Michael
Michael (in Arabic, Mikal) (Mikha'el) (Meka'il). Archangel mentioned in Sura 2:92. According to Muslim tradition, Gabriel and Michael “opened the breast of the Prophet,” i. e., purified his heart before his night journey to Jerusalem (in Arabic, mi‘raj). Michael is also said to have come to the aid of the Muslims in the battle of Badr.
Michael is an archangel in Hebrew, Christian and Islamic tradition. He is viewed as the field commander of the Army of God. He is mentioned by name in the Book of Daniel, the Book of Jude and the Book of Revelation. In the book of Daniel, Michael appears as "one of the chief princes" who in Daniel's vision comes to the Archangel Gabriel's aid in his contest with the angel of Persia (Dobiel). Michael is also described there as the advocate of Israel and "great prince who stands up for the children of your [Daniel's] people".
In Hebrew, the name Michael means "who is like El (God)", which in Talmudic tradition is posed as a rhetorical question: "Who is like God?" to imply that no one is like God.
Much of the late Midrashic detail about Michael was transmitted to Christianity through the Book of Enoch, whence it was taken up and further elaborated. In late medieval Christianity, Michael, together with Saint George, became the patron saint of chivalry, and of the first chivalric order of France, the Order of Saint Michael of 1469. In the British honours system, a chivalric order founded in 1818 is also named for these two saints, the Order of St Michael and St George. St Michael is also considered in many Christian circles as the patron saint of the warrior. Police officers and soldiers, particularly paratroopers and fighter pilots, regard him as their patron. He is also a patron of Germany, the City of Brussels and Kiev.
Roman Catholics refer to him as Saint Michael the Archangel and also simply as Saint Michael. Orthodox Christians refer to him as the Taxiarch Archangel Michael or simply Archangel Michael.
In Arabic literature, Michael is called Meka'il. In the Qur'an, Michael is mentioned once only, in Sura 2:98. Angel Michael is mentioned in the Prophet's Haddiths numerous times. It says in the haddith of ibn Abbas in at-Tabarani that the Prophet said to Jibril (Gabriel) "What is Mika'il in charge of?" He replied, "The plants and the rain." Imam Ahmed transmitted in his Musnad from Anas b. Malik that the Prophet asked Gabriel "Why do I never see Mika'il Laugh?" He replied, "Mika'il has not laughed since the fire was created." The Prophet Muhammed often in his supplication would ask God to bless Jibril, Mika'il and Israfil Muslim commentators state with reference to Sura 11:69 that Michael was one of the three angels who visited Abraham.
Mikal see Michael Mikha'el see Michael Meka'il see Michael
Michael is an archangel in Hebrew, Christian and Islamic tradition. He is viewed as the field commander of the Army of God. He is mentioned by name in the Book of Daniel, the Book of Jude and the Book of Revelation. In the book of Daniel, Michael appears as "one of the chief princes" who in Daniel's vision comes to the Archangel Gabriel's aid in his contest with the angel of Persia (Dobiel). Michael is also described there as the advocate of Israel and "great prince who stands up for the children of your [Daniel's] people".
In Hebrew, the name Michael means "who is like El (God)", which in Talmudic tradition is posed as a rhetorical question: "Who is like God?" to imply that no one is like God.
Much of the late Midrashic detail about Michael was transmitted to Christianity through the Book of Enoch, whence it was taken up and further elaborated. In late medieval Christianity, Michael, together with Saint George, became the patron saint of chivalry, and of the first chivalric order of France, the Order of Saint Michael of 1469. In the British honours system, a chivalric order founded in 1818 is also named for these two saints, the Order of St Michael and St George. St Michael is also considered in many Christian circles as the patron saint of the warrior. Police officers and soldiers, particularly paratroopers and fighter pilots, regard him as their patron. He is also a patron of Germany, the City of Brussels and Kiev.
Roman Catholics refer to him as Saint Michael the Archangel and also simply as Saint Michael. Orthodox Christians refer to him as the Taxiarch Archangel Michael or simply Archangel Michael.
In Arabic literature, Michael is called Meka'il. In the Qur'an, Michael is mentioned once only, in Sura 2:98. Angel Michael is mentioned in the Prophet's Haddiths numerous times. It says in the haddith of ibn Abbas in at-Tabarani that the Prophet said to Jibril (Gabriel) "What is Mika'il in charge of?" He replied, "The plants and the rain." Imam Ahmed transmitted in his Musnad from Anas b. Malik that the Prophet asked Gabriel "Why do I never see Mika'il Laugh?" He replied, "Mika'il has not laughed since the fire was created." The Prophet Muhammed often in his supplication would ask God to bless Jibril, Mika'il and Israfil Muslim commentators state with reference to Sura 11:69 that Michael was one of the three angels who visited Abraham.
Mikal see Michael Mikha'el see Michael Meka'il see Michael
Midhat Pasha
Midhat Pasha (Ahmet Şefik Mithat Pasha) (October 1822, Istanbul – May 8, 1884, At-Ta'if, Arabia). Ottoman Grand Vizier and the father of the 1876 constitution. He was a Turkish liberal reformer who embarked on a collision course with Sultan Abdulhamid II.
Ahmet Şefik Mithat Pasha was a dynamic, pro-Western, reformer and statesman. The son of a civil judge, he was born at Der Saadet (Istanbul) in 1822. His father, a declared partisan of reform, trained him for an administrative career, and at the age of twenty-two he was attached as secretary to Faik Effendi, whom he accompanied in Syria for three years.
On his return to Istanbul, Mithat was appointed chief director of confidential reports, and after a new financial mission in Syria was made second secretary of the grand council. His enemies, however, succeeded in ousting him from this post, and caused him to be entrusted with the apparently impossible task of settling the revolt and brigandage rampant in Rumelia.
His measures were drastic and their success startling, so the government made him an official of the first rank and restored him to his place in the grand council. In similar vigorous fashion he restored order in Bulgaria in 1857. In 1860, he was made vizier and pasha, and entrusted with the government of Nis, where his reforms were so beneficial that the sultan charged him, in conjunction with Fuad Pasha and Ali Pasha, with preparing the scheme for adapting them to the empire which was afterwards known as the law of the vilayets.
After further administrative work in his province, he was ordered to organize the council of state in 1866, and was then made governor of Baghdad, where his success was as decisive as at Nis, but attended with much greater difficulties. In 1871, the anti-reform influence of the grand vizier, Mahmud Nedim Pasha, seemed to Mithat a danger to the country, and in a personal interview he boldly stated his views to the sultan, who was so struck with their force and complete disinterestedness that he appointed Mithat grand vizier in place of Mahmoud. However, proving himself too independent for the court, Mithat remained in power for only three months, and after a short governorship of Salonica he lived apart from affairs at Constantinople until 1875.
From this time forward, however, Mithat Pasha's career resolved itself into a series of strange and almost romantic adventures. While sympathizing with the ideas and aims of the Young Ottomans, he was anxious to restrain their impatience, but the sultan's obduracy led to a coalition between the grand vizier, the war minister and Mithat Pasha, which deposed him in May 1876. The sultan was murdered in the following month.
His nephew Murad V was in turn deposed in the following August and replaced by his brother, Abdul Hamid II. Mithat Pasha now became grand vizier, reforms were freely promised, and the Ottoman parliament was inaugurated with a great flourish. In the following February, however, Mithat was dismissed and banished for supposed complicity in the murder of Abdul Aziz. He then visited various European capitals, and remained for some time in London, where he carefully studied the procedure in the House of Commons.
Again recalled in 1878, he was appointed governor of Syria, and in August exchanged offices with the governor of Smyrna. But in the following May the sultan again ordered him to be arrested, and although he effected his escape and appealed to the powers, he shortly afterwards saw fit to surrender, demanding only a fair hearing. The trial was held in the garden of the sultan Abdul Hamid II's Yildiz Palace and took place over three days in June 1881. Mithat and the others were sentenced to death. The trial was, however, generally regarded as a mockery, and on the intercession of the British government, the sentence was commuted to banishment.
The remaining three years of his life were consequently spent in exile at Taif in Arabia, where he died, probably as a result of violence, on May 8, 1884. To great ability, wide sympathies, and undoubted patriotism he added absolute honesty, that rare quality in a vizier, for he left office as poor as when he entered it. In 1953 his body was brought back to Turkey for burial in Istanbul.
Ahmet Sefik Mithat Pasha see Midhat Pasha
Midhat Pasha (Ahmet Şefik Mithat Pasha) (October 1822, Istanbul – May 8, 1884, At-Ta'if, Arabia). Ottoman Grand Vizier and the father of the 1876 constitution. He was a Turkish liberal reformer who embarked on a collision course with Sultan Abdulhamid II.
Ahmet Şefik Mithat Pasha was a dynamic, pro-Western, reformer and statesman. The son of a civil judge, he was born at Der Saadet (Istanbul) in 1822. His father, a declared partisan of reform, trained him for an administrative career, and at the age of twenty-two he was attached as secretary to Faik Effendi, whom he accompanied in Syria for three years.
On his return to Istanbul, Mithat was appointed chief director of confidential reports, and after a new financial mission in Syria was made second secretary of the grand council. His enemies, however, succeeded in ousting him from this post, and caused him to be entrusted with the apparently impossible task of settling the revolt and brigandage rampant in Rumelia.
His measures were drastic and their success startling, so the government made him an official of the first rank and restored him to his place in the grand council. In similar vigorous fashion he restored order in Bulgaria in 1857. In 1860, he was made vizier and pasha, and entrusted with the government of Nis, where his reforms were so beneficial that the sultan charged him, in conjunction with Fuad Pasha and Ali Pasha, with preparing the scheme for adapting them to the empire which was afterwards known as the law of the vilayets.
After further administrative work in his province, he was ordered to organize the council of state in 1866, and was then made governor of Baghdad, where his success was as decisive as at Nis, but attended with much greater difficulties. In 1871, the anti-reform influence of the grand vizier, Mahmud Nedim Pasha, seemed to Mithat a danger to the country, and in a personal interview he boldly stated his views to the sultan, who was so struck with their force and complete disinterestedness that he appointed Mithat grand vizier in place of Mahmoud. However, proving himself too independent for the court, Mithat remained in power for only three months, and after a short governorship of Salonica he lived apart from affairs at Constantinople until 1875.
From this time forward, however, Mithat Pasha's career resolved itself into a series of strange and almost romantic adventures. While sympathizing with the ideas and aims of the Young Ottomans, he was anxious to restrain their impatience, but the sultan's obduracy led to a coalition between the grand vizier, the war minister and Mithat Pasha, which deposed him in May 1876. The sultan was murdered in the following month.
His nephew Murad V was in turn deposed in the following August and replaced by his brother, Abdul Hamid II. Mithat Pasha now became grand vizier, reforms were freely promised, and the Ottoman parliament was inaugurated with a great flourish. In the following February, however, Mithat was dismissed and banished for supposed complicity in the murder of Abdul Aziz. He then visited various European capitals, and remained for some time in London, where he carefully studied the procedure in the House of Commons.
Again recalled in 1878, he was appointed governor of Syria, and in August exchanged offices with the governor of Smyrna. But in the following May the sultan again ordered him to be arrested, and although he effected his escape and appealed to the powers, he shortly afterwards saw fit to surrender, demanding only a fair hearing. The trial was held in the garden of the sultan Abdul Hamid II's Yildiz Palace and took place over three days in June 1881. Mithat and the others were sentenced to death. The trial was, however, generally regarded as a mockery, and on the intercession of the British government, the sentence was commuted to banishment.
The remaining three years of his life were consequently spent in exile at Taif in Arabia, where he died, probably as a result of violence, on May 8, 1884. To great ability, wide sympathies, and undoubted patriotism he added absolute honesty, that rare quality in a vizier, for he left office as poor as when he entered it. In 1953 his body was brought back to Turkey for burial in Istanbul.
Ahmet Sefik Mithat Pasha see Midhat Pasha
Midrarids
Midrarids. Minor Berber dynasty which was established in Sijilmasa and which enjoyed relative independence from aroun 784 until 976.
Midrarids. Minor Berber dynasty which was established in Sijilmasa and which enjoyed relative independence from aroun 784 until 976.
Midyuna
Midyuna. Berber tribe, belonging to the major branch of the Butr. A significant portion of this tribe moved into Spain in 711. In the Middle Ages, they were found in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Spain and Sicily.
Midyuna. Berber tribe, belonging to the major branch of the Butr. A significant portion of this tribe moved into Spain in 711. In the Middle Ages, they were found in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Spain and Sicily.
Mikalis
Mikalis. Iranian family of Khurasan, prominent in the cultural and social worlds there during the tenth century. They were also active as local administrators and town officials under the Samanids and early Ghaznavids.
Mikalis. Iranian family of Khurasan, prominent in the cultural and social worlds there during the tenth century. They were also active as local administrators and town officials under the Samanids and early Ghaznavids.
Mima-Mimi
Mima-Mimi. The Mima of Sudan and the Mimi of Chad once constituted a unified ethnic group inhabiting the present territory of the Mima southeast of Darfur’s provincial capital of El Fasher. Today, the Mima and Mimi live scattered in Sudan’s Darfur and Kordofan provinces and in Chad’s Wadai Province, in urban and market centers, as pastoral nomads or in rural sedentary colonies on a territory of their own. The main Mima centers in Darfur are Woda’a and Fafa. In Kordofan, Magrur in the center and the Abu Daza District in the west of the province. In Wadai, their main territory encompasses about 60 villages to the north and northeast of the northern district capital of Biltine. Agan is one of the main centers for the sedentary Mimi.
The Mima of Sudan and the pastoralist part of the Chadian Mimi have been Arabophone for a long time. The sedentary, cultivating Mimi of Chad speak a language related to the extensive Fur language spoken hundreds of miles to the east. Evidence points to a migration westwards of part of the original group in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries at the latest. The Mima who stayed behind lived between the Nile Valley, the source of Islamization and Arabization from the seventeenth century onwards, and the Fur. The majority of the migrated Mimi engaged in animal husbandry and frequent migration, and contacts with Arab pastoral nomads, led to their adopting Arabic as their mother tongue.
As immigrants who converted to Islam around 1665 upon the overthrow of the then ruling pagan Tunjur dynasty, the Mimi have since been associated with the Zaghawa, a neighboring group with whom they exchanged women and who were held in contempt by the new Maba dynasty for their religious ignorance.
Mima-Mimi. The Mima of Sudan and the Mimi of Chad once constituted a unified ethnic group inhabiting the present territory of the Mima southeast of Darfur’s provincial capital of El Fasher. Today, the Mima and Mimi live scattered in Sudan’s Darfur and Kordofan provinces and in Chad’s Wadai Province, in urban and market centers, as pastoral nomads or in rural sedentary colonies on a territory of their own. The main Mima centers in Darfur are Woda’a and Fafa. In Kordofan, Magrur in the center and the Abu Daza District in the west of the province. In Wadai, their main territory encompasses about 60 villages to the north and northeast of the northern district capital of Biltine. Agan is one of the main centers for the sedentary Mimi.
The Mima of Sudan and the pastoralist part of the Chadian Mimi have been Arabophone for a long time. The sedentary, cultivating Mimi of Chad speak a language related to the extensive Fur language spoken hundreds of miles to the east. Evidence points to a migration westwards of part of the original group in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries at the latest. The Mima who stayed behind lived between the Nile Valley, the source of Islamization and Arabization from the seventeenth century onwards, and the Fur. The majority of the migrated Mimi engaged in animal husbandry and frequent migration, and contacts with Arab pastoral nomads, led to their adopting Arabic as their mother tongue.
As immigrants who converted to Islam around 1665 upon the overthrow of the then ruling pagan Tunjur dynasty, the Mimi have since been associated with the Zaghawa, a neighboring group with whom they exchanged women and who were held in contempt by the new Maba dynasty for their religious ignorance.
***
Mimoun, Alain
Alain Mimoun (January 1, 1921 – June 27, 2013) was a French runner and Olympic marathon champion.
Born in the arrondissement of Maïder in the town of Telagh, then in French Algeria (his birth name was Ali Mimoun Ould Kacha), Mimoun lost several years of competition to World War II. After the war (in which he was a combatant), he was French champion in the 5000 meters and 10000 meters.
Mimoun's path to an Olympic gold medal was blocked in both 1948 and 1952 by Czech runner Emil Zatopek. Mimoun won silver medals in the 10000 meters in 1948 and 1952 as well as another silver medal in the 5000 meters in 1952. His second place finishes behind Zatopek gave him the nickname "Zatopek's Shadow." He finally won a gold medal in the marathon at the 1956 Summer Olympics in Melbourne, Zatopek finished sixth.
Mimoun made the French team for the 1960 Summer Olympics in Rome. He won his final national championship in 1966, twenty years after his debut.
Mimoun died at age 92 on June 27, 2013. The athletics stadium in Bugeat, France is named in Mimoun's honor.
***
Minangkabau
Minangkabau. The Minangkabau (also “Menangkabau”) are closely related in culture and language to the Malays, from whom they differ in certain important characteristics of social organization. Unlike Malays and unlike most other Islamic peoples, the Minangkabau are matrilineal, organized into kinship groups according to the principle of descent through women. Folk explanations of their name refer symbolically to this fact. For example, one such folk etymology of the term minangkabau is based upon its resemblance to the words menang (winning) and kerbau (water buffalo). This similarity has been elaborated into a story about an ancient time in which an unweaned and starving female calf owned by the Minangkabau unwittingly castrated and thereby defeated a champion Javanese bull. The incident is supposed to have given the Minangkabau their name (“buffalo victory”). Another folk etymology notes that minang refers to the harness that prevents a calf from nursing, and yet another notes that minang refers to the ceremony before marriage in which engagement gifts are offered, both noting the importance of water buffalo for milk, capital and labor in the settled agriculture of the Minangkabau. All Minangkabau are Sunni, adhering to the Shafi school of Muslim law.
Minangkabau are a people who make up approximately ninety percent (90%) of the inhabitants of the Indonesian province of West Sumatra. The Minangkabau are one of the largest matrilineal societies in the world and at the same time a devoutly Islamic people. Their original settlements were in the upland valleys of the region, particularly around the volcano of Mount Merapi in the three districts (lubak) of Agam, Tanan Datar, and Limapuluh Kota.
The first historical record of the Minangkabau appears in 1347 when inscriptions indicate that Adityavarman, a prince of mixed Javanese-Sumatran parentage, threw off allegiance to the East Java kingdom of Majapahit and ruled the gold-rich regions of Tanah Datar until at least 1375. Oral tradition traces the two systems of social organization that characterize the independent Minangkabau villages (nagari) from this period. Essentially federations of kinship groups governed by lineage headmen and with no effective supravillage authority, the nagari adopted either an autocratic or more democratic system of governance.
The Padri War (1803-1837) enabled the Dutch to gain control of the region, and much of their administration in the late nineteenth century was directed to controlling and monopolizing coffee production and export. When these controls were relaxed in the early twentieth century, Minangkabau traders and farmers became more active in a highly monetized economy based on coffee, rubber, and copra exports. Anti-colonial feelings were strong among the Minangkabau, with sporadic uprisings against the Dutch (notably in 1908 and 1927) and with many Minangkabau assuming prominent leadership roles in the Indonesian nationalist movement. During the revolution (1945-1949), the Dutch eventually occupied most towns, but they never extended their control to the villages and rural areas, which remained loyal to the republican government. The Minangkabau region was the principal center of the regional rebellion against the Sukarno government in 1958. Suppression of that revolt accelerated traditional Minangkabau migration (merantau) -- in 1930, according to the census, eleven percent of the Minangkabau lived outside their province -- and in recent years there have been large-scale population movements to the large urban centers of Sumatra and Java, particularly to Jakarta.
In February 1958, dissatisfaction with the centralist and communist-leaning policies of the Sukarno administration triggered a revolt which was centered in the Minangkabau region of Sumatra, with rebels proclaiming the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) in Bukittinggi. The Indonesian military invaded West Sumatra in April 1958 and had recaptured major towns within the next month. A period of guerrilla warfare ensued, but most rebels had surrendered by August 1961. In the years following, West Sumatra was like an occupied territory with Javanese officials occupying most senior civilian, military and police positions. The policies of centralization continued under the Suharto regime. The national government legislated to apply the Javanese desa village system throughout Indonesia, and in 1983 the traditional Minangkabau nagari village units were split into smaller jorong units, thereby destroying the traditional village social and cultural institutions. In the years following the downfall of the Suharto regime decentralization policies were implemented, giving more autonomy to provinces, thereby allowing West Sumatra to re-institute the nagari system.
Menangkabau see Minangkabau.
Minangkabau. The Minangkabau (also “Menangkabau”) are closely related in culture and language to the Malays, from whom they differ in certain important characteristics of social organization. Unlike Malays and unlike most other Islamic peoples, the Minangkabau are matrilineal, organized into kinship groups according to the principle of descent through women. Folk explanations of their name refer symbolically to this fact. For example, one such folk etymology of the term minangkabau is based upon its resemblance to the words menang (winning) and kerbau (water buffalo). This similarity has been elaborated into a story about an ancient time in which an unweaned and starving female calf owned by the Minangkabau unwittingly castrated and thereby defeated a champion Javanese bull. The incident is supposed to have given the Minangkabau their name (“buffalo victory”). Another folk etymology notes that minang refers to the harness that prevents a calf from nursing, and yet another notes that minang refers to the ceremony before marriage in which engagement gifts are offered, both noting the importance of water buffalo for milk, capital and labor in the settled agriculture of the Minangkabau. All Minangkabau are Sunni, adhering to the Shafi school of Muslim law.
Minangkabau are a people who make up approximately ninety percent (90%) of the inhabitants of the Indonesian province of West Sumatra. The Minangkabau are one of the largest matrilineal societies in the world and at the same time a devoutly Islamic people. Their original settlements were in the upland valleys of the region, particularly around the volcano of Mount Merapi in the three districts (lubak) of Agam, Tanan Datar, and Limapuluh Kota.
The first historical record of the Minangkabau appears in 1347 when inscriptions indicate that Adityavarman, a prince of mixed Javanese-Sumatran parentage, threw off allegiance to the East Java kingdom of Majapahit and ruled the gold-rich regions of Tanah Datar until at least 1375. Oral tradition traces the two systems of social organization that characterize the independent Minangkabau villages (nagari) from this period. Essentially federations of kinship groups governed by lineage headmen and with no effective supravillage authority, the nagari adopted either an autocratic or more democratic system of governance.
The Padri War (1803-1837) enabled the Dutch to gain control of the region, and much of their administration in the late nineteenth century was directed to controlling and monopolizing coffee production and export. When these controls were relaxed in the early twentieth century, Minangkabau traders and farmers became more active in a highly monetized economy based on coffee, rubber, and copra exports. Anti-colonial feelings were strong among the Minangkabau, with sporadic uprisings against the Dutch (notably in 1908 and 1927) and with many Minangkabau assuming prominent leadership roles in the Indonesian nationalist movement. During the revolution (1945-1949), the Dutch eventually occupied most towns, but they never extended their control to the villages and rural areas, which remained loyal to the republican government. The Minangkabau region was the principal center of the regional rebellion against the Sukarno government in 1958. Suppression of that revolt accelerated traditional Minangkabau migration (merantau) -- in 1930, according to the census, eleven percent of the Minangkabau lived outside their province -- and in recent years there have been large-scale population movements to the large urban centers of Sumatra and Java, particularly to Jakarta.
In February 1958, dissatisfaction with the centralist and communist-leaning policies of the Sukarno administration triggered a revolt which was centered in the Minangkabau region of Sumatra, with rebels proclaiming the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) in Bukittinggi. The Indonesian military invaded West Sumatra in April 1958 and had recaptured major towns within the next month. A period of guerrilla warfare ensued, but most rebels had surrendered by August 1961. In the years following, West Sumatra was like an occupied territory with Javanese officials occupying most senior civilian, military and police positions. The policies of centralization continued under the Suharto regime. The national government legislated to apply the Javanese desa village system throughout Indonesia, and in 1983 the traditional Minangkabau nagari village units were split into smaller jorong units, thereby destroying the traditional village social and cultural institutions. In the years following the downfall of the Suharto regime decentralization policies were implemented, giving more autonomy to provinces, thereby allowing West Sumatra to re-institute the nagari system.
Menangkabau see Minangkabau.
Mina slaves
Mina slaves. Slaves exported to Brazil from the Gold Coast through the famous slave trading post of Elmina. They were considered to be both stronger and more vigorous than the Bantus and to have almost magical powers with regards to finding gold. These Sudanese blacks were famous for their physique, their proud, dignified bearing, and their culinary skill. Most of them were Muslim and literate. They were able to organize small ethnic communities on the plantations and in the mining district. When a delegation of the Society of Friends (Quakers) arrived in Rio de Janeiro in 1852, it was received by a commission of Mina freedmen, seventy of whom were to be repatriated to Benin. They presented the English visitors with documents written in Arabic.
Mina slaves. Slaves exported to Brazil from the Gold Coast through the famous slave trading post of Elmina. They were considered to be both stronger and more vigorous than the Bantus and to have almost magical powers with regards to finding gold. These Sudanese blacks were famous for their physique, their proud, dignified bearing, and their culinary skill. Most of them were Muslim and literate. They were able to organize small ethnic communities on the plantations and in the mining district. When a delegation of the Society of Friends (Quakers) arrived in Rio de Janeiro in 1852, it was received by a commission of Mina freedmen, seventy of whom were to be repatriated to Benin. They presented the English visitors with documents written in Arabic.
Minorities in Muslim Societies
Minorities in Muslim Societies. The status and treatment of minorities in Muslim societies (or, more generally, under Islam) has always been of special concern to outside powers seeking to establish themselves as their protectors. It has also been a favorite subject of Western Orientalists. Non-Muslim neighbors and observers in the modern age no longer content themselves with traditional notions of tolerance and the absence of persecution, but expect full social, political, and legal equality of Muslims and non-Muslims. Their critical regard has not failed to call forth strong reactions from many Muslims who try to show that on this score, too, Islam has in fact a much better record than other civilizations, particularly the West. The subject therefore continues to be sensitive, raising considerable controversy.
The status and treatment of non-Muslims in Muslim societies (or in the dar al-Islam) have varied greatly over time and space. Legal theory has never been uniform throughout the Muslim world and has often been rather far removed from practice. Traditional rules and regulations clearly show the impact of history, particularly the experience of the Prophet and the conditions of Muslim conquest. Whereas relations between Muhammad, his followers, and their pagan neighbors had almost from the outset been tense, if not openly hostile, relations with the Jews and Christians of the Arabian Peninsula passed through phases of understanding and cooperation to growing distrust, animosity, and finally confrontation.
Muhammad had originally hoped to be acknowledged as Prophet by the guardians of the monotheist traditions. After his move (the Hijra) to Medina in 622, the Muslims entered into a formal alliance with the local Jewish and heathen trives, which was documented in the so-called Constitution (sahifah) of Medina, granting all allies internal autonomy with Muhammad acting as supreme head and arbiter of the newly established community. When recognition of his prophethood was denied and when, under pressure, the political loyalty of the Jewish tribes appeared to be in doubt, Muhammad turned against them until they had been either expelled or killed. By the time of the Battle of Badr (624), the brief spell of political collaboration and unity had ended. Yet in spite of its limited historical relevance and validity, the Constitution of Medina has come to be widely regarded by contemporary Muslims as the blueprint or model of a political community (ummah) that is based on the Qur’an and includes as its citizens both Muslims and non-Muslims.
Mirroring the concerns of the young and vulnerable community, the Qur’an touches repeatedly on the question of whether it is lawful for Muslims to entertain friendly relations (muwalat) with unbelievers. The guiding principle (see Suras 3:28, 5:51, 29:46, and 60:8-9) is that the believers should treat the unbelievers decently and equitably as long as the latter do not act aggressively toward them. A reactive principle linking the treatment of non-Muslims to their behavior toward the Muslims, this clearly reflects the conditions of the early period, when the Muslims were still a small minority facing large and partly hostile non-Muslim majorities.
The reactive principle appears less prominently in the provisions of Islamic law (fiqh). Underneath the rigid divide between dar al-Islam and dar al-harb (non-Muslim lands) concerning territory, and between Muslims and non-Muslims concerning people, one finds the fine distinctions characteristic of Islamic legal reasoning. The basic distinction was between the pagans, idolaters, or polytheists (kafir) on the one hand, with whom there was to be no social intercourse, ranging from shared food to intermarriage, and who were to be fought until they either converted or were killed or enslaved; and the ‘people of the book’ (ahl al-kitab) on the other, whose faith was founded on revelation, who were to be granted protection, and with whom social intercourse was allowed. In the course of Muslim conquestand expansion, their numbers were enlarged beyond the Jews, Sabaeans, and Christians mentioned in the Qur’an to include the Zoroastrians (Majus) and eventually the Buddhists and others.
The Hanafi law school extended protection to non-Arab pagans, and Malik ibn Anas (d. 796), founder of the Maliki school, even included Arab polytheists provided that they did not belong to the clan of the Prophet, the Quraysh. As a result, the category of polytheists was steadily reduced until, in the modern era, it had lost all practical relevance. At the same time, the state of those monotheist groups (e.g., the Baha’is in Iran or the Ahmadiyah/Qadianis in India and Pakistan) that developed after Islam and were regarded by the respective Muslim majorities as renegades or apostates (sg., murtadd) remained precarious. In legal theory, they had to be fought until they either repented and reconverted or were killed.
The status of the “people of the book” was secured by a contract of protection (dhimmah), which in principle was unlimited and which, in accordance with the Qur’anic injunction, “No compulsion in religion” (Sura 2:256), guaranteed their life, body, property, freedom of movement, and religious practice (if carried on discreetly). Protection was granted against the payment of tribtue, dues, and taxes of various kinds. Out of these dues and taxes two main categories evolved, without, however, being consistently defined: a land tax (kharaj) often to be paid in kind, which soon came to be imposed on all owners of land thus categorized irrespective of their religious affiliation; and a poll tax (jizyah) levied on all able-bodied free adult dhimmi males of sufficient means. The various law schools varied considerably as to the precise definition of the legal rights and obligations of the protected people (dhimmis). The most liberal among the Sunni schools was the Hanafi one (dominant in the Ottoman Empire among other places), which granted dhimmis equal rights with regard to property and parts of criminal law (notably diyah, or blood money), but not in the domains of family law, inheritance, or testimony.
The primary aim of all practical measures and legal provisions seems originally to have been to mark unmistakably the boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims. Basing themselves on the notoriously unclear text of Sura 9:29 (“... and fight the infidels until they pay the jizyah our of their hands while they are small/humble”), Muslim jurists tended to translate the submission of non-Muslims to Muslim rule into the requirement of humbleness and humiliation. Prevailing norms and and expectations were mirrored in the so-called Pact of ‘Umar (al-shurut al- ‘umariyah), attributed to the second caliph, ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab (r. 634-644), but probably not formulated before the eighth century. This laid down a number of restrictions regarding dress and hairstyle, worship, the construction and repairing of churches and synagogues, the height of houses, the use of animals, and so forth, which served not only to identify the dhimmis, but also to discriminate against them. Shi‘a thought and law went further in that it considered non-Muslims to be ritually impure (najis), thereby banning (at least theoretically) social intercourse and intermarriage altogether.
Practice, however, frequently did not conform to the restrictive notions of the ‘ulama’ (religious scholars). The actual situation of the dhimmis was more closely conditioned by the economic and political circumstances prevailing within the various Islamic territories and by their relations with the major non-Muslim powers of the day, a correlation with the major non-Muslim powers of the day, a correlation still largely valid in the modern age. Yet until well into the twentieth century, the legal norms essentially retained their normative force, and if at any specific moment the dhimmis or individual members of their elites did in fact enjoy better conditions than those prescribed by the jurists, it was condemned as a deviation from how things ought to be. Umayyad Spain and Fatimid Egypt are widely seen as the golden age of harmonious coexistence among Muslims, Christians, and Jews, which mutually enriched their cultures and heritage. If from the thirteenth century onward, intercommunal relations deteriorated, it has been attributed to the impact of the Mongol invasion rather than the Christian crusades. By that time, the gradual spread of Islam had reduced the dhimmi populations of the Middle East from majorities to minorities. Still, community structures were left basically intact.
In return for submission to Muslim rule, non-Muslims enjoyed considerable autonomy in the fields of personal-status law, worship, and education, forming largely self-contained units with their separate religious, legal, social, educational, and charitable institutions. Although there was in most parts no forced segregation in terms of residence or occupation (Morocco and Iran at certain periods excepted), there was often professional specialization, which has been characterized by modern scholars as “ethnoreligious division of labor.” Non-Muslims fulfilled complementary economic roles and functions, some of which were regarded as undesirable, lowly, or unclean by Muslims. Most important, non-Muslims were incorporated into Muslim society not as individuals, but as members of their religious communities. The principle found its clearest expression in the Ottoman millet system (derived from the Turkish term for ethnoreligious group or community) as it had evolved by the nineteenth century. It exerted administrative control through a number of legally recognized religious communities (notably the Greek Orthodox and Armenian Christians as well as the Rabbanite Jews) headed by their clergy with autonomy compensating for the absence of equal status and the denial of political rights.
In the nineteenth century, European influence and expansion, internal, migration, social differentiation, and cultural change began to affect the dhimmis’ legal status, communal organization, and place in society. The Ottoman reform edicts of the Tanzimat period (issued in 1839 and 1856) proclaimed the principle of legal equality between Muslims and non-Muslims and replaced the jizyah by general conscription or the payment of an exemption tax (bedel-i asker). Religious personal-status law as a powerful marker of communal separateness, however, was retained. Within the Ottoman and Persian empires, European powers assumed the role of protector of specific religious communities. Individual Christians and Jews managed to benefit from increased educational and economic opportunities, gaining access to legal protection (foreign passports) and privilege (under the system of capitulations). Within the various communities, a rising commercial and professional middle class began to challenge the rule of the clergy and notables. The communities as a whole broke out of the place assigned to them under the old order. But socio-cultural change and closer contact also resulted in growing friction and competition, occasionally exploding in intercommunal violence. Even among the cosmopolitan elites, the vertical element of religious and ethnic identification became increasingly superseded but never fully supplanted by the horizontal element of social class.
The role of non-Muslims as intermediaries facilitated their economic advancement, but it also exposed them as dependents -- not any longer on the Muslim ruler, but on the colonial system. The rise of nationalism made their position difficult, if not untenable. When religious and ethnic affiliation tended to merge, religious communities could be transformed into nations, and millets turned into minorities. Although certain nationalsit movements, such as the Wafd in Egypt or Congress in India, attempted to overcome religious divisions and to unite Muslims, Christians, Jews, or Hindus under the banner of national unity, the tie between nationalism and religion was never entirely dissolved. It became more marked in the course of wht has been widely termed the assertion, or surge, of political Islam that since the 1970s made itself felt in the entire Muslim world.
Most written constitutions of Muslim states now confirm the principle of equality of all citizens irrespective of religion, sex, and race. At the same time, however, they usually declare Islam to be the state religion and the shari‘a (the divine law) the principal (or even exclusive) source of legislation. In most cases, the head of state must be a (male) Muslim. In some countries, such as Lebanon, Jordan, or the Islamic Republic of Iran, non-Muslim and other minority groups are guaranteed a fixed share of seats in representative political bodies.
Given the fact that at least as far as constitutional theory is concerned, the principle of equality has been generally accepted, much of the contemporary debate about the status of non-Muslims in the ideal islamic order has a certain ring of unreality. Individual thinkers, groups, and activists have adopted widely divergent views. Certain militant Islamic groups, such as al-Jihad in Egypt, advocate hostile suspicion toward non-Muslims and the re-imposition of the dhimmah regulations. They refer themselves to the medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyah (d. 1328), who conditioned the toleration of non-Muslims on their utility to the Muslim community, and to the Indo-Pakistani activist Abu al-A‘la Mawdudi (1903-1979) and the Egyptian Muslim Brother Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966). They also engage in physical violence that is aimed at the regimes in power as much as at the minorities attacked.
At the other end of the spectrum, there are Muslim intellectuals seeking ways to legitimize full legal political equality of Muslims and non-Muslims in Islamic terms. They clearly perceive the need for radical ijtihad (individual inquiry in legal matters) that takes into account the spirit of maqasid (intentions) of shari‘a rather than the details of fiqh, looking at the public good (al-maslahah al-‘ammah) rather than the letter of the law. Their primary concern is to preserve the unity of the national or territorial community and to avoid fitnah (disorder) in its modern guise of sectarian violence (fitnah ta’ifiyah). The dilemma rests in the fact that on this particular issue, shari‘a, in order to allow for equality, would have to be literally purged of the provisions of fiqh, whose primary function is to demarcate between Muslims and non-Muslims and to ensure the superiority of the former in this world as well as the hereafter.
Between the two extremes there is what might be called a mainstream position that proclaims the principle of “same rights, same duties” (lahum ma lana wa-‘alayhim ma ‘alayna), but limits legal equality to the “non-religious domain.” The decisive questions are, of course, how the religious sphere proper is defined and whether non-Muslims can hold public office in an Islamic state, which has as its primary raison d’etre realization of the rule of Islam, particularly when the presidency (still frequently termed imamate), judicature, and military command are viewed as religious functions. Faced with the double challenge of traditional restrictive norms and modern egalitarian demands, Muslim reformists resort to a historical-functional approach: the jizyah is interpreted as the functional equivalent of a military tax (and here they have historical evidence on their side), and national liberation as the modern equivalent of jihad (war against non-believers). If and when non-Muslims participate in national defense or liberation, the jizyah is no longer incumbent on them; nor do they require any specific kind of protection. They can therefore be granted citizenship of the Islamic state (al-jinsiyah al-islamiyah), including the right to vote and to participate in political decision making. But they continue to be debarred from the highest political, military, and judicial functions.
The commonly used term muwatin, therefore, is understood in its linteral sense, describing non-Muslims as compatriots sharing the same watan (homeland), not as citizens sharing the same legal and political status. The emphasis is on justice that gives to everyone his or her due, rather than on equality which, so it is argued, attempts to make level or equal what should be kept apart.
Minorities in Muslim Societies. The status and treatment of minorities in Muslim societies (or, more generally, under Islam) has always been of special concern to outside powers seeking to establish themselves as their protectors. It has also been a favorite subject of Western Orientalists. Non-Muslim neighbors and observers in the modern age no longer content themselves with traditional notions of tolerance and the absence of persecution, but expect full social, political, and legal equality of Muslims and non-Muslims. Their critical regard has not failed to call forth strong reactions from many Muslims who try to show that on this score, too, Islam has in fact a much better record than other civilizations, particularly the West. The subject therefore continues to be sensitive, raising considerable controversy.
The status and treatment of non-Muslims in Muslim societies (or in the dar al-Islam) have varied greatly over time and space. Legal theory has never been uniform throughout the Muslim world and has often been rather far removed from practice. Traditional rules and regulations clearly show the impact of history, particularly the experience of the Prophet and the conditions of Muslim conquest. Whereas relations between Muhammad, his followers, and their pagan neighbors had almost from the outset been tense, if not openly hostile, relations with the Jews and Christians of the Arabian Peninsula passed through phases of understanding and cooperation to growing distrust, animosity, and finally confrontation.
Muhammad had originally hoped to be acknowledged as Prophet by the guardians of the monotheist traditions. After his move (the Hijra) to Medina in 622, the Muslims entered into a formal alliance with the local Jewish and heathen trives, which was documented in the so-called Constitution (sahifah) of Medina, granting all allies internal autonomy with Muhammad acting as supreme head and arbiter of the newly established community. When recognition of his prophethood was denied and when, under pressure, the political loyalty of the Jewish tribes appeared to be in doubt, Muhammad turned against them until they had been either expelled or killed. By the time of the Battle of Badr (624), the brief spell of political collaboration and unity had ended. Yet in spite of its limited historical relevance and validity, the Constitution of Medina has come to be widely regarded by contemporary Muslims as the blueprint or model of a political community (ummah) that is based on the Qur’an and includes as its citizens both Muslims and non-Muslims.
Mirroring the concerns of the young and vulnerable community, the Qur’an touches repeatedly on the question of whether it is lawful for Muslims to entertain friendly relations (muwalat) with unbelievers. The guiding principle (see Suras 3:28, 5:51, 29:46, and 60:8-9) is that the believers should treat the unbelievers decently and equitably as long as the latter do not act aggressively toward them. A reactive principle linking the treatment of non-Muslims to their behavior toward the Muslims, this clearly reflects the conditions of the early period, when the Muslims were still a small minority facing large and partly hostile non-Muslim majorities.
The reactive principle appears less prominently in the provisions of Islamic law (fiqh). Underneath the rigid divide between dar al-Islam and dar al-harb (non-Muslim lands) concerning territory, and between Muslims and non-Muslims concerning people, one finds the fine distinctions characteristic of Islamic legal reasoning. The basic distinction was between the pagans, idolaters, or polytheists (kafir) on the one hand, with whom there was to be no social intercourse, ranging from shared food to intermarriage, and who were to be fought until they either converted or were killed or enslaved; and the ‘people of the book’ (ahl al-kitab) on the other, whose faith was founded on revelation, who were to be granted protection, and with whom social intercourse was allowed. In the course of Muslim conquestand expansion, their numbers were enlarged beyond the Jews, Sabaeans, and Christians mentioned in the Qur’an to include the Zoroastrians (Majus) and eventually the Buddhists and others.
The Hanafi law school extended protection to non-Arab pagans, and Malik ibn Anas (d. 796), founder of the Maliki school, even included Arab polytheists provided that they did not belong to the clan of the Prophet, the Quraysh. As a result, the category of polytheists was steadily reduced until, in the modern era, it had lost all practical relevance. At the same time, the state of those monotheist groups (e.g., the Baha’is in Iran or the Ahmadiyah/Qadianis in India and Pakistan) that developed after Islam and were regarded by the respective Muslim majorities as renegades or apostates (sg., murtadd) remained precarious. In legal theory, they had to be fought until they either repented and reconverted or were killed.
The status of the “people of the book” was secured by a contract of protection (dhimmah), which in principle was unlimited and which, in accordance with the Qur’anic injunction, “No compulsion in religion” (Sura 2:256), guaranteed their life, body, property, freedom of movement, and religious practice (if carried on discreetly). Protection was granted against the payment of tribtue, dues, and taxes of various kinds. Out of these dues and taxes two main categories evolved, without, however, being consistently defined: a land tax (kharaj) often to be paid in kind, which soon came to be imposed on all owners of land thus categorized irrespective of their religious affiliation; and a poll tax (jizyah) levied on all able-bodied free adult dhimmi males of sufficient means. The various law schools varied considerably as to the precise definition of the legal rights and obligations of the protected people (dhimmis). The most liberal among the Sunni schools was the Hanafi one (dominant in the Ottoman Empire among other places), which granted dhimmis equal rights with regard to property and parts of criminal law (notably diyah, or blood money), but not in the domains of family law, inheritance, or testimony.
The primary aim of all practical measures and legal provisions seems originally to have been to mark unmistakably the boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims. Basing themselves on the notoriously unclear text of Sura 9:29 (“... and fight the infidels until they pay the jizyah our of their hands while they are small/humble”), Muslim jurists tended to translate the submission of non-Muslims to Muslim rule into the requirement of humbleness and humiliation. Prevailing norms and and expectations were mirrored in the so-called Pact of ‘Umar (al-shurut al- ‘umariyah), attributed to the second caliph, ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab (r. 634-644), but probably not formulated before the eighth century. This laid down a number of restrictions regarding dress and hairstyle, worship, the construction and repairing of churches and synagogues, the height of houses, the use of animals, and so forth, which served not only to identify the dhimmis, but also to discriminate against them. Shi‘a thought and law went further in that it considered non-Muslims to be ritually impure (najis), thereby banning (at least theoretically) social intercourse and intermarriage altogether.
Practice, however, frequently did not conform to the restrictive notions of the ‘ulama’ (religious scholars). The actual situation of the dhimmis was more closely conditioned by the economic and political circumstances prevailing within the various Islamic territories and by their relations with the major non-Muslim powers of the day, a correlation with the major non-Muslim powers of the day, a correlation still largely valid in the modern age. Yet until well into the twentieth century, the legal norms essentially retained their normative force, and if at any specific moment the dhimmis or individual members of their elites did in fact enjoy better conditions than those prescribed by the jurists, it was condemned as a deviation from how things ought to be. Umayyad Spain and Fatimid Egypt are widely seen as the golden age of harmonious coexistence among Muslims, Christians, and Jews, which mutually enriched their cultures and heritage. If from the thirteenth century onward, intercommunal relations deteriorated, it has been attributed to the impact of the Mongol invasion rather than the Christian crusades. By that time, the gradual spread of Islam had reduced the dhimmi populations of the Middle East from majorities to minorities. Still, community structures were left basically intact.
In return for submission to Muslim rule, non-Muslims enjoyed considerable autonomy in the fields of personal-status law, worship, and education, forming largely self-contained units with their separate religious, legal, social, educational, and charitable institutions. Although there was in most parts no forced segregation in terms of residence or occupation (Morocco and Iran at certain periods excepted), there was often professional specialization, which has been characterized by modern scholars as “ethnoreligious division of labor.” Non-Muslims fulfilled complementary economic roles and functions, some of which were regarded as undesirable, lowly, or unclean by Muslims. Most important, non-Muslims were incorporated into Muslim society not as individuals, but as members of their religious communities. The principle found its clearest expression in the Ottoman millet system (derived from the Turkish term for ethnoreligious group or community) as it had evolved by the nineteenth century. It exerted administrative control through a number of legally recognized religious communities (notably the Greek Orthodox and Armenian Christians as well as the Rabbanite Jews) headed by their clergy with autonomy compensating for the absence of equal status and the denial of political rights.
In the nineteenth century, European influence and expansion, internal, migration, social differentiation, and cultural change began to affect the dhimmis’ legal status, communal organization, and place in society. The Ottoman reform edicts of the Tanzimat period (issued in 1839 and 1856) proclaimed the principle of legal equality between Muslims and non-Muslims and replaced the jizyah by general conscription or the payment of an exemption tax (bedel-i asker). Religious personal-status law as a powerful marker of communal separateness, however, was retained. Within the Ottoman and Persian empires, European powers assumed the role of protector of specific religious communities. Individual Christians and Jews managed to benefit from increased educational and economic opportunities, gaining access to legal protection (foreign passports) and privilege (under the system of capitulations). Within the various communities, a rising commercial and professional middle class began to challenge the rule of the clergy and notables. The communities as a whole broke out of the place assigned to them under the old order. But socio-cultural change and closer contact also resulted in growing friction and competition, occasionally exploding in intercommunal violence. Even among the cosmopolitan elites, the vertical element of religious and ethnic identification became increasingly superseded but never fully supplanted by the horizontal element of social class.
The role of non-Muslims as intermediaries facilitated their economic advancement, but it also exposed them as dependents -- not any longer on the Muslim ruler, but on the colonial system. The rise of nationalism made their position difficult, if not untenable. When religious and ethnic affiliation tended to merge, religious communities could be transformed into nations, and millets turned into minorities. Although certain nationalsit movements, such as the Wafd in Egypt or Congress in India, attempted to overcome religious divisions and to unite Muslims, Christians, Jews, or Hindus under the banner of national unity, the tie between nationalism and religion was never entirely dissolved. It became more marked in the course of wht has been widely termed the assertion, or surge, of political Islam that since the 1970s made itself felt in the entire Muslim world.
Most written constitutions of Muslim states now confirm the principle of equality of all citizens irrespective of religion, sex, and race. At the same time, however, they usually declare Islam to be the state religion and the shari‘a (the divine law) the principal (or even exclusive) source of legislation. In most cases, the head of state must be a (male) Muslim. In some countries, such as Lebanon, Jordan, or the Islamic Republic of Iran, non-Muslim and other minority groups are guaranteed a fixed share of seats in representative political bodies.
Given the fact that at least as far as constitutional theory is concerned, the principle of equality has been generally accepted, much of the contemporary debate about the status of non-Muslims in the ideal islamic order has a certain ring of unreality. Individual thinkers, groups, and activists have adopted widely divergent views. Certain militant Islamic groups, such as al-Jihad in Egypt, advocate hostile suspicion toward non-Muslims and the re-imposition of the dhimmah regulations. They refer themselves to the medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyah (d. 1328), who conditioned the toleration of non-Muslims on their utility to the Muslim community, and to the Indo-Pakistani activist Abu al-A‘la Mawdudi (1903-1979) and the Egyptian Muslim Brother Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966). They also engage in physical violence that is aimed at the regimes in power as much as at the minorities attacked.
At the other end of the spectrum, there are Muslim intellectuals seeking ways to legitimize full legal political equality of Muslims and non-Muslims in Islamic terms. They clearly perceive the need for radical ijtihad (individual inquiry in legal matters) that takes into account the spirit of maqasid (intentions) of shari‘a rather than the details of fiqh, looking at the public good (al-maslahah al-‘ammah) rather than the letter of the law. Their primary concern is to preserve the unity of the national or territorial community and to avoid fitnah (disorder) in its modern guise of sectarian violence (fitnah ta’ifiyah). The dilemma rests in the fact that on this particular issue, shari‘a, in order to allow for equality, would have to be literally purged of the provisions of fiqh, whose primary function is to demarcate between Muslims and non-Muslims and to ensure the superiority of the former in this world as well as the hereafter.
Between the two extremes there is what might be called a mainstream position that proclaims the principle of “same rights, same duties” (lahum ma lana wa-‘alayhim ma ‘alayna), but limits legal equality to the “non-religious domain.” The decisive questions are, of course, how the religious sphere proper is defined and whether non-Muslims can hold public office in an Islamic state, which has as its primary raison d’etre realization of the rule of Islam, particularly when the presidency (still frequently termed imamate), judicature, and military command are viewed as religious functions. Faced with the double challenge of traditional restrictive norms and modern egalitarian demands, Muslim reformists resort to a historical-functional approach: the jizyah is interpreted as the functional equivalent of a military tax (and here they have historical evidence on their side), and national liberation as the modern equivalent of jihad (war against non-believers). If and when non-Muslims participate in national defense or liberation, the jizyah is no longer incumbent on them; nor do they require any specific kind of protection. They can therefore be granted citizenship of the Islamic state (al-jinsiyah al-islamiyah), including the right to vote and to participate in political decision making. But they continue to be debarred from the highest political, military, and judicial functions.
The commonly used term muwatin, therefore, is understood in its linteral sense, describing non-Muslims as compatriots sharing the same watan (homeland), not as citizens sharing the same legal and political status. The emphasis is on justice that gives to everyone his or her due, rather than on equality which, so it is argued, attempts to make level or equal what should be kept apart.
No comments:
Post a Comment