Bakri
Bakri (Abu ‘Ubaydallah al-Bakri) (d. 1094). Arab geographer. He never left Cordova, but in 1067-68, he compiled information concerning the Western Sudanic region, based on both oral accounts of traders and previous written works. Of the latter the most important was that of Muhammad ibn Yusuf al-Warraq (904-973) which is now lost. Al-Bakri’s description of Ghana, written shortly after its fall, is one of the best sources of information for that empire.
Abu ‘Ubaydallah al-Bakri see Bakri
Abu ‘Ubaydallah al-Bakri see Bakri
Balawi, al-
Balawi, al-. Egyptian historian of the tenth century. His biography of Ahmad ibn Tulun (r. 868-884), the founder of the Tulunids, is the most important source for the period.
Balawi, al-. Egyptian historian of the tenth century. His biography of Ahmad ibn Tulun (r. 868-884), the founder of the Tulunids, is the most important source for the period.
Balban
Balban (Ghiyath al-Din Balban) (Ghiyas ud-Din Balban) (1200-1287). Most prominent of the Mu‘izzi or Slave Sultans of Delhi. He ruled from 1266 to 1287. Balban was originally a slave purchased by the sultan Iltutmish. Balban placed monarchy on a divine pedestal and followed Iranian customs and ceremonies. A firm administrator, he established law and order in disturbed areas and set up police stations with Afghan guards. His garrisoning of the northwestern frontier against Mongol invasions was effective. Balban was one of the few rulers to survive when almost every Muslim state of Central Asia had fallen to the Mongols. He welcomed refugees from Central Asia and named different quarters of the city after them. A believer in inherited status despite his low birth, he did not like to appoint lowborn persons to government offices. He had a stern sense of justice and punished even his officers if they were found guilty of oppression.
Ghiyas ud-Din Balban was son of a Turkish noble of the Ilbari tribe, but as a child was captured by Mongols and sold as a slave at Ghazni. Later, he was bought by Sultan Iltutmish in 1232, who at the orders of his own master, Qutbuddin Aibak, released him from slavery and brought him up in a manner befitting a prince.
Ghiyas ud-Din Balban was liberally educated. He became the head of the Chalissa, a group of forty Turkish nobles of the state. After the overthrow of Razia Sultana he made rapid strides in the subsequent reigns. He was initially the Prime Minister from 1246 to 1266, but Balban declared himself the Sultan of Delhi after the previous sultan Nasir ud-Din Mahmud's death.
During his reign, Balban ruled with an iron fist. He broke up the Chihalgani, a group of the forty most important nobles in the court. He tried to establish peace and order in the country of India. He built many outposts in areas where there was crime and garrisoned them with soldiers. Balban wanted to make sure everyone was loyal to the crown by establishing an efficient espionage system.
He ruled as the Sultan from 1266 until his death in 1287, and was succeeded by his grandson, Muiz ud-Din Qaiqabad, who reign (1287-1290). His successors were weak and incompetent and the throne was eventually captured by Jalal ud-Din Firuz Khilji in 1290, bringing an end to the Slave dynasty.
Balban's tomb is today situated in the Mehrauli Archaeological Park, beyond the Qutb complex.
Ghiyath al-Din Balban see Balban
Ghiyas ud-Din Balban see Balban
Balban (Ghiyath al-Din Balban) (Ghiyas ud-Din Balban) (1200-1287). Most prominent of the Mu‘izzi or Slave Sultans of Delhi. He ruled from 1266 to 1287. Balban was originally a slave purchased by the sultan Iltutmish. Balban placed monarchy on a divine pedestal and followed Iranian customs and ceremonies. A firm administrator, he established law and order in disturbed areas and set up police stations with Afghan guards. His garrisoning of the northwestern frontier against Mongol invasions was effective. Balban was one of the few rulers to survive when almost every Muslim state of Central Asia had fallen to the Mongols. He welcomed refugees from Central Asia and named different quarters of the city after them. A believer in inherited status despite his low birth, he did not like to appoint lowborn persons to government offices. He had a stern sense of justice and punished even his officers if they were found guilty of oppression.
Ghiyas ud-Din Balban was son of a Turkish noble of the Ilbari tribe, but as a child was captured by Mongols and sold as a slave at Ghazni. Later, he was bought by Sultan Iltutmish in 1232, who at the orders of his own master, Qutbuddin Aibak, released him from slavery and brought him up in a manner befitting a prince.
Ghiyas ud-Din Balban was liberally educated. He became the head of the Chalissa, a group of forty Turkish nobles of the state. After the overthrow of Razia Sultana he made rapid strides in the subsequent reigns. He was initially the Prime Minister from 1246 to 1266, but Balban declared himself the Sultan of Delhi after the previous sultan Nasir ud-Din Mahmud's death.
During his reign, Balban ruled with an iron fist. He broke up the Chihalgani, a group of the forty most important nobles in the court. He tried to establish peace and order in the country of India. He built many outposts in areas where there was crime and garrisoned them with soldiers. Balban wanted to make sure everyone was loyal to the crown by establishing an efficient espionage system.
He ruled as the Sultan from 1266 until his death in 1287, and was succeeded by his grandson, Muiz ud-Din Qaiqabad, who reign (1287-1290). His successors were weak and incompetent and the throne was eventually captured by Jalal ud-Din Firuz Khilji in 1290, bringing an end to the Slave dynasty.
Balban's tomb is today situated in the Mehrauli Archaeological Park, beyond the Qutb complex.
Ghiyath al-Din Balban see Balban
Ghiyas ud-Din Balban see Balban
Balewa
Balewa (Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa) (Abubakar Tafawa Balewa) (December 1912 – January 15, 1966) First prime minister of an independent Nigeria. Originally a trained teacher, he became a vocal leader for Northern interests as one of the few educated Nigerians of his time. He was also an international statesman, widely respected across the African continent as one of the leaders who encouraged the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).
Abubakar Balewa was born in Bauchi, the son of a Bageri Muslim district head in the Bauchi divisional district of Lere. He started early education at the Koranic School in Bauchi and like most of his contemporaries, he studied at the Katsina College for further education and soon acquired his teaching certificate. He returned to Bauchi to teach at the Bauchi Middle School. In 1944, along with a few learned teachers from the north, he was chosen to study abroad for a year at the University of London's Institute of Education. Upon returning to Nigeria, he became an Inspector of Schools for the colonial administration and later entered politics. He was elected in 1946, to the colony's Northern House of Assembly, and to the Legislative Assembly in 1947. As a legislator, he was a vocal advocate of the rights of northern Nigeria, and together with Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, who held the hereditary title of Sardauna of Sokoto, he founded the Northern People's Congress (NPC).
In 1949, Balewa militantly represented northern interests in talks on constitutional reform. At the same time, he worked for moderate reform within his own northern region.
In 1950, Balewa incurred the wrath of many of northern Nigeria’s traditional rulers by instigating an investigation (and initiating the reform) of the institution of “Sole Native Authority,” whereby there were no checks on the power of the emirs within their own communities.
In 1951, Alhaji Balewa joined Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto -- the traditional ruler of northern Nigeria -- in forming the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) as a vehicle for establishing northern dominance in national politics. After the implementation of a new constitution in 1952, Balewa became a federal minister.
As a federal minister, Balewa enhanced his reputation as a highly intelligent hard worker. His star began to rise.
Balewa entered the government in 1952 as Minister of Works, and later served as Minister of Transport. In 1957, he was elected Chief Minister, forming a coalition government between the NPC and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), led by Nnamdi Azikiwe. He retained the post as Prime Minister when Nigeria gained independence in 1960, and was re-elected in 1964.
Prior to Nigeria's independence, a constitutional conference in 1954 had adopted a regional political framework for the country, with all regions given a considerable amount of political freedom. The three regions then were composed of diverse cultural groups. The premiers and some prominent leaders of the regions later took on a policy of guiding their regions against political encroachment from other regional leaders. Later on, this political environment influenced the Balewa administration. His term in office was turbulent, with regional factionalism constantly threatening his government.
However, as Prime Minister of Nigeria, he played important roles in the continent's formative indigenous rule. He was an important leader in the formation of the Organization of African Unity and creating a cooperative relationship with French speaking African Countries. He was also instrumental in negotiations between Moise Tshombe and the Congolese authorities during the Congo Crisis of 1960-1964. He led a vocal protest against the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960 and also entered into an alliance with Commonwealth ministers who wanted South Africa to leave the Commonwealth in 1961. However, a treason charge and conviction against one of the western region's leaders, Obafemi Awolowo, led to protest and condemnation from many of his supporters. The 1965 election in the region later produced violent protests. Rioting and violence were soon synchronous with what was perceived as inordinate political encroachment and an over-exuberant election outcome for Awolowo's western opponents.
As Prime Minister of Nigeria, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, from 1960 to 1961, doubled as Foreign Minister of Nigeria. In 1961, he relinquished the position in favour of Jaja Wachuku who became, from 1961 to 1965, the First substantive Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, later called External Affairs.
In 1962, Obafemi Awolowo, the leader of the Western region, was charged with plotting to overthrow Balewa’s government. Awolowo was imprisoned. However, political unrest and violence persisted and continued to plague Balewa’s administration.
In 1966, a military coup was staged in Nigeria. Alhaji Balewa was killed in the coup. He was overthrown and killed in a military coup on January 15, 1966, as were many other leaders, including his old companion Ahmadu Bello. His body was discovered by a roadside near Lagos six days after he was ousted from office. Balewa was buried in Bauchi.
Today, the Abubakar Tafawa Balewa University in Bauchi is named in his honor.
Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa see Balewa
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa see Balewa
Balewa (Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa) (Abubakar Tafawa Balewa) (December 1912 – January 15, 1966) First prime minister of an independent Nigeria. Originally a trained teacher, he became a vocal leader for Northern interests as one of the few educated Nigerians of his time. He was also an international statesman, widely respected across the African continent as one of the leaders who encouraged the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).
Abubakar Balewa was born in Bauchi, the son of a Bageri Muslim district head in the Bauchi divisional district of Lere. He started early education at the Koranic School in Bauchi and like most of his contemporaries, he studied at the Katsina College for further education and soon acquired his teaching certificate. He returned to Bauchi to teach at the Bauchi Middle School. In 1944, along with a few learned teachers from the north, he was chosen to study abroad for a year at the University of London's Institute of Education. Upon returning to Nigeria, he became an Inspector of Schools for the colonial administration and later entered politics. He was elected in 1946, to the colony's Northern House of Assembly, and to the Legislative Assembly in 1947. As a legislator, he was a vocal advocate of the rights of northern Nigeria, and together with Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, who held the hereditary title of Sardauna of Sokoto, he founded the Northern People's Congress (NPC).
In 1949, Balewa militantly represented northern interests in talks on constitutional reform. At the same time, he worked for moderate reform within his own northern region.
In 1950, Balewa incurred the wrath of many of northern Nigeria’s traditional rulers by instigating an investigation (and initiating the reform) of the institution of “Sole Native Authority,” whereby there were no checks on the power of the emirs within their own communities.
In 1951, Alhaji Balewa joined Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto -- the traditional ruler of northern Nigeria -- in forming the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) as a vehicle for establishing northern dominance in national politics. After the implementation of a new constitution in 1952, Balewa became a federal minister.
As a federal minister, Balewa enhanced his reputation as a highly intelligent hard worker. His star began to rise.
Balewa entered the government in 1952 as Minister of Works, and later served as Minister of Transport. In 1957, he was elected Chief Minister, forming a coalition government between the NPC and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), led by Nnamdi Azikiwe. He retained the post as Prime Minister when Nigeria gained independence in 1960, and was re-elected in 1964.
Prior to Nigeria's independence, a constitutional conference in 1954 had adopted a regional political framework for the country, with all regions given a considerable amount of political freedom. The three regions then were composed of diverse cultural groups. The premiers and some prominent leaders of the regions later took on a policy of guiding their regions against political encroachment from other regional leaders. Later on, this political environment influenced the Balewa administration. His term in office was turbulent, with regional factionalism constantly threatening his government.
However, as Prime Minister of Nigeria, he played important roles in the continent's formative indigenous rule. He was an important leader in the formation of the Organization of African Unity and creating a cooperative relationship with French speaking African Countries. He was also instrumental in negotiations between Moise Tshombe and the Congolese authorities during the Congo Crisis of 1960-1964. He led a vocal protest against the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960 and also entered into an alliance with Commonwealth ministers who wanted South Africa to leave the Commonwealth in 1961. However, a treason charge and conviction against one of the western region's leaders, Obafemi Awolowo, led to protest and condemnation from many of his supporters. The 1965 election in the region later produced violent protests. Rioting and violence were soon synchronous with what was perceived as inordinate political encroachment and an over-exuberant election outcome for Awolowo's western opponents.
As Prime Minister of Nigeria, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, from 1960 to 1961, doubled as Foreign Minister of Nigeria. In 1961, he relinquished the position in favour of Jaja Wachuku who became, from 1961 to 1965, the First substantive Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, later called External Affairs.
In 1962, Obafemi Awolowo, the leader of the Western region, was charged with plotting to overthrow Balewa’s government. Awolowo was imprisoned. However, political unrest and violence persisted and continued to plague Balewa’s administration.
In 1966, a military coup was staged in Nigeria. Alhaji Balewa was killed in the coup. He was overthrown and killed in a military coup on January 15, 1966, as were many other leaders, including his old companion Ahmadu Bello. His body was discovered by a roadside near Lagos six days after he was ousted from office. Balewa was buried in Bauchi.
Today, the Abubakar Tafawa Balewa University in Bauchi is named in his honor.
Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa see Balewa
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa see Balewa
Balinus
Balinus. Arab name for Apollonius of Perge and Apollonius of Tyana. {See Apollonius.}
Apollonius of Perge see Balinus.
Apollonius of Tyana see Balinus.
Apollonius see Balinus.
Balinus. Arab name for Apollonius of Perge and Apollonius of Tyana. {See Apollonius.}
Apollonius of Perge see Balinus.
Apollonius of Tyana see Balinus.
Apollonius see Balinus.
Balkar
Balkar. Turkic speaking peoples who live along the northern slopes of the Caucasus Mountains. A few small groups also live in Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan. The name “Balkar” may derive from the word “Bulgar,” which has applied to a number of people in a variety of spellings for many centuries. Other names and spellings which are used to refer to the Balkar include Balkarlar, Malkarlar, Malkarla, Taulu, and Mallqarli.
The exact time of the Balkar conversion to Islam is a matter of conjecture, although they were certainly converted by the mid-nineteenth century, at the time of the Shamil revolt in Daghestan (1834-1858). Whenever the time of conversion, however, the Balkar remained only superficially committed to the faith, retaining certain aspects of shamanism and animism with an incomplete knowledge of the Sunni belief system of the other peoples of the North Caucasus. Their commitment was slight enough to allow the Balkar to refuse to join the Shamil revolt, even though the call to join was plainly cast as a holy war against the Russians.
By the late nineteenth century, the Balkar lands had been caught in the wave of Russian settlement that followed the pacification of the Caucasus. Never a numerous people, the Balkar were unable to oppose the gradual conversion of their lands to agriculture, an occupation to which they themselves gradually adapted.
After the Russian Revolution, the Balkar eventually split from the Karachai, with whom they share a common heritage, and were placed in a separate administrative district -- the Kabardian-Balkar A.S.S.R.
In 1944, Stalin accused the Balkars of Kabardino-Balkaria of collaborating with Nazi Germany and deported the entire population. The territory was renamed the Kabardian ASSR until 1957, when the Balkar population was allowed to return and its name was restored.
Although there is no substantial evidence of Balkar disloyalty during World War II, the Balkar were nonetheless uprooted as a people in 1943 and 1944 and scattered throughout Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Their republic was abolished, and they ceased to be counted as a people. After 1956 and de-Stalinization, they were rehabilitated, their republic was re-created and certain select groups were allowed to return to it. Some remained in Central Asia and continue to live there today. There is little evidence to show that the Balkar of today are practicing Muslims.
The Karachay-Balkar language of the Balkars is of the Ponto-Caspian subgroup of the Northwestern (Kypchak) group of Turkic languages. Related to Crimean Tatar and Kumyk. There is also an opinion that the Balkars are remnants of a branch of the Bulgar tribe that moved into the Caucasus under Bazbaian after the westward movement of the Hunnish wave at the beginning of the 4th century of the Christian calendar.
At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries a small segment of the Balkars emigrated to Turkey and Syria.
Many Balkars live in the Russian republic of Kabardino-Balkaria.
The term Balkar is said to be derived from Bolgar or Bulgar, the Balkars supposedly being Bulgars who lived in Onoghur and Great Bulgaria and who remained in the Caucasus as the others migrated to the Balkans and Middle Volga.
Balkarlar see Balkar.
Malkarlar see Balkar.
Malkarla see Balkar.
Taulu see Balkar.
Mallqarli see Balkar.
Balkar. Turkic speaking peoples who live along the northern slopes of the Caucasus Mountains. A few small groups also live in Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan. The name “Balkar” may derive from the word “Bulgar,” which has applied to a number of people in a variety of spellings for many centuries. Other names and spellings which are used to refer to the Balkar include Balkarlar, Malkarlar, Malkarla, Taulu, and Mallqarli.
The exact time of the Balkar conversion to Islam is a matter of conjecture, although they were certainly converted by the mid-nineteenth century, at the time of the Shamil revolt in Daghestan (1834-1858). Whenever the time of conversion, however, the Balkar remained only superficially committed to the faith, retaining certain aspects of shamanism and animism with an incomplete knowledge of the Sunni belief system of the other peoples of the North Caucasus. Their commitment was slight enough to allow the Balkar to refuse to join the Shamil revolt, even though the call to join was plainly cast as a holy war against the Russians.
By the late nineteenth century, the Balkar lands had been caught in the wave of Russian settlement that followed the pacification of the Caucasus. Never a numerous people, the Balkar were unable to oppose the gradual conversion of their lands to agriculture, an occupation to which they themselves gradually adapted.
After the Russian Revolution, the Balkar eventually split from the Karachai, with whom they share a common heritage, and were placed in a separate administrative district -- the Kabardian-Balkar A.S.S.R.
In 1944, Stalin accused the Balkars of Kabardino-Balkaria of collaborating with Nazi Germany and deported the entire population. The territory was renamed the Kabardian ASSR until 1957, when the Balkar population was allowed to return and its name was restored.
Although there is no substantial evidence of Balkar disloyalty during World War II, the Balkar were nonetheless uprooted as a people in 1943 and 1944 and scattered throughout Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Their republic was abolished, and they ceased to be counted as a people. After 1956 and de-Stalinization, they were rehabilitated, their republic was re-created and certain select groups were allowed to return to it. Some remained in Central Asia and continue to live there today. There is little evidence to show that the Balkar of today are practicing Muslims.
The Karachay-Balkar language of the Balkars is of the Ponto-Caspian subgroup of the Northwestern (Kypchak) group of Turkic languages. Related to Crimean Tatar and Kumyk. There is also an opinion that the Balkars are remnants of a branch of the Bulgar tribe that moved into the Caucasus under Bazbaian after the westward movement of the Hunnish wave at the beginning of the 4th century of the Christian calendar.
At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries a small segment of the Balkars emigrated to Turkey and Syria.
Many Balkars live in the Russian republic of Kabardino-Balkaria.
The term Balkar is said to be derived from Bolgar or Bulgar, the Balkars supposedly being Bulgars who lived in Onoghur and Great Bulgaria and who remained in the Caucasus as the others migrated to the Balkans and Middle Volga.
Balkarlar see Balkar.
Malkarlar see Balkar.
Malkarla see Balkar.
Taulu see Balkar.
Mallqarli see Balkar.
Ba Lobbo
Ba Lobbo (/Balobo) (d. 1864). Leader of the revolt in which Tukolor revolutionary al-Hajj ‘Umar was killed. Ba Lobbo had hoped to succeed his brother, Hamad II, as ruler of Macina, but the latter abdicated in favor of a son before his death in 1853. Ba Lobbo served the new ruler, Hamad III, as commander of the Macina army. When ‘Umar threatened Macina and the neighboring state of Segu, the two rival states allied against him. ‘Umar’s forces defeated the alliance, and in 1862 Hamad III was killed. In 1863, Ba Lobbo led a revolt which triggered a widespread anti-Tukolor uprising. ‘Umar was killed while trying to put down the revolt the following year. But Ba Lobbo’s success was ephemeral. ‘Umar’s nephew, Ahmadu Tijani, reconquered Macina within months.
Ba Lobbo, was the son of Massina Empire ruler Ahmadu Seku, and brother of Hamad III (Ahmadu Ahmadu), the Empire's last king.
After the 1862 fall of the Empire's capital Hamdullahi to El Hadj Umar Tall's (al-Hajj 'Umar's) Tukolor Empire, Hamad III (Ahmadu Ahmadu) was captured and executed, leaving Ba Lobbo the leader of remaining Massina forces. Assembling a force of Fulas and Kountas, Ba Lobbo succeeded in driving Umar Tall from Hamdullahi and into the cliffs of Dogon country near Bandiagara in 1864. Though Umar Tall died there in an explosion of his gunpowder reserves, his nephew Tidiani Tall succeeded him as Tukolor emperor, and suppressed Ba Lobbo's resistance. Thereafter, the Massina never regained their independence as a state.
Lobbo, Ba see Ba Lobbo
Balobo see Ba Lobbo
Ba Lobbo (/Balobo) (d. 1864). Leader of the revolt in which Tukolor revolutionary al-Hajj ‘Umar was killed. Ba Lobbo had hoped to succeed his brother, Hamad II, as ruler of Macina, but the latter abdicated in favor of a son before his death in 1853. Ba Lobbo served the new ruler, Hamad III, as commander of the Macina army. When ‘Umar threatened Macina and the neighboring state of Segu, the two rival states allied against him. ‘Umar’s forces defeated the alliance, and in 1862 Hamad III was killed. In 1863, Ba Lobbo led a revolt which triggered a widespread anti-Tukolor uprising. ‘Umar was killed while trying to put down the revolt the following year. But Ba Lobbo’s success was ephemeral. ‘Umar’s nephew, Ahmadu Tijani, reconquered Macina within months.
Ba Lobbo, was the son of Massina Empire ruler Ahmadu Seku, and brother of Hamad III (Ahmadu Ahmadu), the Empire's last king.
After the 1862 fall of the Empire's capital Hamdullahi to El Hadj Umar Tall's (al-Hajj 'Umar's) Tukolor Empire, Hamad III (Ahmadu Ahmadu) was captured and executed, leaving Ba Lobbo the leader of remaining Massina forces. Assembling a force of Fulas and Kountas, Ba Lobbo succeeded in driving Umar Tall from Hamdullahi and into the cliffs of Dogon country near Bandiagara in 1864. Though Umar Tall died there in an explosion of his gunpowder reserves, his nephew Tidiani Tall succeeded him as Tukolor emperor, and suppressed Ba Lobbo's resistance. Thereafter, the Massina never regained their independence as a state.
Lobbo, Ba see Ba Lobbo
Balobo see Ba Lobbo
Baltis
Baltis. An ethnic group of Tibetan descent with some Dardic admixture located in Baltistan, a region in the Northern Areas, Pakistan, and Ladakh, a region in Jammu and Kashmir, India; as well as scattered throughout Pakistan's major urban centers of Lahore, Karachi and Islamabad and Rawalpindi. The Balti language belongs to the Tibetan language family and is a sub-dialect of Ladakhi. Balti, Ladakhi and Burig are mutually intelligible.
In the basin of the upper Indus River, the Baltis are the downstream neighbors of the Buddhist Ladakhi of Tibet and the upstream neighbors of the Muslim Dards of Gilgit and Chilas. Over mountain passes to the north live the Burusho of Hunza and Nagar. China’s Xinjiang Province is over mountain passes to the northeast, and to the south tracks lead into Indian Kashmir.
The Baltis were Buddhist prior to 1400. At approximately that time, Sufi teachers converted the Baltis to Islam. Local tradition attributes the origin of Islam in Baltistan to one or more visits from Kashmir by Sayyid ‘Ali al’ Hamadani (1314-1384). There is no historical record of his personal visit, but his influence, whether directly or through his disciples, is well established. Some of the oldest mosques in Baltistan are wooden khanaqahs, constructed on the unique design of the famous Shah Hamadan mosque in Srinagar. But most interesting, the Nurbakhshiyya Sufi order, derived from 'Ali al' Hamadani through Isaq al' Khuttalani to Muhammad ibn 'Abdullah (known as Nurbaksh [d. 1465]) was brought from Kashmir to Baltistan. Nurbakhshiyya Sufis still prevail in the eastern sections of Baltistan (Khapalu region) and are numerous in the Shigar region.
The rest of the Balti population, notably in the Skardu area, is predominantly Shi‘a. Shiism was brought from Kashmir to Baltistan by Mir Shams-u-din ‘Iraqi’, a Shi‘a who preached in Kashmir under the cloak of the more acceptable Nurbakshiyya Sufi order. When he fell from favor in Kashmir, he went to Skardu for a brief period.
Although the Baltis have been Muslim for more than 500 years, the Tibetan roots of their culture can still be seen in their language, animal husbandry, clothing, food and folklore traditions.
Baltis. An ethnic group of Tibetan descent with some Dardic admixture located in Baltistan, a region in the Northern Areas, Pakistan, and Ladakh, a region in Jammu and Kashmir, India; as well as scattered throughout Pakistan's major urban centers of Lahore, Karachi and Islamabad and Rawalpindi. The Balti language belongs to the Tibetan language family and is a sub-dialect of Ladakhi. Balti, Ladakhi and Burig are mutually intelligible.
In the basin of the upper Indus River, the Baltis are the downstream neighbors of the Buddhist Ladakhi of Tibet and the upstream neighbors of the Muslim Dards of Gilgit and Chilas. Over mountain passes to the north live the Burusho of Hunza and Nagar. China’s Xinjiang Province is over mountain passes to the northeast, and to the south tracks lead into Indian Kashmir.
The Baltis were Buddhist prior to 1400. At approximately that time, Sufi teachers converted the Baltis to Islam. Local tradition attributes the origin of Islam in Baltistan to one or more visits from Kashmir by Sayyid ‘Ali al’ Hamadani (1314-1384). There is no historical record of his personal visit, but his influence, whether directly or through his disciples, is well established. Some of the oldest mosques in Baltistan are wooden khanaqahs, constructed on the unique design of the famous Shah Hamadan mosque in Srinagar. But most interesting, the Nurbakhshiyya Sufi order, derived from 'Ali al' Hamadani through Isaq al' Khuttalani to Muhammad ibn 'Abdullah (known as Nurbaksh [d. 1465]) was brought from Kashmir to Baltistan. Nurbakhshiyya Sufis still prevail in the eastern sections of Baltistan (Khapalu region) and are numerous in the Shigar region.
The rest of the Balti population, notably in the Skardu area, is predominantly Shi‘a. Shiism was brought from Kashmir to Baltistan by Mir Shams-u-din ‘Iraqi’, a Shi‘a who preached in Kashmir under the cloak of the more acceptable Nurbakshiyya Sufi order. When he fell from favor in Kashmir, he went to Skardu for a brief period.
Although the Baltis have been Muslim for more than 500 years, the Tibetan roots of their culture can still be seen in their language, animal husbandry, clothing, food and folklore traditions.
Baluch
Baluch (Baloch). A people of western Pakistan, southeastern Iran and southwestern Afghanistan. The trans-border “heartland” of the Baluch is a 250,000 square mile tract of desolate desert, mountains and seacoast known as “Baluchistan,” or “land of the Baluch.” However, substantial Baluch populations are found outside this area, notably in Pakistan’s Sind and Punjab provinces and in the Persian Gulf emirates, where for centuries Baluch have gone to find their fortunes, originally as mercenary soldiers and slaves and more recently as workers in oil related activities.
The Baluch language, Baluchi, belongs to the Iranic branch of Indo-Iranian and has affinities to tongues spoken in the northwest part of present day Baluch territory. Baluch traditions trace the ancestry of many of the major tribal groups to the Middle East and the Caspian region. Some native Baluch scholars even suggest that the Baluch are descendants of Babylonian civilization. Others look to an Arabian or Syrian homeland with Hamza, the uncle of the Prophet, often cited as a key ancestor.
References in the tenth century Persian Book of Kings suggest that, for several centuries earlier, Baluch had served prominently in the vanguards of Persian rulers, while Arab accounts from this period portray the Baluch as well established in the Kirman region of Iran, where they enjoyed a formidable reputation as brigands.
By the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a massive eastward thrust of Baluch, under their renowned folk hero, Mir Chakar Rind, carried them throughout most of Baluchistan and even into the Punjab. It was at this time that many of the existing Baluch clan and tribal groupings came into being, for the Baluch, as predatory nomads, absorbed into their society and polity many of the peoples in their path and acted as a magnet to others with freebooting inclinations. This ethnic heterogeneity is evident in the composition of those who call themselves Baluch today. Black slave groups of African origin, refugees from Pushtu-speaking regions and Brahuis of Dravidian language stock are some of the notable components in the contemporary Baluch population.
During the heyday of the British Raj, the Baluch were allowed considerable regional autonomy as long as they served as a buffer to Russian ambitions on the Arabian Sea. Today, this “Great Game” (as Kipling called it) of big power intrigue over the Baluch and their land continued in intensified form, especially after the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.
For the most of the latter part of the twentieth century, the Baluch, long accustomed to handling their own affairs, have been increasingly consolidated into the central governmental structures of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. Resentments about contemptuous, heavy-handed and often corrupt administration by non-Baluch bureaucrats (such as the Punjabis, who dominate Pakistan’s civil service and who often view the Baluch as near savages) have been rife among the honor-obsessed tribesmen. Regional autonomy and outright secessionist and irredentist movements have been the result, centered in Pakistan and headed by traditional elites, who resent usurpation of their accustomed powers by nation states. In recent years, Baluch insurgents have waged both guerrilla and propaganda wars against their various central governments, with the period 1973-1977 witnessing a large scale insurrection in Pakistani Baluchistan spearheaded by the Marri tribe and its Sardar. The Baluch were abetted in this uprising by such outside forces as India, Iraq and Afghanistan, all of whom had vested interests in destabilizing Pakistan and/or Iran, the centers of Baluch population.
Open warfare had subsided by the summer of 1982, but the anti-Pakistani guerrillas known as Farari continued to receive safe haven in Marxist Afghanistan. This was ironic because the Baluch shared many cultural values with the Pushtun of Afghanistan, who comprise the bulk of the anti-Soviet Mujahidin insurgents based in Pakistan. Yet their differing ethnic political interests often lead to armed conflict between Baluch and Pushtun “freedom fighters” when they meet on their respective cross-border forays.
In Iran, the Sunni Baluch held little tolerance for Khomeini style Shi‘a fundamentalism and were among the first of Iran’s minority groups to protest openly the revolution’s policies.
The Baluchis are believed to have migrated to Baluchistan from Persian around 1100. Their cultural identity is manifest in Baluchi, a language closely related to Persian; patrilineal social structures; and a code of honor similar to that of their Pathan neighbors. Baluchis are overwhelmingly Sunni Muslims, although a small Zikri sect exists in Pakistan.
Baluchistan is largely desert intersected by numerous mountain chains. In this habitat, a variety of local adaptation based on altitudinal zones and water sources developed. Local communities range from small nomadic camps and transhumant villages to modest towns. In the more isolated areas, such as the Sarhad in Iran and the Marri-Bugti Hills in Pakistan, pastoral nomadism predominates, often supplemented by rainfall cultivation. In the more productive areas, irrigation agriculture is practiced. Transhumant villages are characterized by a mixed economy of cultivation and animal husbandry that seasonally exploits altitudinal zones.
Economic variation is accompanied by a range of political structures. Pastoral nomadism is associated with tribal organization and egalitarian idioms. In areas of intensive cultivation, there are feudal-like structures in which a local elite controls subject cultivators, exacting a portion of the harvest as rent or tribute. In the past, nomadic tribes articulated with these centers through contractual alliances in which the tribes provided warriors but retained de facto autonomy.
Although the Baluchis have never been politically united, local groups in both Iran and Pakistan have long histories of resistance to outside domination. In recent years, as Iran and Pakistan have attempted to integrate Baluchis in the state, a Baluchi nationalist movement has emerged. It is centered in Pakistan and espouses autonomous Baluchi regions in both countries.
Baloch see Baluch
Baluch (Baloch). A people of western Pakistan, southeastern Iran and southwestern Afghanistan. The trans-border “heartland” of the Baluch is a 250,000 square mile tract of desolate desert, mountains and seacoast known as “Baluchistan,” or “land of the Baluch.” However, substantial Baluch populations are found outside this area, notably in Pakistan’s Sind and Punjab provinces and in the Persian Gulf emirates, where for centuries Baluch have gone to find their fortunes, originally as mercenary soldiers and slaves and more recently as workers in oil related activities.
The Baluch language, Baluchi, belongs to the Iranic branch of Indo-Iranian and has affinities to tongues spoken in the northwest part of present day Baluch territory. Baluch traditions trace the ancestry of many of the major tribal groups to the Middle East and the Caspian region. Some native Baluch scholars even suggest that the Baluch are descendants of Babylonian civilization. Others look to an Arabian or Syrian homeland with Hamza, the uncle of the Prophet, often cited as a key ancestor.
References in the tenth century Persian Book of Kings suggest that, for several centuries earlier, Baluch had served prominently in the vanguards of Persian rulers, while Arab accounts from this period portray the Baluch as well established in the Kirman region of Iran, where they enjoyed a formidable reputation as brigands.
By the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a massive eastward thrust of Baluch, under their renowned folk hero, Mir Chakar Rind, carried them throughout most of Baluchistan and even into the Punjab. It was at this time that many of the existing Baluch clan and tribal groupings came into being, for the Baluch, as predatory nomads, absorbed into their society and polity many of the peoples in their path and acted as a magnet to others with freebooting inclinations. This ethnic heterogeneity is evident in the composition of those who call themselves Baluch today. Black slave groups of African origin, refugees from Pushtu-speaking regions and Brahuis of Dravidian language stock are some of the notable components in the contemporary Baluch population.
During the heyday of the British Raj, the Baluch were allowed considerable regional autonomy as long as they served as a buffer to Russian ambitions on the Arabian Sea. Today, this “Great Game” (as Kipling called it) of big power intrigue over the Baluch and their land continued in intensified form, especially after the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.
For the most of the latter part of the twentieth century, the Baluch, long accustomed to handling their own affairs, have been increasingly consolidated into the central governmental structures of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. Resentments about contemptuous, heavy-handed and often corrupt administration by non-Baluch bureaucrats (such as the Punjabis, who dominate Pakistan’s civil service and who often view the Baluch as near savages) have been rife among the honor-obsessed tribesmen. Regional autonomy and outright secessionist and irredentist movements have been the result, centered in Pakistan and headed by traditional elites, who resent usurpation of their accustomed powers by nation states. In recent years, Baluch insurgents have waged both guerrilla and propaganda wars against their various central governments, with the period 1973-1977 witnessing a large scale insurrection in Pakistani Baluchistan spearheaded by the Marri tribe and its Sardar. The Baluch were abetted in this uprising by such outside forces as India, Iraq and Afghanistan, all of whom had vested interests in destabilizing Pakistan and/or Iran, the centers of Baluch population.
Open warfare had subsided by the summer of 1982, but the anti-Pakistani guerrillas known as Farari continued to receive safe haven in Marxist Afghanistan. This was ironic because the Baluch shared many cultural values with the Pushtun of Afghanistan, who comprise the bulk of the anti-Soviet Mujahidin insurgents based in Pakistan. Yet their differing ethnic political interests often lead to armed conflict between Baluch and Pushtun “freedom fighters” when they meet on their respective cross-border forays.
In Iran, the Sunni Baluch held little tolerance for Khomeini style Shi‘a fundamentalism and were among the first of Iran’s minority groups to protest openly the revolution’s policies.
The Baluchis are believed to have migrated to Baluchistan from Persian around 1100. Their cultural identity is manifest in Baluchi, a language closely related to Persian; patrilineal social structures; and a code of honor similar to that of their Pathan neighbors. Baluchis are overwhelmingly Sunni Muslims, although a small Zikri sect exists in Pakistan.
Baluchistan is largely desert intersected by numerous mountain chains. In this habitat, a variety of local adaptation based on altitudinal zones and water sources developed. Local communities range from small nomadic camps and transhumant villages to modest towns. In the more isolated areas, such as the Sarhad in Iran and the Marri-Bugti Hills in Pakistan, pastoral nomadism predominates, often supplemented by rainfall cultivation. In the more productive areas, irrigation agriculture is practiced. Transhumant villages are characterized by a mixed economy of cultivation and animal husbandry that seasonally exploits altitudinal zones.
Economic variation is accompanied by a range of political structures. Pastoral nomadism is associated with tribal organization and egalitarian idioms. In areas of intensive cultivation, there are feudal-like structures in which a local elite controls subject cultivators, exacting a portion of the harvest as rent or tribute. In the past, nomadic tribes articulated with these centers through contractual alliances in which the tribes provided warriors but retained de facto autonomy.
Although the Baluchis have never been politically united, local groups in both Iran and Pakistan have long histories of resistance to outside domination. In recent years, as Iran and Pakistan have attempted to integrate Baluchis in the state, a Baluchi nationalist movement has emerged. It is centered in Pakistan and espouses autonomous Baluchi regions in both countries.
Baloch see Baluch
Bambara
Bambara (Bamana) (Banmana). Muslim people who form part of the large Mandingo language group. The Bambara are found in all the regions of Mali and the northern Ivory Coast along with parts of Guinea, Burkina Faso and Senegal. In the nineteenth century of the Christian calendar, the Bambara formed two powerful states, Segu and Kaarta. These two states were notable for their attachment to pagan traditions.
The Bambara form part of the large Manding language group and can communicate with Manding speakers as far west as Gambia. They are found in all the regions of Mali and the northern Ivory Coast. Many thousands are scattered in Guinea and Gambia. Most are concentrated along both banks of the Niger River, from the interior delta to Bamako, and from the Bani River in the east to the plains of Kaarta to the west. In Mali, they form 31 percent of the population and greatly influence the culture and politics of the nation. About seventy percent of the Bambara are Muslims.
In the course of the eighteenth century, the Bambara founded two kingdoms in the region where they presently predominate. The Segu and Kaarta kingdoms were fiercely traditionalist and, in the case of Segu, several idols formed part of the institutional apparatus of state. Although the Segu and Kaarta Bambara were pagans, they were not averse to using Islam when and where it suited them. Muslims thus came to have important roles within the administration as diplomats and councilors to the rulers and as representatives of other Muslims living in the kingdoms. Animist Bambara rulers often sought special prayers from famed Muslim clerics, and they rewarded such services with gifts of luxuries and slaves. Nonetheless, Islam existed in an uneasy balance with traditional religion until the conquest by the French in the last two decades of the nineteenth century.
During the period of Bambara hegemony (c. 1710-1861), Bambara identity began to devolve into two forms, although both were clearly defined in opposition to the Muslim Maraka traders. On the one hand, slave warriors came to dominate the Bambara states. These warriors were hard drinking, hard fighting and committed to immediate gratification. All these values were antagonistic to the pious, refrained and accumulative Muslim merchants. On the other hand, Bambara identity remained deeply imbedded in the organization of farming communities using collective labor practices. Bambara farmers still dependent upon the ton consider themselves to be the authentic Bamana.
Magic was the primary means through which Islam percolated into Bambara society. The Bambara are essentially pragmatic. They are not averse to adding new rituals to their established practices, especially when the efficacy thereof is proven. Amulets containing written verses from the Qur’an or prayers, known as grisgris, were common accoutrements to Bambara wardrobes. Indeed, illustrations of fiercely animist Bambara warriors show them bedecked with these amulets. The Somono and the Soninke followed a quieter path of conversion.
Beginning in 1852, Al Hajj 'Umar participated in a wave of militant Muslim revivals which overthrew the Bambara kingdoms of Segu and Kaarta. By 1861, 'Umar had established a theocratic state, albeit on rather slender foundations, stretching throughout the areas where the Bambara had ruled. The 'Umarian experience, however, was not conducive to conversion. Although the 'Umarians (whose leadership was largely dominated by the Tukulor but included a variety of other West African Muslim peoples) introduced the Tijaniyya brotherhood into the Bambara lands, they made few converts. Indeed, the 'Umarian experience probably reinforced local animist religions longer than might otherwise have been the case. Anti-Muslim Bambara warlords led a 30 year resistance against the 'Umarians. Moreover, the 'Umarians did not fully re-establish a viable regional economy and a strong state in which Islam could have made conquering the western Sudan, their success paradoxically re-established conditions favorable for the expansion of Islam.
By 1912, only a tiny fraction (about 3 percent) of the Bambara were Muslims. French pacification eroded the slave warrior tradition, although many Bambara served in the French colonial army. French conquest increased commercial opportunities throughout the western Sudan, and Islam once again spread on the heels of this commerce radiating outward from the cities, as it had done since the eleventh century. Trade and production for the market gnawed at the traditional forms of community solidarity and weakened them. As Islam seeped into these open cracks, it provided a new sense of community for those participating in a larger economic system. Islam also hastened the erosion of these communal bonds, which had rested upon both cooperation and young bachelor’s labor. In a report written in 1909, a French administrator described how the penetration of Islam into a Bambara community had turned newly converted youth against their animist elders. The new opportunities for accumulation engendered by expanding markets stood in sharp opposition to the cooperative anti-accumulative strategy of the Bamana. Conversion also offered those of low social status an opportunity to escape from their place within Bambara society.
Islam also expanded among the Bambara as a form of opposition to colonial rule. While the rebellions during the recruitment drive of World War I were organized along traditional animist lines, resistance after World War II was often articulated in an Islamic idiom. The most numerous conversions among the Bambara occurred after 1945. Most Bambara today admit to being Muslims and participate in Muslim celebrations and in Friday prayers. The adaptation of the Muslim lunar calendar to the Bambara agricultural cycle posed no serious hardships. For example, the fasting of Ramadan meshed naturally with the local “hungry” season. Islam continued to advance among the Bambara as the established forms of social organization and their cultural and political logic disappeared.
Bamana see Bambara
Banmana see Bambara
Bambara (Bamana) (Banmana). Muslim people who form part of the large Mandingo language group. The Bambara are found in all the regions of Mali and the northern Ivory Coast along with parts of Guinea, Burkina Faso and Senegal. In the nineteenth century of the Christian calendar, the Bambara formed two powerful states, Segu and Kaarta. These two states were notable for their attachment to pagan traditions.
The Bambara form part of the large Manding language group and can communicate with Manding speakers as far west as Gambia. They are found in all the regions of Mali and the northern Ivory Coast. Many thousands are scattered in Guinea and Gambia. Most are concentrated along both banks of the Niger River, from the interior delta to Bamako, and from the Bani River in the east to the plains of Kaarta to the west. In Mali, they form 31 percent of the population and greatly influence the culture and politics of the nation. About seventy percent of the Bambara are Muslims.
In the course of the eighteenth century, the Bambara founded two kingdoms in the region where they presently predominate. The Segu and Kaarta kingdoms were fiercely traditionalist and, in the case of Segu, several idols formed part of the institutional apparatus of state. Although the Segu and Kaarta Bambara were pagans, they were not averse to using Islam when and where it suited them. Muslims thus came to have important roles within the administration as diplomats and councilors to the rulers and as representatives of other Muslims living in the kingdoms. Animist Bambara rulers often sought special prayers from famed Muslim clerics, and they rewarded such services with gifts of luxuries and slaves. Nonetheless, Islam existed in an uneasy balance with traditional religion until the conquest by the French in the last two decades of the nineteenth century.
During the period of Bambara hegemony (c. 1710-1861), Bambara identity began to devolve into two forms, although both were clearly defined in opposition to the Muslim Maraka traders. On the one hand, slave warriors came to dominate the Bambara states. These warriors were hard drinking, hard fighting and committed to immediate gratification. All these values were antagonistic to the pious, refrained and accumulative Muslim merchants. On the other hand, Bambara identity remained deeply imbedded in the organization of farming communities using collective labor practices. Bambara farmers still dependent upon the ton consider themselves to be the authentic Bamana.
Magic was the primary means through which Islam percolated into Bambara society. The Bambara are essentially pragmatic. They are not averse to adding new rituals to their established practices, especially when the efficacy thereof is proven. Amulets containing written verses from the Qur’an or prayers, known as grisgris, were common accoutrements to Bambara wardrobes. Indeed, illustrations of fiercely animist Bambara warriors show them bedecked with these amulets. The Somono and the Soninke followed a quieter path of conversion.
Beginning in 1852, Al Hajj 'Umar participated in a wave of militant Muslim revivals which overthrew the Bambara kingdoms of Segu and Kaarta. By 1861, 'Umar had established a theocratic state, albeit on rather slender foundations, stretching throughout the areas where the Bambara had ruled. The 'Umarian experience, however, was not conducive to conversion. Although the 'Umarians (whose leadership was largely dominated by the Tukulor but included a variety of other West African Muslim peoples) introduced the Tijaniyya brotherhood into the Bambara lands, they made few converts. Indeed, the 'Umarian experience probably reinforced local animist religions longer than might otherwise have been the case. Anti-Muslim Bambara warlords led a 30 year resistance against the 'Umarians. Moreover, the 'Umarians did not fully re-establish a viable regional economy and a strong state in which Islam could have made conquering the western Sudan, their success paradoxically re-established conditions favorable for the expansion of Islam.
By 1912, only a tiny fraction (about 3 percent) of the Bambara were Muslims. French pacification eroded the slave warrior tradition, although many Bambara served in the French colonial army. French conquest increased commercial opportunities throughout the western Sudan, and Islam once again spread on the heels of this commerce radiating outward from the cities, as it had done since the eleventh century. Trade and production for the market gnawed at the traditional forms of community solidarity and weakened them. As Islam seeped into these open cracks, it provided a new sense of community for those participating in a larger economic system. Islam also hastened the erosion of these communal bonds, which had rested upon both cooperation and young bachelor’s labor. In a report written in 1909, a French administrator described how the penetration of Islam into a Bambara community had turned newly converted youth against their animist elders. The new opportunities for accumulation engendered by expanding markets stood in sharp opposition to the cooperative anti-accumulative strategy of the Bamana. Conversion also offered those of low social status an opportunity to escape from their place within Bambara society.
Islam also expanded among the Bambara as a form of opposition to colonial rule. While the rebellions during the recruitment drive of World War I were organized along traditional animist lines, resistance after World War II was often articulated in an Islamic idiom. The most numerous conversions among the Bambara occurred after 1945. Most Bambara today admit to being Muslims and participate in Muslim celebrations and in Friday prayers. The adaptation of the Muslim lunar calendar to the Bambara agricultural cycle posed no serious hardships. For example, the fasting of Ramadan meshed naturally with the local “hungry” season. Islam continued to advance among the Bambara as the established forms of social organization and their cultural and political logic disappeared.
Bamana see Bambara
Banmana see Bambara
Bangladesh Nationalist Party
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) (Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Dol). A political grouping created as a vehicle for the associates of President Ziaur Rahman in 1978. Ziaur had been elected president in June 1978 as the candidate of JANODAL (an acronym for the Bengali equivalent of “People’s Party”). JANODAL and portions of the conservative Muslim League, the leftist National Awami Party (formerly led by Maulana 'Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani), and several other smaller parties joined together to support Ziaur’s nineteen point development program. Justice 'Abdus Sattar, who succeeded Ziaur as president of the nation in 1981, was the titular leader of the party. It won 207 of the 300 directly elected seats in the parliamentary poll in February 1979. After Ziaur’s assassination in May 1981 and the coup that ousted Sattar in March 1982, the party was led by Ziaur’s widow, Begum Khalida Ziaur.
Founded in 1978 by General Ziaur Rahman, the 6th President of Bangladesh, the BNP evolved into one of the most powerful political entities in South Asia. The BNP was established by President Zia to provide a political platform for him after his assumption of power during Bangladesh's volatile period of Martial Law from 1975 till 1979. The BNP also accommodated not just his supporters, but also those tradiionally opposed to its principal rival, the Awami League, which had a virtual monopoly domination in Bangladeshi politics prior to the Martial Law period. Idealogically, the party has professed Bangladeshi nationalism, described as a more inclusive and Islamic conscieousness of the people of Muslim majority Bangladesh, in order to counter the Awami League's secular Bengali nationalism. The BNP has since its inception, been opposed to communism and socialism and freedom of religion and advocates vigorous free market policies.
The Bangladesh Nationalist Party has held power in Bangladesh for five separate terms. Amongst its leaders, four have become President of Bangladesh and two have become Prime Minister of Bangladesh. Within the party, power has remained exclusively in the hands of the Zia family, with Begum Khaleda Zia leading the party since the assassination of Ziaur Rahman, her husband and the party's founder.
Around 2006, the BNP became embroiled in a huge controversy with accusations of unbridled corruption from the press. Hundreds of its leaders, including Begum Zia, her sons as well as dozens of its former ministers and lawmakers were arrested on corruption charges by the military backed interim administration in Bangladesh during the 2006–2008 Bangladeshi political crisis. The party has also been accused of paying a blind eye to the growth of Islamic extremism in the country and for allying with Islamic fundamentalist parties, such as the Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, which had also opposed the independence of Bangladesh.
BNP see Bangladesh Nationalist Party
Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Dol see Bangladesh Nationalist Party
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) (Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Dol). A political grouping created as a vehicle for the associates of President Ziaur Rahman in 1978. Ziaur had been elected president in June 1978 as the candidate of JANODAL (an acronym for the Bengali equivalent of “People’s Party”). JANODAL and portions of the conservative Muslim League, the leftist National Awami Party (formerly led by Maulana 'Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani), and several other smaller parties joined together to support Ziaur’s nineteen point development program. Justice 'Abdus Sattar, who succeeded Ziaur as president of the nation in 1981, was the titular leader of the party. It won 207 of the 300 directly elected seats in the parliamentary poll in February 1979. After Ziaur’s assassination in May 1981 and the coup that ousted Sattar in March 1982, the party was led by Ziaur’s widow, Begum Khalida Ziaur.
Founded in 1978 by General Ziaur Rahman, the 6th President of Bangladesh, the BNP evolved into one of the most powerful political entities in South Asia. The BNP was established by President Zia to provide a political platform for him after his assumption of power during Bangladesh's volatile period of Martial Law from 1975 till 1979. The BNP also accommodated not just his supporters, but also those tradiionally opposed to its principal rival, the Awami League, which had a virtual monopoly domination in Bangladeshi politics prior to the Martial Law period. Idealogically, the party has professed Bangladeshi nationalism, described as a more inclusive and Islamic conscieousness of the people of Muslim majority Bangladesh, in order to counter the Awami League's secular Bengali nationalism. The BNP has since its inception, been opposed to communism and socialism and freedom of religion and advocates vigorous free market policies.
The Bangladesh Nationalist Party has held power in Bangladesh for five separate terms. Amongst its leaders, four have become President of Bangladesh and two have become Prime Minister of Bangladesh. Within the party, power has remained exclusively in the hands of the Zia family, with Begum Khaleda Zia leading the party since the assassination of Ziaur Rahman, her husband and the party's founder.
Around 2006, the BNP became embroiled in a huge controversy with accusations of unbridled corruption from the press. Hundreds of its leaders, including Begum Zia, her sons as well as dozens of its former ministers and lawmakers were arrested on corruption charges by the military backed interim administration in Bangladesh during the 2006–2008 Bangladeshi political crisis. The party has also been accused of paying a blind eye to the growth of Islamic extremism in the country and for allying with Islamic fundamentalist parties, such as the Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, which had also opposed the independence of Bangladesh.
BNP see Bangladesh Nationalist Party
Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Dol see Bangladesh Nationalist Party
Banisadr
Banisadr (Abol-Hasan Bani Sadr) (Abolhasan Banisadr) (Abu al-Hasan Bani Sadr) (b. 1933). First president of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1980-1981). Banisadr was born in the western Iranian city of Hamadan to Ayatollah Hajj Sayyid Nasrollah Banisadr, a religious scholar of some standing. Banisadr formed his political ambitions early, predicting at the age of seventeen that he would be the first president of post-shah Iran. He began studies of theology and economics at Tehran University and was at the head of a student delegation that met Prime Minister Amini in 1962. The following year, however, he was imprisoned for four months after participating in demonstrations. On his release, he left for France to continue his studies. He concentrated on economics and sociology, studying these under the guidance of the Marxist scholar Paul Vieille. He also helped in organizing Iranian students in Paris hostile to the shah’s regime. In early 1972, Banisadr had his first contact with Ayatollah Khomeini when he traveled to Najaf, Khomeini’s place of exile, in order to attend the funeral of his father (the elder Banisadr had died in Beirut, and the body was brought to Najaf for burial). Thereafter, Banisadr intensified his political activity, and he began to write a number of works on Islamic politics and economics.
In November 1978, Khomeini himself arrived in Paris, and Banisadr became a highly visible member of his entourage. Returning to Iran with Khomeini in February 1979, Banisadr was appointed to the Council of the Islamic Revolution. In July, he was given the post of acting minister of economy and finance, and on November 5, 1979, after the occupation of the United States embassy by Islamic militants and the resignation of the Bazargan government, he was appointed acting minister of foreign affairs. He soon extricated himself from the latter post and concentrated on preparations for the presidential elections due the following January. As a result of his intensive campaigning -- as well as to the disarray in the Islamic Republican Party -- he received 10.7 million out of the 14.3 million votes cast on January 25, 1980, and was sworn in as first president of the Islamic Republic on February 4, 1980.
The size of Banisadr’s victory was deceptive, however, and in the Majlis, elected in two stages, that first met in May 1980, Banisadr had no organized support. Friction soon arose between him and a majority of its members, especially those associated with the Islamic Republican Party. Three persons he proposed to the Majlis as candidates for prime minister were successively turned down, and in August, he was obliged to accept the premiership of Mohammed Ali Rejai.
One month later, Iraq attacked Iran, but the war served only to widen the gap between Banisadr and his opponents. In November, by denouncing the Islamic Republican Party in a series of speeches, he defied the orders of Khomeini that all parties should observe a political truce. In March 1981, when Banisadr ordered his personal guards to arrest hecklers at a meeting at Tehran University, he had reached a point of no return. The efforts of a conciliation committee were fruitless, and events moved swiftly. On June 10, 1981, Khomeini dismissed Banisadr from his post of commander in chief, and ten days later the Majlis proclaimed him “politically incompetent,” thus removing him from the presidency. Banisadr then went into hiding, and on July 28, 1981, he fled to Paris in the company of Mas’ud Rajavi, leader of the Mujahidin-i Khalq, to set up a “National Council of Resistance” and a government-in-exile. But these were ineffectual charades, for the Islamic Republic was able to surmount the crisis that occurred after many of its leading figures were assassinated by Rajavi’s men. By contrast, the “National Council of Resistance” foundered when Rajavi had a friendly meeting in Paris with Iraqi officials and Banisadr found it politic, in April 1984, to distance himself from him.
Banisadr may be characterized as a man of acute ambition who fundamentally misread the climate of his homeland. His following was never firm and he was unequipped to compete with the charisma of the religious leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini.
Abol-Hasan Bani Sadr see Banisadr
Abolhasan Banisadr see Banisadr
Abu al-Hasan Bani Sadr see Banisadr
Sadr, Abol-Hasan Bani see Banisadr
Sadr, Abu al-Hasan Bani Sadr see Banisadr
Banisadr (Abol-Hasan Bani Sadr) (Abolhasan Banisadr) (Abu al-Hasan Bani Sadr) (b. 1933). First president of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1980-1981). Banisadr was born in the western Iranian city of Hamadan to Ayatollah Hajj Sayyid Nasrollah Banisadr, a religious scholar of some standing. Banisadr formed his political ambitions early, predicting at the age of seventeen that he would be the first president of post-shah Iran. He began studies of theology and economics at Tehran University and was at the head of a student delegation that met Prime Minister Amini in 1962. The following year, however, he was imprisoned for four months after participating in demonstrations. On his release, he left for France to continue his studies. He concentrated on economics and sociology, studying these under the guidance of the Marxist scholar Paul Vieille. He also helped in organizing Iranian students in Paris hostile to the shah’s regime. In early 1972, Banisadr had his first contact with Ayatollah Khomeini when he traveled to Najaf, Khomeini’s place of exile, in order to attend the funeral of his father (the elder Banisadr had died in Beirut, and the body was brought to Najaf for burial). Thereafter, Banisadr intensified his political activity, and he began to write a number of works on Islamic politics and economics.
In November 1978, Khomeini himself arrived in Paris, and Banisadr became a highly visible member of his entourage. Returning to Iran with Khomeini in February 1979, Banisadr was appointed to the Council of the Islamic Revolution. In July, he was given the post of acting minister of economy and finance, and on November 5, 1979, after the occupation of the United States embassy by Islamic militants and the resignation of the Bazargan government, he was appointed acting minister of foreign affairs. He soon extricated himself from the latter post and concentrated on preparations for the presidential elections due the following January. As a result of his intensive campaigning -- as well as to the disarray in the Islamic Republican Party -- he received 10.7 million out of the 14.3 million votes cast on January 25, 1980, and was sworn in as first president of the Islamic Republic on February 4, 1980.
The size of Banisadr’s victory was deceptive, however, and in the Majlis, elected in two stages, that first met in May 1980, Banisadr had no organized support. Friction soon arose between him and a majority of its members, especially those associated with the Islamic Republican Party. Three persons he proposed to the Majlis as candidates for prime minister were successively turned down, and in August, he was obliged to accept the premiership of Mohammed Ali Rejai.
One month later, Iraq attacked Iran, but the war served only to widen the gap between Banisadr and his opponents. In November, by denouncing the Islamic Republican Party in a series of speeches, he defied the orders of Khomeini that all parties should observe a political truce. In March 1981, when Banisadr ordered his personal guards to arrest hecklers at a meeting at Tehran University, he had reached a point of no return. The efforts of a conciliation committee were fruitless, and events moved swiftly. On June 10, 1981, Khomeini dismissed Banisadr from his post of commander in chief, and ten days later the Majlis proclaimed him “politically incompetent,” thus removing him from the presidency. Banisadr then went into hiding, and on July 28, 1981, he fled to Paris in the company of Mas’ud Rajavi, leader of the Mujahidin-i Khalq, to set up a “National Council of Resistance” and a government-in-exile. But these were ineffectual charades, for the Islamic Republic was able to surmount the crisis that occurred after many of its leading figures were assassinated by Rajavi’s men. By contrast, the “National Council of Resistance” foundered when Rajavi had a friendly meeting in Paris with Iraqi officials and Banisadr found it politic, in April 1984, to distance himself from him.
Banisadr may be characterized as a man of acute ambition who fundamentally misread the climate of his homeland. His following was never firm and he was unequipped to compete with the charisma of the religious leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini.
Abol-Hasan Bani Sadr see Banisadr
Abolhasan Banisadr see Banisadr
Abu al-Hasan Bani Sadr see Banisadr
Sadr, Abol-Hasan Bani see Banisadr
Sadr, Abu al-Hasan Bani Sadr see Banisadr
Banna’, Hasan al-
Banna’, Hasan al- (Hasan al-Banna’) (Hassan al-Banna) (October 14, 1906 – February 12, 1949). Arabic: حسن البنا) was an Egyptian social and political reformer, best known for founding the Muslim Brotherhood, one of the largest and most influential 20th century Muslim revivalist organizations. Al-Banna's leadership was critical to the growth of the brotherhood during the 1930s and 1940s. Convinced that Islamic society should return to the Qur’an and the hadith, Hasan al-Banna’ founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. He was arrested several times and was assassinated in 1949 after the Brotherhood had been suppressed.
Hasan al-Banna’ was born on October 14, 1906 in Mohammediya in northern Egypt as the oldest son of a watch repairman. Banna’s family was very religious. In 1923, Banna went to Cairo Teachers College and finished his education as a teacher at the top of his class. He was then admitted to the famous al-Azhar University.
In 1927, Banna' began working as a teacher in a state school in the city of Ismailiyya near the Suez Canal. In March 1928, he established the al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Ikhwanu al-Muslimin) -- the Muslim Brothers -- together with his brother and five others.
The main inspiration for his religious involvement was from the magazine Al Manar which published the writings of Muhammad Rashid Rida. The organization he started when he was 22 was initially a moderate one in its instruments, but changes in the political climate and reorientations in its ideology, made the Brotherhood active in violent operations from the late 1940s.
The first Brotherhood was a youth club stressing moral and social reform, promoting this through education and propaganda.
In 1933, Banna' moved the headquarters to the capital Cairo, and, in 1942 to 1945, he travelled many times to Jordan, where he set up Brotherhood branches in many towns over the entire country.
In 1948, Banna' declared that the Egyptian government was responsible for the Arab weakness in the First Palestinian War against newly formed Israel.
On February 12, 1949, Banna' was shot dead in Cairo by secret service agents.
Banna' was a prolific writer. He wrote memoirs, as well as numerous articles and speeches. Among his most important books is his “Letter to a Muslim Student,” a book in which Banna' explains the principles of his movement.
Banna’s legacy is still active, and his movement has spread to many other Muslim countries.
Hasan al-Banna’ see Banna’, Hasan al-
Hassan al-Banna see Banna’, Hasan al-
Banna’, Hasan al- (Hasan al-Banna’) (Hassan al-Banna) (October 14, 1906 – February 12, 1949). Arabic: حسن البنا) was an Egyptian social and political reformer, best known for founding the Muslim Brotherhood, one of the largest and most influential 20th century Muslim revivalist organizations. Al-Banna's leadership was critical to the growth of the brotherhood during the 1930s and 1940s. Convinced that Islamic society should return to the Qur’an and the hadith, Hasan al-Banna’ founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. He was arrested several times and was assassinated in 1949 after the Brotherhood had been suppressed.
Hasan al-Banna’ was born on October 14, 1906 in Mohammediya in northern Egypt as the oldest son of a watch repairman. Banna’s family was very religious. In 1923, Banna went to Cairo Teachers College and finished his education as a teacher at the top of his class. He was then admitted to the famous al-Azhar University.
In 1927, Banna' began working as a teacher in a state school in the city of Ismailiyya near the Suez Canal. In March 1928, he established the al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Ikhwanu al-Muslimin) -- the Muslim Brothers -- together with his brother and five others.
The main inspiration for his religious involvement was from the magazine Al Manar which published the writings of Muhammad Rashid Rida. The organization he started when he was 22 was initially a moderate one in its instruments, but changes in the political climate and reorientations in its ideology, made the Brotherhood active in violent operations from the late 1940s.
The first Brotherhood was a youth club stressing moral and social reform, promoting this through education and propaganda.
In 1933, Banna' moved the headquarters to the capital Cairo, and, in 1942 to 1945, he travelled many times to Jordan, where he set up Brotherhood branches in many towns over the entire country.
In 1948, Banna' declared that the Egyptian government was responsible for the Arab weakness in the First Palestinian War against newly formed Israel.
On February 12, 1949, Banna' was shot dead in Cairo by secret service agents.
Banna' was a prolific writer. He wrote memoirs, as well as numerous articles and speeches. Among his most important books is his “Letter to a Muslim Student,” a book in which Banna' explains the principles of his movement.
Banna’s legacy is still active, and his movement has spread to many other Muslim countries.
Hasan al-Banna’ see Banna’, Hasan al-
Hassan al-Banna see Banna’, Hasan al-
Banna’, Sabri al-
Banna’, Sabri al-. See Abu Nidal.
Banna’, Sabri al-. See Abu Nidal.
Bantu
Bantu. General label for over 400 ethnic groups in Sub-Saharan Africa, from Cameroon across Central Africa and Eastern Africa to Southern Africa. These peoples share a common language family sub-group, the Bantu languages, and broad ancestral culture, but Bantu languages as a whole are as diverse as Indo-European languages.
"Bantu" means "people" in many Bantu languages, along with similar sounding cognates. Dr. Wilhelm Bleek first used the term "Bantu" in its current sense in his 1862 book A Comparative Grammar of South African Languages, in which he hypothesized that a vast number of languages located across central, southern, eastern, and western Africa shared so many characteristics that they must be part of a single language group. Bleek's basic thesis of linguistic affinity has been confirmed by numerous researchers using the comparative method.
If one were to draw a line from Cameroon in West Africa to Kenya in East Africa, all peoples south of this line would be Bantu speakers except for a few thousand people speaking Nilotic, Cushitic or Khoisan (Click) languages. They comprise an enormous number of ethnic groups, frequently called tribes. In the country of Tanzania alone there are approximately 120 different groups. Most Bantu peoples have retained their own traditional animistic religions steeped in the sacredness of ancestors and a multiplicity of gods and spirits related to forces and things of nature. Many millions have become Christians of various sects. In eastern Africa, a significant number are Muslims, the result of centuries of contact with Arabs and early converts along the coast, the most influential of these being the Swahili peoples. Among the major Bantu-speaking subgroups who have been most influenced by Islam are the Northeast Bantu, Interlacustrine Bantu and Central Bantu.
The Bantu-speaking peoples probably originated in what today is eastern Nigeria. The migrations that led to their present wide distribution seem to have begun about 2,000 years ago. It is thought that they moved south through the rain forest, possibly using canoes, then settled in what is today the Luba area of Katanga in Zaire. From here they seem to have fanned out in a series of migrations until today they are found as far north as southern Somali (the Northeast Bantu) and as far south as South Africa, a distance of more than 2,000 miles. Almost everywhere, the Bantu absorbed the pre-Bantu sedentary peoples they found before them. And almost everywhere they settled, their language developed distinctive characteristics of its own.
Current scholarly understanding places the ancestral proto-Bantu homeland near the southwestern modern boundary of Nigeria and Cameroon ca. 5,000 years ago (3000 B.C.T.), and regards the Bantu languages as a branch of the Niger-Congo language family.
Before the expansion of farming and herding peoples, including those speaking Bantu languages, Africa south of the equator was populated by neolithic hunting and foraging peoples. Some of them were ancestral to modern Central African forest peoples (so-called Pygmies) who now speak Bantu languages. Others were proto-Khoisan-speaking peoples, whose few modern hunter-forager and linguistic descendants today occupy the arid regions around the Kalahari desert. Many more Khoikhoi (Khoekhoe) and San descendants have a Coloured identity in South Africa and Namibia, speaking Afrikaans and English. The small Hadza and Sandawe-speaking populations in Tanzania, whose languages are proposed by many to have a distant relationship to Khoikhoi and San languages (although the hypothesis that the Khoisan languages are a single family is disputed by many, and the name is simply used for convenience), comprise the other modern hunter-forager remnant in Africa. Over a period of many centuries, most hunting-foraging peoples were displaced and absorbed by incoming Bantu-speaking communities, as well as by Ubangian, Nilotic and Central Sudanic language-speakers in North Central and Eastern Africa. While earliest archaeological evidence of farming and herding in today's Bantu language areas often is presumed to reflect spread of Bantu-speaking communities, it need not always do so.
The Bantu expansion was a millennia-long series of physical migrations, a diffusion of language and knowledge out into and in from neighboring populations, and a creation of new societal groups involving inter-marriage among communities and small groups moving to communities and small groups moving to new areas. Bantu-speakers developed novel methods of agriculture and metalworking which allowed people to colonize new areas with widely varying ecologies in greater densities than hunting and foraging permitted. Meanwhile in Eastern and Southern Africa Bantu-speakers adopted livestock husbandry from other peoples they encountered, and in turn passed it to hunter-foragers, so that herding reached the far south several centuries before Bantu-speaking migrants did. Archaeological, linguistic and genetic evidence all support the idea that the Bantu expansion was one of the most significant human migrations and cultural transformations within the past few thousand years.
It is unclear when exactly the spread of Bantu-speakers began from their core area as hypothesized ca. 5,000 years ago. By 3,500 years ago (1500 B.C.T.) in the west, Bantu-speaking communities had reached the great Central African rainforest, and by 2,500 years ago (500 B.C.T.) pioneering groups had emerged into the savannahs to the south, in what are now the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola and Zambia. Another stream of migration, moving east, by 3,000 years ago (1000 B.C.T.) was creating a major new population center near the Great Lakes of East Africa, where a rich environment supported a dense population. Movements by small groups to the southeast from the Great Lakes region were more rapid, with initial settlements widely dispersed near the coast and near rivers, due to comparatively harsh farming conditions in areas further from water. Pioneering groups had reached modern KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa by 300 C.C. along the coast, and the modern Northern Province (encompassed within the former province of the Transvaal) by 500 C.C.
Between the 14th and 15th centuries powerful Bantu-speaking states began to emerge, in the Great Lakes region, in the savannah south of the Central African rainforest, and on the Zambezi river where the Monomatapa kings built the famous Great Zimbabwe complex. Such processes of state-formation occurred with increasing frequency from the 16th century onward. They were probably due to denser population, which led to more specialized divisions of labor, including military power, while making emigration more difficult, to increased trade among African communities and with European, Swahili and Arab traders on the coasts, to technological developments in economic activity, and to new techniques in the political-spiritual ritualization of royalty as the source of national strength and health.
In the 1920s, relatively liberal white South Africans, missionaries and the small black intelligentsia began to use the term "Bantu" in preference to "Native" and more derogatory terms (such as "Kaffir") to refer collectively to Bantu-speaking South Africans. After World War II, the racialist National Party governments adopted that usage officially, while the growing African nationalist movement and its liberal white allies turned to the term "African" instead, so that "Bantu" became identified with the policies of apartheid. By the 1970s this so discredited "Bantu" as an ethno-racial designation that the apartheid government switched to the term "Black" in its official racial categorizations, restricting it to Bantu-speaking Africans, at about the same time that the Black Consciousness Movement led by Steve Biko and others were defining "Black" to mean all racially oppressed South Africans (Africans, Coloureds and Indians).
Bantu. General label for over 400 ethnic groups in Sub-Saharan Africa, from Cameroon across Central Africa and Eastern Africa to Southern Africa. These peoples share a common language family sub-group, the Bantu languages, and broad ancestral culture, but Bantu languages as a whole are as diverse as Indo-European languages.
"Bantu" means "people" in many Bantu languages, along with similar sounding cognates. Dr. Wilhelm Bleek first used the term "Bantu" in its current sense in his 1862 book A Comparative Grammar of South African Languages, in which he hypothesized that a vast number of languages located across central, southern, eastern, and western Africa shared so many characteristics that they must be part of a single language group. Bleek's basic thesis of linguistic affinity has been confirmed by numerous researchers using the comparative method.
If one were to draw a line from Cameroon in West Africa to Kenya in East Africa, all peoples south of this line would be Bantu speakers except for a few thousand people speaking Nilotic, Cushitic or Khoisan (Click) languages. They comprise an enormous number of ethnic groups, frequently called tribes. In the country of Tanzania alone there are approximately 120 different groups. Most Bantu peoples have retained their own traditional animistic religions steeped in the sacredness of ancestors and a multiplicity of gods and spirits related to forces and things of nature. Many millions have become Christians of various sects. In eastern Africa, a significant number are Muslims, the result of centuries of contact with Arabs and early converts along the coast, the most influential of these being the Swahili peoples. Among the major Bantu-speaking subgroups who have been most influenced by Islam are the Northeast Bantu, Interlacustrine Bantu and Central Bantu.
The Bantu-speaking peoples probably originated in what today is eastern Nigeria. The migrations that led to their present wide distribution seem to have begun about 2,000 years ago. It is thought that they moved south through the rain forest, possibly using canoes, then settled in what is today the Luba area of Katanga in Zaire. From here they seem to have fanned out in a series of migrations until today they are found as far north as southern Somali (the Northeast Bantu) and as far south as South Africa, a distance of more than 2,000 miles. Almost everywhere, the Bantu absorbed the pre-Bantu sedentary peoples they found before them. And almost everywhere they settled, their language developed distinctive characteristics of its own.
Current scholarly understanding places the ancestral proto-Bantu homeland near the southwestern modern boundary of Nigeria and Cameroon ca. 5,000 years ago (3000 B.C.T.), and regards the Bantu languages as a branch of the Niger-Congo language family.
Before the expansion of farming and herding peoples, including those speaking Bantu languages, Africa south of the equator was populated by neolithic hunting and foraging peoples. Some of them were ancestral to modern Central African forest peoples (so-called Pygmies) who now speak Bantu languages. Others were proto-Khoisan-speaking peoples, whose few modern hunter-forager and linguistic descendants today occupy the arid regions around the Kalahari desert. Many more Khoikhoi (Khoekhoe) and San descendants have a Coloured identity in South Africa and Namibia, speaking Afrikaans and English. The small Hadza and Sandawe-speaking populations in Tanzania, whose languages are proposed by many to have a distant relationship to Khoikhoi and San languages (although the hypothesis that the Khoisan languages are a single family is disputed by many, and the name is simply used for convenience), comprise the other modern hunter-forager remnant in Africa. Over a period of many centuries, most hunting-foraging peoples were displaced and absorbed by incoming Bantu-speaking communities, as well as by Ubangian, Nilotic and Central Sudanic language-speakers in North Central and Eastern Africa. While earliest archaeological evidence of farming and herding in today's Bantu language areas often is presumed to reflect spread of Bantu-speaking communities, it need not always do so.
The Bantu expansion was a millennia-long series of physical migrations, a diffusion of language and knowledge out into and in from neighboring populations, and a creation of new societal groups involving inter-marriage among communities and small groups moving to communities and small groups moving to new areas. Bantu-speakers developed novel methods of agriculture and metalworking which allowed people to colonize new areas with widely varying ecologies in greater densities than hunting and foraging permitted. Meanwhile in Eastern and Southern Africa Bantu-speakers adopted livestock husbandry from other peoples they encountered, and in turn passed it to hunter-foragers, so that herding reached the far south several centuries before Bantu-speaking migrants did. Archaeological, linguistic and genetic evidence all support the idea that the Bantu expansion was one of the most significant human migrations and cultural transformations within the past few thousand years.
It is unclear when exactly the spread of Bantu-speakers began from their core area as hypothesized ca. 5,000 years ago. By 3,500 years ago (1500 B.C.T.) in the west, Bantu-speaking communities had reached the great Central African rainforest, and by 2,500 years ago (500 B.C.T.) pioneering groups had emerged into the savannahs to the south, in what are now the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola and Zambia. Another stream of migration, moving east, by 3,000 years ago (1000 B.C.T.) was creating a major new population center near the Great Lakes of East Africa, where a rich environment supported a dense population. Movements by small groups to the southeast from the Great Lakes region were more rapid, with initial settlements widely dispersed near the coast and near rivers, due to comparatively harsh farming conditions in areas further from water. Pioneering groups had reached modern KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa by 300 C.C. along the coast, and the modern Northern Province (encompassed within the former province of the Transvaal) by 500 C.C.
Between the 14th and 15th centuries powerful Bantu-speaking states began to emerge, in the Great Lakes region, in the savannah south of the Central African rainforest, and on the Zambezi river where the Monomatapa kings built the famous Great Zimbabwe complex. Such processes of state-formation occurred with increasing frequency from the 16th century onward. They were probably due to denser population, which led to more specialized divisions of labor, including military power, while making emigration more difficult, to increased trade among African communities and with European, Swahili and Arab traders on the coasts, to technological developments in economic activity, and to new techniques in the political-spiritual ritualization of royalty as the source of national strength and health.
In the 1920s, relatively liberal white South Africans, missionaries and the small black intelligentsia began to use the term "Bantu" in preference to "Native" and more derogatory terms (such as "Kaffir") to refer collectively to Bantu-speaking South Africans. After World War II, the racialist National Party governments adopted that usage officially, while the growing African nationalist movement and its liberal white allies turned to the term "African" instead, so that "Bantu" became identified with the policies of apartheid. By the 1970s this so discredited "Bantu" as an ethno-racial designation that the apartheid government switched to the term "Black" in its official racial categorizations, restricting it to Bantu-speaking Africans, at about the same time that the Black Consciousness Movement led by Steve Biko and others were defining "Black" to mean all racially oppressed South Africans (Africans, Coloureds and Indians).
Bantu, Central Tanzanian
Bantu, Central Tanzanian. Central Tanzania, a region of poor soils, low rainfall and frequent famine, is the home of a Bantu speaking people who have in common variants of the basic language family of the Central Bantu of the Niger Congo. Perhaps half the people are Muslims, divided unequally among the major ethnic groups of the Rangi, Turu and Iramba. Islam entered the area of central Tanzania in the nineteenth century through the slave trade, for which the town of Kondoa was a center. It subsequently became a center for Swahili culture, which is Islamic, and continues to hold this position today. All of the central Tanzanian Bantu Muslims are Sunni of the Shafi school.
The earliest concrete evidence of Muslim presence in East Africa is the foundation of a mosque in Shanga on Pate Island where gold, silver and copper coins dated from 830 were found during an excavation in the 1980s. The oldest intact building in East Africa is the Kizimkazi Mosque in southern Zanzibar dated from 1107. It appears that Islam was widespread in the Indian Ocean area by the 14th century. When Ibn Battuta visited the East African littoral in 1332 he reported that he felt at home because of Islam in the area. The coastal population was largely Muslim, and Arabic was the language of literature and trade. The whole of the Indian Ocean seemed to be a "Muslim sea". Muslims controlled the trade and established coastal settlements in Southeast Asia, India and East Africa.
Islam was spread mainly through trade activities along the East African coast, not through conquest and territorial expansion as was partly the case in North Africa, but remained an urban littoral phenomenon for a long time. When the violent Portuguese intrusions in the coastal areas occurred in the 16th century, Islam was already well established there and almost all the ruling families had ties of kinship with Arabia, Persia, India and even Southeast Asia owing to their maritime contacts and political connections with the northern and eastern parts of the Indian Ocean. At the end of the 17th century and beginning of the 18th century the coastal Muslims managed to oust the Portuguese with the help of Oman. The Omanis gradually increased their political influence until the end of the 19th century when Europeans arrived at the coast of East Africa.
During the time when Oman dominated the coast politically, the spread of Islam intensified also in the interior of East Africa. Trade contacts with peoples in the interior, especially the Nyamwezi, gained importance and places like Tabora in Nyamwezi territory and Ujiji at Lake Tanganyika became important centers in the ever-increasing trade in slaves and ivory. Many chiefs, even in parts of Uganda, converted to Islam and cooperated with the coastal Muslims. Trade served to spread not only Islam, but also the Swahili language and culture. Before the establishment of German East Africa in the 1880s the influence of the Swahilis was mainly limited to the areas along the caravan routes and around their destinations.
Bantu, Central Tanzanian. Central Tanzania, a region of poor soils, low rainfall and frequent famine, is the home of a Bantu speaking people who have in common variants of the basic language family of the Central Bantu of the Niger Congo. Perhaps half the people are Muslims, divided unequally among the major ethnic groups of the Rangi, Turu and Iramba. Islam entered the area of central Tanzania in the nineteenth century through the slave trade, for which the town of Kondoa was a center. It subsequently became a center for Swahili culture, which is Islamic, and continues to hold this position today. All of the central Tanzanian Bantu Muslims are Sunni of the Shafi school.
The earliest concrete evidence of Muslim presence in East Africa is the foundation of a mosque in Shanga on Pate Island where gold, silver and copper coins dated from 830 were found during an excavation in the 1980s. The oldest intact building in East Africa is the Kizimkazi Mosque in southern Zanzibar dated from 1107. It appears that Islam was widespread in the Indian Ocean area by the 14th century. When Ibn Battuta visited the East African littoral in 1332 he reported that he felt at home because of Islam in the area. The coastal population was largely Muslim, and Arabic was the language of literature and trade. The whole of the Indian Ocean seemed to be a "Muslim sea". Muslims controlled the trade and established coastal settlements in Southeast Asia, India and East Africa.
Islam was spread mainly through trade activities along the East African coast, not through conquest and territorial expansion as was partly the case in North Africa, but remained an urban littoral phenomenon for a long time. When the violent Portuguese intrusions in the coastal areas occurred in the 16th century, Islam was already well established there and almost all the ruling families had ties of kinship with Arabia, Persia, India and even Southeast Asia owing to their maritime contacts and political connections with the northern and eastern parts of the Indian Ocean. At the end of the 17th century and beginning of the 18th century the coastal Muslims managed to oust the Portuguese with the help of Oman. The Omanis gradually increased their political influence until the end of the 19th century when Europeans arrived at the coast of East Africa.
During the time when Oman dominated the coast politically, the spread of Islam intensified also in the interior of East Africa. Trade contacts with peoples in the interior, especially the Nyamwezi, gained importance and places like Tabora in Nyamwezi territory and Ujiji at Lake Tanganyika became important centers in the ever-increasing trade in slaves and ivory. Many chiefs, even in parts of Uganda, converted to Islam and cooperated with the coastal Muslims. Trade served to spread not only Islam, but also the Swahili language and culture. Before the establishment of German East Africa in the 1880s the influence of the Swahilis was mainly limited to the areas along the caravan routes and around their destinations.
Bantu, Northeast
Bantu, Northeast. The Northeast Bantu of East Africa are about 38 percent Muslim and include a variety of people with enough cultural and linguistic similarities to be grouped together. The term “Northeast Bantu” is mainly a linguistic one, indicating a degree of similarity greater than that which links them to other Bantu speakers.
Bantu, Northeast. The Northeast Bantu of East Africa are about 38 percent Muslim and include a variety of people with enough cultural and linguistic similarities to be grouped together. The term “Northeast Bantu” is mainly a linguistic one, indicating a degree of similarity greater than that which links them to other Bantu speakers.
Banu Hillal
Banu Hillal (Banu Hilal). Bedouins who immigrated from Egypt to the Maghrib (mainly Algeria and Tunisia) in the eleventh century. About 250,000 of the Banu Hillal are believed to have migrated, which represent the largest influx of Arabic settlers in the Maghrib. The entering of the Banu Hillal is considered to have had dramatic and devastating effects on the old social and governmental structures. However, historians note that local structures were in decline, and it is well possible that the success of the Banu Hillal was principally shaped by weakened communities, more than the strength of the Banu Hillal themselves. The Banu Hillal were, in reality, on good terms with the local rulers. Their influx changed the use of land from agriculture to pastoralism, even though the Banu Hillal were not hostile to settled life. The influx also had its effect in that the local population was Arabized in large areas. This is evident in Tunisia, which received the largest immigration and where a Berber identity is almost extinct.
The Banu Hillal were a confederation of bedouin tribes that migrated from Upper Egypt into North Africa in the 11th century, having ostensibly been sent by the Fatimids to punish the Zirids for abandoning Shiism. Other scholarss suggest that the tribes left the grasslands on the upper Nile because of environmental degradation accompanying the Medieval Warm Period. Whatever the reason behind their migration, the Banu Hillal quickly defeated the Zirids and deeply weakened the neighboring Hammadids. Their influx was a major factor in the linguistic and cultural Arabization of the Maghrib (Maghreb), and in the spread of nomadism in areas where agriculture had previously been dominant. Ibn Khaldun noted that the lands ravaged by Banu Hilal invaders had become completely arid desert.
The Banu Hillal were led by Abu Zayd al-Hilali. Their story is recounted in fictionalized form in Taghribat Bani Hilal. The Banu Hillal "saga" is still recounted in the form of poetry in Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt: Djezia and Dhieb bin Ghanim opposed to the Zenati Khalifa.
Banu Hilal see Banu Hillal
Banu Hillal (Banu Hilal). Bedouins who immigrated from Egypt to the Maghrib (mainly Algeria and Tunisia) in the eleventh century. About 250,000 of the Banu Hillal are believed to have migrated, which represent the largest influx of Arabic settlers in the Maghrib. The entering of the Banu Hillal is considered to have had dramatic and devastating effects on the old social and governmental structures. However, historians note that local structures were in decline, and it is well possible that the success of the Banu Hillal was principally shaped by weakened communities, more than the strength of the Banu Hillal themselves. The Banu Hillal were, in reality, on good terms with the local rulers. Their influx changed the use of land from agriculture to pastoralism, even though the Banu Hillal were not hostile to settled life. The influx also had its effect in that the local population was Arabized in large areas. This is evident in Tunisia, which received the largest immigration and where a Berber identity is almost extinct.
The Banu Hillal were a confederation of bedouin tribes that migrated from Upper Egypt into North Africa in the 11th century, having ostensibly been sent by the Fatimids to punish the Zirids for abandoning Shiism. Other scholarss suggest that the tribes left the grasslands on the upper Nile because of environmental degradation accompanying the Medieval Warm Period. Whatever the reason behind their migration, the Banu Hillal quickly defeated the Zirids and deeply weakened the neighboring Hammadids. Their influx was a major factor in the linguistic and cultural Arabization of the Maghrib (Maghreb), and in the spread of nomadism in areas where agriculture had previously been dominant. Ibn Khaldun noted that the lands ravaged by Banu Hilal invaders had become completely arid desert.
The Banu Hillal were led by Abu Zayd al-Hilali. Their story is recounted in fictionalized form in Taghribat Bani Hilal. The Banu Hillal "saga" is still recounted in the form of poetry in Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt: Djezia and Dhieb bin Ghanim opposed to the Zenati Khalifa.
Banu Hilal see Banu Hillal
Baqillani
Baqillani (Ibn al-Baqillani) (Abu Bakr al-Baqilani)(c.950- June 5, 1013). An Ash‘arite theologian and Malikite jurisprudent (lawyer). He is said to have been a major factor in the systematizing and popularizing of Ash‘arism.
Born in Basra c. 950, he spent most of his life in Baghdad, and studied under disciples of al-Ash'ari. He held the office of chief Qadi outside the capital of the Caliphate. He died on 5 June 1013 (402AH).
Al-Baqillani's fifty-two volumous books are regarded as classical works on expounding the Qur'an and its textual integrity, defending orthodoxy and Islam, elaborating on the miracles of the prophethood, providing summaries of the Sunni creed, posing a defense of the Sunni position regarding the Imamate (Caliphate), and rebutting Brahmanism, Dualism, Trinitarianism, etc.
Ibn Taymiyya called al-Baqillani 'the best of the Ash'ari mutakallimun, unrivalled by any predecessor or successor'.
Ibn al-Baqillani see Baqillani
Abu Bakr al-Baqilani see Baqillani
Baqillani (Ibn al-Baqillani) (Abu Bakr al-Baqilani)(c.950- June 5, 1013). An Ash‘arite theologian and Malikite jurisprudent (lawyer). He is said to have been a major factor in the systematizing and popularizing of Ash‘arism.
Born in Basra c. 950, he spent most of his life in Baghdad, and studied under disciples of al-Ash'ari. He held the office of chief Qadi outside the capital of the Caliphate. He died on 5 June 1013 (402AH).
Al-Baqillani's fifty-two volumous books are regarded as classical works on expounding the Qur'an and its textual integrity, defending orthodoxy and Islam, elaborating on the miracles of the prophethood, providing summaries of the Sunni creed, posing a defense of the Sunni position regarding the Imamate (Caliphate), and rebutting Brahmanism, Dualism, Trinitarianism, etc.
Ibn Taymiyya called al-Baqillani 'the best of the Ash'ari mutakallimun, unrivalled by any predecessor or successor'.
Ibn al-Baqillani see Baqillani
Abu Bakr al-Baqilani see Baqillani
Baqi, Mahmud ‘Abd al-
Baqi, Mahmud ‘Abd al- (Mahmud ‘Abd al-Baqi) (1526-1600). A Turkish poet. He was a court poet of the Ottoman Sultans Suleyman II, Selim II, Murad III and Muhammad III and is recognized as the greatest ghazal poet in Turkish literature.
Mahmud 'Abu al-Baqi see Baqi, Mahmud ‘Abd al-
Baqi, Mahmud ‘Abd al- (Mahmud ‘Abd al-Baqi) (1526-1600). A Turkish poet. He was a court poet of the Ottoman Sultans Suleyman II, Selim II, Murad III and Muhammad III and is recognized as the greatest ghazal poet in Turkish literature.
Mahmud 'Abu al-Baqi see Baqi, Mahmud ‘Abd al-
No comments:
Post a Comment