Fu’ad I
Fu’ad I (Fuad I) (March 26, 1868 – April 28, 1936). Sultan (1917-1922) and later King (1922-1936) of Egypt and Sudan, Sovereign of Nubia, Kordofan, and Darfur. The ninth ruler of Egypt and Sudan from the Muhammad Ali Dynasty, he became Sultan of Egypt and Sudan in 1917, succeeding his elder brother Sultan Husayn Kamil. He substituted the title of King for Sultan when the United Kingdom formally recognized Egyptian independence in 1922.
The son of Isma‘il Pasha, Fu’ad was born on March 26, 1868, in Cairo and was originally named Ahmed Fu’ad Pasha. He was educated in Italy during the 1880s. Fu’ad was a general in the Egyptian army from 1892 until 1895. In 1908, he played an important role in the founding of the Egyptian University (now named Cairo University) at Giza, serving for a time as its president. Fu’ad succeeded his brother, Hussein Kamil (1853-1917), to the sultanate.
In 1919, the British initiated the drafting of a treaty to ensure the independence of Egypt. Over the next few years, many disagreements surfaced through public debates concerning the subject matter of the talks with Great Britain. During this period, the Wafd party was the strongest group in Egyptian society.
Fu’ad became king of Egypt in 1922, upon the nominal termination of the British protectorate. Fu’ad introduced an Egyptian constitution the next year. Although opposed to British domination, Fu’ad was an adversary of the powerful Wafd, or Nationalist party, with which he waged a struggle for power throughout his reign, succeeding temporarily in imposing his personal rule on the country by dissolution of Parliament in 1928-29 and from 1930 to 1935.
Fu’ad died on April 28, 1936, in Cairo. He was succeeded by his son, Faruk I.
Fu’ad’s reign was not one of stability. His strongest opponent was the very popular Wafd party, with its leader Saad Zaghlul. However, while fighting against very popular political parties, Fu’ad succeeded in remaining fairly popular among the Egyptians. Indeed, during his reign, Fu’ad founded schools, encouraged the new university at Giza (Gizeh) and the reform of al-Azhar, and promoted numerous cultural institutions.
Ahmed Fu’ad Pasha see Fu’ad I
Fuad I see Fu’ad I
Fu’ad I (Fuad I) (March 26, 1868 – April 28, 1936). Sultan (1917-1922) and later King (1922-1936) of Egypt and Sudan, Sovereign of Nubia, Kordofan, and Darfur. The ninth ruler of Egypt and Sudan from the Muhammad Ali Dynasty, he became Sultan of Egypt and Sudan in 1917, succeeding his elder brother Sultan Husayn Kamil. He substituted the title of King for Sultan when the United Kingdom formally recognized Egyptian independence in 1922.
The son of Isma‘il Pasha, Fu’ad was born on March 26, 1868, in Cairo and was originally named Ahmed Fu’ad Pasha. He was educated in Italy during the 1880s. Fu’ad was a general in the Egyptian army from 1892 until 1895. In 1908, he played an important role in the founding of the Egyptian University (now named Cairo University) at Giza, serving for a time as its president. Fu’ad succeeded his brother, Hussein Kamil (1853-1917), to the sultanate.
In 1919, the British initiated the drafting of a treaty to ensure the independence of Egypt. Over the next few years, many disagreements surfaced through public debates concerning the subject matter of the talks with Great Britain. During this period, the Wafd party was the strongest group in Egyptian society.
Fu’ad became king of Egypt in 1922, upon the nominal termination of the British protectorate. Fu’ad introduced an Egyptian constitution the next year. Although opposed to British domination, Fu’ad was an adversary of the powerful Wafd, or Nationalist party, with which he waged a struggle for power throughout his reign, succeeding temporarily in imposing his personal rule on the country by dissolution of Parliament in 1928-29 and from 1930 to 1935.
Fu’ad died on April 28, 1936, in Cairo. He was succeeded by his son, Faruk I.
Fu’ad’s reign was not one of stability. His strongest opponent was the very popular Wafd party, with its leader Saad Zaghlul. However, while fighting against very popular political parties, Fu’ad succeeded in remaining fairly popular among the Egyptians. Indeed, during his reign, Fu’ad founded schools, encouraged the new university at Giza (Gizeh) and the reform of al-Azhar, and promoted numerous cultural institutions.
Ahmed Fu’ad Pasha see Fu’ad I
Fuad I see Fu’ad I
Fu’ad Pasha
Fu’ad Pasha (Keceji-zade Fu’ad Pasha) (Fuat Pasha) (Kececizade Mehmet Fuat Pasha) (1815-1869). Five times the Ottoman Foreign Minister and twice Grand Vizier. He was a convinced westernizer, and tried to preserve the Ottoman empire through diplomacy and reform.
Fu'ad Pasha was an Ottoman statesman known for his leadership during the Crimean War and in the Tanzimat reforms within the Ottoman Empire.
Fu'ad Pasha was a “Europeanized” man who was fluent in French and was able to negotiate on the same level as his European counterparts. He became the first secretary of the Turkish embassy in London in 1840. During 1848 he was employed on special missions in the principalities and at St. Petersburg. In 1851, he was sent to Egypt as a special commissioner. In that year, he became minister for foreign affairs, a post to which he was reappointed on four subsequent occasions and which he held at the time of his death. During the Crimean War, he commanded the troops on the Greek frontier and distinguished himself by his bravery. He was the Turkish delegate at the Treaty of Paris in 1856; was charged with a mission to Syria in 1860; served as grand vizier two times; and minister of war. He accompanied the sultan Abdülaziz on his journey to Egypt and Europe.
Fu'ad Pasha was an important reformer during the Tanzimat period. He (along with officials such as Ali Pasha, Mustafa Reshid Paşa and Ahmet Mithat Paşa) was an official that was dedicated to the implementation of all of the reforms that came along with the program. He had hoped that the Tanzimat reforms would find salvation for the empire by creating among its peoples the bond of equal citizenship based on Ottoman nationality, the obstacles they faced were too great and the time too late. He realized the importance of change and saw it as a necessary evolution that the Ottoman Empire needed to make. However, in his efforts to create an image of a modern Ottoman Empire, Fu'ad Pasha believed that by giving non-Muslim subjects of the Empire equal rights via the Millet system would dull their nationalist and separatist tendencies. He, along with the other three reformers, believed that in order to save the empire, a sense of “Ottomanism” needed to be created.
Due to his success at executing the changes of the Tanzimat program, Fu'ad Pasha was sent to Syria during 1860 to enforce Ottoman law after the outbreak of war. He arrived in Beirut on July 17, 1860, armed with extreme power granted to him by the Sultan. His goal was to protect the Ottoman power over the region as well as keep out the European influence. For example, in order to send a message to the anti-Ottoman forces, he had some Damascus notables hanged for their lack of regard for the Ottoman commitment to a multi-ethnic state. Fu'ad Pasha saw the events of 1860 in Syria as the converse to the idea of modernism as exhibited by Europe. He chaired the Beirut Commission in 1860 that included Britain, France, Russia, Austria and Prussia.
In an attempt to centralize and stabilize authority in Syria, while maintaining British interests, a British representative suggested Fu'ad Pasha as the leader for the region of Syria. Fu'ad Pasha, who was “Europeanized”, seemed to be aligned with Western ideals that the British wanted to preserve in the Middle East. In the area of Mount Lebanon and Syria, Fu'ad Pasha saw the necessity for authority and modernity under a central ruling body. He sought to rid the area of old tribal rule and put the area under Ottoman authority. Reforms created a more unified state that was under the control and authority of the Ottoman Sultan. Fu'ad Pasha’s work of centralizing Ottoman control in Syria was an example of Ottoman nationalism that encouraged patriotism in Ottoman territories but also strengthened the hierarchical relationship of the “father figure” of Sultan and his relationship with the citizens.
Fu'ad Pasha retired due to ill health to Nice, France, where he died in 1869.
Keceji-zade Fu’ad Pasha see Fu’ad Pasha
Fuat Pasha see Fu’ad Pasha
Kececizade Mehmet Fuat Pasha see Fu’ad Pasha
Fu’ad Pasha (Keceji-zade Fu’ad Pasha) (Fuat Pasha) (Kececizade Mehmet Fuat Pasha) (1815-1869). Five times the Ottoman Foreign Minister and twice Grand Vizier. He was a convinced westernizer, and tried to preserve the Ottoman empire through diplomacy and reform.
Fu'ad Pasha was an Ottoman statesman known for his leadership during the Crimean War and in the Tanzimat reforms within the Ottoman Empire.
Fu'ad Pasha was a “Europeanized” man who was fluent in French and was able to negotiate on the same level as his European counterparts. He became the first secretary of the Turkish embassy in London in 1840. During 1848 he was employed on special missions in the principalities and at St. Petersburg. In 1851, he was sent to Egypt as a special commissioner. In that year, he became minister for foreign affairs, a post to which he was reappointed on four subsequent occasions and which he held at the time of his death. During the Crimean War, he commanded the troops on the Greek frontier and distinguished himself by his bravery. He was the Turkish delegate at the Treaty of Paris in 1856; was charged with a mission to Syria in 1860; served as grand vizier two times; and minister of war. He accompanied the sultan Abdülaziz on his journey to Egypt and Europe.
Fu'ad Pasha was an important reformer during the Tanzimat period. He (along with officials such as Ali Pasha, Mustafa Reshid Paşa and Ahmet Mithat Paşa) was an official that was dedicated to the implementation of all of the reforms that came along with the program. He had hoped that the Tanzimat reforms would find salvation for the empire by creating among its peoples the bond of equal citizenship based on Ottoman nationality, the obstacles they faced were too great and the time too late. He realized the importance of change and saw it as a necessary evolution that the Ottoman Empire needed to make. However, in his efforts to create an image of a modern Ottoman Empire, Fu'ad Pasha believed that by giving non-Muslim subjects of the Empire equal rights via the Millet system would dull their nationalist and separatist tendencies. He, along with the other three reformers, believed that in order to save the empire, a sense of “Ottomanism” needed to be created.
Due to his success at executing the changes of the Tanzimat program, Fu'ad Pasha was sent to Syria during 1860 to enforce Ottoman law after the outbreak of war. He arrived in Beirut on July 17, 1860, armed with extreme power granted to him by the Sultan. His goal was to protect the Ottoman power over the region as well as keep out the European influence. For example, in order to send a message to the anti-Ottoman forces, he had some Damascus notables hanged for their lack of regard for the Ottoman commitment to a multi-ethnic state. Fu'ad Pasha saw the events of 1860 in Syria as the converse to the idea of modernism as exhibited by Europe. He chaired the Beirut Commission in 1860 that included Britain, France, Russia, Austria and Prussia.
In an attempt to centralize and stabilize authority in Syria, while maintaining British interests, a British representative suggested Fu'ad Pasha as the leader for the region of Syria. Fu'ad Pasha, who was “Europeanized”, seemed to be aligned with Western ideals that the British wanted to preserve in the Middle East. In the area of Mount Lebanon and Syria, Fu'ad Pasha saw the necessity for authority and modernity under a central ruling body. He sought to rid the area of old tribal rule and put the area under Ottoman authority. Reforms created a more unified state that was under the control and authority of the Ottoman Sultan. Fu'ad Pasha’s work of centralizing Ottoman control in Syria was an example of Ottoman nationalism that encouraged patriotism in Ottoman territories but also strengthened the hierarchical relationship of the “father figure” of Sultan and his relationship with the citizens.
Fu'ad Pasha retired due to ill health to Nice, France, where he died in 1869.
Keceji-zade Fu’ad Pasha see Fu’ad Pasha
Fuat Pasha see Fu’ad Pasha
Kececizade Mehmet Fuat Pasha see Fu’ad Pasha
Fuduli
Fuduli (Fuzuli) (Muhammad bin Suleyman) (c.1483-1556). One of the most illustrious authors of classical Turkish literature. He was a Shi‘a, and never left his native Iraq. He also wrote in Arabic and Persian. In his literary Azeri, he treats the themes of love, suffering, the impermanence of this world, the emptiness of worldly favors and riches, and the theme of death.
Fuduli was the pen name of the Azerbaijani poet, writer and thinker Muhammad bin Suleyman. Often considered one of the greatest contributors to the Dîvân tradition of Azerbaijani literature, Fudulî in fact wrote his collected poems (dîvân) in three different languages: Azerbaijani Turkic, Persian, and Arabic. Although his Turkish works are written in Azerbaijani, he was well-versed in both the Ottoman and the Chagatai Turkic literary traditions as well. He was also well versed in mathematics and astronomy.
Fudulî is generally believed to have been born around 1483 in what is now Iraq, when the area was under Ak Koyunlu Turkmen rule. He was probably born in either Karbalā’ or an-Najaf. He is believed to belong to the Bayat tribe, one of the Turkic Oghuz tribes which were related to the Ottoman Kayı clan and were scattered throughout the Middle East, Anatolia, and the Caucasus at the time. Though Fudulî's ancestors had been of nomadic origin, the family had long since settled in towns.
Fudulî appears to have received a good education, first under his father—who was a mufti in the city of Al Hillah—and then under a teacher named Rahmetullah. It was during this time that he learned the Persian and Arabic languages in addition to his native Azerbaijani. Fudulî showed poetic promise early in life, composing sometime around his twentieth year the important mesnevî entitled Beng ü Bâde (Hashish and Wine), in which he compared the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid II to hashish and the Safavid Shah Ismail I to wine, much to the advantage of the latter.
In 1534, the Ottoman sultan Süleymân I conquered the region of Baghdad, where Fudulî lived, from the Safavid Empire. Fudulî then had the chance to become a court poet under the Ottoman patronage system, and he composed a number of kasîdes, or panegyric poems, in praise of the sultan and members of his retinue, and as a result, he was granted a stipend. However, owing to the complexities of the Ottoman bureaucracy, this stipend never materialized. In one of his best-known works, the letter Şikâyetnâme (Complaint), Fuzûlî spoke out against such bureaucracy and its attendant corruption.
Though his poetry flourished during his time among the Ottomans, the loss of his stipend meant that, materially speaking, Fudulî never became secure. In fact, most of his life was spent attending upon the Shi`ite Tomb of `Alî in the city of an-Najaf, south of Baghdad. He died during a plague outbreak in 1556, in Karbalā’, either of the plague itself or of cholera.
Fuzuli see Fuduli
Muhammad bin Suleyman see Fuduli
Fuduli (Fuzuli) (Muhammad bin Suleyman) (c.1483-1556). One of the most illustrious authors of classical Turkish literature. He was a Shi‘a, and never left his native Iraq. He also wrote in Arabic and Persian. In his literary Azeri, he treats the themes of love, suffering, the impermanence of this world, the emptiness of worldly favors and riches, and the theme of death.
Fuduli was the pen name of the Azerbaijani poet, writer and thinker Muhammad bin Suleyman. Often considered one of the greatest contributors to the Dîvân tradition of Azerbaijani literature, Fudulî in fact wrote his collected poems (dîvân) in three different languages: Azerbaijani Turkic, Persian, and Arabic. Although his Turkish works are written in Azerbaijani, he was well-versed in both the Ottoman and the Chagatai Turkic literary traditions as well. He was also well versed in mathematics and astronomy.
Fudulî is generally believed to have been born around 1483 in what is now Iraq, when the area was under Ak Koyunlu Turkmen rule. He was probably born in either Karbalā’ or an-Najaf. He is believed to belong to the Bayat tribe, one of the Turkic Oghuz tribes which were related to the Ottoman Kayı clan and were scattered throughout the Middle East, Anatolia, and the Caucasus at the time. Though Fudulî's ancestors had been of nomadic origin, the family had long since settled in towns.
Fudulî appears to have received a good education, first under his father—who was a mufti in the city of Al Hillah—and then under a teacher named Rahmetullah. It was during this time that he learned the Persian and Arabic languages in addition to his native Azerbaijani. Fudulî showed poetic promise early in life, composing sometime around his twentieth year the important mesnevî entitled Beng ü Bâde (Hashish and Wine), in which he compared the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid II to hashish and the Safavid Shah Ismail I to wine, much to the advantage of the latter.
In 1534, the Ottoman sultan Süleymân I conquered the region of Baghdad, where Fudulî lived, from the Safavid Empire. Fudulî then had the chance to become a court poet under the Ottoman patronage system, and he composed a number of kasîdes, or panegyric poems, in praise of the sultan and members of his retinue, and as a result, he was granted a stipend. However, owing to the complexities of the Ottoman bureaucracy, this stipend never materialized. In one of his best-known works, the letter Şikâyetnâme (Complaint), Fuzûlî spoke out against such bureaucracy and its attendant corruption.
Though his poetry flourished during his time among the Ottomans, the loss of his stipend meant that, materially speaking, Fudulî never became secure. In fact, most of his life was spent attending upon the Shi`ite Tomb of `Alî in the city of an-Najaf, south of Baghdad. He died during a plague outbreak in 1556, in Karbalā’, either of the plague itself or of cholera.
Fuzuli see Fuduli
Muhammad bin Suleyman see Fuduli
Fula
Fula (Fulani) (Fulbe). Originally a non-Negroid ethnic group, exclusively pastoral, which settled in West Africa. In the fourteenth century, these pagan herders were associated with the native people of the lower Senegal River. They later established themselves upstream along the Niger River. They converted to Islam. Many Fulani were brought to northeast Brazil during the colonial period. These Sudanese slaves had straight hair, light-skinned faces, prominent noses, and physical traits nearer to those of the Europeans. They were well educated, versed in cattle raising and pasturing herds, and were skillful iron workers. Some were school teachers, priests, and political leaders. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, these slaves led various revolts against the planters and the government.
Fula or Fulani or Fulbe (the latter being an Anglicisation of the word in their language, Fulɓe) are an ethnic group of people spread over many countries, predominantly in West Africa, but found also in Central Africa and Sudanese North Africa. The countries in Africa where they are present include Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, The Gambia, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, Chad, Togo, the Central African Republic, Ghana, Liberia, and as far as Sudan in the east. Fula people form a minority in every country they live, but in Guinea they represent a plurality of the population (40%).
The Fulani of West Africa form the largest nomadic society in the world. Their herds of cattle and sheep are the major single source of meat for hundreds of villages, towns and cities from Wadai, beyond the eastern shore of Lake Chad, to the Atlantic coast of Senegal. The fact that they live in many countries, occupy rugged countryside and are highly mobile means that their numbers are not precisely known. However, it is estimated that over ninety percent of the Fulani are Muslims. The Fulani call themselves Fulbe. English and Hausa speakers call them Fulani. Hausa may also refer to them as Filani and Hilani. They are called Peul by French speakers, Fula by the Manding, and Fulata by the Kanuri. Their language is Pular in Senegal and Fulfulde in Nigeria and most areas. It is of the West Atlantic subfamily of the Niger-Congo group, which also includes Wolof, Serer and Temne.
The Fulani are a Muslim pastoral people, living between Lake Chad and the Atlantic Ocean. Their origin has been the subject of dispute. They are first mentioned in the fifteenth century by al-Maqrizi and have played an important role in the establishment of various African kingdoms.
Today, the Fulani are a cattle-herding people of Africa numbering about 7 million and dispersed in varying, often sizable, concentrations throughout the grassland areas of West Africa from Senegal and Guinea to Nigeria, Cameroon, and Chad. The dark-skinned Fulani have Caucasoid racial features. Their language is closely related to the languages of Senegal, suggesting the possibility that their ancestors migrated from Southwest Asia through North Africa to Senegal. By the tenth century, they had adopted a new language in Senegal and begun to spread eastward, reaching present day Nigeria by about the fourteenth century.
Although most Fulani remained cattle herders through the centuries, many settled down and turned to politics, successfully establishing a series of kingdoms between Senegal and Cameroon by the nineteenth century, and conquering the Hausa by about 1810. The Fulani held much of northern Nigeria in subjugation until defeated by the British in 1906. The religious beliefs of a large percentage of the cattle-herding Fulani are animistic, although many of the politically oriented Fulani are Muslim and have often justified their conquests on religious grounds.
Fulani see Fula
Fulbe see Fula
Filani see Fula
Hilani see Fula
Peul see Fula
Fulata see Fula
Fula (Fulani) (Fulbe). Originally a non-Negroid ethnic group, exclusively pastoral, which settled in West Africa. In the fourteenth century, these pagan herders were associated with the native people of the lower Senegal River. They later established themselves upstream along the Niger River. They converted to Islam. Many Fulani were brought to northeast Brazil during the colonial period. These Sudanese slaves had straight hair, light-skinned faces, prominent noses, and physical traits nearer to those of the Europeans. They were well educated, versed in cattle raising and pasturing herds, and were skillful iron workers. Some were school teachers, priests, and political leaders. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, these slaves led various revolts against the planters and the government.
Fula or Fulani or Fulbe (the latter being an Anglicisation of the word in their language, Fulɓe) are an ethnic group of people spread over many countries, predominantly in West Africa, but found also in Central Africa and Sudanese North Africa. The countries in Africa where they are present include Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, The Gambia, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, Chad, Togo, the Central African Republic, Ghana, Liberia, and as far as Sudan in the east. Fula people form a minority in every country they live, but in Guinea they represent a plurality of the population (40%).
The Fulani of West Africa form the largest nomadic society in the world. Their herds of cattle and sheep are the major single source of meat for hundreds of villages, towns and cities from Wadai, beyond the eastern shore of Lake Chad, to the Atlantic coast of Senegal. The fact that they live in many countries, occupy rugged countryside and are highly mobile means that their numbers are not precisely known. However, it is estimated that over ninety percent of the Fulani are Muslims. The Fulani call themselves Fulbe. English and Hausa speakers call them Fulani. Hausa may also refer to them as Filani and Hilani. They are called Peul by French speakers, Fula by the Manding, and Fulata by the Kanuri. Their language is Pular in Senegal and Fulfulde in Nigeria and most areas. It is of the West Atlantic subfamily of the Niger-Congo group, which also includes Wolof, Serer and Temne.
The Fulani are a Muslim pastoral people, living between Lake Chad and the Atlantic Ocean. Their origin has been the subject of dispute. They are first mentioned in the fifteenth century by al-Maqrizi and have played an important role in the establishment of various African kingdoms.
Today, the Fulani are a cattle-herding people of Africa numbering about 7 million and dispersed in varying, often sizable, concentrations throughout the grassland areas of West Africa from Senegal and Guinea to Nigeria, Cameroon, and Chad. The dark-skinned Fulani have Caucasoid racial features. Their language is closely related to the languages of Senegal, suggesting the possibility that their ancestors migrated from Southwest Asia through North Africa to Senegal. By the tenth century, they had adopted a new language in Senegal and begun to spread eastward, reaching present day Nigeria by about the fourteenth century.
Although most Fulani remained cattle herders through the centuries, many settled down and turned to politics, successfully establishing a series of kingdoms between Senegal and Cameroon by the nineteenth century, and conquering the Hausa by about 1810. The Fulani held much of northern Nigeria in subjugation until defeated by the British in 1906. The religious beliefs of a large percentage of the cattle-herding Fulani are animistic, although many of the politically oriented Fulani are Muslim and have often justified their conquests on religious grounds.
Fulani see Fula
Fulbe see Fula
Filani see Fula
Hilani see Fula
Peul see Fula
Fulata see Fula
Fulani
Fulani (Fulbe; in French, Peuls or Peuhl). See Fula.
Fulbe see Fulani
Peuls see Fulani
Peuhl see Fulani
Filani see Fulani
Hilani see Fulani
Fulata see Fulani
Fulani (Fulbe; in French, Peuls or Peuhl). See Fula.
Fulbe see Fulani
Peuls see Fulani
Peuhl see Fulani
Filani see Fulani
Hilani see Fulani
Fulata see Fulani
Fundamentalists
Fundamentalists. Those who profess an activist affirmation of a particular faith that defines that faith in an absolutist and literalist manner. Fundamentalists are generally engaged in an effort to purify or reform the beliefs and practices of adherents in accord with the self-defined fundamentals of the faith. Fundamentalist interpretation entails a self-conscious effort to avoid compromise, adaptation, or critical reinterpretation of the basic texts and sources of belief. Fundamentalists practice fundamentalism which is a distinctive way of defining and implementing a particular worldview, and fundamentalisms are most frequently presented as styles of religious experience within broader religious traditions.
In the Christian faith, fundamentalists are members of a conservative branch of Christianity which seeks to preserve the core of the religion and its impact on society. Fundamentalists have their origin in the United States, but have reached Europe in modern times. Fundamentalists have one major difference from traditional conservative Christians: fundamentalists define themselves out of a sense of estrangement from society – a society which fundamentalists believe has lost moral values. A traditional conservative Christian does not generally involve such a hard judgment of society. Fundamentalism has had little influence in Southwest Asia and North Africa, as the Christian societies were always minority groups and have not been in a position to mould the social structures outside their small communities. Muslim fundamentalists are misnamed. The correct term would be Islamists.
Originally, fundamentalism was the name applied to a specific Christian experience that emerged as a response to the development of Christian “modernism” in the nineteenth century. While modernism elicited reaction in many areas, it was most vehement in the United States. Between 1909 and 1915, a group of American theologians wrote and published a series of booklets called The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth, in which they defined what they believed to be the absolutely fundamental doctrines of Christianity. The core of these doctrines was the literal inerrancy of the Bible in all its statements and affirmations. During the debates of the 1920s, the supporters of this position came to be called Fundamentalists.
For many years, the term “fundamentalism” was applied almost exclusively to this particular Christian tradition. By the 1970s, as scholars and the general public became increasingly aware of the resurgence of religion in many different societies, the term began to be applied to movements of religious revival in a wide variety of contexts. People spoke of Hindu and Jewish fundamentalism and, in the context of the ideological debates of the 1990s, it was even possible for a major scholar such as Ernest Gellner to speak of “Enlightenment Secular Fundamentalism” when describing the position that both rejected relativism and denied the possibility of revelation. When applied to non-Christians, the term most denoted individuals and movements in the Islamic resurgence of the final quarter of the twentieth century. By the 1990s the phrase “Muslim fundamentalism” (or “Islamic fundamentalism”) was widely used in both scholarly and journalistic literature.
The application of the term “fundamentalism” to Muslims is controversial. Much of the debate starts from the pejorative implications of the term, even when used to describe Christians. It is said by some that the term has connotations of ignorance and backwardness and thus is insulting to movements of legitimate Islamic revival. Others have argued that there is no exactly cognate term in Arabic or other major languages of Muslims, and that this indicates that there is no cognate phenomenon in Muslim societies to which the term might apply.
Despite this, there is general recognition that activist movements of Muslim revival are increasingly important and reference must be made to them. Among the many terms used for this purpose are Islamism, integrism, neo-normative Islam, neo-traditional Islam, Islamic revivalism, and Islamic nativism. However, “fundamentalism” remains the most commonly utilized identification of the various revivalist impulses among Muslims. More technically accurate terms and neologisms have not gained wide acceptance.
The description and analysis of Islamic fundamentalism in the modern era gives rise to many debates. Among the most important of these is whether Islamic fundamentalism is a distinctively modern phenomenon. Some scholars argue that throughout Islamic history it is possible to see activist movements advocating a return to the pristine fundamentals of the faith. From this perspective, the Hanbali tradition, especially as defined by Ibn Taymiyah in the fourteenth century, and reformers in South Asia such as Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1625), and possibly even early Islamic radicals like the Khariji sect, represent pre-modern expressions of a fundamentalist style of Islamic affirmation. In this view, the fundamentalist movements of the eighteenth century in many parts of the Islamic world, most notably the Wahhabi movement in the Arabian Peninsula and jihad efforts organized by Sufi tariqahs in Southeast Asia, West Africa, and elsewhere provide an important foundation for Islamic fundamentalism in the modern era.
In contrast, other scholars argue that fundamentalisms are distinctively the products of the modern era, even though they may have some historical antecedents. In this view, the conditions of modernity are unique, and fundamentalisms are distinctive responses to the religious challenges of modernity. The major examples of Islamic fundamentalist movements are, from this perspective, not the traditionalist movements or nativist revolts of the nineteenth century nor the puritanical holy warriors of pre-modern times. They are those movements – for example, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, that developed in the twentieth century and became most visible in the Islamic resurgence of the last quarter of that century.
Among Muslims there is also a broad spectrum both in the use of the term “fundamentalism” and in evaluation of the phenomenon. In the nineteenth century most Muslims were aware of the power of Western societies and the relative weakness of Muslim communities. One of the major themes of Muslim history in the modern era is the interaction of Muslims with the West and the efforts to revive and/or reform the world of Islam. The first modern response was to adapt to the new world conditions and utilize Western models in reforming Muslim societies. By the second half of the twentieth century, it became clear that the results of these reform programs were not satisfactory, and new, more revolutionary efforts were undertaken. Among these efforts were the major Islamic fundamentalist movements, which adopt positions rejecting the simple copying of Western methods and affirming the comprehensive and effective nature of the Islamic message.
In the 1970s, most Muslim analysts rejected the term “fundamentalism” as an identifying label for the movements of Islamic affirmation. By the 1990s, however, Muslim critics of fundamentalism began to use the term in political and scholarly debates, and some supporters also accepted the term, recognizing its wide use and visibility. Writers in Arabic by the 1980s began to use the term usuliyah, an Arabic neologism that is a direct translation of “fundamentalism” based on usul, the Arabic word for “fundamentals.” In this way, “fundamentalism” became a part of the vocabulary of the Islamic resurgence itself as well as of the study of that resurgence.
In the twenty-first century of the Christian calendar, Islamic fundamentalism's push for Sharia and an Islamic State has come into conflict with conceptions of the secular, democratic state, such as the internationally supported Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Among human rights disputed by fundamentalist Muslims are:
* Freedom from religious police
* Equality issues between men and women
* Separation of religion and state;
* Freedom of speech
* Freedom of religion
Islamists see Fundamentalists.
Fundamentalists. Those who profess an activist affirmation of a particular faith that defines that faith in an absolutist and literalist manner. Fundamentalists are generally engaged in an effort to purify or reform the beliefs and practices of adherents in accord with the self-defined fundamentals of the faith. Fundamentalist interpretation entails a self-conscious effort to avoid compromise, adaptation, or critical reinterpretation of the basic texts and sources of belief. Fundamentalists practice fundamentalism which is a distinctive way of defining and implementing a particular worldview, and fundamentalisms are most frequently presented as styles of religious experience within broader religious traditions.
In the Christian faith, fundamentalists are members of a conservative branch of Christianity which seeks to preserve the core of the religion and its impact on society. Fundamentalists have their origin in the United States, but have reached Europe in modern times. Fundamentalists have one major difference from traditional conservative Christians: fundamentalists define themselves out of a sense of estrangement from society – a society which fundamentalists believe has lost moral values. A traditional conservative Christian does not generally involve such a hard judgment of society. Fundamentalism has had little influence in Southwest Asia and North Africa, as the Christian societies were always minority groups and have not been in a position to mould the social structures outside their small communities. Muslim fundamentalists are misnamed. The correct term would be Islamists.
Originally, fundamentalism was the name applied to a specific Christian experience that emerged as a response to the development of Christian “modernism” in the nineteenth century. While modernism elicited reaction in many areas, it was most vehement in the United States. Between 1909 and 1915, a group of American theologians wrote and published a series of booklets called The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth, in which they defined what they believed to be the absolutely fundamental doctrines of Christianity. The core of these doctrines was the literal inerrancy of the Bible in all its statements and affirmations. During the debates of the 1920s, the supporters of this position came to be called Fundamentalists.
For many years, the term “fundamentalism” was applied almost exclusively to this particular Christian tradition. By the 1970s, as scholars and the general public became increasingly aware of the resurgence of religion in many different societies, the term began to be applied to movements of religious revival in a wide variety of contexts. People spoke of Hindu and Jewish fundamentalism and, in the context of the ideological debates of the 1990s, it was even possible for a major scholar such as Ernest Gellner to speak of “Enlightenment Secular Fundamentalism” when describing the position that both rejected relativism and denied the possibility of revelation. When applied to non-Christians, the term most denoted individuals and movements in the Islamic resurgence of the final quarter of the twentieth century. By the 1990s the phrase “Muslim fundamentalism” (or “Islamic fundamentalism”) was widely used in both scholarly and journalistic literature.
The application of the term “fundamentalism” to Muslims is controversial. Much of the debate starts from the pejorative implications of the term, even when used to describe Christians. It is said by some that the term has connotations of ignorance and backwardness and thus is insulting to movements of legitimate Islamic revival. Others have argued that there is no exactly cognate term in Arabic or other major languages of Muslims, and that this indicates that there is no cognate phenomenon in Muslim societies to which the term might apply.
Despite this, there is general recognition that activist movements of Muslim revival are increasingly important and reference must be made to them. Among the many terms used for this purpose are Islamism, integrism, neo-normative Islam, neo-traditional Islam, Islamic revivalism, and Islamic nativism. However, “fundamentalism” remains the most commonly utilized identification of the various revivalist impulses among Muslims. More technically accurate terms and neologisms have not gained wide acceptance.
The description and analysis of Islamic fundamentalism in the modern era gives rise to many debates. Among the most important of these is whether Islamic fundamentalism is a distinctively modern phenomenon. Some scholars argue that throughout Islamic history it is possible to see activist movements advocating a return to the pristine fundamentals of the faith. From this perspective, the Hanbali tradition, especially as defined by Ibn Taymiyah in the fourteenth century, and reformers in South Asia such as Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1625), and possibly even early Islamic radicals like the Khariji sect, represent pre-modern expressions of a fundamentalist style of Islamic affirmation. In this view, the fundamentalist movements of the eighteenth century in many parts of the Islamic world, most notably the Wahhabi movement in the Arabian Peninsula and jihad efforts organized by Sufi tariqahs in Southeast Asia, West Africa, and elsewhere provide an important foundation for Islamic fundamentalism in the modern era.
In contrast, other scholars argue that fundamentalisms are distinctively the products of the modern era, even though they may have some historical antecedents. In this view, the conditions of modernity are unique, and fundamentalisms are distinctive responses to the religious challenges of modernity. The major examples of Islamic fundamentalist movements are, from this perspective, not the traditionalist movements or nativist revolts of the nineteenth century nor the puritanical holy warriors of pre-modern times. They are those movements – for example, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, that developed in the twentieth century and became most visible in the Islamic resurgence of the last quarter of that century.
Among Muslims there is also a broad spectrum both in the use of the term “fundamentalism” and in evaluation of the phenomenon. In the nineteenth century most Muslims were aware of the power of Western societies and the relative weakness of Muslim communities. One of the major themes of Muslim history in the modern era is the interaction of Muslims with the West and the efforts to revive and/or reform the world of Islam. The first modern response was to adapt to the new world conditions and utilize Western models in reforming Muslim societies. By the second half of the twentieth century, it became clear that the results of these reform programs were not satisfactory, and new, more revolutionary efforts were undertaken. Among these efforts were the major Islamic fundamentalist movements, which adopt positions rejecting the simple copying of Western methods and affirming the comprehensive and effective nature of the Islamic message.
In the 1970s, most Muslim analysts rejected the term “fundamentalism” as an identifying label for the movements of Islamic affirmation. By the 1990s, however, Muslim critics of fundamentalism began to use the term in political and scholarly debates, and some supporters also accepted the term, recognizing its wide use and visibility. Writers in Arabic by the 1980s began to use the term usuliyah, an Arabic neologism that is a direct translation of “fundamentalism” based on usul, the Arabic word for “fundamentals.” In this way, “fundamentalism” became a part of the vocabulary of the Islamic resurgence itself as well as of the study of that resurgence.
In the twenty-first century of the Christian calendar, Islamic fundamentalism's push for Sharia and an Islamic State has come into conflict with conceptions of the secular, democratic state, such as the internationally supported Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Among human rights disputed by fundamentalist Muslims are:
* Freedom from religious police
* Equality issues between men and women
* Separation of religion and state;
* Freedom of speech
* Freedom of religion
Islamists see Fundamentalists.
Funj
Funj. The Islamic Nubian kingdom of Sinnar dominated the Nile Valley between Egypt and Ethiopia from about 1500 to 1821. Today some people who pride themselves on a historical association with this state identify themselves as Funj, but the terms of their association have been diverse.
Modern Funj identity has been mediated by the historical experience of Sinnar. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries people from lands adjacent to Sinnar often called the land Funjistan, or the “Kingdom of the Funj.” At this time, the term “Funj” applied to the hereditary nobility of Sinnar as a whole and distinguished this group both from the ethnically diverse subject class of commoners and from members of the elite of slave status. This hereditary nobility possessed a corporate identity defined by an intricate and highly disciplined system of compulsory matrilateral parallel cousin marriage. Inheritance was through the female line, by which the right to rule the kingdom itself and each of its constituent territorial parts was distributed over space and through time among appropriate members of the royal clan, the Unsab, and its subordinate lineages.
During the eighteenth century, Sinnar gradually disintegrated in civil strife, and its nobility fractured into territorial patrilineages who claimed Arab descent, usually Abbasid, but occasionally Sharifian. Only two groups are known to have continued to identify themselves as Funj throughout the eighteenth century. The immediate royal family itself and the community of Northern Funj resident along the Nile in and around Karamakol, between Dongola and the Shaiqiya country. Both groups have adopted Umayyad Arab identity and patrilineal descent.
The Turkish government of Egypt conquered Sinnar in 1821. The Turks pensioned off the old royal family and gave them estates in and around al Mayna on the Blue Nile opposite Sinja. A community comprised largely of members of the former sultan’s family reside in this area today, and they are known as Funj and Umayyads -- as are those individual descendants of the former kings who live elsewhere.
The Turks governed substantial parts of southern Sinnar indirectly via members of the family of the former wazirs. These leaders identified themselves as Hamaj rather than Funj, but the Turks nevertheless designated the area they administered the Funj Mountains. With the exception of the family of the former sultans and the Northern Funj, modern Funj are most likely to have their place of origin within this nineteenth century colonial jurisdiction. The Funj Mountains included the diverse sedentary peoples who lived on either side of a belt of more important and therefore directly administered Turkish districts which lined the banks of the Blue Nile and extended southward to embrace the gold-bearing region of Bela Shangul in western Wallagga. Within the Funj Mountains the designation “Funj” was employed as a term of self-identification not only by some surviving members of the hereditary nobility of Sinnar (excluding the Hamaj) but also by many ordinary Muslim individuals who looked back with affection to the pre-colonial period. In most cases these Funj were native speakers of Berta, Gumuz or one of the other languages of the Funj Mountains whose lack of literacy in Arabic and formal education in the Islamic sciences precluded their fabrication of a more sophisticated Arab pedigree.
The Anglo-Egyptian government of the Sudan (1898-1956) preserved a truncated portion of the Turkish Funj Mountains as an administrative district called Southern Funj, towards whose diverse populations, including the Funj, a considerable measure of anthropological attention has been directed.
The Funj first appeared in the early sixteenth century as a nomadic cattle-herding people in the Nilotic Sudan. The gradually extended their range down the Blue Nile. The Muslim dynasty of the Funj kings reigned from 1533 to 1762 and their capital Sinnar is said to have been founded in 1504.
In about 1500, after several turbulent centuries of transition in Nubia, a new Islamic government reunited much of the northern Nile valley Sudan in the area bounded by Egypt, Ethiopia, the Red Sea, Darfur, and the vast swamps of the White Nile. Within this pre-capitalist agrarian polity, an ethnically heterogeneous class of subjects, through an ingeniously structured system of payments in labor and in kind, supported a hereditary ruling elite known as the Funj. The Funj monarch ruled from an elaborate central court through a hierarchy of subordinate governors over the eight central provinces and tributary princedoms such as Fazughli and Taqali, and beneath these, the numerous lesser lords of districts and tribes. The Funj government, though Islamic by faith and (for administrative purposes) Arabic by speech, also drew heavily upon older Sudanic traditions of statecraft. Notably, the geographical and historical coherence of the Funj elite depended on the institution of matrilineal kinship inherited from the states of medieval Christian Nubia.
During the latter half of the seventeenth century, a series of strong sultans brought the originally mobile royal court to rest on the Blue Nile at Sinnar, henceforth the eponymous capital of the realm. They also opened the country to unprecedented commercial relations with neighboring lands via royalty sponsored caravans. By 1700, Sinnar had become a large and cosmopolitan city. Exposure to imported commercial capitalist principles from the Islamic heartlands stimulated the appearance of an indigenous middle class within the Funj kingdom during the eighteenth century. About twenty new towns arose, and the money economy interposed itself into many social and political relationships. Meanwhile, increasing contact with the cultural usages of the Islamic heartlands also challenged the sultanate’s corporate, communal vision of Islam, according to which all loyal subjects of the king were Muslims by definition, despite folkways that were often heterodox. During the eighteenth century, middle-class religious sophisticates imported standard legal handbooks from the Islamic heartlands. They wielded the principles found therein as a weapon of social criticism against the tolerant Funj version of a medieval synthesis that had accommodated universal faith to particularistic culture. Henceforth, communal loyalty to the Muslim king was no longer a substitute for conformity to the stipulations of religious law.
Middle class partisans of the intrusive fundamentalist Islamic culture began to identify themselves as “Arabs” and undertook to seize power. The old matrilineal dynasty was overthrown in 1719, and in 1762 a clique of middle class warlords known as the Hamaj imposed one of their own as ruling wazir (vizier). Yet no new order was achieved. Rather, the collapse of Funj kinship discipline precipitated civil war at all levels of government. In 1820-1821, the remnants of the kingdom fell to Muhammad ‘Ali, Ottoman viceroy of Egypt, with little resistance.
Funj. The Islamic Nubian kingdom of Sinnar dominated the Nile Valley between Egypt and Ethiopia from about 1500 to 1821. Today some people who pride themselves on a historical association with this state identify themselves as Funj, but the terms of their association have been diverse.
Modern Funj identity has been mediated by the historical experience of Sinnar. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries people from lands adjacent to Sinnar often called the land Funjistan, or the “Kingdom of the Funj.” At this time, the term “Funj” applied to the hereditary nobility of Sinnar as a whole and distinguished this group both from the ethnically diverse subject class of commoners and from members of the elite of slave status. This hereditary nobility possessed a corporate identity defined by an intricate and highly disciplined system of compulsory matrilateral parallel cousin marriage. Inheritance was through the female line, by which the right to rule the kingdom itself and each of its constituent territorial parts was distributed over space and through time among appropriate members of the royal clan, the Unsab, and its subordinate lineages.
During the eighteenth century, Sinnar gradually disintegrated in civil strife, and its nobility fractured into territorial patrilineages who claimed Arab descent, usually Abbasid, but occasionally Sharifian. Only two groups are known to have continued to identify themselves as Funj throughout the eighteenth century. The immediate royal family itself and the community of Northern Funj resident along the Nile in and around Karamakol, between Dongola and the Shaiqiya country. Both groups have adopted Umayyad Arab identity and patrilineal descent.
The Turkish government of Egypt conquered Sinnar in 1821. The Turks pensioned off the old royal family and gave them estates in and around al Mayna on the Blue Nile opposite Sinja. A community comprised largely of members of the former sultan’s family reside in this area today, and they are known as Funj and Umayyads -- as are those individual descendants of the former kings who live elsewhere.
The Turks governed substantial parts of southern Sinnar indirectly via members of the family of the former wazirs. These leaders identified themselves as Hamaj rather than Funj, but the Turks nevertheless designated the area they administered the Funj Mountains. With the exception of the family of the former sultans and the Northern Funj, modern Funj are most likely to have their place of origin within this nineteenth century colonial jurisdiction. The Funj Mountains included the diverse sedentary peoples who lived on either side of a belt of more important and therefore directly administered Turkish districts which lined the banks of the Blue Nile and extended southward to embrace the gold-bearing region of Bela Shangul in western Wallagga. Within the Funj Mountains the designation “Funj” was employed as a term of self-identification not only by some surviving members of the hereditary nobility of Sinnar (excluding the Hamaj) but also by many ordinary Muslim individuals who looked back with affection to the pre-colonial period. In most cases these Funj were native speakers of Berta, Gumuz or one of the other languages of the Funj Mountains whose lack of literacy in Arabic and formal education in the Islamic sciences precluded their fabrication of a more sophisticated Arab pedigree.
The Anglo-Egyptian government of the Sudan (1898-1956) preserved a truncated portion of the Turkish Funj Mountains as an administrative district called Southern Funj, towards whose diverse populations, including the Funj, a considerable measure of anthropological attention has been directed.
The Funj first appeared in the early sixteenth century as a nomadic cattle-herding people in the Nilotic Sudan. The gradually extended their range down the Blue Nile. The Muslim dynasty of the Funj kings reigned from 1533 to 1762 and their capital Sinnar is said to have been founded in 1504.
In about 1500, after several turbulent centuries of transition in Nubia, a new Islamic government reunited much of the northern Nile valley Sudan in the area bounded by Egypt, Ethiopia, the Red Sea, Darfur, and the vast swamps of the White Nile. Within this pre-capitalist agrarian polity, an ethnically heterogeneous class of subjects, through an ingeniously structured system of payments in labor and in kind, supported a hereditary ruling elite known as the Funj. The Funj monarch ruled from an elaborate central court through a hierarchy of subordinate governors over the eight central provinces and tributary princedoms such as Fazughli and Taqali, and beneath these, the numerous lesser lords of districts and tribes. The Funj government, though Islamic by faith and (for administrative purposes) Arabic by speech, also drew heavily upon older Sudanic traditions of statecraft. Notably, the geographical and historical coherence of the Funj elite depended on the institution of matrilineal kinship inherited from the states of medieval Christian Nubia.
During the latter half of the seventeenth century, a series of strong sultans brought the originally mobile royal court to rest on the Blue Nile at Sinnar, henceforth the eponymous capital of the realm. They also opened the country to unprecedented commercial relations with neighboring lands via royalty sponsored caravans. By 1700, Sinnar had become a large and cosmopolitan city. Exposure to imported commercial capitalist principles from the Islamic heartlands stimulated the appearance of an indigenous middle class within the Funj kingdom during the eighteenth century. About twenty new towns arose, and the money economy interposed itself into many social and political relationships. Meanwhile, increasing contact with the cultural usages of the Islamic heartlands also challenged the sultanate’s corporate, communal vision of Islam, according to which all loyal subjects of the king were Muslims by definition, despite folkways that were often heterodox. During the eighteenth century, middle-class religious sophisticates imported standard legal handbooks from the Islamic heartlands. They wielded the principles found therein as a weapon of social criticism against the tolerant Funj version of a medieval synthesis that had accommodated universal faith to particularistic culture. Henceforth, communal loyalty to the Muslim king was no longer a substitute for conformity to the stipulations of religious law.
Middle class partisans of the intrusive fundamentalist Islamic culture began to identify themselves as “Arabs” and undertook to seize power. The old matrilineal dynasty was overthrown in 1719, and in 1762 a clique of middle class warlords known as the Hamaj imposed one of their own as ruling wazir (vizier). Yet no new order was achieved. Rather, the collapse of Funj kinship discipline precipitated civil war at all levels of government. In 1820-1821, the remnants of the kingdom fell to Muhammad ‘Ali, Ottoman viceroy of Egypt, with little resistance.
Fuqaha’ al-Madina al-Sab‘a
Fuqaha’ al-Madina al-Sab‘a. One of the seven jurists of Medina, to whom tradition (hadith) attributes a significant role in the formation of Muslim law. All of the jurists died between 709 and 724.
Fuqaha’ al-Madina al-Sab‘a. One of the seven jurists of Medina, to whom tradition (hadith) attributes a significant role in the formation of Muslim law. All of the jurists died between 709 and 724.
Fur
Fur. The Fur is the largest ethnic group in the Darfur region of western Sudan. Their language, Fur, is the most obvious feature distinguishing them from surrounding groups. It is the only member of a major sub-family of the large Nilo-Saharan language family. The Fur are nominally Sunni Muslims following the Maliki juridical school.
The Fur were once rulers of the greatest empire of western Sudan. Succeeding the Tunjur empire in the seventeenth century, the Keira clan of the Fur gained control of vassal states and trade with Cairo -- and brought Islam to the western mountains. In 1874, Sultan Ibrahim ibn Muhammad al Husayn and his forces fell to an army of the Khedive of Egypt. Although nominally under the suzerainty of Egyptian Sudan, Fur leaders continued resistance. Not until 1916, when the British invaded Darfur and defeated Sultan Ali Dinar (1898-1916), did the area become politically integrated into Sudan. Dar Fur became Darfur Province. However, integration of the people into Sudan Arab society remained an uncompleted and contentious problem.
It was through the policies of the sultanate that Islam first gained influence among the Fur. The Islamization process was promoted by the sultan’s policies of granting privileges to Muslim immigrants, especially those from West Africa, to build mosques and establish Islamic education for boys.
Until 1916, the Fur were ruled by an independent sultanate and were oriented politically to peoples in Chad. Though the ruling dynasty before that time, as well as the common people, had long been Muslims, they have not been arabized. They are now incorporated into the Sudan political system. The Fur had been basically independent from the 1600s. After British reconquest in 1899, the British approved the re-establishment of the Fur Sultanate, assumed by Ali Dinar when the Mahdist movement crumbled. Mahdist revolts continued to break out in Sudan until 1916. The fall of Darfur was actually decided, however, when Ali Dinar declared loyalty to the Ottoman Empire in World War I. The British abolished the Fur Sultanate in 1916, after Dinar died in battle. In World War I, Darfur made a bid for independence by allying with Turkey against the British. However, the British conquered Darfur in 1916, since then it has been part of Sudan. Since the 1970s, the Darfur area has suffered some of the effects of the northern Arab war prosecuted in the south against Southern tribes who wanted to secede from the Sudan. War was the primary factor in the last few decades of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century for the Darfur area. A civil war lasted about 20 years, until the end of the twentieth century of the Christian calendar. A new conflict arose in 2003, involving local Arab militia called Janjaweed attacking the African peoples village by village in a campaign of terror, reportedly supported by the Sudanese military.
Fur. The Fur is the largest ethnic group in the Darfur region of western Sudan. Their language, Fur, is the most obvious feature distinguishing them from surrounding groups. It is the only member of a major sub-family of the large Nilo-Saharan language family. The Fur are nominally Sunni Muslims following the Maliki juridical school.
The Fur were once rulers of the greatest empire of western Sudan. Succeeding the Tunjur empire in the seventeenth century, the Keira clan of the Fur gained control of vassal states and trade with Cairo -- and brought Islam to the western mountains. In 1874, Sultan Ibrahim ibn Muhammad al Husayn and his forces fell to an army of the Khedive of Egypt. Although nominally under the suzerainty of Egyptian Sudan, Fur leaders continued resistance. Not until 1916, when the British invaded Darfur and defeated Sultan Ali Dinar (1898-1916), did the area become politically integrated into Sudan. Dar Fur became Darfur Province. However, integration of the people into Sudan Arab society remained an uncompleted and contentious problem.
It was through the policies of the sultanate that Islam first gained influence among the Fur. The Islamization process was promoted by the sultan’s policies of granting privileges to Muslim immigrants, especially those from West Africa, to build mosques and establish Islamic education for boys.
Until 1916, the Fur were ruled by an independent sultanate and were oriented politically to peoples in Chad. Though the ruling dynasty before that time, as well as the common people, had long been Muslims, they have not been arabized. They are now incorporated into the Sudan political system. The Fur had been basically independent from the 1600s. After British reconquest in 1899, the British approved the re-establishment of the Fur Sultanate, assumed by Ali Dinar when the Mahdist movement crumbled. Mahdist revolts continued to break out in Sudan until 1916. The fall of Darfur was actually decided, however, when Ali Dinar declared loyalty to the Ottoman Empire in World War I. The British abolished the Fur Sultanate in 1916, after Dinar died in battle. In World War I, Darfur made a bid for independence by allying with Turkey against the British. However, the British conquered Darfur in 1916, since then it has been part of Sudan. Since the 1970s, the Darfur area has suffered some of the effects of the northern Arab war prosecuted in the south against Southern tribes who wanted to secede from the Sudan. War was the primary factor in the last few decades of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century for the Darfur area. A civil war lasted about 20 years, until the end of the twentieth century of the Christian calendar. A new conflict arose in 2003, involving local Arab militia called Janjaweed attacking the African peoples village by village in a campaign of terror, reportedly supported by the Sudanese military.
Futa
Futa. In West Africa, Fulbe kingdoms from which many slaves were brought to the New World. These states were often prefaced by Futa, e.g., Futa Toro, Futa Jallon, and sometimes Futa Bondu.
Futa. In West Africa, Fulbe kingdoms from which many slaves were brought to the New World. These states were often prefaced by Futa, e.g., Futa Toro, Futa Jallon, and sometimes Futa Bondu.
Fyzee
Fyzee (Asaf Ali Asghar Fyzee) (1899-1981). Indian educator, public official, and internationally known writer on Islamic law. Fyzee was born at Matheran near Bombay on April 10, 1899 into a Sulaimani Bohora family. The Bohoras are mainly concentrated in western India and are descendants of Hindu converts and Yemeni Arabs. They supported al-Musta‘li’s (r. 1094-1101) claim to succeed his father al-Mustansir as the Fatimid caliph.
Fyzee was educated at Saint Xavier’s College, Bombay and Saint John’s College, Cambridge, where he received a double first in Oriental languages and was subsequently called to the bar. He married the writer Sultana Asaf Fyzee, daughter of Kazi Kabiruddin and an active supporter of the Muslim Ladies Club.
For nearly a decade from 1938, Fyzee was the principal of Government College, Bombay, and Perry Professor of Jurisprudence. From 1947 to 1949, he served as a member of the Bombay Public Service Commission and in 1949 was appointed as Indian ambassador to Egypt and minister plenipotentiary to Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. From 1952 to 1957, he served as a member of the Union Public Service Commission. Subsequently, he held visiting professorships at McGill University and the University of California at Los Angeles. He also served as the vice-chancellor of Jammu and Kashmir University.
Fyzee received honors both at home and abroad. He was made an honorary member of the Arabic Academy in both Cairo and Damascus. He served as president of Anjuman Taraqqi-i Urdu and as honorary secretary of the Islamic Research Association. In 1962, he received the award of Padma Bhushan from the Indian government.
Fyzee’s fame rests primarily on his numerous writings on Islamic law. His most famous work, Outlines of Muhammadan Law, is characterized by a modernistic and radical approach to the subject but is also sensitive to Muslim sentiments, a balance that others who tried to emulate him found difficult to maintain. He argued that in order to understand the system of Islamic jurisprudence, one ought to be familiar with the historical and cultural background of the law. By the time the second edition of his book was published, Joseph Schacht’s Origins of Muhammad Jurisprudence (Oxford, 1950) had already appeared. Fyzee was impressed by Schacht’s thesis. Islamic law, Fyzee suggested, is the result of a continuous process of development over fourteen centuries and should not be seen as a systematic code. Fyzee agreed in part with Schacht’s thesis that pre-Islamic customs and elements of Roman law influenced the development of Islamic jurisprudence, but he accepted Schacht’s arguments only with some reservations. Fyzee was aware of the inappropriateness of the term “Muhammadan” law and apologized for using it, arguing that for him it denoted those aspects of Islamic law that were applicable in Indian courts.
Like the famous poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal, Fyzee called for a reinterpretation of law (ijtihad) that would bring the law into conformity with the perceived needs and realities of modern existence. Given such apparent similarity of views, it is important to remember that whereas Iqbal’s call for reinterpretation was based essentially within a traditional Islamic paradigm, Fyzee’s desire was, in part, a concession to modern demands. Impressed by the Turkish Revolution and the experiments at codification of law in various Middle Eastern countries, Fyzee veered dangerously close to suggesting a uniform civil code for India. Only his caution as a public figure and as a scholar sensitive to his subject kept him from openly advocating it.
Fyzee is an outstanding example of that generation of Indian Muslim scholars who on one hand were struggling to distance themselves from an earlier apologetic trend of writing and on the other felt a powerful pull toward the Western tradition of criticial scholarship – to the extent that, ironically, they often adopted the conclusions of these modern researchers uncritically.
Asaf Ali Asghar Fyzee see Fyzee
Fyzee (Asaf Ali Asghar Fyzee) (1899-1981). Indian educator, public official, and internationally known writer on Islamic law. Fyzee was born at Matheran near Bombay on April 10, 1899 into a Sulaimani Bohora family. The Bohoras are mainly concentrated in western India and are descendants of Hindu converts and Yemeni Arabs. They supported al-Musta‘li’s (r. 1094-1101) claim to succeed his father al-Mustansir as the Fatimid caliph.
Fyzee was educated at Saint Xavier’s College, Bombay and Saint John’s College, Cambridge, where he received a double first in Oriental languages and was subsequently called to the bar. He married the writer Sultana Asaf Fyzee, daughter of Kazi Kabiruddin and an active supporter of the Muslim Ladies Club.
For nearly a decade from 1938, Fyzee was the principal of Government College, Bombay, and Perry Professor of Jurisprudence. From 1947 to 1949, he served as a member of the Bombay Public Service Commission and in 1949 was appointed as Indian ambassador to Egypt and minister plenipotentiary to Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. From 1952 to 1957, he served as a member of the Union Public Service Commission. Subsequently, he held visiting professorships at McGill University and the University of California at Los Angeles. He also served as the vice-chancellor of Jammu and Kashmir University.
Fyzee received honors both at home and abroad. He was made an honorary member of the Arabic Academy in both Cairo and Damascus. He served as president of Anjuman Taraqqi-i Urdu and as honorary secretary of the Islamic Research Association. In 1962, he received the award of Padma Bhushan from the Indian government.
Fyzee’s fame rests primarily on his numerous writings on Islamic law. His most famous work, Outlines of Muhammadan Law, is characterized by a modernistic and radical approach to the subject but is also sensitive to Muslim sentiments, a balance that others who tried to emulate him found difficult to maintain. He argued that in order to understand the system of Islamic jurisprudence, one ought to be familiar with the historical and cultural background of the law. By the time the second edition of his book was published, Joseph Schacht’s Origins of Muhammad Jurisprudence (Oxford, 1950) had already appeared. Fyzee was impressed by Schacht’s thesis. Islamic law, Fyzee suggested, is the result of a continuous process of development over fourteen centuries and should not be seen as a systematic code. Fyzee agreed in part with Schacht’s thesis that pre-Islamic customs and elements of Roman law influenced the development of Islamic jurisprudence, but he accepted Schacht’s arguments only with some reservations. Fyzee was aware of the inappropriateness of the term “Muhammadan” law and apologized for using it, arguing that for him it denoted those aspects of Islamic law that were applicable in Indian courts.
Like the famous poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal, Fyzee called for a reinterpretation of law (ijtihad) that would bring the law into conformity with the perceived needs and realities of modern existence. Given such apparent similarity of views, it is important to remember that whereas Iqbal’s call for reinterpretation was based essentially within a traditional Islamic paradigm, Fyzee’s desire was, in part, a concession to modern demands. Impressed by the Turkish Revolution and the experiments at codification of law in various Middle Eastern countries, Fyzee veered dangerously close to suggesting a uniform civil code for India. Only his caution as a public figure and as a scholar sensitive to his subject kept him from openly advocating it.
Fyzee is an outstanding example of that generation of Indian Muslim scholars who on one hand were struggling to distance themselves from an earlier apologetic trend of writing and on the other felt a powerful pull toward the Western tradition of criticial scholarship – to the extent that, ironically, they often adopted the conclusions of these modern researchers uncritically.
Asaf Ali Asghar Fyzee see Fyzee
Gabriel
Gabriel (in Arabic, Jibril or Jabra’il). Angel of high rank in Jewish, Christian and Muslim tradition. He is one of the four most often cited archangels in Judaism and Christianity, the others being Michael, Raphael, and Uriel. Gabriel is the heavenly messenger who appears in order to reveal God’s will. In the Old Testament, Gabriel interprets the prophet’s vision of the ram and the he goat {see Daniel 8:15-26} and explains the prediction of the 70 weeks of years (or 490 years) for the duration of the exile from Jerusalem {see Daniel 9:21-27} . In the New Testament, Gabriel announces to Zacharias the birth of Zacharias’ son {see Luke 1:11-20} , who is destined to become known as John the Baptist, and to Mary that she is to be the mother of Jesus Christ {see Luke 1:26-31} . Among Muslims, Gabriel is believed to be the spirit who revealed the sacred writings (the Qur’an) to the Prophet Muhammad. Gabriel is the prince of fire and the spirit who presides over thunder and the ripening of fruits. He is also an accomplished linguist, having taught Joseph the 70 languages spoken at Babel. In art, he is generally represented carrying either a lily, Mary’s flower, at the annunciation or the trumpet that he will blow to announce the second coming.
In Abrahamic religions, Gabriel (Hebrew: Gavriʼel; Tiberian: Gaḇrîʼēl; Latin: Gabrielus; Greek: Gabriēl; Arabic: Jibril, or Jibrail; Aramaic: Gabri-el - "God is my strong man/hero") is an angel who serves as a messenger from God. Based on two passages in the Gospel of Luke, many Christians and Muslims believe Gabriel to have foretold the births of both John the Baptist and Jesus.
Islam further believes he was the medium through whom God revealed the Qur'an to Muhammad, and that he sent a message to most prophets, if not all, revealing their obligations. He is called the chief of the four favored angels and the spirit of truth, and in some views is a personification of the Holy Spirit. Gabriel is also mentioned in Bahá'í Faith texts, specifically in Bahá'u'lláh's mystical work Seven Valleys.
The Arabic name for Gabriel is Jibral, Jibril, Jibrīl, Djibril, Jabrilæ or Jibrail. Muslims believe Gabriel to have been the angel who revealed the Qur'an to the prophet Muhammad. Gabriel is regarded with the exact same respect by Muslims as all of the Prophets, and upon saying his name or referring to him a Muslim repeats: "peace be upon him". Gabriel's primary tasks are to bring messages from God to his messengers. As in Christianity, Gabriel is said to be the angel that informed Mary (Arabic Maryam) of how she would conceive Jesus (Isa). (See Sura 19:17.)
Muslims believe Gabriel to have accompanied Muhammad in his ascension to the heavens, where Muhammad also is said to have met previous messengers of God, and was informed about the Islamic prayer (Bukhari 1:8:345). Muslims also believe that Gabriel descends to Earth on the night of Laylat al-Qadr ("The Night of Great Value"), a night in the last ten days of the holy month of Ramadan in the Islamic calendar which is believed to be the night in which the Qur'an was first revealed.
Jibril see Gabriel
Jabra'il see Gabriel
Gavri'el see Gabriel
Gabrielus see Gabriel
"God is my strong man/hero" see Gabriel
Gabriel (in Arabic, Jibril or Jabra’il). Angel of high rank in Jewish, Christian and Muslim tradition. He is one of the four most often cited archangels in Judaism and Christianity, the others being Michael, Raphael, and Uriel. Gabriel is the heavenly messenger who appears in order to reveal God’s will. In the Old Testament, Gabriel interprets the prophet’s vision of the ram and the he goat {see Daniel 8:15-26} and explains the prediction of the 70 weeks of years (or 490 years) for the duration of the exile from Jerusalem {see Daniel 9:21-27} . In the New Testament, Gabriel announces to Zacharias the birth of Zacharias’ son {see Luke 1:11-20} , who is destined to become known as John the Baptist, and to Mary that she is to be the mother of Jesus Christ {see Luke 1:26-31} . Among Muslims, Gabriel is believed to be the spirit who revealed the sacred writings (the Qur’an) to the Prophet Muhammad. Gabriel is the prince of fire and the spirit who presides over thunder and the ripening of fruits. He is also an accomplished linguist, having taught Joseph the 70 languages spoken at Babel. In art, he is generally represented carrying either a lily, Mary’s flower, at the annunciation or the trumpet that he will blow to announce the second coming.
In Abrahamic religions, Gabriel (Hebrew: Gavriʼel; Tiberian: Gaḇrîʼēl; Latin: Gabrielus; Greek: Gabriēl; Arabic: Jibril, or Jibrail; Aramaic: Gabri-el - "God is my strong man/hero") is an angel who serves as a messenger from God. Based on two passages in the Gospel of Luke, many Christians and Muslims believe Gabriel to have foretold the births of both John the Baptist and Jesus.
Islam further believes he was the medium through whom God revealed the Qur'an to Muhammad, and that he sent a message to most prophets, if not all, revealing their obligations. He is called the chief of the four favored angels and the spirit of truth, and in some views is a personification of the Holy Spirit. Gabriel is also mentioned in Bahá'í Faith texts, specifically in Bahá'u'lláh's mystical work Seven Valleys.
The Arabic name for Gabriel is Jibral, Jibril, Jibrīl, Djibril, Jabrilæ or Jibrail. Muslims believe Gabriel to have been the angel who revealed the Qur'an to the prophet Muhammad. Gabriel is regarded with the exact same respect by Muslims as all of the Prophets, and upon saying his name or referring to him a Muslim repeats: "peace be upon him". Gabriel's primary tasks are to bring messages from God to his messengers. As in Christianity, Gabriel is said to be the angel that informed Mary (Arabic Maryam) of how she would conceive Jesus (Isa). (See Sura 19:17.)
Muslims believe Gabriel to have accompanied Muhammad in his ascension to the heavens, where Muhammad also is said to have met previous messengers of God, and was informed about the Islamic prayer (Bukhari 1:8:345). Muslims also believe that Gabriel descends to Earth on the night of Laylat al-Qadr ("The Night of Great Value"), a night in the last ten days of the holy month of Ramadan in the Islamic calendar which is believed to be the night in which the Qur'an was first revealed.
Jibril see Gabriel
Jabra'il see Gabriel
Gavri'el see Gabriel
Gabrielus see Gabriel
"God is my strong man/hero" see Gabriel
Gadhafi
Gadhafi (Mu’ammar Gadhafi) (Mu’ammar Gadhdhafi) (Mu'ammar Qaddafi) (Mu’ammar Qadhafi) (Mu’ammar Qadhdhafi) (Mu’ammar Kadhafi) (Mu’ammar Kadhdhafi) (b. 1942, near Sirte, Libya - d, October 20, 2011, near Sirte, Libya). De facto leader of Libya since 1969..
The son of an itinerant Bedouin farmer, Qaddafi was born in a tent in the Libyan desert. He proved a talented student and graduated from the University of Libya in 1963. A devout Muslim and ardent Arab nationalist, Qaddafi early began plotting to overthrow the Libyan monarchy of King Idrīs I. He graduated from the Libyan military academy in 1965 and thereafter rose steadily through the ranks, all the while continuing to plan a coup with the help of his fellow army officers. On Sept. 1, 1969, Qaddafi seized control of the government in a military coup that deposed King Idrīs. Qaddafi was named commander in chief of the armed forces and chairman of Libya’s new governing body, the Revolutionary Command Council.
Qaddafi removed the United States and British military bases from Libya in 1970. He expelled most members of the native Italian and Jewish communities from Libya that same year, and in 1973 he nationalized all foreign-owned petroleum assets in the country. He also outlawed alcoholic beverages and gambling, in accordance with his own strict Islamic principles. Qaddafi also began a series of persistent but unsuccessful attempts to unify Libya with other Arab countries. He was adamantly opposed to negotiations with Israel and became a leader of the so-called rejectionist front of Arab nations in this regard. He also earned a reputation for military adventurism; his government was implicated in several abortive coup attempts in Egypt and Sudan, and Libyan forces persistently intervened in the long-running civil war in neighboring Chad.
From 1974 onward Qaddafi espoused a form of Islamic socialism as expressed in The Green Book. This combined the nationalization of many economic sectors with a brand of populist government ostensibly operating through people’s congresses, labor unions, and other mass organizations. Meanwhile, Qaddafi was becoming known for his erratic and unpredictable behavior on the international scene. His government financed a broad spectrum of revolutionary or terrorist groups worldwide, including the Black Panthers and the Nation of Islam in the United States and the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland. Squads of Libyan agents assassinated émigré opponents abroad, and his government was allegedly involved in several bloody terrorist incidents in Europe perpetrated by Palestinian or other Arab extremists. These activities brought him into growing conflict with the United States government, and in April 1986 a force of British-based United States warplanes bombed several sites in Libya, killing or wounding several of his children and narrowly missing Qaddafi himself.
Libya’s purported involvement in the destruction of a civilian airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988, led to United Nations (UN) and United States sanctions that further isolated Qaddafi from the international community. In the late 1990s, however, Qaddafi turned over the alleged perpetrators of the bombing to international authorities. United Nations sanctions against Libya were subsequently lifted in 2003, and, following Qaddafi’s announcement that Libya would cease its unconventional-weapons program, the United States dropped most of its sanctions as well. Although some observers remained critical, these measures provided an opportunity for the rehabilitation of Qaddafi’s image abroad and facilitated his country’s gradual return to the global community.
In February 2009 Qaddafi was elected chairman of the African Union (AU), and later that year he gave his first speech before the UN General Assembly. The lengthy critical speech, in which he threw a copy of the UN charter, generated a significant measure of controversy within the international community. In early 2010 Qaddafi’s attempt to remain as chairman of the AU beyond the customary one-year term was met with resistance from several other African countries and ultimately was denied.
In February 2011, after anti-government demonstrations forced Presidents Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and Ḥosnī Mubārak from power in the neighboring countries of Tunisia and Egypt, anti-Qaddafi demonstrations broke out in the Libyan city of Benghāzī. As the protests spread throughout the country, the Qaddafi regime attempted to violently suppress them, directing police and mercenary forces to fire live ammunition at protesters and ordering attacks by artillery, fighter jets, and helicopter gunships against demonstration sites. Foreign government officials and international human rights groups condemned the regime’s assault on the protesters. Qaddafi’s violent tactics also alienated senior figures in the Libyan government. The Libyan minister of justice resigned in protest and a number of senior Libyan diplomats either resigned or issued statements of support for the uprising. On February 22 Qaddafi delivered a rambling defiant speech on state television, refusing to step down and calling the demonstrators traitors and saboteurs. He claimed that the opposition had been directed by al-Qaeda and that the protesters had been under the influence of hallucinogenic drugs. He urged his supporters to defend him by fighting protesters.
Qaddafi’s hold on power appeared increasingly weak as the opposition forces gained strength. By the end of February, opposition forces had established control over large amounts of Libyan territory, encircling Tripoli, where Qaddafi remained in control but in growing isolation. In interviews with the Western media on February 28, Qaddafi insisted that he was still well loved by the Libyan people and denied that the regime had used violence against the demonstrators. He repeated his claim that the opposition in Libya had been organized by al-Qaeda.
As the opposition gained strength, international pressure for Qaddafi to step down increased. On February 26 the UN Security Council unanimously approved a measure that included sanctions against the Qaddafi regime, imposing a travel ban and an arms embargo and freezing the Qaddafi family’s assets. On February 28 the United States announced that it had frozen $30 billion in Libyan assets linked to Qaddafi.
Although international opposition to Qaddafi’s actions continued to build, his forces seemed to regain the upper hand in Libya, retaking many of the areas that had been taken by the rebels early in the conflict. As Qaddafi’s forces advanced on Benghāzī, the UN Security Council voted on March 17 to authorize military intervention to protect civilians. The ensuing air campaign, led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), inflicted significant damage on pro-Qaddafi forces but did not decisively tip the balance in favor of the rebels, leading to an apparent stalemate between the two forces. In late March the Qaddafi regime was shaken by the defection of two senior Libyan officials, Moussa Koussa and Ali Abdussalam el-Treki, both members of Qaddafi’s inner circle. Despite those setbacks, Qaddafi appeared to remain firmly in control in Tripoli, stating publicly that he would resist any attempt to remove him from power. Pro-Qaddafi forces continued to operate in spite of the NATO air campaign.
On April 30 a NATO air strike on Qaddafi’s Bāb al-ʿAzīziyyah compound in Tripoli killed Qaddafi’s youngest son, Sayf al-Arab, and three of Qaddafi’s grandchildren. Qaddafi, reportedly in the targeted house at the time of the attack, escaped without injury. Following the air strike, NATO denied that it had adopted a strategy of trying to kill Qaddafi.
In early March the International Criminal Court (ICC) had announced that it would open an investigation into possible crimes against humanity by Qaddafi and his supporters. On May 16 the ICC called for arrest warrants to be issued against Qaddafi, along with his son Sayf al-Islam and the Libyan intelligence chief, Abdullah Senussi, for ordering attacks on civilians during the uprising; the arrest warrants, for crimes against humanity, were issued on June 27, 2011.
In connection with the Libyan uprising, Qaddafi's attempts to influence public opinion in Europe and the United States came under increased scrutiny. At the beginning of the 2011 conflict a number of countries pushed for the international isolation of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. On July 15, 2011, at a meeting in Istanbul, more than 30 governments recognized the Transitional National Council (TNC) as the legitimate government of Libya.
Qaddafi responded to the announcement with a speech on Libyan national television, in which he said "Trample on those recognitions, trample on them under your feet ... They are worthless".
On 25 August 2011, with most of Tripoli having fallen out of Qaddafi's control, the Arab League proclaimed the anti-Qaddafi National Transitional Council to be "the legitimate representative of the Libyan state", on which basis Libya would resume its membership in the League.
During the Battle of Tripoli, Qaddafi lost effective political and military control of Tripoli after his compound had been captured by Rebel forces. Rebel forces entered the Green Square in the city center, tearing down posters of Qaddafi and flying flags of the rebellion. As of August 27, 2011, his location was unknown, but it was alleged that he fled to Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, he continued to give addresses through radio, calling upon his supporters to crush the rebels.
On October 20, 2011, a National Transitional Council (NTC) official told Al Jazeera that Qaddafi had been captured that morning by Libyan forces near his hometown of Sirte, in a tunnel west of the town. He had been in a convoy of vehicles that was targeted by a French air strike on a road about 3 kilometers (1.9 miles) west of Sirte, killing dozens of loyalist fighters. Qaddafi survived but was wounded and took refuge with several of his bodyguards in a drainage tunnel underneath the road west of the city. NTC fighters found the group and took Qaddafi prisoner. Shortly afterwards, he was shot dead.
Gadhdhafi see Gadhafi
Qaddafi see Gadhafi
Qadhafi see Gadhafi
Qadhdhafi see Gadhafi
Kadhafi see Gadhafi
Kadhdhafi see Gadhafi
Gadhafi (Mu’ammar Gadhafi) (Mu’ammar Gadhdhafi) (Mu'ammar Qaddafi) (Mu’ammar Qadhafi) (Mu’ammar Qadhdhafi) (Mu’ammar Kadhafi) (Mu’ammar Kadhdhafi) (b. 1942, near Sirte, Libya - d, October 20, 2011, near Sirte, Libya). De facto leader of Libya since 1969..
The son of an itinerant Bedouin farmer, Qaddafi was born in a tent in the Libyan desert. He proved a talented student and graduated from the University of Libya in 1963. A devout Muslim and ardent Arab nationalist, Qaddafi early began plotting to overthrow the Libyan monarchy of King Idrīs I. He graduated from the Libyan military academy in 1965 and thereafter rose steadily through the ranks, all the while continuing to plan a coup with the help of his fellow army officers. On Sept. 1, 1969, Qaddafi seized control of the government in a military coup that deposed King Idrīs. Qaddafi was named commander in chief of the armed forces and chairman of Libya’s new governing body, the Revolutionary Command Council.
Qaddafi removed the United States and British military bases from Libya in 1970. He expelled most members of the native Italian and Jewish communities from Libya that same year, and in 1973 he nationalized all foreign-owned petroleum assets in the country. He also outlawed alcoholic beverages and gambling, in accordance with his own strict Islamic principles. Qaddafi also began a series of persistent but unsuccessful attempts to unify Libya with other Arab countries. He was adamantly opposed to negotiations with Israel and became a leader of the so-called rejectionist front of Arab nations in this regard. He also earned a reputation for military adventurism; his government was implicated in several abortive coup attempts in Egypt and Sudan, and Libyan forces persistently intervened in the long-running civil war in neighboring Chad.
From 1974 onward Qaddafi espoused a form of Islamic socialism as expressed in The Green Book. This combined the nationalization of many economic sectors with a brand of populist government ostensibly operating through people’s congresses, labor unions, and other mass organizations. Meanwhile, Qaddafi was becoming known for his erratic and unpredictable behavior on the international scene. His government financed a broad spectrum of revolutionary or terrorist groups worldwide, including the Black Panthers and the Nation of Islam in the United States and the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland. Squads of Libyan agents assassinated émigré opponents abroad, and his government was allegedly involved in several bloody terrorist incidents in Europe perpetrated by Palestinian or other Arab extremists. These activities brought him into growing conflict with the United States government, and in April 1986 a force of British-based United States warplanes bombed several sites in Libya, killing or wounding several of his children and narrowly missing Qaddafi himself.
Libya’s purported involvement in the destruction of a civilian airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988, led to United Nations (UN) and United States sanctions that further isolated Qaddafi from the international community. In the late 1990s, however, Qaddafi turned over the alleged perpetrators of the bombing to international authorities. United Nations sanctions against Libya were subsequently lifted in 2003, and, following Qaddafi’s announcement that Libya would cease its unconventional-weapons program, the United States dropped most of its sanctions as well. Although some observers remained critical, these measures provided an opportunity for the rehabilitation of Qaddafi’s image abroad and facilitated his country’s gradual return to the global community.
In February 2009 Qaddafi was elected chairman of the African Union (AU), and later that year he gave his first speech before the UN General Assembly. The lengthy critical speech, in which he threw a copy of the UN charter, generated a significant measure of controversy within the international community. In early 2010 Qaddafi’s attempt to remain as chairman of the AU beyond the customary one-year term was met with resistance from several other African countries and ultimately was denied.
In February 2011, after anti-government demonstrations forced Presidents Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and Ḥosnī Mubārak from power in the neighboring countries of Tunisia and Egypt, anti-Qaddafi demonstrations broke out in the Libyan city of Benghāzī. As the protests spread throughout the country, the Qaddafi regime attempted to violently suppress them, directing police and mercenary forces to fire live ammunition at protesters and ordering attacks by artillery, fighter jets, and helicopter gunships against demonstration sites. Foreign government officials and international human rights groups condemned the regime’s assault on the protesters. Qaddafi’s violent tactics also alienated senior figures in the Libyan government. The Libyan minister of justice resigned in protest and a number of senior Libyan diplomats either resigned or issued statements of support for the uprising. On February 22 Qaddafi delivered a rambling defiant speech on state television, refusing to step down and calling the demonstrators traitors and saboteurs. He claimed that the opposition had been directed by al-Qaeda and that the protesters had been under the influence of hallucinogenic drugs. He urged his supporters to defend him by fighting protesters.
Qaddafi’s hold on power appeared increasingly weak as the opposition forces gained strength. By the end of February, opposition forces had established control over large amounts of Libyan territory, encircling Tripoli, where Qaddafi remained in control but in growing isolation. In interviews with the Western media on February 28, Qaddafi insisted that he was still well loved by the Libyan people and denied that the regime had used violence against the demonstrators. He repeated his claim that the opposition in Libya had been organized by al-Qaeda.
As the opposition gained strength, international pressure for Qaddafi to step down increased. On February 26 the UN Security Council unanimously approved a measure that included sanctions against the Qaddafi regime, imposing a travel ban and an arms embargo and freezing the Qaddafi family’s assets. On February 28 the United States announced that it had frozen $30 billion in Libyan assets linked to Qaddafi.
Although international opposition to Qaddafi’s actions continued to build, his forces seemed to regain the upper hand in Libya, retaking many of the areas that had been taken by the rebels early in the conflict. As Qaddafi’s forces advanced on Benghāzī, the UN Security Council voted on March 17 to authorize military intervention to protect civilians. The ensuing air campaign, led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), inflicted significant damage on pro-Qaddafi forces but did not decisively tip the balance in favor of the rebels, leading to an apparent stalemate between the two forces. In late March the Qaddafi regime was shaken by the defection of two senior Libyan officials, Moussa Koussa and Ali Abdussalam el-Treki, both members of Qaddafi’s inner circle. Despite those setbacks, Qaddafi appeared to remain firmly in control in Tripoli, stating publicly that he would resist any attempt to remove him from power. Pro-Qaddafi forces continued to operate in spite of the NATO air campaign.
On April 30 a NATO air strike on Qaddafi’s Bāb al-ʿAzīziyyah compound in Tripoli killed Qaddafi’s youngest son, Sayf al-Arab, and three of Qaddafi’s grandchildren. Qaddafi, reportedly in the targeted house at the time of the attack, escaped without injury. Following the air strike, NATO denied that it had adopted a strategy of trying to kill Qaddafi.
In early March the International Criminal Court (ICC) had announced that it would open an investigation into possible crimes against humanity by Qaddafi and his supporters. On May 16 the ICC called for arrest warrants to be issued against Qaddafi, along with his son Sayf al-Islam and the Libyan intelligence chief, Abdullah Senussi, for ordering attacks on civilians during the uprising; the arrest warrants, for crimes against humanity, were issued on June 27, 2011.
In connection with the Libyan uprising, Qaddafi's attempts to influence public opinion in Europe and the United States came under increased scrutiny. At the beginning of the 2011 conflict a number of countries pushed for the international isolation of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. On July 15, 2011, at a meeting in Istanbul, more than 30 governments recognized the Transitional National Council (TNC) as the legitimate government of Libya.
Qaddafi responded to the announcement with a speech on Libyan national television, in which he said "Trample on those recognitions, trample on them under your feet ... They are worthless".
On 25 August 2011, with most of Tripoli having fallen out of Qaddafi's control, the Arab League proclaimed the anti-Qaddafi National Transitional Council to be "the legitimate representative of the Libyan state", on which basis Libya would resume its membership in the League.
During the Battle of Tripoli, Qaddafi lost effective political and military control of Tripoli after his compound had been captured by Rebel forces. Rebel forces entered the Green Square in the city center, tearing down posters of Qaddafi and flying flags of the rebellion. As of August 27, 2011, his location was unknown, but it was alleged that he fled to Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, he continued to give addresses through radio, calling upon his supporters to crush the rebels.
On October 20, 2011, a National Transitional Council (NTC) official told Al Jazeera that Qaddafi had been captured that morning by Libyan forces near his hometown of Sirte, in a tunnel west of the town. He had been in a convoy of vehicles that was targeted by a French air strike on a road about 3 kilometers (1.9 miles) west of Sirte, killing dozens of loyalist fighters. Qaddafi survived but was wounded and took refuge with several of his bodyguards in a drainage tunnel underneath the road west of the city. NTC fighters found the group and took Qaddafi prisoner. Shortly afterwards, he was shot dead.
Gadhdhafi see Gadhafi
Qaddafi see Gadhafi
Qadhafi see Gadhafi
Qadhdhafi see Gadhafi
Kadhafi see Gadhafi
Kadhdhafi see Gadhafi
Galen
Galen (in Arabic, Jalinus) (Aelius Galenus) (Claudius Galenus) (September 129, Pergamum, Mysia, Anatolia – c. 216). Roman physician and philosopher of Greek origin. Known as Galen of Pergamum (modern-day Bergama, Turkey), Galen was probably the most accomplished medical researcher of the Roman period. His theories dominated and influenced Western medical science for well over a millennium.. The Arabs came to possess translations of every work of Galen which were still being read in Greek centers of learning during the seventh through ninth centuries. They thus knew a number of Galen’s works which disappeared in the late Byzantine period. These works became an integral part of Arab medical learning. The translations into Arabic, among others by Hunayn ibn Ishaq, greatly influenced medieval and renaissance medicine in Europe.
Galen of Pergamum came to exercise a dominant influence on medical theory and practice in Europe from the Middle Ages until the mid-17th century. His authority in the Byzantine world and the Muslim Middle East was similarly long-lived.
The son of a wealthy architect, Galen was educated as a philosopher and man of letters. His hometown, Pergamum, was the site of a magnificent shrine of the healing god, Asclepius, that was visited by many distinguished figures of the Roman Empire for cures. When Galen was 16, he changed his career to that of medicine, which he studied at Pergamum, at Smyrna (modern İzmir, Turkey), and finally at Alexandria in Egypt, which was the greatest medical center of the ancient world. After more than a decade of study, he returned in 157 to Pergamum, where he served as chief physician to the troop of gladiators maintained by the high priest of Asia.
In 162, the ambitious Galen moved to Rome. There he quickly rose in the medical profession owing to his public demonstrations of anatomy, his successes with rich and influential patients whom other doctors had pronounced incurable, his enormous learning, and the rhetorical skills he displayed in public debates. Galen’s wealthy background, social contacts, and a friendship with his old philosophy teacher Eudemus further enhanced his reputation as a philosopher and physician.
Galen abruptly ended his sojourn in the capital in 166. Although he claimed that the intolerable envy of his colleagues prompted his return to Pergamum, an impending plague in Rome was probably a more compelling reason. In 168–169, however, he was called by the joint emperors Lucius Verus and Marcus Aurelius to accompany them on a military campaign in northern Italy. After Verus’ sudden death in 169, Galen returned to Rome, where he served Marcus Aurelius and the later emperors Commodus and Septimius Severus as a physician. Galen’s final works were written after 207, which suggests that his Arab biographers were correct in their claim that he died at age 87, in 216/217.
Galen regarded anatomy as the foundation of medical knowledge, and he frequently dissected and experimented on such lower animals as the Barbary ape (or African monkey), pigs, sheep, and goats. Galen’s advocacy of dissection, both to improve surgical skills and for research purposes, formed part of his self-promotion, but there is no doubt that he was an accurate observer. He distinguished seven pairs of cranial nerves, described the valves of the heart, and observed the structural differences between arteries and veins. One of his most important demonstrations was that the arteries carry blood, not air, as had been taught for 400 years. Notable also were his vivisection experiments, such as tying off the recurrent laryngeal nerve to show that the brain controls the voice, performing a series of transsections of the spinal cord to establish the functions of the spinal nerves, and tying off the ureters to demonstrate kidney and bladder functions. Galen was seriously hampered by the prevailing social taboo against dissecting human corpses, however, and the inferences he made about human anatomy based on his dissections of animals often led him into errors. His anatomy of the uterus, for example, is largely that of the dog’s.
Galen’s physiology was a mixture of ideas taken from the philosophers Plato and Aristotle as well as from the physician Hippocrates, whom Galen revered as the fount of all medical learning. Galen viewed the body as consisting of three connected systems: the brain and nerves, which are responsible for sensation and thought; the heart and arteries, responsible for life-giving energy; and the liver and veins, responsible for nutrition and growth. According to Galen, blood is formed in the liver and is then carried by the veins to all parts of the body, where it is used up as nutriment or is transformed into flesh and other substances. A small amount of blood seeps through the lungs between the pulmonary artery and pulmonary veins, thereby becoming mixed with air, and then seeps from the right to the left ventricle of the heart through minute pores in the wall separating the two chambers. A small proportion of this blood is further refined in a network of nerves at the base of the skull (in reality found only in ungulates) and the brain to make psychic pneuma, a subtle material that is the vehicle of sensation. Galen’s physiological theory proved extremely seductive, and few possessed the skills needed to challenge it in succeeding centuries.
Building on earlier Hippocratic conceptions, Galen believed that human health requires an equilibrium between the four main bodily fluids, or humors—blood, yellow bile, black bile, and phlegm. Each of the humors is built up from the four elements and displays two of the four primary qualities: hot, cold, wet, and dry. Unlike Hippocrates, Galen argued that humoral imbalances can be located in specific organs, as well as in the body as a whole. This modification of the theory allowed doctors to make more precise diagnoses and to prescribe specific remedies to restore the body’s balance. As a continuation of earlier Hippocratic conceptions, Galenic physiology became a powerful influence in medicine for the next 1,400 years.
Galen was both a universal genius and a prolific writer: about 300 titles of works by him are known, of which about 150 survive wholly or in part. He was perpetually inquisitive, even in areas remote from medicine, such as linguistics, and he was an important logician who wrote major studies of scientific method. Galen was also a skilled polemicist and an incorrigible publicist of his own genius, and these traits, combined with the enormous range of his writings, help to explain his subsequent fame and influence.
Galen’s writings achieved wide circulation during his lifetime, and copies of some of his works survive that were written within a generation of his death. By 500 his works were being taught and summarized at Alexandria, and his theories were already crowding out those of others in the medical handbooks of the Byzantine world. Greek manuscripts began to be collected and translated by enlightened Arabs in the 9th century, and about 850 Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq, an Arab physician at the court of Baghdad, prepared an annotated list of 129 works of Galen that he and his followers had translated from Greek into Arabic or Syriac. Learned medicine in the Arabic world thus became heavily based upon the commentary, exposition, and understanding of Galen.
Galen’s influence was initially almost negligible in western Europe except for drug recipes, but from the late 11th century Ḥunayn’s translations, commentaries on them by Arab physicians, and sometimes the original Greek writings themselves were translated into Latin. These Latin versions came to form the basis of medical education in the new medieval universities. From about 1490, Italian humanists felt the need to prepare new Latin versions of Galen directly from Greek manuscripts in order to free his texts from medieval preconceptions and misunderstandings. Galen’s works were first printed in Greek in their entirety in 1525, and printings in Latin swiftly followed. These texts offered a different picture from that of the Middle Ages, one that emphasized Galen as a clinician, a diagnostician, and above all, an anatomist. His new followers stressed his methodical techniques of identifying and curing illness, his independent judgment, and his cautious empiricism. Galen’s injunctions to investigate the body were eagerly followed, since physicians wished to repeat the experiments and observations that he had recorded. Paradoxically, this soon led to the overthrow of Galen’s authority as an anatomist. In 1543 the Flemish physician Andreas Vesalius showed that Galen’s anatomy of the body was more animal than human in some of its aspects, and it became clear that Galen and his medieval followers had made many errors. Galen’s notions of physiology, by contrast, lasted for a further century, until the English physician William Harvey correctly explained the circulation of the blood. The renewal and then the overthrow of the Galenic tradition in the Renaissance was an important element in the rise of modern science, however.
Jalinus see Galen
Aelius Galenus see Galen
Galenus, Aelius see Galen
Claudius Galenus see Galen
Galenus, Claudius see Galen
Galenos see Galen
Galen (in Arabic, Jalinus) (Aelius Galenus) (Claudius Galenus) (September 129, Pergamum, Mysia, Anatolia – c. 216). Roman physician and philosopher of Greek origin. Known as Galen of Pergamum (modern-day Bergama, Turkey), Galen was probably the most accomplished medical researcher of the Roman period. His theories dominated and influenced Western medical science for well over a millennium.. The Arabs came to possess translations of every work of Galen which were still being read in Greek centers of learning during the seventh through ninth centuries. They thus knew a number of Galen’s works which disappeared in the late Byzantine period. These works became an integral part of Arab medical learning. The translations into Arabic, among others by Hunayn ibn Ishaq, greatly influenced medieval and renaissance medicine in Europe.
Galen of Pergamum came to exercise a dominant influence on medical theory and practice in Europe from the Middle Ages until the mid-17th century. His authority in the Byzantine world and the Muslim Middle East was similarly long-lived.
The son of a wealthy architect, Galen was educated as a philosopher and man of letters. His hometown, Pergamum, was the site of a magnificent shrine of the healing god, Asclepius, that was visited by many distinguished figures of the Roman Empire for cures. When Galen was 16, he changed his career to that of medicine, which he studied at Pergamum, at Smyrna (modern İzmir, Turkey), and finally at Alexandria in Egypt, which was the greatest medical center of the ancient world. After more than a decade of study, he returned in 157 to Pergamum, where he served as chief physician to the troop of gladiators maintained by the high priest of Asia.
In 162, the ambitious Galen moved to Rome. There he quickly rose in the medical profession owing to his public demonstrations of anatomy, his successes with rich and influential patients whom other doctors had pronounced incurable, his enormous learning, and the rhetorical skills he displayed in public debates. Galen’s wealthy background, social contacts, and a friendship with his old philosophy teacher Eudemus further enhanced his reputation as a philosopher and physician.
Galen abruptly ended his sojourn in the capital in 166. Although he claimed that the intolerable envy of his colleagues prompted his return to Pergamum, an impending plague in Rome was probably a more compelling reason. In 168–169, however, he was called by the joint emperors Lucius Verus and Marcus Aurelius to accompany them on a military campaign in northern Italy. After Verus’ sudden death in 169, Galen returned to Rome, where he served Marcus Aurelius and the later emperors Commodus and Septimius Severus as a physician. Galen’s final works were written after 207, which suggests that his Arab biographers were correct in their claim that he died at age 87, in 216/217.
Galen regarded anatomy as the foundation of medical knowledge, and he frequently dissected and experimented on such lower animals as the Barbary ape (or African monkey), pigs, sheep, and goats. Galen’s advocacy of dissection, both to improve surgical skills and for research purposes, formed part of his self-promotion, but there is no doubt that he was an accurate observer. He distinguished seven pairs of cranial nerves, described the valves of the heart, and observed the structural differences between arteries and veins. One of his most important demonstrations was that the arteries carry blood, not air, as had been taught for 400 years. Notable also were his vivisection experiments, such as tying off the recurrent laryngeal nerve to show that the brain controls the voice, performing a series of transsections of the spinal cord to establish the functions of the spinal nerves, and tying off the ureters to demonstrate kidney and bladder functions. Galen was seriously hampered by the prevailing social taboo against dissecting human corpses, however, and the inferences he made about human anatomy based on his dissections of animals often led him into errors. His anatomy of the uterus, for example, is largely that of the dog’s.
Galen’s physiology was a mixture of ideas taken from the philosophers Plato and Aristotle as well as from the physician Hippocrates, whom Galen revered as the fount of all medical learning. Galen viewed the body as consisting of three connected systems: the brain and nerves, which are responsible for sensation and thought; the heart and arteries, responsible for life-giving energy; and the liver and veins, responsible for nutrition and growth. According to Galen, blood is formed in the liver and is then carried by the veins to all parts of the body, where it is used up as nutriment or is transformed into flesh and other substances. A small amount of blood seeps through the lungs between the pulmonary artery and pulmonary veins, thereby becoming mixed with air, and then seeps from the right to the left ventricle of the heart through minute pores in the wall separating the two chambers. A small proportion of this blood is further refined in a network of nerves at the base of the skull (in reality found only in ungulates) and the brain to make psychic pneuma, a subtle material that is the vehicle of sensation. Galen’s physiological theory proved extremely seductive, and few possessed the skills needed to challenge it in succeeding centuries.
Building on earlier Hippocratic conceptions, Galen believed that human health requires an equilibrium between the four main bodily fluids, or humors—blood, yellow bile, black bile, and phlegm. Each of the humors is built up from the four elements and displays two of the four primary qualities: hot, cold, wet, and dry. Unlike Hippocrates, Galen argued that humoral imbalances can be located in specific organs, as well as in the body as a whole. This modification of the theory allowed doctors to make more precise diagnoses and to prescribe specific remedies to restore the body’s balance. As a continuation of earlier Hippocratic conceptions, Galenic physiology became a powerful influence in medicine for the next 1,400 years.
Galen was both a universal genius and a prolific writer: about 300 titles of works by him are known, of which about 150 survive wholly or in part. He was perpetually inquisitive, even in areas remote from medicine, such as linguistics, and he was an important logician who wrote major studies of scientific method. Galen was also a skilled polemicist and an incorrigible publicist of his own genius, and these traits, combined with the enormous range of his writings, help to explain his subsequent fame and influence.
Galen’s writings achieved wide circulation during his lifetime, and copies of some of his works survive that were written within a generation of his death. By 500 his works were being taught and summarized at Alexandria, and his theories were already crowding out those of others in the medical handbooks of the Byzantine world. Greek manuscripts began to be collected and translated by enlightened Arabs in the 9th century, and about 850 Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq, an Arab physician at the court of Baghdad, prepared an annotated list of 129 works of Galen that he and his followers had translated from Greek into Arabic or Syriac. Learned medicine in the Arabic world thus became heavily based upon the commentary, exposition, and understanding of Galen.
Galen’s influence was initially almost negligible in western Europe except for drug recipes, but from the late 11th century Ḥunayn’s translations, commentaries on them by Arab physicians, and sometimes the original Greek writings themselves were translated into Latin. These Latin versions came to form the basis of medical education in the new medieval universities. From about 1490, Italian humanists felt the need to prepare new Latin versions of Galen directly from Greek manuscripts in order to free his texts from medieval preconceptions and misunderstandings. Galen’s works were first printed in Greek in their entirety in 1525, and printings in Latin swiftly followed. These texts offered a different picture from that of the Middle Ages, one that emphasized Galen as a clinician, a diagnostician, and above all, an anatomist. His new followers stressed his methodical techniques of identifying and curing illness, his independent judgment, and his cautious empiricism. Galen’s injunctions to investigate the body were eagerly followed, since physicians wished to repeat the experiments and observations that he had recorded. Paradoxically, this soon led to the overthrow of Galen’s authority as an anatomist. In 1543 the Flemish physician Andreas Vesalius showed that Galen’s anatomy of the body was more animal than human in some of its aspects, and it became clear that Galen and his medieval followers had made many errors. Galen’s notions of physiology, by contrast, lasted for a further century, until the English physician William Harvey correctly explained the circulation of the blood. The renewal and then the overthrow of the Galenic tradition in the Renaissance was an important element in the rise of modern science, however.
Jalinus see Galen
Aelius Galenus see Galen
Galenus, Aelius see Galen
Claudius Galenus see Galen
Galenus, Claudius see Galen
Galenos see Galen
Gamaat al-Islamiyya, al-
Gamaat al-Islamiyya, al- (GI -- al-Gamaat al-Islamiyya) (IG -- the Islamic Group, al-Gama’at, Islamic Gama’at, Egyptian al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya). The IG, begun in the 1970s, is the largest of the Egyptian militant groups. Its core goal is the overthrow of the Cairo regime and the creation of an Islamic state. The IG was a more loosely organized entity than the EIJ (Egyptian Islamic Jihad), and maintained a globally present external wing. IG leadership signed Usama bin Laden’s February 1998 anti-United States fatwa but denied supporting bin Laden. Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman was al-Gama’at’s spiritual leader, and thus the United States was threatened with attack. From 1993, until the cease fire, al-Gama’at launched attacks on tourists in Egypt, most notably the attack in November 1997 at Luxor that killed 58 foreign tourists. The IG also claimed responsibility for the attempt in June 1995 to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Adaba, Ethiopia. IG has a worldwide presence, including Sudan, the United Kingdom, Afghanistan, Austria, and Yemen. The Egyptian government believed that Iran, bin Laden, and Afghan militant groups supported the IG. {See also Bin Laden; Egyptian Islamic Jihad; and Mubarak.}
Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (Arabic: al-jamāʕaħ al-'islāmiyyaħ) (Arabic for "the Islamic Group"; also transliterated Gamaat Islamiya, al Jamaat al Islamiya, and El Gama'a El Islamiyya) is an Egyptian Islamist movement, and is considered a terrorist organization by the United States, European Union and Egyptian governments. The group is (or was) dedicated to the overthrow of the Egyptian government and replacing it with an Islamic state.
The now imprisoned cleric Omar Abdel-Rahman was a spiritual leader of the movement. The group is reported to be responsible for the killing of hundreds of Egyptian policemen and soldiers, civilians, dozens of tourists in a violent campaign in the 1990s. While the assassination of the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1981 is generally thought to have been carried out by another Islamist group, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, some have suggested al-Gamaat was responsible for or at least related to the assassination. In 2003 the imprisoned leadership of the group renounced bloodshed, and a series of high-ranking members have since been released by Egyptian authorities, and the group has been allowed to resume semi-legal peaceful activities.
Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya began as an umbrella organization for militant student groups, formed, like the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, after the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood renounced violence in the 1970s.
In its early days, the group was primarily active on university campuses, and was mainly composed of university students. In addition, Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya recruited some inmates of Egyptian jails. Its membership has since become poorer, younger, and less well educated. Its main base of recruiting and support has moved away from universities to poor neighborhoods of cities, and to rural areas.
Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya may have been indirectly involved in the assassination of president Anwar Sadat in 1981. Karam Zuhdi, group leader of Al-Jamaat Islamiya, expressed regret for conspiring with Egyptian Islamic Jihad in the 1981 assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, according to the Council on Foreign Relations. He was among the 900 militants who were set free in April 2006 by the Egyptian government.
The cleric Omar Abdel-Rahman is the spiritual leader of the movement. He was accused of participating in the World Trade Center 1993 bombings conspiracy, and was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for his espousal of a subsequent conspiracy to bomb New York City landmarks, including the United Nations and FBI offices. The Islamic Group has publicly threatened to retaliate against the United States unless Rahman is released from prison. However, the group later renounced violence and their leaders and members were released from prison in Egypt.
While the Islamic group had originally been an amorphous movement of local groups centered in mosques without offices or membership roll, by the late 1980s it became more organized and even adopted an official logo: an upright sword standing on an open Qur'an with an orange sun rising in the background, encircled by the Qur'anic verse that Abdel Rahman had quoted at his trials while trying to explain jihad to the judges.
The 1990s saw Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya engage in an extended campaign of violence, from the murders and attempted murders of prominent writers and intellectuals, to the repeated targeting of tourists and foreigners. This did serious damage to the largest sector of Egypt's economy and in turn to the government, but it also devastated the livelihoods of many of the people on whom the group depends for support.
Victims of campaign against the Egyptian state from 1992-1997 totaled more than 1200 and included the head of the counter-terrorism police (Major General Raouf Khayrat), a speaker of parliament (Rifaat al-Mahgoub), dozens of European tourists and Egyptian bystanders, and over 100 Egyptian police.
The 1991 killing of the group's leader, Ala Mohieddin, presumably by security forces, led Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya to murder Egypt's speaker of parliament in retaliation. In June 1995, working together with Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the group staged a carefully planned attempt on the life of president Mubarak, lead by Mustafa Hamza, a senior Egyptian member of the Al-Qaeda and commander of the military branch of the Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya. Mubarak escaped unharmed and retaliated with a massive and ruthless crackdown on GI members and their families in Egypt.
By 1997 the movement had become paralyzed. 20,000 Islamists were in custody in Egypt and thousands more had been cut down by the security forces. In July of that year, Islamist lawyer Montassir al-Zayyat brokered a deal between the Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya and the Egyptian government, called the Nonviolence Initiative, whereby the movement formally renounced violence. The next year the government released 2,000 members of the Islamic Group. After the initiative was declared Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman also gave his approval from his prison cell in the United States, though he later withdrew it.
The initiative divided the Islamic Group between members in Egypt who supported it and those in exile who wanted the attacks to continue. Leading the opposition was EIJ leader Ayman Zawahiri who termed it "surrender" in angry letters to the London newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat.
Zawahiri enlisted Mustafa Hamza, the new emir of Islamic Groups and its military leader, Rifai Ahmed Taha, both exiles in Afghanistan with him, to sabotage the initiative with a massive terrorism attack that would provoke the government into repression. So on November 17, 1997 the Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya campaign climaxed with the attack at the Temple of Hatshepsut (Deir el-Bahri) in Luxor, in which a band of six men dressed in police uniforms machine-gunned and hacked to death with knives 58 foreign tourists and four Egyptians. The killing went on for 45 minutes, until the floors streamed with blood. The dead included a five-year-old British child and four Japanese couples on their honeymoons. Altogether 71 people were killed. The attack stunned Egyptian society, devastated the tourist industry for a number of years, and consequently sapped a large segment of popular support for violent Islamism in Egypt.
The revulsion of Egyptians and rejection of jihadi terrorism was so complete, the attack's supporters backpedaled. The day after the attack, Rifai Taha claimed the attackers intended only to take the tourists hostage, despite the evidence of the systematic nature of the slaughter. Others denied Islamist involvement completely. Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman blamed Israelis for the killings, and Zawahiri maintaining the Egyptian police had done it.
Major attacks carried out by Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya:
* 17 November 1997 – Luxor massacre at Deir el-Bahri, Luxor, Egypt. 58 foreign tourists and four Egyptians were killed.
* 28 April 1996 – Europa Hotel shooting, Cairo. 18 Greek tourists were killed, mistaken to be Jews.[13][14][15]
* 19 November 1995 – Car bomb attack on the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan. 16 people were killed.
* 20 October 1995 – Car bomb attack on police station in Rijeka, Croatia
* 26 June 1995 – attempt to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
* 8 June 1992 – assassination of Farag Foda.
Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya was also responsible for a spate of tourist shootings (trains and cruise ships sprayed with bullets) in middle and upper Egypt during the early 1990s. As a result of those attacks, cruise ships ceased sailing between Cairo and Luxor for several years.
After spending more than two decades in prison and after intense debates and discussions with Al-Azhar scholars, most of the leaders of Al-Gama'at Al-Islamiyya have written several books renouncing their ideology of violence and some of them went as far as calling ex-Egyptian president Sadat, whom they assassinated, a martyr.
Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya renounced bloodshed in 2003, and in September 2003 Egypt freed more than 1,000 members, citing what Interior Minister Habib el-Adli called the group's stated "commitment to rejecting violence."
Harsh repressive measures by the Egyptian government and the unpopularity of the killing of foreign tourists reduced the group's profile but the movement retained popular support among Egyptian Islamists who disapproved of the secular nature of Egypt's society and peace treaty with Israel.
In April 2006 the Egyptian government released approximately 1200 members, including a founder, Najeh Ibrahim, from prison.
On August 5, 2006, the deputy leader of al-Qaeda Ayman al-Zawahiri announced a new alliance with a faction of Al Gama'a al-Islamiyya.
IG see Gamaat al-Islamiyya, al-
Islamic Group see Gamaat al-Islamiyya, al-
Islamic Gama'at see Gamaat al-Islamiyya, al-
Egyptian al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya see Gamaat al-Islamiyya, al-
GI see Gamaat al-Islamiyya, al-
Gamaat al-Islamiyya, al- (GI -- al-Gamaat al-Islamiyya) (IG -- the Islamic Group, al-Gama’at, Islamic Gama’at, Egyptian al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya). The IG, begun in the 1970s, is the largest of the Egyptian militant groups. Its core goal is the overthrow of the Cairo regime and the creation of an Islamic state. The IG was a more loosely organized entity than the EIJ (Egyptian Islamic Jihad), and maintained a globally present external wing. IG leadership signed Usama bin Laden’s February 1998 anti-United States fatwa but denied supporting bin Laden. Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman was al-Gama’at’s spiritual leader, and thus the United States was threatened with attack. From 1993, until the cease fire, al-Gama’at launched attacks on tourists in Egypt, most notably the attack in November 1997 at Luxor that killed 58 foreign tourists. The IG also claimed responsibility for the attempt in June 1995 to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Adaba, Ethiopia. IG has a worldwide presence, including Sudan, the United Kingdom, Afghanistan, Austria, and Yemen. The Egyptian government believed that Iran, bin Laden, and Afghan militant groups supported the IG. {See also Bin Laden; Egyptian Islamic Jihad; and Mubarak.}
Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (Arabic: al-jamāʕaħ al-'islāmiyyaħ) (Arabic for "the Islamic Group"; also transliterated Gamaat Islamiya, al Jamaat al Islamiya, and El Gama'a El Islamiyya) is an Egyptian Islamist movement, and is considered a terrorist organization by the United States, European Union and Egyptian governments. The group is (or was) dedicated to the overthrow of the Egyptian government and replacing it with an Islamic state.
The now imprisoned cleric Omar Abdel-Rahman was a spiritual leader of the movement. The group is reported to be responsible for the killing of hundreds of Egyptian policemen and soldiers, civilians, dozens of tourists in a violent campaign in the 1990s. While the assassination of the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1981 is generally thought to have been carried out by another Islamist group, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, some have suggested al-Gamaat was responsible for or at least related to the assassination. In 2003 the imprisoned leadership of the group renounced bloodshed, and a series of high-ranking members have since been released by Egyptian authorities, and the group has been allowed to resume semi-legal peaceful activities.
Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya began as an umbrella organization for militant student groups, formed, like the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, after the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood renounced violence in the 1970s.
In its early days, the group was primarily active on university campuses, and was mainly composed of university students. In addition, Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya recruited some inmates of Egyptian jails. Its membership has since become poorer, younger, and less well educated. Its main base of recruiting and support has moved away from universities to poor neighborhoods of cities, and to rural areas.
Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya may have been indirectly involved in the assassination of president Anwar Sadat in 1981. Karam Zuhdi, group leader of Al-Jamaat Islamiya, expressed regret for conspiring with Egyptian Islamic Jihad in the 1981 assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, according to the Council on Foreign Relations. He was among the 900 militants who were set free in April 2006 by the Egyptian government.
The cleric Omar Abdel-Rahman is the spiritual leader of the movement. He was accused of participating in the World Trade Center 1993 bombings conspiracy, and was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for his espousal of a subsequent conspiracy to bomb New York City landmarks, including the United Nations and FBI offices. The Islamic Group has publicly threatened to retaliate against the United States unless Rahman is released from prison. However, the group later renounced violence and their leaders and members were released from prison in Egypt.
While the Islamic group had originally been an amorphous movement of local groups centered in mosques without offices or membership roll, by the late 1980s it became more organized and even adopted an official logo: an upright sword standing on an open Qur'an with an orange sun rising in the background, encircled by the Qur'anic verse that Abdel Rahman had quoted at his trials while trying to explain jihad to the judges.
The 1990s saw Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya engage in an extended campaign of violence, from the murders and attempted murders of prominent writers and intellectuals, to the repeated targeting of tourists and foreigners. This did serious damage to the largest sector of Egypt's economy and in turn to the government, but it also devastated the livelihoods of many of the people on whom the group depends for support.
Victims of campaign against the Egyptian state from 1992-1997 totaled more than 1200 and included the head of the counter-terrorism police (Major General Raouf Khayrat), a speaker of parliament (Rifaat al-Mahgoub), dozens of European tourists and Egyptian bystanders, and over 100 Egyptian police.
The 1991 killing of the group's leader, Ala Mohieddin, presumably by security forces, led Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya to murder Egypt's speaker of parliament in retaliation. In June 1995, working together with Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the group staged a carefully planned attempt on the life of president Mubarak, lead by Mustafa Hamza, a senior Egyptian member of the Al-Qaeda and commander of the military branch of the Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya. Mubarak escaped unharmed and retaliated with a massive and ruthless crackdown on GI members and their families in Egypt.
By 1997 the movement had become paralyzed. 20,000 Islamists were in custody in Egypt and thousands more had been cut down by the security forces. In July of that year, Islamist lawyer Montassir al-Zayyat brokered a deal between the Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya and the Egyptian government, called the Nonviolence Initiative, whereby the movement formally renounced violence. The next year the government released 2,000 members of the Islamic Group. After the initiative was declared Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman also gave his approval from his prison cell in the United States, though he later withdrew it.
The initiative divided the Islamic Group between members in Egypt who supported it and those in exile who wanted the attacks to continue. Leading the opposition was EIJ leader Ayman Zawahiri who termed it "surrender" in angry letters to the London newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat.
Zawahiri enlisted Mustafa Hamza, the new emir of Islamic Groups and its military leader, Rifai Ahmed Taha, both exiles in Afghanistan with him, to sabotage the initiative with a massive terrorism attack that would provoke the government into repression. So on November 17, 1997 the Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya campaign climaxed with the attack at the Temple of Hatshepsut (Deir el-Bahri) in Luxor, in which a band of six men dressed in police uniforms machine-gunned and hacked to death with knives 58 foreign tourists and four Egyptians. The killing went on for 45 minutes, until the floors streamed with blood. The dead included a five-year-old British child and four Japanese couples on their honeymoons. Altogether 71 people were killed. The attack stunned Egyptian society, devastated the tourist industry for a number of years, and consequently sapped a large segment of popular support for violent Islamism in Egypt.
The revulsion of Egyptians and rejection of jihadi terrorism was so complete, the attack's supporters backpedaled. The day after the attack, Rifai Taha claimed the attackers intended only to take the tourists hostage, despite the evidence of the systematic nature of the slaughter. Others denied Islamist involvement completely. Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman blamed Israelis for the killings, and Zawahiri maintaining the Egyptian police had done it.
Major attacks carried out by Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya:
* 17 November 1997 – Luxor massacre at Deir el-Bahri, Luxor, Egypt. 58 foreign tourists and four Egyptians were killed.
* 28 April 1996 – Europa Hotel shooting, Cairo. 18 Greek tourists were killed, mistaken to be Jews.[13][14][15]
* 19 November 1995 – Car bomb attack on the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan. 16 people were killed.
* 20 October 1995 – Car bomb attack on police station in Rijeka, Croatia
* 26 June 1995 – attempt to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
* 8 June 1992 – assassination of Farag Foda.
Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya was also responsible for a spate of tourist shootings (trains and cruise ships sprayed with bullets) in middle and upper Egypt during the early 1990s. As a result of those attacks, cruise ships ceased sailing between Cairo and Luxor for several years.
After spending more than two decades in prison and after intense debates and discussions with Al-Azhar scholars, most of the leaders of Al-Gama'at Al-Islamiyya have written several books renouncing their ideology of violence and some of them went as far as calling ex-Egyptian president Sadat, whom they assassinated, a martyr.
Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya renounced bloodshed in 2003, and in September 2003 Egypt freed more than 1,000 members, citing what Interior Minister Habib el-Adli called the group's stated "commitment to rejecting violence."
Harsh repressive measures by the Egyptian government and the unpopularity of the killing of foreign tourists reduced the group's profile but the movement retained popular support among Egyptian Islamists who disapproved of the secular nature of Egypt's society and peace treaty with Israel.
In April 2006 the Egyptian government released approximately 1200 members, including a founder, Najeh Ibrahim, from prison.
On August 5, 2006, the deputy leader of al-Qaeda Ayman al-Zawahiri announced a new alliance with a faction of Al Gama'a al-Islamiyya.
IG see Gamaat al-Islamiyya, al-
Islamic Group see Gamaat al-Islamiyya, al-
Islamic Gama'at see Gamaat al-Islamiyya, al-
Egyptian al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya see Gamaat al-Islamiyya, al-
GI see Gamaat al-Islamiyya, al-
Ganda
Ganda. The Ganda belong to the Bantu-speaking people of Africa and live in Uganda. Ganda is the root of their tribal name, and to this, several prefixes are added to form related concept words: mu ganda -- a member of the tribe; ba ganda -- the plural; Lu ganda -- the language; Ki ganda -- the religion and tradition; Bu ganda -- the land of the Baganda. Uganda is the name given to the entire country as formed by colonial British rule.
Buganda was one of the African kingdoms which developed in the inter-lacustrine region around lakes Victoria, Edward, Albert and Kygoa and included in addition to Buganda the kingdoms of Bunyoro, Ankole, Karagwe, Koki, Buziba, Toro and Soga states. The kingdom of Buganda was established in about 1300 northwest of Lake Victoria, a region of fertile soil, pleasant climate, adequate rainfall and lush natural growth, all in all, a favorable environment for human development. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Buganda became the strongest kingdom in the area. It had a well-organized and centralized government under the absolute rule of the kabaka (king). According to local traditions a dynasty of about 35 kings ruled over it.
The Ganda had their own indigenous religion with its gods (balubale), fetishes, ghosts, priests and rituals, which were well known and established. Some aspects in their religion were helpful to the diffusion of Islam and Christianity. The Ganda, for example, already believed in a supreme being, the god Katonda, creator and ruler of the universe. Nevertheless, in daily life his influence was not felt in the same way as that of other national gods or local clan gods.
When the first Europeans reached Buganda (I. H. Speke and J. A. Grant in 1862 and H. M. Stanley in 1875), they were impressed with the well-organized kingdom and indicated that the Ganda were far more advanced and cultured than any of their neighbors. They were also surprised by their tidy dress and the advanced structure of their clean homes, which were much superior to those of any of the surrounding peoples.
During the British rule (1894-1962) the Kingdom of Buganda constituted one of the four provinces of Uganda, and it enjoyed extensive autonomy. It was officially abolished in 1967 by President A. M. Obote.
Islam was the first monotheistic religion to enter Buganda. Its initial diffusion occurred in the middle of the nineteenth century during the reign of Kabaka Suna II (circa 1832-1856) when Arab and Swahili traders arrived from Zanzibar and the coast of East Africa. Suna treated the Muslim traders favorably, and Buganda witnessed the first stages of Islamization. The king and some of his relatives were influenced by several Muslim religious ideas and even studied a few short chapters of the Qur’an, particularly those considered to be formulas for protection against magic and spirits. Nevertheless, because of the relatively long journey from the coast, the small demand for cloth and other merchandise, along with the limited number of Muslim traders who arrived in the kingdom, the impact of Islam was meager.
The process of Islamization in Buganda reached its climax during the reign of Kabaka Mutesa I (1856-1884). Mutesa was a clever, pragmatic and shrewd king, and he encouraged Muslim traders to come to his country mainly to get from them material benefits and especially guns and gunpowder to strengthen his position among his neighbors. Mutesa’s approach to religion was utilitarian. Nonetheless, his unusual curiosity, wit and intelligence led to his being genuinely impressed by certain Muslim religious ideas. Besides, the Kabaka was a secular monarch who, although carrying out some important religious duties, was not considered a god or a priest.
The kings of Buganda were often in conflict with the traditional religious establishment of gods, mediums and priests. Therefore, Mutesa tried to use the new religion, Islam, to weaken the influence of the traditional priests. In 1865, Mutesa declared Islam the official religion of Buganda and imposed it on all his subjects, a situation that lasted ten years. A royal decree was issued that the three rituals of regular prayers, fasting during Ramadan and eating lawful meat must be considered obligatory and the transgressor would be convicted and might even be put to death.
Coercion and threats were used to enforce the new religion among the people, thus assuring the superficial character of Islam in the country. For example, a custom connected with the Muslim pre-prayer ablutions was to clean and dry the feet by rubbing them on a big stone placed before the mosque. When the Kabaka wished to know if his subjects were performing the prayers regularly, he would send his inspectors to see if they had stones in front of their courtyards.
The arrival of Christianity in Buganda in the 1870s brought a change in the position of Islam. The first Protestant missionaries arrived in 1877. In 1879, the Catholics followed and Islam’s position was challenged. The Kabaka was given to understand that the Christian world possessed technical superiority, greater force, wider resources and more wealth than the Arabs and that he could utilize these advantages for the advancement of his interests. Mutesa’s attitude towards Islam was shaken, and he allowed the missionaries to teach him and his subjects the precepts of Christianity. However, the rivalry between Catholics and Protestants weakened the Christian influence, and in the competition between Christians and Muslims, the Muslims’ influence was usually more successful. Although Mutesa was, during most of his reign, nearer to Islam, he shrewdly realized that a greater advantage might be gained by avoiding clear identification with any religion, and from time to time he consulted the traditional gods and mediums.
The history of Buganda after Mutesa reflects the vitality of the Islamic nucleus established during his regime, and when his successor, Mwanga, assumed the throne in 1884, the Muslim position was generally strong. When war broke out between Muslims and Christians towards the end of the 1880s, the Muslims won. With European help, the Christians reversed the victory and crushed the Muslims by 1884, when Buganda became a part of the British protectorate of Uganda. Since then, Christianity has been the dominant religion of the country.
The position of Muslims in the colonial period was weak. While Christians, with foreign help, developed schools and health facilities, Muslims languished. They lacked foreign assisatnce and objected not only to secular education but to sending their children to schools run by Christians. Quranic schools did not prepare their young people for government positions.
Personal rivalries and religious conflicts among the Muslims were additional negative influences on the development of Islam in Buganda. Prince Nuhu Mbogo, the Muslim brother of Kabaka Mutesa I, was officially recognized by the British in 1892 as the leader of the Muslim community. The fact that Mbogo came from the royal family strengthened his leadership. Mbogo was a moderate and accepted by all Muslims as their sole leader. This situation changed drastically after his death in 1921, and his successor Prince Badru Kakungulu became involved in Muslim internal rivalries. One of the conflicts which left a crucial and still visible mark on the Muslim community. The fact that Mbogo came from the royal family strengthened his leadership. Mbogo was a moderate and accepted by all Muslims as their sole leader. This situation changed drastically after his death in 1921, and his successor Prince Badru Kakungulu became involved in Muslim internal rivalries. One of the conflicts which left a crucial and still visible mark on the Muslim community was the Juma-Zukuli dispute. The point of issue was whether the ordinary noonday prayer (Zukuli) might be omitted on Fridays or should be prayed in addition to the Juma, which is recited on Fridays. In Buganda, under the influence of the Swahili teachers, the Juma prayer was recited in conjunction with Zukuli. The issue arose in a severe form after Nuhu Mbogo’s death when Abdullah Sekimwanyi, one of the most learned Muslim shaikhs and one of the first of the Baganda to make the pilgrimage to Mecca (in 1920), started to pray the Juma alone. He was followed by others. His opponents were led by Prince Badru Kakungulu, the son of Mbogo, who was under the influence of a Swahili shaikh, Khalfan ibn Mubaraka. The Kakungulu faction was called the Juma-Zukuli and was the more popular and influential group. This ostensibly religious aspect was inextricably involved with political and personal jealousy.
The two factions differed also on other religious issues. The Juma faction objected to the use of matali (drums) at religious ceremonies and insisted on the use of the calendar to determine the timing of Ramadan, while the Juma-Zukuli allowed the use of drums and determined the start of Ramadan by the sight of the moon. These differences among the Baganda Muslims still exist.
Despite its competitive disadvantages, Islam expanded in the colonial period due to improved communications and security. Baganda Muslim traders, shopkeepers, watchmen, cooks and interpreters (Muslims generally knew Kiswahili better than the Christians and therefore were recruited by British administrators as interpreters) penetrated from their center in Buganda into other areas and spread Islam there. Muslim population growth was proportionately higher than that of any other religion in Uganda.
In the first five years of Uganda independence, when the ruling party of Prime Minister Obote, the Uganda Peoples Congress, was allied with the Kabaka of Buganda, the Baganda Muslims exerted increasing influence through their leader, Prince Kakungulu, who was a close relative of the Kabaka. The government recognized Id al Fitr as a national holiday. The right to slaughter animals for public consumption was granted exclusively to the Muslim community. But in 1965, when the cracks in the coalition between Obote and the Kabaka became wider, a new split, mainly political in character, occurred. Obote established a new Muslim organization called the National Association for the Advancement of Muslims (N. A. A. M.). Its main aim was to recruit the support of Muslims of Uganda, including Buganda, for government policies and to oppose Prince Kakungulu, who supported his uncle, the Kabaka, and whose center was in the Kibuli hills of Kampala. After the abolition of the Buganda kingdom by Obote in 1966, the activities of the Kibuli groups were severely limited, and its leaders, among them Prince Kakungulu, were arrested.
General Idi Amin’s coup in January 1971 reversed the situation entirely. N.A.A.M. was outlawed. Kibuli followers took revenge upon their rivals. Idi Amin, a Muslim, tried to recruit support of Muslims both within and outside Uganda by emphasizing his devoutness. Islamic activities and construction of new mosques occupied a prominent place. Although more than two-thirds of the population in Uganda were Christians, Idi Amin convinced the Arab and Muslim world that the majority were Muslims and declared Uganda a Muslim country. Uganda was admitted as a member of the Islamic Conference Organization and became a beneficiary of Arab financial aid. The Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah in 1978 pledged $60 million for building an Islamic university in Kampala “in appreciation of Idi Amin’s untiring effort in the Islamization of Uganda.” This Muslim preeminence ended with the fall of Idi Amin in 1979.
During Idi Amin’s rule the main motives for conversion to Islam were fear or desire for benefits. When Amin was toppled, Christians in various parts of the country, especially in the town of Masaka, took revenge, killing Muslims and burning houses and shops. In April 1982, Obote promised an Arab delegation that he would re-open the Islamic University and “build a united nation without any tribal or religious discrimination.” {See also Idi Amin; Mutesa I; shpeoplealso called Baganda, or Waganda,
people inhabiting the area north and northwest of Lake Victoria in south-central Uganda. They speak a Bantu language—called Ganda, or Luganda—of the Benue-Congo group. The Ganda are the most numerous people in Uganda and their territory the most productive and fertile. Once the core of the Uganda Protectorate, they have a higher standard of living and are more literate and modernized than any other people in Uganda.
The traditional Ganda are settled hoe cultivators, with plantains their staple food. They also grow cotton and coffee for export. They keep sheep, goats, chickens, and cattle.
Descent, inheritance, and succession are patrilineal. About 50 exogamous clans are recognized, each having principal and secondary totem animals that may not be killed or eaten.
Traditional Ganda religion recognized ancestors, past kings, nature spirits, and a pantheon of gods who were approached through spirit mediums. Most modern Ganda, however, are Christian. Traditional Ganda villages were compact, centred on the chief’s house.
By the early 19th century the Ganda had developed a well-organized, efficient administrative hierarchy and a sophisticated political system centred on the institution and person of the kabaka (king). The kabaka was also the high priest and supreme judge of the land. Ruling through a system of governors and district chiefs, the kabaka maintained absolute control over his ever-expanding kingdom. The Ganda state was organized for war, the Nyoro being its hereditary enemies. On becoming the first in the region to accept British influence, the Ganda gained even greater power and a special status in the politics of the Uganda Protectorate, a status they retained after the departure of the British. Between 1966 and 1993, however, the centuries-old kingship was abolished; the kabaka was restored in 1993, although his powers were reduced considerably.
Ganda. The Ganda belong to the Bantu-speaking people of Africa and live in Uganda. Ganda is the root of their tribal name, and to this, several prefixes are added to form related concept words: mu ganda -- a member of the tribe; ba ganda -- the plural; Lu ganda -- the language; Ki ganda -- the religion and tradition; Bu ganda -- the land of the Baganda. Uganda is the name given to the entire country as formed by colonial British rule.
Buganda was one of the African kingdoms which developed in the inter-lacustrine region around lakes Victoria, Edward, Albert and Kygoa and included in addition to Buganda the kingdoms of Bunyoro, Ankole, Karagwe, Koki, Buziba, Toro and Soga states. The kingdom of Buganda was established in about 1300 northwest of Lake Victoria, a region of fertile soil, pleasant climate, adequate rainfall and lush natural growth, all in all, a favorable environment for human development. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Buganda became the strongest kingdom in the area. It had a well-organized and centralized government under the absolute rule of the kabaka (king). According to local traditions a dynasty of about 35 kings ruled over it.
The Ganda had their own indigenous religion with its gods (balubale), fetishes, ghosts, priests and rituals, which were well known and established. Some aspects in their religion were helpful to the diffusion of Islam and Christianity. The Ganda, for example, already believed in a supreme being, the god Katonda, creator and ruler of the universe. Nevertheless, in daily life his influence was not felt in the same way as that of other national gods or local clan gods.
When the first Europeans reached Buganda (I. H. Speke and J. A. Grant in 1862 and H. M. Stanley in 1875), they were impressed with the well-organized kingdom and indicated that the Ganda were far more advanced and cultured than any of their neighbors. They were also surprised by their tidy dress and the advanced structure of their clean homes, which were much superior to those of any of the surrounding peoples.
During the British rule (1894-1962) the Kingdom of Buganda constituted one of the four provinces of Uganda, and it enjoyed extensive autonomy. It was officially abolished in 1967 by President A. M. Obote.
Islam was the first monotheistic religion to enter Buganda. Its initial diffusion occurred in the middle of the nineteenth century during the reign of Kabaka Suna II (circa 1832-1856) when Arab and Swahili traders arrived from Zanzibar and the coast of East Africa. Suna treated the Muslim traders favorably, and Buganda witnessed the first stages of Islamization. The king and some of his relatives were influenced by several Muslim religious ideas and even studied a few short chapters of the Qur’an, particularly those considered to be formulas for protection against magic and spirits. Nevertheless, because of the relatively long journey from the coast, the small demand for cloth and other merchandise, along with the limited number of Muslim traders who arrived in the kingdom, the impact of Islam was meager.
The process of Islamization in Buganda reached its climax during the reign of Kabaka Mutesa I (1856-1884). Mutesa was a clever, pragmatic and shrewd king, and he encouraged Muslim traders to come to his country mainly to get from them material benefits and especially guns and gunpowder to strengthen his position among his neighbors. Mutesa’s approach to religion was utilitarian. Nonetheless, his unusual curiosity, wit and intelligence led to his being genuinely impressed by certain Muslim religious ideas. Besides, the Kabaka was a secular monarch who, although carrying out some important religious duties, was not considered a god or a priest.
The kings of Buganda were often in conflict with the traditional religious establishment of gods, mediums and priests. Therefore, Mutesa tried to use the new religion, Islam, to weaken the influence of the traditional priests. In 1865, Mutesa declared Islam the official religion of Buganda and imposed it on all his subjects, a situation that lasted ten years. A royal decree was issued that the three rituals of regular prayers, fasting during Ramadan and eating lawful meat must be considered obligatory and the transgressor would be convicted and might even be put to death.
Coercion and threats were used to enforce the new religion among the people, thus assuring the superficial character of Islam in the country. For example, a custom connected with the Muslim pre-prayer ablutions was to clean and dry the feet by rubbing them on a big stone placed before the mosque. When the Kabaka wished to know if his subjects were performing the prayers regularly, he would send his inspectors to see if they had stones in front of their courtyards.
The arrival of Christianity in Buganda in the 1870s brought a change in the position of Islam. The first Protestant missionaries arrived in 1877. In 1879, the Catholics followed and Islam’s position was challenged. The Kabaka was given to understand that the Christian world possessed technical superiority, greater force, wider resources and more wealth than the Arabs and that he could utilize these advantages for the advancement of his interests. Mutesa’s attitude towards Islam was shaken, and he allowed the missionaries to teach him and his subjects the precepts of Christianity. However, the rivalry between Catholics and Protestants weakened the Christian influence, and in the competition between Christians and Muslims, the Muslims’ influence was usually more successful. Although Mutesa was, during most of his reign, nearer to Islam, he shrewdly realized that a greater advantage might be gained by avoiding clear identification with any religion, and from time to time he consulted the traditional gods and mediums.
The history of Buganda after Mutesa reflects the vitality of the Islamic nucleus established during his regime, and when his successor, Mwanga, assumed the throne in 1884, the Muslim position was generally strong. When war broke out between Muslims and Christians towards the end of the 1880s, the Muslims won. With European help, the Christians reversed the victory and crushed the Muslims by 1884, when Buganda became a part of the British protectorate of Uganda. Since then, Christianity has been the dominant religion of the country.
The position of Muslims in the colonial period was weak. While Christians, with foreign help, developed schools and health facilities, Muslims languished. They lacked foreign assisatnce and objected not only to secular education but to sending their children to schools run by Christians. Quranic schools did not prepare their young people for government positions.
Personal rivalries and religious conflicts among the Muslims were additional negative influences on the development of Islam in Buganda. Prince Nuhu Mbogo, the Muslim brother of Kabaka Mutesa I, was officially recognized by the British in 1892 as the leader of the Muslim community. The fact that Mbogo came from the royal family strengthened his leadership. Mbogo was a moderate and accepted by all Muslims as their sole leader. This situation changed drastically after his death in 1921, and his successor Prince Badru Kakungulu became involved in Muslim internal rivalries. One of the conflicts which left a crucial and still visible mark on the Muslim community. The fact that Mbogo came from the royal family strengthened his leadership. Mbogo was a moderate and accepted by all Muslims as their sole leader. This situation changed drastically after his death in 1921, and his successor Prince Badru Kakungulu became involved in Muslim internal rivalries. One of the conflicts which left a crucial and still visible mark on the Muslim community was the Juma-Zukuli dispute. The point of issue was whether the ordinary noonday prayer (Zukuli) might be omitted on Fridays or should be prayed in addition to the Juma, which is recited on Fridays. In Buganda, under the influence of the Swahili teachers, the Juma prayer was recited in conjunction with Zukuli. The issue arose in a severe form after Nuhu Mbogo’s death when Abdullah Sekimwanyi, one of the most learned Muslim shaikhs and one of the first of the Baganda to make the pilgrimage to Mecca (in 1920), started to pray the Juma alone. He was followed by others. His opponents were led by Prince Badru Kakungulu, the son of Mbogo, who was under the influence of a Swahili shaikh, Khalfan ibn Mubaraka. The Kakungulu faction was called the Juma-Zukuli and was the more popular and influential group. This ostensibly religious aspect was inextricably involved with political and personal jealousy.
The two factions differed also on other religious issues. The Juma faction objected to the use of matali (drums) at religious ceremonies and insisted on the use of the calendar to determine the timing of Ramadan, while the Juma-Zukuli allowed the use of drums and determined the start of Ramadan by the sight of the moon. These differences among the Baganda Muslims still exist.
Despite its competitive disadvantages, Islam expanded in the colonial period due to improved communications and security. Baganda Muslim traders, shopkeepers, watchmen, cooks and interpreters (Muslims generally knew Kiswahili better than the Christians and therefore were recruited by British administrators as interpreters) penetrated from their center in Buganda into other areas and spread Islam there. Muslim population growth was proportionately higher than that of any other religion in Uganda.
In the first five years of Uganda independence, when the ruling party of Prime Minister Obote, the Uganda Peoples Congress, was allied with the Kabaka of Buganda, the Baganda Muslims exerted increasing influence through their leader, Prince Kakungulu, who was a close relative of the Kabaka. The government recognized Id al Fitr as a national holiday. The right to slaughter animals for public consumption was granted exclusively to the Muslim community. But in 1965, when the cracks in the coalition between Obote and the Kabaka became wider, a new split, mainly political in character, occurred. Obote established a new Muslim organization called the National Association for the Advancement of Muslims (N. A. A. M.). Its main aim was to recruit the support of Muslims of Uganda, including Buganda, for government policies and to oppose Prince Kakungulu, who supported his uncle, the Kabaka, and whose center was in the Kibuli hills of Kampala. After the abolition of the Buganda kingdom by Obote in 1966, the activities of the Kibuli groups were severely limited, and its leaders, among them Prince Kakungulu, were arrested.
General Idi Amin’s coup in January 1971 reversed the situation entirely. N.A.A.M. was outlawed. Kibuli followers took revenge upon their rivals. Idi Amin, a Muslim, tried to recruit support of Muslims both within and outside Uganda by emphasizing his devoutness. Islamic activities and construction of new mosques occupied a prominent place. Although more than two-thirds of the population in Uganda were Christians, Idi Amin convinced the Arab and Muslim world that the majority were Muslims and declared Uganda a Muslim country. Uganda was admitted as a member of the Islamic Conference Organization and became a beneficiary of Arab financial aid. The Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah in 1978 pledged $60 million for building an Islamic university in Kampala “in appreciation of Idi Amin’s untiring effort in the Islamization of Uganda.” This Muslim preeminence ended with the fall of Idi Amin in 1979.
During Idi Amin’s rule the main motives for conversion to Islam were fear or desire for benefits. When Amin was toppled, Christians in various parts of the country, especially in the town of Masaka, took revenge, killing Muslims and burning houses and shops. In April 1982, Obote promised an Arab delegation that he would re-open the Islamic University and “build a united nation without any tribal or religious discrimination.” {See also Idi Amin; Mutesa I; shpeoplealso called Baganda, or Waganda,
people inhabiting the area north and northwest of Lake Victoria in south-central Uganda. They speak a Bantu language—called Ganda, or Luganda—of the Benue-Congo group. The Ganda are the most numerous people in Uganda and their territory the most productive and fertile. Once the core of the Uganda Protectorate, they have a higher standard of living and are more literate and modernized than any other people in Uganda.
The traditional Ganda are settled hoe cultivators, with plantains their staple food. They also grow cotton and coffee for export. They keep sheep, goats, chickens, and cattle.
Descent, inheritance, and succession are patrilineal. About 50 exogamous clans are recognized, each having principal and secondary totem animals that may not be killed or eaten.
Traditional Ganda religion recognized ancestors, past kings, nature spirits, and a pantheon of gods who were approached through spirit mediums. Most modern Ganda, however, are Christian. Traditional Ganda villages were compact, centred on the chief’s house.
By the early 19th century the Ganda had developed a well-organized, efficient administrative hierarchy and a sophisticated political system centred on the institution and person of the kabaka (king). The kabaka was also the high priest and supreme judge of the land. Ruling through a system of governors and district chiefs, the kabaka maintained absolute control over his ever-expanding kingdom. The Ganda state was organized for war, the Nyoro being its hereditary enemies. On becoming the first in the region to accept British influence, the Ganda gained even greater power and a special status in the politics of the Uganda Protectorate, a status they retained after the departure of the British. Between 1966 and 1993, however, the centuries-old kingship was abolished; the kabaka was restored in 1993, although his powers were reduced considerably.
Gandhi
Gandhi (Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi) (1869-1948). India’s major nationalist leader who was often known by the Hindu title mahatma (“great soul”). Gandhi was assassinated in New Delhi on January 30, 1948, six months after India’s independence, by a Hindu who blamed him for the subcontinent’s partition into India and Muslim Pakistan when the British left.
Gandhi’s family came from a trader caste in Gujarat, western India. Several relatives had served in the administration of a minor princely state, but the family had no connections with developing continental politics in British India, which was largely dominated by the Indian National Congress. Gandhi’s emergence as a major figure in the Congress after World War I was even more unlikely because he was diffident as a young man. Despite reading for the bar in London in 1888-1889, Gandhi had no university degree and failed in his legal practice in Bombay. From 1893, he spent two decades in South Africa, then returned permanently to India in 1915, a middle-aged stranger to Indian public life.
South Africa, however, had proved a crucial experience. As a lawyer, gradually drawn in to lead the diverse Indian community (consisting of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs) in its struggle against European discrimination, he taught himself the political skills of organization, publicity, negotiation, and agitation. From his South African campaigns, Gandhi gained public notoriety in Britain and in India and learned to work with Indians from different religious and regional backgrounds. He also took the progressive stance of involving women in his political activities. Finally, while in South Africa, Gandhi’s personal life and values underwent a radical change, symbolized by his vow of celibacy and his experiments with a simple community life, in the manner of a Hindu ashram, for his relatives and close associates.
Drawing on experience, on his reading of Christian and Western religion and philosophy, and on his Hindu inheritance, Gandhi became convinced that all persons have an innate spark of truth or ultimate reality deep within them. To strive for perfection, Gandhi believed that each person must learn to respond to the inward truth by listening to what Gandhi called the “inner voice” and disciplining himself by simplicity and self-denial in preparation for such spiritual receptivity. In later life, Gandhi would say not “God is Truth” but rather that “Truth is God.” He believed that none of the world’s religions had completely discovered such truth, although all gave sincere believers a path toward the Truth and a partial vision of it. Consequently, in Gandhi’s worldview there were as many religions as there were individuals. From Gandhi’s belief in the spiritual nature and destiny of man, a nature and destiny imperfectly realized by reason of man’s faulty apprehension of Truth, flowed a passionate dedication to religious tolerance, to non-violence (ahimsa) in all conflicts as the safeguard of the integrity of all involved, and to a way of life markedly contrasting with Western industrial civilization, which in Gandhi’s eyes corrupted humanity with false ideals of wealth and competitiveness. He castigated British rule in India and Indians who absorbed or aped Western culture, claiming that they destroyed India spiritually, and believed that India’s mission in the world was to be true to itself by basing national life on sufficiency and not on endless accumulation, on interdependence and not on competition and exploitation -- a way of life possible only in a village setting.
Gandhi’s ideas about India’s present and future became more definite after 1915. When people accused him of inconsistency, he argued that courage to modify opinions was a hallmark of the truth seeker. He increasingly concentrated on softening communal hostilities; on changing Hindu attitudes that oppressed those at the base of caste society, particularly the Untouchables; and on reviving spinning, by hand, along with other village industries, as part of a total plan of village uplift. Politically, he began to work for the demolition of the British Raj, but for him swaraj (“self-rule”) was never just political independence: it meant reconstructing an Indian nation from its spiritual and social roots. His ashrams strove to build this new identity in microcosm and to train people to be spiritually aware and dedicated to the service of mankind.
Gandhi’s participation in Indian politics before 1920 was limited to occasions in which he perceived a wrong or grievance that could be righted by the method of non-violent protest that he had begun to forge in Africa. He called his method satyagraha (“truth-force”) and believed it was far more than the passive resistance of the weak known in the West, for it demanded courage of mind and body, and it also purified and turned to a fuller vision of truth those who practiced it and those against whom it was deployed. It could take various forms, from mass non-violent non-cooperation with the government or the breaking of unjust laws to individual demonstrations and fasts. After 1920, Gandhi assumed that full participation in the anti-British struggle was not only his rightful role but also an integral part of his wider-ranging work for true swaraj. He began to make more than brief appearances at Congress sessions, and, in fact, his dramatic rise to leadership in the Indian National Congress began at this time. He called for non-cooperation and non-violence, which, he predicted, would result in swaraj in one year. Gandhi’s rise to power rested not on large-scale conversion to his views but rather on politician’s calculations -- in terms of all-India and provincial politics -- that alliance with Gandhi and a temporary strategy of non-cooperation with the government might prove productive, since cooperation and violent resistance offered equally little prospect of political achievement.
Thereafter, Gandhi’s career was one of political peaks and troughs. Times of apparent retirement, in which Gandhi concentrated on the reconstruction of villages and the amelioration of conditions for Untouchables, and phases in which he led all-India satyagrahas, as in 1920-1922, 1930-1934, and 1940-1942. Recurring characteristics of these agitations included very loose central control and a tendency to degenerate into violence as they became the focus and channel of myriad local grievances and aspirations. Gandhi and other major leaders were regularly jailed. Congressmen followed Gandhi, not blindly or constantly, but only when his particular technique suited their needs and interests or seemed the only basis for much-needed unity. This support was equally true both of provinicial Congressional groups or Congress as an all-India vehicle of nationalism. Even in his apparently fallow phases, Gandhi remained a seminal figure in Congressional deliberations, revered and often referred to, even by those whose views differed from his.
Once World War II had ended and it was clear that the British were intent on departure, the Mahatma played a less significant role in the intricate negotiations for independence. A tired old man, deeply hurt and even demoralized by the horrific evidence of communal violence that he had tried to stem in strife-torn areas, Gandhi called himself “a back number.” In many ways, partition and the nature of government and politics after independence made Gandhi realize that Indians had neither achieved nor desired the true swaraj of his vision.
Understandably, Gandhi was and is a controversial figure. Despite the awe and devotion that surrounded him, in his lifetime, British and Indians alike questioned his priorities, particularly his concentration on social work and his attempt to swing India from the path of industrialization. Many found his religious vision inexplicable or doubted his integrity, judging him a charlatan who manipulated religion for political ends. Muslims increasingly perceived him as the symbol of a future Hindu-dominated India despite his work for communal harmony, a misconception inexplicable, however, in light of the Hindu style of his leadership and appeal and the growing adherence of the Hindu majority to Congress, of which he was the figurehead. Since his death, he has become a rather legendary figure and is often called the “father of the Indian nation.” However, his priorities and prescriptions for India are today largely ignored and variants of satyagraha are used in the most un-Gandhian ways.
Later commentators from many disciplines have been similarly intrigued and perplexed by Gandhi’s role and significance. Some have delved into the early, emotional experiences that produced a man so dedicated to public action yet overscrupulous about his motivation and most private life, a man so highly driven yet so full of self-doubt, a man of immense moral and physical courage who delighted in a maternal role. Others, who have examined the origins and internal coherence of his beliefs, recognize that he was neither trained philosopher nor founder of a philosophical school but a pragmatic seeker after truth who was guided by a few fundamental principles. Among historians, interest has focused on his political role. Earlier, hagiographical studies have given place to more realistic assessments, based on his copious writings and a weight of other primary evidence generated by the political interplay of British and Indian leaders and Indians with one another. Simple assertions about his charismatic appeal and ability to generate and lead mass political campaigns now tend to be replaced by more detailed investigations of precisely who followed him and why, the evidence being illuminated by a deeper awareness of the differing characteristics of politics in the diverse regions of so vast a land.
As an all-India leader with a flexible method and a flair for conciliation, Gandhi was often highly attractive for limited periods in specific political circumstances. His personality undoubtedly brought thousands onto the streets in political demonstrations. Yet this support could ebb as quickly as it had flowed, both among permanently committed political activists and those who were temporarily motivated into agitation campaigns. Furthermore, investigations of the weakness and internal contradictions of the British Raj, and of the declining worth of India to Britain from the 1920s, have lessened the long-term historical significance of Gandhian satyagraha in undermining the imperial edifice.
It is clear nonetheless that Gandhi’s campaigns had great importance in educating Indians in political awareness and action and in bonding them across old barriers of region and caste -- key factors in India’s subsequent stability as a democratic nation. As an inspiration and educator who changed the nation’s sense of identity, Gandhi played a highly creative public role. He underlined and confronted some of the critical problems facing the new nation and illuminated the lives of the countless individuals to whom he gave time, affection, and advice, tempering discipline with tenderness and humor. He remains an enigmatic, powerful figure who demands attention and whose life and death ask uncomfortable yet abiding questions about the nature of the self and its relationship to the environment and to all humanity.
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi see Gandhi
Mahatma see Gandhi
Great Soul see Gandhi
Gandhi (Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi) (1869-1948). India’s major nationalist leader who was often known by the Hindu title mahatma (“great soul”). Gandhi was assassinated in New Delhi on January 30, 1948, six months after India’s independence, by a Hindu who blamed him for the subcontinent’s partition into India and Muslim Pakistan when the British left.
Gandhi’s family came from a trader caste in Gujarat, western India. Several relatives had served in the administration of a minor princely state, but the family had no connections with developing continental politics in British India, which was largely dominated by the Indian National Congress. Gandhi’s emergence as a major figure in the Congress after World War I was even more unlikely because he was diffident as a young man. Despite reading for the bar in London in 1888-1889, Gandhi had no university degree and failed in his legal practice in Bombay. From 1893, he spent two decades in South Africa, then returned permanently to India in 1915, a middle-aged stranger to Indian public life.
South Africa, however, had proved a crucial experience. As a lawyer, gradually drawn in to lead the diverse Indian community (consisting of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs) in its struggle against European discrimination, he taught himself the political skills of organization, publicity, negotiation, and agitation. From his South African campaigns, Gandhi gained public notoriety in Britain and in India and learned to work with Indians from different religious and regional backgrounds. He also took the progressive stance of involving women in his political activities. Finally, while in South Africa, Gandhi’s personal life and values underwent a radical change, symbolized by his vow of celibacy and his experiments with a simple community life, in the manner of a Hindu ashram, for his relatives and close associates.
Drawing on experience, on his reading of Christian and Western religion and philosophy, and on his Hindu inheritance, Gandhi became convinced that all persons have an innate spark of truth or ultimate reality deep within them. To strive for perfection, Gandhi believed that each person must learn to respond to the inward truth by listening to what Gandhi called the “inner voice” and disciplining himself by simplicity and self-denial in preparation for such spiritual receptivity. In later life, Gandhi would say not “God is Truth” but rather that “Truth is God.” He believed that none of the world’s religions had completely discovered such truth, although all gave sincere believers a path toward the Truth and a partial vision of it. Consequently, in Gandhi’s worldview there were as many religions as there were individuals. From Gandhi’s belief in the spiritual nature and destiny of man, a nature and destiny imperfectly realized by reason of man’s faulty apprehension of Truth, flowed a passionate dedication to religious tolerance, to non-violence (ahimsa) in all conflicts as the safeguard of the integrity of all involved, and to a way of life markedly contrasting with Western industrial civilization, which in Gandhi’s eyes corrupted humanity with false ideals of wealth and competitiveness. He castigated British rule in India and Indians who absorbed or aped Western culture, claiming that they destroyed India spiritually, and believed that India’s mission in the world was to be true to itself by basing national life on sufficiency and not on endless accumulation, on interdependence and not on competition and exploitation -- a way of life possible only in a village setting.
Gandhi’s ideas about India’s present and future became more definite after 1915. When people accused him of inconsistency, he argued that courage to modify opinions was a hallmark of the truth seeker. He increasingly concentrated on softening communal hostilities; on changing Hindu attitudes that oppressed those at the base of caste society, particularly the Untouchables; and on reviving spinning, by hand, along with other village industries, as part of a total plan of village uplift. Politically, he began to work for the demolition of the British Raj, but for him swaraj (“self-rule”) was never just political independence: it meant reconstructing an Indian nation from its spiritual and social roots. His ashrams strove to build this new identity in microcosm and to train people to be spiritually aware and dedicated to the service of mankind.
Gandhi’s participation in Indian politics before 1920 was limited to occasions in which he perceived a wrong or grievance that could be righted by the method of non-violent protest that he had begun to forge in Africa. He called his method satyagraha (“truth-force”) and believed it was far more than the passive resistance of the weak known in the West, for it demanded courage of mind and body, and it also purified and turned to a fuller vision of truth those who practiced it and those against whom it was deployed. It could take various forms, from mass non-violent non-cooperation with the government or the breaking of unjust laws to individual demonstrations and fasts. After 1920, Gandhi assumed that full participation in the anti-British struggle was not only his rightful role but also an integral part of his wider-ranging work for true swaraj. He began to make more than brief appearances at Congress sessions, and, in fact, his dramatic rise to leadership in the Indian National Congress began at this time. He called for non-cooperation and non-violence, which, he predicted, would result in swaraj in one year. Gandhi’s rise to power rested not on large-scale conversion to his views but rather on politician’s calculations -- in terms of all-India and provincial politics -- that alliance with Gandhi and a temporary strategy of non-cooperation with the government might prove productive, since cooperation and violent resistance offered equally little prospect of political achievement.
Thereafter, Gandhi’s career was one of political peaks and troughs. Times of apparent retirement, in which Gandhi concentrated on the reconstruction of villages and the amelioration of conditions for Untouchables, and phases in which he led all-India satyagrahas, as in 1920-1922, 1930-1934, and 1940-1942. Recurring characteristics of these agitations included very loose central control and a tendency to degenerate into violence as they became the focus and channel of myriad local grievances and aspirations. Gandhi and other major leaders were regularly jailed. Congressmen followed Gandhi, not blindly or constantly, but only when his particular technique suited their needs and interests or seemed the only basis for much-needed unity. This support was equally true both of provinicial Congressional groups or Congress as an all-India vehicle of nationalism. Even in his apparently fallow phases, Gandhi remained a seminal figure in Congressional deliberations, revered and often referred to, even by those whose views differed from his.
Once World War II had ended and it was clear that the British were intent on departure, the Mahatma played a less significant role in the intricate negotiations for independence. A tired old man, deeply hurt and even demoralized by the horrific evidence of communal violence that he had tried to stem in strife-torn areas, Gandhi called himself “a back number.” In many ways, partition and the nature of government and politics after independence made Gandhi realize that Indians had neither achieved nor desired the true swaraj of his vision.
Understandably, Gandhi was and is a controversial figure. Despite the awe and devotion that surrounded him, in his lifetime, British and Indians alike questioned his priorities, particularly his concentration on social work and his attempt to swing India from the path of industrialization. Many found his religious vision inexplicable or doubted his integrity, judging him a charlatan who manipulated religion for political ends. Muslims increasingly perceived him as the symbol of a future Hindu-dominated India despite his work for communal harmony, a misconception inexplicable, however, in light of the Hindu style of his leadership and appeal and the growing adherence of the Hindu majority to Congress, of which he was the figurehead. Since his death, he has become a rather legendary figure and is often called the “father of the Indian nation.” However, his priorities and prescriptions for India are today largely ignored and variants of satyagraha are used in the most un-Gandhian ways.
Later commentators from many disciplines have been similarly intrigued and perplexed by Gandhi’s role and significance. Some have delved into the early, emotional experiences that produced a man so dedicated to public action yet overscrupulous about his motivation and most private life, a man so highly driven yet so full of self-doubt, a man of immense moral and physical courage who delighted in a maternal role. Others, who have examined the origins and internal coherence of his beliefs, recognize that he was neither trained philosopher nor founder of a philosophical school but a pragmatic seeker after truth who was guided by a few fundamental principles. Among historians, interest has focused on his political role. Earlier, hagiographical studies have given place to more realistic assessments, based on his copious writings and a weight of other primary evidence generated by the political interplay of British and Indian leaders and Indians with one another. Simple assertions about his charismatic appeal and ability to generate and lead mass political campaigns now tend to be replaced by more detailed investigations of precisely who followed him and why, the evidence being illuminated by a deeper awareness of the differing characteristics of politics in the diverse regions of so vast a land.
As an all-India leader with a flexible method and a flair for conciliation, Gandhi was often highly attractive for limited periods in specific political circumstances. His personality undoubtedly brought thousands onto the streets in political demonstrations. Yet this support could ebb as quickly as it had flowed, both among permanently committed political activists and those who were temporarily motivated into agitation campaigns. Furthermore, investigations of the weakness and internal contradictions of the British Raj, and of the declining worth of India to Britain from the 1920s, have lessened the long-term historical significance of Gandhian satyagraha in undermining the imperial edifice.
It is clear nonetheless that Gandhi’s campaigns had great importance in educating Indians in political awareness and action and in bonding them across old barriers of region and caste -- key factors in India’s subsequent stability as a democratic nation. As an inspiration and educator who changed the nation’s sense of identity, Gandhi played a highly creative public role. He underlined and confronted some of the critical problems facing the new nation and illuminated the lives of the countless individuals to whom he gave time, affection, and advice, tempering discipline with tenderness and humor. He remains an enigmatic, powerful figure who demands attention and whose life and death ask uncomfortable yet abiding questions about the nature of the self and its relationship to the environment and to all humanity.
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi see Gandhi
Mahatma see Gandhi
Great Soul see Gandhi
Farid al-Din Mas'ud Ganj-i-Shaka (b.c. April 4, 1179, Kothewal, Multan, Punjab, Ghurid Sultanate (present day Pakistan) - d. May 7, 1266 [5 Muharram 665 AH], Pakpattan, Punjab, Delhi Sultanate (present day Pakistan)) was a 12th-century Punjabi Sunni Muslim preacher and mystic who went on to become one of the most revered and distinguished Muslim mystics of the Golden Age of Islam. He is known reverentially as Baba Farid or Shaikh Farid by Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus of the Punjab Region, or simply as Fariduddin Ganjshakar.
Gardizi
Gardizi (Abu Sa’id Gardizi) (Abu Saʿīd Abdul-Hay ibn Dhaḥḥāk ibn Maḥmūd Gardēzī) (died c. 1061). Persian geographer and historian of the eleventh century. He wrote histories of the pre-Islamic kings of Persia, of the Prophet and the caliphs up to the year 1032, and a detailed history of Khurasan from the Arab conquest to 1041.
Abu Saʿīd Abdul-Hay ibn Dhaḥḥāk ibn Maḥmūd Gardēzī from Gardēz (now in Afghanistan) who wrote the book Zayn ul-Akhbār. Gardizī's work is very important for the Islamic history of Central Asia and Eastern Persia.
Gardīzī took a dispassionate view of history which is fairly remarkable for his time. For example, he does not either praise the Ghaznavids nor the coming of the Saljuqs. His style of Persian is simple but mature and provides one of the classical examples of Persian prose-writing.
Abu Sa’id Gardizi see Gardizi
Abu Saʿīd Abdul-Hay ibn Dhaḥḥāk ibn Maḥmūd Gardēzī see Gardizi
Gardezi, Abu Saʿīd Abdul-Hay ibn Dhaḥḥāk ibn Maḥmūd see Gardizi
Gardizi (Abu Sa’id Gardizi) (Abu Saʿīd Abdul-Hay ibn Dhaḥḥāk ibn Maḥmūd Gardēzī) (died c. 1061). Persian geographer and historian of the eleventh century. He wrote histories of the pre-Islamic kings of Persia, of the Prophet and the caliphs up to the year 1032, and a detailed history of Khurasan from the Arab conquest to 1041.
Abu Saʿīd Abdul-Hay ibn Dhaḥḥāk ibn Maḥmūd Gardēzī from Gardēz (now in Afghanistan) who wrote the book Zayn ul-Akhbār. Gardizī's work is very important for the Islamic history of Central Asia and Eastern Persia.
Gardīzī took a dispassionate view of history which is fairly remarkable for his time. For example, he does not either praise the Ghaznavids nor the coming of the Saljuqs. His style of Persian is simple but mature and provides one of the classical examples of Persian prose-writing.
Abu Sa’id Gardizi see Gardizi
Abu Saʿīd Abdul-Hay ibn Dhaḥḥāk ibn Maḥmūd Gardēzī see Gardizi
Gardezi, Abu Saʿīd Abdul-Hay ibn Dhaḥḥāk ibn Maḥmūd see Gardizi
Gaspirali
Gaspirali (Isma‘il Gaspirali) (Isma‘il Gasprinski) (Isma'il Gasprali) (İsmail Gasprinsky) (March 8, 1851 - September 11, 1914). Crimean Tatar intellectual, educator, publisher and politician. He was one of the first Muslim intellectuals in the Russian Empire, who realized the need for education and cultural reform and modernization of the Turkic and Islamic communities. His last name comes from the town of Gaspra in Crimea.
Gaspirali advocated Pan-Turkism, preaching unity in language, thought and action. He was also a leading advocate of socioeconomic change and cultural transformation designed to restore the competitive ability of Muslim communities, especially in Russia, vis-a-vis the West in particular. Through the vehicles of education, for which he pursued substantial reforms of the traditional curriculum and pedagogy, and publishing -- his newspaper Tercuman (The Interpreter) appeared from 1883 until 1918 -- Gaspirali sought to alter the consciousness of his co-religionists and to inform them of both the roots of and the remedies for their current social malaise. Drawing upon a syncretic view of human culture, he strove to combine the best of Islamic and Western achievements to create the possibility of Dar ul-Islam (“the world of Islam”) once again playing a major role in human social development.
Gaspirali’s thought and activity were central to the emergence of a broad movement of change among Russian Muslims called Jedidism, from usul-i jedid (“the new method”), originally applied to the phonetic approach to language extended to a wide range of issues touching upon most significant aspects of Muslim life. Axiomatic to Jedidism, as propounded by Gaspirali, were attitudes typical of the spirit of the European Enlightenment: unbounded faith in progress and its beneficial social effects; belief in the value of science; commitment to secularization; and, above all, dedication to the rational ordering of society. From this intellectual base, Gaspirali moved beyond educational reform to propose creation of a common Turkic language to enhance communications and unity among most Muslims within Russia (and Turkey); emancipation of women, so as to involve the “other half” of Muslims in socially productive activities outside familial life; and economic development, in order to ensure a prosperous and independent society.
Gaspıralı also initiated a new journal for women, Alem-i Nisvan (World of Women), edited by his daughter Şefiqa, as well as a publication for children, Alem-i Subyan (World of Children). Gaspıralı was one of the founders of Union of Muslims (İttifaq-i Müslimin), created in 1907 and uniting members of intelligentsia from various Muslim Turkic peoples of the Russian Empire. He was also one of the main organizers of first All-Russian Muslim congresses, aimed at introducing social and religious reforms among the Muslim peoples of Russia.
He also inspired the movement known as Jadidism.
Isma‘il Gaspirali see Gaspirali
Isma‘il Gasprinski see Gaspirali
Isma'il Gasprali see Gaspirali
Gasprali, Isma'il see Gaspirali
Gasprinski, Isma‘il see Gaspirali
Gasprinsky, Ismail see Gaspirali
Gaspirali (Isma‘il Gaspirali) (Isma‘il Gasprinski) (Isma'il Gasprali) (İsmail Gasprinsky) (March 8, 1851 - September 11, 1914). Crimean Tatar intellectual, educator, publisher and politician. He was one of the first Muslim intellectuals in the Russian Empire, who realized the need for education and cultural reform and modernization of the Turkic and Islamic communities. His last name comes from the town of Gaspra in Crimea.
Gaspirali advocated Pan-Turkism, preaching unity in language, thought and action. He was also a leading advocate of socioeconomic change and cultural transformation designed to restore the competitive ability of Muslim communities, especially in Russia, vis-a-vis the West in particular. Through the vehicles of education, for which he pursued substantial reforms of the traditional curriculum and pedagogy, and publishing -- his newspaper Tercuman (The Interpreter) appeared from 1883 until 1918 -- Gaspirali sought to alter the consciousness of his co-religionists and to inform them of both the roots of and the remedies for their current social malaise. Drawing upon a syncretic view of human culture, he strove to combine the best of Islamic and Western achievements to create the possibility of Dar ul-Islam (“the world of Islam”) once again playing a major role in human social development.
Gaspirali’s thought and activity were central to the emergence of a broad movement of change among Russian Muslims called Jedidism, from usul-i jedid (“the new method”), originally applied to the phonetic approach to language extended to a wide range of issues touching upon most significant aspects of Muslim life. Axiomatic to Jedidism, as propounded by Gaspirali, were attitudes typical of the spirit of the European Enlightenment: unbounded faith in progress and its beneficial social effects; belief in the value of science; commitment to secularization; and, above all, dedication to the rational ordering of society. From this intellectual base, Gaspirali moved beyond educational reform to propose creation of a common Turkic language to enhance communications and unity among most Muslims within Russia (and Turkey); emancipation of women, so as to involve the “other half” of Muslims in socially productive activities outside familial life; and economic development, in order to ensure a prosperous and independent society.
Gaspıralı also initiated a new journal for women, Alem-i Nisvan (World of Women), edited by his daughter Şefiqa, as well as a publication for children, Alem-i Subyan (World of Children). Gaspıralı was one of the founders of Union of Muslims (İttifaq-i Müslimin), created in 1907 and uniting members of intelligentsia from various Muslim Turkic peoples of the Russian Empire. He was also one of the main organizers of first All-Russian Muslim congresses, aimed at introducing social and religious reforms among the Muslim peoples of Russia.
He also inspired the movement known as Jadidism.
Isma‘il Gaspirali see Gaspirali
Isma‘il Gasprinski see Gaspirali
Isma'il Gasprali see Gaspirali
Gasprali, Isma'il see Gaspirali
Gasprinski, Isma‘il see Gaspirali
Gasprinsky, Ismail see Gaspirali
Gaykhatu
Gaykhatu (Gaikhatu) (d. 1295). Fifth Ilkhanate ruler in Iran. He reigned from 1291 to 1295. During his reign, Gaykhatu was a noted dissolute. His Buddhist baghshi gave him the Tibetan name Rinchindorj. His name means "amazing/surprising" in the Mongolian language as in "gaikhakh" (to get surprised).
Gaykhatu had originally been governor of Seljuk Anatolia, and was nominated for the throne by an influential Mongol commander, Ta'achar, who had murdered Gaykhatu's brother Arghun and intended to promote Baydu, but Baydu didn't show up at the quriltai, so Gaykhatu was enthroned instead. He was to care for a princess by the name of Koekecin. Gaykhatu's wife, Padshah Hatun, was the daughter of Kitlugh Turkan (Turkan Khatun) and Kirman. Padshah took the title Safwad al dunya wa al-Din (literally, Purity of the earthly world and of the faith) after Djalal da-Din Abu'l-Muzzafar was deposed as head of the Mongol tribe, who reigned in southeastern Iran. Padshah was known for killing her stepbrother, Suyurghatamish, but one of his clansmen, Khurdudjin, managed to avenge her by putting her to death with permission from Baydu during his reign as Ilkhan.
Gaykhatu is known to have spent government money in an extravagant way. Among his beneficiaries were the Nestorian Christians, who praised him abundantly for his gifts to the Church, as apparent in the history of Mar Yahballaha III.
In 1294, Gaykhatu had wanted to replenish his treasury emptied by royal extravagance and a great cattle plague. In response, his vizier Ahmed al-Khalidi proposed the introduction of a recent Chinese invention called Chao (paper money). Gaykhatu agreed and called for Kublai Khan's ambassador Bolad in Tabriz. After the ambassador showed how the system worked, Gaykhatu printed banknotes which imitated the Chinese ones so closely that they even had Chinese words printed on them. The Muslim confession of faith was printed on the banknotes as a sop to local sentiment.
The plan was to get his subjects to use only paper money, and allow Gaykhatu to control the treasury. The experiment was a complete failure, as the people and merchants refused to accept the banknotes. Soon, bazaar riots broke out, and economic activities came to a standstill. Gaykhatu had no choice but to withdraw the use of paper money.
Gaykhatu was assassinated shortly after that, strangled by a bowstring so as to avoid bloodshed.[4] His cousin Baydu, another puppet placed by Ta'achar, succeeded Gaykhatu but only lasted a few months before himself being assassinated.
Gaykhatu (Gaikhatu) (d. 1295). Fifth Ilkhanate ruler in Iran. He reigned from 1291 to 1295. During his reign, Gaykhatu was a noted dissolute. His Buddhist baghshi gave him the Tibetan name Rinchindorj. His name means "amazing/surprising" in the Mongolian language as in "gaikhakh" (to get surprised).
Gaykhatu had originally been governor of Seljuk Anatolia, and was nominated for the throne by an influential Mongol commander, Ta'achar, who had murdered Gaykhatu's brother Arghun and intended to promote Baydu, but Baydu didn't show up at the quriltai, so Gaykhatu was enthroned instead. He was to care for a princess by the name of Koekecin. Gaykhatu's wife, Padshah Hatun, was the daughter of Kitlugh Turkan (Turkan Khatun) and Kirman. Padshah took the title Safwad al dunya wa al-Din (literally, Purity of the earthly world and of the faith) after Djalal da-Din Abu'l-Muzzafar was deposed as head of the Mongol tribe, who reigned in southeastern Iran. Padshah was known for killing her stepbrother, Suyurghatamish, but one of his clansmen, Khurdudjin, managed to avenge her by putting her to death with permission from Baydu during his reign as Ilkhan.
Gaykhatu is known to have spent government money in an extravagant way. Among his beneficiaries were the Nestorian Christians, who praised him abundantly for his gifts to the Church, as apparent in the history of Mar Yahballaha III.
In 1294, Gaykhatu had wanted to replenish his treasury emptied by royal extravagance and a great cattle plague. In response, his vizier Ahmed al-Khalidi proposed the introduction of a recent Chinese invention called Chao (paper money). Gaykhatu agreed and called for Kublai Khan's ambassador Bolad in Tabriz. After the ambassador showed how the system worked, Gaykhatu printed banknotes which imitated the Chinese ones so closely that they even had Chinese words printed on them. The Muslim confession of faith was printed on the banknotes as a sop to local sentiment.
The plan was to get his subjects to use only paper money, and allow Gaykhatu to control the treasury. The experiment was a complete failure, as the people and merchants refused to accept the banknotes. Soon, bazaar riots broke out, and economic activities came to a standstill. Gaykhatu had no choice but to withdraw the use of paper money.
Gaykhatu was assassinated shortly after that, strangled by a bowstring so as to avoid bloodshed.[4] His cousin Baydu, another puppet placed by Ta'achar, succeeded Gaykhatu but only lasted a few months before himself being assassinated.
Gaylani
Gaylani (Rashid Ali al-Gaylani) (Sayyad Rashid Ali al-Gillani) (Sayyad Rashid Ali al-Gailani) (Sayyad Rashid Ali el Keilany) (1892–August 28, 1965). Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Iraq on three occasions. He is chiefly remembered as an Arab nationalist that attempted to remove the British influence from Iraq. During his brief tenures as Prime Minister in 1940 and 1941, he attempted to negotiate settlements with the Axis powers during World War II in order to counter British influence in Iraq.
Rashid Ali was born as the son of Sayyad Abdul Wahhab al-Gaylani into the prominent Baghdad-based Gaylani family. The Sunni Muslim Gaylani were known as sadeh, signifying that they were a family of religion that traced their ancestry back to the Prophet Muhammad. He was also related to Iraq's first Prime Minister, Abd al-Rahman al-Kayyali, though the two parts of the family were estranged. Rashid Ali enrolled in law school in Baghdad and became a lawyer prior to his political activism.
In 1924, Rashid Ali al-Gaylani began his career in politics in the first government led by Prime Minister Yasin al-Hashimi. Yasin al-Hashimi appointed Gaylani as the Minister of Justice. The two men were ardent nationalists and were opposed to any British involvement in the internal politics of Iraq. They rejected the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty signed by the government of Prime Minister Nuri as-Said in 1930. They formed the Party of National Brotherhood to promote nationalist aims. Gaylani served as Prime Minister for the first time in 1933 but held office for less than eight months.
On March 31, 1940, when Gaylani was again appointed Prime Minister, World War II had started and Iraq had just experienced the premature death of King Ghazi. Ghazi's reign was followed by a Regency for his four-year-old son who was then the new King Faisal II. Faisal's regent was Ghazi's uncle, Emir Abdul-Illah. While Abdul-Illah supported Britain in the war, he was unable to control Gaylani, who used the war to further his own nationalist goals by refusing to allow troops to cross through Iraq to the front. He also rejected calls that Iraq break its ties with Fascist Italy and sent his Justice Minister, Naji Shawkat, to meet with the then German ambassador to Turkey, Franz von Papen, to win German support for his government.
Britain responded with severe economic sanctions against Iraq. Meanwhile, news of British victories against Italian forces in North Africa dulled support for Gaylani's government, and, on January 31, 1941, under pressure from Regent Abdul-Illah, he resigned his post as Prime Minister. This only exacerbated his mistrust of Britain and its supporters in the government. Together with the members of the Golden Square, Gaylani made plans to assassinate Regent Abdul-Illah and seize power. On March 31, Abdul Illah discovered the plot to assassinate him and fled the country. On April 1, the coup d'état was launched, and, on April 3, Gaylani returned to power as Prime Minister. As one of his first acts, he sent an Iraqi artillery force to confront the RAF base situated in Habbaniya, RAF Habbaniya. By the end of April, the Iraqi armed forces were situated in strong positions on the escarpment above the base and a siege began.
Iraq had been a major supplier of petroleum to the Allied war effort and represented an important landbridge between British forces in Egypt and India. To secure Iraq, Prime Minister Winston Churchill ordered General Archibald Wavell to protect the air base at Habbaniya. On April 18, British forces from India landed in Basra, Sabine Force. In the British Mandate of Palestine, another force was created to enter Iraq from the west and relieve RAF Habbaniya, Habbaniya Force.
At Habbaniya, the besieging Iraqis demanded the cessation of all training activities and of all flights in and out of the base. On May 2, the commander at RAF Habbaniya, Air Vice-Marshal Harry George Smart, responded to the Iraqi demands by launching a pre-emptive strike against the Iraqi forces overlooking the air base. This action initiated the Anglo-Iraqi War. Within a week, the Iraqis abandoned the escarpment. By mid-May, British forces from Habbaniya had moved on to Fallujah and, after overcoming Iraqi resistance there, moved on to Baghdad. On May 29, fearing a British onslaught, Gaylani fled to Persia. Before he left Baghdad, Gaylani contacted Mulla Effendi and informed him that he had chosen his house as a safe haven for the Royal family to stay until the conflict ended.
On May 31, an armistice between the British and the Iraqis was signed. On June 3, the Regent returned to Baghdad and his government was restored.
Gaylani was not to stay long in Persia. On August 25, 1941, armed forces of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union invaded Persia and removed the pro-German Shah Reza Shah. Gaylani now fled to Nazi occupied Europe. In Berlin, he was received by German dictator Adolf Hitler and he was recognized as the leader of the Iraqi government in exile. Upon the defeat of Germany, Gaylani again fled and found refuge this time in Saudi Arabia.
Gaylani only returned from exile after the revolution that overthrew the Iraqi monarchy in 1958. Once again he attempted to seize power, and plotted a revolt against Abdul Karim Kassem's government. The revolt was foiled and Gaylani was sentenced to death. Later pardoned, he returned to exile in Beirut, Lebanon, where he died in 1965.
Rashid Ali al-Gaylani see Gaylani
al-Gaylani, Rashid Ali see Gaylani
Sayyid Rashid Ali al-Gillani see Gaylani
Gillani, Sayyid Rashid Ali al- see Gaylani
Sayyad Rashid Ali el-Keilany see Gaylani
Keilany, Sayyad Rashid Ali el- see Gaylani
Gaylani (Rashid Ali al-Gaylani) (Sayyad Rashid Ali al-Gillani) (Sayyad Rashid Ali al-Gailani) (Sayyad Rashid Ali el Keilany) (1892–August 28, 1965). Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Iraq on three occasions. He is chiefly remembered as an Arab nationalist that attempted to remove the British influence from Iraq. During his brief tenures as Prime Minister in 1940 and 1941, he attempted to negotiate settlements with the Axis powers during World War II in order to counter British influence in Iraq.
Rashid Ali was born as the son of Sayyad Abdul Wahhab al-Gaylani into the prominent Baghdad-based Gaylani family. The Sunni Muslim Gaylani were known as sadeh, signifying that they were a family of religion that traced their ancestry back to the Prophet Muhammad. He was also related to Iraq's first Prime Minister, Abd al-Rahman al-Kayyali, though the two parts of the family were estranged. Rashid Ali enrolled in law school in Baghdad and became a lawyer prior to his political activism.
In 1924, Rashid Ali al-Gaylani began his career in politics in the first government led by Prime Minister Yasin al-Hashimi. Yasin al-Hashimi appointed Gaylani as the Minister of Justice. The two men were ardent nationalists and were opposed to any British involvement in the internal politics of Iraq. They rejected the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty signed by the government of Prime Minister Nuri as-Said in 1930. They formed the Party of National Brotherhood to promote nationalist aims. Gaylani served as Prime Minister for the first time in 1933 but held office for less than eight months.
On March 31, 1940, when Gaylani was again appointed Prime Minister, World War II had started and Iraq had just experienced the premature death of King Ghazi. Ghazi's reign was followed by a Regency for his four-year-old son who was then the new King Faisal II. Faisal's regent was Ghazi's uncle, Emir Abdul-Illah. While Abdul-Illah supported Britain in the war, he was unable to control Gaylani, who used the war to further his own nationalist goals by refusing to allow troops to cross through Iraq to the front. He also rejected calls that Iraq break its ties with Fascist Italy and sent his Justice Minister, Naji Shawkat, to meet with the then German ambassador to Turkey, Franz von Papen, to win German support for his government.
Britain responded with severe economic sanctions against Iraq. Meanwhile, news of British victories against Italian forces in North Africa dulled support for Gaylani's government, and, on January 31, 1941, under pressure from Regent Abdul-Illah, he resigned his post as Prime Minister. This only exacerbated his mistrust of Britain and its supporters in the government. Together with the members of the Golden Square, Gaylani made plans to assassinate Regent Abdul-Illah and seize power. On March 31, Abdul Illah discovered the plot to assassinate him and fled the country. On April 1, the coup d'état was launched, and, on April 3, Gaylani returned to power as Prime Minister. As one of his first acts, he sent an Iraqi artillery force to confront the RAF base situated in Habbaniya, RAF Habbaniya. By the end of April, the Iraqi armed forces were situated in strong positions on the escarpment above the base and a siege began.
Iraq had been a major supplier of petroleum to the Allied war effort and represented an important landbridge between British forces in Egypt and India. To secure Iraq, Prime Minister Winston Churchill ordered General Archibald Wavell to protect the air base at Habbaniya. On April 18, British forces from India landed in Basra, Sabine Force. In the British Mandate of Palestine, another force was created to enter Iraq from the west and relieve RAF Habbaniya, Habbaniya Force.
At Habbaniya, the besieging Iraqis demanded the cessation of all training activities and of all flights in and out of the base. On May 2, the commander at RAF Habbaniya, Air Vice-Marshal Harry George Smart, responded to the Iraqi demands by launching a pre-emptive strike against the Iraqi forces overlooking the air base. This action initiated the Anglo-Iraqi War. Within a week, the Iraqis abandoned the escarpment. By mid-May, British forces from Habbaniya had moved on to Fallujah and, after overcoming Iraqi resistance there, moved on to Baghdad. On May 29, fearing a British onslaught, Gaylani fled to Persia. Before he left Baghdad, Gaylani contacted Mulla Effendi and informed him that he had chosen his house as a safe haven for the Royal family to stay until the conflict ended.
On May 31, an armistice between the British and the Iraqis was signed. On June 3, the Regent returned to Baghdad and his government was restored.
Gaylani was not to stay long in Persia. On August 25, 1941, armed forces of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union invaded Persia and removed the pro-German Shah Reza Shah. Gaylani now fled to Nazi occupied Europe. In Berlin, he was received by German dictator Adolf Hitler and he was recognized as the leader of the Iraqi government in exile. Upon the defeat of Germany, Gaylani again fled and found refuge this time in Saudi Arabia.
Gaylani only returned from exile after the revolution that overthrew the Iraqi monarchy in 1958. Once again he attempted to seize power, and plotted a revolt against Abdul Karim Kassem's government. The revolt was foiled and Gaylani was sentenced to death. Later pardoned, he returned to exile in Beirut, Lebanon, where he died in 1965.
Rashid Ali al-Gaylani see Gaylani
al-Gaylani, Rashid Ali see Gaylani
Sayyid Rashid Ali al-Gillani see Gaylani
Gillani, Sayyid Rashid Ali al- see Gaylani
Sayyad Rashid Ali el-Keilany see Gaylani
Keilany, Sayyad Rashid Ali el- see Gaylani
Gayo
Gayo. The Gayo live primarily in the highland areas of the province of Aceh, Indonesia. From sixty to seventy percent live near the town of Takengon in the regency of Central Aceh. Increasingly large numbers have moved to cities elsewhere in Indonesia, principally Banda Aceh, Medan and Jakarta. They are totally Sunni Muslim.
The term “Gayo” is used by Gayo and others to refer both to a people and to their language, Bahasa Gayo of the Western Malayo-Polynesian group. Acehnese sources indicate that Gayo was already a distinct ethnic term by the sixteenth century, and an ethnohistorical perusal of Gayo and Acehnese traditions suggests that Islamization of the area was well under way by the seventeenth century.
Modernist Islam entered Gayo in the late 1920s through west Sumatran traders, but several Gayo ulama soon thereafter attended reformist leaning schools in Aceh and Surabaya. Takengon soon became the center for the reformist group (kaum muda) which sought to change traditional practices deemed to be contrary to the tenets of Islam, including the traditions and legal norms governing marriage, inheritance and divorce. Whereas the Dutch administration sought to remake Gayo adat in accord with its legal views, the reformists argued that Islamic law should be applied to Gayo society through a judicial body independent of adat specialists and traditional rulers.
Shortly after independence (1945), a separate Islamic court, the Mahkamah Syariah, was established in Takengon and began to hear inheritance and divorce cases. The impact of the court was most felt in its strict application of Islamic inheritance law, which allots shares to both sons and daughters at a ratio of two to one.
Although there are no written sources for the history of Islam in Gayo, indigenous traditions and the long-term Acehnese suzerainty indicate that the Gayo have been Muslims for at least three centuries. Although one Acehnese account claims that the Gayo fled upriver from the coast to avoid becoming Muslim, this refusal to become Muslim, were it to have occurred, would have been in the early fourteenth century, at the time of the conversion of the northern coastal city states. The story is therefore consistent with an eventual conversion of the Gayo to Islam by the time of Sultan Iskandar Muda’s reign in the early seventeenth century, when the Gayo appear to have been included in the Acehnese realm.
The entire corpus of Gayo origin stories is structured around Islamic (often originally Judeo-Christian) tales, beginning with a sea voyage by the son of the King of Rum (Constantinople), whose boat lodges on the Gayo origin mountain, to a version of Joseph and his brothers (the origin story for Isaq) and the story of Cain and Abel, which serves as the charter for man’s relation to hunting spirits. Gayo attribute their early conversion to Islam to the missionary work of Abdurrauf, the early seventeenth century west Aceh ulama whose commentary on the Qur’an was disputably the central religious text in early Aceh. Moreover, there are no Gayo traditions or tales in which Gayo are represented as non- or pre-Islamic. Ethnohistorically, Gayo conversion took place in the distant, murky past. In legend, Islam is represented as present at the beginning.
Gayo. The Gayo live primarily in the highland areas of the province of Aceh, Indonesia. From sixty to seventy percent live near the town of Takengon in the regency of Central Aceh. Increasingly large numbers have moved to cities elsewhere in Indonesia, principally Banda Aceh, Medan and Jakarta. They are totally Sunni Muslim.
The term “Gayo” is used by Gayo and others to refer both to a people and to their language, Bahasa Gayo of the Western Malayo-Polynesian group. Acehnese sources indicate that Gayo was already a distinct ethnic term by the sixteenth century, and an ethnohistorical perusal of Gayo and Acehnese traditions suggests that Islamization of the area was well under way by the seventeenth century.
Modernist Islam entered Gayo in the late 1920s through west Sumatran traders, but several Gayo ulama soon thereafter attended reformist leaning schools in Aceh and Surabaya. Takengon soon became the center for the reformist group (kaum muda) which sought to change traditional practices deemed to be contrary to the tenets of Islam, including the traditions and legal norms governing marriage, inheritance and divorce. Whereas the Dutch administration sought to remake Gayo adat in accord with its legal views, the reformists argued that Islamic law should be applied to Gayo society through a judicial body independent of adat specialists and traditional rulers.
Shortly after independence (1945), a separate Islamic court, the Mahkamah Syariah, was established in Takengon and began to hear inheritance and divorce cases. The impact of the court was most felt in its strict application of Islamic inheritance law, which allots shares to both sons and daughters at a ratio of two to one.
Although there are no written sources for the history of Islam in Gayo, indigenous traditions and the long-term Acehnese suzerainty indicate that the Gayo have been Muslims for at least three centuries. Although one Acehnese account claims that the Gayo fled upriver from the coast to avoid becoming Muslim, this refusal to become Muslim, were it to have occurred, would have been in the early fourteenth century, at the time of the conversion of the northern coastal city states. The story is therefore consistent with an eventual conversion of the Gayo to Islam by the time of Sultan Iskandar Muda’s reign in the early seventeenth century, when the Gayo appear to have been included in the Acehnese realm.
The entire corpus of Gayo origin stories is structured around Islamic (often originally Judeo-Christian) tales, beginning with a sea voyage by the son of the King of Rum (Constantinople), whose boat lodges on the Gayo origin mountain, to a version of Joseph and his brothers (the origin story for Isaq) and the story of Cain and Abel, which serves as the charter for man’s relation to hunting spirits. Gayo attribute their early conversion to Islam to the missionary work of Abdurrauf, the early seventeenth century west Aceh ulama whose commentary on the Qur’an was disputably the central religious text in early Aceh. Moreover, there are no Gayo traditions or tales in which Gayo are represented as non- or pre-Islamic. Ethnohistorically, Gayo conversion took place in the distant, murky past. In legend, Islam is represented as present at the beginning.
Gbagyi
Gbagyi (Gbari) (Gwari). A subgroup of the Gbari. The Gbagyi live in four Nigerian states: Niger, Plateau, Kaduna and Kwara. These states form the heartland of Nigeria and constitute an area of great ethnic heterogeneity. Gbagyi come into contact with numerous peoples, ranging from centralized Town Fulani and culturally similar Kamberi. All Gbagyi claim to come from Bornu and to have split into their two main sections after emigrating from there. The Gbagyi Ngenge (“True Gbagyi”) live in Plateau State near Abuja. Perhaps ten percent of the Gbagyi Ngenge are Muslim. The Gbagyi Yamma (“Western Gbagyi”) are centered in Niger and Kwara states. About half of the Gbagyi Yamma are Muslim.
Gwari people were often enslaved by some of the nearby Hausa-Fulani emirates.
Gbari see Gbagyi
Gwari see Gbagyi
Gbagyi (Gbari) (Gwari). A subgroup of the Gbari. The Gbagyi live in four Nigerian states: Niger, Plateau, Kaduna and Kwara. These states form the heartland of Nigeria and constitute an area of great ethnic heterogeneity. Gbagyi come into contact with numerous peoples, ranging from centralized Town Fulani and culturally similar Kamberi. All Gbagyi claim to come from Bornu and to have split into their two main sections after emigrating from there. The Gbagyi Ngenge (“True Gbagyi”) live in Plateau State near Abuja. Perhaps ten percent of the Gbagyi Ngenge are Muslim. The Gbagyi Yamma (“Western Gbagyi”) are centered in Niger and Kwara states. About half of the Gbagyi Yamma are Muslim.
Gwari people were often enslaved by some of the nearby Hausa-Fulani emirates.
Gbari see Gbagyi
Gwari see Gbagyi
Gbaya
Gbaya. The Gbaya-speaking peoples (often referred to as the Baya), are the largest ethnic grouping of east-central Cameroon and the western Central African Republic. The various Gbaya dialects have been classified in the Eastern (sometimes called Ubangian) branch of Greenberg’s Adamawa-Eastern language sub-family, which in turn is a part of the broad Niger-Congo language grouping.
The Gbaya first came into contact with Islam in the early 1800's as a result of the Adamawa jihad of the Fulani from northern Cameroon and northern Nigeria. In particular, the founding of the Fulani city state of Ngaoundere in the 1830s marked the start of significant Muslim influence on the Gbaya when regular slave raids on Gbaya groups began to be launched from Ngaoundere. The Gbaya also first came into contact with Muslim Hausa and Kanuri traders, at this time, as long distance caravans penetrated the Gbaya area in search of slaves, ivory and kola nuts. Some of these Muslim traders settled down in the larger Gbaya villages, and in continuing their commercial activities, they were active in disseminting Islam.
By the 1850s, a number of Gbaya leaders had established regular tribute and trade relations with the Fulani and Hausa and used these links to increase their power within their local communities. A condition of the establishment of friendly relations between Ngaoundere and these Gbaya groups was that the Gbaya chiefs espouse Islam. Mosques or prayer grounds were established in the larger Gbaya villages, but the influence of Islam at this period was restricted to the immediate followings of chiefs. This process of political centralization continued throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, and in the 1890s when French and German explorers first entered this region, several relatively strong Gbaya chieftancies had developed at towns such as Bertoua, Baboua, Lokoti (near Meiganga) and Betare Oya.
Thus, from the very outset of Gbaya contact with Islam, there has been a close association between this religion and centralized political power in Gbaya society. The association continues today in that Gbaya canton chiefs are all Muslim and mount a court display of titled officials and retainers, musicians and imams which is closely modelled on Fulani Muslim patterns.
The Gbaya live in Central African Republic, East-central Cameroon, the north of the Republic of Congo, and the northwest of the Democratic Republic of Congo. They numbered 970,000 at the end of the 20th century. They are the largest ethnic group in the Central African Republic, comprising 34% of the population there.
Baya see Gbaya.
Gbaya. The Gbaya-speaking peoples (often referred to as the Baya), are the largest ethnic grouping of east-central Cameroon and the western Central African Republic. The various Gbaya dialects have been classified in the Eastern (sometimes called Ubangian) branch of Greenberg’s Adamawa-Eastern language sub-family, which in turn is a part of the broad Niger-Congo language grouping.
The Gbaya first came into contact with Islam in the early 1800's as a result of the Adamawa jihad of the Fulani from northern Cameroon and northern Nigeria. In particular, the founding of the Fulani city state of Ngaoundere in the 1830s marked the start of significant Muslim influence on the Gbaya when regular slave raids on Gbaya groups began to be launched from Ngaoundere. The Gbaya also first came into contact with Muslim Hausa and Kanuri traders, at this time, as long distance caravans penetrated the Gbaya area in search of slaves, ivory and kola nuts. Some of these Muslim traders settled down in the larger Gbaya villages, and in continuing their commercial activities, they were active in disseminting Islam.
By the 1850s, a number of Gbaya leaders had established regular tribute and trade relations with the Fulani and Hausa and used these links to increase their power within their local communities. A condition of the establishment of friendly relations between Ngaoundere and these Gbaya groups was that the Gbaya chiefs espouse Islam. Mosques or prayer grounds were established in the larger Gbaya villages, but the influence of Islam at this period was restricted to the immediate followings of chiefs. This process of political centralization continued throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, and in the 1890s when French and German explorers first entered this region, several relatively strong Gbaya chieftancies had developed at towns such as Bertoua, Baboua, Lokoti (near Meiganga) and Betare Oya.
Thus, from the very outset of Gbaya contact with Islam, there has been a close association between this religion and centralized political power in Gbaya society. The association continues today in that Gbaya canton chiefs are all Muslim and mount a court display of titled officials and retainers, musicians and imams which is closely modelled on Fulani Muslim patterns.
The Gbaya live in Central African Republic, East-central Cameroon, the north of the Republic of Congo, and the northwest of the Democratic Republic of Congo. They numbered 970,000 at the end of the 20th century. They are the largest ethnic group in the Central African Republic, comprising 34% of the population there.
Baya see Gbaya.
Geber
Geber (in Arabic, Jabir ibn Aflah) (Abu Muhammad Jabir ibn Aflah) (1100, in Seville, Spain – 1150). Astronomer of Seville of the twelfth century. His astronomic work, which sharply criticizes certain views held by Ptolemy and contains a chapter on trigonometry, was translated into Latin by Gerard of Cremona.
Abu Muhammad Jabir ibn Aflah was an Arab Muslim astronomer, mathematician and inventor whose works, once translated into Latin (under his Latinized name Geber), influenced later European mathematicians and astronomers. He invented an observational instrument known as the torquetum, a mechanical device to transform between spherical coordinate systems. Gerolamo Cardano noted much of the material of Regiomontanus on spherical trigonometry was plagiarized from the twelfth-century work of the Jäbir ibn Aflah. Similarly the trigonometry that Nicholas Copernicus (1473-1543) outlined in the first part of his epochal work De revolutionibus was also apparently inspired by Jabir ibn Aflah.
Jabir ibn Aflah see Geber
Abu Muhammad Jabir ibn Aflah see Geber
Geber (in Arabic, Jabir ibn Aflah) (Abu Muhammad Jabir ibn Aflah) (1100, in Seville, Spain – 1150). Astronomer of Seville of the twelfth century. His astronomic work, which sharply criticizes certain views held by Ptolemy and contains a chapter on trigonometry, was translated into Latin by Gerard of Cremona.
Abu Muhammad Jabir ibn Aflah was an Arab Muslim astronomer, mathematician and inventor whose works, once translated into Latin (under his Latinized name Geber), influenced later European mathematicians and astronomers. He invented an observational instrument known as the torquetum, a mechanical device to transform between spherical coordinate systems. Gerolamo Cardano noted much of the material of Regiomontanus on spherical trigonometry was plagiarized from the twelfth-century work of the Jäbir ibn Aflah. Similarly the trigonometry that Nicholas Copernicus (1473-1543) outlined in the first part of his epochal work De revolutionibus was also apparently inspired by Jabir ibn Aflah.
Jabir ibn Aflah see Geber
Abu Muhammad Jabir ibn Aflah see Geber
Geber
Geber. See Jabir ibn Hayyan.
Geber. See Jabir ibn Hayyan.
Gelofe
Gelofe (Galofo) (Wolof) (Ouolof). African ethnic group, today known as Wolof, located in Senegal, many of whose members were shipped as slaves to Peru and the Caribbean. Because of their insubordination and tendency to run away, the planters considered these Muslim slaves to be a very dangerous influence.
The Wolof (also spelled Ouolof) are an ethnic group found in Senegal, The Gambia, and Mauritania.
In Senegal, the Wolof form an ethnic plurality with about 40% of the population self-identifying as Wolof. They are also the majority in the region stretching from Saint-Louis in the north, Kaolack in the center, and Dakar to the west. However, there are few Wolof who reside in Casamance.
In The Gambia, about 15% of the population are Wolof. Here, they are a minority, where the Mandinka are the majority with 40% of the population, yet Wolof language and culture have a disproportionate influence because of their prevalence in Banjul, The Gambia's capital, where 50% of the population are Wolof.
In Mauritania, about 7% of the population are Wolof. They live largely in the southern coastal region of the country.
Most Wolof are farmers, growing peanuts (groundnuts) as a cash crop and millet and sorghum as staples; many, however, live and work in Dakar and Banjul as traders, goldsmiths, tailors, carpenters, teachers, and civil servants. Traditional groups were characterized by a markedly hierarchical social stratification, including royalty, an aristocracy, a warrior class, commoners, slaves, and members of low-status artisan castes; at their head was a paramount chief.
In the past the Wolof observed double descent; i.e., descent was traced through both the male and female lines. Islamic influence, however, has tended to make the male line dominant. A household unit may consist of a nuclear family (husband, wife, and minor children) or a polygynous family (a husband, his several wives, and their children). Other close kin, however, may sometimes be found together with the nuclear family. Wolof women are renowned for their elaborate hairstyles, abundant gold ornaments, and voluminous dresses.
The Wolof Empire was a medieval West African state that ruled parts of Senegal and The Gambia from approximately 1350 to 1890. While only ever consolidated into a single state structure for part of this time, the tradition of governance, caste, and culture of the Wolof dominate the history of north-central Senegal for much of the last 800 years. Its final demise at the hands of French colonial forces in the 1870s-1890s also marks the beginning of the formation of Senegal as a unified state.
Galofo see Gelofe
Wolof see Gelofe
Ouolof see Gelofe
Gelofe (Galofo) (Wolof) (Ouolof). African ethnic group, today known as Wolof, located in Senegal, many of whose members were shipped as slaves to Peru and the Caribbean. Because of their insubordination and tendency to run away, the planters considered these Muslim slaves to be a very dangerous influence.
The Wolof (also spelled Ouolof) are an ethnic group found in Senegal, The Gambia, and Mauritania.
In Senegal, the Wolof form an ethnic plurality with about 40% of the population self-identifying as Wolof. They are also the majority in the region stretching from Saint-Louis in the north, Kaolack in the center, and Dakar to the west. However, there are few Wolof who reside in Casamance.
In The Gambia, about 15% of the population are Wolof. Here, they are a minority, where the Mandinka are the majority with 40% of the population, yet Wolof language and culture have a disproportionate influence because of their prevalence in Banjul, The Gambia's capital, where 50% of the population are Wolof.
In Mauritania, about 7% of the population are Wolof. They live largely in the southern coastal region of the country.
Most Wolof are farmers, growing peanuts (groundnuts) as a cash crop and millet and sorghum as staples; many, however, live and work in Dakar and Banjul as traders, goldsmiths, tailors, carpenters, teachers, and civil servants. Traditional groups were characterized by a markedly hierarchical social stratification, including royalty, an aristocracy, a warrior class, commoners, slaves, and members of low-status artisan castes; at their head was a paramount chief.
In the past the Wolof observed double descent; i.e., descent was traced through both the male and female lines. Islamic influence, however, has tended to make the male line dominant. A household unit may consist of a nuclear family (husband, wife, and minor children) or a polygynous family (a husband, his several wives, and their children). Other close kin, however, may sometimes be found together with the nuclear family. Wolof women are renowned for their elaborate hairstyles, abundant gold ornaments, and voluminous dresses.
The Wolof Empire was a medieval West African state that ruled parts of Senegal and The Gambia from approximately 1350 to 1890. While only ever consolidated into a single state structure for part of this time, the tradition of governance, caste, and culture of the Wolof dominate the history of north-central Senegal for much of the last 800 years. Its final demise at the hands of French colonial forces in the 1870s-1890s also marks the beginning of the formation of Senegal as a unified state.
Galofo see Gelofe
Wolof see Gelofe
Ouolof see Gelofe
Gemayel, Amin
Gemayel, Amin (Amine Pierre Gemayel) (b. January 22, 1942) was President of Lebanon from 1982 to 1988 and the leader of Kataeb Party.
Gemayel was born on November 10, 1942, in Bikfayya (20 kilometers east of Beirut) into a Maronite Christian family, as son of Pierre Gemayel, a founder of the Phalange Party. In 1965, after graduating with a law degree from Saint Joseph University in Beirut, Gemayel began working as an attorney at law.
In 1970, Gemayel became a member of the parliament, representing the Phalange Party. He was, at the time, the youngest member of parliament.
In 1976, Gemayel established contact with the Syrian forces that had intervened in the Lebanese Civil War.
On September 21, 1982, after Gemayel’s brother Bashir had been assassinated on September 14, Gemayel was elected president of Lebanon. Gemayel’s election was an attempt to fill the political void left by the demise of Bashir. The parliament vote concerning Gemayel’s presidency was 78 to 1.
On May 17, 1983, under pressure from the United States, Gemayel signed an agreement with Israel, following discussions that had taken the first half of the year. In September 1983, Gemayel sent a letter to Syrian president Hafiz al-Assad asking for the withdrawal of Syrian forces in Lebanon.
In February of 1984, Gemayel dispatched the army against the Shi‘i strongholds in West Beirut, but it failed to bring them under government control. Instead, the Lebanese army started to split according to religious division lines. In March, Gemayel appointed a new government led by Rashid Karami, a Sunni Muslim, intended to bring national reconciliation to Lebanon.
On August 29, 1984, Gemayel’s father, Pierre, died. The death of Pierre Gemayel resulted in a deterioration of Gemayel’s position in Lebanese politics, especially inside the Phalange Party.
On September 22, 1988, on his last day in office, Gemayel appointed Michel Aoun as leader of an interim military government, in order to rule until a new president was elected. On September 23, as his term of office came to an end, Gemayel stepped down as president. In October, Gemayel moved to the United States where he became a lecturer and fellow at Harvard University.
In 1989, Gemayel moved to France, where he reverted to being a businessman, and as leader of the opposition. Hoping that his absence would help to heal the divisions of Lebanon, Gemayel went into exile for the next twelve years, living variously in Switzerland, France, and the United States, where he lectured at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs (1988 - 1989) and at the University of Maryland, College Park. In 2000, however, he returned to Lebanon and began to organize the opposition to the government of President Émile Lahoud, whom he regarded as a Syrian puppet. Unable to regain control of the then pro-Syrian dominated official Kataeb Party, he founded a new party, Al qaida al Kataebiya, which claimed to be the true successor to the old Kataeb Party founded by his father. He also joined the Qornet Chehwan Gathering, a group of anti-government politicians (mostly Christian) leading numerous different political parties.
In 2003, Amin Gemayel attempted to act as an intermediary between United States President George W. Bush and the Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein. Although his efforts to forestall the ensuing Iraq War were not successful, they fuelled speculation that he might be a candidate for Secretary General of the United Nations when Kofi Annan's term expired.
After the Cedar Revolution the Kataeb factions were united under the leadership of Gemayel. In the August 2007 by-elections of the Metn region, Amin Gemayel lost by a small margin to a candidate presented by Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement.
Gemayel married Joyce Tyan in December 1967. They had a daughter (Nicole) and two sons (Pierre and Sami). Pierre Gemayel was elected to Parliament in 2000, and established his reputation as a moderate opposition politician before being appointed to the Cabinet in 2005. He was assassinated by unidentified assailants in Jdeideh, a Beirut suburb, on November 21, 2006. Amin Gemayel angrily blamed Syria for the murder of his son.
Gemayel was fluent in English and French, and he was regarded as a scholar of Classical Arabic.
Unlike his brother Bashir, Amin was never active in the Phalangist militia, and not directly involved in the Lebanese Civil War. Amin was considered a moderate, and at his accession many Muslims hoped that he represented an end to the dominance of the extreme powers in the Phalange Party. The problems Amin had to face were grave: two foreign armies occupied large parts of the country (hence these areas were out of his jurisdiction), and there was extensive violence throughout the country. In the north, pro- and anti-Syrian groups fought each other, and in the southern Israeli-dominated area, Phalangists and Druze faced each other. Even in the government controlled areas in central Lebanon, many militia groups were fighting each other.
A central dilemma to Gemayel’s politics was the need of meeting the demands from the Muslims, without destroying the support from his own Christians. Balancing the interests of Lebanon with those of Syria was another challenge. While Gemayel was helped to power by the Syrians, he ultimately lost their support after a mere two years.
Amin Gemayel see Gemayel, Amin
Amine Pierre Gemayel see Gemayel, Amin
Gemayel, Amine Pierre see Gemayel, Amin
Gemayel, Amin (Amine Pierre Gemayel) (b. January 22, 1942) was President of Lebanon from 1982 to 1988 and the leader of Kataeb Party.
Gemayel was born on November 10, 1942, in Bikfayya (20 kilometers east of Beirut) into a Maronite Christian family, as son of Pierre Gemayel, a founder of the Phalange Party. In 1965, after graduating with a law degree from Saint Joseph University in Beirut, Gemayel began working as an attorney at law.
In 1970, Gemayel became a member of the parliament, representing the Phalange Party. He was, at the time, the youngest member of parliament.
In 1976, Gemayel established contact with the Syrian forces that had intervened in the Lebanese Civil War.
On September 21, 1982, after Gemayel’s brother Bashir had been assassinated on September 14, Gemayel was elected president of Lebanon. Gemayel’s election was an attempt to fill the political void left by the demise of Bashir. The parliament vote concerning Gemayel’s presidency was 78 to 1.
On May 17, 1983, under pressure from the United States, Gemayel signed an agreement with Israel, following discussions that had taken the first half of the year. In September 1983, Gemayel sent a letter to Syrian president Hafiz al-Assad asking for the withdrawal of Syrian forces in Lebanon.
In February of 1984, Gemayel dispatched the army against the Shi‘i strongholds in West Beirut, but it failed to bring them under government control. Instead, the Lebanese army started to split according to religious division lines. In March, Gemayel appointed a new government led by Rashid Karami, a Sunni Muslim, intended to bring national reconciliation to Lebanon.
On August 29, 1984, Gemayel’s father, Pierre, died. The death of Pierre Gemayel resulted in a deterioration of Gemayel’s position in Lebanese politics, especially inside the Phalange Party.
On September 22, 1988, on his last day in office, Gemayel appointed Michel Aoun as leader of an interim military government, in order to rule until a new president was elected. On September 23, as his term of office came to an end, Gemayel stepped down as president. In October, Gemayel moved to the United States where he became a lecturer and fellow at Harvard University.
In 1989, Gemayel moved to France, where he reverted to being a businessman, and as leader of the opposition. Hoping that his absence would help to heal the divisions of Lebanon, Gemayel went into exile for the next twelve years, living variously in Switzerland, France, and the United States, where he lectured at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs (1988 - 1989) and at the University of Maryland, College Park. In 2000, however, he returned to Lebanon and began to organize the opposition to the government of President Émile Lahoud, whom he regarded as a Syrian puppet. Unable to regain control of the then pro-Syrian dominated official Kataeb Party, he founded a new party, Al qaida al Kataebiya, which claimed to be the true successor to the old Kataeb Party founded by his father. He also joined the Qornet Chehwan Gathering, a group of anti-government politicians (mostly Christian) leading numerous different political parties.
In 2003, Amin Gemayel attempted to act as an intermediary between United States President George W. Bush and the Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein. Although his efforts to forestall the ensuing Iraq War were not successful, they fuelled speculation that he might be a candidate for Secretary General of the United Nations when Kofi Annan's term expired.
After the Cedar Revolution the Kataeb factions were united under the leadership of Gemayel. In the August 2007 by-elections of the Metn region, Amin Gemayel lost by a small margin to a candidate presented by Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement.
Gemayel married Joyce Tyan in December 1967. They had a daughter (Nicole) and two sons (Pierre and Sami). Pierre Gemayel was elected to Parliament in 2000, and established his reputation as a moderate opposition politician before being appointed to the Cabinet in 2005. He was assassinated by unidentified assailants in Jdeideh, a Beirut suburb, on November 21, 2006. Amin Gemayel angrily blamed Syria for the murder of his son.
Gemayel was fluent in English and French, and he was regarded as a scholar of Classical Arabic.
Unlike his brother Bashir, Amin was never active in the Phalangist militia, and not directly involved in the Lebanese Civil War. Amin was considered a moderate, and at his accession many Muslims hoped that he represented an end to the dominance of the extreme powers in the Phalange Party. The problems Amin had to face were grave: two foreign armies occupied large parts of the country (hence these areas were out of his jurisdiction), and there was extensive violence throughout the country. In the north, pro- and anti-Syrian groups fought each other, and in the southern Israeli-dominated area, Phalangists and Druze faced each other. Even in the government controlled areas in central Lebanon, many militia groups were fighting each other.
A central dilemma to Gemayel’s politics was the need of meeting the demands from the Muslims, without destroying the support from his own Christians. Balancing the interests of Lebanon with those of Syria was another challenge. While Gemayel was helped to power by the Syrians, he ultimately lost their support after a mere two years.
Amin Gemayel see Gemayel, Amin
Amine Pierre Gemayel see Gemayel, Amin
Gemayel, Amine Pierre see Gemayel, Amin
Gemayel, Bashir
Gemayel, Bashir (Bachir Gemayel) (Bashir al-Jumayyil El Gemaiel) (Bashir Joomayyeel) (November 10, 1947 – September 14, 1982) was a Lebanese politician, militia commander, and president-elect. (1947-1982). Lebanese politician who became the president-elect in 1982.
Bashir Gemayel was born on November 10, 1947 in Bikfayya (20 kilometers east of Beirut), into a Maronite Christian family, as the youngest son of Pierre Gemayel and the brother of Amin Gemayel.
In 1971, Gemayel graduated from St. Joseph University, Beirut with a bachelor degree in Law and Political Science. In 1972, Gemayel was appointed political director of the Ashrafiyya district of Beirut.
In 1975, Gemayel became an attorney after three years of legal internship. In April of 1975, with the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War, Gemayel joined the Phalangist militia, fighting the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) forces.
In July 1976 after the death of the Commander-in-Chief of the Phalangist Military Council, Bashir is appointed as his follower. On August 30, Gemayel was appointed head of the unified command of the Lebanese Forces, a coalition of the Christian militias of the Phalange Party, the National Liberal Party, the Tanzim and the Guardians of the Cedars.
In 1977, Bashir married Solange Toutounji.
In June 1978, Bashir had Tony Franjiyah, the son of Lebanon’s president, assassinated.
On February 23, 1980, Bashir’s infant child Maya was killed by a car bomb which was intended for Bashir. On July 7, 1980, the military alliance which Bashir led, was unified into one as the Lebanese Forces. Bashir Gemayel became commander-in-chief. In December of 1980, through the Lebanese Front, Bashir launched an initiative for a federal Lebanon.
In January 1981, Bashir became Chief of the Phalange Security Council, and a member of the party’s political bureau.
In June 1982, Bashir cooperated with Israeli troops stationed in the outskirts of Beirut. On August 23, he was elected president, with 57 out of 65 votes in the parliament. Bashir started preparing for the presidency by conducting talks with Muslim and Christian leaders. On September 1, he met with Menachim Begin and agreed to commence diplomatic relations with Israel.
On September 14, 1982, Bashir Gemayel was killed by a bomb in the Phalangist headquarters in Ashrafiyya, Beirut, together with 26 others. This was only eight days before he was to be installed in office. It was later discovered that the bomb had been placed at the headquarters by Syrian agents.
Gemayel was a ruthless politician. He strove to become president by having rivals assassinated, or stripped of power through tactics. He was also the architect behind a secret cooperation with Israel. The background for this was one of his main objectives – to get rid of Palestinian (PLO) guerrillas in Lebanon.
Gemayel was also a charismatic and strong leader. Singlehandedly, he brought prominence to the Phalange Party. Gemayel was the leader of the Phalange and was responsible for bringing it into the forefront of Lebanon’s political life.
Even while he was a military leader, Gemayel was a shrewd politician. He used the Lebanese Forces to provide for basic public services, in fields where the state services had disappeared: water, electricity, road maintenance, garbage collection, social relief as well as running two radio stations and a television station.
At his death in 1982, Gemayel left a wife, Solange, and two children.
Bashir Gemayel see Gemayel, Bashir
Bachir Gemayel see Gemayel, Bashir
Gemayel, Bachir see Gemayel, Bashir
Gemaiel, Bashir al-Jumayyil El see Gemayel, Bashir
Joomayyeel, Bashir see Gemayel, Bashir
Gemayel, Bashir (Bachir Gemayel) (Bashir al-Jumayyil El Gemaiel) (Bashir Joomayyeel) (November 10, 1947 – September 14, 1982) was a Lebanese politician, militia commander, and president-elect. (1947-1982). Lebanese politician who became the president-elect in 1982.
Bashir Gemayel was born on November 10, 1947 in Bikfayya (20 kilometers east of Beirut), into a Maronite Christian family, as the youngest son of Pierre Gemayel and the brother of Amin Gemayel.
In 1971, Gemayel graduated from St. Joseph University, Beirut with a bachelor degree in Law and Political Science. In 1972, Gemayel was appointed political director of the Ashrafiyya district of Beirut.
In 1975, Gemayel became an attorney after three years of legal internship. In April of 1975, with the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War, Gemayel joined the Phalangist militia, fighting the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) forces.
In July 1976 after the death of the Commander-in-Chief of the Phalangist Military Council, Bashir is appointed as his follower. On August 30, Gemayel was appointed head of the unified command of the Lebanese Forces, a coalition of the Christian militias of the Phalange Party, the National Liberal Party, the Tanzim and the Guardians of the Cedars.
In 1977, Bashir married Solange Toutounji.
In June 1978, Bashir had Tony Franjiyah, the son of Lebanon’s president, assassinated.
On February 23, 1980, Bashir’s infant child Maya was killed by a car bomb which was intended for Bashir. On July 7, 1980, the military alliance which Bashir led, was unified into one as the Lebanese Forces. Bashir Gemayel became commander-in-chief. In December of 1980, through the Lebanese Front, Bashir launched an initiative for a federal Lebanon.
In January 1981, Bashir became Chief of the Phalange Security Council, and a member of the party’s political bureau.
In June 1982, Bashir cooperated with Israeli troops stationed in the outskirts of Beirut. On August 23, he was elected president, with 57 out of 65 votes in the parliament. Bashir started preparing for the presidency by conducting talks with Muslim and Christian leaders. On September 1, he met with Menachim Begin and agreed to commence diplomatic relations with Israel.
On September 14, 1982, Bashir Gemayel was killed by a bomb in the Phalangist headquarters in Ashrafiyya, Beirut, together with 26 others. This was only eight days before he was to be installed in office. It was later discovered that the bomb had been placed at the headquarters by Syrian agents.
Gemayel was a ruthless politician. He strove to become president by having rivals assassinated, or stripped of power through tactics. He was also the architect behind a secret cooperation with Israel. The background for this was one of his main objectives – to get rid of Palestinian (PLO) guerrillas in Lebanon.
Gemayel was also a charismatic and strong leader. Singlehandedly, he brought prominence to the Phalange Party. Gemayel was the leader of the Phalange and was responsible for bringing it into the forefront of Lebanon’s political life.
Even while he was a military leader, Gemayel was a shrewd politician. He used the Lebanese Forces to provide for basic public services, in fields where the state services had disappeared: water, electricity, road maintenance, garbage collection, social relief as well as running two radio stations and a television station.
At his death in 1982, Gemayel left a wife, Solange, and two children.
Bashir Gemayel see Gemayel, Bashir
Bachir Gemayel see Gemayel, Bashir
Gemayel, Bachir see Gemayel, Bashir
Gemaiel, Bashir al-Jumayyil El see Gemayel, Bashir
Joomayyeel, Bashir see Gemayel, Bashir
Gemayel, Pierre
Gemayel, Pierre (Pierre Jmayyel) (Pierre Jemayyel) (Pierre al-Jumayyil) (November 6, 1905 – August 29, 1984). Lebanese politician and the founder of the Phalange Party. He was respectfully known as Shaykh Pierre.
Pierre Gemayel was born on November 6, 1905, into a notable Maronite Christian family in Bikfayya (20 kilometers east of Beirut). In 1914, because his family opposed Ottoman rule in Lebanon, they all had to seek refuge in Mansoura in Egypt.
In 1918, the Gemayel family returned to Lebanon after the fall of Ottoman power.
In the 1920s, Pierre attended universities in Beirut and Paris, France, in an effort to become a pharmacist. He subsequently opened up a pharmacy in Beirut.
In 1936, Pierre founded the Phalange Party (or Kataeb Party) as it is also known together with four others: Charles Helou (who later became president of Lebanon), Shafic Nassif, Emile Yared and Georges Maccache. In 1937, the Phalangists rallied to demonstrate in Beirut. The demonstration was crushed by French authorities. Gemayel was arrested, but released after a short time.
In 1958, during the two month civil war, Gemayel and the Phalange Party sided with president Chamoun against the pan-Arabists. On September 23, Fuad Chehab became the new president, and Gemayel was appointed to the four member interim cabinet.
In June and July of 1960, Gemayel was elected to the parliament.
In 1962, an assassination attempt was made on Gemayel’s life.
In September of 1964, Gemayel became Minister of Finance in the government of Hussein Oweini.
In 1968, with the general elections, Gemayel formed a triple alliance together with Chamoun and Raymond Edde. This alliance defined the presence of Palestinian militian men in Lebanon as a threat to national security.
In 1970, Gemayel gave his support to Suleiman Franjiyah in the president elections. Franjiyah was elected president.
In April of 1975, with the start of the Lebanese Civil War, the Phalange militia became important in the fighting, and with them Gemayel’s son, Bashir.
In 1976, the Phalange Party turned to its secret ally, Israel, for support against the Syrian backed groups. Gemayel helped to form the Lebanese Front, an alliance of Christian parties. Chamoun was also one of the participants in this effort.
In May 1978, Gemayel visited Israel to sign an arms and training agreement.
On June 5, 1979, another assassination attempt was made on Gemayel’s life.
In 1980, following fighting between the militia of the Phalange Party and Chamoun’s party, Gemayel and Chamoun decided to solve the conflict by merging the two parties.
In September 1982, Gemayel’s son Bashir, the president-elect, was killed by Syrian agents. A week later Gemayel’s other son, Amin, was elected president.
In April of 1984, Gemayel joined the government of Rashid Karami. Later, in May of 1984, during the National Reconciliation Conference in Switzerland, Gemayel together with Chamoun, gave support to forming a federal system of government in Lebanon. However, Gemayel did not garner sufficient support from other participants and the proposal died.
In July of 1984, Gemayel stepped down as chairman of the Phalange Party.
On August 29, 1984, Pierre Gemayel died from a heart attack in his home in Bikfayya.
Pierre Gemayel’s politics were based upon a profound belief that Muslims and Christians of Lebanon could co-exist. However, his main political act was inspired by a distinctly non-tolerant organization: the Nazi Youth Movement that he had seen in Hitler’s Germany. During the first ten years, the Phalange Party grew from a handful of members to nearly 40,000, both men and women.
Other central motifs of Gemayel’s politics were his opposition to both pan-Arabism and the French mandate. Gemayel wanted to build Lebanon into a country that was free from any foreign influences.
Gemayel’s importance as a politician was often of an indirect nature. He had influence on other politician’s careers, and could practice a great deal of pressure on their politics. The completion of this was when he had his son Amin elected president of Lebanon in 1982 (Pierre’s other son, Bashir, had at first been elect but was assassinated).
Pierre Gemayel see Gemayel, Pierre
Shaykh Pierre see Gemayel, Pierre
Jmayyel, Pierre see Gemayel, Pierre
Jemayyel, Pierre see Gemayel, Pierre
Jumayyil, Pierre al- see Gemayel, Pierre
Gemayel, Pierre (Pierre Jmayyel) (Pierre Jemayyel) (Pierre al-Jumayyil) (November 6, 1905 – August 29, 1984). Lebanese politician and the founder of the Phalange Party. He was respectfully known as Shaykh Pierre.
Pierre Gemayel was born on November 6, 1905, into a notable Maronite Christian family in Bikfayya (20 kilometers east of Beirut). In 1914, because his family opposed Ottoman rule in Lebanon, they all had to seek refuge in Mansoura in Egypt.
In 1918, the Gemayel family returned to Lebanon after the fall of Ottoman power.
In the 1920s, Pierre attended universities in Beirut and Paris, France, in an effort to become a pharmacist. He subsequently opened up a pharmacy in Beirut.
In 1936, Pierre founded the Phalange Party (or Kataeb Party) as it is also known together with four others: Charles Helou (who later became president of Lebanon), Shafic Nassif, Emile Yared and Georges Maccache. In 1937, the Phalangists rallied to demonstrate in Beirut. The demonstration was crushed by French authorities. Gemayel was arrested, but released after a short time.
In 1958, during the two month civil war, Gemayel and the Phalange Party sided with president Chamoun against the pan-Arabists. On September 23, Fuad Chehab became the new president, and Gemayel was appointed to the four member interim cabinet.
In June and July of 1960, Gemayel was elected to the parliament.
In 1962, an assassination attempt was made on Gemayel’s life.
In September of 1964, Gemayel became Minister of Finance in the government of Hussein Oweini.
In 1968, with the general elections, Gemayel formed a triple alliance together with Chamoun and Raymond Edde. This alliance defined the presence of Palestinian militian men in Lebanon as a threat to national security.
In 1970, Gemayel gave his support to Suleiman Franjiyah in the president elections. Franjiyah was elected president.
In April of 1975, with the start of the Lebanese Civil War, the Phalange militia became important in the fighting, and with them Gemayel’s son, Bashir.
In 1976, the Phalange Party turned to its secret ally, Israel, for support against the Syrian backed groups. Gemayel helped to form the Lebanese Front, an alliance of Christian parties. Chamoun was also one of the participants in this effort.
In May 1978, Gemayel visited Israel to sign an arms and training agreement.
On June 5, 1979, another assassination attempt was made on Gemayel’s life.
In 1980, following fighting between the militia of the Phalange Party and Chamoun’s party, Gemayel and Chamoun decided to solve the conflict by merging the two parties.
In September 1982, Gemayel’s son Bashir, the president-elect, was killed by Syrian agents. A week later Gemayel’s other son, Amin, was elected president.
In April of 1984, Gemayel joined the government of Rashid Karami. Later, in May of 1984, during the National Reconciliation Conference in Switzerland, Gemayel together with Chamoun, gave support to forming a federal system of government in Lebanon. However, Gemayel did not garner sufficient support from other participants and the proposal died.
In July of 1984, Gemayel stepped down as chairman of the Phalange Party.
On August 29, 1984, Pierre Gemayel died from a heart attack in his home in Bikfayya.
Pierre Gemayel’s politics were based upon a profound belief that Muslims and Christians of Lebanon could co-exist. However, his main political act was inspired by a distinctly non-tolerant organization: the Nazi Youth Movement that he had seen in Hitler’s Germany. During the first ten years, the Phalange Party grew from a handful of members to nearly 40,000, both men and women.
Other central motifs of Gemayel’s politics were his opposition to both pan-Arabism and the French mandate. Gemayel wanted to build Lebanon into a country that was free from any foreign influences.
Gemayel’s importance as a politician was often of an indirect nature. He had influence on other politician’s careers, and could practice a great deal of pressure on their politics. The completion of this was when he had his son Amin elected president of Lebanon in 1982 (Pierre’s other son, Bashir, had at first been elect but was assassinated).
Pierre Gemayel see Gemayel, Pierre
Shaykh Pierre see Gemayel, Pierre
Jmayyel, Pierre see Gemayel, Pierre
Jemayyel, Pierre see Gemayel, Pierre
Jumayyil, Pierre al- see Gemayel, Pierre
Genghis Khan
Genghis Khan. See Jenghiz Khan.
Jenghiz Khan see Genghis Khan.
Genghis Khan. See Jenghiz Khan.
Jenghiz Khan see Genghis Khan.
genie (in Arabic, jinn or djinn or jinni or jinniyah – “spirit” or “sprite”). The Qur’an teaches that the genies were created of smokeless flame, while mankind and the angels, the other two classes of intelligent beings, were created of clay and light. Genies are capable of salvation. They play an important role in Arabic, Turkish, Indian and Indonesian folklore. The Arabic term zar, a loanword from the Amharic language of Ethiopia, indicates spirits who may temporarily become incarnate in particular human beings. Belief in the existence of such genie is widespread in Ethiopia itself, in Somalia, Egypt, the Hejaz and in Oman.
In Arabic, a Djinn is a supernatural creature which occupies a parallel world to that of mankind, and together with humans and angels makes up the three sentient creations of Allah. Possessing free will, a djinn can be either good or evil.
The Djinn are mentioned frequently in the Qur'an, and there is a Surah entitled Al-Jinn. While Christianity maintains that Lucifer was an angel that rebelled against God's orders, Islam maintains that Iblis was a Djinn who had been granted special privilege to live amongst angels prior to his rebellion. Although some scholars have ruled that it is apostasy to disbelieve in one of God's creations; the belief in Djinn has fallen comparably to the belief in angels in other Abrahamic traditions.
The word genie derives from Latin genius, which meant a sort of tutelary or guardian spirit thought to be assigned to each person at their birth. English borrowed the French descendent of this word, génie. Its earliest written attestation in English, in 1655, is a plural spelled genyes. The French translators of The Book of One Thousand and One Nights used génie as a translation of jinnī because it was similar to the Arabic word in sound and in meaning. This use was also adopted in English and has since become dominant.
The Arabic root JNN means "hidden, concealed", as in the verb janna "to hide, to conceal". (This is not to be confused with the Arabic word jannah, which means "paradise"). Arabic lexicons, such as William Lane's lexicon provide the rendered meaning of jinn not only for spirits, but also for anything concealed through time, status, and even physical darkness. In Arabic, the word jinn is plural; jinnī is the singular (and adjective). The feminine form is jinnīyah.
Amongst archaeologists dealing with ancient Middle Eastern cultures, any spirit lesser than angels is often referred to as a djinn, especially when describing stone carvings or other forms of art.
The pre-Islamic Zoroastrian culture of ancient Persia believed in jaini/jahi, evil female spirits thought to spread diseases to people. However, Zoroaster himself did not believe in the existence of such evil female spirits.
Inscriptions found in Northwestern Arabia seem to indicate the worship of djinn, or at least their tributary status.
Types of djinn include the Shaitan, the Ghul, the Marid, the Ifrit and the Djinn. According to the information in The Arabian Nights, Ifrit seemed to be the strongest form of djinn, followed by Marid, and then the rest of the djinn forms.
In Islamic theology, djinn are said to be creatures with free will, made from 'smokeless fire' by Allah in the same way humans were made of earth. According to the Qur'an, Djinn have free will, and Iblis used this freedom in front of Allah by refusing to bow to Adam when Allah told Iblis to do so. By disobeying Allah, he was thrown out of Paradise and called “Shaitan”. Djinn are frequently mentioned in the Qur'an, Sura 72 of the Qur'an (named Al-Jinn) is entirely about them. Another Sura (Al-Nas) mentions Djinn in the last verse. The Qur’an also mentions that Muhammad was sent as a prophet to both humanity and the Djinn.
Similar to humans, djinn have free will allowing them to follow any religion they choose. They are usually invisible to humans and humans do not appear clear to them. However, djinn often harass and even possess humans, for various reasons, such as romantic infatuation, revenge, or because of a deal made with a practitioner of black magic. Djinns have the power to travel large distances extremely quickly and live in remote areas, mountains, seas, trees, and the air, in their own communities. Like humans, djinns will also be judged on the Day of Judgment and will be sent to Heaven or Hell according to their deeds.
Every person is assigned a special djinn to them, also called a qareen, the djinns that whisper into your soul and tell you to give in to your evil desires. Muhammad's djinn turned into a Muslim djinn, on the recitation of the Qur'an, as the djinn found it very beautiful. However, the notion of a qareen is not universally accepted amongst all Muslims.
The social organization of the jinn community resembles that of humans - such as they have kings, courts of law, weddings, and mourning rituals. Muhammad reportedly divided djinn into three classes: those who have wings and fly in the air, those who resemble snakes and dogs, and those who travel about ceaselessly. Abd Allah ibn Mas'ud (d. 652), who was accompanying Muhammad when the djinn came to hear his recitation of the Qur'an, described them as creatures of different forms; some resembling vultures and snakes, others tall black men in white garbs. They may even appear as dragons, onagers, or a number of other animals. In addition to their animal forms, the djinn occasionally assume human form to mislead and destroy their human victims. One such jinni who had assumed the form of a beautiful woman was identified because of her beastly feet by her human victim, who killed her by throwing a rope around her neck and dragging her behind his camel. This type of jinn is called mardāzmā, (tester of men) among the Baluch people. Muhammad is also said to have told the djinn that they may subsist on bones, which will grow flesh again as soon as they touch them, and that their animals may live on dung, which will revert back to grain or grass for the use of the djinn flocks.
Muslims believe that the djinn account for much of the "magic" perceived by humans, cooperating with magicians to lift items in the air unseen, delivering hidden truths to fortune tellers, and mimicking the voices of deceased humans during seances.
The Qur'an states that King Solomon (Sulayman) is said to have compelled the djinn into his service and given them dominion over 25 parasangs of his realm. In his court, the djinn stood behind the learned humans, who in turn, sat behind the prophets. Solomon’s wife, the Queen of Sheba, was reportedly born of the marriage between a djinn and a human, some sources suggesting a djinn named Rayḥāna was her mother. It was this connection to the djinn that made people apprehensive about Solomon’s marriage to her. They feared that if their master Solomon married a half-djinn, they would be forced to remain in the service of the offspring of that marriage forever. Thus, to make Solomon fall out of love with her, they told him that she was insane, and that her feet were hairy and resembled
those of a donkey.
The djinn remained in the service of Solomon, who had placed them in bondage, and had ordered their king, Zūba’a, to perform a number of tasks throughout his life. Upon Solomon’s death, however, Zūbaa went to the places where his subjects were toiling, and called out to them to stop working. They happily obeyed, and one of them carved a message in stone, enumerating what they had built during their servitude.
jinn see genie
“spirit” see genie
“sprite" see genie
djinn see genie
jinni see genie
The djinn remained in the service of Solomon, who had placed them in bondage, and had ordered their king, Zūba’a, to perform a number of tasks throughout his life. Upon Solomon’s death, however, Zūbaa went to the places where his subjects were toiling, and called out to them to stop working. They happily obeyed, and one of them carved a message in stone, enumerating what they had built during their servitude.
jinn see genie
“spirit” see genie
“sprite" see genie
djinn see genie
jinni see genie
George
George (Saint George) (in Arabic, Jirjis). Islam honors Saint George, the Christian martyr, as a symbol of resurrection and renovation.
Saint George (ca. 275/281 – 23 April 303, traditionally Lydda, Palestine [now Lod, Israel]) was, according to tradition, a Roman soldier in the Guard of Diocletian, who is venerated as a Christian martyr. In hagiography Saint George is one of the most venerated saints in the Roman Catholic Church, Anglican Church, Eastern Orthodox Church, Oriental Orthodox Church, and the Eastern Catholic Churches. He is immortalized in the tale of Saint George and the Dragon and is one of the Fourteen Holy Helpers. His memorial is celebrated on April 23, and he is regarded as one of the most prominent military saints. He is the patron saint of England.
Nothing of George’s life or deeds can be established, but legends about him as a warrior-saint, dating from the 6th century, became popular and increasingly extravagant. Jacob de Voragine’s Legenda aurea (1265–66; Golden Legend) repeats the story of his rescuing a Libyan king’s daughter from a dragon and then slaying the monster in return for a promise by the king’s subjects to be baptized. George’s slaying of the dragon may be a Christian version of the legend of Perseus, who was said to have rescued Andromeda from a sea monster near Lydda. It is a theme much represented in art, the saint frequently being depicted as a youth wearing knight’s armour with a scarlet cross.
George was known in England by at least the 8th century. Returning crusaders likely popularized his cult (he was said to have been seen helping the Franks at the Battle of Antioch in 1098), but he was probably not recognized as England’s patron saint until after King Edward III (reigned 1327–77) made him the patron of the newly founded Order of the Garter. He was also adopted as protector of several other medieval powers, including Portugal, Genoa, and Venice. With the passing of the chivalric age and finally the Protestant Reformation, the cult of Saint George dwindled. His feast is given a lesser status in the calendar of the Church of England; a holy day of obligation for English Roman Catholics until the late 18th century, it is now an optional memorial for local observance.
However, there is a tradition in the Holy Land of Christians and Muslims going to an Eastern Orthodox shrine for Saint George at Beith Jala. Jews also attend the site in the belief that the prophet Elijah was buried there. According to custom it is believed that Saint George killed the dragon in Palestine. There many churches and convents were named after him. The church at Lydda was dedicated to Saint George. So was a convent near Bethlehem, and another small one just opposite the Jaffa gate, and others beside. The Arabs believed that Saint George could restore mad people to their senses. It is notable that the Muslim Arabs shared this veneration for Saint George, and sent their mad people to be cured by him, as well as the Christians. However, they commonly call him El Khudder —The Green—according to their favorite manner of using epithets instead of names. A possible explanation for this color reference is Al Khidr, the erstwhile tutor of Moses.
It has also been noted that Muslims, who usually identify Saint George with the prophet Elijah, at Lydda confound his legend with one about Christ himself. Their name for Anti-christ is Dajjal, and Muslims had a tradition that Jesus will slay the Anti-christ by the gate of Lydda. The notion sprang from an ancient bas-relief of George and the Dragon on the Lydda church. But Dajjal may be derived, by a very common confusion between n and l, from Dagon, whose name two neighboring villages bear to this day, while one of the gates of Lydda used to be called the Gate of Dagon.
Jirjis see George
Saint George see George
George (Saint George) (in Arabic, Jirjis). Islam honors Saint George, the Christian martyr, as a symbol of resurrection and renovation.
Saint George (ca. 275/281 – 23 April 303, traditionally Lydda, Palestine [now Lod, Israel]) was, according to tradition, a Roman soldier in the Guard of Diocletian, who is venerated as a Christian martyr. In hagiography Saint George is one of the most venerated saints in the Roman Catholic Church, Anglican Church, Eastern Orthodox Church, Oriental Orthodox Church, and the Eastern Catholic Churches. He is immortalized in the tale of Saint George and the Dragon and is one of the Fourteen Holy Helpers. His memorial is celebrated on April 23, and he is regarded as one of the most prominent military saints. He is the patron saint of England.
Nothing of George’s life or deeds can be established, but legends about him as a warrior-saint, dating from the 6th century, became popular and increasingly extravagant. Jacob de Voragine’s Legenda aurea (1265–66; Golden Legend) repeats the story of his rescuing a Libyan king’s daughter from a dragon and then slaying the monster in return for a promise by the king’s subjects to be baptized. George’s slaying of the dragon may be a Christian version of the legend of Perseus, who was said to have rescued Andromeda from a sea monster near Lydda. It is a theme much represented in art, the saint frequently being depicted as a youth wearing knight’s armour with a scarlet cross.
George was known in England by at least the 8th century. Returning crusaders likely popularized his cult (he was said to have been seen helping the Franks at the Battle of Antioch in 1098), but he was probably not recognized as England’s patron saint until after King Edward III (reigned 1327–77) made him the patron of the newly founded Order of the Garter. He was also adopted as protector of several other medieval powers, including Portugal, Genoa, and Venice. With the passing of the chivalric age and finally the Protestant Reformation, the cult of Saint George dwindled. His feast is given a lesser status in the calendar of the Church of England; a holy day of obligation for English Roman Catholics until the late 18th century, it is now an optional memorial for local observance.
However, there is a tradition in the Holy Land of Christians and Muslims going to an Eastern Orthodox shrine for Saint George at Beith Jala. Jews also attend the site in the belief that the prophet Elijah was buried there. According to custom it is believed that Saint George killed the dragon in Palestine. There many churches and convents were named after him. The church at Lydda was dedicated to Saint George. So was a convent near Bethlehem, and another small one just opposite the Jaffa gate, and others beside. The Arabs believed that Saint George could restore mad people to their senses. It is notable that the Muslim Arabs shared this veneration for Saint George, and sent their mad people to be cured by him, as well as the Christians. However, they commonly call him El Khudder —The Green—according to their favorite manner of using epithets instead of names. A possible explanation for this color reference is Al Khidr, the erstwhile tutor of Moses.
It has also been noted that Muslims, who usually identify Saint George with the prophet Elijah, at Lydda confound his legend with one about Christ himself. Their name for Anti-christ is Dajjal, and Muslims had a tradition that Jesus will slay the Anti-christ by the gate of Lydda. The notion sprang from an ancient bas-relief of George and the Dragon on the Lydda church. But Dajjal may be derived, by a very common confusion between n and l, from Dagon, whose name two neighboring villages bear to this day, while one of the gates of Lydda used to be called the Gate of Dagon.
Jirjis see George
Saint George see George
Germiyan
Germiyan (Germiyan-oghullari). Germiyan, at first the name of a Turkmen tribe, was afterwards applied to a family, then to an emirate. The Germiyan appeared for the first time in 1239 in the region of Malatya. In 1299, the emirate was founded by Ya‘qub ibn ‘Ali Shir with its capital at Kutahya. At the battle of Ankara in 1402, one of Ya‘qub’s successors, Ya‘qub Celebi, pointed the Ottoman sultan Bayezid I out to Timur and thus contributed to his capture. After 1411, the Germiyan amir reigned under the protection of the Ottomans until the emirate was bequeathed to the Ottoman sultan Murad II in 1428.
The Anatolian Turkish Beylik of Germiyan with its capital in Kütahya was one of the prominent frontier principalities established by Oghuz Turkish clans after the decline of Seljuk Sultanate of Rûm.
For a brief period in the second half of the 14th century, the Germiyan Dynasty was second only to Karamanoğlu Dynasty in its rising power. But they were later taken over by the neighboring Osmanoğlu dynasty, who were to found the Ottoman Empire later.
Germiyans played a crucial role in settling Turkish populations along the coastal regions of the Aegean Sea, the founders of the Beyliks of Aydınoğlu, Saruhan, İnançoğlu and Menteşe having started out as Germiyan commanders.
The beylik was probably established by members of the Afshar clan of Oghuz Turks. Because of various factors arising from the Mongol invasion, their branch of the clan had left the regions of Fars and Kirman, and headed west into Anatolia, having remained for a time around Malatya, and then moving to the Kütahya area, where their beylik was formed rather rapidly.
They rebelled against the central power in 1283, upon the execution of the sultan Kaykhusraw III by the Mongols, and placing of Mesud II on the Seljuk throne. The struggle between combined Mongol-Seljuk forces based in Konya and the rebel forces of Germiyan continued until 1290. An agreement could only be reached in 1299, upon which the Germiyan Dynasty also entered into possession of Ankara. When the Ilkhanid governor Emir Çoban took over Anatolia in 1314, they declared allegiance and concentrated on raids towards the regions to their west.
Their western offshoots that were the Beyliks of Menteşe, Aydınoğlu, İnançoğlu, Saruhan and Karesi were all subject to the Germiyan in the early periods of their foundation, while the Beyliks of Sâhib Ata and Hamidoğlu to the south had to rely on them for protection against attacks from the Karamanoğlu. As for the northern regions of Anatolia, Byzantine sources record Umur Bey, a commander and son-in-law to the Germiyan family, to be the possessor of Paphlagonia, where the Candaroğlu dynasty was to rule only after Germiyan power weakened.
Their strong political entity was eventually surrounded by newer states established by their own former commanders, leaving the Germiyan no outlet to the coastline or to Byzantine territory. Their powerful Karamanoğlu neighbors exerting constant pressure from the east, Germiyan gradually fell under the rising influence of the Ottomans.
The actual Turkish province of Kütahya was called the sub-province (sanjak) and later province (vilayet) of Germiyan until the early years of the Republic of Turkey, when which it was re-named after its central town.
The founding dynasty of the beylik produced descendants who illustrated themselves either under the Ottoman Empire or in present-day Turkey, a notable one among these being the 19th century grand vizier Abdurrahman Nureddin Pasha.
Germiyan-oghullari see Germiyan
Germiyan (Germiyan-oghullari). Germiyan, at first the name of a Turkmen tribe, was afterwards applied to a family, then to an emirate. The Germiyan appeared for the first time in 1239 in the region of Malatya. In 1299, the emirate was founded by Ya‘qub ibn ‘Ali Shir with its capital at Kutahya. At the battle of Ankara in 1402, one of Ya‘qub’s successors, Ya‘qub Celebi, pointed the Ottoman sultan Bayezid I out to Timur and thus contributed to his capture. After 1411, the Germiyan amir reigned under the protection of the Ottomans until the emirate was bequeathed to the Ottoman sultan Murad II in 1428.
The Anatolian Turkish Beylik of Germiyan with its capital in Kütahya was one of the prominent frontier principalities established by Oghuz Turkish clans after the decline of Seljuk Sultanate of Rûm.
For a brief period in the second half of the 14th century, the Germiyan Dynasty was second only to Karamanoğlu Dynasty in its rising power. But they were later taken over by the neighboring Osmanoğlu dynasty, who were to found the Ottoman Empire later.
Germiyans played a crucial role in settling Turkish populations along the coastal regions of the Aegean Sea, the founders of the Beyliks of Aydınoğlu, Saruhan, İnançoğlu and Menteşe having started out as Germiyan commanders.
The beylik was probably established by members of the Afshar clan of Oghuz Turks. Because of various factors arising from the Mongol invasion, their branch of the clan had left the regions of Fars and Kirman, and headed west into Anatolia, having remained for a time around Malatya, and then moving to the Kütahya area, where their beylik was formed rather rapidly.
They rebelled against the central power in 1283, upon the execution of the sultan Kaykhusraw III by the Mongols, and placing of Mesud II on the Seljuk throne. The struggle between combined Mongol-Seljuk forces based in Konya and the rebel forces of Germiyan continued until 1290. An agreement could only be reached in 1299, upon which the Germiyan Dynasty also entered into possession of Ankara. When the Ilkhanid governor Emir Çoban took over Anatolia in 1314, they declared allegiance and concentrated on raids towards the regions to their west.
Their western offshoots that were the Beyliks of Menteşe, Aydınoğlu, İnançoğlu, Saruhan and Karesi were all subject to the Germiyan in the early periods of their foundation, while the Beyliks of Sâhib Ata and Hamidoğlu to the south had to rely on them for protection against attacks from the Karamanoğlu. As for the northern regions of Anatolia, Byzantine sources record Umur Bey, a commander and son-in-law to the Germiyan family, to be the possessor of Paphlagonia, where the Candaroğlu dynasty was to rule only after Germiyan power weakened.
Their strong political entity was eventually surrounded by newer states established by their own former commanders, leaving the Germiyan no outlet to the coastline or to Byzantine territory. Their powerful Karamanoğlu neighbors exerting constant pressure from the east, Germiyan gradually fell under the rising influence of the Ottomans.
The actual Turkish province of Kütahya was called the sub-province (sanjak) and later province (vilayet) of Germiyan until the early years of the Republic of Turkey, when which it was re-named after its central town.
The founding dynasty of the beylik produced descendants who illustrated themselves either under the Ottoman Empire or in present-day Turkey, a notable one among these being the 19th century grand vizier Abdurrahman Nureddin Pasha.
Germiyan-oghullari see Germiyan
Abdul Rahman al-Ghafiqi (died 732), also known as Abd er Rahman, Abdderrahman, Abderame, and Abd el-Rahman, led the Andalusian Muslims into battle against the forces of Charles Martel in the Battle of Tours on October 10, 732 A.D.[1] for which he is primarily remembered in the West. His full name was Abu Said Abdul Rahman ibn Abdullah ibn Bishr ibn Al Sarem Al 'Aki Al Ghafiqi.
From the Yemeni tribe of Ghafiq, he relocated to Ifriqiya (now Tunisia), then to the Maghrib (now Morocco), where he became acquainted with Musa Ibn Nusair and his son Abdul Aziz, the governors of Al-Andalus.
After Al Samh ibn Malik was killed at the Battle of Toulouse in 721 (102 A.H.) by the forces of Duke Odo of Aquitaine, Abdul Rahman took over the command of Eastern Andalus. He was briefly relieved of his command, when 'Anbasa ibn Suhaym Al-Kalbi was appointed in 721 (103 A.H.). After 'Anbasa was killed in battle in 726 (107 A.H.) in Gaul, several successive commanders were put in place, none of whom lasted very long.
In 730 (112 A.H.) the Caliph Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik appointed Abdul Rahman as governor/commander of Al Andalus. He prepared to invade Gaul, and called for recruits from Yemen and the Levant. Many arrived, and he crossed the Pyrenees range, with an army of approximately 50,000 cavalry) composed primarily of Arabs and Berbers. Emir Abdul Rahman made his way through Gascony and Aquitaine, according to one unidentified Arab, "That army went through all places like a desolating storm," sacking and capturing the city of Bordeaux, after defeating Duke Odo of Aquitaine in battle outside the city, and then again defeating a second army of Duke Odo of Aquitaine at the Battle of the River Garonne—where the western chroniclers state, "God alone knows the number of the slain." Odo, with his remaining nobility, fled to Charles Martel, seeking help. Unlike Toulouse, where Odo had won by achieving complete surprise over the Muslim forces when he relieved the city in 721, this time his forces were forced to face the Muslim cavalry in open battle and were utterly destroyed. Also, the Muslim forces he had
faced at the Battle of Toulouse were primarily light infantry, and while good fighters, were not remotely close to the caliber of the Arab and Berber cavalry brought by the Emir in this invasion.
However, the Frankish Mayor of the Palace of Austrasia, Charles Martel, had a core of seasoned professional infantry who had campaigned with him for many years, in addition to the levies of militia the Franks normally called up to buttress their forces, he formed an army of Gauls and Germans approximately 30,000 strong. The invading forces, having no reason to believe the Franks were anything more than one of the various barbarian tribes that had ravaged Europe after Rome's fall, failed to scout their strength in advance. They also misjudged Charles Martel, who was determined to prevent the expansion of the Caliphate over the Pyrenees into the heart of Christian Europe. This was a disastrous mistake which led to the defeat of Abdul Rahman in 732 (114 A.H.) near Poitiers, south of the Loire River.
Abdul Rahman was killed in this battle. One reason for the defeat of the Muslim army was their preoccupation with war booty; another was the squabbles between various ethnic and tribal factions, which led to the surviving generals being unable to agree on a single commander to take the Abdul Rahman's place, (he alone had a Fatwa from the Caliph, and thus absolute authority over the faithful under arms). Political factions, racial and ethnic rivalries, and personality clashes arose following his death. The varied nationalities and ethnicities present in an army drawn from all over the Caliphate, and the surviving generals, bickered among themselves, unable to agree on a commander to lead them the following day. The inability to select anyone to lead certainly contributed to the wholesale retreat of an army that possibly could have defeated the Franks. Additional reasons for the defeat were found in the strategy employed by Charles Martel. He trained his men specifically to fight in a large square, similar to the ancient Greek phalanx formation, to withstand the dreaded Muslim heavy cavalry. The Frankish leader chose the battlefield. Moving his army over the mountains and avoiding the old Roman roads, he escaped detection until positioning his men on a high, wooded plain. For seven days, the two armies skirmished and maneuvered, with the Islamic forces recalling all their raiding parties, so on the seventh day, their army was at full size. Martel also received some reinforcements, though most historians still believe he was badly outnumbered at the onset of the battle. The Franks held their defensive formation all day, and repulsed repeated cavalry charges. The charges of the Arab and Berber cavalry were impeded by the sloping and wooded terrain. Late on the first day of battle, according to most sources, Martel sent his scouts to slip into Abdul Rahman's camp and free prisoners held by the Arab forces. Believing that their booty was being stolen, a large contingent of Abdul Rahman's forces broke away from battle to save their property. Abdul Rahman was exposed to the Frankish forces and killed while he attempted to stop his men from leaving the field.
Arab historians unanimously praise Abdul Rahman as a just and able administrator and commander, and bestow on him the honor of being the best governor of Al-Andalus. Also, he did not take sides in the ethnic and tribal divisions that plagued Al-Andalus under other rulers. Evidence of his fairness and importance as a ruler was demonstrated in the aftermath of his death at the Battle of Tours. Without his leadership and guidance, the other commanders were unable to even agree on a commander to lead them back into battle the following morning. The effect of the death of Abdul Rahman on both Islamic and world history was profound.
His son attempted another invasion of Gaul under the Caliph's instructions in 736, this time by sea. This naval invasion landed in Narbonne in 736 and moved at once to reinforce Arles and move inland. Charles again descended on the Provençal strongholds of the Muslims. In 736, he retook Montfrin and Avignon, and Arles and Aix-en-Provence with the help of Liutprand, King of the Lombards. Nîmes, Agde, and Béziers, held by Muslims since 725, fell to him and their fortresses were destroyed. He crushed one Muslim army at Arles, as that force sallied out of the city, and then took the city itself by a direct and brutal frontal attack, and burned it to the ground to prevent its use again as a stronghold for Muslim expansion. He then moved swiftly and defeated a mighty host outside of Narbonnea at the River Berre, but failed to take the city. In five short years, he had incorporated Muslim heavy cavalry equipment and tactics into his forces, and was able to crush the invading armies, and leave the Muslim forces isolated in Narbonne, which his son Pippin would retake in 759.
Ghafiqi, Muhammad al-
Ghafiqi, Muhammad al- (Muhammad ibn Qassum ibn Aslam al-Ghafiqi) (d. 1165). Spanish-Arab scholar and oculist of the twelfth century. His Guide of the Oculist is regarded as a summary of all the knowledge of ophthalmology possessed by the Arabs of both the Islamic East and West in the author’s time.
Al-Ghafiqi lived and practiced in Cordoba, writing a book entitled The Right Guide in Ophthalmic Drug. The book is not just confined to the eye but gives details of the head and diseases of the brain. Al-Ghafiqi's treatment of the eye disease trachoma was utilized until World War I.
A bust of al-Ghafiqi is in the municipal hospital of Cordoba and was erected in 1965 to commemorate the 800th anniversary of his death.
Muhammad al-Ghafiqi see Ghafiqi, Muhammad al-
However, the Frankish Mayor of the Palace of Austrasia, Charles Martel, had a core of seasoned professional infantry who had campaigned with him for many years, in addition to the levies of militia the Franks normally called up to buttress their forces, he formed an army of Gauls and Germans approximately 30,000 strong. The invading forces, having no reason to believe the Franks were anything more than one of the various barbarian tribes that had ravaged Europe after Rome's fall, failed to scout their strength in advance. They also misjudged Charles Martel, who was determined to prevent the expansion of the Caliphate over the Pyrenees into the heart of Christian Europe. This was a disastrous mistake which led to the defeat of Abdul Rahman in 732 (114 A.H.) near Poitiers, south of the Loire River.
Abdul Rahman was killed in this battle. One reason for the defeat of the Muslim army was their preoccupation with war booty; another was the squabbles between various ethnic and tribal factions, which led to the surviving generals being unable to agree on a single commander to take the Abdul Rahman's place, (he alone had a Fatwa from the Caliph, and thus absolute authority over the faithful under arms). Political factions, racial and ethnic rivalries, and personality clashes arose following his death. The varied nationalities and ethnicities present in an army drawn from all over the Caliphate, and the surviving generals, bickered among themselves, unable to agree on a commander to lead them the following day. The inability to select anyone to lead certainly contributed to the wholesale retreat of an army that possibly could have defeated the Franks. Additional reasons for the defeat were found in the strategy employed by Charles Martel. He trained his men specifically to fight in a large square, similar to the ancient Greek phalanx formation, to withstand the dreaded Muslim heavy cavalry. The Frankish leader chose the battlefield. Moving his army over the mountains and avoiding the old Roman roads, he escaped detection until positioning his men on a high, wooded plain. For seven days, the two armies skirmished and maneuvered, with the Islamic forces recalling all their raiding parties, so on the seventh day, their army was at full size. Martel also received some reinforcements, though most historians still believe he was badly outnumbered at the onset of the battle. The Franks held their defensive formation all day, and repulsed repeated cavalry charges. The charges of the Arab and Berber cavalry were impeded by the sloping and wooded terrain. Late on the first day of battle, according to most sources, Martel sent his scouts to slip into Abdul Rahman's camp and free prisoners held by the Arab forces. Believing that their booty was being stolen, a large contingent of Abdul Rahman's forces broke away from battle to save their property. Abdul Rahman was exposed to the Frankish forces and killed while he attempted to stop his men from leaving the field.
Arab historians unanimously praise Abdul Rahman as a just and able administrator and commander, and bestow on him the honor of being the best governor of Al-Andalus. Also, he did not take sides in the ethnic and tribal divisions that plagued Al-Andalus under other rulers. Evidence of his fairness and importance as a ruler was demonstrated in the aftermath of his death at the Battle of Tours. Without his leadership and guidance, the other commanders were unable to even agree on a commander to lead them back into battle the following morning. The effect of the death of Abdul Rahman on both Islamic and world history was profound.
His son attempted another invasion of Gaul under the Caliph's instructions in 736, this time by sea. This naval invasion landed in Narbonne in 736 and moved at once to reinforce Arles and move inland. Charles again descended on the Provençal strongholds of the Muslims. In 736, he retook Montfrin and Avignon, and Arles and Aix-en-Provence with the help of Liutprand, King of the Lombards. Nîmes, Agde, and Béziers, held by Muslims since 725, fell to him and their fortresses were destroyed. He crushed one Muslim army at Arles, as that force sallied out of the city, and then took the city itself by a direct and brutal frontal attack, and burned it to the ground to prevent its use again as a stronghold for Muslim expansion. He then moved swiftly and defeated a mighty host outside of Narbonnea at the River Berre, but failed to take the city. In five short years, he had incorporated Muslim heavy cavalry equipment and tactics into his forces, and was able to crush the invading armies, and leave the Muslim forces isolated in Narbonne, which his son Pippin would retake in 759.
Ghafiqi, Abu Ja'far Ahmad al-
Ghafiqi, Abu Ja'far Ahmad al- (Abu Ja‘far Ahmad al-Ghafiqi). Spanish-Arabic pharmaco-botanist of the twelfth century. He wrote a work on drugs, quoting the best-known sources and adding personal observations.
Abu Ja‘far Ahmad al-Ghafiqi see Ghafiqi, Abu Ja'far Ahmad al-
Ghafiqi, Abu Ja'far Ahmad al- (Abu Ja‘far Ahmad al-Ghafiqi). Spanish-Arabic pharmaco-botanist of the twelfth century. He wrote a work on drugs, quoting the best-known sources and adding personal observations.
Abu Ja‘far Ahmad al-Ghafiqi see Ghafiqi, Abu Ja'far Ahmad al-
Ghafiqi, Muhammad al- (Muhammad ibn Qassum ibn Aslam al-Ghafiqi) (d. 1165). Spanish-Arab scholar and oculist of the twelfth century. His Guide of the Oculist is regarded as a summary of all the knowledge of ophthalmology possessed by the Arabs of both the Islamic East and West in the author’s time.
Al-Ghafiqi lived and practiced in Cordoba, writing a book entitled The Right Guide in Ophthalmic Drug. The book is not just confined to the eye but gives details of the head and diseases of the brain. Al-Ghafiqi's treatment of the eye disease trachoma was utilized until World War I.
A bust of al-Ghafiqi is in the municipal hospital of Cordoba and was erected in 1965 to commemorate the 800th anniversary of his death.
Muhammad al-Ghafiqi see Ghafiqi, Muhammad al-
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