incomplete: they have not reached the level of forming “a general theory of Arab nationalism”; they have not linked their idea of the Arab nation to any distinct concept of the state; nor have they clarified the groups or classes that “embody the Arabist idea” and, hence, the socioeconomic orientation that the Arabist movement is bound to follow.
‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Duri see Duri
Durranis
Durranis. Name carried by an Afghan tribe, known as Abdali, until it was changed by Ahmad Shah Durrani. The Durranis became an Afghan dynasty of the shahs of Afghanistan which ruled from 1747 to 1826. Their main capitals were Kandahar, and Kabul from 1772. The Durrani tribe in Afghanistan gained independence under its chief, Ahmad Shah Durrani (1747-1772), following the murder in 1747 of Nadir Shah of Persia, who had occupied the country. Durrani founded Afghanistan’s most powerful emirate, assuming the title of shah. He then decreed that Durrani would be the new name of the Abdalis. The change from Abdali, a term for a category in the Sufi hierarchy, to Durrani, derived from a word meaning “pearl,” was symbolically significant. The change also allowed for modifications in the genealogical charter. Some Abdali clans were not recognized as Durrani, and some subclans in the Peshawar valley were renamed Bar (“upper”) Durrani.
In 1750, Ahmad Shah conquered Herat. Stable rule was set up by Taimur Shah (1772-1793) before it was endangered by internal power struggles after 1801. In 1816, the Durrani had to defend Herat against the Persians. In 1817, they were divided into two ruling branches in Kabul and Peshawar/Kashmir. Conflicts with the viziers of the Barakzai house marked the start of their decline. After being removed from the throne by the Barakzai in 1826, the last Durrani ruler was finally expelled in 1842.
During the imperial period (1747-1818), Durrani clans were the military backbone of the state. They consolidated their hold on southwestern Afghanistan and acquired property in eastern Afghanistan and northern India. Several previously nomadic clans became settled.
In the post-imperial period, the institutionalization of a standing army gradually weakened the privileged position of the Durranis. Nevertheless, as members of the Durrani Muhammadzai lineage held state power from 1880 to 1978, Durrani clans were able to claim a symbolically superior social status. This was especially important in northern Afghanistan, to which Durrani nomadic clans moved from 1880 onward. Some Durrani clans played an active role against Soviet occupation in their localities during the 1980s, but no Durrani leader of national significance emerged.
Abdali see Durranis.
Durranis. Name carried by an Afghan tribe, known as Abdali, until it was changed by Ahmad Shah Durrani. The Durranis became an Afghan dynasty of the shahs of Afghanistan which ruled from 1747 to 1826. Their main capitals were Kandahar, and Kabul from 1772. The Durrani tribe in Afghanistan gained independence under its chief, Ahmad Shah Durrani (1747-1772), following the murder in 1747 of Nadir Shah of Persia, who had occupied the country. Durrani founded Afghanistan’s most powerful emirate, assuming the title of shah. He then decreed that Durrani would be the new name of the Abdalis. The change from Abdali, a term for a category in the Sufi hierarchy, to Durrani, derived from a word meaning “pearl,” was symbolically significant. The change also allowed for modifications in the genealogical charter. Some Abdali clans were not recognized as Durrani, and some subclans in the Peshawar valley were renamed Bar (“upper”) Durrani.
In 1750, Ahmad Shah conquered Herat. Stable rule was set up by Taimur Shah (1772-1793) before it was endangered by internal power struggles after 1801. In 1816, the Durrani had to defend Herat against the Persians. In 1817, they were divided into two ruling branches in Kabul and Peshawar/Kashmir. Conflicts with the viziers of the Barakzai house marked the start of their decline. After being removed from the throne by the Barakzai in 1826, the last Durrani ruler was finally expelled in 1842.
During the imperial period (1747-1818), Durrani clans were the military backbone of the state. They consolidated their hold on southwestern Afghanistan and acquired property in eastern Afghanistan and northern India. Several previously nomadic clans became settled.
In the post-imperial period, the institutionalization of a standing army gradually weakened the privileged position of the Durranis. Nevertheless, as members of the Durrani Muhammadzai lineage held state power from 1880 to 1978, Durrani clans were able to claim a symbolically superior social status. This was especially important in northern Afghanistan, to which Durrani nomadic clans moved from 1880 onward. Some Durrani clans played an active role against Soviet occupation in their localities during the 1980s, but no Durrani leader of national significance emerged.
Abdali see Durranis.
Durrizade
Durrizade. Patronymic of a family of Ottoman scholars of the eighteenth through nineteenth centuries, five members of which attained the office of Shaykh al-Islam.
Durrizade. Patronymic of a family of Ottoman scholars of the eighteenth through nineteenth centuries, five members of which attained the office of Shaykh al-Islam.
Durrizade ‘Abd Allah Bey
Durrizade ‘Abd Allah Bey (1869-1923). Last Shaykh al-Islam of the Ottoman Empire. He is known for his legal opinions (in Arabic, fatwa) condemning the Turkish nationalist movement under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.
Durrizade ‘Abd Allah Bey (1869-1923). Last Shaykh al-Islam of the Ottoman Empire. He is known for his legal opinions (in Arabic, fatwa) condemning the Turkish nationalist movement under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.
Dust Muhammad
Dust Muhammad (Dost Mohammed) (Dost Muhammad) (Dost Mohammad Khan) (December 23, 1793 - June 9, 1863). Founder of Barakzay rule in Afghanistan (r.1826-1863). He took the title of amir in 1835 and made the country into a geographically compact unit.
Dost Mohammad Khan was the son of Sardār Pāyenda Khan (chief of the Barakzai tribe) who was put to death by Zaman Shah Durrani. He was a descendant of Jamal Khan Barakzai who founded the Barakzai dynasty in Afghanistan. He also belonged to the Pashtun ethnic group.
The elder brother of Dost Mohammad (Dust Muhammad), the chief of the Barakzai, Fatteh Khan, took an important part in raising Mahmud Shah Durrani to the sovereignty of Afghanistan in 1800 and in restoring him to the throne in 1809. Mahmud Shah repaid Fatteh Khan's services by having him assassinated in 1818, thus incurring the enmity of his tribe. After a bloody conflict, Mahmud Shah was deprived of all his possessions but Herat, the rest of his dominions being divided among Fatteh Khan's brothers. Of these, Dost Mohammad received Ghazni, to which in 1826 he added Kabul, the richest of the Afghan provinces.
From the commencement of his reign, Dost Mohammad found himself involved in disputes with Ranjit Singh, the Sikh ruler of the Punjab, who used the dethroned Sadozai prince, Shuja Shah Durrani, as his instrument. In 1834, Shuja Shah made a last attempt to recover his kingdom. He was defeated by Dost Mohammad Khan under the walls of Kandahar, but Ranjit Singh seized the opportunity to annex Peshawar. The recovery of this fortress became the Afghan amir's great concern.
Rejecting overtures from Russia, Dost Mohammad endeavored to form an alliance with England, and welcomed Alexander Burnes to Kabul in 1837. Burnes, however, was unable to prevail on the governor-general, Lord Auckland, to respond to the amir's advances. Dost Mohammad was enjoined to abandon the attempt to recover Peshawar, and to place his foreign policy under British guidance. In return, he was only promised protection from Maharaja Ranjit Singh of the Sikhs. He replied by renewing his relations with Russia, and in 1838 Lord Auckland set the British troops in motion against him.
In March 1839 the British force under Sir Willoughby Cotton advanced through the Bolan Pass, and on April 26 it reached Kandahar. Shah Shuja was proclaimed amir, and entered Kabul on August 7, while Dost Mohammad sought refuge in the wilds of the Hindu Kush. Closely followed by the British, Dost was driven to extremities, and on November 4, 1840 surrendered as a prisoner. He remained in captivity during the British occupation, during the disastrous retreat of the army of occupation in January 1842, and until the recapture of Kabul in the autumn of 1842.
He was then set at liberty, in consequence of the resolve of the British government to abandon the attempt to intervene in the internal politics of Afghanistan. On his return from Hindustan, Dost Mohammad was received in triumph at Kabul, and set himself to re-establish his authority on a firm basis. From 1846 he renewed his policy of hostility to the British and allied himself with the Sikhs. However, after the defeat of his allies at Gujrat on February 21, 1849, he abandoned his designs and led his troops back into Afghanistan. In 1850, he conquered Balkh, and in 1854 he acquired control over the southern Afghan tribes by the capture of Kandahar.
On March 30, 1855 Dost Mohammad reversed his former policy by concluding an offensive and defensive alliance with the British government. In 1857 he declared war on Persia in conjunction with the British, and in July a treaty was concluded by which the province of Herat was placed under a Barakzai prince. During the Indian Mutiny, Dost Mohammad refrained from assisting the insurgents. His later years were disturbed by troubles at Herat and in Bokhara. These he resolved for a time, but in 1862 a Persian army, acting in concert with Ahmad Khan, advanced against Kandahar. The old amir called the British to his aid, and, putting himself at the head of his warriors, drove the enemy from his frontiers. On May 26, 1863, Dost Mohammad captured Herat, but on the 9th of June he died suddenly in the midst of victory, after playing a great role in the history of Central Asia for forty years.
Dost Mohammed see Dust Muhammad
Dost Muhammad see Dust Muhammad
Mohammed, Dost see Dust Muhammad
Muhammad, Dost see Dust Muhammad
Muhammad, Dust see Dust Muhammad
Dost Mohammad Khan see Dust Muhammad
Dust Muhammad (Dost Mohammed) (Dost Muhammad) (Dost Mohammad Khan) (December 23, 1793 - June 9, 1863). Founder of Barakzay rule in Afghanistan (r.1826-1863). He took the title of amir in 1835 and made the country into a geographically compact unit.
Dost Mohammad Khan was the son of Sardār Pāyenda Khan (chief of the Barakzai tribe) who was put to death by Zaman Shah Durrani. He was a descendant of Jamal Khan Barakzai who founded the Barakzai dynasty in Afghanistan. He also belonged to the Pashtun ethnic group.
The elder brother of Dost Mohammad (Dust Muhammad), the chief of the Barakzai, Fatteh Khan, took an important part in raising Mahmud Shah Durrani to the sovereignty of Afghanistan in 1800 and in restoring him to the throne in 1809. Mahmud Shah repaid Fatteh Khan's services by having him assassinated in 1818, thus incurring the enmity of his tribe. After a bloody conflict, Mahmud Shah was deprived of all his possessions but Herat, the rest of his dominions being divided among Fatteh Khan's brothers. Of these, Dost Mohammad received Ghazni, to which in 1826 he added Kabul, the richest of the Afghan provinces.
From the commencement of his reign, Dost Mohammad found himself involved in disputes with Ranjit Singh, the Sikh ruler of the Punjab, who used the dethroned Sadozai prince, Shuja Shah Durrani, as his instrument. In 1834, Shuja Shah made a last attempt to recover his kingdom. He was defeated by Dost Mohammad Khan under the walls of Kandahar, but Ranjit Singh seized the opportunity to annex Peshawar. The recovery of this fortress became the Afghan amir's great concern.
Rejecting overtures from Russia, Dost Mohammad endeavored to form an alliance with England, and welcomed Alexander Burnes to Kabul in 1837. Burnes, however, was unable to prevail on the governor-general, Lord Auckland, to respond to the amir's advances. Dost Mohammad was enjoined to abandon the attempt to recover Peshawar, and to place his foreign policy under British guidance. In return, he was only promised protection from Maharaja Ranjit Singh of the Sikhs. He replied by renewing his relations with Russia, and in 1838 Lord Auckland set the British troops in motion against him.
In March 1839 the British force under Sir Willoughby Cotton advanced through the Bolan Pass, and on April 26 it reached Kandahar. Shah Shuja was proclaimed amir, and entered Kabul on August 7, while Dost Mohammad sought refuge in the wilds of the Hindu Kush. Closely followed by the British, Dost was driven to extremities, and on November 4, 1840 surrendered as a prisoner. He remained in captivity during the British occupation, during the disastrous retreat of the army of occupation in January 1842, and until the recapture of Kabul in the autumn of 1842.
He was then set at liberty, in consequence of the resolve of the British government to abandon the attempt to intervene in the internal politics of Afghanistan. On his return from Hindustan, Dost Mohammad was received in triumph at Kabul, and set himself to re-establish his authority on a firm basis. From 1846 he renewed his policy of hostility to the British and allied himself with the Sikhs. However, after the defeat of his allies at Gujrat on February 21, 1849, he abandoned his designs and led his troops back into Afghanistan. In 1850, he conquered Balkh, and in 1854 he acquired control over the southern Afghan tribes by the capture of Kandahar.
On March 30, 1855 Dost Mohammad reversed his former policy by concluding an offensive and defensive alliance with the British government. In 1857 he declared war on Persia in conjunction with the British, and in July a treaty was concluded by which the province of Herat was placed under a Barakzai prince. During the Indian Mutiny, Dost Mohammad refrained from assisting the insurgents. His later years were disturbed by troubles at Herat and in Bokhara. These he resolved for a time, but in 1862 a Persian army, acting in concert with Ahmad Khan, advanced against Kandahar. The old amir called the British to his aid, and, putting himself at the head of his warriors, drove the enemy from his frontiers. On May 26, 1863, Dost Mohammad captured Herat, but on the 9th of June he died suddenly in the midst of victory, after playing a great role in the history of Central Asia for forty years.
Dost Mohammed see Dust Muhammad
Dost Muhammad see Dust Muhammad
Mohammed, Dost see Dust Muhammad
Muhammad, Dost see Dust Muhammad
Muhammad, Dust see Dust Muhammad
Dost Mohammad Khan see Dust Muhammad
Dyula
Dyula (Dioula) (Juula). Ethnic group and language from West Africa (Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast). The term Dyula is more commonly used to refer to a group specializing in trade. The term “Dioula” is synonymous with the term “Dyula.”
The Dyula (Dioula or Juula) are a Mande ethnic group inhabiting several West African countries, including the Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Mali, Ghana, Senegal and Guinea-Bissau.
Characterized as a highly successful merchant caste, Dyula migrants began establishing trading communities across the region in the fourteenth century. Since business was often conducted under non-Muslim rulers, the Dyula developed a set of theological principles for Muslim minorities in non-Muslim societies. Their unique contribution of long-distance commerce, Islamic scholarship and religious tolerance were significant factors to the peaceful expansion of Islam in West Africa.
The Mandé embraced Islam during the thirteenth century, following introduction to the faith through contact with the Soninké people and North African traders. By the 14th century the Malian empire (c.1230-1600) had reached its apogee, acquiring a considerable reputation for the Islamic practice of its court and the pilgrimages of several emperors who followed the tradition of Lahilatul Kalabi, the first black prince to make hajj to Mecca. It was at this time that Mali began encouraging some of its local merchants to establish colonies close to the gold fields of West Africa. This migrant trading class were known as dyula, the Mandingo word for “merchant” that referred simultaneously to their language (a dialect of Mandinka), commercial vocation, and religious practice.
The Dyula spread throughout the former area of Mandé culture, from the Atlantic coast of Senegambia to the Niger, and from the southern edge of the Sahara to forest zones further south. They established decentralized townships in non-Muslim colonies that were linked to an extensive commercial network, in a trading diaspora. Motivated by business imperatives, they expanded into new markets, founding settlements under the auspices of various local rulers who often permitted self-governance and autonomy. The organization of Dyula trading companies were based on a clan-family structure known as the lu - a working unit consisting of a father, his sons, and other attached males. Members of a given lu dispersed from the savanna to the forest, managed circulation of goods and information, placed orders, and effectively controlled the economic mechanisms of supply and demand.
Over time dyula colonies developed a theological rationale for their relations with non-Muslim ruling classes and subjects in what author Nehemia Levtzion dubbed “accommodationist Islam”. The man credited with formulating this rationale is Sheikh Al-Hajj Salim Suwari, a Soninke cleric from the core Mali area who lived around 1500. He made hajj to Mecca several times and devoted his intellectual career to developing an understanding of the faith that would assist Muslim minorities in “pagan” lands. He drew on North African and Middle Eastern jurists and theologians who had reflected on the situations of Muslims living among non-Muslim majorities, situations that were frequent in the centuries of Islamic expansion.
Sheikh Suwari formulated the obligations of Muslim minorities in West Africa into something known as the Suwarian tradition. It stressed the need for Muslims to coexist peaceably with unbelievers, and so justified a separation of religion and politics. In this understanding Muslims must nurture their own learning and piety and thereby furnish good examples to the non-Muslims around them. They could accept jurisdiction of non-Muslim authorities, as long as they had the necessary protection and conditions to practice the faith. In this teaching Suwari followed a strong predilection in Islamic thought for any government, albeit non-Muslim or tyrannical, as opposed to none. The military jihad was a resort only if the faithful were threatened. Suwari discouraged dawah (missionary), instead contending that Allah would bring non-Muslims to Islam in Allah's own way. It was not a Muslim's responsibility to decide when ignorance should give way to belief. Since their Islamic practice was capable of accommodating traditional cults, Dyula often served as priests, soothsayers and counselors at the courts of animist rulers.
As fellow Muslims, Dyula merchants were also able to assess the valuable trans-Saharan trade network, conducted by North African Arabs and Berbers whom they met at commercial centers across the Sahel. Some important trade goods included gold, millet, slaves, kola nuts from the south and slave beads and cowrie shells from the north (for use as currency). It was under Mali that the great cities of the Niger bend - including Gao and Djenné - prospered, with Timbuktu in particular becoming known across Europe for its great wealth. Important trading centers in southern West Africa developed at the transitional zone between the forest and the savanna; examples include Begho and Bono Manso (in present-day Ghana) and Bondoukou (in present-day Côte d'Ivoire). Western trade routes continued to be important, with Ouadane, Oualata and Chinguetti being the major trade centres in what is now Mauritania.
The development of Dyula trade in Ghana and the adjacent Ivory Coast had important political consequences, and sometimes military implications as well. The Dyula spearheaded Mande penetration of the forested zones in the south by establishing caravan routes and trading posts at strategic locations throughout the region en route to cola producing areas. By the start of the sixteenth century, Dyula merchants were trading as far south as the coast of modern Ghana.
On the forests northern fringes, new states emerged such as Bono and Banda. As the economic value of gold and kola became appreciated, forests south of these states - which had hitherto been little inhabited because of limited agricultural potential - became more thickly populated, and the same principles of political and military mobilization began being applied there. Village communities became tributaries of ruling groups, with some members becoming the clients and slaves needed to support royal households, armies, and trading enterprises. Sometimes these political changes were not to the advantage of the Dyula, who employed Mande warriors to guard their caravans and, if necessary, could call in larger contingents from the Sudanic kingdoms. In the seventeenth century, tensions between the Muslims and the local pagans in Begho erupted into a destructive war which eventually led to the total abandonment of the Banda capital. The local people eventually settled in a number of towns further east, while the Dyula withdrew to the west, to the further side of the Banda hills, where they established the new trading center of Bonduku.
The Dyula presence and changes in the balance of power occasioned political upheavals in other places. Among the paramount Mande political initiatives along trade routes south of Jenne was creation of the Dyula state of Gonja in the early 17th century. This was apparently motivated by a general worsening of the competitive position of Dyula traders, and was occasioned by three factors: (1) a near monopoly control in exporting forest produce achieved by the Akan kingdom of Bono; (2) the rise to power further north of the Dagomba kingdom, which controlled local salt pans; and (3) increased competition following the arrival in the region of rival long-distance traders from Hausaland.
The reaction of the Dyula in the Bono-Banda-Gonja region to these developments was to erect a kingdom of their own in Gonja - the territory northern traders had to cross to reach Akan forestlands. By 1675, Gonja had established a paramount chief called Yagbongwura, to control the kingdom. But Gonja was not a fruitful land in which to try to maintain a centralized government, neither Dagomba power to the north nor Akan power to the south had been finally destroyed, and the new kingdom rapidly declined in strength.
Many of the trading posts established by the Dyula eventually became market villages or cities, such as Kong in today's north-eastern Côte d'Ivoire. It emerged as a commercial center when Malian merchants began trading in the territory which was inhabited by pagan Senufo and other Voltaic groups. The sous-préfecture of Kong, in the area of Kong to Dabakala, is said to be the “origin” area, where dyula traders first settled in the twelfth century. Dyula presence in the Kong area grew rapidly in the seventeenth century as a result of the developing trade between the commercial centers along the Niger banks and the forest region to the south, which was controlled by the Baule chiefdoms and by Ashanti. The Dyula brought their trading skills and connections, and transformed Kong into an international market for the exchange of northern desert goods, such as salt and cloth, and southern forest exports such as cola nuts, gold, and slaves. The city was also a religious center that housed a substantial academic community of Muslim scholars, with palaces and mosques built in the traditional Sudanese style. As Kong grew prosperous, its early rulers – from the Taraweré clan, combined Dyula and Senufo traditions and extended their authority over the surrounding region.
By the eighteenth century, the Dyula had become quite powerful in the area and wished to rid themselves of subordination to Senufo chiefs. This was achieved in an uprising led by Seku Wattara (Ouattara), a Dyula warrior who claimed descent from the Malinke Keita lineage and who had studied the Quran and engaged in commerce before becoming a warrior. By rallying around himself all Dyula in the area, Seku Wattara easily defeated local chiefdoms and set up an independent Dyula state in 1710, the first of its kind in West Africa. He established himself as ruler and, under his authority, the city rose from a small city-state to become the capital of the great Kong Empire holding sway over much of the region. The Dyula of Kong also maintained commercial links with European traders on the Atlantic coast, around the Gulf of Guinea, from whom they easily obtained prized European goods, most notably rifles, gunpowder and textiles. The acquisition of weapons allowed for the creation of an armed militia force that protected trade routes passing through the territories of various minor rulers. In the course of developing his state, Seku Wattara built a strong army composed mostly of defeated pagan groups. The leadership of the army eventually developed into a new warrior class, called sonangi, which was gradually separated from the overall Dyula merchant class.
The Kong Empire started to decline after the death of Seku Wattara. Succession struggles divided the kingdom into two parts, the northern area being controlled by Seku’s brother Famagan who refused to recognize the rule of Seku’s oldest son in the south. Towards the end of the nineteenth century many of Kong’s provinces had formed independent chiefdoms. The city of Kong retained the prestige of an Islamic commercial center, but it was no longer the seat of an important political power. It eventually came under French colonial control in 1898. Despite the fall from glory, the seventeenth century Kong Friday Mosque survived and the city was largely rebuilt in a traditional Sudano-Sahelian architectural style featuring a Qur'anic school.
The Mande conquerors of the nineteenth century frequently utilized trade routes established by the Dyula. Indeed, it was his exploitation of their commercial network that allowed military leader Samory Touré (1830-1900) to rise to a dominant position in the Upper Niger region. A member of a dyula family from Sanankoro in Guinea, Samori conquered and united Dyula states during the 1860s. He gained control over the Milo River Valley in 1871, seized the village of Kankan in 1881, and became the principal power-holder on the upper Niger. By 1883, Samori had successfully brought the local chieftains under his control and officially founded the kingdom of Wasulu.
Having established an empire, he adopted the religious title of Almami in 1884 and recreated the Malian realm. This new state was governed by Samori and a council of kinsmen and clients who took on the management of the chancery and the treasury, administered justice, religious affairs, and foreign relations. Unlike some of his contemporary state-builders, Samori was not a religious preacher and Wasulu was not a reformist state as such. Nevertheless, he used Islam to unify the nation, promoting Islamic education and basing his rule on shari’a (Islamic law). However, Samori’s professional army was the essential institution and the real strength behind his empire. He imported horses and weapons and modernized the army along European lines.
Dyula traders had never enjoyed as much prosperity as they did under the almamy. Even though they did not play a central part in the creation of the state, the Dyula supported Samori because he actively encouraged commerce and protected trade routes, thus promoting a free circulation of people and goods. Samori put up the strongest resistance to European colonial penetration in West Africa, fighting both the French and British for seventeen years. Samori’s would-be Muslim empire was undone by the French, who took Sikasso in 1898, and sent Samori into exile, where he died in 1900.
The Dyula have been predominantly Muslim since the 13th century. Many in rural areas combine Islamic beliefs with certain pre-Islamic animistic traditions, such as the presence of spirits and use of amulets. Dyula communities have a reputation for historically maintaining a high standard of Muslim education. The Dyula family enterprise based on the lu could afford to provide some of its younger men an Islamic education. Thus, an ulema (clerical) class known as karamogo emerged, who were educated in the Quran and commentary (tafsir), hadith (prophetic narrations), and the life of the Prophet Muhammad. According to the Dyula clerical tradition, a student received instruction under a single sheikh for a duration varying from five to thirty years, and earned his living as a part-time farmer working his teacher's lands. After completing his studies, a karamogo obtained a turban and an isnad (teaching license), and either sought further instruction or to start his own school in a remote village. A highly educated karamogo could become a professional imam or qadi (judge).
Dioula see Dyula
Juula see Dyula
trader see Dyula
Wangara see Dyula
Dyula (Dioula) (Juula). Ethnic group and language from West Africa (Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast). The term Dyula is more commonly used to refer to a group specializing in trade. The term “Dioula” is synonymous with the term “Dyula.”
The Dyula (Dioula or Juula) are a Mande ethnic group inhabiting several West African countries, including the Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Mali, Ghana, Senegal and Guinea-Bissau.
Characterized as a highly successful merchant caste, Dyula migrants began establishing trading communities across the region in the fourteenth century. Since business was often conducted under non-Muslim rulers, the Dyula developed a set of theological principles for Muslim minorities in non-Muslim societies. Their unique contribution of long-distance commerce, Islamic scholarship and religious tolerance were significant factors to the peaceful expansion of Islam in West Africa.
The Mandé embraced Islam during the thirteenth century, following introduction to the faith through contact with the Soninké people and North African traders. By the 14th century the Malian empire (c.1230-1600) had reached its apogee, acquiring a considerable reputation for the Islamic practice of its court and the pilgrimages of several emperors who followed the tradition of Lahilatul Kalabi, the first black prince to make hajj to Mecca. It was at this time that Mali began encouraging some of its local merchants to establish colonies close to the gold fields of West Africa. This migrant trading class were known as dyula, the Mandingo word for “merchant” that referred simultaneously to their language (a dialect of Mandinka), commercial vocation, and religious practice.
The Dyula spread throughout the former area of Mandé culture, from the Atlantic coast of Senegambia to the Niger, and from the southern edge of the Sahara to forest zones further south. They established decentralized townships in non-Muslim colonies that were linked to an extensive commercial network, in a trading diaspora. Motivated by business imperatives, they expanded into new markets, founding settlements under the auspices of various local rulers who often permitted self-governance and autonomy. The organization of Dyula trading companies were based on a clan-family structure known as the lu - a working unit consisting of a father, his sons, and other attached males. Members of a given lu dispersed from the savanna to the forest, managed circulation of goods and information, placed orders, and effectively controlled the economic mechanisms of supply and demand.
Over time dyula colonies developed a theological rationale for their relations with non-Muslim ruling classes and subjects in what author Nehemia Levtzion dubbed “accommodationist Islam”. The man credited with formulating this rationale is Sheikh Al-Hajj Salim Suwari, a Soninke cleric from the core Mali area who lived around 1500. He made hajj to Mecca several times and devoted his intellectual career to developing an understanding of the faith that would assist Muslim minorities in “pagan” lands. He drew on North African and Middle Eastern jurists and theologians who had reflected on the situations of Muslims living among non-Muslim majorities, situations that were frequent in the centuries of Islamic expansion.
Sheikh Suwari formulated the obligations of Muslim minorities in West Africa into something known as the Suwarian tradition. It stressed the need for Muslims to coexist peaceably with unbelievers, and so justified a separation of religion and politics. In this understanding Muslims must nurture their own learning and piety and thereby furnish good examples to the non-Muslims around them. They could accept jurisdiction of non-Muslim authorities, as long as they had the necessary protection and conditions to practice the faith. In this teaching Suwari followed a strong predilection in Islamic thought for any government, albeit non-Muslim or tyrannical, as opposed to none. The military jihad was a resort only if the faithful were threatened. Suwari discouraged dawah (missionary), instead contending that Allah would bring non-Muslims to Islam in Allah's own way. It was not a Muslim's responsibility to decide when ignorance should give way to belief. Since their Islamic practice was capable of accommodating traditional cults, Dyula often served as priests, soothsayers and counselors at the courts of animist rulers.
As fellow Muslims, Dyula merchants were also able to assess the valuable trans-Saharan trade network, conducted by North African Arabs and Berbers whom they met at commercial centers across the Sahel. Some important trade goods included gold, millet, slaves, kola nuts from the south and slave beads and cowrie shells from the north (for use as currency). It was under Mali that the great cities of the Niger bend - including Gao and Djenné - prospered, with Timbuktu in particular becoming known across Europe for its great wealth. Important trading centers in southern West Africa developed at the transitional zone between the forest and the savanna; examples include Begho and Bono Manso (in present-day Ghana) and Bondoukou (in present-day Côte d'Ivoire). Western trade routes continued to be important, with Ouadane, Oualata and Chinguetti being the major trade centres in what is now Mauritania.
The development of Dyula trade in Ghana and the adjacent Ivory Coast had important political consequences, and sometimes military implications as well. The Dyula spearheaded Mande penetration of the forested zones in the south by establishing caravan routes and trading posts at strategic locations throughout the region en route to cola producing areas. By the start of the sixteenth century, Dyula merchants were trading as far south as the coast of modern Ghana.
On the forests northern fringes, new states emerged such as Bono and Banda. As the economic value of gold and kola became appreciated, forests south of these states - which had hitherto been little inhabited because of limited agricultural potential - became more thickly populated, and the same principles of political and military mobilization began being applied there. Village communities became tributaries of ruling groups, with some members becoming the clients and slaves needed to support royal households, armies, and trading enterprises. Sometimes these political changes were not to the advantage of the Dyula, who employed Mande warriors to guard their caravans and, if necessary, could call in larger contingents from the Sudanic kingdoms. In the seventeenth century, tensions between the Muslims and the local pagans in Begho erupted into a destructive war which eventually led to the total abandonment of the Banda capital. The local people eventually settled in a number of towns further east, while the Dyula withdrew to the west, to the further side of the Banda hills, where they established the new trading center of Bonduku.
The Dyula presence and changes in the balance of power occasioned political upheavals in other places. Among the paramount Mande political initiatives along trade routes south of Jenne was creation of the Dyula state of Gonja in the early 17th century. This was apparently motivated by a general worsening of the competitive position of Dyula traders, and was occasioned by three factors: (1) a near monopoly control in exporting forest produce achieved by the Akan kingdom of Bono; (2) the rise to power further north of the Dagomba kingdom, which controlled local salt pans; and (3) increased competition following the arrival in the region of rival long-distance traders from Hausaland.
The reaction of the Dyula in the Bono-Banda-Gonja region to these developments was to erect a kingdom of their own in Gonja - the territory northern traders had to cross to reach Akan forestlands. By 1675, Gonja had established a paramount chief called Yagbongwura, to control the kingdom. But Gonja was not a fruitful land in which to try to maintain a centralized government, neither Dagomba power to the north nor Akan power to the south had been finally destroyed, and the new kingdom rapidly declined in strength.
Many of the trading posts established by the Dyula eventually became market villages or cities, such as Kong in today's north-eastern Côte d'Ivoire. It emerged as a commercial center when Malian merchants began trading in the territory which was inhabited by pagan Senufo and other Voltaic groups. The sous-préfecture of Kong, in the area of Kong to Dabakala, is said to be the “origin” area, where dyula traders first settled in the twelfth century. Dyula presence in the Kong area grew rapidly in the seventeenth century as a result of the developing trade between the commercial centers along the Niger banks and the forest region to the south, which was controlled by the Baule chiefdoms and by Ashanti. The Dyula brought their trading skills and connections, and transformed Kong into an international market for the exchange of northern desert goods, such as salt and cloth, and southern forest exports such as cola nuts, gold, and slaves. The city was also a religious center that housed a substantial academic community of Muslim scholars, with palaces and mosques built in the traditional Sudanese style. As Kong grew prosperous, its early rulers – from the Taraweré clan, combined Dyula and Senufo traditions and extended their authority over the surrounding region.
By the eighteenth century, the Dyula had become quite powerful in the area and wished to rid themselves of subordination to Senufo chiefs. This was achieved in an uprising led by Seku Wattara (Ouattara), a Dyula warrior who claimed descent from the Malinke Keita lineage and who had studied the Quran and engaged in commerce before becoming a warrior. By rallying around himself all Dyula in the area, Seku Wattara easily defeated local chiefdoms and set up an independent Dyula state in 1710, the first of its kind in West Africa. He established himself as ruler and, under his authority, the city rose from a small city-state to become the capital of the great Kong Empire holding sway over much of the region. The Dyula of Kong also maintained commercial links with European traders on the Atlantic coast, around the Gulf of Guinea, from whom they easily obtained prized European goods, most notably rifles, gunpowder and textiles. The acquisition of weapons allowed for the creation of an armed militia force that protected trade routes passing through the territories of various minor rulers. In the course of developing his state, Seku Wattara built a strong army composed mostly of defeated pagan groups. The leadership of the army eventually developed into a new warrior class, called sonangi, which was gradually separated from the overall Dyula merchant class.
The Kong Empire started to decline after the death of Seku Wattara. Succession struggles divided the kingdom into two parts, the northern area being controlled by Seku’s brother Famagan who refused to recognize the rule of Seku’s oldest son in the south. Towards the end of the nineteenth century many of Kong’s provinces had formed independent chiefdoms. The city of Kong retained the prestige of an Islamic commercial center, but it was no longer the seat of an important political power. It eventually came under French colonial control in 1898. Despite the fall from glory, the seventeenth century Kong Friday Mosque survived and the city was largely rebuilt in a traditional Sudano-Sahelian architectural style featuring a Qur'anic school.
The Mande conquerors of the nineteenth century frequently utilized trade routes established by the Dyula. Indeed, it was his exploitation of their commercial network that allowed military leader Samory Touré (1830-1900) to rise to a dominant position in the Upper Niger region. A member of a dyula family from Sanankoro in Guinea, Samori conquered and united Dyula states during the 1860s. He gained control over the Milo River Valley in 1871, seized the village of Kankan in 1881, and became the principal power-holder on the upper Niger. By 1883, Samori had successfully brought the local chieftains under his control and officially founded the kingdom of Wasulu.
Having established an empire, he adopted the religious title of Almami in 1884 and recreated the Malian realm. This new state was governed by Samori and a council of kinsmen and clients who took on the management of the chancery and the treasury, administered justice, religious affairs, and foreign relations. Unlike some of his contemporary state-builders, Samori was not a religious preacher and Wasulu was not a reformist state as such. Nevertheless, he used Islam to unify the nation, promoting Islamic education and basing his rule on shari’a (Islamic law). However, Samori’s professional army was the essential institution and the real strength behind his empire. He imported horses and weapons and modernized the army along European lines.
Dyula traders had never enjoyed as much prosperity as they did under the almamy. Even though they did not play a central part in the creation of the state, the Dyula supported Samori because he actively encouraged commerce and protected trade routes, thus promoting a free circulation of people and goods. Samori put up the strongest resistance to European colonial penetration in West Africa, fighting both the French and British for seventeen years. Samori’s would-be Muslim empire was undone by the French, who took Sikasso in 1898, and sent Samori into exile, where he died in 1900.
The Dyula have been predominantly Muslim since the 13th century. Many in rural areas combine Islamic beliefs with certain pre-Islamic animistic traditions, such as the presence of spirits and use of amulets. Dyula communities have a reputation for historically maintaining a high standard of Muslim education. The Dyula family enterprise based on the lu could afford to provide some of its younger men an Islamic education. Thus, an ulema (clerical) class known as karamogo emerged, who were educated in the Quran and commentary (tafsir), hadith (prophetic narrations), and the life of the Prophet Muhammad. According to the Dyula clerical tradition, a student received instruction under a single sheikh for a duration varying from five to thirty years, and earned his living as a part-time farmer working his teacher's lands. After completing his studies, a karamogo obtained a turban and an isnad (teaching license), and either sought further instruction or to start his own school in a remote village. A highly educated karamogo could become a professional imam or qadi (judge).
Dioula see Dyula
Juula see Dyula
trader see Dyula
Wangara see Dyula
Eastern Rite Catholics
Eastern Rite Catholics. Members of the Eastern Rite Churches. The Eastern Rite Churches are Christian churches based in Southwest Asia in communion with the Roman Catholic Church and the pope in the Vatican. These churches have retained their identity, and can be classified according to which of five rites they belong: (1) Byzantine, (2) Alexandrian, (3) Antiochene (from which the Maronites and Syrians stem), (4) Chaldean and (5) Armenian. Estimates as to the number of adherents of the Eastern Rite Churches vary between 4 and 12 million throughout the world. However, the lower estimate appears to be the most accurate. About half of the Eastern Rite Catholics live outside Southwest Asia and North Africa, mainly in Europe and the Americas.
The Eastern Rite Churches are also called the Eastern Rite Church (note the singular), Eastern Catholic Church or the Uniate. The main churches include: Armenian Catholic Church; Chaldean Catholic Church (part of the Nestorian tradition); Maronite Church; Melkite Greek Catholic Church; Coptic Catholic Church (a small part of the total Coptic Church); and Syrian Catholic Church. By their affiliation with the Roman Catholic Church, the Eastern Rite Churches differ from other churches in the same region, the so-called Orthodox Churches and the independent churches.
By defining the Eastern Rite Churches as having their own rites (or rituals), these churches have retained a certain degree of independence. However, they have had to accept the core of the Catholic faith namely the seven sacraments (baptism, confirmation, Eucharist, penance, anointing or extreme unction, holy orders or ordination, and matrimony) and the pope as the supreme head of the church.
The liturgy, sacred art, organization and canon law are specific to each church. One of the most notable differences is that the clergy is allowed to marry. In most churches, local language or the founding language are used in the liturgy, not Latin as in the Catholic Church.
Eastern Rite Churches are organized from the Congregation for the Eastern Churches, with the pope as prefect, and cardinal proprefect as chairman. The churches are headed by a patriarch, who has the right to appoint bishops and create dioceses. There are now six Eastern Catholic patriarchs: one in Alexandria for the Copts; three in Antioch (with one for the Maronites [based in Jounieh, Lebanon], one for the Syrians, and one for the Melikites [based in Damascus, Syria]); one in Iraq for the Chaldeans; and one in Sis for the Armenians. The two latter patriarchs are also called katholikos. Below the patriarchs, there are archbishops, bishops and priests.
A brief history of the Eastern Rite Churches reads as follows:
In 1182, the Maronite Church attained partial affiliation with the Roman Catholic Church, but was allowed to preserve its liturgy and keep the organization with the Patriarch in Lebanon.
In 1439, the Council of Ferrara-Florence failed in uniting east and west in the Christian world. The Council had convened in an attempt to bring churches back under the supremacy of the Pope in Rome.
In 1551, many Nestorian congregations rejoined the Roman Catholic Church. These congregations came to be known as the Chaldean Catholic since it would have been heretical (in the eyes of the pope) to keep the reference to Nestorius.
In 1596, two Ukrainian Orthodox bishops acknowledged the primacy of the pope. This became the founding moment of the idea of “Eastern Rite Churches.”
In 1667, one of the two opposing patriarchs of the Syrian Church joined the Catholic Church.
In 1724, the Melkite Church joined the Roman Catholic Church.
In 1741, a congregation of the Coptic Church joined the Roman Catholic Church.
In 1742, part of the Armenian Orthodox Church joined the Eastern Rite Church.
On November 21, 1964, in the Decree on the Catholic Eastern Churches, the Second Vatican Council declared its intent to preserve and protect the Eastern rites.
Eastern Rite Church see Eastern Rite Catholics.
Eastern Catholic Church see Eastern Rite Catholics.
Uniate see Eastern Rite Catholics.
Eastern Rite Catholics. Members of the Eastern Rite Churches. The Eastern Rite Churches are Christian churches based in Southwest Asia in communion with the Roman Catholic Church and the pope in the Vatican. These churches have retained their identity, and can be classified according to which of five rites they belong: (1) Byzantine, (2) Alexandrian, (3) Antiochene (from which the Maronites and Syrians stem), (4) Chaldean and (5) Armenian. Estimates as to the number of adherents of the Eastern Rite Churches vary between 4 and 12 million throughout the world. However, the lower estimate appears to be the most accurate. About half of the Eastern Rite Catholics live outside Southwest Asia and North Africa, mainly in Europe and the Americas.
The Eastern Rite Churches are also called the Eastern Rite Church (note the singular), Eastern Catholic Church or the Uniate. The main churches include: Armenian Catholic Church; Chaldean Catholic Church (part of the Nestorian tradition); Maronite Church; Melkite Greek Catholic Church; Coptic Catholic Church (a small part of the total Coptic Church); and Syrian Catholic Church. By their affiliation with the Roman Catholic Church, the Eastern Rite Churches differ from other churches in the same region, the so-called Orthodox Churches and the independent churches.
By defining the Eastern Rite Churches as having their own rites (or rituals), these churches have retained a certain degree of independence. However, they have had to accept the core of the Catholic faith namely the seven sacraments (baptism, confirmation, Eucharist, penance, anointing or extreme unction, holy orders or ordination, and matrimony) and the pope as the supreme head of the church.
The liturgy, sacred art, organization and canon law are specific to each church. One of the most notable differences is that the clergy is allowed to marry. In most churches, local language or the founding language are used in the liturgy, not Latin as in the Catholic Church.
Eastern Rite Churches are organized from the Congregation for the Eastern Churches, with the pope as prefect, and cardinal proprefect as chairman. The churches are headed by a patriarch, who has the right to appoint bishops and create dioceses. There are now six Eastern Catholic patriarchs: one in Alexandria for the Copts; three in Antioch (with one for the Maronites [based in Jounieh, Lebanon], one for the Syrians, and one for the Melikites [based in Damascus, Syria]); one in Iraq for the Chaldeans; and one in Sis for the Armenians. The two latter patriarchs are also called katholikos. Below the patriarchs, there are archbishops, bishops and priests.
A brief history of the Eastern Rite Churches reads as follows:
In 1182, the Maronite Church attained partial affiliation with the Roman Catholic Church, but was allowed to preserve its liturgy and keep the organization with the Patriarch in Lebanon.
In 1439, the Council of Ferrara-Florence failed in uniting east and west in the Christian world. The Council had convened in an attempt to bring churches back under the supremacy of the Pope in Rome.
In 1551, many Nestorian congregations rejoined the Roman Catholic Church. These congregations came to be known as the Chaldean Catholic since it would have been heretical (in the eyes of the pope) to keep the reference to Nestorius.
In 1596, two Ukrainian Orthodox bishops acknowledged the primacy of the pope. This became the founding moment of the idea of “Eastern Rite Churches.”
In 1667, one of the two opposing patriarchs of the Syrian Church joined the Catholic Church.
In 1724, the Melkite Church joined the Roman Catholic Church.
In 1741, a congregation of the Coptic Church joined the Roman Catholic Church.
In 1742, part of the Armenian Orthodox Church joined the Eastern Rite Church.
On November 21, 1964, in the Decree on the Catholic Eastern Churches, the Second Vatican Council declared its intent to preserve and protect the Eastern rites.
Eastern Rite Church see Eastern Rite Catholics.
Eastern Catholic Church see Eastern Rite Catholics.
Uniate see Eastern Rite Catholics.
Shirin Ebadi (b. June 21, 1947, Hamadan, Iran) was an Iranian lawyer, writer, and teacher, who received the Nobel Prize for Peace in 2003 for her efforts to promote democracy and human rights, especially those of women and children in Iran. She was the first Muslim woman and the first Iranian to receive the award.
Ebadi was born into an educated Iranian family; her father was an author and a lecturer in commercial law. When she was an infant, her family moved to Tehran. Ebadi attended Anoshiravn Dadgar and Reza Shah Kabir schools before earning a law degree, in only three and a half years, from the University of Tehrān (1969). That same year she took an apprenticeship at the Department of Justice and became one of the first women judges in Iran. While serving as a judge, she also earned a doctorate in private law from the University of Tehrān (1971). From 1975 to 1979 she was head of the city court of Tehrān.
After the 1979 revolution and the establishment of an Islamic republic, women were deemed unsuitable to serve as judges because the new leaders believed that Islam forbids it. Ebadi was subsequently forced to become a clerk of the court. After she and other female judges protested this action, they were given higher roles within the Department of Justice but were still not allowed to serve as judges. Ebadi resigned in protest. She then chose to practice law but was initially denied a lawyer’s license. In 1992, after years of struggle, she finally obtained a license to practice law and began to do so. She also taught at the University of Tehrān and became an advocate for civil rights. In court, Ebadi defended women and dissidents and represented many people who, like her, had run afoul of the Iranian government. She also distributed evidence implicating government officials in the 1999 murders of students at the University of Tehrān, for which she was jailed for three weeks in 2000. Found guilty of “disturbing public opinion,” she was given a prison term, barred from practicing law for five years, and fined, although her sentence was later suspended.
Ebadi wrote a number of books on the subject of human rights. These include The Rights of the Child: A Study of Legal Aspects of Children’s Rights in Iran (1994), History and Documentation of Human Rights in Iran (2000), and The Rights of Women (2002). She also was founder and head of the Association for Support of Children’s Rights in Iran. In addition to writing books on human rights, Ebadi reflected on her own experiences in Iran Awakening: From Prison to Peace Prize, One Woman’s Struggle at the Crossroads (2006; with Azadeh Moaveni; also published as Iran Awakening: A Memoir of Revolution and Hope).
Ecevit
Ecevit (Bulent Ecevit) (May 28, 1925 - November 5, 2006). Turkish prime minister (r. 1974, 1978-1979, and 1999-2002). He was born in Istanbul into an intellectual family. His father Ahmet Fahri Ecevit, who was born in Kastamonu, was a professor of forensic medicine at Ankara University. Later, Ahmet Fahri entered political life as Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi's (CHP's) Kastamonu deputy between 1943-1950. His mother, Fatma Nazli, was born in Istanbul and was among the first women in Turkey to paint professionally.
During the 1940s, he received an education from universities in Istanbul, Great Britain and the United States. In 1944, Ecevit graduated from Robert College and started working as a translator in the Press Publication Head Office (Basin Yayin Genel Mudurlugu). He married his classmate Rahsan Ecevit in 1946. He came to the United States in the mid-1950s on a State Department fellowship, and worked at two newspapers in North Carolina.
A poet and student of literature, Ecevit turned to politics as a protégé of Ismet Inonu, leader of the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi -- Republican People’s Party (RPP), and was elected to the parliament in 1957. From 1961 to 1965, he served as minister of labor in Inonu’s cabinets. In 1966, Ecevit became the secretary general of the Republican People’s Party.
Breaking with Inonu over the intervention of the military in 1971, Ecevit stepped down from his position as secretary-general of the Republican People’s Party. Ecevit won leadership of the RPP the following year. In 1974, he formed a coalition government with the National Salvation Party of Necmettin Erbakan. Ecevit briefly became a national hero, when he ordered (on July 20, 1974) the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in response to a coup in Cyprus organized by the Greek military government. The Ecevit government's actions led to the dividing of the island, the uprooting of hundreds of thousands of people and the setting of the stage for the breakaway Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (a de facto state which is only officially recognized by Turkey). His coalition broke apart, however, and (in November) he was forced to resign.
Ecevit returned to power in January of 1978, but after a year of escalating political terrorism and economic deterioration, he resigned in October 1979.
Ecevit was a hard line nationalist, and he was opposed to the recognition of cultural and linguistic rights for Turkey’s Kurdish minority. As prime minister in the 1970s, Ecevit was responsible for an anti-European policy. While in power through most of 1974, Ecevit was in charge of invading northern Cyprus, reintroducing opium production in the country and attempting to limit the excesses of the police.
Following the September 12, 1980, military coup led by General Kenan Evren, Ecevit was incarcerated and was suspended from active politics for life. Imprisoned in December 1981 for making political statements, he was released in early 1982. A referendum in 1987 lifted his ban from politics, and he became the chairman of the Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party) inheriting the position from his wife, Rahsan Ecevit. His party failed to enter the National Assembly in 1987 national elections, and in spite of passing the electoral barrier in 1991 managed to win only 7 seats in the parliament. The fortunes of the Democratic Left Party changed after the elections in 1995, securing the party 75 seats (out of 550). After two short lived governments (formed by Mesut Yilmaz and Necmettin Erbakan respectively) Ecevit became a deputy prime minister under the last government of Mesut Yilmaz.
Ecevit, as leader of the Democratic Left Party, once again became prime minister of Turkey in January 1999 after nearly a 20 year absence from power. In January 1999, Turkish President Suleyman Demirel, a political rival, asked Ecevit to form a caretaker government, a parliamentary group that would govern until elections could be held. Ecevit’s coalition was comprised of three parties: Ecevit’s Democratic Left Party; the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) of the last prime minister, Mesut Yilmaz; and the True Path Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi) of former prime minister, Tansu Ciller. In May, 1999, voters upheld Ecevit’s governing coalition in the Turkish Parliament.
Initially, Ecevit enjoyed high approval ratings. His government restored public confidence in the wake of scandals that had toppled former Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz in late 1998. Ecevit, who strongly opposed political autonomy for the Kurdish region of Turkey, benefited politically when Turkish agents captured Abdullah Ocalan, a Kurdish rebel, in February 1999. Ecevit’s government came under severe criticism, however, for its handling of emergency relief after a devastating earthquake struck western Turkey on August 17, 1999. In that disaster, more than 17,000 Turks perished and as many as 600,000 were left homeless.
Much like the devastation caused by the earthquake, Ecevit’s third tenure as prime minister likewise turned out to be a disaster, bringing Turkey into one of its deepest and most serious economic crises ever. Ecevit's government undertook a number of reforms aimed at stabilizing the Turkish economy in preparation for accession negotiations with the European Union. However, the short term economic pain brought on by the reforms caused rifts within his coalition and party, and eventually forced new elections in 2002.
The popular reaction to this devastation was made manifest in the November 2002 general elections, when none of the parties of Ecevit’s government coalition received enough votes to be represented in the parliament. On November 3, 2002, Ecevit’s party received only 1.2 percent of the votes in the general elections and garnered no representation in the parliament. Ecevit subsequently retired from active politics in 2004.
Ecevit was not only a politician but also a published poet, journalist, essayist, and translator. He wrote many books on Turkish politics and translated Hindu and British literature into Turkish. He studied Sanskrit, Bengali, and English, and translated works by Rabindranath Tabore, T. S. Eliot, and Bernard Lewis into Turkish. Ecevit, who studied at American Robert College, the most prestigious high school in Istanbul, was successful in these literary endeavors despite never having graduated from a university, a fact that also prevented Ecevit from ever running for President of the Turkish Repbulic since, pursuant to the Turkish constitution, holding a university degree was a prerequisite for the presidency.
Ecevit was hospitalized at the Gulhane Military Hospital in Ankara and placed in a medically induced coma after suffering a stroke on May 19, 2006. He died on November 5, 2006, due to respiratory failure without regaining consciousness.
Bulent Ecevit see Ecevit
Ecevit (Bulent Ecevit) (May 28, 1925 - November 5, 2006). Turkish prime minister (r. 1974, 1978-1979, and 1999-2002). He was born in Istanbul into an intellectual family. His father Ahmet Fahri Ecevit, who was born in Kastamonu, was a professor of forensic medicine at Ankara University. Later, Ahmet Fahri entered political life as Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi's (CHP's) Kastamonu deputy between 1943-1950. His mother, Fatma Nazli, was born in Istanbul and was among the first women in Turkey to paint professionally.
During the 1940s, he received an education from universities in Istanbul, Great Britain and the United States. In 1944, Ecevit graduated from Robert College and started working as a translator in the Press Publication Head Office (Basin Yayin Genel Mudurlugu). He married his classmate Rahsan Ecevit in 1946. He came to the United States in the mid-1950s on a State Department fellowship, and worked at two newspapers in North Carolina.
A poet and student of literature, Ecevit turned to politics as a protégé of Ismet Inonu, leader of the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi -- Republican People’s Party (RPP), and was elected to the parliament in 1957. From 1961 to 1965, he served as minister of labor in Inonu’s cabinets. In 1966, Ecevit became the secretary general of the Republican People’s Party.
Breaking with Inonu over the intervention of the military in 1971, Ecevit stepped down from his position as secretary-general of the Republican People’s Party. Ecevit won leadership of the RPP the following year. In 1974, he formed a coalition government with the National Salvation Party of Necmettin Erbakan. Ecevit briefly became a national hero, when he ordered (on July 20, 1974) the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in response to a coup in Cyprus organized by the Greek military government. The Ecevit government's actions led to the dividing of the island, the uprooting of hundreds of thousands of people and the setting of the stage for the breakaway Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (a de facto state which is only officially recognized by Turkey). His coalition broke apart, however, and (in November) he was forced to resign.
Ecevit returned to power in January of 1978, but after a year of escalating political terrorism and economic deterioration, he resigned in October 1979.
Ecevit was a hard line nationalist, and he was opposed to the recognition of cultural and linguistic rights for Turkey’s Kurdish minority. As prime minister in the 1970s, Ecevit was responsible for an anti-European policy. While in power through most of 1974, Ecevit was in charge of invading northern Cyprus, reintroducing opium production in the country and attempting to limit the excesses of the police.
Following the September 12, 1980, military coup led by General Kenan Evren, Ecevit was incarcerated and was suspended from active politics for life. Imprisoned in December 1981 for making political statements, he was released in early 1982. A referendum in 1987 lifted his ban from politics, and he became the chairman of the Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party) inheriting the position from his wife, Rahsan Ecevit. His party failed to enter the National Assembly in 1987 national elections, and in spite of passing the electoral barrier in 1991 managed to win only 7 seats in the parliament. The fortunes of the Democratic Left Party changed after the elections in 1995, securing the party 75 seats (out of 550). After two short lived governments (formed by Mesut Yilmaz and Necmettin Erbakan respectively) Ecevit became a deputy prime minister under the last government of Mesut Yilmaz.
Ecevit, as leader of the Democratic Left Party, once again became prime minister of Turkey in January 1999 after nearly a 20 year absence from power. In January 1999, Turkish President Suleyman Demirel, a political rival, asked Ecevit to form a caretaker government, a parliamentary group that would govern until elections could be held. Ecevit’s coalition was comprised of three parties: Ecevit’s Democratic Left Party; the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) of the last prime minister, Mesut Yilmaz; and the True Path Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi) of former prime minister, Tansu Ciller. In May, 1999, voters upheld Ecevit’s governing coalition in the Turkish Parliament.
Initially, Ecevit enjoyed high approval ratings. His government restored public confidence in the wake of scandals that had toppled former Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz in late 1998. Ecevit, who strongly opposed political autonomy for the Kurdish region of Turkey, benefited politically when Turkish agents captured Abdullah Ocalan, a Kurdish rebel, in February 1999. Ecevit’s government came under severe criticism, however, for its handling of emergency relief after a devastating earthquake struck western Turkey on August 17, 1999. In that disaster, more than 17,000 Turks perished and as many as 600,000 were left homeless.
Much like the devastation caused by the earthquake, Ecevit’s third tenure as prime minister likewise turned out to be a disaster, bringing Turkey into one of its deepest and most serious economic crises ever. Ecevit's government undertook a number of reforms aimed at stabilizing the Turkish economy in preparation for accession negotiations with the European Union. However, the short term economic pain brought on by the reforms caused rifts within his coalition and party, and eventually forced new elections in 2002.
The popular reaction to this devastation was made manifest in the November 2002 general elections, when none of the parties of Ecevit’s government coalition received enough votes to be represented in the parliament. On November 3, 2002, Ecevit’s party received only 1.2 percent of the votes in the general elections and garnered no representation in the parliament. Ecevit subsequently retired from active politics in 2004.
Ecevit was not only a politician but also a published poet, journalist, essayist, and translator. He wrote many books on Turkish politics and translated Hindu and British literature into Turkish. He studied Sanskrit, Bengali, and English, and translated works by Rabindranath Tabore, T. S. Eliot, and Bernard Lewis into Turkish. Ecevit, who studied at American Robert College, the most prestigious high school in Istanbul, was successful in these literary endeavors despite never having graduated from a university, a fact that also prevented Ecevit from ever running for President of the Turkish Repbulic since, pursuant to the Turkish constitution, holding a university degree was a prerequisite for the presidency.
Ecevit was hospitalized at the Gulhane Military Hospital in Ankara and placed in a medically induced coma after suffering a stroke on May 19, 2006. He died on November 5, 2006, due to respiratory failure without regaining consciousness.
Bulent Ecevit see Ecevit
Egyptian Islamic Jihad
Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) (Al-Jihad) (Jihad Group (Islamic Jihad) (Jihad Organization). Egyptian group active since the late 1970s. The EIJ is apparently split into two factions: one led by Ayman al-Zawahiri -- who currently is in Afghanistan and is a key leader in the Usama bin Laden (UBL) network -- and the Vanguards of Conquest (Talaa’ al-Fateh) led by Ahmad Husayn Agiza. Abbud al-Zumar, leader of the original Jihad, was imprisoned in Egypt and recently joined the group’s jailed spiritual leader, Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman, in a call for a “peaceful front.” The group’s traditional goal is the overthrow of the Egyptian government and creation of an Islamic state. Given its involvement with UBL, during the years immediately after 2001, the EIJ appeared to be increasingly willing to target United States interests. The group threatened to strike the United States for its jailing of Shaykh al-Rahman and the arrests of EIJ cadres in Albania, Azerbaijan, and the United Kingdom.
The Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), formerly called simply Islamic Jihad (and Liberation Army for Holy Sites) originally referred to as "al-Jihad," and then "the Jihad Group", or "the Jihad Organization", was an Egyptian Islamist group active since the late 1970s. It has been under worldwide embargo by the United Nations as an affiliate of al-Qaeda. It was also banned by several individual governments including that of the Russian Federation. It was led by Ayman al-Zawahiri.
The organization's original primary goal was to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state. Later it broadened its aims to include attacking the United States and Israel interests in Egypt and abroad.
EIJ has suffered setbacks as a result of numerous arrests of operatives worldwide, most recently in Lebanon and Yemen. In June 2001, Al Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which had been associated with each other for many years, merged into "Qaeda al-Jihad."
Al-Jihad or "Tanzim al-Jihad" was formed in 1980 from the merger of two clusters of Islamist groups: a Cairo branch, under Mohammad abd al-Salam Faraj, and a Saidi (Upper Egypt) branch under Karam Zuhdi. Faraj used to deliver Friday sermons in a private mosque that had been built by his in-laws. During the ensuing discussions with his listeners, he managed to convince some to join in a clandestine organization to eventually wage violent jihad. The Cairo branch was composed of five or six groups, loosely connected and each with its own emir (one of whom was Ayman al-Zawahiri). They had autonomy but met weekly to work out a general strategy.
In October 6, 1981 it carried out the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat. After the assassination, the Egyptian government succeeded in rounding up the membership of Tanzim al-Jihad, but was rather lenient in the ensuing trial. Only the four direct perpetrators and the Cairo leader Faraj, were condemned to death. In prison, the Cairenes and Saidis reverted into two factions, the Cairo militants later becoming the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and the Saidis later forming the al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, or the Islamic Group.
The leader of the Cairo militants was Abud Zumour, a onetime army intelligence officer serving a life sentence for his part in the plot to kill Sadat. This faction, the Islamic Jihad, was small and tightly disciplined. Among its members was a 30-year-old Cairo physician named Ayman Zawahiri.
Most of the middle-rank members were discharged from prison after only three years and fled to Pakistan and Afghanistan to help the mujahideen there and escape persecution at home.
In the mid-1980s, in Peshawar Pakistan, the militants reconstituted themselves as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, with very loose ties to their nominal imprisoned leader, Abud al-Zumur. A physician by the name of Sayyed Imam Al-Sharif or "Dr. Fadl" was head of EIJ for some time, although eventually Ayman al-Zawahiri, whose leadership style was autocratic, would take over. During this time EIJ became more extreme, with for example, Dr. Fadl emphasizing the importance of takfir and execution of apostates, which he argued should include those who registered to vote, since this was a violation of God's sovereignty over governance.
It was also at this time that some saw "the Egyptians" of the EIJ begin to exert an influence on Osama bin Laden, who at the time was known as a wealthy and well-connected fundraiser for the jihad in Afghanistan. Egyptian filmmaker Essam Deraz, bin Laden's first biographer, met bin Laden in the "Lion's Den" training camp in Afghanistan and complained that the Egyptians formed a barrier around bin Laden and whenever an outsider tried to speak confidentially to bin Laden, the Egyptians would surround the Saudi and drag him into another room. One of those who complained of being elbowed aside was a former mentor of bin Laden Abdullah Azzam, the original exponent and organizer of global jihad on behalf of the Afghan mujahideen.
In 1991, EIJ broke with al-Zumur and al-Zawahiri took control of the leadership. At this point, the EIJ became a free-floating network without any real ties to its original society or to its surrounding society.
Al-Jihad (EIJ) had a blind-cell structure, meaning members in one group did not know the identities or activities of those in another, so that if one member were captured they would not be able to endanger the whole organization. However, Egyptian authorities captured the membership director of EIJ, the one member who had all the other members names. The database in his computer listed every member's address, aliases, and potential hideouts. Al-Jihad leader al-Zawahiri bitterly lamented the government newspapers elation over the arrest of 800 members of the al-Jihad group without a single shot being fired.
In August 1993 Al-Jihad attempted to kill the Egyptian Interior Minister, Hasan al-Alfi. who was leading a crackdown on Islamic militants and their terror campaign. A bomb-laden motorcycle exploded next to the minister's car, killing the bomber and his accomplice, but not the minister. The attack marked the first time Sunni Islamists had made use of suicide in terrorism, a technique made famous by Shia Hezbollah in Lebanon. It is likely that the notion of suicide bombing was inspired by Hezbollah as EIJ head Ayman Zawahir had been to Iran to raise money, and had sent his talented associate, Ali Mohamed, to Lebanon to train with Hezbollah.
A few months later in November Al-Jihad made another bombing attempt, this time to kill Egypt's prime minister, Atef Sidqi. The car bomb exploded close to a girls' school in Cairo as the minister was driven past. The minister, protected by his armored car, was unhurt, but the explosion injured 21 people and killed a young schoolgirl, Shayma Abdel-Halim. Unfortunately for al-Jihad this bombing was preceded by two years of terror by a larger terror group, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya that had killed 240, and the patience of the Egyptian public had run short. Shayma's death captured people's emotions as nothing else had and when her coffin was borne through the streets of Cairo, people cried, `Terrorism is the enemy of God!`" A harsh police crackdown followed and 280 EIJ members were arrested, with 6 eventually given a death sentence.
EIJ's longtime association with al-Qaeda became closer at this time when most of its members were reported to have gone on the al-Qaeda payroll. EIJ leader hoped this would be a temporary measure but later confided to one of this chief assistants that joining with bin Laden had been the only solution to keeping the Jihad organization abroad alive.
In June 1995 another failed assassination attempt caused yet a greater setback. Operating from its exile base in Sudan, EIJ joined forces with the Egyptian al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya and Sudanese intelligence in an attempt to kill Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak while he was in Ethiopia for a conference of the Organization of African Unity. The leader of the plot was Mustafa Hamza, a senior Egyptian member of Al-Qaeda and commander to the military branch of the Islamic Group. The plotters had been planning the attack for more than a year, and even married local women in Ethiopia. They received assistance from Sudanese intelligence services, which smuggled weapons into their embassy in Ethiopia.
Their hope was to decapitate the Egyptian government thereby eliminating the "iron grip" of the state security services, and creating a power vacuum which Islamists could then fill. Unfortunately for this plan, the attack was foiled by a malfunctioning grenade launcher and Mubarak’s bulletproof limousine.
Back in Egypt, Mubarak launched a ruthless campaign to crush anyone involved in Islamist terrorism, but in Sudan the EIJ had even worse troubles. In 1994, Ahmad Salama Mabruk's 17-year old son Musab, as well as the 15-year old son Ahmed of Mohammed Sharaf, were captured by the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate and sexually abused. They were blackmailed with videotape of the sodomy, until they agreed to act as informants against their fathers' group. Musab went through his father's files and photocopied them for the Egyptians, but the Sudanese intelligence service saw the covert meetings and alerted al-Jihad, recommending that they treat the boys leniently if they confessed. al-Zawahiri convened a Sharia court, where Musab confessed he had been given explosives by the Egyptians which he was told to detonate at the next Shura council meeting. They were each found guilty of sodomy, treason, and attempted murder, and sentenced to death by firing squad. The trial, and the execution, were filmed and copies of the film were distributed by al-Jihad.
When the Sudanese found out about the executions in its jurisdiction, al-Zawahiri and the rest of EIJ were ordered to leave the country. It was a devastating blow to the group.
Bin Laden was also weakened by this failed operation. The core of his al-Qaeda group was made up of members of Islamic Jihad. Because of Sudan's collaboration in the plot, the United Nations voted to impose sanctions on the country. To rehabilitate itself in the international community, the Sudanese government pressured bin Laden to leave the country. Bin Laden and many EIJ returned to war torn Afghanistan having lost many members and almost all of bin Laden's assets.
On November 19, 1995 EIJ bombed the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad killing 16 and wounding 60. The attack served as a prototype for future attacks by its sister organization al-Qaeda, such as the 1998 bombings of American embassies in Africa.
In 1998, three al-Jihad members were arrested in Albania, and the United States intervened to ensure they were extradited to Egypt to face charges. In Afghanistan Zawahiri wrote the 1998 fatwa for the International Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, calling for the killing of Americans and their allies, both civilian and military, which was signed by representatives of several jihadi organizations, including EIJ. In August 1998, Issam Abdel-Tawab was extradited to Egypt from Bulgaria.
Dissent among EIJ members to this change of direction and abandonment of the taking over Egypt as the group's primary goal, was so strong that in the end, Zawahiri pledged to resign if the members failed to endorse his actions. The organization was in such disarray because of arrests and defections, and so close to bankruptcy, that the only choice was to follow Zawahiri or abandon al-Jihad. One of those who did abandon al-Jihad was Zawahiri's own brother Muhammed, the military commander of EIJ.
In June 2001, Al Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad merged into an entity formally called jamaa'at Qa'idat al-Jihad, with leadership of EIJ comprising the majority - six of nine seats - of al Qaeda's ruling council (shura).
Consequently, EIJ is often considered synonymous with Al-Qaeda, (for example by the U.S. Treasury Department), although some refer to it as a separate organization with al-Zawahiri as its leader and global jihad's main ideologist.
The organization specializes in armed attacks against high-level Egyptian Government personnel, including cabinet ministers, and car-bombings against official United States and Egyptian facilities. The original Jihad was responsible for the attempted assassinations of Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfi in August 1993 and Prime Minister Atef Sedky in November 1993. Egyptian Jihad and rival armed groups launched a wave of violence against Egypt's secular government in 1992, a campaign they only abandoned at the end of the decade. Nearly 1300 people died in the unrest, including policemen and government officials. It is responsible for the Egyptian Embassy bombing in Islamabad, Pakistan in 1995. In 1998 a planned attack against the US Embassy in Albania was thwarted by a roundup of suspects who are now called the Returnees from Albania.
Al-Sharif passed the Jihad leadership to Ayman al-Zawahiri amid dissent within the movement in the mid 1980's. The al-Zawahiri faction subsequently formed an alliance with Al-Qaeda leading over time to the effective merger of the two groups operations inside Afghanistan.
Although al-Zawahiri was frequently referred to as a lieutenant or second in command of Al Qaeda this description is misleading as it implies a hierarchical relationship. The modern Al Qaeda organization was the combination of Bin Laden's financial resources with al-Zawahiri's ideological and operational leadership. Despite the effective merger of al-Zawahiri and Bin Laden's groups in the Afghanistan area of operations there is evidence that suggests that at least part of the Islamic Jihad group continuing to operate in Egypt remained independent of Bin Laden's organization and reports to al-Zawahiri personally.
EIJ see Egyptian Islamic Jihad
Al-Jihad see Egyptian Islamic Jihad
Jihad Group see Egyptian Islamic Jihad
Islamic Jihad see Egyptian Islamic Jihad
Liberation Army for Holy Sites see Egyptian Islamic Jihad
Jihad Organization see Egyptian Islamic Jihad
Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) (Al-Jihad) (Jihad Group (Islamic Jihad) (Jihad Organization). Egyptian group active since the late 1970s. The EIJ is apparently split into two factions: one led by Ayman al-Zawahiri -- who currently is in Afghanistan and is a key leader in the Usama bin Laden (UBL) network -- and the Vanguards of Conquest (Talaa’ al-Fateh) led by Ahmad Husayn Agiza. Abbud al-Zumar, leader of the original Jihad, was imprisoned in Egypt and recently joined the group’s jailed spiritual leader, Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman, in a call for a “peaceful front.” The group’s traditional goal is the overthrow of the Egyptian government and creation of an Islamic state. Given its involvement with UBL, during the years immediately after 2001, the EIJ appeared to be increasingly willing to target United States interests. The group threatened to strike the United States for its jailing of Shaykh al-Rahman and the arrests of EIJ cadres in Albania, Azerbaijan, and the United Kingdom.
The Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), formerly called simply Islamic Jihad (and Liberation Army for Holy Sites) originally referred to as "al-Jihad," and then "the Jihad Group", or "the Jihad Organization", was an Egyptian Islamist group active since the late 1970s. It has been under worldwide embargo by the United Nations as an affiliate of al-Qaeda. It was also banned by several individual governments including that of the Russian Federation. It was led by Ayman al-Zawahiri.
The organization's original primary goal was to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state. Later it broadened its aims to include attacking the United States and Israel interests in Egypt and abroad.
EIJ has suffered setbacks as a result of numerous arrests of operatives worldwide, most recently in Lebanon and Yemen. In June 2001, Al Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which had been associated with each other for many years, merged into "Qaeda al-Jihad."
Al-Jihad or "Tanzim al-Jihad" was formed in 1980 from the merger of two clusters of Islamist groups: a Cairo branch, under Mohammad abd al-Salam Faraj, and a Saidi (Upper Egypt) branch under Karam Zuhdi. Faraj used to deliver Friday sermons in a private mosque that had been built by his in-laws. During the ensuing discussions with his listeners, he managed to convince some to join in a clandestine organization to eventually wage violent jihad. The Cairo branch was composed of five or six groups, loosely connected and each with its own emir (one of whom was Ayman al-Zawahiri). They had autonomy but met weekly to work out a general strategy.
In October 6, 1981 it carried out the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat. After the assassination, the Egyptian government succeeded in rounding up the membership of Tanzim al-Jihad, but was rather lenient in the ensuing trial. Only the four direct perpetrators and the Cairo leader Faraj, were condemned to death. In prison, the Cairenes and Saidis reverted into two factions, the Cairo militants later becoming the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and the Saidis later forming the al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, or the Islamic Group.
The leader of the Cairo militants was Abud Zumour, a onetime army intelligence officer serving a life sentence for his part in the plot to kill Sadat. This faction, the Islamic Jihad, was small and tightly disciplined. Among its members was a 30-year-old Cairo physician named Ayman Zawahiri.
Most of the middle-rank members were discharged from prison after only three years and fled to Pakistan and Afghanistan to help the mujahideen there and escape persecution at home.
In the mid-1980s, in Peshawar Pakistan, the militants reconstituted themselves as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, with very loose ties to their nominal imprisoned leader, Abud al-Zumur. A physician by the name of Sayyed Imam Al-Sharif or "Dr. Fadl" was head of EIJ for some time, although eventually Ayman al-Zawahiri, whose leadership style was autocratic, would take over. During this time EIJ became more extreme, with for example, Dr. Fadl emphasizing the importance of takfir and execution of apostates, which he argued should include those who registered to vote, since this was a violation of God's sovereignty over governance.
It was also at this time that some saw "the Egyptians" of the EIJ begin to exert an influence on Osama bin Laden, who at the time was known as a wealthy and well-connected fundraiser for the jihad in Afghanistan. Egyptian filmmaker Essam Deraz, bin Laden's first biographer, met bin Laden in the "Lion's Den" training camp in Afghanistan and complained that the Egyptians formed a barrier around bin Laden and whenever an outsider tried to speak confidentially to bin Laden, the Egyptians would surround the Saudi and drag him into another room. One of those who complained of being elbowed aside was a former mentor of bin Laden Abdullah Azzam, the original exponent and organizer of global jihad on behalf of the Afghan mujahideen.
In 1991, EIJ broke with al-Zumur and al-Zawahiri took control of the leadership. At this point, the EIJ became a free-floating network without any real ties to its original society or to its surrounding society.
Al-Jihad (EIJ) had a blind-cell structure, meaning members in one group did not know the identities or activities of those in another, so that if one member were captured they would not be able to endanger the whole organization. However, Egyptian authorities captured the membership director of EIJ, the one member who had all the other members names. The database in his computer listed every member's address, aliases, and potential hideouts. Al-Jihad leader al-Zawahiri bitterly lamented the government newspapers elation over the arrest of 800 members of the al-Jihad group without a single shot being fired.
In August 1993 Al-Jihad attempted to kill the Egyptian Interior Minister, Hasan al-Alfi. who was leading a crackdown on Islamic militants and their terror campaign. A bomb-laden motorcycle exploded next to the minister's car, killing the bomber and his accomplice, but not the minister. The attack marked the first time Sunni Islamists had made use of suicide in terrorism, a technique made famous by Shia Hezbollah in Lebanon. It is likely that the notion of suicide bombing was inspired by Hezbollah as EIJ head Ayman Zawahir had been to Iran to raise money, and had sent his talented associate, Ali Mohamed, to Lebanon to train with Hezbollah.
A few months later in November Al-Jihad made another bombing attempt, this time to kill Egypt's prime minister, Atef Sidqi. The car bomb exploded close to a girls' school in Cairo as the minister was driven past. The minister, protected by his armored car, was unhurt, but the explosion injured 21 people and killed a young schoolgirl, Shayma Abdel-Halim. Unfortunately for al-Jihad this bombing was preceded by two years of terror by a larger terror group, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya that had killed 240, and the patience of the Egyptian public had run short. Shayma's death captured people's emotions as nothing else had and when her coffin was borne through the streets of Cairo, people cried, `Terrorism is the enemy of God!`" A harsh police crackdown followed and 280 EIJ members were arrested, with 6 eventually given a death sentence.
EIJ's longtime association with al-Qaeda became closer at this time when most of its members were reported to have gone on the al-Qaeda payroll. EIJ leader hoped this would be a temporary measure but later confided to one of this chief assistants that joining with bin Laden had been the only solution to keeping the Jihad organization abroad alive.
In June 1995 another failed assassination attempt caused yet a greater setback. Operating from its exile base in Sudan, EIJ joined forces with the Egyptian al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya and Sudanese intelligence in an attempt to kill Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak while he was in Ethiopia for a conference of the Organization of African Unity. The leader of the plot was Mustafa Hamza, a senior Egyptian member of Al-Qaeda and commander to the military branch of the Islamic Group. The plotters had been planning the attack for more than a year, and even married local women in Ethiopia. They received assistance from Sudanese intelligence services, which smuggled weapons into their embassy in Ethiopia.
Their hope was to decapitate the Egyptian government thereby eliminating the "iron grip" of the state security services, and creating a power vacuum which Islamists could then fill. Unfortunately for this plan, the attack was foiled by a malfunctioning grenade launcher and Mubarak’s bulletproof limousine.
Back in Egypt, Mubarak launched a ruthless campaign to crush anyone involved in Islamist terrorism, but in Sudan the EIJ had even worse troubles. In 1994, Ahmad Salama Mabruk's 17-year old son Musab, as well as the 15-year old son Ahmed of Mohammed Sharaf, were captured by the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate and sexually abused. They were blackmailed with videotape of the sodomy, until they agreed to act as informants against their fathers' group. Musab went through his father's files and photocopied them for the Egyptians, but the Sudanese intelligence service saw the covert meetings and alerted al-Jihad, recommending that they treat the boys leniently if they confessed. al-Zawahiri convened a Sharia court, where Musab confessed he had been given explosives by the Egyptians which he was told to detonate at the next Shura council meeting. They were each found guilty of sodomy, treason, and attempted murder, and sentenced to death by firing squad. The trial, and the execution, were filmed and copies of the film were distributed by al-Jihad.
When the Sudanese found out about the executions in its jurisdiction, al-Zawahiri and the rest of EIJ were ordered to leave the country. It was a devastating blow to the group.
Bin Laden was also weakened by this failed operation. The core of his al-Qaeda group was made up of members of Islamic Jihad. Because of Sudan's collaboration in the plot, the United Nations voted to impose sanctions on the country. To rehabilitate itself in the international community, the Sudanese government pressured bin Laden to leave the country. Bin Laden and many EIJ returned to war torn Afghanistan having lost many members and almost all of bin Laden's assets.
On November 19, 1995 EIJ bombed the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad killing 16 and wounding 60. The attack served as a prototype for future attacks by its sister organization al-Qaeda, such as the 1998 bombings of American embassies in Africa.
In 1998, three al-Jihad members were arrested in Albania, and the United States intervened to ensure they were extradited to Egypt to face charges. In Afghanistan Zawahiri wrote the 1998 fatwa for the International Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, calling for the killing of Americans and their allies, both civilian and military, which was signed by representatives of several jihadi organizations, including EIJ. In August 1998, Issam Abdel-Tawab was extradited to Egypt from Bulgaria.
Dissent among EIJ members to this change of direction and abandonment of the taking over Egypt as the group's primary goal, was so strong that in the end, Zawahiri pledged to resign if the members failed to endorse his actions. The organization was in such disarray because of arrests and defections, and so close to bankruptcy, that the only choice was to follow Zawahiri or abandon al-Jihad. One of those who did abandon al-Jihad was Zawahiri's own brother Muhammed, the military commander of EIJ.
In June 2001, Al Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad merged into an entity formally called jamaa'at Qa'idat al-Jihad, with leadership of EIJ comprising the majority - six of nine seats - of al Qaeda's ruling council (shura).
Consequently, EIJ is often considered synonymous with Al-Qaeda, (for example by the U.S. Treasury Department), although some refer to it as a separate organization with al-Zawahiri as its leader and global jihad's main ideologist.
The organization specializes in armed attacks against high-level Egyptian Government personnel, including cabinet ministers, and car-bombings against official United States and Egyptian facilities. The original Jihad was responsible for the attempted assassinations of Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfi in August 1993 and Prime Minister Atef Sedky in November 1993. Egyptian Jihad and rival armed groups launched a wave of violence against Egypt's secular government in 1992, a campaign they only abandoned at the end of the decade. Nearly 1300 people died in the unrest, including policemen and government officials. It is responsible for the Egyptian Embassy bombing in Islamabad, Pakistan in 1995. In 1998 a planned attack against the US Embassy in Albania was thwarted by a roundup of suspects who are now called the Returnees from Albania.
Al-Sharif passed the Jihad leadership to Ayman al-Zawahiri amid dissent within the movement in the mid 1980's. The al-Zawahiri faction subsequently formed an alliance with Al-Qaeda leading over time to the effective merger of the two groups operations inside Afghanistan.
Although al-Zawahiri was frequently referred to as a lieutenant or second in command of Al Qaeda this description is misleading as it implies a hierarchical relationship. The modern Al Qaeda organization was the combination of Bin Laden's financial resources with al-Zawahiri's ideological and operational leadership. Despite the effective merger of al-Zawahiri and Bin Laden's groups in the Afghanistan area of operations there is evidence that suggests that at least part of the Islamic Jihad group continuing to operate in Egypt remained independent of Bin Laden's organization and reports to al-Zawahiri personally.
EIJ see Egyptian Islamic Jihad
Al-Jihad see Egyptian Islamic Jihad
Jihad Group see Egyptian Islamic Jihad
Islamic Jihad see Egyptian Islamic Jihad
Liberation Army for Holy Sites see Egyptian Islamic Jihad
Jihad Organization see Egyptian Islamic Jihad
Ekrem Bey
Ekrem Bey (1847-1914). Turkish writer, poet, and critic. He was one of the leading personalities in the victory of the modern school of poetry over traditional poetry.
Bey, Ekrem see Ekrem Bey
Ekrem Bey (1847-1914). Turkish writer, poet, and critic. He was one of the leading personalities in the victory of the modern school of poetry over traditional poetry.
Bey, Ekrem see Ekrem Bey
El Guerrouj (Hicham El Guerrouj) (b. September 14, 1974, Berkane). Dominant middle distance runner of the late 1990s. Born in Morocco, El Guerrouj won two 1500 meter championships at the IAAF World Championships, one in 1997 and the other in 1999. He held three world records, in the 1500 and 2000 meters and in the mile. He became interested in racing as a child after being inspired by countryman Said Aouita’s win in the 5,000 meters during the 1984 Olympics. El Guerrouj capped his career by winning the 1500 and 5000 meters at the 2004 Olympics in Athens.
Hicham El Guerrouj's first international triumph was in 1992, when he took 3rd in the 5000 meters of the 1992 Junior World Championships in Seoul, behind Haile Gebreselassie of Ethiopia.
In 1994, he was a member of the Moroccan team in the 1994 IAAF World Road Relay
Championships, which won the race in world record time.
El Guerrouj rose to international prominence in the mid-1990s with near-record times in the 1500 meters and mile. At the age of 20 he finished second in the 1500 meters at the 1995 World Championships in Gothenburg. In 1996 after setting a new personal best over 1500 meters in 3:29.59 in Stockholm, he was considered one of the favorites for the Olympic gold.
El Guerrouj competed in his first Olympic Games in 1996 at Atlanta. Running the 1500 meters final, he fell with 400 meters to go and finished in 12th place. He had been expected to challenge the world record holder and three-time World champion, Noureddine Morceli.
One month later, at the Grand Prix final in Milan, El Guerrouj became the first runner to defeat Morceli over 1500 meters in four years. In the following years, El Guerrouj became the only middle distance runner to win four consecutive world titles in 1997, 1999, 2001, and 2003.
In 1998 in Rome, El Guerrouj broke Morceli's 1500 meter world record (3:27.37) with a time of 3:26.00.
In 1999, also in Rome, El Guerrouj broke the world record in the mile set by Noureddine Morceli in 1993, with a time of 3:43.13 Noah Ngeny of Kenya, who ran second, was also under the previous world record with a time of 3:43.40. This was the first time in over 40 years that two men had bettered the world record in the same race.
Later that season he set a new world record over 2000 meters in Berlin at 4:44.79, bettering the previous mark set by Morceli by more than three seconds. He also ran the second fastest 3000 meter ever in Brussels.
At the Sydney Olympics, El Guerrouj, finished second in the 1500 meters, behind Noah Ngeny, a Kenyan runner who ran as El Guerrouj's pacemaker when El Guerrouj ran his 1500 meter world record in Rome in 1998.
El Guerrouj defended his 1500 meter title in the 2001 and 2003 World Championships and came close to breaking his own 1500 m record in Brussels in 2001 with a time of 3:26.12. He also won 3 consecutive IAAF Golden League prizes in 2001, 2002 and 2003. He was the only middle distance athlete to have a win streak necessary to be entitled to a share of the jackpot of 50 kilograms (1,608 troy ounces) of gold (2000–2002) or USD 1 million (1998–1999, 2003–present). He won it three times in a row.
In 2003, El Guerrouj set a personal best of 12:50.24 in the 5000 meters. Later in the year, at the World Track and Field Championships, he finished a close second to Kenyan Eliud Kipchoge in the 5000 meters, adding a silver to the gold he had previously won in the 1500 meters.
After a relatively poor start to the 2004 season that included slow times and an 8th place finish in a 1500 meter race in Rome, El Guerrouj won the gold medal in both the 1500 meters and 5000 meters at the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens, Greece.
Only 20 days before the Olympic final, 2000 Olympic bronze medalist Bernard Lagat ran the fastest 1500 meters in 2004 (3:27.40), narrowly defeating El Guerrouj (3:27.64) at the Weltklasse Zürich meet on August 6. However, on August 24, El Guerrouj beat Lagat by 0.12 seconds in the Olympic 1500 meter final, winning the gold medal.
Four days later El Guerrouj won the 5,000 meter final with a time of 13:14.39 preventing Kenenisa Bekele from achieving the 5000 meter/10000 meter distance double, last achieved by Ethiopian Miruts Yifter in the 1980 Moscow Olympics.
El Guerrouj became then the first man in 80 years to win both 1500 meter and 5000 meter races in the same Olympics, last achieved by the "Flying Finn" Paavo Nurmi in 1924.
After the Olympics, El Geurrouj never again competed internationally, and announced his retirement on May 22, 2006. Nevertheless, his sporting career is marked by numerous recognitions such as the award for humanitarian effort from the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), which he received in 1996. He is also a UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador. El Guerrouj was named athlete of the year by the IAAF in 2001 and 2002 after remaining unbeaten in more than 20 races, becoming the first man to win the award in consecutive years. He was also named best athlete of the year by the athletics journal Track and Field News in 2002. In 2003, he was elected as a member of the IAAF Athletes Committee.
On September 7, 2004, El Guerrouj was decorated with the "Cordon de Commandeur" by King Mohammed VI of Morocco. In the same year, he was awarded the Prince of Asturias Awards.
El Guerrouj is also a member of the International Olympic Committee Athletes' Commission.
[edit] Personal bests
The following table includes El Guerrouj's personal best times as published by the IAAF:
Distance Mark Date Location
800 m 1:47.18 1995-02-06
1000 m 2:16.85 1999-07-12 Nice
1500 m 3:26.00 1998-07-14 Rome
Mile 3:43.13 1999-07-07 Rome
2000 m 4:44.79 1999-09-07 Berlin
3000 m 7:23.09 1999-09-03 Brussels
5000 m 12:50.24 2003-03-12 Ostrava
Titles and major results
(1500 meters unless indicated)
Year (Age) Competition Place Date Place Time Notes
1995 (21) World Championship Indoor Barcelona March 11 (1) 3:44.54
1995 World Championships Gothenburg August 13 (2) 3:35.28 Noureddine Morceli (1)
1996 (22) 1996 Atlanta Olympics Atlanta August 3 (12) 3:40.75 El Guerrouj fell down
1997 (23) Grand Prix Stuttgart February 2 (1) 3:31.18 WR 1500 meters indoor
Grand Prix Gand February 12 (1) 3:48.45 (mile) - WR mile indoor
World Championship Indoor Paris March 8 (1) 3:35.31
1997 World Championships Athens August 6 (1) 3:35.83 Fermín Cacho (2)
1998 (24) Grand Prix Rome July 14 (1) 3:26.00 WR 1500 meters
1999 (25) Grand Prix Rome July 7 (1) 3:43.13 (mile) - WR mile; Noah Ngeny (2)
1999 World Championships Seville August 24 (1) 3:27.65 Noah Ngeny (2)
Grand Prix Final Berlin September 7 (1) 4:44.79 (2000 m) - WR 2000 meters
2000 (26) 2000 Sydney Olympics Sydney September 29 (2) 3:32.32 Noah Ngeny (1)
2001 (27) World Championship Indoor Lisbon March 11 (1) 7:37.74 (3000 m)
2001 World Championships Edmonton August 5 (1) 3:30.68 Bernard Lagat (2)
2003 (29) 2003 World Championships Paris August 27 (1) 3:31.77 Mehdi Baala (2)
August 31 (2) 12:52.83 (5000 m) - Eliud Kipchoge (1)
2004 (30) 2004 Athens Olympics Athens August 24 (1) 3:34.18 Bernard Lagat (2)
August 28 (1) 13:14.39 (5000 m) - Kenenisa Bekele (2)
Hicham El Guerrouj see El Guerrouj
El Guerrouj rose to international prominence in the mid-1990s with near-record times in the 1500 meters and mile. At the age of 20 he finished second in the 1500 meters at the 1995 World Championships in Gothenburg. In 1996 after setting a new personal best over 1500 meters in 3:29.59 in Stockholm, he was considered one of the favorites for the Olympic gold.
El Guerrouj competed in his first Olympic Games in 1996 at Atlanta. Running the 1500 meters final, he fell with 400 meters to go and finished in 12th place. He had been expected to challenge the world record holder and three-time World champion, Noureddine Morceli.
One month later, at the Grand Prix final in Milan, El Guerrouj became the first runner to defeat Morceli over 1500 meters in four years. In the following years, El Guerrouj became the only middle distance runner to win four consecutive world titles in 1997, 1999, 2001, and 2003.
In 1998 in Rome, El Guerrouj broke Morceli's 1500 meter world record (3:27.37) with a time of 3:26.00.
In 1999, also in Rome, El Guerrouj broke the world record in the mile set by Noureddine Morceli in 1993, with a time of 3:43.13 Noah Ngeny of Kenya, who ran second, was also under the previous world record with a time of 3:43.40. This was the first time in over 40 years that two men had bettered the world record in the same race.
Later that season he set a new world record over 2000 meters in Berlin at 4:44.79, bettering the previous mark set by Morceli by more than three seconds. He also ran the second fastest 3000 meter ever in Brussels.
At the Sydney Olympics, El Guerrouj, finished second in the 1500 meters, behind Noah Ngeny, a Kenyan runner who ran as El Guerrouj's pacemaker when El Guerrouj ran his 1500 meter world record in Rome in 1998.
El Guerrouj defended his 1500 meter title in the 2001 and 2003 World Championships and came close to breaking his own 1500 m record in Brussels in 2001 with a time of 3:26.12. He also won 3 consecutive IAAF Golden League prizes in 2001, 2002 and 2003. He was the only middle distance athlete to have a win streak necessary to be entitled to a share of the jackpot of 50 kilograms (1,608 troy ounces) of gold (2000–2002) or USD 1 million (1998–1999, 2003–present). He won it three times in a row.
In 2003, El Guerrouj set a personal best of 12:50.24 in the 5000 meters. Later in the year, at the World Track and Field Championships, he finished a close second to Kenyan Eliud Kipchoge in the 5000 meters, adding a silver to the gold he had previously won in the 1500 meters.
After a relatively poor start to the 2004 season that included slow times and an 8th place finish in a 1500 meter race in Rome, El Guerrouj won the gold medal in both the 1500 meters and 5000 meters at the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens, Greece.
Only 20 days before the Olympic final, 2000 Olympic bronze medalist Bernard Lagat ran the fastest 1500 meters in 2004 (3:27.40), narrowly defeating El Guerrouj (3:27.64) at the Weltklasse Zürich meet on August 6. However, on August 24, El Guerrouj beat Lagat by 0.12 seconds in the Olympic 1500 meter final, winning the gold medal.
Four days later El Guerrouj won the 5,000 meter final with a time of 13:14.39 preventing Kenenisa Bekele from achieving the 5000 meter/10000 meter distance double, last achieved by Ethiopian Miruts Yifter in the 1980 Moscow Olympics.
El Guerrouj became then the first man in 80 years to win both 1500 meter and 5000 meter races in the same Olympics, last achieved by the "Flying Finn" Paavo Nurmi in 1924.
After the Olympics, El Geurrouj never again competed internationally, and announced his retirement on May 22, 2006. Nevertheless, his sporting career is marked by numerous recognitions such as the award for humanitarian effort from the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), which he received in 1996. He is also a UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador. El Guerrouj was named athlete of the year by the IAAF in 2001 and 2002 after remaining unbeaten in more than 20 races, becoming the first man to win the award in consecutive years. He was also named best athlete of the year by the athletics journal Track and Field News in 2002. In 2003, he was elected as a member of the IAAF Athletes Committee.
On September 7, 2004, El Guerrouj was decorated with the "Cordon de Commandeur" by King Mohammed VI of Morocco. In the same year, he was awarded the Prince of Asturias Awards.
El Guerrouj is also a member of the International Olympic Committee Athletes' Commission.
[edit] Personal bests
The following table includes El Guerrouj's personal best times as published by the IAAF:
Distance Mark Date Location
800 m 1:47.18 1995-02-06
1000 m 2:16.85 1999-07-12 Nice
1500 m 3:26.00 1998-07-14 Rome
Mile 3:43.13 1999-07-07 Rome
2000 m 4:44.79 1999-09-07 Berlin
3000 m 7:23.09 1999-09-03 Brussels
5000 m 12:50.24 2003-03-12 Ostrava
Titles and major results
(1500 meters unless indicated)
Year (Age) Competition Place Date Place Time Notes
1995 (21) World Championship Indoor Barcelona March 11 (1) 3:44.54
1995 World Championships Gothenburg August 13 (2) 3:35.28 Noureddine Morceli (1)
1996 (22) 1996 Atlanta Olympics Atlanta August 3 (12) 3:40.75 El Guerrouj fell down
1997 (23) Grand Prix Stuttgart February 2 (1) 3:31.18 WR 1500 meters indoor
Grand Prix Gand February 12 (1) 3:48.45 (mile) - WR mile indoor
World Championship Indoor Paris March 8 (1) 3:35.31
1997 World Championships Athens August 6 (1) 3:35.83 Fermín Cacho (2)
1998 (24) Grand Prix Rome July 14 (1) 3:26.00 WR 1500 meters
1999 (25) Grand Prix Rome July 7 (1) 3:43.13 (mile) - WR mile; Noah Ngeny (2)
1999 World Championships Seville August 24 (1) 3:27.65 Noah Ngeny (2)
Grand Prix Final Berlin September 7 (1) 4:44.79 (2000 m) - WR 2000 meters
2000 (26) 2000 Sydney Olympics Sydney September 29 (2) 3:32.32 Noah Ngeny (1)
2001 (27) World Championship Indoor Lisbon March 11 (1) 7:37.74 (3000 m)
2001 World Championships Edmonton August 5 (1) 3:30.68 Bernard Lagat (2)
2003 (29) 2003 World Championships Paris August 27 (1) 3:31.77 Mehdi Baala (2)
August 31 (2) 12:52.83 (5000 m) - Eliud Kipchoge (1)
2004 (30) 2004 Athens Olympics Athens August 24 (1) 3:34.18 Bernard Lagat (2)
August 28 (1) 13:14.39 (5000 m) - Kenenisa Bekele (2)
Hicham El Guerrouj see El Guerrouj
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