Harithi, Salih ibn ‘Ali al-
Harithi, Salih ibn ‘Ali al- (Salih ibn ‘Ali al-Harithi) (1834-1896). Ibadi leader. He was the shaykh of the confederation of tribes of eastern Oman known as the Sharqiyya Hinawis.
Salih ibn ‘Ali al-Harithi see Harithi, Salih ibn ‘Ali al-
Harithi, Salih ibn ‘Ali al- (Salih ibn ‘Ali al-Harithi) (1834-1896). Ibadi leader. He was the shaykh of the confederation of tribes of eastern Oman known as the Sharqiyya Hinawis.
Salih ibn ‘Ali al-Harithi see Harithi, Salih ibn ‘Ali al-
Harun al-Rashid
Harun al-Rashid (Harun ar-Rashid) (English: "Aaron the Upright," "Aaron the Just," or "Aaron the Rightly Guided") (March 17, 763 – March 24, 809). Fifth and most famous Abbasid Caliph (r.786-809). He was the son of the third Abbasid caliph, al-Mahdi (r. 775-785), and succeeded to the throne on the death of his brother al-Hadi (r. 785-786).
Thanks to the “Thousand and One Nights,” Harun al-Rashid is almost a legendary figure which obscures his true historic personality. In fact, his reign initiated the political disintegration of the Islamic empire.
Syria, inhabited by tribes with Umayyad sympathies, remained the bitter enemy of the ‘Abbasids and Egypt witnessed risings due to poor administration and arbitrary taxation. The Umayyads had been established in Spain in 755, the Idrisids in the Maghrib in 788 and the Aghlabids in Ifriqiya in 800. Besides, unrest flared up in Yemen, and the Kharijites rose in rebellion in Daylam, Kirman, Fars and Sistan. Revolts also broke out in Khurasan. A great part of Harun al-Rashid’s fame was due to his interest in Holy War against the Byzantines, in which he occasionally participated personally. From 791 to 809, Harun’s empire was at war with the Byzantine Empire, and in 807 his forces occupied the Byzantine province of Cyprus. He also paid attention to naval power.
The period of Harun al-Rashid’s reign marked a notable development of culture. Until 803, administrative power was entrusted to Yahya ibn-Khalid (d. about 803), the grand vizier, or councillor of state, and head of the illustrious family of the Barmakids. During this time, Baghdad, the capital of Harun’s realm, became the most flourishing city of the period. Tribute was paid to the caliph by many rulers, and splendid edifices were erected in his honor at enormous cost. He is said to have exchanged gifts with Charlemagne. However, Arabic sources do not substantiate that such an exchange ever occurred.
Harun was a generous patron of learning, poetry, and music, and his court was visited by the most eminent Muslims of the age. He was celebrated in countless songs and stories, and is perhaps best known to the Western world as the caliph whose court is described in the Arabian Nights. Toward the end of his reign, Harun was influenced to depose the Barmakids, and in 803 he imprisoned the grand vizier.
Harun ruled from 786 to 809, and his time was marked by scientific, cultural and religious prosperity. Art and music also flourished significantly during his reign. He established the legendary library Bayt al-Hikma ("House of Wisdom").
Since Harun was intellectually, politically and militarily resourceful, his life and the court over which he held sway have been the subject of many tales: some are claimed to be factual but most are believed to be fictitious. Among what is known to be fictional is The Book of One Thousand and One Nights, which contains many stories that are fantasized about Harun's magnificent court and even Harun al-Rashid himself.
Harun virtually dismembered the empire by apportioning it between his two sons al-Amin and al-Ma’mun. The caliph died while on his way to put down an insurrection in the eastern part of his empire.
Harun ar-Rashid see Harun al-Rashid
“Aaron the Upright” see Harun al-Rashid
"Aaron the Just" see Harun al-Rashid
"Aaron the Rightly Guided" see Harun al-Rashid
Harun al-Rashid (Harun ar-Rashid) (English: "Aaron the Upright," "Aaron the Just," or "Aaron the Rightly Guided") (March 17, 763 – March 24, 809). Fifth and most famous Abbasid Caliph (r.786-809). He was the son of the third Abbasid caliph, al-Mahdi (r. 775-785), and succeeded to the throne on the death of his brother al-Hadi (r. 785-786).
Thanks to the “Thousand and One Nights,” Harun al-Rashid is almost a legendary figure which obscures his true historic personality. In fact, his reign initiated the political disintegration of the Islamic empire.
Syria, inhabited by tribes with Umayyad sympathies, remained the bitter enemy of the ‘Abbasids and Egypt witnessed risings due to poor administration and arbitrary taxation. The Umayyads had been established in Spain in 755, the Idrisids in the Maghrib in 788 and the Aghlabids in Ifriqiya in 800. Besides, unrest flared up in Yemen, and the Kharijites rose in rebellion in Daylam, Kirman, Fars and Sistan. Revolts also broke out in Khurasan. A great part of Harun al-Rashid’s fame was due to his interest in Holy War against the Byzantines, in which he occasionally participated personally. From 791 to 809, Harun’s empire was at war with the Byzantine Empire, and in 807 his forces occupied the Byzantine province of Cyprus. He also paid attention to naval power.
The period of Harun al-Rashid’s reign marked a notable development of culture. Until 803, administrative power was entrusted to Yahya ibn-Khalid (d. about 803), the grand vizier, or councillor of state, and head of the illustrious family of the Barmakids. During this time, Baghdad, the capital of Harun’s realm, became the most flourishing city of the period. Tribute was paid to the caliph by many rulers, and splendid edifices were erected in his honor at enormous cost. He is said to have exchanged gifts with Charlemagne. However, Arabic sources do not substantiate that such an exchange ever occurred.
Harun was a generous patron of learning, poetry, and music, and his court was visited by the most eminent Muslims of the age. He was celebrated in countless songs and stories, and is perhaps best known to the Western world as the caliph whose court is described in the Arabian Nights. Toward the end of his reign, Harun was influenced to depose the Barmakids, and in 803 he imprisoned the grand vizier.
Harun ruled from 786 to 809, and his time was marked by scientific, cultural and religious prosperity. Art and music also flourished significantly during his reign. He established the legendary library Bayt al-Hikma ("House of Wisdom").
Since Harun was intellectually, politically and militarily resourceful, his life and the court over which he held sway have been the subject of many tales: some are claimed to be factual but most are believed to be fictitious. Among what is known to be fictional is The Book of One Thousand and One Nights, which contains many stories that are fantasized about Harun's magnificent court and even Harun al-Rashid himself.
Harun virtually dismembered the empire by apportioning it between his two sons al-Amin and al-Ma’mun. The caliph died while on his way to put down an insurrection in the eastern part of his empire.
Harun ar-Rashid see Harun al-Rashid
“Aaron the Upright” see Harun al-Rashid
"Aaron the Just" see Harun al-Rashid
"Aaron the Rightly Guided" see Harun al-Rashid
Harut and Marut
Harut and Marut. Names of two angels, mentioned in the Qur’an, who are a reminiscent of the “fallen angels” of Genesis 6:1-4.
Harut and Marut are two angels mentioned in the second Surah of the Qur'an, who were sent down to test the people at Babel or Babylon by performing deeds of magic. (Sura Al-Baqara, verse 102). The Qur'an indicates that although they warned the Babylonians not to imitate them or do as they were doing, some members of their audience failed to obey and became sorcerers, thus damning their own souls.
Harut and Marut. Names of two angels, mentioned in the Qur’an, who are a reminiscent of the “fallen angels” of Genesis 6:1-4.
Harut and Marut are two angels mentioned in the second Surah of the Qur'an, who were sent down to test the people at Babel or Babylon by performing deeds of magic. (Sura Al-Baqara, verse 102). The Qur'an indicates that although they warned the Babylonians not to imitate them or do as they were doing, some members of their audience failed to obey and became sorcerers, thus damning their own souls.
Hasan I
Hasan I (Hasan I ibn Muhammad, al-) (b.1836). Filali Sharif of Morocco (r.1873-1894). On his initiative and that of Britain, the first international conference concerned with Morocco was held at Madrid in 1880. It initiated the process which was to lead to the French Protectorate of 1912.
Hasan I ibn Muhammad, al- see Hasan I
Hasan I (Hasan I ibn Muhammad, al-) (b.1836). Filali Sharif of Morocco (r.1873-1894). On his initiative and that of Britain, the first international conference concerned with Morocco was held at Madrid in 1880. It initiated the process which was to lead to the French Protectorate of 1912.
Hasan I ibn Muhammad, al- see Hasan I
Hasan al-A‘sam, al-
Hasan al-A‘sam, al- (891-977). Carmathian leader of Bahrain. He took Damascus and fought the Fatimids.
Hasan al-A‘sam, al- (891-977). Carmathian leader of Bahrain. He took Damascus and fought the Fatimids.
Hasan al-Basri
Hasan al-Basri (Abu Sa'id al-Hasan ibn Abi-l-Hasan Yasar al-Basri) (642-728). Preacher of Basra. The fragments of his sermons which have been preserved are among the best surviving specimens of early Arabic prose.
Hasan al-Basri, also known as Imam Hasan al Basri, was a well-known Muslim theologian and scholar of Islam who was born at Medina of Persian parents. His father, Pirouz (later called Abul Hasan, or Hasan's Father, in Arabic), was a Persian landowner in a village of Khuzestan who was enslaved during a military campaign of Umar, the Second Caliph, and taken back to Medina. In the course of dividing spoils of war, Pirouz, along with a woman from his own village, was given to Umm Salama, a wife of Muhammad. Umm Salama gifted both to one of her close relatives where they were ultimately wed and freed by the couple who received them.
Tradition says that Umm Salama often nursed Hasan in his infancy. He was thus one of the Tabi'een (i.e. of the generation that succeeded the Sahabah). According to Abu Zur'a, at the age of 14 years, Hasan became the murid of 'Ali. Thereafter, Hasan migrated to Iraq.
Hasan did not take sides in the fitna of Ibn al-Zubayr. In 700 C. C., he joined the camp of Ibn al-Ash'ath during his revolt, as an amir. Hasan is not known to have supported any Caliph after Abu Bakr, but he was on decent terms with Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz.
After the revolt Hasan became a teacher in Basra (Iraq) and founded a madrasa (school) there. Among his many followers were Amr Ibn Ubayd (d.761) and Wasil ibn Ata (d.749), the founder of the Mu'tazilites - which name derives from the Arabic verb i'tizàl ("to part from", "to separate from"). Wasil ibn Ata broke all relations with his ancient Master. Among Hasan's juristic students were the Imam Ayyub al-Sakhtiyani and also Humayd.
Hasan married a woman of the Ahl al-Kitab (that is, he married a Jew or a Christian). They had three sons: 'Ali, Muhammad, and Sa'id. Hasan was buried in Basra.
Under the reign of Caliph 'Abd al-Malik and his governor in Iraq al-Hajjaj, Hasan came to oppose the inherited caliphate of the Umayyads (r.660-750).
Hasan held to a doctrine of human free will, called "Qadarism" by its enemies, as opposed to predestination. In particular, he refused to believe that a just God would predetermine a man to sin. His stance on this upset his non-Mutazil pupils Ayyub and Humayd, and embarrassed later Sunnis. Some, like Dawud bin Abi Hind, went so far as to forge anti-"Qadarite" opinions in Hasan's name.
Hasan was a great supporter of asceticism in the time of its first development. According to him, fear is the basis of morality, and sadness the characteristic of his religion. Life is only a pilgrimage, and comfort must be denied to subdue the passions. Al-Basri is also held in high regard by the Sufis for his asceticism, though he predated Sufism as a self-aware movement. Many writers testify to the purity of his life and to his excelling in the virtues of Muhammad's own companions.
Hasan is associated with the authorship of several epistles, many of which are known to be forged. Among the forgeries is an epistle to Abd al-Malik espousing human free will, first attested to by Abd al-Jabbar (d. 1024). This epistle, despite claiming "some of the ... best examples of Arabic linguistic prose style", is based on the theology of al-Rassi's Kitab al-Radd and on the politics of the Zaydi Shi'a. That is, it comes from Abd al-Jabbar's circle if not from Abd al-Jabbar himself.
Abu Sa'id al-Hasan ibn Abi-l-Hasan Yasar al-Basri see Hasan al-Basri
Hasan al-Basri (Abu Sa'id al-Hasan ibn Abi-l-Hasan Yasar al-Basri) (642-728). Preacher of Basra. The fragments of his sermons which have been preserved are among the best surviving specimens of early Arabic prose.
Hasan al-Basri, also known as Imam Hasan al Basri, was a well-known Muslim theologian and scholar of Islam who was born at Medina of Persian parents. His father, Pirouz (later called Abul Hasan, or Hasan's Father, in Arabic), was a Persian landowner in a village of Khuzestan who was enslaved during a military campaign of Umar, the Second Caliph, and taken back to Medina. In the course of dividing spoils of war, Pirouz, along with a woman from his own village, was given to Umm Salama, a wife of Muhammad. Umm Salama gifted both to one of her close relatives where they were ultimately wed and freed by the couple who received them.
Tradition says that Umm Salama often nursed Hasan in his infancy. He was thus one of the Tabi'een (i.e. of the generation that succeeded the Sahabah). According to Abu Zur'a, at the age of 14 years, Hasan became the murid of 'Ali. Thereafter, Hasan migrated to Iraq.
Hasan did not take sides in the fitna of Ibn al-Zubayr. In 700 C. C., he joined the camp of Ibn al-Ash'ath during his revolt, as an amir. Hasan is not known to have supported any Caliph after Abu Bakr, but he was on decent terms with Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz.
After the revolt Hasan became a teacher in Basra (Iraq) and founded a madrasa (school) there. Among his many followers were Amr Ibn Ubayd (d.761) and Wasil ibn Ata (d.749), the founder of the Mu'tazilites - which name derives from the Arabic verb i'tizàl ("to part from", "to separate from"). Wasil ibn Ata broke all relations with his ancient Master. Among Hasan's juristic students were the Imam Ayyub al-Sakhtiyani and also Humayd.
Hasan married a woman of the Ahl al-Kitab (that is, he married a Jew or a Christian). They had three sons: 'Ali, Muhammad, and Sa'id. Hasan was buried in Basra.
Under the reign of Caliph 'Abd al-Malik and his governor in Iraq al-Hajjaj, Hasan came to oppose the inherited caliphate of the Umayyads (r.660-750).
Hasan held to a doctrine of human free will, called "Qadarism" by its enemies, as opposed to predestination. In particular, he refused to believe that a just God would predetermine a man to sin. His stance on this upset his non-Mutazil pupils Ayyub and Humayd, and embarrassed later Sunnis. Some, like Dawud bin Abi Hind, went so far as to forge anti-"Qadarite" opinions in Hasan's name.
Hasan was a great supporter of asceticism in the time of its first development. According to him, fear is the basis of morality, and sadness the characteristic of his religion. Life is only a pilgrimage, and comfort must be denied to subdue the passions. Al-Basri is also held in high regard by the Sufis for his asceticism, though he predated Sufism as a self-aware movement. Many writers testify to the purity of his life and to his excelling in the virtues of Muhammad's own companions.
Hasan is associated with the authorship of several epistles, many of which are known to be forged. Among the forgeries is an epistle to Abd al-Malik espousing human free will, first attested to by Abd al-Jabbar (d. 1024). This epistle, despite claiming "some of the ... best examples of Arabic linguistic prose style", is based on the theology of al-Rassi's Kitab al-Radd and on the politics of the Zaydi Shi'a. That is, it comes from Abd al-Jabbar's circle if not from Abd al-Jabbar himself.
Abu Sa'id al-Hasan ibn Abi-l-Hasan Yasar al-Basri see Hasan al-Basri
Hasan al-Utrush
Hasan al-Utrush (844-917). Ruler in Tabaristan. The Zaydis in Yemen recognize him as Imam under the official name al-Nasir al-Kabir.
Hasan al-Utrush (844-917). Ruler in Tabaristan. The Zaydis in Yemen recognize him as Imam under the official name al-Nasir al-Kabir.
Hasan Bey-zade
Hasan Bey-zade (d. 1636). Ottoman historian. His History of the Ottomans is of great importance since it depends on his own experiences. He also left a collection of maxims of government.
Hasan Bey-zade (d. 1636). Ottoman historian. His History of the Ottomans is of great importance since it depends on his own experiences. He also left a collection of maxims of government.
Hasani
Hasani (in plural form, Hasaniyyun). Name of the ‘Alid Sharifs descended from ‘Ali’s son al-Hasan. In Morocco, the Hasani family have given birth to the Sharifian dynasties of the Sa‘dids and of the Filalis.
Hasaniyyun see Hasani
Hasani (in plural form, Hasaniyyun). Name of the ‘Alid Sharifs descended from ‘Ali’s son al-Hasan. In Morocco, the Hasani family have given birth to the Sharifian dynasties of the Sa‘dids and of the Filalis.
Hasaniyyun see Hasani
Hasan ibn Ali ibn Abi Talib, al-
Hasan ibn Ali ibn Abi Talib, al- (Al-Hassan ibn Ali ibn Talib) (c.624-669). Grandson of Muhammad, son of ‘Alī ibn Abī Tālib (final Rashidun Caliph and first Shī‘a Imām) and Fātimah al-Zahraā (daughter of Muhammad). Hasan is an important figure in Islām as he is a member of the Ahl ul Bayt (the household of Muhammad) and Ahl ul Kisā, as well as being a Shī‘ah Imām, and one of The Fourteen Infallibles of the Twelver Shī‘a.
Hasan is portrayed as the favorite of the prophet Muhammad, his grandfather. However, he did not get along well with his father and brother, Husayn, after the death of his mother, Fatima, in 633.
After Ali’s assassination in 661, Hasan was proclaimed caliph by his followers in Persia. These followers were principally interested in ousting Syria from its position of power. These followers wanted Hasan to start a war between Arabia and Syria. However, after about six months, Hasan reached an agreement with the first Umayyad caliph Mu’awiya.
This was done in the mosque of Kufa in 661 and Hasan subsequently retired with wealth to Medina.
While Shi’i texts try to blame Mu’awiya for the death of Hasan, these texts are probably erroneous. After all, at the time of his death, Hasan posed no threat to Mu’awiya. The most likely conclusion is that Hassan died of consumption. After his death his brother Husayn became the head of the 'Alids.
According to most Shi‘ites, Hasan was the rightful successor to 'Ali, and thus was the second imam. However, there seems to have been, at least until his death, a faction of Shi‘ites who refused to recognize Hasan as imam because he renounced the caliphate. Nevertheless, in the eyes of the Shi‘is, Hasan is the second Imam and in the Persian religious dramas he is one of the principal characters.
Hasan ibn Ali ibn Abi Talib, al- (Al-Hassan ibn Ali ibn Talib) (c.624-669). Grandson of Muhammad, son of ‘Alī ibn Abī Tālib (final Rashidun Caliph and first Shī‘a Imām) and Fātimah al-Zahraā (daughter of Muhammad). Hasan is an important figure in Islām as he is a member of the Ahl ul Bayt (the household of Muhammad) and Ahl ul Kisā, as well as being a Shī‘ah Imām, and one of The Fourteen Infallibles of the Twelver Shī‘a.
Hasan is portrayed as the favorite of the prophet Muhammad, his grandfather. However, he did not get along well with his father and brother, Husayn, after the death of his mother, Fatima, in 633.
After Ali’s assassination in 661, Hasan was proclaimed caliph by his followers in Persia. These followers were principally interested in ousting Syria from its position of power. These followers wanted Hasan to start a war between Arabia and Syria. However, after about six months, Hasan reached an agreement with the first Umayyad caliph Mu’awiya.
This was done in the mosque of Kufa in 661 and Hasan subsequently retired with wealth to Medina.
While Shi’i texts try to blame Mu’awiya for the death of Hasan, these texts are probably erroneous. After all, at the time of his death, Hasan posed no threat to Mu’awiya. The most likely conclusion is that Hassan died of consumption. After his death his brother Husayn became the head of the 'Alids.
According to most Shi‘ites, Hasan was the rightful successor to 'Ali, and thus was the second imam. However, there seems to have been, at least until his death, a faction of Shi‘ites who refused to recognize Hasan as imam because he renounced the caliphate. Nevertheless, in the eyes of the Shi‘is, Hasan is the second Imam and in the Persian religious dramas he is one of the principal characters.
Hasan ibn Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya, al-
Hasan ibn Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya, al- (d. c. 710). Grandson of the Prophet’s son-in-law ‘Ali. He is the author of the two earliest texts on Islamic theology.
Hasan ibn Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya, al- (d. c. 710). Grandson of the Prophet’s son-in-law ‘Ali. He is the author of the two earliest texts on Islamic theology.
Hasan ibn Ustadh-Hurmuz
Hasan ibn Ustadh-Hurmuz (c. 960-1011). Leading figure of the Buyid regime. He is praised for the impartial energy of his administration, which restored order and established a sound financial system. {See also Buyids.}
Abu Ali Hasan Ibn Ustadh-Hurmuz was a governor and military buwàyhida.
El seu pare Ustadh-Hurmuz fou hudjdjab d' Adud al-Dawla i després (983) del seu fill i successor al Fars Sharaf al-Dawla , que el va nomenar governador d' Oman . His father Ustadh-Hurmuz was hudjdjab of Adud al-Dawla and after (983) of his son and successor to the lighthouses Sharaf al-Dawla, who appointed him governor of Oman. Quan va tranferir la seva lleialtat a Samsan al-Dawla , germà de Sharaf, fou obligat a retirar-se ( 984 ). When tranferir his loyalty to al-Dawla Samsan brother Sharaf, was forced to retire (984).
Llavors Hasan tenia uns 23 anys i ja estava al servei de Samsan al-Dawla que governava a Bagdad ; però al cap de pocs anys Samsan fou expulsat de l'Iraq per Sharaf al-Dawla ( 987 ); a aquest el va succeir el seu germà Baha al-Dawla ( 989 ). Then Hasan was about 23 years and was already serving Samsan al-Dawla who ruled Baghdad, but after a few years Samsan was expelled from Iraq by Sharaf al-Dawla (987), this was succeeded by his brother Baha al-Dawla (989). Samsan es va trobar amb el poder a Fars ( 990 ) a més de Kirman (que ja dominava des de el 983 ). Samsan found power in Fars (990) in addition to Kirman (already dominated from the 983). Hasan va anar a Fars i es va entrevistar amb Samsan al que va cònvencer de donar el govern de Kirman al seu pare Ustadh-Hurmuz. Hasan went Lighthouses and met Samsan that convinced the government to give his father Ustadh Kirman-Hurmuz. Hasan va romandre aquestos anys al Fars i va derrotar la revolta dels fills d' Izz al-Dawla Bakhtiar (cosins de Samsan al-Dawla). Hasan remained in these years and lighthouses defeated the revolt of the sons of Izz al-Dawla Bakhtiar (cousins Samsan al-Dawla). Fou també Hasan el que va sostenir la lluita a Ahwaz contra Baha al-Dawla. Hasan was also argued that the struggle in Ahwaz against Baha al-Dawla.
Mort Samsan el 998 en una segona revolta dels fills d'Izz al-Dawla Bakhtiar, Hasan va trespassar la seva lleialtat (i les seves tropes daylamites) a Baha. Death Samsan the 998 in a second rebellion of the sons of Izz al-Dawla Bakhtiar, Hassan was Trespasser their loyalty (and his troops daylamites) in Baha. Fars i Kirman van passar a Baha al-Dawla. Fars and Kirman went to Baha al-Dawla. El 1001 va nomenar a Hasan governador d' Ahwaz i el 1002 li va donar l'administració de l' Iraq , mentre el seu pare Ustadh-Hurmuz era nomenat al seu lloc a Ahwaz. In 1001 Hasan was appointed governor of Ahvaz and in 1002 gave the government rating of Iraq, while his father was appointed Ustadh-Hurmuz place in Ahvaz. En general es considera que va governar encertadament; al Iraq no va poder derrotar al rebel senyor de la Batiha Ibn Wasil ia les muntanyes no va poder amb al kurd Badr ibn Hasanawayh amb el que va acabar pactant. Generally considered to be rightly ruled, in Iraq could not defeat the rebel Lord Batiha Ibn Wasil and the mountains could not with the Kurdish Badr ibn Hasanawayh which ended with agreement being reached.
Va administrar Iraq fins a la seva sobtada mort el 1011 quan tenia uns 50 anys. Was administered Iraq until his sudden death in 1011 when he was about 50 years. El seu pare el va sobreviure quatre anys en els que va restar al govern d'Ahwaz. His father survived four years in which the government remained Ahvaz.
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Hasan ibn Ustadh-Hurmuz (c. 960-1011). Leading figure of the Buyid regime. He is praised for the impartial energy of his administration, which restored order and established a sound financial system. {See also Buyids.}
Abu Ali Hasan Ibn Ustadh-Hurmuz was a governor and military buwàyhida.
El seu pare Ustadh-Hurmuz fou hudjdjab d' Adud al-Dawla i després (983) del seu fill i successor al Fars Sharaf al-Dawla , que el va nomenar governador d' Oman . His father Ustadh-Hurmuz was hudjdjab of Adud al-Dawla and after (983) of his son and successor to the lighthouses Sharaf al-Dawla, who appointed him governor of Oman. Quan va tranferir la seva lleialtat a Samsan al-Dawla , germà de Sharaf, fou obligat a retirar-se ( 984 ). When tranferir his loyalty to al-Dawla Samsan brother Sharaf, was forced to retire (984).
Llavors Hasan tenia uns 23 anys i ja estava al servei de Samsan al-Dawla que governava a Bagdad ; però al cap de pocs anys Samsan fou expulsat de l'Iraq per Sharaf al-Dawla ( 987 ); a aquest el va succeir el seu germà Baha al-Dawla ( 989 ). Then Hasan was about 23 years and was already serving Samsan al-Dawla who ruled Baghdad, but after a few years Samsan was expelled from Iraq by Sharaf al-Dawla (987), this was succeeded by his brother Baha al-Dawla (989). Samsan es va trobar amb el poder a Fars ( 990 ) a més de Kirman (que ja dominava des de el 983 ). Samsan found power in Fars (990) in addition to Kirman (already dominated from the 983). Hasan va anar a Fars i es va entrevistar amb Samsan al que va cònvencer de donar el govern de Kirman al seu pare Ustadh-Hurmuz. Hasan went Lighthouses and met Samsan that convinced the government to give his father Ustadh Kirman-Hurmuz. Hasan va romandre aquestos anys al Fars i va derrotar la revolta dels fills d' Izz al-Dawla Bakhtiar (cosins de Samsan al-Dawla). Hasan remained in these years and lighthouses defeated the revolt of the sons of Izz al-Dawla Bakhtiar (cousins Samsan al-Dawla). Fou també Hasan el que va sostenir la lluita a Ahwaz contra Baha al-Dawla. Hasan was also argued that the struggle in Ahwaz against Baha al-Dawla.
Mort Samsan el 998 en una segona revolta dels fills d'Izz al-Dawla Bakhtiar, Hasan va trespassar la seva lleialtat (i les seves tropes daylamites) a Baha. Death Samsan the 998 in a second rebellion of the sons of Izz al-Dawla Bakhtiar, Hassan was Trespasser their loyalty (and his troops daylamites) in Baha. Fars i Kirman van passar a Baha al-Dawla. Fars and Kirman went to Baha al-Dawla. El 1001 va nomenar a Hasan governador d' Ahwaz i el 1002 li va donar l'administració de l' Iraq , mentre el seu pare Ustadh-Hurmuz era nomenat al seu lloc a Ahwaz. In 1001 Hasan was appointed governor of Ahvaz and in 1002 gave the government rating of Iraq, while his father was appointed Ustadh-Hurmuz place in Ahvaz. En general es considera que va governar encertadament; al Iraq no va poder derrotar al rebel senyor de la Batiha Ibn Wasil ia les muntanyes no va poder amb al kurd Badr ibn Hasanawayh amb el que va acabar pactant. Generally considered to be rightly ruled, in Iraq could not defeat the rebel Lord Batiha Ibn Wasil and the mountains could not with the Kurdish Badr ibn Hasanawayh which ended with agreement being reached.
Va administrar Iraq fins a la seva sobtada mort el 1011 quan tenia uns 50 anys. Was administered Iraq until his sudden death in 1011 when he was about 50 years. El seu pare el va sobreviure quatre anys en els que va restar al govern d'Ahwaz. His father survived four years in which the government remained Ahvaz.
[ edita ] Bibliografia [Edit] References
Hasan ibn Zayd ibn Muhammad, al-
Hasan ibn Zayd ibn Muhammad, al- (d. 884). Descendant of the Prophet’s son-in-law ‘Ali. He founded the Zaydiyya in Tabaristan, which ruled there from 864 to 928.
Hasan ibn Zayd ibn Muhammad, al- (d. 884). Descendant of the Prophet’s son-in-law ‘Ali. He founded the Zaydiyya in Tabaristan, which ruled there from 864 to 928.
Hasan-i Sabbah
Hasan-i Sabbah (Hasan al-Sabbah) (Hassan-i Sabbāh) (Hassan aṣ-Ṣabbāḥ) (Hasan ibn Sabbah) (Hassan Ben Sabbah) (1050s-1124) . First chief propagandist (in Arabic, da‘i) of the Nizari Isma‘ilis at Alamut. He seized the fortress in 1090 and held it against many Saljuq attacks. His exposition of the Shi‘a doctrine that absolute authority in religious faith must be accepted greatly affected Abu Hamid al-Ghazali. {See also Ghazali, Abu Hamid al-; Nizari Isma'ilis; Saljuq; and Shi'a.}
Hasan-i Sabbāh was a Persian Nizārī Ismā'īlī missionary who converted a community in the late 11th century in the heart of the Alborz Mountains of northern Iran. The place was called Alamut and was attributed to an ancient king of Daylam. He founded a group whose members are sometimes referred to as the Hashshashin.
Hassan is thought to have written an autobiography, which does not survive but seems to underlie the first part of an anonymous Isma'ili biography entitled Sargudhasht-i Sayyidnā. The latter is known only from quotations made by later Persian authors. Hassan also wrote a Persian treatise on the doctrine of ta'līm, i.e. the teachings of the imam. The text is no longer extant, but fragments are cited or paraphrased by al-Shahrastānī and several Persian historians.
The possibly autobiographical information found in Sargudhasht-i Sayyidnā is the main source for Hassan's background and early life. According to this, Hassan-i Sabbāh was born in the city of Qom (modern Iran) in Persia in the 1050s to a family of Twelver Shī‘a. His father was an Arab claiming Yemeni descent, who left the Sawād of Kufa (modern Iraq) to settle in the (predominantly Shi'a) town of Qom.
Early in his life, his family moved to Rayy (Rey, modern Iran). Rayy was a city that had seen a lot of radical thought since the 9th century and it had seen Hamdan Qarmaṭ as one of its voices. It had also seen a lot of missionary work by various sects.
It was in this center of religious matrices that Hassan developed a keen interest in metaphysical matters and adhered to the Twelver code of instruction. From 7 to 17, he studied at home, and mastered palmistry, languages, philosophy, astronomy and mathematics (especially geometry).
Rayy was also home to the activities of Ismā‘īlī missionaries in the Jibal. At the time, Isma'ilism was a growing movement in Persia and other lands east of Egypt. The Persian Isma'ilis supported the da'wa ("mission") directed by the Fatimid caliphate of Cairo and recognized the authority of the Imam-Caliph al-Mustanṣir (d. 1094). However, after some time, Isfahan rather than Cairo came to function as their principal headquarters. The Ismā'īlī mission worked on three layers: the lowest was the foot soldier or fidā'ī, followed by the rafīk or "comrade", and finally the dā‘ī or "missionary". It has been suggested that its popularity in Persia owed something to dissatisfaction with their Seljuk rulers, who had recently removed local rulers.
In Rayy, young Hassan came in touch with Amira Darrab, a comrade, who introduced him to Ismā'īlī doctrine. Hassan was initially unimpressed. As he met Darrab, participating in many passionate debates that discussed the merits of Ismā‘īl over Mūsā, Hassan's respect grew. Impressed with the conviction of Darrab, Hassan decided to delve deeper into Ismā'īlī doctrines and beliefs. Hassan began to see merit in switching to Ismā‘īlī.
At the age of 17, Hassan converted and swore allegiance to the Fatimid Caliph in Cairo. Hassan's studies did not end with his crossing over. He further studied under two other dā‘iyyayn, and as he proceeded on his path, he was looked upon with eyes of respect.
Hassan's austere and devoted commitment to the da'wa brought him an audience with the chief missionary of the region: ‘Abdul-Malik ibn Attash. Ibn Attash, suitably impressed with the young seventeen year old Hassan, made him Deputy Missionary and advised him to go to Cairo to further his studies.
However, Hassan did not go to Cairo. Some historians have postulated that Hassan, following his conversion, was playing host to some members of the Fatimid caliphate, and this was leaked to the anti-Fatimid and anti-Shī‘a Nizam al-Mulk. This prompted his abandoning Rayy and heading to Cairo in 1076.
Hassan took about 2 years to reach Cairo. Along the way he toured many other regions that did not fall in the general direction of Egypt. Isfahan was the first city that he visited. He was hosted by one of the Missionaries of his youth, a man who had taught the youthful Hassan in Rayy. His name was Resi Abufasl and he further instructed Hassan.
From here he went to Azerbaijan, hundreds of miles to the north, and from there to Turkey. There he attracted the ire of priests following a heated discussion, and Hassan was thrown out of the town he was in.
He then turned south and traveled through Iraq, reaching Damascus in Syria. He left for Egypt from Palestine. Records exist, some in the fragmentary remains of his autobiography, and from another biography written by Rashid ad-Din Tabib in 1310, to date his arrival in Egypt at August 30, 1078.
It is unclear how long Hassan stayed in Egypt - about 3 years is the usually accepted amount of time. He continued his studies there, and became a full missionary.
While he was in Cairo, studying and preaching, he upset the highly excitable Chief of the Army, Badr al-Jamalī. It is also said by later sources that the Ismaili Imam-Caliph al-Mustanṣir informed Hassan that his elder son Nizar would be the next Imam. Hassan was briefly imprisoned by Badr al-Jamali. The collapse of a minaret of the jail was taken to be an omen in the favor of Hassan and he was promptly released and deported. The ship that he was traveling on was wrecked. He was rescued and taken to Syria. Traveling via Aleppo and Baghdad, he terminated his journey at Isfahan in 1081.
Hassan’s life now was totally devoted to the mission. Hassan toured extensively throughout Iran. To the north of Iran, and touching the south shore of the Caspian Sea, are the mountains of Alborz. These mountains were home to a people who had traditionally resisted all attempts at subjugation. This place was also of Shī‘a leaning. Within these mountains, in the region of Daylam, Hassan chose to pursue his missionary activities. Hassan became the Chief Missionary of that area and sent his personally trained missionaries into the rest of the region.
The news of this Ismā'īlī's activities reached Nizam al-Mulk, who dispatched his soldiers with the orders for Hassan's capture. Hassan evaded them, and went deeper into the mountains.
Hassan's search for a base from where to guide his mission ended when he found the castle of Alamut in the Rudbar area in 1088. It was a fort that stood guard to a valley that was about fifty kilometers long and five kilometers wide. The fort had been built about the year 865. Legend has it that it was built by a king who saw his eagle fly up to and perch upon a rock, of which the king, Wah Sudan ibn Marzuban, understood the importance. Likening the perching of the eagle to a lesson given by it, he called the fort Aluh Amut - the "Eagles Teaching".
Hassan’s takeover of the fort was one of silent surrender in the face of defeated odds. To effect this takeover Hassan employed an ingenious strategy. It took the better part of two years to accomplish. First Hassan sent his Daˤiyyīn and Rafīks to win the villages in the valley over. Next, key people were converted and in 1090 Hassan took over the fort. It is said that Hassan offered 3000 gold dinars to the fort owner for the amount of land that would fit a buffalo’s hide. The term having been agreed upon, Hassan cut the hide in to strips and joined them all over along the perimeter of the fort. The owner was defeated. (This story bears striking resemblance to Virgil's account of Dido's founding of Carthage.) Hassan gave him a draft on the name of a wealthy landlord and told him to take the money from him. Legend further has it that when the landlord saw the draft with Hassan’s signature, he immediately paid the amount to the fort owner, astonishing him.
With Alamut as his, Hassan devoted himself so faithfully to study, that it is said that in all the years that he was there – almost 35, he never left his quarters, except the two times when he went up to the roof. He was studying, translating, praying, fasting, and directing the activities of the Daˤwa. The propagation of the Nizarī doctrine was headquartered at Alamut. He knew the Qur'ān by heart, could quote extensively from the texts of most Muslim sects, and, apart from philosophy, he was well versed in mathematics, astronomy, alchemy, medicine, architecture, and the major science fields of his time. Hassan was one who found solace in austerity and frugality. A pious life was one of prayer and devotion. Hassan was a charismatic revolutionary. It was said that by the sheer gravity of his conviction he could pierce the hardest and most orthodox of hearts and win them over to his side.
Hassan's community and its branches spread throughout Iran and Syria and came to be called Hashshashin or Assassins, an Islamic mystery cult.
Hassan was extremely strict and disciplined. The event of the Great Resurrection (al-qiyāmat al-kubrā) occurred under the later Ismaili Imam Hasan ala-dhikrihi as-salaam in 1164.
Not much is known about Hassan from first hand sources, but legends abound as to the tactics used to induct members. They either stem from Sunni polemicists who were motivated to discredit the Nizari Isma'ili on political and religious grounds, and Crusaders returning to Europe. Marco Polo also claimed to have visited Alamut, although the timeframe he gives makes his assertion dubious.
According to polemical accounts which would evolve into legend, a future assassin was subjected to rites very similar to those of other mystery cults in which the subject was made to believe that he was in imminent danger of death. But the twist of the assassins was that they drugged the person to simulate a "dying" to later have them awaken in a garden flowing with wine and served a sumptuous feast by virgins. The supplicant was then convinced he was in Heaven and that Sabbah was a representative of the divinity and that all of his orders should be followed, even to death. This legend derives from Marco Polo, who visited Alamut just after it fell to the Mongols in the thirteenth century.
Other accounts of the indoctrination attest that the future assassins were brought to Alamut at a young age and, while they matured, inhabited the aforementioned paradisaical gardens and were kept drugged with hashish. As in the previous version, Hassan occupied this garden as a divine emissary. At a certain point (when their initiation could be said to have begun) the drug was withdrawn from them, and they were removed from the gardens and flung into a dungeon. There they were informed that, if they wished to return to the paradise they had so recently enjoyed it would be at Sabbah's discretion, and that they must, therefore, follow his directions exactly, up to and including murder and self-sacrifice.
Given the pillars of devoted adherence to the path of the faith, it is unlikely that the usually accepted "Assassin" postulate is accurate. Hassan had his son executed for drinking wine and another person was banished from Alamut for playing the flute. Furthermore there have emerged traces that there was a name given to Alamut by the people with Nizarī leanings: al-Assas "the foundation". It was the base for all operations that Hassan wished to effect. Members of al-Assas became known as al-Assasīn.
Hasan al-Sabbah see Hasan-i Sabbah
Sabbah, Hasan al- see Hasan-i Sabbah
Sabbah, Hasan-i see Hasan-i Sabbah
Hasan-i Sabbah (Hasan al-Sabbah) (Hassan-i Sabbāh) (Hassan aṣ-Ṣabbāḥ) (Hasan ibn Sabbah) (Hassan Ben Sabbah) (1050s-1124) . First chief propagandist (in Arabic, da‘i) of the Nizari Isma‘ilis at Alamut. He seized the fortress in 1090 and held it against many Saljuq attacks. His exposition of the Shi‘a doctrine that absolute authority in religious faith must be accepted greatly affected Abu Hamid al-Ghazali. {See also Ghazali, Abu Hamid al-; Nizari Isma'ilis; Saljuq; and Shi'a.}
Hasan-i Sabbāh was a Persian Nizārī Ismā'īlī missionary who converted a community in the late 11th century in the heart of the Alborz Mountains of northern Iran. The place was called Alamut and was attributed to an ancient king of Daylam. He founded a group whose members are sometimes referred to as the Hashshashin.
Hassan is thought to have written an autobiography, which does not survive but seems to underlie the first part of an anonymous Isma'ili biography entitled Sargudhasht-i Sayyidnā. The latter is known only from quotations made by later Persian authors. Hassan also wrote a Persian treatise on the doctrine of ta'līm, i.e. the teachings of the imam. The text is no longer extant, but fragments are cited or paraphrased by al-Shahrastānī and several Persian historians.
The possibly autobiographical information found in Sargudhasht-i Sayyidnā is the main source for Hassan's background and early life. According to this, Hassan-i Sabbāh was born in the city of Qom (modern Iran) in Persia in the 1050s to a family of Twelver Shī‘a. His father was an Arab claiming Yemeni descent, who left the Sawād of Kufa (modern Iraq) to settle in the (predominantly Shi'a) town of Qom.
Early in his life, his family moved to Rayy (Rey, modern Iran). Rayy was a city that had seen a lot of radical thought since the 9th century and it had seen Hamdan Qarmaṭ as one of its voices. It had also seen a lot of missionary work by various sects.
It was in this center of religious matrices that Hassan developed a keen interest in metaphysical matters and adhered to the Twelver code of instruction. From 7 to 17, he studied at home, and mastered palmistry, languages, philosophy, astronomy and mathematics (especially geometry).
Rayy was also home to the activities of Ismā‘īlī missionaries in the Jibal. At the time, Isma'ilism was a growing movement in Persia and other lands east of Egypt. The Persian Isma'ilis supported the da'wa ("mission") directed by the Fatimid caliphate of Cairo and recognized the authority of the Imam-Caliph al-Mustanṣir (d. 1094). However, after some time, Isfahan rather than Cairo came to function as their principal headquarters. The Ismā'īlī mission worked on three layers: the lowest was the foot soldier or fidā'ī, followed by the rafīk or "comrade", and finally the dā‘ī or "missionary". It has been suggested that its popularity in Persia owed something to dissatisfaction with their Seljuk rulers, who had recently removed local rulers.
In Rayy, young Hassan came in touch with Amira Darrab, a comrade, who introduced him to Ismā'īlī doctrine. Hassan was initially unimpressed. As he met Darrab, participating in many passionate debates that discussed the merits of Ismā‘īl over Mūsā, Hassan's respect grew. Impressed with the conviction of Darrab, Hassan decided to delve deeper into Ismā'īlī doctrines and beliefs. Hassan began to see merit in switching to Ismā‘īlī.
At the age of 17, Hassan converted and swore allegiance to the Fatimid Caliph in Cairo. Hassan's studies did not end with his crossing over. He further studied under two other dā‘iyyayn, and as he proceeded on his path, he was looked upon with eyes of respect.
Hassan's austere and devoted commitment to the da'wa brought him an audience with the chief missionary of the region: ‘Abdul-Malik ibn Attash. Ibn Attash, suitably impressed with the young seventeen year old Hassan, made him Deputy Missionary and advised him to go to Cairo to further his studies.
However, Hassan did not go to Cairo. Some historians have postulated that Hassan, following his conversion, was playing host to some members of the Fatimid caliphate, and this was leaked to the anti-Fatimid and anti-Shī‘a Nizam al-Mulk. This prompted his abandoning Rayy and heading to Cairo in 1076.
Hassan took about 2 years to reach Cairo. Along the way he toured many other regions that did not fall in the general direction of Egypt. Isfahan was the first city that he visited. He was hosted by one of the Missionaries of his youth, a man who had taught the youthful Hassan in Rayy. His name was Resi Abufasl and he further instructed Hassan.
From here he went to Azerbaijan, hundreds of miles to the north, and from there to Turkey. There he attracted the ire of priests following a heated discussion, and Hassan was thrown out of the town he was in.
He then turned south and traveled through Iraq, reaching Damascus in Syria. He left for Egypt from Palestine. Records exist, some in the fragmentary remains of his autobiography, and from another biography written by Rashid ad-Din Tabib in 1310, to date his arrival in Egypt at August 30, 1078.
It is unclear how long Hassan stayed in Egypt - about 3 years is the usually accepted amount of time. He continued his studies there, and became a full missionary.
While he was in Cairo, studying and preaching, he upset the highly excitable Chief of the Army, Badr al-Jamalī. It is also said by later sources that the Ismaili Imam-Caliph al-Mustanṣir informed Hassan that his elder son Nizar would be the next Imam. Hassan was briefly imprisoned by Badr al-Jamali. The collapse of a minaret of the jail was taken to be an omen in the favor of Hassan and he was promptly released and deported. The ship that he was traveling on was wrecked. He was rescued and taken to Syria. Traveling via Aleppo and Baghdad, he terminated his journey at Isfahan in 1081.
Hassan’s life now was totally devoted to the mission. Hassan toured extensively throughout Iran. To the north of Iran, and touching the south shore of the Caspian Sea, are the mountains of Alborz. These mountains were home to a people who had traditionally resisted all attempts at subjugation. This place was also of Shī‘a leaning. Within these mountains, in the region of Daylam, Hassan chose to pursue his missionary activities. Hassan became the Chief Missionary of that area and sent his personally trained missionaries into the rest of the region.
The news of this Ismā'īlī's activities reached Nizam al-Mulk, who dispatched his soldiers with the orders for Hassan's capture. Hassan evaded them, and went deeper into the mountains.
Hassan's search for a base from where to guide his mission ended when he found the castle of Alamut in the Rudbar area in 1088. It was a fort that stood guard to a valley that was about fifty kilometers long and five kilometers wide. The fort had been built about the year 865. Legend has it that it was built by a king who saw his eagle fly up to and perch upon a rock, of which the king, Wah Sudan ibn Marzuban, understood the importance. Likening the perching of the eagle to a lesson given by it, he called the fort Aluh Amut - the "Eagles Teaching".
Hassan’s takeover of the fort was one of silent surrender in the face of defeated odds. To effect this takeover Hassan employed an ingenious strategy. It took the better part of two years to accomplish. First Hassan sent his Daˤiyyīn and Rafīks to win the villages in the valley over. Next, key people were converted and in 1090 Hassan took over the fort. It is said that Hassan offered 3000 gold dinars to the fort owner for the amount of land that would fit a buffalo’s hide. The term having been agreed upon, Hassan cut the hide in to strips and joined them all over along the perimeter of the fort. The owner was defeated. (This story bears striking resemblance to Virgil's account of Dido's founding of Carthage.) Hassan gave him a draft on the name of a wealthy landlord and told him to take the money from him. Legend further has it that when the landlord saw the draft with Hassan’s signature, he immediately paid the amount to the fort owner, astonishing him.
With Alamut as his, Hassan devoted himself so faithfully to study, that it is said that in all the years that he was there – almost 35, he never left his quarters, except the two times when he went up to the roof. He was studying, translating, praying, fasting, and directing the activities of the Daˤwa. The propagation of the Nizarī doctrine was headquartered at Alamut. He knew the Qur'ān by heart, could quote extensively from the texts of most Muslim sects, and, apart from philosophy, he was well versed in mathematics, astronomy, alchemy, medicine, architecture, and the major science fields of his time. Hassan was one who found solace in austerity and frugality. A pious life was one of prayer and devotion. Hassan was a charismatic revolutionary. It was said that by the sheer gravity of his conviction he could pierce the hardest and most orthodox of hearts and win them over to his side.
Hassan's community and its branches spread throughout Iran and Syria and came to be called Hashshashin or Assassins, an Islamic mystery cult.
Hassan was extremely strict and disciplined. The event of the Great Resurrection (al-qiyāmat al-kubrā) occurred under the later Ismaili Imam Hasan ala-dhikrihi as-salaam in 1164.
Not much is known about Hassan from first hand sources, but legends abound as to the tactics used to induct members. They either stem from Sunni polemicists who were motivated to discredit the Nizari Isma'ili on political and religious grounds, and Crusaders returning to Europe. Marco Polo also claimed to have visited Alamut, although the timeframe he gives makes his assertion dubious.
According to polemical accounts which would evolve into legend, a future assassin was subjected to rites very similar to those of other mystery cults in which the subject was made to believe that he was in imminent danger of death. But the twist of the assassins was that they drugged the person to simulate a "dying" to later have them awaken in a garden flowing with wine and served a sumptuous feast by virgins. The supplicant was then convinced he was in Heaven and that Sabbah was a representative of the divinity and that all of his orders should be followed, even to death. This legend derives from Marco Polo, who visited Alamut just after it fell to the Mongols in the thirteenth century.
Other accounts of the indoctrination attest that the future assassins were brought to Alamut at a young age and, while they matured, inhabited the aforementioned paradisaical gardens and were kept drugged with hashish. As in the previous version, Hassan occupied this garden as a divine emissary. At a certain point (when their initiation could be said to have begun) the drug was withdrawn from them, and they were removed from the gardens and flung into a dungeon. There they were informed that, if they wished to return to the paradise they had so recently enjoyed it would be at Sabbah's discretion, and that they must, therefore, follow his directions exactly, up to and including murder and self-sacrifice.
Given the pillars of devoted adherence to the path of the faith, it is unlikely that the usually accepted "Assassin" postulate is accurate. Hassan had his son executed for drinking wine and another person was banished from Alamut for playing the flute. Furthermore there have emerged traces that there was a name given to Alamut by the people with Nizarī leanings: al-Assas "the foundation". It was the base for all operations that Hassan wished to effect. Members of al-Assas became known as al-Assasīn.
Hasan al-Sabbah see Hasan-i Sabbah
Sabbah, Hasan al- see Hasan-i Sabbah
Sabbah, Hasan-i see Hasan-i Sabbah
Hasan Pasha
Hasan Pasha (Hasan Pasha ibn Khayr al-Din). Commander in Algiers in the years 1544 to 1551; 1557 to 1561; and 1562 to 1567. He fought the Spaniards and tried to enroll the Kabyles in his service against the Moroccans.
Hasan Pasha ibn Khayr al-Din see Hasan Pasha
Pasha, Hasan see Hasan Pasha
Hasan Pasha (Hasan Pasha ibn Khayr al-Din). Commander in Algiers in the years 1544 to 1551; 1557 to 1561; and 1562 to 1567. He fought the Spaniards and tried to enroll the Kabyles in his service against the Moroccans.
Hasan Pasha ibn Khayr al-Din see Hasan Pasha
Pasha, Hasan see Hasan Pasha
Hasanwayhids
Hasanwayhids (Hasanuyid). Name of a Kurdish dynasty descended from Hasanawayh. Between 959 and 1015, they maintained more or less autonomous principalities in Western Persia.
The Hasanawayhid or Hasanuyid was a Kurdish principality from 959 to 1015, centered at Dinawar (northeast of present-day Kermanshah). The principality ruled western Iran and upper Mesopotamia. The founder of the dynasty was Hasanwayh bin Husayn from the Kurdish tribe of Barzikani. He managed to successfully resist Sahlan bin Musafir, the Buyid governor of Hamadan, and the Buyid vizier, Ibn Al-Amed. In 970, he reached a compromise with Amed's successor which guaranteed his autonomy. Hasanwayh died in 979 at Sarmaj, located in south of Bisitun.
After Hasanwayh's death, conflict broke out between several of his sons. The intervention of Buyid Muayyid al-Dawla of Ray led to the defeat of Fakhr al-Dawla, one of Hasanwayh's sons. Then another heir, Abul-Najm Badr (Nasir Al-Dawla), was installed as the leader of Bazikani Kurds, and the principality became a vassal of Buyids. Abul-Najm expanded Hasanwayhid's control to Shapur-Khwast, Dinawar, Nahavand, Asadabad, Borujerd, Ahwaz, Ilam, Kermanshah, Hulwan and Sharazur (Kirkuk).
Around 1006, the principality came into conflict with the Annazid to the west. Abul-Najm Badr finally died in a minor battle in 1014. The principality was conquered by Abul-Shawk, the Annazid ruler. However the princely family continued to rule their stronghold at Sarmaj until Seljuk Ibrahim Inal entered their territory in 1047.
Hasanuyid see Hasanwayhids
Hasanwayhids (Hasanuyid). Name of a Kurdish dynasty descended from Hasanawayh. Between 959 and 1015, they maintained more or less autonomous principalities in Western Persia.
The Hasanawayhid or Hasanuyid was a Kurdish principality from 959 to 1015, centered at Dinawar (northeast of present-day Kermanshah). The principality ruled western Iran and upper Mesopotamia. The founder of the dynasty was Hasanwayh bin Husayn from the Kurdish tribe of Barzikani. He managed to successfully resist Sahlan bin Musafir, the Buyid governor of Hamadan, and the Buyid vizier, Ibn Al-Amed. In 970, he reached a compromise with Amed's successor which guaranteed his autonomy. Hasanwayh died in 979 at Sarmaj, located in south of Bisitun.
After Hasanwayh's death, conflict broke out between several of his sons. The intervention of Buyid Muayyid al-Dawla of Ray led to the defeat of Fakhr al-Dawla, one of Hasanwayh's sons. Then another heir, Abul-Najm Badr (Nasir Al-Dawla), was installed as the leader of Bazikani Kurds, and the principality became a vassal of Buyids. Abul-Najm expanded Hasanwayhid's control to Shapur-Khwast, Dinawar, Nahavand, Asadabad, Borujerd, Ahwaz, Ilam, Kermanshah, Hulwan and Sharazur (Kirkuk).
Around 1006, the principality came into conflict with the Annazid to the west. Abul-Najm Badr finally died in a minor battle in 1014. The principality was conquered by Abul-Shawk, the Annazid ruler. However the princely family continued to rule their stronghold at Sarmaj until Seljuk Ibrahim Inal entered their territory in 1047.
Hasanuyid see Hasanwayhids
Hashid wa-Bakil
Hashid wa-Bakil. Large confederation of tribes in the highlands of northern Yemen between San‘a’ and Sa‘da, which has played a role since the dawn of history.
The Bakil federation is the second largest tribal federation in Yemen. Imam Yahya's campaign to subject the country, and more specifically the tribes, to his control, led him to undertake massive campaigns against their influence and power; in fact, his efforts succeeded in permanently eliminating all but two of the ancient confederations (the Hashid is the other one to survive). The member tribes of the Bakil Confederation are found primarily in the far north of the country; its leaders today are the Abu Luhum clan, of the Nihm tribe.
Hashid and Bakil the sons of Jashim bin Jubran bin Nawf bin Tuba'a bin Zayd bin Amro bin Hamdan, Bani Hamdan was already a well known tribe in the 1st century of yhr Chtisyian calendar and it was mentioned in Sabean inscripts. Therefore, Hashid and Bakil (the brothers) must have lived in the B.C.T. era. In the 3rd century most of Hamdan migrated to Syria. Hashid and Bakil switched their alliance to Himyar.
In the year 622, the Prophet Muhammad sent Khalid ibn Al-Walid to Yemen to call them to Islam. However, Khaled managed to push the Najrani and Tihami Yemenis into Islam but he did not get a warm response from the Hamdani Yemenis of the highlands. So the Prophet Muhammad sent over Ali bin Abi Talib and he was much more successful in converting the Hamdani Yemenis.
After the death of the Prophet Muhammad the Hamdan tribe remained Muslim and neutral. It did not join in the wars against other Yemeni tribes that backed Islam.
The Hamdan tribe remained on the side of Ali, after the defeat of Ali and later his sons. The tribes remained in alliance to Ali but did not oppose the Ummayads or ally themselves with the other Shi'as.
At that time Yemen was experiencing a great population movement forming the bulk of the Islamic Expansion mainly settling and Arabizing North Africa/Spain. However, the majority of the Hamdan tribe remained in Yemen which later helped the Hashid/Bakil Hamdani tribes become the biggest local key player, benefiting from the departure of the bulk of the most powerful Nomadic Yemeni tribes of that time into North Africa/Spain in Wetsward movements that continued until the 13th century.
By the 10th century, the Imam al-Hadi Yahya bin al-Hussain bin al-Qasim (a scion of Imam al-Hasan, grandson of the Prophet) arrived in the Northern Highlands on invitation from the Hamdan tribe and from that time until the present day the Zaidi moderate Shia teachings became dominant in north Yemen.
Imam Yahya's campaign to subject the country, and more specifically the tribes, to his control, led him to undertake massive campaigns against their influence and power. Indeed, his efforts succeeded in permanently eliminating all but two of the ancient confederations (the Bakil is the other one to survive).
Many writers have referred to the Hashid and Bakil confederations as the "two wings" of the Zaidi imamate in the sense that many of the tribes that belong to these confederations are and were strongly committed to Zaidi Islam. The imams were recognized - to a greater or lesser degree - as the heads of the Zaidi community and could, therefore, count on a measure of support and loyalty. Not all the tribes, however, accepted the temporal and even legal role that the imams arrogated to themselves. Consequently, many imams (Imam Yahya and Imam Ahmad in the twentieth century included) complained bitterly about the tribes' inordinate political power.
wa-Bakil, Hashid see Hashid wa-Bakil.
Bakil, Hashid wa- see Hashid wa-Bakil.
Hashid wa-Bakil. Large confederation of tribes in the highlands of northern Yemen between San‘a’ and Sa‘da, which has played a role since the dawn of history.
The Bakil federation is the second largest tribal federation in Yemen. Imam Yahya's campaign to subject the country, and more specifically the tribes, to his control, led him to undertake massive campaigns against their influence and power; in fact, his efforts succeeded in permanently eliminating all but two of the ancient confederations (the Hashid is the other one to survive). The member tribes of the Bakil Confederation are found primarily in the far north of the country; its leaders today are the Abu Luhum clan, of the Nihm tribe.
Hashid and Bakil the sons of Jashim bin Jubran bin Nawf bin Tuba'a bin Zayd bin Amro bin Hamdan, Bani Hamdan was already a well known tribe in the 1st century of yhr Chtisyian calendar and it was mentioned in Sabean inscripts. Therefore, Hashid and Bakil (the brothers) must have lived in the B.C.T. era. In the 3rd century most of Hamdan migrated to Syria. Hashid and Bakil switched their alliance to Himyar.
In the year 622, the Prophet Muhammad sent Khalid ibn Al-Walid to Yemen to call them to Islam. However, Khaled managed to push the Najrani and Tihami Yemenis into Islam but he did not get a warm response from the Hamdani Yemenis of the highlands. So the Prophet Muhammad sent over Ali bin Abi Talib and he was much more successful in converting the Hamdani Yemenis.
After the death of the Prophet Muhammad the Hamdan tribe remained Muslim and neutral. It did not join in the wars against other Yemeni tribes that backed Islam.
The Hamdan tribe remained on the side of Ali, after the defeat of Ali and later his sons. The tribes remained in alliance to Ali but did not oppose the Ummayads or ally themselves with the other Shi'as.
At that time Yemen was experiencing a great population movement forming the bulk of the Islamic Expansion mainly settling and Arabizing North Africa/Spain. However, the majority of the Hamdan tribe remained in Yemen which later helped the Hashid/Bakil Hamdani tribes become the biggest local key player, benefiting from the departure of the bulk of the most powerful Nomadic Yemeni tribes of that time into North Africa/Spain in Wetsward movements that continued until the 13th century.
By the 10th century, the Imam al-Hadi Yahya bin al-Hussain bin al-Qasim (a scion of Imam al-Hasan, grandson of the Prophet) arrived in the Northern Highlands on invitation from the Hamdan tribe and from that time until the present day the Zaidi moderate Shia teachings became dominant in north Yemen.
Imam Yahya's campaign to subject the country, and more specifically the tribes, to his control, led him to undertake massive campaigns against their influence and power. Indeed, his efforts succeeded in permanently eliminating all but two of the ancient confederations (the Bakil is the other one to survive).
Many writers have referred to the Hashid and Bakil confederations as the "two wings" of the Zaidi imamate in the sense that many of the tribes that belong to these confederations are and were strongly committed to Zaidi Islam. The imams were recognized - to a greater or lesser degree - as the heads of the Zaidi community and could, therefore, count on a measure of support and loyalty. Not all the tribes, however, accepted the temporal and even legal role that the imams arrogated to themselves. Consequently, many imams (Imam Yahya and Imam Ahmad in the twentieth century included) complained bitterly about the tribes' inordinate political power.
wa-Bakil, Hashid see Hashid wa-Bakil.
Bakil, Hashid wa- see Hashid wa-Bakil.
Hashim ibn ‘Abd Manaf
Hashim ibn ‘Abd Manaf (Hashim ibn Abd al-Manaf) (d. ca. 497). Great-grandfather of the Prophet and the name giving ancestor of the Hashimites -- the clan to which the Prophet belonged. He had made the tribe of Quraysh dominant in Mecca and had reorganized the pilgrimage. He is said to have died at Gaza on a journey to Syria.
Hashim ibn 'Abd Manaf was the great-grandfather of both Muhammad and 'Ali ibn Abi Talib (the first Shi'a imam and the fourth Sunni caliph). He also was the originator of the Banu Hashim clan of the distinguished Quraysh tribe in Mecca. His grave can be found in Jannatul Mualla cemetery, in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.
His real name was Amr which means "ruler" or "commander," but he was given the nickname "Hashim," which translates as "pulverizer" in Arabic, because he initiated the practice of providing crumbled bread in broth for the pilgrims to the Kaaba in Mecca. According to tradition, he was a descendant of Ishmael and thus Ibrahim (Abraham). He married Salma bint Amr, a woman of Medina. He is said to have died while doing business in Gaza, Palestine in 497. His grave is preserved, and Gaza is called "Ghazzah Hashim" or Hashim's Gaza.
Hashim is credited with initiating trade caravans of the Quraysh after obtaining an edict from the Byzantine emperor, exempting Quraysh from duties or taxes when operating in the countries under his domain. He obtained the same concession from the emperor of Ethiopia. Thus, the Quraysh engaged in trade in Yemen, Syria, and Ankara which allowed them to flourish economically.
Hashim's father was 'Abd Manaf ibn Qusai and he had two brothers that are known to history, the elder 'Abd Shams ibn 'Abd Manaf and a younger brother Muttalib ibn 'Abd Manaf who would become his successor.
Hashim ibn Abd al-Manaf see Hashim ibn ‘Abd Manaf
Hashim ibn ‘Abd Manaf (Hashim ibn Abd al-Manaf) (d. ca. 497). Great-grandfather of the Prophet and the name giving ancestor of the Hashimites -- the clan to which the Prophet belonged. He had made the tribe of Quraysh dominant in Mecca and had reorganized the pilgrimage. He is said to have died at Gaza on a journey to Syria.
Hashim ibn 'Abd Manaf was the great-grandfather of both Muhammad and 'Ali ibn Abi Talib (the first Shi'a imam and the fourth Sunni caliph). He also was the originator of the Banu Hashim clan of the distinguished Quraysh tribe in Mecca. His grave can be found in Jannatul Mualla cemetery, in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.
His real name was Amr which means "ruler" or "commander," but he was given the nickname "Hashim," which translates as "pulverizer" in Arabic, because he initiated the practice of providing crumbled bread in broth for the pilgrims to the Kaaba in Mecca. According to tradition, he was a descendant of Ishmael and thus Ibrahim (Abraham). He married Salma bint Amr, a woman of Medina. He is said to have died while doing business in Gaza, Palestine in 497. His grave is preserved, and Gaza is called "Ghazzah Hashim" or Hashim's Gaza.
Hashim is credited with initiating trade caravans of the Quraysh after obtaining an edict from the Byzantine emperor, exempting Quraysh from duties or taxes when operating in the countries under his domain. He obtained the same concession from the emperor of Ethiopia. Thus, the Quraysh engaged in trade in Yemen, Syria, and Ankara which allowed them to flourish economically.
Hashim's father was 'Abd Manaf ibn Qusai and he had two brothers that are known to history, the elder 'Abd Shams ibn 'Abd Manaf and a younger brother Muttalib ibn 'Abd Manaf who would become his successor.
Hashim ibn Abd al-Manaf see Hashim ibn ‘Abd Manaf
Hashimids
Hashimids (al-Hawashim). Collective name of the four main branches of Hasanid Sharifs, who ruled Mecca from 960 to 1924. The name al-Hawashim is used to distinguish them from the Hashimites of the Hejaz, Iraq and Jordan. The eponym of the Hashimids was Hashim ibn ‘Abd Manaf. They were descended from Musa I al-Jawn, a great-grandson of ‘Ali’s son al-Hasan. Musa I’s son ‘Abd Allah al-Shaykh al-Salih was the sire of the Meccan Sharifs, and from the latter’s son Musa II sprang the four main branches of the dynasty -- the Musawids, the Sulaymanids, the Hashimids and the Qatadids. A Hashimid is also a supporter of the militant mawali Shi‘a sect in the late Umayyad times.
Hawashim, al- see Hashimids
Hashimids (al-Hawashim). Collective name of the four main branches of Hasanid Sharifs, who ruled Mecca from 960 to 1924. The name al-Hawashim is used to distinguish them from the Hashimites of the Hejaz, Iraq and Jordan. The eponym of the Hashimids was Hashim ibn ‘Abd Manaf. They were descended from Musa I al-Jawn, a great-grandson of ‘Ali’s son al-Hasan. Musa I’s son ‘Abd Allah al-Shaykh al-Salih was the sire of the Meccan Sharifs, and from the latter’s son Musa II sprang the four main branches of the dynasty -- the Musawids, the Sulaymanids, the Hashimids and the Qatadids. A Hashimid is also a supporter of the militant mawali Shi‘a sect in the late Umayyad times.
Hawashim, al- see Hashimids
Hashimite
Hashimite (Hashemite). Name of two Arabian dynasties, both of which claim descent from Hashim of the tribe of Koreish, traditionally the custodians of the sacred Muslim shrine, the Ka‘ba, at Mecca. The Hashimites included the founders of Islam, notably the Prophet Muhammad. His paternal uncle Abbas, progenitory of the Abbasid dynasty of caliphs, which ruled Islam from 750 to 1258, and his son-in-law, the caliph Ali. The modern Arabian dynasty, by tradition descended from Muhammad, was founded in 1916 by Husein ibn Ali (1856-1931), sharif of Mecca, who at that time made himself king of the Hijaz (al-Hijaz). Sons of Husein ibn Ali were Ali ibn Husein (1878-1935), who succeeded his father in 1924 but was overthrown in 1925 by Ibn Saud, king of Saudi Arabia; Abdullah ibn Husein, king of Jordan; and Faisal I, king of Iraq. King Hussein I of Jordan is a grandson of Abdullah ibn Husein, Faisal II, the last king of Iraq, was a grandson of Faisal I.
Hashimite, today, is the term used to describe a member of the dynasty which ruled the Hijaz (1908-1925), Syria (1918-1920), Iraq (1921-1958), and which rules Jordan (1921- ) to this day. The family belongs to the Dhawu ‘Awn, one of the branches of the Hasanid Sharifs of Mecca. They claimed descent from the Prophet’s grandson, al-Hasan.
In 1908, the Ottoman sultan appointed Husayn ibn ‘Ali as sharif and amir of Mecca and of the Hijaz. Emir Husayn (Hussain or Hussein) I ibn Ali (1856-1931), sharif of Mecca from 1908 under Ottoman sovereignty, conducted negotiations with the British in 1915 over an Arab kingdom under British mandate. Following the Sykes-Picot Agreement, under which the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were divided into British and French zones of influence, he became king of the Hijaz (central Arabia with Mecca and Medina) in 1916. In 1924, he was expelled by Ibn Saud. His eldest son, Ali, who assumed the title of king in 1924, also had to yield in 1925. Of his younger sons, Faisal I (1883-1933), was elected king of Syria in 1920 by the Arab National Congress (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine). Driven out by the French, he became King of Iraq in 1921 at the initiative of the British. The Iraqi Hashimite branch was brutally removed by Iraqi officers in 1958 with the assassination of his grandson, Faisal II. His brother, Abdallah I (1882-1951), became emir of Transjordania and Palestine under British sovereignty in 1921/23 (in return for assurances of an Israeli state for the Jews) and in 1946 king of the independent Jordan. Following his assassination, his grandson, Hussain II (Hussein II) (1952-1999), steered a tricky course between national independence, support for the Palestinians expelled to Jordan, foreign and economic policy dependence on the United States, resistance to Egyptian influence (President Nasser’s pan-Arabism), and reconciliation with Israel while fending off several attempted coups. In February 1999, Hussain II was succeeded to the throne by his son, Abdallah II.
Hashemite see Hashimite
Hashimite (Hashemite). Name of two Arabian dynasties, both of which claim descent from Hashim of the tribe of Koreish, traditionally the custodians of the sacred Muslim shrine, the Ka‘ba, at Mecca. The Hashimites included the founders of Islam, notably the Prophet Muhammad. His paternal uncle Abbas, progenitory of the Abbasid dynasty of caliphs, which ruled Islam from 750 to 1258, and his son-in-law, the caliph Ali. The modern Arabian dynasty, by tradition descended from Muhammad, was founded in 1916 by Husein ibn Ali (1856-1931), sharif of Mecca, who at that time made himself king of the Hijaz (al-Hijaz). Sons of Husein ibn Ali were Ali ibn Husein (1878-1935), who succeeded his father in 1924 but was overthrown in 1925 by Ibn Saud, king of Saudi Arabia; Abdullah ibn Husein, king of Jordan; and Faisal I, king of Iraq. King Hussein I of Jordan is a grandson of Abdullah ibn Husein, Faisal II, the last king of Iraq, was a grandson of Faisal I.
Hashimite, today, is the term used to describe a member of the dynasty which ruled the Hijaz (1908-1925), Syria (1918-1920), Iraq (1921-1958), and which rules Jordan (1921- ) to this day. The family belongs to the Dhawu ‘Awn, one of the branches of the Hasanid Sharifs of Mecca. They claimed descent from the Prophet’s grandson, al-Hasan.
In 1908, the Ottoman sultan appointed Husayn ibn ‘Ali as sharif and amir of Mecca and of the Hijaz. Emir Husayn (Hussain or Hussein) I ibn Ali (1856-1931), sharif of Mecca from 1908 under Ottoman sovereignty, conducted negotiations with the British in 1915 over an Arab kingdom under British mandate. Following the Sykes-Picot Agreement, under which the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were divided into British and French zones of influence, he became king of the Hijaz (central Arabia with Mecca and Medina) in 1916. In 1924, he was expelled by Ibn Saud. His eldest son, Ali, who assumed the title of king in 1924, also had to yield in 1925. Of his younger sons, Faisal I (1883-1933), was elected king of Syria in 1920 by the Arab National Congress (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine). Driven out by the French, he became King of Iraq in 1921 at the initiative of the British. The Iraqi Hashimite branch was brutally removed by Iraqi officers in 1958 with the assassination of his grandson, Faisal II. His brother, Abdallah I (1882-1951), became emir of Transjordania and Palestine under British sovereignty in 1921/23 (in return for assurances of an Israeli state for the Jews) and in 1946 king of the independent Jordan. Following his assassination, his grandson, Hussain II (Hussein II) (1952-1999), steered a tricky course between national independence, support for the Palestinians expelled to Jordan, foreign and economic policy dependence on the United States, resistance to Egyptian influence (President Nasser’s pan-Arabism), and reconciliation with Israel while fending off several attempted coups. In February 1999, Hussain II was succeeded to the throne by his son, Abdallah II.
Hashemite see Hashimite
Hashimiyya
Hashimiyya. In Umayyad times, the term was applied to a religio-political faction who believed that the Imamate had passed from the ‘Alid Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya to his son Abu Hashim (d. 716). The ‘Abbasids inherited Abu Hashim’s party and organization, the Hashimiyya, which was the main instrument of the ‘Abbasid propaganda and movement in Khurasan. The term was then applied to members of the ‘Abbasid house, and understood as denoting the descendants of Hashim ibn ‘Abd Manaf, the common ancestor of the Prophet, of the latter’s son-in-law ‘Ali and of al-‘Abbas.
Hashimiyya. In Umayyad times, the term was applied to a religio-political faction who believed that the Imamate had passed from the ‘Alid Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya to his son Abu Hashim (d. 716). The ‘Abbasids inherited Abu Hashim’s party and organization, the Hashimiyya, which was the main instrument of the ‘Abbasid propaganda and movement in Khurasan. The term was then applied to members of the ‘Abbasid house, and understood as denoting the descendants of Hashim ibn ‘Abd Manaf, the common ancestor of the Prophet, of the latter’s son-in-law ‘Ali and of al-‘Abbas.
Hashishiyya
Hashishiyya. See Assassins.
Hashishiyya. See Assassins.
Hassan
Hassan (El-Hassan bin Talal) (b. March 20, 1947). Crown prince of Jordan from 1965 to 1999. He was born on March 20, 1947, in Amman as the son of crown prince Talal (later king) and Zeini ash-Sharaf bint Jamil. In 1965, he was named crown prince of Jordan by King Hussein, thereby deposing his nephew, the then three year old Abdullah. The background for this change was that Hussein was exposed to a number of assassination attempts, and did not want to take the risk of leaving Jordan in the hands of an infant. In 1968, Hassan married Indian born Sarvath Ikramullah. In January 1999, Abdullah was appointed crown prince, deposing Hassan. During his tenure as crown prince, Hassan was one of King Hussein’s closest advisors. He was active in the work of bringing different religions together for interfaith dialogue, and was educated in Oriental studies from the Christ Church in Oxford.
Hassan is the son of King Talal and Queen Zein al-Sharaf. He is the brother of the late King Hussein, was Crown Prince from 1965 to 1999, and is uncle to the King Abdullah II of Jordan.
In 1968, Prince Hassan married Sarvath Ikramullah, daughter of Pakistani politician Shaista Suhrawardy Ikramullah, whom he first met in London in 1958, when they were both youngsters. They have four children together:
Princess Rahma (born August 13, 1969)
Princess Sumaya (born May 14, 1971)
Princess Badiya (born March 28, 1974)
Prince Rashid (born May 20, 1979)
Prince Hassan was educated first in Amman. He then attended Summer Fields School, then Harrow School in England as well as Christ Church, Oxford University, where he received a bachelor's degree in Oriental Studies followed by an master's degree. Prince Hassan became fluent in Arabic, English, French and German; developed a working knowledge of Turkish and Spanish; and studied Hebrew in university.
From 1965 to 1999, he served as Crown Prince of Jordan.
In 2002 Prince Hassan was awarded an honorary doctorate by the University of York in recognition of his contribution to the field of post-war reconstruction and development.
In 2009, he joined the project "Soldiers of Peace", a movie against all wars and for a global peace.
El-Hassan bin Talal see Hassan
Hassan (El-Hassan bin Talal) (b. March 20, 1947). Crown prince of Jordan from 1965 to 1999. He was born on March 20, 1947, in Amman as the son of crown prince Talal (later king) and Zeini ash-Sharaf bint Jamil. In 1965, he was named crown prince of Jordan by King Hussein, thereby deposing his nephew, the then three year old Abdullah. The background for this change was that Hussein was exposed to a number of assassination attempts, and did not want to take the risk of leaving Jordan in the hands of an infant. In 1968, Hassan married Indian born Sarvath Ikramullah. In January 1999, Abdullah was appointed crown prince, deposing Hassan. During his tenure as crown prince, Hassan was one of King Hussein’s closest advisors. He was active in the work of bringing different religions together for interfaith dialogue, and was educated in Oriental studies from the Christ Church in Oxford.
Hassan is the son of King Talal and Queen Zein al-Sharaf. He is the brother of the late King Hussein, was Crown Prince from 1965 to 1999, and is uncle to the King Abdullah II of Jordan.
In 1968, Prince Hassan married Sarvath Ikramullah, daughter of Pakistani politician Shaista Suhrawardy Ikramullah, whom he first met in London in 1958, when they were both youngsters. They have four children together:
Princess Rahma (born August 13, 1969)
Princess Sumaya (born May 14, 1971)
Princess Badiya (born March 28, 1974)
Prince Rashid (born May 20, 1979)
Prince Hassan was educated first in Amman. He then attended Summer Fields School, then Harrow School in England as well as Christ Church, Oxford University, where he received a bachelor's degree in Oriental Studies followed by an master's degree. Prince Hassan became fluent in Arabic, English, French and German; developed a working knowledge of Turkish and Spanish; and studied Hebrew in university.
From 1965 to 1999, he served as Crown Prince of Jordan.
In 2002 Prince Hassan was awarded an honorary doctorate by the University of York in recognition of his contribution to the field of post-war reconstruction and development.
In 2009, he joined the project "Soldiers of Peace", a movie against all wars and for a global peace.
El-Hassan bin Talal see Hassan
Hassan II (Muhammad Hassan) (July 9, 1929-July 23, 1999). King who ruled Morocco for 38 years and played an important role as mediator between Israel and the Arab nations of the Middle East.
Hassan was born Moulay Hassan ben Mohammed Alaoui in Rabat on July 9, 1929, the eldest of six children of Muhammad V (Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef, 1913-1961). Most of Morocco was then a protectorate of France, except for sections governed by Spain in the northwest and on the southern coast and the city of Tangier, an international zone.
As World War II unfolded, resistance to colonial rule grew. After the fall of France, the Free French forces promised independence if Morocco would cooperate in the war against the Axis, a promise that Paris proved unwilling to keep.
After the war, tension rose between the Sultan and the French, but the young Prince Moulay Hassan was educated as befitted the heir of two traditions: He attended the Imperial College at Rabat, where instruction was in Arabic and French. Later he earned a law degree from the University of Bordeaux and served in the French Navy aboard the battleship Jeanne d'Arc.
Hassan started at the Qur’anic school at the Royal Palace in 1934 and finished his Qur’anic training in 1936, when he began modern school. In 1941, Hassan’s secondary training commenced at the Imperial College at the Royal College, where he was taught by the best Moroccan and foreign teachers.
In April of 1947,
Hassan accompanied his father to Tangier, where king Muhammad V, for the first time, officially announced a goal of Moroccan independence.
In 1948, Hassan received his Baccalaureate. Hassan then began studying at the Institute of Higher Juridical Studies in Rabat, an institute that was part of the College of Law of Bordeaux, France.
In 1951, Hassan received his bachelor of arts degree in law.
On August 20, 1953, Hassan, along with the rest of the royal family, was exiled to Corsica, France. This was done in reaction to the king’s unwillingness to cooperate with the French colonial powers and his agitation for Moroccan independence. In January 1954, the royal family was forced to leave Corsica for Madagascar.
In 1954 and 1955, as rioting and guerrilla warfare increased, Prince Moulay's father regained his title. In November 1955, the royal family returned to Morocco, with the promise of Moroccan independence. Prince Moulay worked with his father, now Mohammed V, to maintain the monarchy's authority during a time of social discontent and the conflicting expectations of those who fought for Moroccan independence.
In 1956, France granted Morocco independence. In May 1956, Hassan was appointed commander of the Royal Armed Forces.
On July 9, 1957, Hassan was invested as crown prince, and became the commander in chief of the Moroccan army. At the time, the army was splintered between officers who had been loyal to the French and the former rebels. Prince Moulay kept the military occupied with civilian projects, and led it to victory against rebel Berber tribesmen in the Rif mountains in 1958.
However, in the shantytowns of Rabat, Casablanca and other cities, opposition simmered against the royal house. Though the monarchy looked to Paris and Washington for financial support, it needed to placate the leftist opposition. Declaring neutrality in the cold war, the Prince made overtures to Moscow and accepted Soviet military aid.
In 1960, Hassan was appointed minister of defense, and deputy premier. Hassan led the negotiations with France, Spain and the United States which ensured the withdrawal of foreign troops from Morocco.
On February 26, 1961, immediately following the death of Muhammad V of heart failure following what was expected to be a minor operation, Prince Moulay, who had been named Prime Minister in 1960, moved quickly to establish his rule. Hassan became the new king of Morocco, and on March 3, he was officially crowned as the new king. His Constitution, which was ratified in 1962, guaranteed freedom of the press and of religion, and created an elected legislature. However, the new Parliament, fractured by bitter rivalries, proved ineffectual. The new king retained the power to name the Prime Minister, disband the legislature and control the army.
In the mid-1960's, student agitation led to a wave of rioting and arrests. In response, in 1965, Hassan began to exercise authoritarian rule because of fear of the strength of the opposition. Subsequently, opposition figures fled abroad or were imprisoned. Some were executed. Mehdi Ben Barka, a prominent nationalist and opposition leader, was kidnapped in Paris and never seen again. The King's right-hand man, the Minister of Interior, Mohammed Oufkir, was linked to the disappearance, but the case was never pressed.
In June of 1965, Hassan dissolved Parliament and instituted a state of emergency, wielding absolute power until a new Constitution was adopted in 1970. The Constitution restored limited parliamentary government, but discontent simmered amid continuing poverty and official corruption.
In 1971, Hassan survived an attempt on his life. On July 10, 1971, Hassan invited some 400 prominent Moroccans, diplomats and other guests to his seaside palace of Skhirat near Rabat to celebrate his 42nd birthday. The festivities ended in a burst of gunfire as more than 1,000 muntinous troops attacked the palace, hurling grenades and spraying the grounds with small arms fire. Nearly 100 guests were killed and more than 125 wounded. The King hid in a bathroom. When the firing died down, Hassan re-emerged to find himself face to face with one of the rebel commanders. Keeping eye contact, Hassan recited the opening verse of the Qur'an, and the rebel knelt and kissed his hand. Loyal troops crushed the revolt, killing more than 150 rebels and capturing 900 others, many of them young military cadets. A dozen high-ranking, conservative officers were executed. Mohammed Oufkir was named Minister of Defense.
Hassan survived another attempt in 1972. On August 16, 1972, the King was returning from Paris aboard his private Boeing 727 when it encountered an unscheduled escort of four Royal Moroccan Air Force F-5 fighters. As the Boeing approached Rabat's airport, the fighters fired on the plane, knocking out an engine and scoring other hits. The Boeing landed safely, but the renegade pilots continued to strafe the runway until Hassan radioed them, saying the King had been killed. The rebels broke off the attack. Within hours, key participants in the coup were arrested and shot. One of their leaders proved to be General Oufkir, who apparently had been secretly involved in the earlier attack on the palace. According to official reports, the general committed suicide, but his body was supposedly found with several wounds. His widow and six children were placed under house arrest and were not released until February 1991, in an amnesty marking the King's thirty (30) years in power.
A third coup attempt in 1973 was averted and avenged.
As the 1970's unfolded, the King took several steps to dampen domestic turmoil. In 1973, Hassan put through measures to increase Moroccan ownership and employment in companies doing business in Morocco and also redistributed farmland owned by foreigners to rural peasants.
In November of 1975, Hassan initiated the Green March, where 350,000 civilians marched into the former Spanish colony, later named Western Sahara, claiming that the territory was Moroccan. Morocco seized control over the northern two thirds of the territory and ignited a war with guerrillas of the Polisario Front, who had been fighting for independence from Spain. Libya and Algeria supported the guerrillas in their war against the Moroccan Army.
In 1976, the part of the Western Sahara occupied by Morocco the preceding year, was officially annexed. This act was not accepted by any foreign state.
In 1979, after the Mauritanian withdrawal from the southern part of the Western Sahara, Morocco annexed the rest, without taking control over the border town of La Gouera.
In 1984, the King signed an accord with Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi that ended Libyan backing for the insurgents. Algeria, plagued by its own domestic problems, could give them only minimal support. Militarily, Morocco eventually triumphed, agreeing to a cease-fire with Polisario in 1991 that left the country in control of most of the region.
In 1991, Morocco was the only Maghrib country to send troops in support of the United Nations actions against Iraq in Kuwait.
King Hassan was adept at managing Arab-Israeli relations, and he liked to say he viewed Morocco's Jewish population, which numbered around 8,000, as a bridge between Israelis and Arabs. During World War II, his father, Mohammed V, had defied the Axis and protected his country's Jews. In 1956, the year of Moroccan independence, there were about 275,000 Jews in Morocco. Most were allowed to emigrate to Israel, Europe and elsewhere.
During the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, King Hassan contributed a nominal number of troops to support Egypt and Syria. Nevertheless, Hassan kept his channels open with Israel. In 1982, Hassan was the host of a meeting of Arab leaders in Fez where he pushed through agreement on a peace plan that called for the creation of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital but implicitly recognized Israel's right to exist. The plan, though rejected by Israel, laid the groundwork for the King to meet with Prime Minister Peres in 1986, a meeting that caused the King to be criticized by Arab leaders. Hassan responded by saying they had neither the ability to make war on Israel nor the willingness to make peace.
In September 1993, Morocco gave de facto recognition to Israel by welcoming Prime Minister Rabin, marking the first official visit by an Israeli leader to an Arab nation other than Egypt.
Despite such bold gestures, he was careful to play both sides of a conflict when necessary. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, he sent 1,300 troops to Saudi Arabia. Morocco was the only Maghrib country to send troops in support of the United Nations actions, a gesture that pleased the West. However, at the time, Hassan also expressed sympathy for the plight of Iraqi suffering under United Nations sanctions and ordered members of the Moroccan royal family to supervise the collection of supplies to ease their plight.
On July 23, 1999, Hassan died in Rabat from a heart attack. He was survived by his two sons (Sidi Mohammed and Moulay Rashid); his wife, Lalla Latifa, a commoner who was officially described as the "Mother of the Royal Children;" and three daughters. He was buried on July 25, 1999, in the mausoleum next to his father. The funeral was attended by many prominent world leaders and members of royal families, in addition to enormous crowds of Moroccans.
Hassan conducted politics with relative conservatism, but with emphasis on the market economy. His relations with neighboring countries (Algeria and Mauritania) were at times tense, and inside Morocco strict efforts were sometimes used to uphold the king’s position and the stability of the country.
Hassan’s politics were the most Western friendly in North Africa, and in many cases Hassan played an important role in international affairs. He was recognized for being one of the most important participants in the peace process in the Middle East that went on for more than ten of the last years of his rule.
Much of Hassan’s success at home, especially confronting the Islamists, rested in his family’s claim on being sharifs, descendants of Muhammad, a claim that was widely accepted in Morocco as well as abroad. Also, Hassan was careful in taking care of Moroccan heritage and religion. The world’s highest mosque, completed in 1993, was constructed under his initiative and was named for him.
On the political scene, an effective secret police and heavy handed reactions against political opposition, provided for political stability, or more precisely, to an absence of political activity. Anyone involved in politics in Morocco was forced to swear loyalty to Hassan II. Hassan II was, at times, severely criticized by organizations in other countries for what was seen as violations of human rights, political oppression and cruel punishment of prisoners. At the same time, Hassan was widely respected for keeping together a country which always had been ruled by strong, freedom loving tribes all over, but especially in the mountains.
Despite strong efforts by Hassan, Morocco saw relatively little economic progress. Indeed, there were several elements which made economic growth difficult: a strong increase in population, isolation from neighboring countries (i.e., Algeria) which had conducted politics quite different from Hassan’s, Europe which imposed strong limitations on economic relations with Morocco, and all the countries in the south which are separated by the Sahara desert and no continuous roads or railways.
Morocco, at the time of Hassan’s death, suffered from high unemployment, an educational system that does not meet the needs of Moroccan society, an unresolved situation in Western Sahara, and strong tensions inside the population. On the brighter side, Morocco, during the last decades of Hassan’s rule, developed an excellent infrastructure, and in some sectors, the Moroccan economy saw very positive growth, such as in information technology and tourism.
Hassan became fairly popular among his own population, even though many Moroccans felt that they had gained little from Hassan’s policies.
Muhammad Hassan see Hassan II
Moulay Hassan ben Mohammed Alaoui see Hassan II
Alaoui, Moulay Hassan ben Mohammed see Hassan II
In 1948, Hassan received his Baccalaureate. Hassan then began studying at the Institute of Higher Juridical Studies in Rabat, an institute that was part of the College of Law of Bordeaux, France.
In 1951, Hassan received his bachelor of arts degree in law.
On August 20, 1953, Hassan, along with the rest of the royal family, was exiled to Corsica, France. This was done in reaction to the king’s unwillingness to cooperate with the French colonial powers and his agitation for Moroccan independence. In January 1954, the royal family was forced to leave Corsica for Madagascar.
In 1954 and 1955, as rioting and guerrilla warfare increased, Prince Moulay's father regained his title. In November 1955, the royal family returned to Morocco, with the promise of Moroccan independence. Prince Moulay worked with his father, now Mohammed V, to maintain the monarchy's authority during a time of social discontent and the conflicting expectations of those who fought for Moroccan independence.
In 1956, France granted Morocco independence. In May 1956, Hassan was appointed commander of the Royal Armed Forces.
On July 9, 1957, Hassan was invested as crown prince, and became the commander in chief of the Moroccan army. At the time, the army was splintered between officers who had been loyal to the French and the former rebels. Prince Moulay kept the military occupied with civilian projects, and led it to victory against rebel Berber tribesmen in the Rif mountains in 1958.
However, in the shantytowns of Rabat, Casablanca and other cities, opposition simmered against the royal house. Though the monarchy looked to Paris and Washington for financial support, it needed to placate the leftist opposition. Declaring neutrality in the cold war, the Prince made overtures to Moscow and accepted Soviet military aid.
In 1960, Hassan was appointed minister of defense, and deputy premier. Hassan led the negotiations with France, Spain and the United States which ensured the withdrawal of foreign troops from Morocco.
On February 26, 1961, immediately following the death of Muhammad V of heart failure following what was expected to be a minor operation, Prince Moulay, who had been named Prime Minister in 1960, moved quickly to establish his rule. Hassan became the new king of Morocco, and on March 3, he was officially crowned as the new king. His Constitution, which was ratified in 1962, guaranteed freedom of the press and of religion, and created an elected legislature. However, the new Parliament, fractured by bitter rivalries, proved ineffectual. The new king retained the power to name the Prime Minister, disband the legislature and control the army.
In the mid-1960's, student agitation led to a wave of rioting and arrests. In response, in 1965, Hassan began to exercise authoritarian rule because of fear of the strength of the opposition. Subsequently, opposition figures fled abroad or were imprisoned. Some were executed. Mehdi Ben Barka, a prominent nationalist and opposition leader, was kidnapped in Paris and never seen again. The King's right-hand man, the Minister of Interior, Mohammed Oufkir, was linked to the disappearance, but the case was never pressed.
In June of 1965, Hassan dissolved Parliament and instituted a state of emergency, wielding absolute power until a new Constitution was adopted in 1970. The Constitution restored limited parliamentary government, but discontent simmered amid continuing poverty and official corruption.
In 1971, Hassan survived an attempt on his life. On July 10, 1971, Hassan invited some 400 prominent Moroccans, diplomats and other guests to his seaside palace of Skhirat near Rabat to celebrate his 42nd birthday. The festivities ended in a burst of gunfire as more than 1,000 muntinous troops attacked the palace, hurling grenades and spraying the grounds with small arms fire. Nearly 100 guests were killed and more than 125 wounded. The King hid in a bathroom. When the firing died down, Hassan re-emerged to find himself face to face with one of the rebel commanders. Keeping eye contact, Hassan recited the opening verse of the Qur'an, and the rebel knelt and kissed his hand. Loyal troops crushed the revolt, killing more than 150 rebels and capturing 900 others, many of them young military cadets. A dozen high-ranking, conservative officers were executed. Mohammed Oufkir was named Minister of Defense.
Hassan survived another attempt in 1972. On August 16, 1972, the King was returning from Paris aboard his private Boeing 727 when it encountered an unscheduled escort of four Royal Moroccan Air Force F-5 fighters. As the Boeing approached Rabat's airport, the fighters fired on the plane, knocking out an engine and scoring other hits. The Boeing landed safely, but the renegade pilots continued to strafe the runway until Hassan radioed them, saying the King had been killed. The rebels broke off the attack. Within hours, key participants in the coup were arrested and shot. One of their leaders proved to be General Oufkir, who apparently had been secretly involved in the earlier attack on the palace. According to official reports, the general committed suicide, but his body was supposedly found with several wounds. His widow and six children were placed under house arrest and were not released until February 1991, in an amnesty marking the King's thirty (30) years in power.
A third coup attempt in 1973 was averted and avenged.
As the 1970's unfolded, the King took several steps to dampen domestic turmoil. In 1973, Hassan put through measures to increase Moroccan ownership and employment in companies doing business in Morocco and also redistributed farmland owned by foreigners to rural peasants.
In November of 1975, Hassan initiated the Green March, where 350,000 civilians marched into the former Spanish colony, later named Western Sahara, claiming that the territory was Moroccan. Morocco seized control over the northern two thirds of the territory and ignited a war with guerrillas of the Polisario Front, who had been fighting for independence from Spain. Libya and Algeria supported the guerrillas in their war against the Moroccan Army.
In 1976, the part of the Western Sahara occupied by Morocco the preceding year, was officially annexed. This act was not accepted by any foreign state.
In 1979, after the Mauritanian withdrawal from the southern part of the Western Sahara, Morocco annexed the rest, without taking control over the border town of La Gouera.
In 1984, the King signed an accord with Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi that ended Libyan backing for the insurgents. Algeria, plagued by its own domestic problems, could give them only minimal support. Militarily, Morocco eventually triumphed, agreeing to a cease-fire with Polisario in 1991 that left the country in control of most of the region.
In 1991, Morocco was the only Maghrib country to send troops in support of the United Nations actions against Iraq in Kuwait.
King Hassan was adept at managing Arab-Israeli relations, and he liked to say he viewed Morocco's Jewish population, which numbered around 8,000, as a bridge between Israelis and Arabs. During World War II, his father, Mohammed V, had defied the Axis and protected his country's Jews. In 1956, the year of Moroccan independence, there were about 275,000 Jews in Morocco. Most were allowed to emigrate to Israel, Europe and elsewhere.
During the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, King Hassan contributed a nominal number of troops to support Egypt and Syria. Nevertheless, Hassan kept his channels open with Israel. In 1982, Hassan was the host of a meeting of Arab leaders in Fez where he pushed through agreement on a peace plan that called for the creation of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital but implicitly recognized Israel's right to exist. The plan, though rejected by Israel, laid the groundwork for the King to meet with Prime Minister Peres in 1986, a meeting that caused the King to be criticized by Arab leaders. Hassan responded by saying they had neither the ability to make war on Israel nor the willingness to make peace.
In September 1993, Morocco gave de facto recognition to Israel by welcoming Prime Minister Rabin, marking the first official visit by an Israeli leader to an Arab nation other than Egypt.
Despite such bold gestures, he was careful to play both sides of a conflict when necessary. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, he sent 1,300 troops to Saudi Arabia. Morocco was the only Maghrib country to send troops in support of the United Nations actions, a gesture that pleased the West. However, at the time, Hassan also expressed sympathy for the plight of Iraqi suffering under United Nations sanctions and ordered members of the Moroccan royal family to supervise the collection of supplies to ease their plight.
On July 23, 1999, Hassan died in Rabat from a heart attack. He was survived by his two sons (Sidi Mohammed and Moulay Rashid); his wife, Lalla Latifa, a commoner who was officially described as the "Mother of the Royal Children;" and three daughters. He was buried on July 25, 1999, in the mausoleum next to his father. The funeral was attended by many prominent world leaders and members of royal families, in addition to enormous crowds of Moroccans.
Hassan conducted politics with relative conservatism, but with emphasis on the market economy. His relations with neighboring countries (Algeria and Mauritania) were at times tense, and inside Morocco strict efforts were sometimes used to uphold the king’s position and the stability of the country.
Hassan’s politics were the most Western friendly in North Africa, and in many cases Hassan played an important role in international affairs. He was recognized for being one of the most important participants in the peace process in the Middle East that went on for more than ten of the last years of his rule.
Much of Hassan’s success at home, especially confronting the Islamists, rested in his family’s claim on being sharifs, descendants of Muhammad, a claim that was widely accepted in Morocco as well as abroad. Also, Hassan was careful in taking care of Moroccan heritage and religion. The world’s highest mosque, completed in 1993, was constructed under his initiative and was named for him.
On the political scene, an effective secret police and heavy handed reactions against political opposition, provided for political stability, or more precisely, to an absence of political activity. Anyone involved in politics in Morocco was forced to swear loyalty to Hassan II. Hassan II was, at times, severely criticized by organizations in other countries for what was seen as violations of human rights, political oppression and cruel punishment of prisoners. At the same time, Hassan was widely respected for keeping together a country which always had been ruled by strong, freedom loving tribes all over, but especially in the mountains.
Despite strong efforts by Hassan, Morocco saw relatively little economic progress. Indeed, there were several elements which made economic growth difficult: a strong increase in population, isolation from neighboring countries (i.e., Algeria) which had conducted politics quite different from Hassan’s, Europe which imposed strong limitations on economic relations with Morocco, and all the countries in the south which are separated by the Sahara desert and no continuous roads or railways.
Morocco, at the time of Hassan’s death, suffered from high unemployment, an educational system that does not meet the needs of Moroccan society, an unresolved situation in Western Sahara, and strong tensions inside the population. On the brighter side, Morocco, during the last decades of Hassan’s rule, developed an excellent infrastructure, and in some sectors, the Moroccan economy saw very positive growth, such as in information technology and tourism.
Hassan became fairly popular among his own population, even though many Moroccans felt that they had gained little from Hassan’s policies.
Muhammad Hassan see Hassan II
Moulay Hassan ben Mohammed Alaoui see Hassan II
Alaoui, Moulay Hassan ben Mohammed see Hassan II
Hassan al-Askari
Hassan al-Askari (846-874). Eleventh imam of the Twelver Shi‘a (r.868-874). Hassan al-Askari lived almost his entire life under house arrest. He was 22 when he received the Imamate. During the six years of his tenure, he was severely restricted in his freedom and was often only able to speak to his followers through intermediaries. A controversy surrounded the birth of his son and successor, Muhammad al-Mahdi by a Byzantine slave, Narjis Khatun. Hasan Al-‘Askarī was 27, when martyred by Al-Mu'tamid (the Abbasid caliph) and was buried in Samarra.
Hasan al-Askari, whose ancestor was the Prophet Muhammad, was born in Medina to Ali al-Hadi and Saleel. His title al-Askari derives from the Arabic word Asker which means Army. Hasan's title was reflective of his living most of his life in a garrison town. He married a Byzantine princess who was the granddaughter of a Byzantine emperor, named Narjis.
Hasan al-Askari lived almost his entire life under house arrest in Samarra and under supervision of Abbasid caliphs. Despite his confinement as a prisoner, he was occasionally allowed to go to Baghdad, although it was under guard.
He was very knowledgeable and despite being confined to house arrest for almost his entire life, Hasan al-Askari was able to teach others about Islam, and even compiled a commentary on the Qur'an that would be used by later scholars.
Hasan al-Askari had one son, Muhammad al-Mahdi, who was six at the time of Hasan al-Askari's death and disappeared. Twelver Shi’as believe him to be the Mahdi; a very important figure in Islamic teaching who is believed will reappear at the end of time to fill the world with justice, peace and to establish Islam as the global religion.
Hasan al-Askari was four years old, when he was exiled to Samarra along with his father. He was placed under the caliph's observation at a point, which was the center of the armed forces.
Following the death of his father, Al-Mu'tamid (Abbasid caliph) imprisoned him. The piety and chastity of Hasan al-Askari attracted the attention of all the prisoners towards him, and made them all enticed and enchanted. The officials and agents of the caliph daily reported to the caliph as to his condition. Eventually, Hasan al-Askari was killed.
Hasan al-Askari died at the age of 27 by poison. Hasan al-Askari’s funeral was attended by many people, including the Abbasid caliph Al-Mu'tamid who is accused of being secretly responsible for the poisoning of Hasan al-Askari.
At the funeral services for Hasan al-Askari, his brother Ja'far ibn Ali, who was counted as one of the helpers of the caliph, stood up to offer the funeral prayer upon the body of Hasan al-Askari. However, as he was about to start the prayers, the son of Hasan al-Askari, who was a minor, came forward and said to his uncle to step aside because only an Imam can lead the funeral prayer of another Imam. After the funeral prayer, Muhammad al-Mahdi went into the house and disappeared. This was the beginning of the Minor Occultation (ghaybat-e-sughra).
After the death of Hasan al-Askari, there was a sect of his followers who believed, as a result of shock and bewilderment, that he did not die, but had instead entered occultation and that he was the Mahdi. According to this sect, their beliefs were based upon the impossibility of the death of the Imam without an apparent known issue (this sect did not believe in the imamate or even existence of Muhammad al-Mahdi), since the earth can never be without an Imam according to their doctrine. This sect later separated into several other groups. Among them were those who admitted the death of Imam Hasan al-Askari, but added that he returned to life after a little while, in accordance with a tradition on the meaning of the word Qa’im, i.e. one who returns to life after his death. Also among them were those who claimed that he did die and did not return to life, but that he will return to life in the future. These groups incorporated some traditions (into their thought) from some early Waqifite Shiite movements.
Hasan al-Askari is buried in the mausoleum containing the remains of his father, Ali al-Hadi – The Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, Iraq. The site is considered a holy shrine for the Shi’a's, though a bomb blast on February 22, 2006 destroyed much of the structure, and another bomb blast on June 13, 2007 destroyed the two remaining minarets of the Al-Askariya Mosque.
Askari, Hassan al- see Hassan al-Askari
Hassan al-Askari (846-874). Eleventh imam of the Twelver Shi‘a (r.868-874). Hassan al-Askari lived almost his entire life under house arrest. He was 22 when he received the Imamate. During the six years of his tenure, he was severely restricted in his freedom and was often only able to speak to his followers through intermediaries. A controversy surrounded the birth of his son and successor, Muhammad al-Mahdi by a Byzantine slave, Narjis Khatun. Hasan Al-‘Askarī was 27, when martyred by Al-Mu'tamid (the Abbasid caliph) and was buried in Samarra.
Hasan al-Askari, whose ancestor was the Prophet Muhammad, was born in Medina to Ali al-Hadi and Saleel. His title al-Askari derives from the Arabic word Asker which means Army. Hasan's title was reflective of his living most of his life in a garrison town. He married a Byzantine princess who was the granddaughter of a Byzantine emperor, named Narjis.
Hasan al-Askari lived almost his entire life under house arrest in Samarra and under supervision of Abbasid caliphs. Despite his confinement as a prisoner, he was occasionally allowed to go to Baghdad, although it was under guard.
He was very knowledgeable and despite being confined to house arrest for almost his entire life, Hasan al-Askari was able to teach others about Islam, and even compiled a commentary on the Qur'an that would be used by later scholars.
Hasan al-Askari had one son, Muhammad al-Mahdi, who was six at the time of Hasan al-Askari's death and disappeared. Twelver Shi’as believe him to be the Mahdi; a very important figure in Islamic teaching who is believed will reappear at the end of time to fill the world with justice, peace and to establish Islam as the global religion.
Hasan al-Askari was four years old, when he was exiled to Samarra along with his father. He was placed under the caliph's observation at a point, which was the center of the armed forces.
Following the death of his father, Al-Mu'tamid (Abbasid caliph) imprisoned him. The piety and chastity of Hasan al-Askari attracted the attention of all the prisoners towards him, and made them all enticed and enchanted. The officials and agents of the caliph daily reported to the caliph as to his condition. Eventually, Hasan al-Askari was killed.
Hasan al-Askari died at the age of 27 by poison. Hasan al-Askari’s funeral was attended by many people, including the Abbasid caliph Al-Mu'tamid who is accused of being secretly responsible for the poisoning of Hasan al-Askari.
At the funeral services for Hasan al-Askari, his brother Ja'far ibn Ali, who was counted as one of the helpers of the caliph, stood up to offer the funeral prayer upon the body of Hasan al-Askari. However, as he was about to start the prayers, the son of Hasan al-Askari, who was a minor, came forward and said to his uncle to step aside because only an Imam can lead the funeral prayer of another Imam. After the funeral prayer, Muhammad al-Mahdi went into the house and disappeared. This was the beginning of the Minor Occultation (ghaybat-e-sughra).
After the death of Hasan al-Askari, there was a sect of his followers who believed, as a result of shock and bewilderment, that he did not die, but had instead entered occultation and that he was the Mahdi. According to this sect, their beliefs were based upon the impossibility of the death of the Imam without an apparent known issue (this sect did not believe in the imamate or even existence of Muhammad al-Mahdi), since the earth can never be without an Imam according to their doctrine. This sect later separated into several other groups. Among them were those who admitted the death of Imam Hasan al-Askari, but added that he returned to life after a little while, in accordance with a tradition on the meaning of the word Qa’im, i.e. one who returns to life after his death. Also among them were those who claimed that he did die and did not return to life, but that he will return to life in the future. These groups incorporated some traditions (into their thought) from some early Waqifite Shiite movements.
Hasan al-Askari is buried in the mausoleum containing the remains of his father, Ali al-Hadi – The Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, Iraq. The site is considered a holy shrine for the Shi’a's, though a bomb blast on February 22, 2006 destroyed much of the structure, and another bomb blast on June 13, 2007 destroyed the two remaining minarets of the Al-Askariya Mosque.
Askari, Hassan al- see Hassan al-Askari
Hassan ibn al-Nu‘man al-Ghassani
Hassan ibn al-Nu‘man al-Ghassani (Hasan ibn al-Nu'man<?I>) (d. 699). Umayyad general who played a decisive part in the consolidation of the conquest of Ifriqiya by storming Carthage.
The Battle of Carthage was fought in 698 between a Byzantine expeditionary force and the armies of the Umayyad Caliphate. Having lost Carthage to the Muslims, Emperor Leontius sent the navy under the command of John the Patrician and the droungarios Tiberius Apsimarus. They entered the harbor and successfully recaptured it, as well as the city, in a stunning surprise attack. The Arab forces fled to Kairouan.
The emir Hasan ibn al-Nu'man was in the midst of pacifying the lands of Tamazgh, but withdrew from campaigning in the field to confront the renewed Roman challenge to the emerging caliphate. At Kairouan, he began plans to retake Carthage the following spring. It is estimated that he headed a force of 40,000 men. The Romans sent out a call for help to their traditional allies, the native Amazigh, and even to their enemies the Visigoths and the Franks. Despite having retaken the city, the Romans were in disarray due to the bitter in-fighting that characterized medieval Romania and sapped much of its strength. The previous exarch Gennadius had been a traitor to the Christian cause, defecting to the Muslims and becoming their vassal. The king of the Visigoths, Witiza, sent a reputed force of 500 warriors in order to help defend Carthage, perhaps to help check the rising Muslim threat which was lopping off large chunks of the Roman Empire, so close to Visigothic Hispania.
Hasan ibn al-Nu'man, enraged at having to retake a city that had not resisted the Roman take over, offered no terms except to surrender or die. The emperor Leontius, infamous for his harsh reaction to failure, had also given his forces instructions of victory or death. The Romans did sally forth and engaged into battle with the Arabs directly, but were defeated. They later preferred to continue to incite revolt through the Amazigh princes. The Roman commander, John, decided to wait out the siege behind the walls of Carthage and let the Arabs exhaust themselves, since he could continue to be resupplied from the sea. however, the defenders were faced with Hasan's overwhelming force. Hasan's forces were deployed in ferocious attacks as his men continuously tried to scale the walls with ladders. The Arabs combined their land assault with an attack from the sea that caused John and Apsimarus to fear being trapped within the city. In the end, the determination of the defenders only resulted in the second and final great destruction of Carthage. The Romans retreated to the islands of Corsica, Sicily and Crete to further resist Muslim expansion and await the emperor's wrath.
John the Patrician was later murdered after a conspiracy at the hands of his co-commander, Tiberius Apsimarus. Tiberius Apsimarus then, instead of taking the step of returning to Africa to fight the Muslims, sailed instead to Constantinople. After a successful rebellion he rose to the throne as Tiberius III, and was later deposed by former emperor Justinian II, now known as the Rhinotmetus.
The conquest of North Africa by the forces of Islam was now nearly complete. Hasan ibn al-Nu'man was triumphant. Hasan met with trouble from the Zenata tribe of Berbers under al-Kahina. They inflicted a serious defeat on him and drove him back to Barqa. However, in 702 Caliph Abd al-Malik strongly reinforced him. Now with a large army and the support of the settled population of North Africa, Hasan pushed forward. He decisively defeated al-Kahina in the Battle of Tabarka, 85 miles (136 km) west of Carthage. He then developed the village of Tunis, ten miles from the destroyed Carthage. Around 705, Musa ibn Nusayr replaced Hasan. He pacified much of North Africa.
Hasan ibn al-Nu'man see Hassan ibn al-Nu‘man al-Ghassani
Hassan ibn al-Nu‘man al-Ghassani (Hasan ibn al-Nu'man<?I>) (d. 699). Umayyad general who played a decisive part in the consolidation of the conquest of Ifriqiya by storming Carthage.
The Battle of Carthage was fought in 698 between a Byzantine expeditionary force and the armies of the Umayyad Caliphate. Having lost Carthage to the Muslims, Emperor Leontius sent the navy under the command of John the Patrician and the droungarios Tiberius Apsimarus. They entered the harbor and successfully recaptured it, as well as the city, in a stunning surprise attack. The Arab forces fled to Kairouan.
The emir Hasan ibn al-Nu'man was in the midst of pacifying the lands of Tamazgh, but withdrew from campaigning in the field to confront the renewed Roman challenge to the emerging caliphate. At Kairouan, he began plans to retake Carthage the following spring. It is estimated that he headed a force of 40,000 men. The Romans sent out a call for help to their traditional allies, the native Amazigh, and even to their enemies the Visigoths and the Franks. Despite having retaken the city, the Romans were in disarray due to the bitter in-fighting that characterized medieval Romania and sapped much of its strength. The previous exarch Gennadius had been a traitor to the Christian cause, defecting to the Muslims and becoming their vassal. The king of the Visigoths, Witiza, sent a reputed force of 500 warriors in order to help defend Carthage, perhaps to help check the rising Muslim threat which was lopping off large chunks of the Roman Empire, so close to Visigothic Hispania.
Hasan ibn al-Nu'man, enraged at having to retake a city that had not resisted the Roman take over, offered no terms except to surrender or die. The emperor Leontius, infamous for his harsh reaction to failure, had also given his forces instructions of victory or death. The Romans did sally forth and engaged into battle with the Arabs directly, but were defeated. They later preferred to continue to incite revolt through the Amazigh princes. The Roman commander, John, decided to wait out the siege behind the walls of Carthage and let the Arabs exhaust themselves, since he could continue to be resupplied from the sea. however, the defenders were faced with Hasan's overwhelming force. Hasan's forces were deployed in ferocious attacks as his men continuously tried to scale the walls with ladders. The Arabs combined their land assault with an attack from the sea that caused John and Apsimarus to fear being trapped within the city. In the end, the determination of the defenders only resulted in the second and final great destruction of Carthage. The Romans retreated to the islands of Corsica, Sicily and Crete to further resist Muslim expansion and await the emperor's wrath.
John the Patrician was later murdered after a conspiracy at the hands of his co-commander, Tiberius Apsimarus. Tiberius Apsimarus then, instead of taking the step of returning to Africa to fight the Muslims, sailed instead to Constantinople. After a successful rebellion he rose to the throne as Tiberius III, and was later deposed by former emperor Justinian II, now known as the Rhinotmetus.
The conquest of North Africa by the forces of Islam was now nearly complete. Hasan ibn al-Nu'man was triumphant. Hasan met with trouble from the Zenata tribe of Berbers under al-Kahina. They inflicted a serious defeat on him and drove him back to Barqa. However, in 702 Caliph Abd al-Malik strongly reinforced him. Now with a large army and the support of the settled population of North Africa, Hasan pushed forward. He decisively defeated al-Kahina in the Battle of Tabarka, 85 miles (136 km) west of Carthage. He then developed the village of Tunis, ten miles from the destroyed Carthage. Around 705, Musa ibn Nusayr replaced Hasan. He pacified much of North Africa.
Hasan ibn al-Nu'man see Hassan ibn al-Nu‘man al-Ghassani
Hassan ibn Thabit
Hassan ibn Thabit (d. 674). Traditionally known as the “poet laureate” of the Prophet, he is the most prominent of several poets who were associated with the rise of Islam.
Hassan ibn Thabit was an Arabian poet and one of the Sahaba, or companions of Muhammad. He was born in Yathrib (Medina), and was a member of the Banu Khazraj tribe.
In his youth, he traveled to Al-Hirah and Damascus, then settled in Medina, where, after the advent of Muhammad, he accepted Islam and wrote poems in defense of him. He was one of the best poets of the time, who would often win poetry competitions and the like. He was a prime example of how the early Muslims were able to use their pre-Islam talents for the cause of Islam.
Muhammad gave Hassan his slave Sirin, the sister of Muhammad's wife Maria al-Qibtiyya. The sisters were Egyptian Coptic Christians sent as gifts to Muhammad by Muqawqis, a ruler of Egypt, in around 628. Sirin bore Hassan a son, 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Hassan.
Hassan ibn Thabit (d. 674). Traditionally known as the “poet laureate” of the Prophet, he is the most prominent of several poets who were associated with the rise of Islam.
Hassan ibn Thabit was an Arabian poet and one of the Sahaba, or companions of Muhammad. He was born in Yathrib (Medina), and was a member of the Banu Khazraj tribe.
In his youth, he traveled to Al-Hirah and Damascus, then settled in Medina, where, after the advent of Muhammad, he accepted Islam and wrote poems in defense of him. He was one of the best poets of the time, who would often win poetry competitions and the like. He was a prime example of how the early Muslims were able to use their pre-Islam talents for the cause of Islam.
Muhammad gave Hassan his slave Sirin, the sister of Muhammad's wife Maria al-Qibtiyya. The sisters were Egyptian Coptic Christians sent as gifts to Muhammad by Muqawqis, a ruler of Egypt, in around 628. Sirin bore Hassan a son, 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Hassan.
Hatem
Hatem (George Hatem) (Shafick George Hatem) (Ma Haide) (Ma Hai-te) (1910-1988). Medical adviser in Communist China. Hatem was a Lebanese-American born in New York. Hatem went to Shanghai in 1933 after completing medical studies in Switzerland. Shaken by the turmoil and health conditions around him, he was persuaded by Agnes Smedley to visit Communist led guerrilla units in northwest China. Hatem made the trip with Edgar Snow in 1936 and never returned. In Yan’an, he married a Chinese actress, joined the Chinese Communist Party, and became the backbone of a new health care system in guerrilla-held areas during World War II. After the Communists came to power in 1949, Hatem helped to design health policies for the entire nation. He is noted in particular for leading a successful campaign to wipe out venereal disease in the 1950s. In later years, his chief focus has been on the eradication of leprosy. In 1986, Hatem received the Lasker Award in recognition of his efforts to conquer these diseases in China.
Ma Haide, born Shafick George Hatem, was a doctor and public health official in China from 1933 until his death.
Shafick George Hatem was born into a family of Syrian Jewish extraction, living in Buffalo, New York in 1910. His parents immigrated to the United States from the village of Hamana in the Metn mountains of Lebanon. He attended pre-med classes at the University of North Carolina and medicine at the American University in Beirut and the University of Geneva. While in Geneva, he, called by friends Shag, became acquainted with students from East Asia, and learned much about China. With financial help from the parents of one of his friends, he and several others set off to Shanghai to establish a medical practice to concentrate on venereal diseases, as well as basic health care for the needy. On August 3, 1933, he with colleagues, Lazar Katz and Robert Levinson, boarded a ship in Triest that took him to several ports in Asia, including Singapore and Hong Kong. On September 5, the three young American doctors landed in Shanghai.
Shafick George Hatem set up a practice in Shanghai, and changed his name to Ma Hai-te (Ma Haide). It was in Shanghai that he met the well known journalist, Agnes Smedley, who introduced him to Liu Ting, a member of the Communist Party of China. Disgusted by the corruption of Shanghai and the Chinese Nationalists, he closed his practice there three years later, and, with the help of the earlier established Communist contacts, was smuggled across Kuomintang lines to provide medical service to Mao Zedong's Communist troops in Xi'an (Sian).
In the summer of 1936, Ma travelled to the Communist headquarters at Yan'an, the capital of the Communist-controlled Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. He was accompanied by the pioneering American journalist Edgar Snow. At Hatem's request, he was not explicitly mentioned in the first edition of Snow's famous book, Red Star Over China. He is there anonymously as a western-trained doctor who had examined Mao and determined he was not dying of some mysterious disease, which was the rumor at the time. He also became the first foreign member of the Chinese Communist Party.
As the war with Japan in started for real in 1937, Ma Haide sent requests to Soong Ching-ling, Agnes Smedley, and other notables to organize recruitment of foreign medical personnel for the communists' troops fighting the Japanese armies in northern China. He was among those meeting Norman Bethune when Bethune arrived in Yan'an in late March 1938, and was instrumental in helping Bethune get started at his task of organizing medical services for the front and the region.
Ma Haide was present at Yan'an, when the Dixie Mission, an American civilian and military group, arrived in July 1944. Ma was a source of surprise and comfort for many of the Americans when they met the American born physician. Many accounts of the mission make reference to Haide. Known commonly to the group as "Doc Ma," Ma periodically assisted Major Melvin Casberg in studies of the state of medical treatment in the Communist territories.
He remained a doctor with the Communists until their victory in 1949, and then became a public health official. He is credited with helping to eliminate leprosy and many venereal diseases in post-war China for which he received the Lasker Medical Award for his efforts in 1986. He was one of the few non-Chinese persons to hold a position of trust and authority in the People's Republic of China. His Chinese name can be loosely translated to mean,"Horse" and "Virtue From the Sea".
He died in China in 1988 and was buried at the Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery.
During his life, Ma Haide was honored in his city Hammana in Lebanon, where the main square of the city is named after him.
Tere is an extensive interview with him in the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's groundbreaking ninety minute documentary by Patrick Watson, The Seven Hundred Million (1964)
A film about him, showing an American doctor affirming Communist ideology is broadcast frequently in the People's Republic of China. Consequently, his story is familiar to all PRC Chinese.
George Hatem see Hatem
Ma Haide see Hatem
Haide, Ma see Hatem
Hatem, George see Hatem
Shafick George Hatem see Hatem
Hatem, Shafick George see Hatem
Hatem (George Hatem) (Shafick George Hatem) (Ma Haide) (Ma Hai-te) (1910-1988). Medical adviser in Communist China. Hatem was a Lebanese-American born in New York. Hatem went to Shanghai in 1933 after completing medical studies in Switzerland. Shaken by the turmoil and health conditions around him, he was persuaded by Agnes Smedley to visit Communist led guerrilla units in northwest China. Hatem made the trip with Edgar Snow in 1936 and never returned. In Yan’an, he married a Chinese actress, joined the Chinese Communist Party, and became the backbone of a new health care system in guerrilla-held areas during World War II. After the Communists came to power in 1949, Hatem helped to design health policies for the entire nation. He is noted in particular for leading a successful campaign to wipe out venereal disease in the 1950s. In later years, his chief focus has been on the eradication of leprosy. In 1986, Hatem received the Lasker Award in recognition of his efforts to conquer these diseases in China.
Ma Haide, born Shafick George Hatem, was a doctor and public health official in China from 1933 until his death.
Shafick George Hatem was born into a family of Syrian Jewish extraction, living in Buffalo, New York in 1910. His parents immigrated to the United States from the village of Hamana in the Metn mountains of Lebanon. He attended pre-med classes at the University of North Carolina and medicine at the American University in Beirut and the University of Geneva. While in Geneva, he, called by friends Shag, became acquainted with students from East Asia, and learned much about China. With financial help from the parents of one of his friends, he and several others set off to Shanghai to establish a medical practice to concentrate on venereal diseases, as well as basic health care for the needy. On August 3, 1933, he with colleagues, Lazar Katz and Robert Levinson, boarded a ship in Triest that took him to several ports in Asia, including Singapore and Hong Kong. On September 5, the three young American doctors landed in Shanghai.
Shafick George Hatem set up a practice in Shanghai, and changed his name to Ma Hai-te (Ma Haide). It was in Shanghai that he met the well known journalist, Agnes Smedley, who introduced him to Liu Ting, a member of the Communist Party of China. Disgusted by the corruption of Shanghai and the Chinese Nationalists, he closed his practice there three years later, and, with the help of the earlier established Communist contacts, was smuggled across Kuomintang lines to provide medical service to Mao Zedong's Communist troops in Xi'an (Sian).
In the summer of 1936, Ma travelled to the Communist headquarters at Yan'an, the capital of the Communist-controlled Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. He was accompanied by the pioneering American journalist Edgar Snow. At Hatem's request, he was not explicitly mentioned in the first edition of Snow's famous book, Red Star Over China. He is there anonymously as a western-trained doctor who had examined Mao and determined he was not dying of some mysterious disease, which was the rumor at the time. He also became the first foreign member of the Chinese Communist Party.
As the war with Japan in started for real in 1937, Ma Haide sent requests to Soong Ching-ling, Agnes Smedley, and other notables to organize recruitment of foreign medical personnel for the communists' troops fighting the Japanese armies in northern China. He was among those meeting Norman Bethune when Bethune arrived in Yan'an in late March 1938, and was instrumental in helping Bethune get started at his task of organizing medical services for the front and the region.
Ma Haide was present at Yan'an, when the Dixie Mission, an American civilian and military group, arrived in July 1944. Ma was a source of surprise and comfort for many of the Americans when they met the American born physician. Many accounts of the mission make reference to Haide. Known commonly to the group as "Doc Ma," Ma periodically assisted Major Melvin Casberg in studies of the state of medical treatment in the Communist territories.
He remained a doctor with the Communists until their victory in 1949, and then became a public health official. He is credited with helping to eliminate leprosy and many venereal diseases in post-war China for which he received the Lasker Medical Award for his efforts in 1986. He was one of the few non-Chinese persons to hold a position of trust and authority in the People's Republic of China. His Chinese name can be loosely translated to mean,"Horse" and "Virtue From the Sea".
He died in China in 1988 and was buried at the Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery.
During his life, Ma Haide was honored in his city Hammana in Lebanon, where the main square of the city is named after him.
Tere is an extensive interview with him in the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's groundbreaking ninety minute documentary by Patrick Watson, The Seven Hundred Million (1964)
A film about him, showing an American doctor affirming Communist ideology is broadcast frequently in the People's Republic of China. Consequently, his story is familiar to all PRC Chinese.
George Hatem see Hatem
Ma Haide see Hatem
Haide, Ma see Hatem
Hatem, George see Hatem
Shafick George Hatem see Hatem
Hatem, Shafick George see Hatem
Hathout, Maher
Maher Hathout (January 1, 1936 – January 3, 2015) was a leading American-Muslim community leader of Egyptian origin, and widely regarded as the Father of the American Muslim identity. Hathout helped to found the Muslim Public Affairs Council and spoke extensively against Islamic radicalism.
Maher Hathout (January 1, 1936 – January 3, 2015) was a leading American-Muslim community leader of Egyptian origin, and widely regarded as the Father of the American Muslim identity. Hathout helped to found the Muslim Public Affairs Council and spoke extensively against Islamic radicalism.
Born in Cairo, Egypt in 1936, Hathout eventually moved to Buffalo, New York, and then to Los Angeles. He immersed himself in volunteering at the Islamic Center of Southern California (ICSC) as Chairman and Spokesperson. One of the most progressive mosques in the country – the ICSC had a woman on its board of directors in 1952 – the Islamic Center became a vehicle for a vision of Islam in America that is rooted in what Hathout called the definition of home: "Home is not where my grandparents are buried, but where my grandchildren will be raised."
Hathout stressed throughout his life that being a faithful Muslim was entirely compatible with being a proud American, and that Islam is a religion of coexistence, reason and moderation.
He was also among the pioneers of interfaith engagement within the American Muslim community, helping found the Religious Coalition Against War in the Middle East with Reverend George Regas and Rabbi Leonard Beerman in 1991. Hathout was a charter member of the Pacific Council on International Policy, the western partner of the Council on Foreign Relations, and served on the Board of Directors of the Interfaith Alliance and Claremont Lincoln University.
Over the years, Hathout was invited repeatedly to Capitol Hill and the State Department to address a variety of topics, such as "Islam and U.S. Policy," "Islamic Democracy," "Emerging Trends in Islamic Movements," and "The Future of the Middle East." He was also the first Muslim invited to give the invocation prayer at the Democratic National Convention in 2000.
Hathout was the recipient of many awards, including the George Regas Courageous Peacemaker Award, the Islamic Shura Council of Southern California’s Lifetime Service Award, the South Coast Interfaith Council Award for his life-long commitment to interfaith work and the Los Angeles County John Allen Buggs Award for excellence in human relations. He died of cancer in Duarte, California on January 3, 2015.
Hatta
Hatta (Mohammad Hatta) (August 12, 1902 - March 14, 1980). Vice-president of Indonesia (1945-1956). A Minangkabau born in Bukittinggi (West Sumatra) and educated in Dutch primary and secondary schools in Padang and Batavia, Hatta gained his early political experience as treasurer of the Jong Sumatranen Bond in Padang and Batavia. In 1922, he proceeded to tertiary studies in Rotterdam, where he remained for ten years. He was involved in converting the Indische Vereeninging, the Indies students’ society in the Netherlands, from a social club into the politically active Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indonesian Union). He became chairman in 1926 and contributed to the planning of a new nationalist party in the Indies, became involved with the League against Imperialism, was arrested in 1927, tried for subversive activities, and acquitted. He returned to Batavia in 1932.
In 1931, Hatta was instrumental in founding the Club Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia (National Education Club), arguing that educating nationalist cadres was more important than forming mass parties, such as the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), that could be easily suppressed by the authorities. Arrested in 1935, Hatta was exiled first to Boven Digul and then to Banda Naira. He was brought back to Java just before the Japanese invasion and served during the occupation regime as vice-chairman of its mass organizations. In August 1945, he, together with Sukarno, signed Indonesia’s Proclamation of Independence, and he became vice-president. In 1948, during a period of acute factional rivalry, Sukarno commissioned him to form a government, and as prime minister Hatta presided over negotiations with the Dutch and the transfer of sovereignty to the republic. Increasingly disturbed by political trends in the early fifties, he resigned as vice-president in December 1956.
A social democrat in political outlook, Hatta was a devout Muslim who believed in the possibility of a synthesis of Islam and socialism. He advocated the development of cooperatives as a solution to Indonesia’s economic problems. As vice-president, Hatta was seen as balancing Sukarno in a two-in-one unity (dwi-tunngal): Java-Sumatra, Javanism-Islam, passion-intellect, nation builder-administrator. After his resignation, Hatta remained a respected elder statesman until his death.
Mohammad Hatta see Hatta
Hatta (Mohammad Hatta) (August 12, 1902 - March 14, 1980). Vice-president of Indonesia (1945-1956). A Minangkabau born in Bukittinggi (West Sumatra) and educated in Dutch primary and secondary schools in Padang and Batavia, Hatta gained his early political experience as treasurer of the Jong Sumatranen Bond in Padang and Batavia. In 1922, he proceeded to tertiary studies in Rotterdam, where he remained for ten years. He was involved in converting the Indische Vereeninging, the Indies students’ society in the Netherlands, from a social club into the politically active Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indonesian Union). He became chairman in 1926 and contributed to the planning of a new nationalist party in the Indies, became involved with the League against Imperialism, was arrested in 1927, tried for subversive activities, and acquitted. He returned to Batavia in 1932.
In 1931, Hatta was instrumental in founding the Club Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia (National Education Club), arguing that educating nationalist cadres was more important than forming mass parties, such as the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), that could be easily suppressed by the authorities. Arrested in 1935, Hatta was exiled first to Boven Digul and then to Banda Naira. He was brought back to Java just before the Japanese invasion and served during the occupation regime as vice-chairman of its mass organizations. In August 1945, he, together with Sukarno, signed Indonesia’s Proclamation of Independence, and he became vice-president. In 1948, during a period of acute factional rivalry, Sukarno commissioned him to form a government, and as prime minister Hatta presided over negotiations with the Dutch and the transfer of sovereignty to the republic. Increasingly disturbed by political trends in the early fifties, he resigned as vice-president in December 1956.
A social democrat in political outlook, Hatta was a devout Muslim who believed in the possibility of a synthesis of Islam and socialism. He advocated the development of cooperatives as a solution to Indonesia’s economic problems. As vice-president, Hatta was seen as balancing Sukarno in a two-in-one unity (dwi-tunngal): Java-Sumatra, Javanism-Islam, passion-intellect, nation builder-administrator. After his resignation, Hatta remained a respected elder statesman until his death.
Mohammad Hatta see Hatta
Hausa
Hausa. The Hausa are a large and diverse West African group, collectively the most numerous Muslim people south of the Sahara. Although Hausa speakers are to be found throughout West Africa, most Hausa live in the northern states of Nigeria and, to a lesser extent, in the southern parts of the Niger republic.
A large part of the Hausa identity involves being Muslim. Nowhere in Hausaland is the impress of Islam absent. Prior to European conquest, the Hausa lived in walled city-states with a sharply hierarchical social organization reminiscent of the European feudal era. Sunni Islam first came to the region in the thirteenth century, brought by western Sudanic and Arab merchants. The Maliki school of law, still followed by the Hausa, dates from this early period. Almost as old as the Ajemic script -- a form of medieval Arabic writing -- which made the Hausa a literate people long before Europeans arrived. Thus, Islamic influence has a long history among the Hausa, particularly in the cities and among the ruling aristocracy.
The purity of that Islam, however, was questioned by a Fulani-speaking scholar and religious leader, Uthman dan Fodio, who in 1802 declared jihad against the traditional Hausa rulers. Ultimately, most of the Hausa aristocracy were replaced by followers of Uthman, and Islam was extended far to the south. The old Hausa states became emirates linked to a central caliphate in the new city of Sokoto, which today remains a center of Muslim learning and orthodoxy.
Many Fulani remain pastoral nomads, culturally distinct from Hausa, while many Hausa trace their origins to other, non-Fulani groups. Hausa-Fulani places undue emphasis on a single one of the streams whose modern confluence has created the Hausa. Actually, Hausa often have the same sort of hyphenated ethnic identity common in North America. Just as there are Italian-Americans and Irish-Canadians, so are there Fulani-Hausa, Gbari-Hausa and Kanuri-Hausa. At times, entire communities have, for various reasons, become Hausa (e.g., Gbari, Koro), adopting Hausa language and dress and certain of the most widespread Hausa customs, as well as the Muslim religion. Some Hausa like to distinguish between the seven traditional city states of the Hausa -- the Hausa Seven or Hausa Bakwai -- and all other Hausa, termed the “useless Hausa” or Hausa Banza. The historical truthfulness of this distinction is unclear.
Hausa itself is a term which refers to an ethnic group and language in West Africa (especially Niger and Nigeria). The Hausa people are now predominantly Muslim, dwelling mainly in the northern region of Nigeria. Islamic rites of slaughter and prayer were introduced in Kano by Mandingo missionaries in the fourteenth century. A further stage in the establishment of Islam was the arrival of the North African divine. Abd al-Karim al-Maghili in the fifteenth century Islamic literature, written in Hausa, is almost entirely in verse and religious in character. The Hausa language is second to Swahili as the language with the most speakers in Black Africa.
The Hausa are a racially diverse, but culturally fairly homogeneous, tribe numbering about 10 to 15 million people. Historically, organized into a group of feudal city-states, the Hausa were conquered from the 14th century on by a succession of West African kingdoms, among them, Mali, Songhai, Bornu, and Fula. They occasionally attained enough power and unity, however, to throw off foreign domination and to engage in local conquest and slave raiding themselves. In the opening years of the 20th century, with the Hausa on the verge of overthrowing the Fula, the British invaded northern Nigeria and instituted their policy of indirect rule. Under the British and Fula, the Hausa were supported in their political supremacy, and the Hausa-Fula ruling coalition, still dominant in northern Nigeria, was confirmed. The beginnings of this coalition were, however, much earlier, because the Fula governed by simply assuming the highest hereditary positions in the well-organized Hausa political system. Many of the ruling Fula have now become culturally and linguistically Hausa.
Although the earliest Hausas were animists, Islam is now the dominant organized religion among all but several thousand Hausa, called Maguzawa. Hausa culture manifest a greater degree of specialization and diversification than that of most of the surrounding peoples. Subsistence agriculture is the primary occupation of most, but other skills such as tanning, dyeing, weaving, and metalworking are also highly developed. Hausas have long been famous for wide-ranging itinerant trading, and wealthy merchants share the highest social positions with the politically powerful and the learned.
The Hausa language is the largest and best-known member of the Chadic sub-family of the Afro-Asiatic family of languagtes. Hausa has borrowed freely from other languages, especially Arabic, and is adapting well to the demands of contemporary cultural change. It has become a common language for millions of non-Hausa West Africans, and sizable Hausa-speaking communites exist in each major city of West or North Africa as well as along the trans-Saharan trade and pilgrimage routes. An extensive literature and several periodicals in Romanized script have been produced since the beginning of British rule. An Arabic based writing system, developed before the British conquest, is still in limited use.
Hausa. The Hausa are a large and diverse West African group, collectively the most numerous Muslim people south of the Sahara. Although Hausa speakers are to be found throughout West Africa, most Hausa live in the northern states of Nigeria and, to a lesser extent, in the southern parts of the Niger republic.
A large part of the Hausa identity involves being Muslim. Nowhere in Hausaland is the impress of Islam absent. Prior to European conquest, the Hausa lived in walled city-states with a sharply hierarchical social organization reminiscent of the European feudal era. Sunni Islam first came to the region in the thirteenth century, brought by western Sudanic and Arab merchants. The Maliki school of law, still followed by the Hausa, dates from this early period. Almost as old as the Ajemic script -- a form of medieval Arabic writing -- which made the Hausa a literate people long before Europeans arrived. Thus, Islamic influence has a long history among the Hausa, particularly in the cities and among the ruling aristocracy.
The purity of that Islam, however, was questioned by a Fulani-speaking scholar and religious leader, Uthman dan Fodio, who in 1802 declared jihad against the traditional Hausa rulers. Ultimately, most of the Hausa aristocracy were replaced by followers of Uthman, and Islam was extended far to the south. The old Hausa states became emirates linked to a central caliphate in the new city of Sokoto, which today remains a center of Muslim learning and orthodoxy.
Many Fulani remain pastoral nomads, culturally distinct from Hausa, while many Hausa trace their origins to other, non-Fulani groups. Hausa-Fulani places undue emphasis on a single one of the streams whose modern confluence has created the Hausa. Actually, Hausa often have the same sort of hyphenated ethnic identity common in North America. Just as there are Italian-Americans and Irish-Canadians, so are there Fulani-Hausa, Gbari-Hausa and Kanuri-Hausa. At times, entire communities have, for various reasons, become Hausa (e.g., Gbari, Koro), adopting Hausa language and dress and certain of the most widespread Hausa customs, as well as the Muslim religion. Some Hausa like to distinguish between the seven traditional city states of the Hausa -- the Hausa Seven or Hausa Bakwai -- and all other Hausa, termed the “useless Hausa” or Hausa Banza. The historical truthfulness of this distinction is unclear.
Hausa itself is a term which refers to an ethnic group and language in West Africa (especially Niger and Nigeria). The Hausa people are now predominantly Muslim, dwelling mainly in the northern region of Nigeria. Islamic rites of slaughter and prayer were introduced in Kano by Mandingo missionaries in the fourteenth century. A further stage in the establishment of Islam was the arrival of the North African divine. Abd al-Karim al-Maghili in the fifteenth century Islamic literature, written in Hausa, is almost entirely in verse and religious in character. The Hausa language is second to Swahili as the language with the most speakers in Black Africa.
The Hausa are a racially diverse, but culturally fairly homogeneous, tribe numbering about 10 to 15 million people. Historically, organized into a group of feudal city-states, the Hausa were conquered from the 14th century on by a succession of West African kingdoms, among them, Mali, Songhai, Bornu, and Fula. They occasionally attained enough power and unity, however, to throw off foreign domination and to engage in local conquest and slave raiding themselves. In the opening years of the 20th century, with the Hausa on the verge of overthrowing the Fula, the British invaded northern Nigeria and instituted their policy of indirect rule. Under the British and Fula, the Hausa were supported in their political supremacy, and the Hausa-Fula ruling coalition, still dominant in northern Nigeria, was confirmed. The beginnings of this coalition were, however, much earlier, because the Fula governed by simply assuming the highest hereditary positions in the well-organized Hausa political system. Many of the ruling Fula have now become culturally and linguistically Hausa.
Although the earliest Hausas were animists, Islam is now the dominant organized religion among all but several thousand Hausa, called Maguzawa. Hausa culture manifest a greater degree of specialization and diversification than that of most of the surrounding peoples. Subsistence agriculture is the primary occupation of most, but other skills such as tanning, dyeing, weaving, and metalworking are also highly developed. Hausas have long been famous for wide-ranging itinerant trading, and wealthy merchants share the highest social positions with the politically powerful and the learned.
The Hausa language is the largest and best-known member of the Chadic sub-family of the Afro-Asiatic family of languagtes. Hausa has borrowed freely from other languages, especially Arabic, and is adapting well to the demands of contemporary cultural change. It has become a common language for millions of non-Hausa West Africans, and sizable Hausa-speaking communites exist in each major city of West or North Africa as well as along the trans-Saharan trade and pilgrimage routes. An extensive literature and several periodicals in Romanized script have been produced since the beginning of British rule. An Arabic based writing system, developed before the British conquest, is still in limited use.
Hausa slaves
Hausa slaves. The Hausa Kingdom was an ancient black kingdom in northern Nigeria which converted to Islam in the thirteenth century (c. 1203). It flourished throughout the Middle Ages and, in about 1500, emerged as a powerful military state in West Africa. It was conquered by the Fula in 1870. At one time, the Hausa language was spoken throughout the western Sudan. In Brazil and elsewhere in tropical America, "Hausa" became a generic term applied to a large number of black slaves brought from northern Nigeria. They were distinguished by a stubby beard. The Hausa slaves led rigorous and even austere lives, refusing to mix with the other slaves. These blacks, members of Islam, were largely responsible for the slave uprisings in the Brazilian province of Bahia in the first half of the nineteenth century. The Hausas had powerful secret societies such as the Obgoni which generally followed the same lines as those in West Africa. Their language was spoken in Bahia during the entire nineteenth century and perhaps even in the eighteenth century. Though relatively few in number, their influence was considerable. After abolition in 1888, many Hausas were repatriated to the city of Ardra.
Hausa slaves. The Hausa Kingdom was an ancient black kingdom in northern Nigeria which converted to Islam in the thirteenth century (c. 1203). It flourished throughout the Middle Ages and, in about 1500, emerged as a powerful military state in West Africa. It was conquered by the Fula in 1870. At one time, the Hausa language was spoken throughout the western Sudan. In Brazil and elsewhere in tropical America, "Hausa" became a generic term applied to a large number of black slaves brought from northern Nigeria. They were distinguished by a stubby beard. The Hausa slaves led rigorous and even austere lives, refusing to mix with the other slaves. These blacks, members of Islam, were largely responsible for the slave uprisings in the Brazilian province of Bahia in the first half of the nineteenth century. The Hausas had powerful secret societies such as the Obgoni which generally followed the same lines as those in West Africa. Their language was spoken in Bahia during the entire nineteenth century and perhaps even in the eighteenth century. Though relatively few in number, their influence was considerable. After abolition in 1888, many Hausas were repatriated to the city of Ardra.
Haut Conseil de Securite
Haut Conseil de Securite (HCE). Temporary body that governed Algeria from January 12, 1992 until the end of 1993. HCE was established after the elections of 1991, where the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) was close to winning. HCE was made up of five members, who in 1992 were: Khalid Nezzar, Ali Kafi, Ali Haroun, Tijani Heddam (the religious leader of the Great Mosque in Paris) and its chairman Muhammad Boudiaf. At first HCE declared that they should govern Algeria until the presidency of Chadly had finished towards the end of 1993. Boudiaf was shot in Annaba while giving a lecture, on June 29, by one of his security guards. Ali Kafi became the new leader after him. When the mandate of HCE ran out in 1993, Liamine Zeroual became president, and had the authority of HCE transferred to himself.
HCE see Haut Conseil de Securite
Haut Conseil de Securite (HCE). Temporary body that governed Algeria from January 12, 1992 until the end of 1993. HCE was established after the elections of 1991, where the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) was close to winning. HCE was made up of five members, who in 1992 were: Khalid Nezzar, Ali Kafi, Ali Haroun, Tijani Heddam (the religious leader of the Great Mosque in Paris) and its chairman Muhammad Boudiaf. At first HCE declared that they should govern Algeria until the presidency of Chadly had finished towards the end of 1993. Boudiaf was shot in Annaba while giving a lecture, on June 29, by one of his security guards. Ali Kafi became the new leader after him. When the mandate of HCE ran out in 1993, Liamine Zeroual became president, and had the authority of HCE transferred to himself.
HCE see Haut Conseil de Securite
Hawwara
Hawwara. Name of a Berber people, who spread from Tripolitania to Fazzan, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Spain, Sicily, Egypt and the Sudan.
Hawwara. Name of a Berber people, who spread from Tripolitania to Fazzan, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Spain, Sicily, Egypt and the Sudan.
Hayatu ibn Sa’id
Hayatu ibn Sa’id (c.1840-1898). Mahdist figure in the Central Sudanic region of Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria. Hayatu ibn Sa’id was a great-grandson of the Fula Islamic revolutionary leader ‘Uthman dan Fodio. He was born in the Sokoto Caliphate in northern Nigeria.
After his early ambitions for high political office in Sokoto were frustrated, Hayatu ibn Sa’id left for Adamawa in the southeastern part of the empire. In 1881, when Muhammed ‘Ahmad proclaimed himself the Mahdi in Sudan, Hayatu became his protégé in the central Sudan. Hayatu attracted many adherents to the town of Balda and maintained a large following throughout Adamawa.
The Sokoto empire, however, did not recognize Muhammed ‘Ahmad. By 1892, Zubeiru, the governor of Adamawa, felt he could no longer tolerate the presence of the Mahdists. Zubeiru challenged Hayatu on the battlefield. In the resulting battle, Hayatu was victorious. However, the victory only made the rulers of Sokoto’s other emirates more fearful of him.
Hayatu decided to throw in his lot with Rabeh Zubair, another Mahdist leader. Their combined forces conquered Bornu in 1893. Rabeh became the ruler of Bornu. Hayatu, frustrated with his subordinate role, attempted to break away.
In 1898, the forces of Hayatu and Rabeh met on the battlefield. Hayatu’s forces were defeated and Hayatu was killed.
Hayatu left a legacy of consciousness and concern over the coming of the Mahdi in Sokoto at a time when these had been on the verge of fading away. The Mahdist movement grew and became a rallying point for anti-British sentiment after Hayatu’s death.
Hayatu ibn Sa’id (c.1840-1898). Mahdist figure in the Central Sudanic region of Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria. Hayatu ibn Sa’id was a great-grandson of the Fula Islamic revolutionary leader ‘Uthman dan Fodio. He was born in the Sokoto Caliphate in northern Nigeria.
After his early ambitions for high political office in Sokoto were frustrated, Hayatu ibn Sa’id left for Adamawa in the southeastern part of the empire. In 1881, when Muhammed ‘Ahmad proclaimed himself the Mahdi in Sudan, Hayatu became his protégé in the central Sudan. Hayatu attracted many adherents to the town of Balda and maintained a large following throughout Adamawa.
The Sokoto empire, however, did not recognize Muhammed ‘Ahmad. By 1892, Zubeiru, the governor of Adamawa, felt he could no longer tolerate the presence of the Mahdists. Zubeiru challenged Hayatu on the battlefield. In the resulting battle, Hayatu was victorious. However, the victory only made the rulers of Sokoto’s other emirates more fearful of him.
Hayatu decided to throw in his lot with Rabeh Zubair, another Mahdist leader. Their combined forces conquered Bornu in 1893. Rabeh became the ruler of Bornu. Hayatu, frustrated with his subordinate role, attempted to break away.
In 1898, the forces of Hayatu and Rabeh met on the battlefield. Hayatu’s forces were defeated and Hayatu was killed.
Hayatu left a legacy of consciousness and concern over the coming of the Mahdi in Sokoto at a time when these had been on the verge of fading away. The Mahdist movement grew and became a rallying point for anti-British sentiment after Hayatu’s death.
Haydar-i Amuli
Haydar-i Amuli (1320-after 1385). Early representative of Persian theosophy and a commentator of Ibn al-‘Arabi.
Haydar-i Amuli (1320-after 1385). Early representative of Persian theosophy and a commentator of Ibn al-‘Arabi.
Hayy ibn Yaqzan
Hayy ibn Yaqzan. Name of the principal character of two philosophical allegories, one by Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and the other by Ibn Tufayl.
Hayy ibn Yaqzan. Name of the principal character of two philosophical allegories, one by Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and the other by Ibn Tufayl.
Hazaras
Hazaras. One of Afghanistan’s most impoverished ethnic groups, yet most resistant to central government domination, is the Hazaras. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, they became virtually independent of government control.
Hazara origins are obscure. They appear to be descendants of two types of people: the “original” Indo-Iranian inhabitants of the Hindu Kush region, and the Mongol and Turkic groups who came to dominate it in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The term hazara itself suggests a Mongol-Persian blend. It means “thousand” in Farsi, but it is believed to be a Persianized equivalent for the Mongol word for “thousand,” minggan. The Mongols, at one time, designated a fighting unit by this term; as this unit consisted of a kinship unit providing a thousand horsemen, it meant, in fact, “tribe.” Presumably as the Hindu Kush Mongols acquired Farsi, the Farsi equivalent replaced the Mongol word. By the fifteenth century, hazara meant “mountain tribe,” and somewhat later on it came to mean specifically the group now called Hazara.
This shift in meaning corresponded with a retreat of the Mongol tribes into the mountainous area now known as the Hazarajat. They were gradually pushed out of the more desirable lowlands neighboring the Hindu Kush by competing tribal groups. From the south and west they were pressed by the Pushtun tribes; from the north by Turkmen tribes who liked to raid them for slaves. Eventually, the Hazaras rebelled in 1891; after two years of war they were totally crushed. Many were forced out of their homelands; most fled to Mashad and Quetta. Later the expatriate Hazaras were offered amnesty to return and were given land.
An important consequence of the war was the opening of the Hazarajat to Pushtun nomads, who grazed their flocks there during the summer. By loaning money and selling products from India, the nomads gained economic advantage over many Hazaras and acquired ownership of some of their lands. Impoverished Hazaras migrated to the cities, mainly Ghazni, Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, to work as hired laborers in winter, returning in spring to farm their lands.
After 1978, when the Khalq Party took over the Afghanistan government, the Hazaras in diverse areas, without coordination, revolted, the earliest to revolt being those in the northern and eastern provinces. After the Soviet invasion in December 1979, the entire Hazarajat with the exception of a landing strip in Bamian, remained virtually independent of government control. Interest in tribal ties based on patrilineal descent appears to have been rekindled in this context. Subgroups within the Hazarajat, however, remained autonomous, each managing its own judicial and administrative affairs. An attempt in 1979 to unite the Hazaras, in which a prominent Sayyid was elected to be first of several rotating supreme commanders, failed.
The active resistance units among the Hazaras are called “fronts.” Those fronts that have seen the most military action against Afghan and Soviet military forces, because they lie along the routes of access into the Hazarajat, are Behsud (which controls the Unai Pass) and Sheikh Ali, Turkmen and Surkh-o-Parsa (because they controlled access to the Shibar Pass) and the Hazara communities of Turkestan, especially Chararkint and Dare-Suf.
Hazaras. One of Afghanistan’s most impoverished ethnic groups, yet most resistant to central government domination, is the Hazaras. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, they became virtually independent of government control.
Hazara origins are obscure. They appear to be descendants of two types of people: the “original” Indo-Iranian inhabitants of the Hindu Kush region, and the Mongol and Turkic groups who came to dominate it in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The term hazara itself suggests a Mongol-Persian blend. It means “thousand” in Farsi, but it is believed to be a Persianized equivalent for the Mongol word for “thousand,” minggan. The Mongols, at one time, designated a fighting unit by this term; as this unit consisted of a kinship unit providing a thousand horsemen, it meant, in fact, “tribe.” Presumably as the Hindu Kush Mongols acquired Farsi, the Farsi equivalent replaced the Mongol word. By the fifteenth century, hazara meant “mountain tribe,” and somewhat later on it came to mean specifically the group now called Hazara.
This shift in meaning corresponded with a retreat of the Mongol tribes into the mountainous area now known as the Hazarajat. They were gradually pushed out of the more desirable lowlands neighboring the Hindu Kush by competing tribal groups. From the south and west they were pressed by the Pushtun tribes; from the north by Turkmen tribes who liked to raid them for slaves. Eventually, the Hazaras rebelled in 1891; after two years of war they were totally crushed. Many were forced out of their homelands; most fled to Mashad and Quetta. Later the expatriate Hazaras were offered amnesty to return and were given land.
An important consequence of the war was the opening of the Hazarajat to Pushtun nomads, who grazed their flocks there during the summer. By loaning money and selling products from India, the nomads gained economic advantage over many Hazaras and acquired ownership of some of their lands. Impoverished Hazaras migrated to the cities, mainly Ghazni, Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, to work as hired laborers in winter, returning in spring to farm their lands.
After 1978, when the Khalq Party took over the Afghanistan government, the Hazaras in diverse areas, without coordination, revolted, the earliest to revolt being those in the northern and eastern provinces. After the Soviet invasion in December 1979, the entire Hazarajat with the exception of a landing strip in Bamian, remained virtually independent of government control. Interest in tribal ties based on patrilineal descent appears to have been rekindled in this context. Subgroups within the Hazarajat, however, remained autonomous, each managing its own judicial and administrative affairs. An attempt in 1979 to unite the Hazaras, in which a prominent Sayyid was elected to be first of several rotating supreme commanders, failed.
The active resistance units among the Hazaras are called “fronts.” Those fronts that have seen the most military action against Afghan and Soviet military forces, because they lie along the routes of access into the Hazarajat, are Behsud (which controls the Unai Pass) and Sheikh Ali, Turkmen and Surkh-o-Parsa (because they controlled access to the Shibar Pass) and the Hazara communities of Turkestan, especially Chararkint and Dare-Suf.
Hazaraspids
Hazaraspids. Local dynasty in Persia with its capital at Idhaj. They ruled over parts of Luristan from 1148 to 1424, when the Timurids put an end to the dynasty.
Hazaraspid (1148-1424) was a local Kurdish dynasty that ruled the Zagros mountains region of southwestern Persia, essentially in Lorestān and the adjacent parts of Fārs which flourished in the later Saljuq, Ilkhanid, Muzaffarids, and Timurid periods. The founder of the dynasty Abu Tahir bin Muhammad was initially a commander of the Salghurid Atabaks of Fars and was appointed as the governor of Kuhgiluya, but eventually gained independence in Luristan and extended his realm as far as Isfahan and assumed the prestigious title of Atabak. His son, Malek Hazarasp fought a successful campaign against Salghurids and assisted Jalal-al-din Khwarezmshah in his struggle against the Mongols. Another Hazaraspid ruler Takla, accompanied Hulagu on his march to Baghdad, but deserted because of the murder of the last caliph. He was eventually caught and executed on Hulagu's order. Yusuf Shah I received Ilkhan Abaqa's confirmation of his rule and added Khuzestan, Kuhgiluya, Firuzan (near Isfahan) and Golpayegan to his domain. Afrasiab I attempted to extend his control to the coast of Persian Gulf but faced stiff opposition from the Mongols who defeated his army at Kuhrud near Kashan. He was reinstated by Ilkhan Gaykhatu but was executed by Gazan in October 1296.
The capital of the Hazaraspids was located at Idaj located in present-day northern Khuzestan. Yusuf Shah II annexed the cities of Shushtar, Hoveizeh and Basra in the first half of the fourteenth century. During the reign of Shams-al-din Pashang, the dynasty faced attacks from the Muzaffarids and the capital Idaj temporarily fell into their hands, until the occupiers had to retreat due to their own internecine fighting. In 1424, the Timurid King Shahrokh deposed the last Hazaraspid ruler Ghias-al-din thereby ended the dynasty.
A listing of the Hazaraspid rulers reads as follows:
1. Abu Tahir bin Muhammad (r. 1148-1203)
2. Malek Hazarasp (r. 1204-1248 )
3. Emad-al-din (r. 1248-1251)
4. Nosrat-al-din (r. 1252-1257)
5. Takla (r. 1258- )
6. Shams-al-din Alp Arghun
7. Yusuf Shah I (r. 1274-1288)
8. Afrasiab I (r. 1288-1296)
9. Nosrat-al-din Ahmad (r.1296- 1330)
10. Rokn-al-din Yusuf Shah II (r.1330-1340)
11. Mozaffar-al-din Afrasiab II (r.1340-1355)
12. Shams-al-din Pashang (r.1355-1378)
13. Malek Pir Ahmad (r.1378-1408)
14. Abu Saeed (r. 1408- 1417)
15. Shah Hussein (r.1417-1424)
16. Ghias-al-din (r.1424)
Hazaraspids. Local dynasty in Persia with its capital at Idhaj. They ruled over parts of Luristan from 1148 to 1424, when the Timurids put an end to the dynasty.
Hazaraspid (1148-1424) was a local Kurdish dynasty that ruled the Zagros mountains region of southwestern Persia, essentially in Lorestān and the adjacent parts of Fārs which flourished in the later Saljuq, Ilkhanid, Muzaffarids, and Timurid periods. The founder of the dynasty Abu Tahir bin Muhammad was initially a commander of the Salghurid Atabaks of Fars and was appointed as the governor of Kuhgiluya, but eventually gained independence in Luristan and extended his realm as far as Isfahan and assumed the prestigious title of Atabak. His son, Malek Hazarasp fought a successful campaign against Salghurids and assisted Jalal-al-din Khwarezmshah in his struggle against the Mongols. Another Hazaraspid ruler Takla, accompanied Hulagu on his march to Baghdad, but deserted because of the murder of the last caliph. He was eventually caught and executed on Hulagu's order. Yusuf Shah I received Ilkhan Abaqa's confirmation of his rule and added Khuzestan, Kuhgiluya, Firuzan (near Isfahan) and Golpayegan to his domain. Afrasiab I attempted to extend his control to the coast of Persian Gulf but faced stiff opposition from the Mongols who defeated his army at Kuhrud near Kashan. He was reinstated by Ilkhan Gaykhatu but was executed by Gazan in October 1296.
The capital of the Hazaraspids was located at Idaj located in present-day northern Khuzestan. Yusuf Shah II annexed the cities of Shushtar, Hoveizeh and Basra in the first half of the fourteenth century. During the reign of Shams-al-din Pashang, the dynasty faced attacks from the Muzaffarids and the capital Idaj temporarily fell into their hands, until the occupiers had to retreat due to their own internecine fighting. In 1424, the Timurid King Shahrokh deposed the last Hazaraspid ruler Ghias-al-din thereby ended the dynasty.
A listing of the Hazaraspid rulers reads as follows:
1. Abu Tahir bin Muhammad (r. 1148-1203)
2. Malek Hazarasp (r. 1204-1248 )
3. Emad-al-din (r. 1248-1251)
4. Nosrat-al-din (r. 1252-1257)
5. Takla (r. 1258- )
6. Shams-al-din Alp Arghun
7. Yusuf Shah I (r. 1274-1288)
8. Afrasiab I (r. 1288-1296)
9. Nosrat-al-din Ahmad (r.1296- 1330)
10. Rokn-al-din Yusuf Shah II (r.1330-1340)
11. Mozaffar-al-din Afrasiab II (r.1340-1355)
12. Shams-al-din Pashang (r.1355-1378)
13. Malek Pir Ahmad (r.1378-1408)
14. Abu Saeed (r. 1408- 1417)
15. Shah Hussein (r.1417-1424)
16. Ghias-al-din (r.1424)
Hazarfen Ahmed Celebi
Hazarfen Ahmed Celebi (Hezârfen Ahmed Çelebi) was a legendary Ottoman aviator of 17th-century Constantinople (present day Istanbul), purported in the writings of traveller Evliya Çelebi to have achieved sustained unpowered flight.
The title "Hazarfen" was given by Evliya Celebi to Ahmed Celebi. The title means "a thousand sciences.The 17th century writings of Evliyâ Çelebi relate this story of Hazarfen Ahmed Çelebi, circa 1630-1632:
"First he practiced by flying over the pulpit of Okmeydanı eight or nine times with eagle wings, using the force of the wind. Then, as Sultan Murad Khan (Murad IV) was watching from the Sinan Pasha mansion at Sarayburnu, he flew from the very top of the Galata Tower and landed in the Doğancılar Square in Üsküdar, with the help of the south-west wind. Then Murad Khan granted him a sack of golden coins, and said: 'This is a scary man. He is capable of doing anything he wishes. It is not right to keep such people,' and thus sent him to Algeria on exile. He died there".—Evliyâ Çelebi
Hazmiriyyun
Hazmiriyyun. Moroccan religious brotherhood of the fourteenth through fifteenth centuries. Its main object was to Islamicize the Berbers who were inclined to form their own local brand of Islam. The Hazmiriyyun were a religious brotherhood Moroccan brothers founded by Abu Zayd Abd ar-Rahman (d. 1306 or 1308) and Abu Muhammad Abd Allah lah (d. 1280), son of 'Abd al-Karim al-Hazmirí.
HCE
HCE. See Haut Conseil de Securite.
HCE. See Haut Conseil de Securite.
Hekmatyar
Hekmatyar (Gulbuddin Hekmatyar) (b. 1947?). Leader of the Hizb-i Islami Afghanistan, one of the major Islamic political parties in Afghanistan. Hekmatyar was a Pushtun from a branch of the Kharoti tribe that resettled n the northern province of Kunduz. While a student in the College of Engineering at Kabul University in the late 1960s, Hekmatyar became one of the founders of the Organization of Muslim Youth (Sazman-i Javanan-i Musulman). Inspired by the writings of Sayyid Qutb and other Islamic political theorists to whom they were introduced by professors at the university, Hekmatyar and the other members of the Muslim Youth were actively involved in campus politics, particularly in response to the increasing activism of Marxist political parties that were also seeking members from the student population.
In 1972, Hekmatyar was arrested and imprisoned for his involvement in a campus demonstration in which a leftist student was killed. Released at the end of his sentence in 1973, Hekmatyar and other leaders of the Muslim Youth went into exile in Peshawar, Pakistan, where they began planning the violent overthrow of the government of President Muhammad Da’ud. In 1975 Hekmatyar became the secretary (munshi) and head of military operations for the party. In this capacity, he was one of the principal proponents and organizers of a controversial plan to stage a coup d’etat with sympathetic members of the military while simultaneously mounting rural insurrections in a number of provincial centers. The plan, which was carried out in July 1975, collapsed when the expected surge of popular support failed to materialize, and most of the top leaders of the Muslim Youth were captured and executed, either by the Da’ud government or later after the Marxist takeover in 1978. Following the failure of this operation, Hekmatyar became the dominant figure in the Organization of Muslim Youth, which was reconstituted as Hizb-I Islami Afghanistan in this same period. As leader of Hizb-i Islami during the thirteen year guerrilla war against the Marxist government in Afghanistan (1978-1992), Hekmatyar proved to be a controversial figure. He was respected for his organizational skills and energy and held in some awe for his oratorical powers and charismatic presence, but he nevertheless inspired much hostility.
Ruthless in his suppression of dissidents within the party and as energetic in fighting rival parties as in attacking enemy forces, Hekmatyar was frequently accused of undermining the unity of resistance efforts in his search for power. Although he was recognized personally as one of the least corrupt of the major party leaders and one of the most successful at gaining international diplomatic and financial support for the resistance, he was also resented by many traditional Afghans for interjecting a divisive brand of revolutionary Islamic ideology into the jihad.
After the overthrow of the Marxists in April 1992, Hekmatyar stayed on the fringes of the coalition government that was established in Kabul from among the former resistance parties. He accused the new regime of opportunistically conspiring with Marxists and former militia leaders and of playing on Pushtun fear of Persian and Uzbek dominance in the new government. He set up a base of operations in Logar Province south of Kabul, where he sometimes shelled the capital and sometimes negotiated with the coalition leaders. In March 1993, an accord negotiated in Islamabad made him prime minister, but as his main rival, Ahmad Shah Mas‘ud, was made defense minister, the shelling did not stop and Hekmatyar’s national authority was only nominal.
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was Prime Minister of Afghanistan from 1993 to 1994 and again briefly in 1996. One of the most controversial of the Mujahideen leaders, he was accused of spending "more time fighting other Mujahideen than killing Soviets" and wantonly killing civilians.
The Pakistani military had supported Hekmatyar until then in the hope of installing a Pashtun-dominated government in Kabul, which would be friendly to their interests. By 1994, it had become clear that Hekmatyar would never achieve this, and that his extremism had antagonized most Pashtuns, so the Pakistanis began turning to new allies: the fundamentalist and predominantly Pashtun Taliban. After capturing Kandahar in November 1994, the Taliban made rapid progress towards Kabul, making inroads into Hezb-i Islami positions. They captured Wardak on February 2 1995, and moved on to Maidan Shahr on February 10 and Mohammed Agha the next day. Very soon, Hekmatyar found himself caught between the advancing Taliban and the government forces, and the morale of his men collapsed. On February 14, 1995, he was forced to abandon his heaquarters at Charasiab, from where rockets were fired at Kabul, and flee in disorder to Surobi.
Nonetheless, in May 1996, Rabbani and Hekmatyar finally formed a power-sharing government in which Hekmatyar was made prime minister. Rabbani was anxious to enhance the legitimacy of his government by enlisting the support of Pashtun leaders. However, the Mahipar agreement did not bring any such benefits to him as Hekmatyar had little grassroots support, but did have many adverse effects. It caused outrage among Jamiat supporters, and among the population of Kabul, who had endured Hekmatyar's attacks for the last four years. Moreover, the agreement was clearly not what the Pakistanis wanted, and convinced them of Hekmatyar's weakness, and that they should shift their aid entirely over to the Taliban. Hekmatyar took office on June 26, and immediately started issuing severe decrees on women's dress, that struck a sharp contrast with the relatively liberal policy that Massoud had followed until then. The Taliban responded to the agreement with a further spate of rocket attacks on the capital.
The Rabbani/Hekmatyar regime lasted only a few months before the Taliban took control of Kabul in September 1996. Many of the Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) local commanders joined the Taliban both out of ideological sympathy and for reason of tribal solidarity. Those that did not were expelled by the Taliban. In Pakistan Hezb-e-Islami training camps were taken over by the Taliban and handed over to Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) groups such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP).
Hekmatyar then fled to Iran in 1997 where he resided for almost six years. Isolated from Afghanistan he is reported to have lost his power base back home to defections or inactivity of former members.
After September 11, 2001 Hekmatyar, who had worked closely with bin Laden in the early 1990s, declared his opposition to the United States campaign in Afghanistan and criticized Pakistan for assisting the United States. After the United States entry into the anti-Taliban alliance and the fall of the Taliban, Hekmatyar rejected the United Nations-brokered accord of December 5, 2001 negotiated in Germany as a post-Taliban interim government for Afghanistan.
As a result of pressure by the United States and the Karzai administration, on February 10, 2002 all the offices of Hezb-e-Islami were closed in Iran and Hekmatyar was expelled by his Iranian hosts.
On May 6, 2002 the CIA fired on a Hekmatyar vehicle convoy using a Lockheed Martin manufactured AGM-114 Hellfire missile launched from an MQ-1 Predator aircraft. The missile missed its target.
The United States accused Hekmatyar of urging Taliban fighters to re-form and fight against Coalition troops in Afghanistan. He is also accused of offering bounties for those who killed United States troops. He was labeled a war criminal by members of the United States-backed President Hamid Karzai's government. He also became a suspect behind the September 5, 2002 assassination attempt on Karzai that killed more than a dozen people.
In September 2002, Hekmatyar released a taped message calling for jihad against the United States.
On December 25, 2002 news broke that American spy organizations had discovered Hekmatyar attempting to join al-Qaeda. According to the news, he had said that he was available to aid them. However, in a video released by Hekmatyar on September 1, 2003, he denied forming alliances with the Taliban or al-Qaeda, but praised attacks against United States and international forces.
On February 19, 2003 the United States State Department and the United States Treasury Department jointly designated Hekmatyar a "global terrorist". This designation meant that any assets Hekmatyar held in the United States, or held through companies based in the United States, would be frozen. The United States also requested the United Nations Committee on Terrorism to follow suit, and designate Hekmatyar an associate of Osama bin Laden.
In October 2003, Hekmatyar declared a ceasefire with local commanders in Jalalabad, Kunar, Logar and Sarobi, and stated that they should only fight foreigners.
In May 2006, he released a video to Al Jazeera in which he accused Iran of backing the United States in the Afghan conflict and said he was ready to fight alongside Osama bin Laden and blamed the ongoing conflicts in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan on the United States interference.
In September 2006, he was reported as captured, but the report was later retracted.
In December 2006, a video was released in Pakistan, where Gulbuddin Hekmatyar claimed that the fate the Soviet Union faced was awaiting America as well.
In January 2007 CNN reported that Hekmatyar claimed that his fighters helped Osama bin Laden escape from the mountains of Tora Bora five years ago.
In May 2008, the Jamestown Foundation reported that after being sidelined from Afghan politics since the mid-1990s, Gulbuddin's HIG group had recently re-emerged as an aggressive militant group, claiming responsibility for many bloody attacks against Coalition forces and the administration of President Hamid Karzai. The re-emergence of this experienced guerrilla strategist came at a propitious time for insurgency, following the killing of Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah, when some elements of the Taliban were becoming disorganized and frustrated.
HIG claimed responsibility for and is thought to have at least assisted in the April 27, 2008 attempt on the life of President Karzai in Kabul that killed three Afghan citizens, including a member of parliament. Other attacks HIG is thought to be responsible for include the January 2, 2008 shooting down of a helicopter containing foreign troops in the Laghman province; the shooting and forcing down a United States military helicopter in the Sarubi district of Kabul on January 22; and the blowing up of a Kabul police vehicle in March 2008, killing 10 soldiers.
In interviews he demanded all foreign forces leave immediately without any condition. Offers by President Hamid Karzai to open talks with opponents of the government and hints that they would be offered official posts such as deputy minister or head of department, were thought to be directed at Hekmatyar.
In January 2010, Hekmatyar was still considered as one of the three main leaders of the Afghan insurgency. By then, he held out the possibility of negotiations with President Karzai and outlined a roadmap for political reconciliation. In contrast to Taliban leader Mullah Omar and allied insurgent chief Sirajuddin Haqqani, who refused any talks with Kabul as long as foreign troops remained in the country, Hekmatyar appeared less reluctant.
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar see Hekmatyar
Hekmatyar (Gulbuddin Hekmatyar) (b. 1947?). Leader of the Hizb-i Islami Afghanistan, one of the major Islamic political parties in Afghanistan. Hekmatyar was a Pushtun from a branch of the Kharoti tribe that resettled n the northern province of Kunduz. While a student in the College of Engineering at Kabul University in the late 1960s, Hekmatyar became one of the founders of the Organization of Muslim Youth (Sazman-i Javanan-i Musulman). Inspired by the writings of Sayyid Qutb and other Islamic political theorists to whom they were introduced by professors at the university, Hekmatyar and the other members of the Muslim Youth were actively involved in campus politics, particularly in response to the increasing activism of Marxist political parties that were also seeking members from the student population.
In 1972, Hekmatyar was arrested and imprisoned for his involvement in a campus demonstration in which a leftist student was killed. Released at the end of his sentence in 1973, Hekmatyar and other leaders of the Muslim Youth went into exile in Peshawar, Pakistan, where they began planning the violent overthrow of the government of President Muhammad Da’ud. In 1975 Hekmatyar became the secretary (munshi) and head of military operations for the party. In this capacity, he was one of the principal proponents and organizers of a controversial plan to stage a coup d’etat with sympathetic members of the military while simultaneously mounting rural insurrections in a number of provincial centers. The plan, which was carried out in July 1975, collapsed when the expected surge of popular support failed to materialize, and most of the top leaders of the Muslim Youth were captured and executed, either by the Da’ud government or later after the Marxist takeover in 1978. Following the failure of this operation, Hekmatyar became the dominant figure in the Organization of Muslim Youth, which was reconstituted as Hizb-I Islami Afghanistan in this same period. As leader of Hizb-i Islami during the thirteen year guerrilla war against the Marxist government in Afghanistan (1978-1992), Hekmatyar proved to be a controversial figure. He was respected for his organizational skills and energy and held in some awe for his oratorical powers and charismatic presence, but he nevertheless inspired much hostility.
Ruthless in his suppression of dissidents within the party and as energetic in fighting rival parties as in attacking enemy forces, Hekmatyar was frequently accused of undermining the unity of resistance efforts in his search for power. Although he was recognized personally as one of the least corrupt of the major party leaders and one of the most successful at gaining international diplomatic and financial support for the resistance, he was also resented by many traditional Afghans for interjecting a divisive brand of revolutionary Islamic ideology into the jihad.
After the overthrow of the Marxists in April 1992, Hekmatyar stayed on the fringes of the coalition government that was established in Kabul from among the former resistance parties. He accused the new regime of opportunistically conspiring with Marxists and former militia leaders and of playing on Pushtun fear of Persian and Uzbek dominance in the new government. He set up a base of operations in Logar Province south of Kabul, where he sometimes shelled the capital and sometimes negotiated with the coalition leaders. In March 1993, an accord negotiated in Islamabad made him prime minister, but as his main rival, Ahmad Shah Mas‘ud, was made defense minister, the shelling did not stop and Hekmatyar’s national authority was only nominal.
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was Prime Minister of Afghanistan from 1993 to 1994 and again briefly in 1996. One of the most controversial of the Mujahideen leaders, he was accused of spending "more time fighting other Mujahideen than killing Soviets" and wantonly killing civilians.
The Pakistani military had supported Hekmatyar until then in the hope of installing a Pashtun-dominated government in Kabul, which would be friendly to their interests. By 1994, it had become clear that Hekmatyar would never achieve this, and that his extremism had antagonized most Pashtuns, so the Pakistanis began turning to new allies: the fundamentalist and predominantly Pashtun Taliban. After capturing Kandahar in November 1994, the Taliban made rapid progress towards Kabul, making inroads into Hezb-i Islami positions. They captured Wardak on February 2 1995, and moved on to Maidan Shahr on February 10 and Mohammed Agha the next day. Very soon, Hekmatyar found himself caught between the advancing Taliban and the government forces, and the morale of his men collapsed. On February 14, 1995, he was forced to abandon his heaquarters at Charasiab, from where rockets were fired at Kabul, and flee in disorder to Surobi.
Nonetheless, in May 1996, Rabbani and Hekmatyar finally formed a power-sharing government in which Hekmatyar was made prime minister. Rabbani was anxious to enhance the legitimacy of his government by enlisting the support of Pashtun leaders. However, the Mahipar agreement did not bring any such benefits to him as Hekmatyar had little grassroots support, but did have many adverse effects. It caused outrage among Jamiat supporters, and among the population of Kabul, who had endured Hekmatyar's attacks for the last four years. Moreover, the agreement was clearly not what the Pakistanis wanted, and convinced them of Hekmatyar's weakness, and that they should shift their aid entirely over to the Taliban. Hekmatyar took office on June 26, and immediately started issuing severe decrees on women's dress, that struck a sharp contrast with the relatively liberal policy that Massoud had followed until then. The Taliban responded to the agreement with a further spate of rocket attacks on the capital.
The Rabbani/Hekmatyar regime lasted only a few months before the Taliban took control of Kabul in September 1996. Many of the Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) local commanders joined the Taliban both out of ideological sympathy and for reason of tribal solidarity. Those that did not were expelled by the Taliban. In Pakistan Hezb-e-Islami training camps were taken over by the Taliban and handed over to Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) groups such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP).
Hekmatyar then fled to Iran in 1997 where he resided for almost six years. Isolated from Afghanistan he is reported to have lost his power base back home to defections or inactivity of former members.
After September 11, 2001 Hekmatyar, who had worked closely with bin Laden in the early 1990s, declared his opposition to the United States campaign in Afghanistan and criticized Pakistan for assisting the United States. After the United States entry into the anti-Taliban alliance and the fall of the Taliban, Hekmatyar rejected the United Nations-brokered accord of December 5, 2001 negotiated in Germany as a post-Taliban interim government for Afghanistan.
As a result of pressure by the United States and the Karzai administration, on February 10, 2002 all the offices of Hezb-e-Islami were closed in Iran and Hekmatyar was expelled by his Iranian hosts.
On May 6, 2002 the CIA fired on a Hekmatyar vehicle convoy using a Lockheed Martin manufactured AGM-114 Hellfire missile launched from an MQ-1 Predator aircraft. The missile missed its target.
The United States accused Hekmatyar of urging Taliban fighters to re-form and fight against Coalition troops in Afghanistan. He is also accused of offering bounties for those who killed United States troops. He was labeled a war criminal by members of the United States-backed President Hamid Karzai's government. He also became a suspect behind the September 5, 2002 assassination attempt on Karzai that killed more than a dozen people.
In September 2002, Hekmatyar released a taped message calling for jihad against the United States.
On December 25, 2002 news broke that American spy organizations had discovered Hekmatyar attempting to join al-Qaeda. According to the news, he had said that he was available to aid them. However, in a video released by Hekmatyar on September 1, 2003, he denied forming alliances with the Taliban or al-Qaeda, but praised attacks against United States and international forces.
On February 19, 2003 the United States State Department and the United States Treasury Department jointly designated Hekmatyar a "global terrorist". This designation meant that any assets Hekmatyar held in the United States, or held through companies based in the United States, would be frozen. The United States also requested the United Nations Committee on Terrorism to follow suit, and designate Hekmatyar an associate of Osama bin Laden.
In October 2003, Hekmatyar declared a ceasefire with local commanders in Jalalabad, Kunar, Logar and Sarobi, and stated that they should only fight foreigners.
In May 2006, he released a video to Al Jazeera in which he accused Iran of backing the United States in the Afghan conflict and said he was ready to fight alongside Osama bin Laden and blamed the ongoing conflicts in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan on the United States interference.
In September 2006, he was reported as captured, but the report was later retracted.
In December 2006, a video was released in Pakistan, where Gulbuddin Hekmatyar claimed that the fate the Soviet Union faced was awaiting America as well.
In January 2007 CNN reported that Hekmatyar claimed that his fighters helped Osama bin Laden escape from the mountains of Tora Bora five years ago.
In May 2008, the Jamestown Foundation reported that after being sidelined from Afghan politics since the mid-1990s, Gulbuddin's HIG group had recently re-emerged as an aggressive militant group, claiming responsibility for many bloody attacks against Coalition forces and the administration of President Hamid Karzai. The re-emergence of this experienced guerrilla strategist came at a propitious time for insurgency, following the killing of Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah, when some elements of the Taliban were becoming disorganized and frustrated.
HIG claimed responsibility for and is thought to have at least assisted in the April 27, 2008 attempt on the life of President Karzai in Kabul that killed three Afghan citizens, including a member of parliament. Other attacks HIG is thought to be responsible for include the January 2, 2008 shooting down of a helicopter containing foreign troops in the Laghman province; the shooting and forcing down a United States military helicopter in the Sarubi district of Kabul on January 22; and the blowing up of a Kabul police vehicle in March 2008, killing 10 soldiers.
In interviews he demanded all foreign forces leave immediately without any condition. Offers by President Hamid Karzai to open talks with opponents of the government and hints that they would be offered official posts such as deputy minister or head of department, were thought to be directed at Hekmatyar.
In January 2010, Hekmatyar was still considered as one of the three main leaders of the Afghan insurgency. By then, he held out the possibility of negotiations with President Karzai and outlined a roadmap for political reconciliation. In contrast to Taliban leader Mullah Omar and allied insurgent chief Sirajuddin Haqqani, who refused any talks with Kabul as long as foreign troops remained in the country, Hekmatyar appeared less reluctant.
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar see Hekmatyar
Helou
Helou (Charles Helou) (September 25, 1913-7 January 2001). President of Lebanon (1964-1970). Helou was born in Beirut into a middle-class Maronite Christian family. In the 1930s, Helou studied with the French faculty of law in Beirut. In 1932, he founded the newspaper L’Eclair du Nord in Aleppo and, in 1935, Helou founded the newspaper Le Jour in Beirut.
Helou became the Lebanese ambassador to the Vatican in 1947, and became minister of justice and health in 1954. In 1955, Helou stepped down as a minister.
In 1964, Helou became minister of education. On August 18, 1964, Helou was elected president after Fuad Chehab. One reason why he was elected was that he was one of few actual candidates that had not been active in the Civil War of 1958. He also got the support of Chehab. Helou declared that he would continue the political line of Chehab. As he became president, he declared that he would not allow any bases of the newly established Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon. On September 25, 1964, the prime minister, Hussein Oweini formed a government.
On July 20, 1965, Hussein Oweini resigned as prime minister. On July 26, 1965, Rashid Karami formed a new government. In December of 1965, Karami and Helou cooperated in a campaign of an administrative and judicial reform program intended on ridding Lebanon of the many officials that were involved in corruption.
In March 1966, much in opposition to Helou’s and Karami’s program, protests came from within the government itself. It ended with Karami offering his resignation.
In 1968, the Christians, with Helou, tried to stop the stationing of Palestinian guerrillas, while Muslim leaders favored this.
In 1969, Helou had to accept that the PLO had taken over control over the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.
In 1970, Helou endorsed Elias Sarkis as his chosen successor, but he lost the election in the National Assembly by one vote to Suleiman Frangieh. Unlike other former Presidents, who remained politically active after retirement, Helou faded from the scene. He was involved in a philanthropic venture, founding a number of restaurants to provide free hot meals to elderly people.
Helou died of a heart attack on January 7, 2001. He was 87.
Helou was not a strong politician, and had little direct support on his own. He was chosen president as a compromise candidate between factions still upset from the Civil War of 1958. The reform work that former president Fuad Chehab had started, slowed down under Helou. In some fields, the weakness of Helou was his strongest side: He was able to cooperate both with Christian as well as Muslim groups. He also kept Lebanon out of the destructive Six-Day War. However, he was not able to curb the influx of Palestinian guerrillas, and, in his time, Lebanon saw the first serious attacks by Israel. In many ways, Helou’s time was the forerunner of the Lebanese Civil War that started five years after the end of his presidency.
Charles Helou see Helou
Helou (Charles Helou) (September 25, 1913-7 January 2001). President of Lebanon (1964-1970). Helou was born in Beirut into a middle-class Maronite Christian family. In the 1930s, Helou studied with the French faculty of law in Beirut. In 1932, he founded the newspaper L’Eclair du Nord in Aleppo and, in 1935, Helou founded the newspaper Le Jour in Beirut.
Helou became the Lebanese ambassador to the Vatican in 1947, and became minister of justice and health in 1954. In 1955, Helou stepped down as a minister.
In 1964, Helou became minister of education. On August 18, 1964, Helou was elected president after Fuad Chehab. One reason why he was elected was that he was one of few actual candidates that had not been active in the Civil War of 1958. He also got the support of Chehab. Helou declared that he would continue the political line of Chehab. As he became president, he declared that he would not allow any bases of the newly established Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon. On September 25, 1964, the prime minister, Hussein Oweini formed a government.
On July 20, 1965, Hussein Oweini resigned as prime minister. On July 26, 1965, Rashid Karami formed a new government. In December of 1965, Karami and Helou cooperated in a campaign of an administrative and judicial reform program intended on ridding Lebanon of the many officials that were involved in corruption.
In March 1966, much in opposition to Helou’s and Karami’s program, protests came from within the government itself. It ended with Karami offering his resignation.
In 1968, the Christians, with Helou, tried to stop the stationing of Palestinian guerrillas, while Muslim leaders favored this.
In 1969, Helou had to accept that the PLO had taken over control over the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.
In 1970, Helou endorsed Elias Sarkis as his chosen successor, but he lost the election in the National Assembly by one vote to Suleiman Frangieh. Unlike other former Presidents, who remained politically active after retirement, Helou faded from the scene. He was involved in a philanthropic venture, founding a number of restaurants to provide free hot meals to elderly people.
Helou died of a heart attack on January 7, 2001. He was 87.
Helou was not a strong politician, and had little direct support on his own. He was chosen president as a compromise candidate between factions still upset from the Civil War of 1958. The reform work that former president Fuad Chehab had started, slowed down under Helou. In some fields, the weakness of Helou was his strongest side: He was able to cooperate both with Christian as well as Muslim groups. He also kept Lebanon out of the destructive Six-Day War. However, he was not able to curb the influx of Palestinian guerrillas, and, in his time, Lebanon saw the first serious attacks by Israel. In many ways, Helou’s time was the forerunner of the Lebanese Civil War that started five years after the end of his presidency.
Charles Helou see Helou
Henrique
Henrique. Black Yoruba slave who, in 1835, led a great slave revolt in Pernambuco, Brazil. In the fight he was badly wounded. Although almost speechless from agony, he refused to betray his brethren.
Henrique. Black Yoruba slave who, in 1835, led a great slave revolt in Pernambuco, Brazil. In the fight he was badly wounded. Although almost speechless from agony, he refused to betray his brethren.
Hermes Trismegistus
Hermes Trismegistus (in Arabic, Hirmis). For Islamic authors, the author of philosophical, scientific and magical works appears divided into three individuals. The first Hermes was identified with Enoch and Idris, who lived in Egypt before the Flood and built the Pyramids. The second lived in Babylon after the Flood and revived the study of the sciences. The third wrote in Egypt after the Flood about various sciences and crafts.
Trismegistus, Hermes see Hermes Trismegistus
Hirmis see Hermes Trismegistus
Hermes Trismegistus (in Arabic, Hirmis). For Islamic authors, the author of philosophical, scientific and magical works appears divided into three individuals. The first Hermes was identified with Enoch and Idris, who lived in Egypt before the Flood and built the Pyramids. The second lived in Babylon after the Flood and revived the study of the sciences. The third wrote in Egypt after the Flood about various sciences and crafts.
Trismegistus, Hermes see Hermes Trismegistus
Hirmis see Hermes Trismegistus
Hezbollah
Hezbollah. See Hizballah.
Hizballah see Hezbollah.
Hezbollah. See Hizballah.
Hizballah see Hezbollah.
Hidayat
Hidayat (Sadiq Hidayat) (February 17, 1903 - April 9, 1951). Revolutionary writer of modern Iran. His daring experiments in technique and in thought have exercised a powerful influence on the development of modern Persian fiction.
Sadiq Hidayat is considered the father of modern Persian fiction. Although his works show a variety of literary forms, he was essentially a short-story writer.
Only since the beginning of the 20th century, because of the development of journalism and the influence of the West, has Persian prose been given the same status as poetry. Sadiq Hidayat contributed greatly to this literary revolution.
Hidayat was born in Tehran, Persia, to an aristocratic family of great landowners from the northern province of Mazandaran. His ancestors gave Persia (especially in the 19th century) many prominent statesmen and men of letters, and his family played an important role during the constitutional revolution of 1906, in this period of confrontation of the past with the new.
Very little is known about Hidayat as an individual, as he preferred to live modestly and in solitude. However, it is known that he cared for the underprivileged and the humble people of his country and that he was a patriot, but at the same time he was obsessed with an idea of self-destruction, of suicide.
In his 20s Hidayat went to France to study dentistry but soon changed to engineering. His engineering studies did not last long as he got interested in the study of pre-Islamic Persia. He turned to writing and in 1927 published The Advantages of Vegetarianism, a second attempt (the first was a short book, Man and Animals, an unsuccessful literary debut) to show man's cruelty to animals. The first sign of his new, simple style is seen in his short play, The Legend of Creation.
Hidayat returned to Persia in 1930, and his first collection of short stories, Buried Alive, was published that year. The Blind Owl (1937), his masterpiece, is his self-analysis. Through Kafka-like dream technique, Hidayat brings about unreality. The hero of the book seeks an escape from his misery and poverty in alcohol and opium, which cause his dream life. The atmosphere of The Blind Owl reminds one of the grimmest passages of E. A. Poe, F. Kafka, F. Dostoevsky, C. Dickens, and E. Zola. The recurring motif in Hidayat's stories is the vanity of human existence and its uselessness and absurdity.
During the 1930s Hidayat not only published eight other important works but was engaged with other progressive artists and writers in the movement against the old-fashioned bombastic style. His interest in Persian studies can be seen in the writing of this period as he tried to show the continuity of long Persian civilization and its glorious past. At the same time Hidayat was one of the pioneers in bringing folklore into his literary works. He was still under the influence of the famous Persian writer Omar Khayyam. Hidayat devoted three books to Khayyam and his philosophy, which touches on the everlasting puzzles of humanity.
The characters in Hidayat's short stories are mostly small people with their problems, sorrows, hates, and weak-nesses - sympathetic yet repulsive. But as Henry D. G. Law writes: "Hidayat does not write objectively; with his reckless soaring genius he infuses into each of his tales his own personality, his own mood of pity, indignation, or tenderness, so that you may enter fully into the mind and thoughts of his characters, whoever they may be - seeing them as he sees them. They live and they haunt you long after you have closed the book."
In his stories Hidayat paints the abnormalities of human characters, who in most cases suffer from suicidal temptations. The satirical tone in some of his short stories in indirect criticism of the society which obstructs the education and advancement of the masses. Hidayat is particularly sympathetic toward the position of women, and the women in his stories are symbols of revolt against backwardness.
Hidayat's search for the glorious past of Persia led him to India, where he studied with Parsee scholars. But India did not cure him of his melancholy and gloomy pessimism. After returning to Persia, he published new collections of his grimmest short stories, The Stray Dog and The Dead End, which show his belief that man cannot liberate himself from his fate. Hidayat committed suicide in Paris on April 9, 1951.
Sadiq Hidayat see Hidayat
Hidayat (Sadiq Hidayat) (February 17, 1903 - April 9, 1951). Revolutionary writer of modern Iran. His daring experiments in technique and in thought have exercised a powerful influence on the development of modern Persian fiction.
Sadiq Hidayat is considered the father of modern Persian fiction. Although his works show a variety of literary forms, he was essentially a short-story writer.
Only since the beginning of the 20th century, because of the development of journalism and the influence of the West, has Persian prose been given the same status as poetry. Sadiq Hidayat contributed greatly to this literary revolution.
Hidayat was born in Tehran, Persia, to an aristocratic family of great landowners from the northern province of Mazandaran. His ancestors gave Persia (especially in the 19th century) many prominent statesmen and men of letters, and his family played an important role during the constitutional revolution of 1906, in this period of confrontation of the past with the new.
Very little is known about Hidayat as an individual, as he preferred to live modestly and in solitude. However, it is known that he cared for the underprivileged and the humble people of his country and that he was a patriot, but at the same time he was obsessed with an idea of self-destruction, of suicide.
In his 20s Hidayat went to France to study dentistry but soon changed to engineering. His engineering studies did not last long as he got interested in the study of pre-Islamic Persia. He turned to writing and in 1927 published The Advantages of Vegetarianism, a second attempt (the first was a short book, Man and Animals, an unsuccessful literary debut) to show man's cruelty to animals. The first sign of his new, simple style is seen in his short play, The Legend of Creation.
Hidayat returned to Persia in 1930, and his first collection of short stories, Buried Alive, was published that year. The Blind Owl (1937), his masterpiece, is his self-analysis. Through Kafka-like dream technique, Hidayat brings about unreality. The hero of the book seeks an escape from his misery and poverty in alcohol and opium, which cause his dream life. The atmosphere of The Blind Owl reminds one of the grimmest passages of E. A. Poe, F. Kafka, F. Dostoevsky, C. Dickens, and E. Zola. The recurring motif in Hidayat's stories is the vanity of human existence and its uselessness and absurdity.
During the 1930s Hidayat not only published eight other important works but was engaged with other progressive artists and writers in the movement against the old-fashioned bombastic style. His interest in Persian studies can be seen in the writing of this period as he tried to show the continuity of long Persian civilization and its glorious past. At the same time Hidayat was one of the pioneers in bringing folklore into his literary works. He was still under the influence of the famous Persian writer Omar Khayyam. Hidayat devoted three books to Khayyam and his philosophy, which touches on the everlasting puzzles of humanity.
The characters in Hidayat's short stories are mostly small people with their problems, sorrows, hates, and weak-nesses - sympathetic yet repulsive. But as Henry D. G. Law writes: "Hidayat does not write objectively; with his reckless soaring genius he infuses into each of his tales his own personality, his own mood of pity, indignation, or tenderness, so that you may enter fully into the mind and thoughts of his characters, whoever they may be - seeing them as he sees them. They live and they haunt you long after you have closed the book."
In his stories Hidayat paints the abnormalities of human characters, who in most cases suffer from suicidal temptations. The satirical tone in some of his short stories in indirect criticism of the society which obstructs the education and advancement of the masses. Hidayat is particularly sympathetic toward the position of women, and the women in his stories are symbols of revolt against backwardness.
Hidayat's search for the glorious past of Persia led him to India, where he studied with Parsee scholars. But India did not cure him of his melancholy and gloomy pessimism. After returning to Persia, he published new collections of his grimmest short stories, The Stray Dog and The Dead End, which show his belief that man cannot liberate himself from his fate. Hidayat committed suicide in Paris on April 9, 1951.
Sadiq Hidayat see Hidayat
Hikmet
Hikmet (Nazim Hikmet) (Nâzım Hikmet Ran) (January 15, 1902 – June 2, 1963). Turkish radical poet and dramatist. Nazim Hikmet was born in Salonika to a family of Ottoman officials. Nazim Hikmet became a cadet in the Turkish navy and began to write poems, the first being published when Nazim was 15.
In 1921, Nazim Hikmet went to Moscow. He would remain in the Soviet Union until 1928. While in the Soviet Union, Hikmet adopted Marxist ideas and became greatly influenced by the futurist poetry of Vladimir Mayakovsky. In 1928, Hikmet returned to Turkey, having joined the Turkish Communist Party in 1924.
Nazim Hikmet published books of verse seeking to free Turkish poetry from the hitherto dominant stylized classical metres. With lively eloquence, vigor and vivid, satiric humor, Hikmet tackled many social problems of the Kemalist Turkey of his day, though he also wrote love and nature poems.
Among Hikmet’s early books of verse are 835 Satir (“835 Lines”), which was published in 1929; 1+1=1, which was published in 1930; Gece Gelen Telgraf (“Night Wire”), which was published in 1932; Benerci kendini nicin oldurdu? (“Why did Benerci Kill Himself?”), which was also published in 1932; and The Lay of Simavneli Kadtoglu Bedrettin, which was published in 1936.
In 1938, Hikmet was arrested on charges of sedition and sentenced to 28 years imprisonment. Hikmet was released in 1950 as a result of an international campaign of protest against this treatment. Hikmet soon escaped to the Soviet Union, where many of his poems and plays have been published in Russian and Azerbaijani translations. Some of his verse has also been translated into Greek and French.
Hikmet’s last important work was a powerful semi-autobiographical novel, first published in Russian at Moscow in 1962, and then in a French version, by Munevver Andac under the title Les romantiques.
Nazim Hikmet see Hikmet
Hikmet (Nazim Hikmet) (Nâzım Hikmet Ran) (January 15, 1902 – June 2, 1963). Turkish radical poet and dramatist. Nazim Hikmet was born in Salonika to a family of Ottoman officials. Nazim Hikmet became a cadet in the Turkish navy and began to write poems, the first being published when Nazim was 15.
In 1921, Nazim Hikmet went to Moscow. He would remain in the Soviet Union until 1928. While in the Soviet Union, Hikmet adopted Marxist ideas and became greatly influenced by the futurist poetry of Vladimir Mayakovsky. In 1928, Hikmet returned to Turkey, having joined the Turkish Communist Party in 1924.
Nazim Hikmet published books of verse seeking to free Turkish poetry from the hitherto dominant stylized classical metres. With lively eloquence, vigor and vivid, satiric humor, Hikmet tackled many social problems of the Kemalist Turkey of his day, though he also wrote love and nature poems.
Among Hikmet’s early books of verse are 835 Satir (“835 Lines”), which was published in 1929; 1+1=1, which was published in 1930; Gece Gelen Telgraf (“Night Wire”), which was published in 1932; Benerci kendini nicin oldurdu? (“Why did Benerci Kill Himself?”), which was also published in 1932; and The Lay of Simavneli Kadtoglu Bedrettin, which was published in 1936.
In 1938, Hikmet was arrested on charges of sedition and sentenced to 28 years imprisonment. Hikmet was released in 1950 as a result of an international campaign of protest against this treatment. Hikmet soon escaped to the Soviet Union, where many of his poems and plays have been published in Russian and Azerbaijani translations. Some of his verse has also been translated into Greek and French.
Hikmet’s last important work was a powerful semi-autobiographical novel, first published in Russian at Moscow in 1962, and then in a French version, by Munevver Andac under the title Les romantiques.
Nazim Hikmet see Hikmet
Hilal
Hilal (Banu Hilal). Tribe of Arabia who, in the eighth century, emigrated to Egypt, joined the Carmathians in the tenth century and were given Ifriqiya by the Fatimids in the eleventh century to invade. Their movement into North Africa and the battles they fought there form the historical basis for the saga known as Sirat Bani Hilal.
The Banu Hilal were a confederation of Bedouin tribes that migrated from Upper Egypt into North Africa in the 11th century, having been sent by the Fatimids to punish the Zirids for abandoning Shiism. Other authors suggest that the tribes left the grasslands on the upper Nile because of environmental degradation accompanying the Medieval Warm Period. The Banu Hilal quickly defeated the Zirids and deeply weakened the neighboring Hammadids. Their influx was a major factor in the linguistic and cultural Arabization of the Maghreb, and in the spread of nomadism in areas where agriculture had previously been dominant. Ibn Khaldun noted that the lands ravaged by Banu Hilal invaders had become completely arid desert.
Banu Hilal see Hilal
Hilal (Banu Hilal). Tribe of Arabia who, in the eighth century, emigrated to Egypt, joined the Carmathians in the tenth century and were given Ifriqiya by the Fatimids in the eleventh century to invade. Their movement into North Africa and the battles they fought there form the historical basis for the saga known as Sirat Bani Hilal.
The Banu Hilal were a confederation of Bedouin tribes that migrated from Upper Egypt into North Africa in the 11th century, having been sent by the Fatimids to punish the Zirids for abandoning Shiism. Other authors suggest that the tribes left the grasslands on the upper Nile because of environmental degradation accompanying the Medieval Warm Period. The Banu Hilal quickly defeated the Zirids and deeply weakened the neighboring Hammadids. Their influx was a major factor in the linguistic and cultural Arabization of the Maghreb, and in the spread of nomadism in areas where agriculture had previously been dominant. Ibn Khaldun noted that the lands ravaged by Banu Hilal invaders had become completely arid desert.
Banu Hilal see Hilal
Hilli
Hilli (‘Allamah ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hilli) (Jamal ad-Din Hasan ibn Yusuf ibn 'Ali ibn Muthahhar al-Hilli) (al-Allamah al-Hilli) (December 15, 1250 - December 18, 1325). Scholar and jurist of the Imami (or Ithna ‘Ashari) Shi‘a. Hasan ibn Yusuf ibn Mutahhar al-Hilli, known as ‘Allamah (“most learned”), was born in Hilla in Iraq. His lifetime saw the Mongol capture of Baghdad (in 1258) and the foundation of the Il-khanid dynasty. The Mongols, contrary to their reputation, permitted, even encouraged, intellectual activity. Hulegu, for example, founded the observatory and informal academy at Maragha in 1259. ‘Allamah benefited from this freedom. He probably studied at Maragha with Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (d. 1274), but primarily found his teachers and colleagues in Baghdad, where also he became involved with the Il-khanid court during the reign of Oljeitu (r. 1304-1316). His education covered the usual curriculum, in its Shi‘a version, but included significant input from Sunni thinkers.
‘Allamah’s writings included works on grammar, logic, hadith, tafsir (Qur’anic commentary), and biography, but his constructive achievement was in the areas of jurisprudence, theology, and polemics. His polemical works (defending the existence, necessity, and historical evolution of the imamate and exemplified in the Minhaj al-karamah) are probably associated with his time at the court of Oljeitu, whose religious vacillation encouraged sectarian debate. In the field of theology (kalam), ‘Allamah was one of the most distinguished thinkers in the later Mu‘tazili tradition, which had been accepted into Imami Shi‘ism in the Buyid period (945-1055). The Kashf al-Murad, ‘Allamah’s commentary on al-Tusi’s creedal statement, the Tajrid al-i‘tiqad, is a representative work. Its technical scholasticism remained a part of the tradition, but was not a key to its significant development. The great achievement of later Shi ‘a theology is associated with Mulla Sadra al-Shirazi (d. 1641), who drew rather on the philosophical tradition of Ibn Sina (d. 1037) and on the illuminationist theories of Suhrawardi (d. 1190).
In the field of jurisprudence, ‘Allamah produced works of positive law (furu‘) and of hermeneutical theory (usul). In the former area, he continued the work of his teacher Ja ‘far ibn al-Hasan al-Muhaqqiq al-Hilli (d. 1277). This work was a reformulation of the tradition established by Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Tusi, Shaykh al-Ta’ifah (d. 1068), and reconciled some of the damaging disputes that had emerged in the intervening centuries. ‘Allamah refined and expanded the Shi ‘a corpus of furu‘ al-figh, notably exploring the range of dispute within the tradition in his Mukhtalaf al-Shi‘ah. He perceived that justification and reconciliation within the tradition required a theoretical foundation achievable only within the discipline of usul. His great achievement there, and of his scholarship as a whole, was to integrate the theory of ijtihad into the structures of Imami Shi‘a jurisprudence. ‘Allamah perceived that ijtihad and its implications (previously rejected by the Shi‘is) were not irreconcilable with the reality of interpretative development within Shiism. The theory of ijtihad explained dispute, permitted creative interpretation with the tradition, and justified the authority of the jurists. All subsequent Shi‘a thinking in this area can be seen as either a development of or a reaction to ‘Allamah’s ideas.
Reaction to this thinking is associated with Muhammad Amin al-Astarabadi (d. 1627), who fought against ‘Allamah’s innovations and inspired the Akhbari movement, which was opposed by the Usuli movement. The Akhbari-Usuli controversy may reflect literalist and rationalist tensions of earlier periods, but it was articulated solely in relation to aspects of the theory of ijtihad. It dominated juristic thinking throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and was finally resolved in favor of the Usulis, whose thinking prevailed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
‘Allamah ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hilli see Hilli
Hasan ibn Yusuf ibn Mutahhar al-Hilli see Hilli
“most learned" see Hilli
‘Allamah see Hilli
Jamal ad-Din Hasan ibn Yusuf ibn 'Ali ibn Muthahhar al-Hilli see Hilli
al-Allamah al-Hilli see Hilli
Hilli (‘Allamah ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hilli) (Jamal ad-Din Hasan ibn Yusuf ibn 'Ali ibn Muthahhar al-Hilli) (al-Allamah al-Hilli) (December 15, 1250 - December 18, 1325). Scholar and jurist of the Imami (or Ithna ‘Ashari) Shi‘a. Hasan ibn Yusuf ibn Mutahhar al-Hilli, known as ‘Allamah (“most learned”), was born in Hilla in Iraq. His lifetime saw the Mongol capture of Baghdad (in 1258) and the foundation of the Il-khanid dynasty. The Mongols, contrary to their reputation, permitted, even encouraged, intellectual activity. Hulegu, for example, founded the observatory and informal academy at Maragha in 1259. ‘Allamah benefited from this freedom. He probably studied at Maragha with Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (d. 1274), but primarily found his teachers and colleagues in Baghdad, where also he became involved with the Il-khanid court during the reign of Oljeitu (r. 1304-1316). His education covered the usual curriculum, in its Shi‘a version, but included significant input from Sunni thinkers.
‘Allamah’s writings included works on grammar, logic, hadith, tafsir (Qur’anic commentary), and biography, but his constructive achievement was in the areas of jurisprudence, theology, and polemics. His polemical works (defending the existence, necessity, and historical evolution of the imamate and exemplified in the Minhaj al-karamah) are probably associated with his time at the court of Oljeitu, whose religious vacillation encouraged sectarian debate. In the field of theology (kalam), ‘Allamah was one of the most distinguished thinkers in the later Mu‘tazili tradition, which had been accepted into Imami Shi‘ism in the Buyid period (945-1055). The Kashf al-Murad, ‘Allamah’s commentary on al-Tusi’s creedal statement, the Tajrid al-i‘tiqad, is a representative work. Its technical scholasticism remained a part of the tradition, but was not a key to its significant development. The great achievement of later Shi ‘a theology is associated with Mulla Sadra al-Shirazi (d. 1641), who drew rather on the philosophical tradition of Ibn Sina (d. 1037) and on the illuminationist theories of Suhrawardi (d. 1190).
In the field of jurisprudence, ‘Allamah produced works of positive law (furu‘) and of hermeneutical theory (usul). In the former area, he continued the work of his teacher Ja ‘far ibn al-Hasan al-Muhaqqiq al-Hilli (d. 1277). This work was a reformulation of the tradition established by Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Tusi, Shaykh al-Ta’ifah (d. 1068), and reconciled some of the damaging disputes that had emerged in the intervening centuries. ‘Allamah refined and expanded the Shi ‘a corpus of furu‘ al-figh, notably exploring the range of dispute within the tradition in his Mukhtalaf al-Shi‘ah. He perceived that justification and reconciliation within the tradition required a theoretical foundation achievable only within the discipline of usul. His great achievement there, and of his scholarship as a whole, was to integrate the theory of ijtihad into the structures of Imami Shi‘a jurisprudence. ‘Allamah perceived that ijtihad and its implications (previously rejected by the Shi‘is) were not irreconcilable with the reality of interpretative development within Shiism. The theory of ijtihad explained dispute, permitted creative interpretation with the tradition, and justified the authority of the jurists. All subsequent Shi‘a thinking in this area can be seen as either a development of or a reaction to ‘Allamah’s ideas.
Reaction to this thinking is associated with Muhammad Amin al-Astarabadi (d. 1627), who fought against ‘Allamah’s innovations and inspired the Akhbari movement, which was opposed by the Usuli movement. The Akhbari-Usuli controversy may reflect literalist and rationalist tensions of earlier periods, but it was articulated solely in relation to aspects of the theory of ijtihad. It dominated juristic thinking throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and was finally resolved in favor of the Usulis, whose thinking prevailed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
‘Allamah ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hilli see Hilli
Hasan ibn Yusuf ibn Mutahhar al-Hilli see Hilli
“most learned" see Hilli
‘Allamah see Hilli
Jamal ad-Din Hasan ibn Yusuf ibn 'Ali ibn Muthahhar al-Hilli see Hilli
al-Allamah al-Hilli see Hilli
Hintata
Hintata. Berber confederation in the central Moroccan High Atlas. They were the first to support the Mahdi Ibn Tumart, the founder of the Almohads.
Hintata. Berber confederation in the central Moroccan High Atlas. They were the first to support the Mahdi Ibn Tumart, the founder of the Almohads.
Hisham I
Hisham I (Hisham I Abu’l-Walid al-Rida) (b. 757). Umayyad ruler of Muslim Spain (r.788-796). During his reign, expeditions were sent regularly against the Christians and Narbonne was attacked in 793.
Hisham I Abu’l-Walid al-Rida see Hisham I
Hisham I (Hisham I Abu’l-Walid al-Rida) (b. 757). Umayyad ruler of Muslim Spain (r.788-796). During his reign, expeditions were sent regularly against the Christians and Narbonne was attacked in 793.
Hisham I Abu’l-Walid al-Rida see Hisham I
Hisham II (al-Mu’ayyad bi-‘llah Hisham II) (b. 966). Umayyad caliph of Cordoba (r.976-1009 and 1010- 1013). He was held under permanent tutelage of the vizier Almanzor. {See also Almanzor; Caliphs; Umayyads; and Vizier.}
Hisham II was the third Caliph of Cordoba, of the Umayyad dynasty. He ruled 976-1009, and 1010-1013 in the Al-Andalus (Moorish Iberia).
Hisham II succeeded his father Al-Hakam II as Caliph of Cordoba in 976 at the age of 10, with his mother Subh and the first minister Jafar al-Mushafi acting as regents. General Ghalib and Al-Mansur Ibn Abi Aamir (Almansor) managed to prevent the eunuchs from placing a brother of al-Hakam II on the throne. Subh advanced Al-Mansur and appointed him to the treasury of the Caliphate. Hisham II himself was kept from government and exercised no political influence, and in 997 he was even forced to officially hand over sole control of the government to Al-Mansur, under whom the Caliphate reached its greatest extent and attained its greatest success over the Christian states.
After Al-Mansur's death in 1002 his son Abd al-Malik (1002-1008) came to power and secured his position in the Caliphate with successful campaigns against Navarre and Barcelona before being murdered by Abd ur-Rahman Sangul (1008-1009). In 1009 a popular uprising led by Muhammad II al-Mahdi deposed both Sangul and Hisham II, the latter being kept imprisoned in Cordoba under the new regime.
The next few years saw rapid changes of leadership as a result of wars between Berber and Arab armies, as well as of Slavic mercenaries, with al-Mahdi losing out to Sulaiman al-Mustain in 1009 before regaining power in 1010. Finally the Slavic troops of the Caliphate under al-Wahdid restored Hisham II as Caliph (1010-1013).
Hisham II came under the influence of al-Wahdid, who was nevertheless unable to gain control of the Berber troops which still supported Sulaiman, and the civil war continued. In 1013 the Berbers took Cordoba with much plundering and destruction. What happened to Hisham after that is uncertain. Supposedly he was killed on April 19, 1013 by the Berbers. In any case, Sulaiman al-Mustain (1013-1016) became Caliph.
al-Mu’ayyad bi-‘llah Hisham II see Hisham II
Hisham III
Hisham III (al-Mu‘tadd bi-‘llah Hisham III) (974-1036). Last of the Umayyads caliphs of Cordoba. He ruled from 1027 to 1031. He was deposed in 1031, after which followed the period of the Muluk al-Tawa’if.
Hisham III was the last Umayyad ruler in the Al-Andalus (Moorish Iberia) (1026-1031), and the last person to hold the title Caliph of Cordoba.
Hisham III, the brother of Abd ar-Rahman IV, was chosen as Caliph after long negotiations between the governors of the border regions and the people of Cordoba. He could not enter Cordoba until 1029 as the city was occupied by the Berber armies of the Hammudids.
Although he tried to consolidate the Caliphate, the raising of taxes (to pay for mosques amongst other things) led to heavy opposition from the Muslim clerics. After the murder of his Visir al-Hakam by a conspiracy of Cordoban Patricians, Hisham was imprisoned. He managed to escape, but died in exile in 1036 in Lerida.
After the Caliphate fell with the overthrow of Hisham III in 1031 , the Caliphate's land holdings — already much diminished from its height in power just 100 years before — devolved into a number of militarily weak but culturally advanced taifas.
al-Mu‘tadd bi-‘llah Hisham III see Hisham III
Hisham III (al-Mu‘tadd bi-‘llah Hisham III) (974-1036). Last of the Umayyads caliphs of Cordoba. He ruled from 1027 to 1031. He was deposed in 1031, after which followed the period of the Muluk al-Tawa’if.
Hisham III was the last Umayyad ruler in the Al-Andalus (Moorish Iberia) (1026-1031), and the last person to hold the title Caliph of Cordoba.
Hisham III, the brother of Abd ar-Rahman IV, was chosen as Caliph after long negotiations between the governors of the border regions and the people of Cordoba. He could not enter Cordoba until 1029 as the city was occupied by the Berber armies of the Hammudids.
Although he tried to consolidate the Caliphate, the raising of taxes (to pay for mosques amongst other things) led to heavy opposition from the Muslim clerics. After the murder of his Visir al-Hakam by a conspiracy of Cordoban Patricians, Hisham was imprisoned. He managed to escape, but died in exile in 1036 in Lerida.
After the Caliphate fell with the overthrow of Hisham III in 1031 , the Caliphate's land holdings — already much diminished from its height in power just 100 years before — devolved into a number of militarily weak but culturally advanced taifas.
al-Mu‘tadd bi-‘llah Hisham III see Hisham III
Hisham ibn ‘Abd al-Malik
Hisham ibn ‘Abd al-Malik (b. 691). Caliph of the Umayyad dynasty (r.724-743). His reign marks the final period of prosperity and splendor of the Umayyad caliphate.
Hisham ibn ‘Abd al-Malik (b. 691). Caliph of the Umayyad dynasty (r.724-743). His reign marks the final period of prosperity and splendor of the Umayyad caliphate.
Hisham ibn al-Hakam
Hisham ibn al-Hakam (d.795). Most prominent Imami theologian in the times of the Imams Ja‘far al-Sadiq and Musa al-Kazim. The theory of the imamate which he elaborated has remained at the basis of Imami doctrine.
Hisham ibn al-Hakam (d.795). Most prominent Imami theologian in the times of the Imams Ja‘far al-Sadiq and Musa al-Kazim. The theory of the imamate which he elaborated has remained at the basis of Imami doctrine.
Hissou
Hissou ( Salah Hissou) (b. January 16, 1972 in Ait Taghia). Moroccan runner who was the 1999 world champion at 5,000 meters.
Salah Hissou was a long-distance runner from Morocco, who won the gold medal over 5000 meters at the 1999 World Championships in Seville. With a time of 26:38.08, he also set a world record over 10,000 meters in Brussels in 1996 and won a bronze medal over 10,000 meters at the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta.
Salah Hissou see Hissou
Hissou ( Salah Hissou) (b. January 16, 1972 in Ait Taghia). Moroccan runner who was the 1999 world champion at 5,000 meters.
Salah Hissou was a long-distance runner from Morocco, who won the gold medal over 5000 meters at the 1999 World Championships in Seville. With a time of 26:38.08, he also set a world record over 10,000 meters in Brussels in 1996 and won a bronze medal over 10,000 meters at the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta.
Salah Hissou see Hissou
Hizb
Hizb. Term which denotes factions or factionalism in the Qur’an, referring to a state of affairs that should be avoided. The term occurs twice in the Qur’an with positive connotations in the compound term hizaballah (party of God). In modern usage, hizb refers to a political party in a clearly defined manner. This usage is the result of an attempt to find an Arabic word for a European phenomenon.
In 1906, Farah Antun (1874-1922), the Lebanese intellectual who spent most of his life in Egypt and the United States, defined the term in his journal, Al-jami‘ah, as an organized group that is at loggerheads with other organized groups becaue of differences in views and interests. Soon after, in 1907, two parties were formed in Egypt: the Ummah party (Hizb al-Ummah) and the National party (Hizb al-Watani). These were primarily secular nationalist parties, although the latter had a tinge of Pan-Islamism.
There has been a reluctance to accept the concept of political parties in Islamic countries because of the divisiveness which it implies. The first organized group with a clear Islamic ideology – and regarded as the mother of almost all major Islamic organizations – established in Isma‘iliyah in 1928, was called by its founder, Hasan al-Banna’ (1906-1949), the Society of Muslim Brothers (Jam‘iyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) rather than hizb or political party. Most offshoots of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers in other Islamic countries also avoided the use of the term hizb. In Sudan and Syria, the groups have called themselves the Muslim Brothers. In Lebanon, a similar organization was named al-Jama‘ah al-Islamiyah (The Islamic Group). In Tunisia, the equivalent of the Muslim Brothers called themselves Harakat al-Ittijah al-Islami (Islamic Tendency Movement), and later the name was changed to Nahdah (Renaissance). In Algeria, the major organization is called Jabhat al-Inqadh al-Islami (Islamic Salvation Front). The recent offshoots of the Jami‘ah al-Islamiyah in the Gaza Strip are Hamas, the Arabic acronym of Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyah (Islamic Resistance Movement) and the Jihad al-Islami (Islamic Holy War), and they keep the same tradition by not using the term hizb. Similarly, in Pakistan the leading Islamic organization is called Jama‘at-i Islami (Islamic Assembly).
There has been an increase in the use of the term hizb in Islamic organizations. For instance, Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party) in Jordan, the Islamic organization Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) in Turkey, the Sunni Pashtun-based Hizb-i Islami (the Islamic Party) in Afghanistan, and Hizbullah (Party of God), the Shi‘a militant organization in Lebanon, formed under the influence of the ruling Iranian clergymen. Furthermore, Islamic organizations have been pushed willy-nilly to partake in parliamentary elections. Some elections were free, as in Pakistan in 1993, in which the Jama‘at-i Islami participated and accepted the results, and as in the free elections of 1993 in Jordan, where the Jabhat al-Amal al-Islami (Islamic Action Front) participated. Other elections were basically not free, as in Egypt in 1984 and 1987, where the Muslim Brothers participated, and in Lebanon in 1992, where both the Sunni Islamic Group and the Shi‘a Hizbullah participated.
Although the Islamic political organizations have come a long way from Hasan al-Banna’s condemnation of al-hizbiyah (party politics), a strong ambivalence toward elections and competitive party politics still exists. Nevertheless, perhaps there is a greater acceptance of competition if parties or groups have a particular Islamic ideology, as has been the case in Iran since the revolution of 1979. The most prominent ideologue of Hizbullah in Lebanon, Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, demonstrated this intolerance toward non-Muslim and secular political parties, which by their nature did not subscribe to his Islamic ideology, by depicting them as the “parties of unbelief and atheism” (“ahzab al-kuf wa-la-ilhad”).
Another reason why political parties in the Islamic countries were not particularly interested in competitive party politics is that most of them had come into being during the struggle for independence from colonial rule. It is not surprising that they tended to concentrate on the unity of the nation rather than on competition among various political organizations. For instance, the mass-based Wafd, which came to being in 1919, was not regarded by its leader Zaghlul (1857-1927) as a hizb. The name used by Zaghlul, and later by his successor Mustafa Al-Nahhas (1879-1965), was the Egyptian Wafd (al-Wafd al-Misri). This emphasis on the anti-colonial struggle made the leaders of these movements shy away from the use of the term hizb, because it might have implied that the national movement was not all-inclusive in its support. Politial organizations formed under the rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970) were called, for instance, al-Ittihad al-Qawmi (National Union), and al-Ittihad al-Ishtiraki al-‘Arabi (Arab Socialist Union), rather than political parties.
The role of predominantly non-Islamic and secular parties in Islamic countries was a manifestation of socio-economic forces, and ethnic and sectarian interests have been very extensive indeed. There was a proliferation of political parties in an open and mostly free political system in Egypt from 1923 to 1952 and in Lebanon from 1943 to 1975. In Turkey, Sudan, and Pakistan, whenever the military is not in power, political parties have played a major role. The future role of political parties in the Islamic countries will undoubtedly be one of paramount importance, as attested by greater political awareness throughout the Islamic world. These developments show clearly that political parties have become an integral part of the political life of Muslims, whether the parties are in power, in opposition in democratic or quasi-democratic polities, in opposition in exile, or as underground parties trying to topple dictators.
Hizb. Term which denotes factions or factionalism in the Qur’an, referring to a state of affairs that should be avoided. The term occurs twice in the Qur’an with positive connotations in the compound term hizaballah (party of God). In modern usage, hizb refers to a political party in a clearly defined manner. This usage is the result of an attempt to find an Arabic word for a European phenomenon.
In 1906, Farah Antun (1874-1922), the Lebanese intellectual who spent most of his life in Egypt and the United States, defined the term in his journal, Al-jami‘ah, as an organized group that is at loggerheads with other organized groups becaue of differences in views and interests. Soon after, in 1907, two parties were formed in Egypt: the Ummah party (Hizb al-Ummah) and the National party (Hizb al-Watani). These were primarily secular nationalist parties, although the latter had a tinge of Pan-Islamism.
There has been a reluctance to accept the concept of political parties in Islamic countries because of the divisiveness which it implies. The first organized group with a clear Islamic ideology – and regarded as the mother of almost all major Islamic organizations – established in Isma‘iliyah in 1928, was called by its founder, Hasan al-Banna’ (1906-1949), the Society of Muslim Brothers (Jam‘iyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) rather than hizb or political party. Most offshoots of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers in other Islamic countries also avoided the use of the term hizb. In Sudan and Syria, the groups have called themselves the Muslim Brothers. In Lebanon, a similar organization was named al-Jama‘ah al-Islamiyah (The Islamic Group). In Tunisia, the equivalent of the Muslim Brothers called themselves Harakat al-Ittijah al-Islami (Islamic Tendency Movement), and later the name was changed to Nahdah (Renaissance). In Algeria, the major organization is called Jabhat al-Inqadh al-Islami (Islamic Salvation Front). The recent offshoots of the Jami‘ah al-Islamiyah in the Gaza Strip are Hamas, the Arabic acronym of Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyah (Islamic Resistance Movement) and the Jihad al-Islami (Islamic Holy War), and they keep the same tradition by not using the term hizb. Similarly, in Pakistan the leading Islamic organization is called Jama‘at-i Islami (Islamic Assembly).
There has been an increase in the use of the term hizb in Islamic organizations. For instance, Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party) in Jordan, the Islamic organization Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) in Turkey, the Sunni Pashtun-based Hizb-i Islami (the Islamic Party) in Afghanistan, and Hizbullah (Party of God), the Shi‘a militant organization in Lebanon, formed under the influence of the ruling Iranian clergymen. Furthermore, Islamic organizations have been pushed willy-nilly to partake in parliamentary elections. Some elections were free, as in Pakistan in 1993, in which the Jama‘at-i Islami participated and accepted the results, and as in the free elections of 1993 in Jordan, where the Jabhat al-Amal al-Islami (Islamic Action Front) participated. Other elections were basically not free, as in Egypt in 1984 and 1987, where the Muslim Brothers participated, and in Lebanon in 1992, where both the Sunni Islamic Group and the Shi‘a Hizbullah participated.
Although the Islamic political organizations have come a long way from Hasan al-Banna’s condemnation of al-hizbiyah (party politics), a strong ambivalence toward elections and competitive party politics still exists. Nevertheless, perhaps there is a greater acceptance of competition if parties or groups have a particular Islamic ideology, as has been the case in Iran since the revolution of 1979. The most prominent ideologue of Hizbullah in Lebanon, Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, demonstrated this intolerance toward non-Muslim and secular political parties, which by their nature did not subscribe to his Islamic ideology, by depicting them as the “parties of unbelief and atheism” (“ahzab al-kuf wa-la-ilhad”).
Another reason why political parties in the Islamic countries were not particularly interested in competitive party politics is that most of them had come into being during the struggle for independence from colonial rule. It is not surprising that they tended to concentrate on the unity of the nation rather than on competition among various political organizations. For instance, the mass-based Wafd, which came to being in 1919, was not regarded by its leader Zaghlul (1857-1927) as a hizb. The name used by Zaghlul, and later by his successor Mustafa Al-Nahhas (1879-1965), was the Egyptian Wafd (al-Wafd al-Misri). This emphasis on the anti-colonial struggle made the leaders of these movements shy away from the use of the term hizb, because it might have implied that the national movement was not all-inclusive in its support. Politial organizations formed under the rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970) were called, for instance, al-Ittihad al-Qawmi (National Union), and al-Ittihad al-Ishtiraki al-‘Arabi (Arab Socialist Union), rather than political parties.
The role of predominantly non-Islamic and secular parties in Islamic countries was a manifestation of socio-economic forces, and ethnic and sectarian interests have been very extensive indeed. There was a proliferation of political parties in an open and mostly free political system in Egypt from 1923 to 1952 and in Lebanon from 1943 to 1975. In Turkey, Sudan, and Pakistan, whenever the military is not in power, political parties have played a major role. The future role of political parties in the Islamic countries will undoubtedly be one of paramount importance, as attested by greater political awareness throughout the Islamic world. These developments show clearly that political parties have become an integral part of the political life of Muslims, whether the parties are in power, in opposition in democratic or quasi-democratic polities, in opposition in exile, or as underground parties trying to topple dictators.
Hizb al-Da‘wah al-Islamiyah
Hizb al-Da‘wah al-Islamiyah (Islamic Call Party) (Islamic Dawa Party). One of the three most important activist Shi‘a organizations in opposition to Saddam Hussein’s Ba‘th regime in Iraq, and the oldest among them. The others were the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, founded in Iran in November 1982, and the Organization of Islamic Action, founded in Karbala in the 1960s.
The party (known in short form simply as the Da‘wah) was established in October 1957 in Najaf by the young and ingenious Shi‘a religious authority, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (born in 1933 in Kazimayn, Baghdad, and executed by the Ba‘th in April 1980). Cofounders were a group of junior Shi‘a clergy, some of whom achieved great prominence in later years (chiefly Muhammad Baqir and Mahdi, the two sons of Iraq’s then chief mujtahid Muhsin al-Hakim, as well as two lay intellectuals).
The decision to found a political party (which al-Sadr, using a Qur’anic expression dubbed Hizb Allah, “Party of God”), whose sole purpose would be to call the people of Iraq back to Islam, was the result of the young clergy’s realization that Islam, and in particular, Shi‘a Islam in Iraq was on the decline. Owing to a number of political, social, and economic developments under the monarchy, the number of students of religion in the two holy cities of Najaf and Karbala had declined steeply and many young Shi‘a were estranged from religion and markedly so, from the religious establishment.
Under the republican regime of ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim, (July 14, 1958-February 8, 1963), followed by the short-lived Ba‘th regime of 1963 and that of the ‘Arif brothers, ‘Abd al-Salam and ‘Abd al-Rahman (November 18, 1963-July 17, 1968), relations between the Shi‘a establishment of the holy cities and the government were tense, but both sides refrained from drastic action. The regimes tolerated de facto Shi‘a autonomy in the religious educational institutions (al-hawzat al-‘ilmiyah) of Najaf and Karbala, and the latter, for their part, kept their protest against the secularizing Sunni ruling elites within strict limits.
These circumstances permitted the Da‘wah to operate almost without restriction, not only in Najaf but also in Baghdad. (Indeed, the main opposition to its activity came, in those days, from the more conservative circles within the religious university of Najaf, who regarded activity along modern party lines as deviation from tradition. As a result, so as not to compromise his position as a mujtahid, Sadr was eventually forced to sever his organizational ties with the party.) The Da‘wah’s main activity in Baghdad was aimed at winning over young lay Shi‘a intellectuals (a few Sunnis joined the party as well, but they were a small minority), and thus it concentrated its main effort among the students of Baghdad University and young professionals, as well as among high school students. Almost all the recruiting activity within these circles was conducted by lay university students and graduates.
At the same time, the party tried to expand its influence among the Shi ‘a poor in the al-Thawrah slum (later Saddam City) on the outskirts of Baghdad, but this was done, mainly, through party members who were junior clergy. Until the Ba ‘th came to power (and, indeed, even two or three years afterward) this activity was carried out almost openly, with little or no official interference. It involved public prayers, gatherings to celebrate Islamic festivals, Islamic placards, and, for the hard core of activists, classes led by al-Sadr and others in Qur’an interpretation and some advanced Islamic studies. Beginning in the late 1960s, the Da ‘wah expanded its activities to other parts of the Shi‘a world, notably to Lebanon. According to an interview with a senior member in the 1960s, to disguise its activity somewhat, the Da‘wah also called itself the Fatimid Party (al-Hizb al-Fatimi) after Fatimah al-Zahra’, ‘Ali’s wife and the Prophet’s daughter.
In the second half of 1969, the Ba‘th regime, when trying to eliminate the Shi‘a educational autonomy, cracked down in an unprecedented way on the hawzat of Najaf and Karbala. This marked the beginning of a rapid deterioration of relations between the two establishments. The Da‘wah’s activities, too, were severely restricted, and, eventually, it was forced to go underground. This, as well as its own theory of action that dictated a leap into political activity after a few years of purely educational work, drove the party to become progressively more militant. In 1970, the party’s first member was martyred, and in 1974 the regime executed five more senior members. As reported by its own sources, in February 1977 the party was deeply involved in organizing the vast anti-government demonstrations that occurred during a mass pilgrimage to Karbala to commemorate the anniversary of the fortieth day after the martyrdom of Imam Husayn.
But the Da‘wah’s main political and guerrilla thrust occurred soon thereafter under the influence of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s February 1979 takeover in Iran. The party then engaged in organizing mass Shi‘a anti-Ba‘th demonstrations and armed attacks against Ba‘th party and internal security centers, all in an attempt to topple the regime and replace it with an Iranian style Islamic republic. As a result of the regime’s crackdown, hundreds of party members (including al-Sadr who, by then, no longer belonged officially to the party, but who remained its intellectual mentor) were executed, a few thousand members and supporters were arrested, and most other members fled the country.
Throughout the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988) the Da‘wah’s activity was fourfold: (1) it acted inside Iraq, sporadically hitting at Ba‘th targets; (2) it had a small, regular unit that fought on Iran’s side against Iraq; (3) it carried out terrorist activities against pro-Iraqi regimes in the Middle East, chiefly in Kuwait, and against Western targets; and (4) it endeavored to incorporate new members and supporters from among the Iraqi Shi‘a expatriates in the West and in Iran. At the end of the war, in order to improve its image in the West, the party stopped all armed activities outside of Iraq.
During the Kuwait crisis (August 1990-March 1991) and following it, the party initiated a number of overtures toward Western governments, notably the United States and Britain, as well as toward anti-Ba‘thist, pro-Western Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia, with which they were at loggerheads during the Iraq-Iran War. Another aspect of their growing pragmatism was a claim, voiced by some of the party’s spokesmen (but clearly not by all), to be in favor of Western-style liberal parliamentary democracy. As those spokesmen put it, if the majority in post-Saddam Iraq were to reject their notion of an Islamic republic, the party would accept the majority verdict. It then would continue its educational work designed to persuade the people of the need for such an Islamic rule.
In the era after the Iraq-Iran war some differences within the party between those whose main activity was in Iran and those who lived and worked in the West have been exposed. One major difference concerned the degree to which the party ought to be independent of Iranian dictates, now that the interest of the Iraqi opposition in continuing the struggle and that of the Iranian state in increasing stability were incompatible. Another difference, albeit a less important one, was over the degree of clarity with which the party should express its commitment to democracy. Those members operating in Iran (led by the party’s spokesman Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi al-Asafi) have been rather vague about democracy and have been receptive to Iranian policy dictates, whereas some party members who live in the West have inclined toward more independence and democracy.
During the Kuwait crisis, the party suffered from at least one split. The new group, calling itself the Cadres of the Iraqi Islamic Da‘wah Party (Kawadir Hizb al-Da ‘wah al-Islamiyah al-‘Iraqi), emphasized its Iraqi identity and “the independence of the Islamic Iraqi decision-making” of Iranian policy. In addition, it claims that, for more than a decade, the Da‘wah failed to provide a plan of action, and that an urgent need for such a plan existed. It was typical, however, of this closely knit and highly ideological movement that the two factions restrained their argument and refrained from the acrimonious accusations so widespread in political disputes in the Middle East.
The contribution of Da‘wah activists to the anti-Ba‘thist Shi‘a intifadah or uprising of March 1991 is unclear. According to party members’ reports, they were active in encouraging the masses to revolt, but it is clear that most of the uprising was spontaneous. Moreover, there is little doubt that a rival Shi‘a opposition organization, the Tehran based Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, was more prominent, sending into Iraq many hundreds of its Iran based membership. Whatever the case, the regime’s crackdown that followed weakened the party organization inside Iraq: members who exposed themselves during the revolt were later jailed or executed.
Owing to the requirements of its underground activity, the precise organizational structure of the party was a well-guarded secret. However, its general outlines may still be delineated. At the top of what is described as “a pyramidal structure” stood a collective body of around ten. Its first name was Majlis al-Fuqaha’ (Council of Jurists). In later years, it also included a few laymen, though they were still a small minority. In its contemporary incarnation it is reported as being called al-Qiyadah al-‘Ammah (General Leadership). One level lower is the Council of Leadership (Majlis al-Qiyadah) that consists of a few score of activists. Its more contemporary name was either the General Congress (al-Mu’tamar al-‘Amm), or the Political Bureau (al-Maktab al-Siyasi). This body, which consisted mostly of lay intellectuals who represented their respective territorial branches, directed the day-to-day activity of the party branches. Under it one would find an unknown number of lower levels, ending with the basic unit, the Family (al-Usrah) or the Ring (al-Halaqah).
Inside Iraq, to minimize the danger of exposure, an ordinary member knew only other members of his own basic unit, and only vertical contacts between units were maintained. This structure was strongly influenced by the organizational structures of the Communist and Ba‘th parties. Al-Sadr was the first to acknowledge that any organizational form was legitimate if it could spread “the call” more efficiently, and as long as it was not forbidden by the shari‘a. “The Prophet,” he explained, “had he lived in our age, would have used … the modern and suitable means of communications and spreading of the message.” In Europe, where there was no danger of suppression, the lowest echelon was the local branch, apparently combining all party members in a town.
On the face of it, the position of the Da‘wah publications was ecumenical. The party called for the establishment of a full-fledged Islamic regime in Iraq that would apply the rules of the shari‘a to every walk of life, regardless of differences between Sunni and Shi‘a Islam (and, indeed, the differences between them in terms of substantive law are very small). A more careful reading, however, revealed Shi‘a undertones. For example, there are occasional inferences that once Saddam Hussein and his Ba‘th regime were toppled, Shiism would become the dominant power in Iraq’s political life. Shi‘a youth were called upon to be ready to sacrifice themselves, as did Imam Husayn and most other Shi‘a imams. Although such appeals made it difficult for Sunnis to join the movement, this did not prevent the Da ‘wah from establishing cordial relations with the main (Sunni) Kurdish opposition organizations. Unsurprisingly, however, the party had somewhat uneasy relations with the other main Shi‘a opposition groups, for they were all competing for the allegiance of the Iraqi Shi‘a expatriates in Iran and Europe.
The party’s ideas were first expressed by al-Sadr in a magazine, Al-adwa’ (The Lights), issued by an activist group of ‘ulama’ in Najaf in the early 1960s. The party’s own first magazine was called Sawt al-da‘wah (Voice of the Da‘wah), and it, too, came out in Najaf in the mid and late 1960s. During most of the 1980s and the early 1990s, its main publications were a weekly issued in Tehran, Al-jihad, and another issued in London, Sawt al-‘Iraq (Voice of Iraq). The cadres issued a weekly magazine called Fajr al-‘Iraq (Iraq’s Dawn).
After the Persian Gulf War, the interests of al-Dawa and the United States became more closely aligned. The efforts of al-Dawa representatives and other opponents of Saddam Hussein led to the founding of the Iraqi National Congress, which relied heavily on United States funding. INC's political platform promised human rights and rule of law within a constitutional, democratic, and pluralistic Iraq. The Dawa Party itself participated in the congress between 1992 and 1995, withdrawing because of disagreements with Kurdish parties over how Iraq should be governed after Hussein's eventual ouster.
Most leaders of al-Dawa remained in exile in Iran and elsewhere until the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. During this period, some of its factions moved to SCIRI (Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq). Al-Dawa party, in contrast to the other Shi'a Islamic Iraqi opposition parties, took a stance against the war. Ibrahim Al-Jaffari was personally involved in ensuring that Al-Dawa participated in anti war protests across the United Kingdom in the run up to the 2003 Iraq war. After the invasion, both al-Dawa and SCIRI returned to Iraq. Al-Dawa chose Nasariyah as its base of operations in Iraq.
The political ideology of al-Da'wa was heavily influenced by work done by Baqr al-Sadr who laid out four mandatory principles of governance in his 1975 work, Islamic Political System. These were:
1. Absolute sovereignty belongs to God.
2. Islamic injunctions are the basis of legislation. The legislative authority may enact any law not repugnant to Islam.
3. The people, as vice-regents of Allah, are entrusted with legislative and executive powers.
4. The jurist holding religious authority represents Islam. By confirming legislative and executive actions, he gives them legality.
Upon joining the party, allegiance must be sworn to the party.
A brief chronology Al-Dawa reads as follows:
* 1968-1969 - Al-Dawa founded by Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in response to repression of Shi'i religious academies in Najaf by the Iraqi Ba'ath regime.
* 1974 - Ba'thist revolutionary court arrests and sentences 75 al-Dawa members to death.
* 1975 - Annual pilgrimage from Najaf to Karbala - called the Marad al-Ras - is cancelled by the Ba'ath government.
* 1977 February - The Safar Intifada. Al-Dawa organizes Marad al-Ras, in spite of government ban. Event is attacked by police.
* 1979 Iranian Revolution. Al-Dawa creates a military wing, later called Shahid al-Sadr.
* 1980 30 March - Ba'athist Revolutionary Command Council retroactively bans al-Dawa; membership was made punishable by death. 96 al-Dawa members are allegedly executed this month.
* 1980 1 April - al-Dawa unsuccessfully attempts to assassinate Tariq Aziz, Foreign Minister at the time.
* 1980 9 April - Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and his sister Amina Sadr bint al-Huda are arrested and executed.
* 1981 Mid-December - Iraqi embassy in Beirut is leveled by a suicide bomber. Iraqi al-Da'wa party claims credit for the attack, citing Iraq's invasion of Iran. Perhaps the first Shi'a suicide bombing, the attack was an "oft-noticed precedent" for the 1983 bombing of the American Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut.
* 1982 - Al-Dawa assassination attempt on Saddam Hussein in Dujail fails. Heavy crack-downs on al-Dawa by Hussein's regime. Many flee to Iran, where it suffers from competition with SCIRI.
* 1983 12 December - In Kuwait, the American and French embassies, Kuwait airport, the main oil refinery in Kuwait, and a residential area for Raytheon employees are bombed. 17 suspects were soon arrested, mostly al-Dawa members, including Jamal Jafaar Mohammed (currently member of Iraq's parliament as a member of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's ruling coalition). Jamal Jafaar Mohammed escapes from Kuwait before the trial starts and is sentenced to death in absentia in 1984.
* 1987 - Al-Dawa attacks Saddam's motorcade but again fails to kill him.
* 1996 - Attempt made on the life of Saddam's son, Uday. Al-Dawa blamed.
* 2003 - After the Invasion of Iraq al-Dawa returns to Iraq, basing itself in the city of Nasiriya which the party now runs and controls.
* 2005 January - The United Iraqi Alliance, triumphs in the January 2005 Elections; Dawa leader Ibrahim al-Jaafari becomes Prime Minister.
* 2005 December - The United Iraqi Alliance, triumphs in the December 2005 Elections.
* 2006 - Dawa deputy leader Jawad al-Maliki replaces Ibrahim al-Jaafari as Prime Minister.
Islamic Call Party see Hizb al-Da‘wah al-Islamiyah
Da‘wah see Hizb al-Da‘wah al-Islamiyah
Fatimid Party see Hizb al-Da‘wah al-Islamiyah
al-Hizb al-Fatimi see Hizb al-Da‘wah al-Islamiyah
Islamic Dawa Party see Hizb al-Da‘wah al-Islamiyah
Hizb al-Da‘wah al-Islamiyah (Islamic Call Party) (Islamic Dawa Party). One of the three most important activist Shi‘a organizations in opposition to Saddam Hussein’s Ba‘th regime in Iraq, and the oldest among them. The others were the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, founded in Iran in November 1982, and the Organization of Islamic Action, founded in Karbala in the 1960s.
The party (known in short form simply as the Da‘wah) was established in October 1957 in Najaf by the young and ingenious Shi‘a religious authority, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (born in 1933 in Kazimayn, Baghdad, and executed by the Ba‘th in April 1980). Cofounders were a group of junior Shi‘a clergy, some of whom achieved great prominence in later years (chiefly Muhammad Baqir and Mahdi, the two sons of Iraq’s then chief mujtahid Muhsin al-Hakim, as well as two lay intellectuals).
The decision to found a political party (which al-Sadr, using a Qur’anic expression dubbed Hizb Allah, “Party of God”), whose sole purpose would be to call the people of Iraq back to Islam, was the result of the young clergy’s realization that Islam, and in particular, Shi‘a Islam in Iraq was on the decline. Owing to a number of political, social, and economic developments under the monarchy, the number of students of religion in the two holy cities of Najaf and Karbala had declined steeply and many young Shi‘a were estranged from religion and markedly so, from the religious establishment.
Under the republican regime of ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim, (July 14, 1958-February 8, 1963), followed by the short-lived Ba‘th regime of 1963 and that of the ‘Arif brothers, ‘Abd al-Salam and ‘Abd al-Rahman (November 18, 1963-July 17, 1968), relations between the Shi‘a establishment of the holy cities and the government were tense, but both sides refrained from drastic action. The regimes tolerated de facto Shi‘a autonomy in the religious educational institutions (al-hawzat al-‘ilmiyah) of Najaf and Karbala, and the latter, for their part, kept their protest against the secularizing Sunni ruling elites within strict limits.
These circumstances permitted the Da‘wah to operate almost without restriction, not only in Najaf but also in Baghdad. (Indeed, the main opposition to its activity came, in those days, from the more conservative circles within the religious university of Najaf, who regarded activity along modern party lines as deviation from tradition. As a result, so as not to compromise his position as a mujtahid, Sadr was eventually forced to sever his organizational ties with the party.) The Da‘wah’s main activity in Baghdad was aimed at winning over young lay Shi‘a intellectuals (a few Sunnis joined the party as well, but they were a small minority), and thus it concentrated its main effort among the students of Baghdad University and young professionals, as well as among high school students. Almost all the recruiting activity within these circles was conducted by lay university students and graduates.
At the same time, the party tried to expand its influence among the Shi ‘a poor in the al-Thawrah slum (later Saddam City) on the outskirts of Baghdad, but this was done, mainly, through party members who were junior clergy. Until the Ba ‘th came to power (and, indeed, even two or three years afterward) this activity was carried out almost openly, with little or no official interference. It involved public prayers, gatherings to celebrate Islamic festivals, Islamic placards, and, for the hard core of activists, classes led by al-Sadr and others in Qur’an interpretation and some advanced Islamic studies. Beginning in the late 1960s, the Da ‘wah expanded its activities to other parts of the Shi‘a world, notably to Lebanon. According to an interview with a senior member in the 1960s, to disguise its activity somewhat, the Da‘wah also called itself the Fatimid Party (al-Hizb al-Fatimi) after Fatimah al-Zahra’, ‘Ali’s wife and the Prophet’s daughter.
In the second half of 1969, the Ba‘th regime, when trying to eliminate the Shi‘a educational autonomy, cracked down in an unprecedented way on the hawzat of Najaf and Karbala. This marked the beginning of a rapid deterioration of relations between the two establishments. The Da‘wah’s activities, too, were severely restricted, and, eventually, it was forced to go underground. This, as well as its own theory of action that dictated a leap into political activity after a few years of purely educational work, drove the party to become progressively more militant. In 1970, the party’s first member was martyred, and in 1974 the regime executed five more senior members. As reported by its own sources, in February 1977 the party was deeply involved in organizing the vast anti-government demonstrations that occurred during a mass pilgrimage to Karbala to commemorate the anniversary of the fortieth day after the martyrdom of Imam Husayn.
But the Da‘wah’s main political and guerrilla thrust occurred soon thereafter under the influence of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s February 1979 takeover in Iran. The party then engaged in organizing mass Shi‘a anti-Ba‘th demonstrations and armed attacks against Ba‘th party and internal security centers, all in an attempt to topple the regime and replace it with an Iranian style Islamic republic. As a result of the regime’s crackdown, hundreds of party members (including al-Sadr who, by then, no longer belonged officially to the party, but who remained its intellectual mentor) were executed, a few thousand members and supporters were arrested, and most other members fled the country.
Throughout the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988) the Da‘wah’s activity was fourfold: (1) it acted inside Iraq, sporadically hitting at Ba‘th targets; (2) it had a small, regular unit that fought on Iran’s side against Iraq; (3) it carried out terrorist activities against pro-Iraqi regimes in the Middle East, chiefly in Kuwait, and against Western targets; and (4) it endeavored to incorporate new members and supporters from among the Iraqi Shi‘a expatriates in the West and in Iran. At the end of the war, in order to improve its image in the West, the party stopped all armed activities outside of Iraq.
During the Kuwait crisis (August 1990-March 1991) and following it, the party initiated a number of overtures toward Western governments, notably the United States and Britain, as well as toward anti-Ba‘thist, pro-Western Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia, with which they were at loggerheads during the Iraq-Iran War. Another aspect of their growing pragmatism was a claim, voiced by some of the party’s spokesmen (but clearly not by all), to be in favor of Western-style liberal parliamentary democracy. As those spokesmen put it, if the majority in post-Saddam Iraq were to reject their notion of an Islamic republic, the party would accept the majority verdict. It then would continue its educational work designed to persuade the people of the need for such an Islamic rule.
In the era after the Iraq-Iran war some differences within the party between those whose main activity was in Iran and those who lived and worked in the West have been exposed. One major difference concerned the degree to which the party ought to be independent of Iranian dictates, now that the interest of the Iraqi opposition in continuing the struggle and that of the Iranian state in increasing stability were incompatible. Another difference, albeit a less important one, was over the degree of clarity with which the party should express its commitment to democracy. Those members operating in Iran (led by the party’s spokesman Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi al-Asafi) have been rather vague about democracy and have been receptive to Iranian policy dictates, whereas some party members who live in the West have inclined toward more independence and democracy.
During the Kuwait crisis, the party suffered from at least one split. The new group, calling itself the Cadres of the Iraqi Islamic Da‘wah Party (Kawadir Hizb al-Da ‘wah al-Islamiyah al-‘Iraqi), emphasized its Iraqi identity and “the independence of the Islamic Iraqi decision-making” of Iranian policy. In addition, it claims that, for more than a decade, the Da‘wah failed to provide a plan of action, and that an urgent need for such a plan existed. It was typical, however, of this closely knit and highly ideological movement that the two factions restrained their argument and refrained from the acrimonious accusations so widespread in political disputes in the Middle East.
The contribution of Da‘wah activists to the anti-Ba‘thist Shi‘a intifadah or uprising of March 1991 is unclear. According to party members’ reports, they were active in encouraging the masses to revolt, but it is clear that most of the uprising was spontaneous. Moreover, there is little doubt that a rival Shi‘a opposition organization, the Tehran based Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, was more prominent, sending into Iraq many hundreds of its Iran based membership. Whatever the case, the regime’s crackdown that followed weakened the party organization inside Iraq: members who exposed themselves during the revolt were later jailed or executed.
Owing to the requirements of its underground activity, the precise organizational structure of the party was a well-guarded secret. However, its general outlines may still be delineated. At the top of what is described as “a pyramidal structure” stood a collective body of around ten. Its first name was Majlis al-Fuqaha’ (Council of Jurists). In later years, it also included a few laymen, though they were still a small minority. In its contemporary incarnation it is reported as being called al-Qiyadah al-‘Ammah (General Leadership). One level lower is the Council of Leadership (Majlis al-Qiyadah) that consists of a few score of activists. Its more contemporary name was either the General Congress (al-Mu’tamar al-‘Amm), or the Political Bureau (al-Maktab al-Siyasi). This body, which consisted mostly of lay intellectuals who represented their respective territorial branches, directed the day-to-day activity of the party branches. Under it one would find an unknown number of lower levels, ending with the basic unit, the Family (al-Usrah) or the Ring (al-Halaqah).
Inside Iraq, to minimize the danger of exposure, an ordinary member knew only other members of his own basic unit, and only vertical contacts between units were maintained. This structure was strongly influenced by the organizational structures of the Communist and Ba‘th parties. Al-Sadr was the first to acknowledge that any organizational form was legitimate if it could spread “the call” more efficiently, and as long as it was not forbidden by the shari‘a. “The Prophet,” he explained, “had he lived in our age, would have used … the modern and suitable means of communications and spreading of the message.” In Europe, where there was no danger of suppression, the lowest echelon was the local branch, apparently combining all party members in a town.
On the face of it, the position of the Da‘wah publications was ecumenical. The party called for the establishment of a full-fledged Islamic regime in Iraq that would apply the rules of the shari‘a to every walk of life, regardless of differences between Sunni and Shi‘a Islam (and, indeed, the differences between them in terms of substantive law are very small). A more careful reading, however, revealed Shi‘a undertones. For example, there are occasional inferences that once Saddam Hussein and his Ba‘th regime were toppled, Shiism would become the dominant power in Iraq’s political life. Shi‘a youth were called upon to be ready to sacrifice themselves, as did Imam Husayn and most other Shi‘a imams. Although such appeals made it difficult for Sunnis to join the movement, this did not prevent the Da ‘wah from establishing cordial relations with the main (Sunni) Kurdish opposition organizations. Unsurprisingly, however, the party had somewhat uneasy relations with the other main Shi‘a opposition groups, for they were all competing for the allegiance of the Iraqi Shi‘a expatriates in Iran and Europe.
The party’s ideas were first expressed by al-Sadr in a magazine, Al-adwa’ (The Lights), issued by an activist group of ‘ulama’ in Najaf in the early 1960s. The party’s own first magazine was called Sawt al-da‘wah (Voice of the Da‘wah), and it, too, came out in Najaf in the mid and late 1960s. During most of the 1980s and the early 1990s, its main publications were a weekly issued in Tehran, Al-jihad, and another issued in London, Sawt al-‘Iraq (Voice of Iraq). The cadres issued a weekly magazine called Fajr al-‘Iraq (Iraq’s Dawn).
After the Persian Gulf War, the interests of al-Dawa and the United States became more closely aligned. The efforts of al-Dawa representatives and other opponents of Saddam Hussein led to the founding of the Iraqi National Congress, which relied heavily on United States funding. INC's political platform promised human rights and rule of law within a constitutional, democratic, and pluralistic Iraq. The Dawa Party itself participated in the congress between 1992 and 1995, withdrawing because of disagreements with Kurdish parties over how Iraq should be governed after Hussein's eventual ouster.
Most leaders of al-Dawa remained in exile in Iran and elsewhere until the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. During this period, some of its factions moved to SCIRI (Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq). Al-Dawa party, in contrast to the other Shi'a Islamic Iraqi opposition parties, took a stance against the war. Ibrahim Al-Jaffari was personally involved in ensuring that Al-Dawa participated in anti war protests across the United Kingdom in the run up to the 2003 Iraq war. After the invasion, both al-Dawa and SCIRI returned to Iraq. Al-Dawa chose Nasariyah as its base of operations in Iraq.
The political ideology of al-Da'wa was heavily influenced by work done by Baqr al-Sadr who laid out four mandatory principles of governance in his 1975 work, Islamic Political System. These were:
1. Absolute sovereignty belongs to God.
2. Islamic injunctions are the basis of legislation. The legislative authority may enact any law not repugnant to Islam.
3. The people, as vice-regents of Allah, are entrusted with legislative and executive powers.
4. The jurist holding religious authority represents Islam. By confirming legislative and executive actions, he gives them legality.
Upon joining the party, allegiance must be sworn to the party.
A brief chronology Al-Dawa reads as follows:
* 1968-1969 - Al-Dawa founded by Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in response to repression of Shi'i religious academies in Najaf by the Iraqi Ba'ath regime.
* 1974 - Ba'thist revolutionary court arrests and sentences 75 al-Dawa members to death.
* 1975 - Annual pilgrimage from Najaf to Karbala - called the Marad al-Ras - is cancelled by the Ba'ath government.
* 1977 February - The Safar Intifada. Al-Dawa organizes Marad al-Ras, in spite of government ban. Event is attacked by police.
* 1979 Iranian Revolution. Al-Dawa creates a military wing, later called Shahid al-Sadr.
* 1980 30 March - Ba'athist Revolutionary Command Council retroactively bans al-Dawa; membership was made punishable by death. 96 al-Dawa members are allegedly executed this month.
* 1980 1 April - al-Dawa unsuccessfully attempts to assassinate Tariq Aziz, Foreign Minister at the time.
* 1980 9 April - Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and his sister Amina Sadr bint al-Huda are arrested and executed.
* 1981 Mid-December - Iraqi embassy in Beirut is leveled by a suicide bomber. Iraqi al-Da'wa party claims credit for the attack, citing Iraq's invasion of Iran. Perhaps the first Shi'a suicide bombing, the attack was an "oft-noticed precedent" for the 1983 bombing of the American Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut.
* 1982 - Al-Dawa assassination attempt on Saddam Hussein in Dujail fails. Heavy crack-downs on al-Dawa by Hussein's regime. Many flee to Iran, where it suffers from competition with SCIRI.
* 1983 12 December - In Kuwait, the American and French embassies, Kuwait airport, the main oil refinery in Kuwait, and a residential area for Raytheon employees are bombed. 17 suspects were soon arrested, mostly al-Dawa members, including Jamal Jafaar Mohammed (currently member of Iraq's parliament as a member of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's ruling coalition). Jamal Jafaar Mohammed escapes from Kuwait before the trial starts and is sentenced to death in absentia in 1984.
* 1987 - Al-Dawa attacks Saddam's motorcade but again fails to kill him.
* 1996 - Attempt made on the life of Saddam's son, Uday. Al-Dawa blamed.
* 2003 - After the Invasion of Iraq al-Dawa returns to Iraq, basing itself in the city of Nasiriya which the party now runs and controls.
* 2005 January - The United Iraqi Alliance, triumphs in the January 2005 Elections; Dawa leader Ibrahim al-Jaafari becomes Prime Minister.
* 2005 December - The United Iraqi Alliance, triumphs in the December 2005 Elections.
* 2006 - Dawa deputy leader Jawad al-Maliki replaces Ibrahim al-Jaafari as Prime Minister.
Islamic Call Party see Hizb al-Da‘wah al-Islamiyah
Da‘wah see Hizb al-Da‘wah al-Islamiyah
Fatimid Party see Hizb al-Da‘wah al-Islamiyah
al-Hizb al-Fatimi see Hizb al-Da‘wah al-Islamiyah
Islamic Dawa Party see Hizb al-Da‘wah al-Islamiyah
Hizballah
Hizballah (Hizb Allah) (Hizbullah) (Hezbollah). Arabic name which literally means “the party of God.” The Hizballah is better known by its Farsi name of Hezbollah.
Hizballah is a radical Shi‘a group formed in 1982 in Lebanon with Hussayn Musawi as its leader. Strongly anti-Western and anti-Israeli, closely allied with, and often directed by, Iran, Hizballah may have conducted operations that were not approved by Tehran. Known or suspected to have been involved in numerous anti-United States terrorist attacks, including the suicide truck bombing of the United States Embassy and the United States Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983 and the United States Embassy annex in Beirut in September 1984. Elements of the group were responsible for the kidnapping and detention of American and other Western hostages in Lebanon. The group also attacked the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992 and is a suspect in the 1994 bombing of the Israeli cultural center in Buenos Aires. Hizballah operated in the Bekaa Valley (Biqaa’ Valley), the southern suburbs of Beirut, and southern Lebanon. It also established cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North America, and Asia. It received substantial amounts of financial aid, explosives, and diplomatic aid from Iran and Syria.
Hizballah is an umbrella organization where groups like Islamic Jihad, Revolutionary Justice organization, Islamic Jihad for a Free Palestine and Revolutionary Arab Groups are subdivisions. Hizballah had about 5,000 members and received much of its support and training from Iran and Syria. Hizballah demanded that Westerners leave Lebanon and it charged the Christian Lebanese population with crimes against their Muslim compatriots.
Hizballah was formed by members of a faction inside the Lebanese Amal party. However, following the Iranian revolution in 1979 there was a split inside the party. The final split came after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon earlier in 1982. In many cases, the main enemy of Hizballah had been Israel. The struggle of Hizballah is defined as a jihad, -- a holy fight --, and members dying in action became shaded, martyrs, who were guaranteed a place in Paradise.
While Hizballah claimed responsibility for bombing the United States embassy and marine headquarters in Beirut in 1983, hijackings, and the taking of Western and Israeli hostages, Hizballah also performed peaceful actions, and was in charge of important social welfare programs for the Lebanese population.
In 1984, Sheikh Muhammad Hussayn Fadlallah took control over Hizballah, and the organization became more of an instrument to oppose Israel on political and religious grounds. Hizballah attacked Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and Israelis in northern Israel, and was, in turn, attacked by Israel. Neither party came close to neutralizing the other.
On occasion, Iran was able to persuade Hizballah to release hostages in an effort to improve international relations.
Hizb Allah see Hizballah
Hizbullah see Hizballah
Hezbollah see Hizballah
“the party of God” see Hizballah
Hizballah (Hizb Allah) (Hizbullah) (Hezbollah). Arabic name which literally means “the party of God.” The Hizballah is better known by its Farsi name of Hezbollah.
Hizballah is a radical Shi‘a group formed in 1982 in Lebanon with Hussayn Musawi as its leader. Strongly anti-Western and anti-Israeli, closely allied with, and often directed by, Iran, Hizballah may have conducted operations that were not approved by Tehran. Known or suspected to have been involved in numerous anti-United States terrorist attacks, including the suicide truck bombing of the United States Embassy and the United States Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983 and the United States Embassy annex in Beirut in September 1984. Elements of the group were responsible for the kidnapping and detention of American and other Western hostages in Lebanon. The group also attacked the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992 and is a suspect in the 1994 bombing of the Israeli cultural center in Buenos Aires. Hizballah operated in the Bekaa Valley (Biqaa’ Valley), the southern suburbs of Beirut, and southern Lebanon. It also established cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North America, and Asia. It received substantial amounts of financial aid, explosives, and diplomatic aid from Iran and Syria.
Hizballah is an umbrella organization where groups like Islamic Jihad, Revolutionary Justice organization, Islamic Jihad for a Free Palestine and Revolutionary Arab Groups are subdivisions. Hizballah had about 5,000 members and received much of its support and training from Iran and Syria. Hizballah demanded that Westerners leave Lebanon and it charged the Christian Lebanese population with crimes against their Muslim compatriots.
Hizballah was formed by members of a faction inside the Lebanese Amal party. However, following the Iranian revolution in 1979 there was a split inside the party. The final split came after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon earlier in 1982. In many cases, the main enemy of Hizballah had been Israel. The struggle of Hizballah is defined as a jihad, -- a holy fight --, and members dying in action became shaded, martyrs, who were guaranteed a place in Paradise.
While Hizballah claimed responsibility for bombing the United States embassy and marine headquarters in Beirut in 1983, hijackings, and the taking of Western and Israeli hostages, Hizballah also performed peaceful actions, and was in charge of important social welfare programs for the Lebanese population.
In 1984, Sheikh Muhammad Hussayn Fadlallah took control over Hizballah, and the organization became more of an instrument to oppose Israel on political and religious grounds. Hizballah attacked Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and Israelis in northern Israel, and was, in turn, attacked by Israel. Neither party came close to neutralizing the other.
On occasion, Iran was able to persuade Hizballah to release hostages in an effort to improve international relations.
Hizb Allah see Hizballah
Hizbullah see Hizballah
Hezbollah see Hizballah
“the party of God” see Hizballah
Hizballah in Iran
Hizballah in Iran. The Qur’anic term hizb Allah (mentioned in surahs 5 and 58) refers to the body of Muslim believers who are promised triumph over hizb al-Shaytan (the Devil’s party). Thirteen centuries later, the term was re-employed by Iranian Shi‘a faithful who described their amorphous political organization as “the Party of God” and claimed to emulate the teachings of Ayatollah Ruhollah al-Musavi Khomeini. The Hizballah philosophy was summed up nicely in its slogan: “Only one party, the Party of Allah; only one leader, Ruhollah.”
The lineage of Hizballah in Iran can be traced back to a few extreme right wing organizations, such as the Fida’iyan-i Islam, which were active in the 1940s and 1950s. Like their predecessors, Hizballah faithful have adhered to a politicized interpretation of Islam and have not shied away from using violent means to achieve their goals. They entered the Iranian political scene during the 1978-1979 revolutionary upheaval of Iran. Recruited mainly from the ranks of the urban poor, the bazaris, and the lumpenproletariat, the Hizballahis played an important role in organizaing demonstrations and strikes that led to the downfall of the Pahlavi regime. Following the victory of the revolution, they served as the unofficial watchdogs and storm troopers of the clerically dominated Islamic Republican Party (established in 1979 and dissolved in 1987). Considering its amorphous nature and non-official status, there is no way one can correctly estimate Hizballah’s numerical strength. However, the fact remains that along with such other (para)military-intelligence apparatuses as the Sipah-i Pasdaran-i Inqilab-i Islami (Revolutionary Guards), komitehs (revolutionary committees), and SAVAMA (the intelligence service), Hizballah played a crucial role in the consolidation of the new regime.
Often led by the firebrand Hujjat al-Islam Hadi Ghaffari, the Hizballahis were known to employ clubs, chains, knives, and guns to disrupt the rallies of opposition parties, beat their members, and ransack their offices. The Hizballahi ruffians, nicknamed by the opposition as chumaqdars (club wielders), were instrumental in the undoing of President Abol-Hasan Bani Sadr, the closing of the universities, the enforcement of veiling, the suppression of the press, and cowing people into silence. In addition, the Hizballah provided an inexhaustible pool of faithful warriors who enlisted for the war with Iraq. The recruitment of many of these veterans by such organizations as the Basij (youth volunteers), Jihad-i Sazandigi (Reconstruction Crusade), and Pasdaran has so far prevented the actual establishment of a formal party called Hizballah. Quite to the contrary, some Hizballahi squads have now been transformed into the private militias of powerful clerics and have even set on each other’s benefactors.
The Iranian Hizballah was reported to have certain transnational links with like-minded groups in the region, in particular with its namesake in Lebanon. The Lebanese Hizballah was organized, trained, and financed by the Iranian Pasdarans who were dispatched to Lebanon in 1982. The two groups share certain characteristics, such as a militant interpretation of Shi‘a doctrines, adoration for Ayatollah Khomeini, anti-Zionism, suspicion of Western governments, and propensity to use violence. Furthermore, some of the leading personalities of these two groups are linked through family ties or can boast of having studied with the same mentors at Najaf and Qom theological seminaries. However, while the Hizballah of Lebanon operates as a formal political party, the Iranian Hizballahis for the most part continue to operate as vigilante bands. Nonetheless, in both countries, they have proven themselves forces to be reckoned with.
Hizballah in Iran. The Qur’anic term hizb Allah (mentioned in surahs 5 and 58) refers to the body of Muslim believers who are promised triumph over hizb al-Shaytan (the Devil’s party). Thirteen centuries later, the term was re-employed by Iranian Shi‘a faithful who described their amorphous political organization as “the Party of God” and claimed to emulate the teachings of Ayatollah Ruhollah al-Musavi Khomeini. The Hizballah philosophy was summed up nicely in its slogan: “Only one party, the Party of Allah; only one leader, Ruhollah.”
The lineage of Hizballah in Iran can be traced back to a few extreme right wing organizations, such as the Fida’iyan-i Islam, which were active in the 1940s and 1950s. Like their predecessors, Hizballah faithful have adhered to a politicized interpretation of Islam and have not shied away from using violent means to achieve their goals. They entered the Iranian political scene during the 1978-1979 revolutionary upheaval of Iran. Recruited mainly from the ranks of the urban poor, the bazaris, and the lumpenproletariat, the Hizballahis played an important role in organizaing demonstrations and strikes that led to the downfall of the Pahlavi regime. Following the victory of the revolution, they served as the unofficial watchdogs and storm troopers of the clerically dominated Islamic Republican Party (established in 1979 and dissolved in 1987). Considering its amorphous nature and non-official status, there is no way one can correctly estimate Hizballah’s numerical strength. However, the fact remains that along with such other (para)military-intelligence apparatuses as the Sipah-i Pasdaran-i Inqilab-i Islami (Revolutionary Guards), komitehs (revolutionary committees), and SAVAMA (the intelligence service), Hizballah played a crucial role in the consolidation of the new regime.
Often led by the firebrand Hujjat al-Islam Hadi Ghaffari, the Hizballahis were known to employ clubs, chains, knives, and guns to disrupt the rallies of opposition parties, beat their members, and ransack their offices. The Hizballahi ruffians, nicknamed by the opposition as chumaqdars (club wielders), were instrumental in the undoing of President Abol-Hasan Bani Sadr, the closing of the universities, the enforcement of veiling, the suppression of the press, and cowing people into silence. In addition, the Hizballah provided an inexhaustible pool of faithful warriors who enlisted for the war with Iraq. The recruitment of many of these veterans by such organizations as the Basij (youth volunteers), Jihad-i Sazandigi (Reconstruction Crusade), and Pasdaran has so far prevented the actual establishment of a formal party called Hizballah. Quite to the contrary, some Hizballahi squads have now been transformed into the private militias of powerful clerics and have even set on each other’s benefactors.
The Iranian Hizballah was reported to have certain transnational links with like-minded groups in the region, in particular with its namesake in Lebanon. The Lebanese Hizballah was organized, trained, and financed by the Iranian Pasdarans who were dispatched to Lebanon in 1982. The two groups share certain characteristics, such as a militant interpretation of Shi‘a doctrines, adoration for Ayatollah Khomeini, anti-Zionism, suspicion of Western governments, and propensity to use violence. Furthermore, some of the leading personalities of these two groups are linked through family ties or can boast of having studied with the same mentors at Najaf and Qom theological seminaries. However, while the Hizballah of Lebanon operates as a formal political party, the Iranian Hizballahis for the most part continue to operate as vigilante bands. Nonetheless, in both countries, they have proven themselves forces to be reckoned with.
Hizballah in Lebanon
Hizballah in Lebanon. Political and social movement that arose among Lebanon’s Shi‘as in response to the Islamic revolution in Iran, Hizballah means the “Party of God,” after the Qur’an (Sura 5:56): “Lo! the Party of God, they are the victorious.” During the 1980s, Hizballah drew on Iranian support to become a major political force in Lebanon and the Middle East. It gained international renown, first for its attacks against the American, French, and Israeli forces deployed in parts of Lebanon, and later for its holding of Western hostages. Hizballah also emerged as the major rival of the established Amal movement for the loyalty of Lebanon’s Shi‘as. Hizballah’s declared objective has been the transformation of Lebanon (and the region) into an Islamic state, a goal it has pursued by diversified means, ranging from acts of violence to participation in parliamentary elections.
The foundations of Hizballah were laid years before the Iranian Revolution of 1979 in the ties that bound the Shi‘a ‘ulama’ (religious scholars) of Iran and Lebanon. Many of these ‘ulama’ were schooled together in the Shi‘a theological academies in Iraq, especially in the shrine city of Najaf. During the late 1950s and 1960s, these academies became active in formulating an Islamic response to nationalism and secularism. Prominent ‘ulama’ lectured and wrote on Islamic government, Islamic economics, and the ideal Islamic state. In Najaf, the Iraqi ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and the exiled Iranian ayatollah Ruhollah al-Musavi Khomeini both subjected the existing political order to an Islamic critique. Lebanese ‘ulama’ and theological students overheard and joined in these debates.
Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, the future mentor of Hizballah, was an exemplary product of Najaf’s mix of scholasticism and radicalism. Fadlallah was born and schooled in Najaf, where his father, a scholar from south Lebanon, had come to study. Fadlallah imbibed the ideas then current in Najaf and went to Lebanon in 1966, where he made his Beirut husayniyah (a Shi‘a congregation house) into a center of Islamic activism. Sayyid Musal al-Sadr dominated the Shi‘a scene at the time, and Fadlallah had a modest following. But in the 1970s, Fadlallah received an important reinforcement: Iraqi authorities expelled about a hundred Lebanese theology students as part of a crackdown on Shi‘a activism in the shrine cities. The expelled students became disciples of Fadlallah on their return to Lebanon and later formed the core of Hizballah.
In Iran, the early foundations of Hizballah were laid by members of the Islamic opposition who found refuge in war-torn Lebanon during the 1970s. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) took this opposition under its wing and provided the Iranian dissidents with training and forged documents. Graduates of the Palestinian camps included Muhammad Muntaziri, the son of a leading opposition cleric and future founder of the Liberation Movements Department of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and ‘Ali Akbar Muhtashimii, future Iranian ambassador to Syria, who was to play a critical role in the creation of Hizballah. Both men arrived in Lebanon from Najar, where they had studied under Khomeini, and both joined Khomeini in Paris in 1978.
After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Shi‘a traffic between Lebanon and Iran intensified. Fadlallah and his disciples became frequent visitors to Iran, while former Iranian dissidents who had spent time in Lebanon returned as emissaries of the Islamic revolution. Muhammad Muntaziri made the first attempt, in 1979, to send six hundred Iranian volunteers to Lebanon, where they proposed to launch a jihad against Israel. However, the Lebanese government successfully appealed to Syria to block the entry of the volunteers, and most got no further than Damascus. Muntaziri, who accused “liberals” in Iran’s government of failing to support his mission, died in a Tehran bombing in 1981.
The obstacles to an effective partnership between Lebanon’s Shi‘as and Iran lifted only in 1982, following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the deployment of American and French peacekeeping forces in Beirut. Syria, although defeated in battle, was determined to drive all other foreign forces out of Lebanon by encouraging popular resistance, especially among the Shi‘as. Many Shi‘as were receptive, believing that Israel and the West planned to restore Maronite privilege by force. When Iran offered to assist in mobilizing the Shi‘as, Syria approved, permitting Iran to send about a thousand Revolutionary Guards to the Bekaa (Biqa‘) Valley in eastern Lebanon. There they seized a Lebanese army barracks and turned it into their operational base.
Emboldened by the arrival of the Iranians, Fadlallah and a number of young ‘ulama’ declared jihad against the Western and Israeli presence in Lebanon while pledging their allegiance to Khomeini. Similarly, a faction of the Amal militia led by a former schoolteacher, Husayn al-Musawi, went over to the Revolutionary Guards, accusing the Amal movement of failing to resist Israel’s invasion. Iran’s ambassador to Damascus, ‘Ali Akbar Muhtashimi, established a council to govern the new movement. The council included the Iranian ambassador, Lebanese ‘ulama’, and security strongmen responsible for secret operations and the movement’s militia. Later, the council created the post of secretary general, held successively by Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli, Sayyid ‘Abbas al-Musawi, and Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah. Fadlallah declined all formal office, but his rhetorical genius and seniority assured his moral prestige in the movement.
The movement drew its support from two components of Shi‘a society. It especially appealed to some of the larger Shi‘a clans of the Bekaa Valley, for whom the war in Lebanon had brought prosperity fueled by the expansion of smuggling and hashish and opium cultivation. The leadership of the Amal movement, based on the Shi‘a professional and commercial classes, made insufficient room for this emerging counterelite of the Bekaa Valley. With the encouragement of the Iranian emissaries based in the valley, the clans flocked to Hizballah. Ba‘labakk, capital of the Bekaa Province, practically became an autonomous zone for Hizballah. Its buildings were plastered with posters of Khomeini and draped with Iranian flags.
The message of Hizballah also appealed to the Shi‘a refugees who had been forced by war into the dismal slums of southern Beirut. They included the Shi‘as driven from their homes in the Phalangist assault on Palestinians in eastern Beirut (Nab‘a and Buri Hammud) in 1976 and many more who fled the south following the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982. Fadlallah personified their grievance. His ancestral villages in the south (Bint Jubayl and ‘Aynata) had come under Israeli assault, then occupation. He lost his first pulpit in Nab‘a during the Phalangist siege of 1976. These Shi‘a refugees felt a strong sense of identification with the Palestinians and a deep resentment against Israel, the Phalangists, and the West. Many young Shi‘a refugees even joined Palestinian organizations during the 1970s, from which they acquired fighting experience. When Israel forced these organizations from Beirut in 1982, Shi‘a fighters who were left behind joined Hizballah, which promised to continue their struggle.
Hizballah systematically formulated its doctrine in its “open letter” of 1985. “We are proceeding toward a battle with vice at its very roots,” declared the letter, “and the first root of vice is America.” The letter set four objectives for the movement: the termination of all American and French influence in Lebanon; Israel’s complete departure from Lebanon “as a prelude to its final obliteration”; submission of the Lebanese Phalangists to “just rule” and trial for their “crimes”; and granting the people the right to choose their own system of government, “keeping in mind that we do not hide our commitment to the rule of Islam.”
From the outset, Hizballah conducted its struggle on three discrete levels – open, semi-clandestine, and clandestine. Fadlallah and the ‘ulama’ openly preached the message of resistance to Islam’s enemies and fealty to Khomeini in mosques and husaniyah, which became the focal points for public rallies. The Revolutionary Guards trained the semi-clandestine Islamic Resistance, a militia-like formation which attacked Israeli forces in south Lebanon. The Organization of the Islamic Jihad, the clandestine branch of the movement, operated against Western targets. It was reputedly led by ‘Imad Mughniyah, a shadowy Shi‘a figure from south Lebanon and a veteran of Palestinian service, who became the subject of much lore during the 1980s.
The violence of Islamic Jihad catapulted Hizballah to prominence. Assassinations of individual foreigners escalated into massive bombings, some of them done by “self-martyrs,” which destroyed the United States embassy and its annex in two separate attacks in 1983 and 1984; the Beirut barracks of American and French peacekeeping troops in two attacks on the same morning in 1983; and command facilities of Israeli forces in the south in 1982 and 1983. Hundreds of foreigners died in these bombings, the most successful of which killed 241 United States marines in their barracks. As a result, the United States and France withdrew their forces from Lebanon; Israel, whose forces also came under attack by the Islamic Resistance, retreated to a narrow “security zone” in the south. In solidarity with Iran, Islamic Jihad also bombed the United States and French embassies in Kuwait in 1983, in an effort to compel Kuwait to abandon its support of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War. Hizballah activists were also responsible for a spate of fatal bombings in Paris in 1986, meant to force France to abandon its policy of supplying Iraq with arms.
Hizballah also conducted operations to free members who had been imprisoned by governments in the Middle East and Europe. These operations included the hijacking of an American airliner in 1985, to secure the freedom of Lebanese Shi‘as held by Israel, and two hijackings of Kuwaiti airliners in 1984 and 1988, to win freedom for Lebanese Shi‘as held by Kuwait for the bombings there. The hijackers killed passengers in each instance to demonstrate their resolve. In addition, Islamic Jihad and other groups affiliated with Hizballah abducted dozens of foreigners in Lebanon, mostly American, French, British, and German citizens, for the same purpose. Some of these foreigners were traded for American arms needed by Iran in the Iran-Iraq War, but the motive for the wave of abductions remained the release of Hizballah’s imprisoned fighters elsewhere. Only when the hostage holding became a political burden for Iran did it prevail on Hizballah to free the hostages. The last French hostages were freed in 1988; the last American and British hostages in 1991; and the last Germans in 1992.
Although the movement’s ‘ulama’ disavowed all direct knowledge of operations, and occasionally expressed reservations, they harvested the credit (and blame) for Hizballah’s jihad. Their mosques filled to overflowing, and their statements and interviews resonated in the media. However, they themselves became the targets of assassination and abduction. Fadlallah narrowly missed death in a massive car bombing in 1985, which killed eighty persons. Israel abducted a local Hizballah cleric, Shaykh ‘Abd al-Karim ‘Ubayd, in 1988; and Israeli helicopter gunships killed Hizballah’s secretary general, Sayyid ‘Abbas al-Musawi, and his family, in an attack on his motorcade in 1992.
Hizballah also found that its growing appeal among Lebanon’s Shi‘as made enemies within the existing Amal movement. As Hizballah gained momentum, it sought unimpeded access to the south, so it could promote the struggle against Israel. Amal regarded this as an encroachment on its last strongholds. Beginning in 1988, occasional skirmishes with Amal escalated into civil war. More than one thousand Shi‘a combatants and civilians died in this fighting, which was characterized by atrocities and assassinations. Hizballah usually enjoyed the upper hand in fighting, but Syrian intervention denied it the fruits of victory. The strife ended in late 1990 in an accord mediated by Syria and Iran.
Although Hizballah battled its adversaries, it also cooperated with Iranian aid agencies to fund a wide range of social and economic projects. These included a hospital and pharmacies in Beirut; small textile factories and sheltered workshops to employ families of members and “martyrs”; book allowances and scholarships for students; street paving in Beirut; and the digging of wells and reservoirs in rural areas. Hizballah sponsored a scout movement, summer camps, and a soccer league. The movement published a weekly newspaper and operated an independent radio station. These activities broadened the base of the movement and enhanced its ability to field fighters.
By the end of its first decade, Hizballah had fought and bought its way into the hearts of perhaps as many as half of Lebanon’s Shi‘as, but the objective of an Islamic Lebanon remained remote. On the basis of the 1989 Ta’if Accord, Syria enforced an end to the civil war, based on a fairer confessional balance. Syria also disarmed the militias and launched a determined drive to build up the authority of a Syrian-backed government in Beirut. In 1991, the governments of Syria and Lebanon sat down with Israel in direct talks to discuss territory, security, and a possible peace.
Hizballah’s place in the new Syrian order remained uncertain. In Beirut and parts of the south, Hizballah surrendered its weapons and turned over positions to the reconstituted Lebanese army. In 1992, Hizballah and the Revolutionary Guards evacuated the Lebanese army barracks near Ba‘labakk, which had served as operational headquarters for ten years. Nevertheless, Hizballah’s Islamic Resistance enjoyed an exemption from the general disarming of militias to permit it to continue a guerrilla war of attrition against Israel’s “security zone” in the south. The Islamic Resistance increase its operations, even in the midst of peace talks, and Syria pledged to disarm it only after a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.
Hizballah also opposed implementation of the Syrian-guaranteed Ta’if Accord, which it denounced as an American plan. Hizballah denounced the first stage of implementation, establishing Muslim-Christian parity in government, for perpetuating confessionalism. Hizballah advocated a straightforward referendum on an Islamic state. In such a state, the Christians would be entitled to protection, not parity. However, Iran prevailed on Hizballah to participate in the 1992 parliamentary elections, the first held in twenty years, despite the fact that the elections still apportioned seats by confession. In the Bekaa Valley, Hizballah swept the Shi’a vote, and the movement made a credible showing in the south, collecting a total of eight parliamentary seats – the largest single block in the fragmented parliament.
In parliament, Hizballah organized as an opposition to the Syrian backed government. It denounced the government’s negotiations with Israel and denied all interest in cabinet positions. In most respects, Hizballah still remained an extra-parliamentary movement – a point emphasized by the deliberate obscurity of the movement’s parliamentary candidates. Hizballah signaled that its actual leaders would remain in the mosques and in the fighting ranks of the Islamic Resistance. But the “Party of God” had moved one reluctant step toward becoming a true hizb (political party) of its followers. It remained to be seen whether Hizballah’s votes would succeed, where its violence had failed, in creating an Islamic Lebanon. {See also Amal; Ayatollah; Maronite Catholics; Nasrallah, Hassan; Sadr, Muhammad Baqir al-; Palestine Liberation Organization; Phalangists; Shi'a; and 'Ulama'.}
Hizballah in Lebanon. Political and social movement that arose among Lebanon’s Shi‘as in response to the Islamic revolution in Iran, Hizballah means the “Party of God,” after the Qur’an (Sura 5:56): “Lo! the Party of God, they are the victorious.” During the 1980s, Hizballah drew on Iranian support to become a major political force in Lebanon and the Middle East. It gained international renown, first for its attacks against the American, French, and Israeli forces deployed in parts of Lebanon, and later for its holding of Western hostages. Hizballah also emerged as the major rival of the established Amal movement for the loyalty of Lebanon’s Shi‘as. Hizballah’s declared objective has been the transformation of Lebanon (and the region) into an Islamic state, a goal it has pursued by diversified means, ranging from acts of violence to participation in parliamentary elections.
The foundations of Hizballah were laid years before the Iranian Revolution of 1979 in the ties that bound the Shi‘a ‘ulama’ (religious scholars) of Iran and Lebanon. Many of these ‘ulama’ were schooled together in the Shi‘a theological academies in Iraq, especially in the shrine city of Najaf. During the late 1950s and 1960s, these academies became active in formulating an Islamic response to nationalism and secularism. Prominent ‘ulama’ lectured and wrote on Islamic government, Islamic economics, and the ideal Islamic state. In Najaf, the Iraqi ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and the exiled Iranian ayatollah Ruhollah al-Musavi Khomeini both subjected the existing political order to an Islamic critique. Lebanese ‘ulama’ and theological students overheard and joined in these debates.
Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, the future mentor of Hizballah, was an exemplary product of Najaf’s mix of scholasticism and radicalism. Fadlallah was born and schooled in Najaf, where his father, a scholar from south Lebanon, had come to study. Fadlallah imbibed the ideas then current in Najaf and went to Lebanon in 1966, where he made his Beirut husayniyah (a Shi‘a congregation house) into a center of Islamic activism. Sayyid Musal al-Sadr dominated the Shi‘a scene at the time, and Fadlallah had a modest following. But in the 1970s, Fadlallah received an important reinforcement: Iraqi authorities expelled about a hundred Lebanese theology students as part of a crackdown on Shi‘a activism in the shrine cities. The expelled students became disciples of Fadlallah on their return to Lebanon and later formed the core of Hizballah.
In Iran, the early foundations of Hizballah were laid by members of the Islamic opposition who found refuge in war-torn Lebanon during the 1970s. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) took this opposition under its wing and provided the Iranian dissidents with training and forged documents. Graduates of the Palestinian camps included Muhammad Muntaziri, the son of a leading opposition cleric and future founder of the Liberation Movements Department of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and ‘Ali Akbar Muhtashimii, future Iranian ambassador to Syria, who was to play a critical role in the creation of Hizballah. Both men arrived in Lebanon from Najar, where they had studied under Khomeini, and both joined Khomeini in Paris in 1978.
After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Shi‘a traffic between Lebanon and Iran intensified. Fadlallah and his disciples became frequent visitors to Iran, while former Iranian dissidents who had spent time in Lebanon returned as emissaries of the Islamic revolution. Muhammad Muntaziri made the first attempt, in 1979, to send six hundred Iranian volunteers to Lebanon, where they proposed to launch a jihad against Israel. However, the Lebanese government successfully appealed to Syria to block the entry of the volunteers, and most got no further than Damascus. Muntaziri, who accused “liberals” in Iran’s government of failing to support his mission, died in a Tehran bombing in 1981.
The obstacles to an effective partnership between Lebanon’s Shi‘as and Iran lifted only in 1982, following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the deployment of American and French peacekeeping forces in Beirut. Syria, although defeated in battle, was determined to drive all other foreign forces out of Lebanon by encouraging popular resistance, especially among the Shi‘as. Many Shi‘as were receptive, believing that Israel and the West planned to restore Maronite privilege by force. When Iran offered to assist in mobilizing the Shi‘as, Syria approved, permitting Iran to send about a thousand Revolutionary Guards to the Bekaa (Biqa‘) Valley in eastern Lebanon. There they seized a Lebanese army barracks and turned it into their operational base.
Emboldened by the arrival of the Iranians, Fadlallah and a number of young ‘ulama’ declared jihad against the Western and Israeli presence in Lebanon while pledging their allegiance to Khomeini. Similarly, a faction of the Amal militia led by a former schoolteacher, Husayn al-Musawi, went over to the Revolutionary Guards, accusing the Amal movement of failing to resist Israel’s invasion. Iran’s ambassador to Damascus, ‘Ali Akbar Muhtashimi, established a council to govern the new movement. The council included the Iranian ambassador, Lebanese ‘ulama’, and security strongmen responsible for secret operations and the movement’s militia. Later, the council created the post of secretary general, held successively by Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli, Sayyid ‘Abbas al-Musawi, and Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah. Fadlallah declined all formal office, but his rhetorical genius and seniority assured his moral prestige in the movement.
The movement drew its support from two components of Shi‘a society. It especially appealed to some of the larger Shi‘a clans of the Bekaa Valley, for whom the war in Lebanon had brought prosperity fueled by the expansion of smuggling and hashish and opium cultivation. The leadership of the Amal movement, based on the Shi‘a professional and commercial classes, made insufficient room for this emerging counterelite of the Bekaa Valley. With the encouragement of the Iranian emissaries based in the valley, the clans flocked to Hizballah. Ba‘labakk, capital of the Bekaa Province, practically became an autonomous zone for Hizballah. Its buildings were plastered with posters of Khomeini and draped with Iranian flags.
The message of Hizballah also appealed to the Shi‘a refugees who had been forced by war into the dismal slums of southern Beirut. They included the Shi‘as driven from their homes in the Phalangist assault on Palestinians in eastern Beirut (Nab‘a and Buri Hammud) in 1976 and many more who fled the south following the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982. Fadlallah personified their grievance. His ancestral villages in the south (Bint Jubayl and ‘Aynata) had come under Israeli assault, then occupation. He lost his first pulpit in Nab‘a during the Phalangist siege of 1976. These Shi‘a refugees felt a strong sense of identification with the Palestinians and a deep resentment against Israel, the Phalangists, and the West. Many young Shi‘a refugees even joined Palestinian organizations during the 1970s, from which they acquired fighting experience. When Israel forced these organizations from Beirut in 1982, Shi‘a fighters who were left behind joined Hizballah, which promised to continue their struggle.
Hizballah systematically formulated its doctrine in its “open letter” of 1985. “We are proceeding toward a battle with vice at its very roots,” declared the letter, “and the first root of vice is America.” The letter set four objectives for the movement: the termination of all American and French influence in Lebanon; Israel’s complete departure from Lebanon “as a prelude to its final obliteration”; submission of the Lebanese Phalangists to “just rule” and trial for their “crimes”; and granting the people the right to choose their own system of government, “keeping in mind that we do not hide our commitment to the rule of Islam.”
From the outset, Hizballah conducted its struggle on three discrete levels – open, semi-clandestine, and clandestine. Fadlallah and the ‘ulama’ openly preached the message of resistance to Islam’s enemies and fealty to Khomeini in mosques and husaniyah, which became the focal points for public rallies. The Revolutionary Guards trained the semi-clandestine Islamic Resistance, a militia-like formation which attacked Israeli forces in south Lebanon. The Organization of the Islamic Jihad, the clandestine branch of the movement, operated against Western targets. It was reputedly led by ‘Imad Mughniyah, a shadowy Shi‘a figure from south Lebanon and a veteran of Palestinian service, who became the subject of much lore during the 1980s.
The violence of Islamic Jihad catapulted Hizballah to prominence. Assassinations of individual foreigners escalated into massive bombings, some of them done by “self-martyrs,” which destroyed the United States embassy and its annex in two separate attacks in 1983 and 1984; the Beirut barracks of American and French peacekeeping troops in two attacks on the same morning in 1983; and command facilities of Israeli forces in the south in 1982 and 1983. Hundreds of foreigners died in these bombings, the most successful of which killed 241 United States marines in their barracks. As a result, the United States and France withdrew their forces from Lebanon; Israel, whose forces also came under attack by the Islamic Resistance, retreated to a narrow “security zone” in the south. In solidarity with Iran, Islamic Jihad also bombed the United States and French embassies in Kuwait in 1983, in an effort to compel Kuwait to abandon its support of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War. Hizballah activists were also responsible for a spate of fatal bombings in Paris in 1986, meant to force France to abandon its policy of supplying Iraq with arms.
Hizballah also conducted operations to free members who had been imprisoned by governments in the Middle East and Europe. These operations included the hijacking of an American airliner in 1985, to secure the freedom of Lebanese Shi‘as held by Israel, and two hijackings of Kuwaiti airliners in 1984 and 1988, to win freedom for Lebanese Shi‘as held by Kuwait for the bombings there. The hijackers killed passengers in each instance to demonstrate their resolve. In addition, Islamic Jihad and other groups affiliated with Hizballah abducted dozens of foreigners in Lebanon, mostly American, French, British, and German citizens, for the same purpose. Some of these foreigners were traded for American arms needed by Iran in the Iran-Iraq War, but the motive for the wave of abductions remained the release of Hizballah’s imprisoned fighters elsewhere. Only when the hostage holding became a political burden for Iran did it prevail on Hizballah to free the hostages. The last French hostages were freed in 1988; the last American and British hostages in 1991; and the last Germans in 1992.
Although the movement’s ‘ulama’ disavowed all direct knowledge of operations, and occasionally expressed reservations, they harvested the credit (and blame) for Hizballah’s jihad. Their mosques filled to overflowing, and their statements and interviews resonated in the media. However, they themselves became the targets of assassination and abduction. Fadlallah narrowly missed death in a massive car bombing in 1985, which killed eighty persons. Israel abducted a local Hizballah cleric, Shaykh ‘Abd al-Karim ‘Ubayd, in 1988; and Israeli helicopter gunships killed Hizballah’s secretary general, Sayyid ‘Abbas al-Musawi, and his family, in an attack on his motorcade in 1992.
Hizballah also found that its growing appeal among Lebanon’s Shi‘as made enemies within the existing Amal movement. As Hizballah gained momentum, it sought unimpeded access to the south, so it could promote the struggle against Israel. Amal regarded this as an encroachment on its last strongholds. Beginning in 1988, occasional skirmishes with Amal escalated into civil war. More than one thousand Shi‘a combatants and civilians died in this fighting, which was characterized by atrocities and assassinations. Hizballah usually enjoyed the upper hand in fighting, but Syrian intervention denied it the fruits of victory. The strife ended in late 1990 in an accord mediated by Syria and Iran.
Although Hizballah battled its adversaries, it also cooperated with Iranian aid agencies to fund a wide range of social and economic projects. These included a hospital and pharmacies in Beirut; small textile factories and sheltered workshops to employ families of members and “martyrs”; book allowances and scholarships for students; street paving in Beirut; and the digging of wells and reservoirs in rural areas. Hizballah sponsored a scout movement, summer camps, and a soccer league. The movement published a weekly newspaper and operated an independent radio station. These activities broadened the base of the movement and enhanced its ability to field fighters.
By the end of its first decade, Hizballah had fought and bought its way into the hearts of perhaps as many as half of Lebanon’s Shi‘as, but the objective of an Islamic Lebanon remained remote. On the basis of the 1989 Ta’if Accord, Syria enforced an end to the civil war, based on a fairer confessional balance. Syria also disarmed the militias and launched a determined drive to build up the authority of a Syrian-backed government in Beirut. In 1991, the governments of Syria and Lebanon sat down with Israel in direct talks to discuss territory, security, and a possible peace.
Hizballah’s place in the new Syrian order remained uncertain. In Beirut and parts of the south, Hizballah surrendered its weapons and turned over positions to the reconstituted Lebanese army. In 1992, Hizballah and the Revolutionary Guards evacuated the Lebanese army barracks near Ba‘labakk, which had served as operational headquarters for ten years. Nevertheless, Hizballah’s Islamic Resistance enjoyed an exemption from the general disarming of militias to permit it to continue a guerrilla war of attrition against Israel’s “security zone” in the south. The Islamic Resistance increase its operations, even in the midst of peace talks, and Syria pledged to disarm it only after a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.
Hizballah also opposed implementation of the Syrian-guaranteed Ta’if Accord, which it denounced as an American plan. Hizballah denounced the first stage of implementation, establishing Muslim-Christian parity in government, for perpetuating confessionalism. Hizballah advocated a straightforward referendum on an Islamic state. In such a state, the Christians would be entitled to protection, not parity. However, Iran prevailed on Hizballah to participate in the 1992 parliamentary elections, the first held in twenty years, despite the fact that the elections still apportioned seats by confession. In the Bekaa Valley, Hizballah swept the Shi’a vote, and the movement made a credible showing in the south, collecting a total of eight parliamentary seats – the largest single block in the fragmented parliament.
In parliament, Hizballah organized as an opposition to the Syrian backed government. It denounced the government’s negotiations with Israel and denied all interest in cabinet positions. In most respects, Hizballah still remained an extra-parliamentary movement – a point emphasized by the deliberate obscurity of the movement’s parliamentary candidates. Hizballah signaled that its actual leaders would remain in the mosques and in the fighting ranks of the Islamic Resistance. But the “Party of God” had moved one reluctant step toward becoming a true hizb (political party) of its followers. It remained to be seen whether Hizballah’s votes would succeed, where its violence had failed, in creating an Islamic Lebanon. {See also Amal; Ayatollah; Maronite Catholics; Nasrallah, Hassan; Sadr, Muhammad Baqir al-; Palestine Liberation Organization; Phalangists; Shi'a; and 'Ulama'.}
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