Hammudids
Hammudids. Refers to a dynasty of the period of the Muluk al-Tawa’if, which reigned over various towns in Muslim Spain from 1016 until 1058. The Hammudids were rulers of the taifa kingdoms of Malaga and Algeciras (1016/18-1058), rulers of Cordoba 1016-1027. The Banu Hammud, arabicized Hispano-Berber dynasty, branch of the Idrisids. Their leader, Ali ibn Hammud (r. 1016-1018), governor of Ceuta in 1013 and leader of the African contingent of the Spanish caliphate, rose to power in Malaga in 1016 and became caliph of Cordoba after the removal of the Umayyads. Following his murder, his brother al-Qasim (r. 1018-1021 and 1023-1025), governor of Algeciras, Tangier, and Arzila, and his son Yahya (r. 1021-1023 and 1025-1027/35) ruled in dispute with each other in Cordoba and Malaga. Driven out of Cordoba in 1027, Yahya (d. 1035) and his successors ruled briefly in Malaga and Algeciras, maintaining their position until Malaga fell to the Zirids of Granada and Algeciras to the Abbadids of Seville in 1058.
The Hammudid dynasty is one of the Alid dynasties of Muslim Berbers in Al-Andalus (i.e. Muslim Iberia, in what is now southern Spain). It is named after their ancestor, Hammud, a descendant of Idris ibn Abdallah, i.e., it is of Idrisid lineage.
The dynasty ruled several principalities (taifas) after the decline of Umayyad Caliphate of Cordoba in early 11th century. The Hammudid ruled principalities include:
* Córdoba (1016-1018: Ali ibn Hammud, 1018-1021: al-Qasim, 1021-1022: Yahya al-Mutali, 1022-1023: al-Qasim)
* Sevilla (1016: al-Qasim)
* Algeciras (1039–58: al-Qasim and heirs)
* Málaga (1022-1057: Yahya al-Mutali and heirs).
* Melilla
The Hammudid dynasty is one of the Alid dynasties of Muslim Berbers in Al-Andalus (i.e. Muslim Iberia, in what is now southern Spain). It is named after their ancestor, Hammud, a descendant of Idris ibn Abdallah, i.e., it is of Idrisid lineage.
The dynasty ruled several principalities (taifas) after the decline of Umayyad Caliphate of Cordoba in early 11th century. The Hammudid ruled principalities include:
* Córdoba (1016-1018: Ali ibn Hammud, 1018-1021: al-Qasim, 1021-1022: Yahya al-Mutali, 1022-1023: al-Qasim)
* Sevilla (1016: al-Qasim)
* Algeciras (1039–58: al-Qasim and heirs)
* Málaga (1022-1057: Yahya al-Mutali and heirs).
* Melilla
Hamza al-Isfahani
Hamza al-Isfahani (c.893-after 961). Persian philologist and historian. He is the author of a well-known chronology of pre-Islamic and Islamic dynasties. He is also described as a Persian nationalist with strong prejudices against the Arabs.
Isfahani, Hamza al- see Hamza al-Isfahani
Hamza al-Isfahani (c.893-after 961). Persian philologist and historian. He is the author of a well-known chronology of pre-Islamic and Islamic dynasties. He is also described as a Persian nationalist with strong prejudices against the Arabs.
Isfahani, Hamza al- see Hamza al-Isfahani
Hamza Beg
Hamza Beg (Imam Hamza Beg) (d. 1834). Imam of Dagestan and the leader of the popular politico-religious movement which disturbed the northern Caucasus from 1832 to 1859.
Imam Hamza Beg see Hamza Beg
Beg, Hamza see Hamza Beg
Hamza Beg (Imam Hamza Beg) (d. 1834). Imam of Dagestan and the leader of the popular politico-religious movement which disturbed the northern Caucasus from 1832 to 1859.
Imam Hamza Beg see Hamza Beg
Beg, Hamza see Hamza Beg
Hamza Fansuri
Hamza Fansuri (Hamzah Fansuri) (Hamzah Pansuri) (c. 1550-1600 [1608?]). Indonesian Sufi of the sixteenth century. Originating from the west coast of Sumatra, he was the author of treatises and poems in Malay.
Hamza Fansuri was probably born at Ayuthaya in Thailand, but his family evidently came from Barus in North Sumatra. It was in North Sumatra where Hamza Fansuri subsequently settled.
In his travels, Hamza Fansuri visited Arabia, Iraq, the Malay peninsula and Java. He was initiated in Baghdad into the Qadiriyyah religious order. Hamza Fansuri adhered to the so-called Wujudiyyah school of Sufis, who affirm the doctrine of Oneness of Being.
Hamza Fansuri wrote in Malay, but knew Arabic and Persian well. He was much influenced by Ibn al-Arabi, Jili as well as other classical Sufi writers and poets, among whom are al-Ghazali, Attar, Jalal al-Din Rumi, Sadi and Jami.
So far as is known, Hamza Fansuri was the first to write a systematic and definitive account of the Sufi doctrines in the Malay language. By writing about Sufism, Hamza Fansuri introduced Muslim philosophical and mystical terminology into the Malay language.
Hamza Fansuri is also credited with introducing the poetic verse genre of the ruba’i -- the quatrain -- which in Malay literature became popularly known as the sha’ir. His ideas have always been very much misunderstood and misrepresented, even up to the present day.
One of Hamza Fansuri’s most assiduous and potent accusers was Nuruddin Ar-Raniri who wrote several polemical treatises charging Hamza Fansuri with heresy. In 1637, the works of Hamza Fansuri were ceremonially burned by order of the Sultan of Aceh.
Hamzah Fansuri see Hamza Fansuri
Fansuri, Hamzah see Hamza Fansuri
Hamzah Pansuri see Hamza Fansuri
Pansuri, Hamzah see Hamza Fansuri
Hamza Fansuri (Hamzah Fansuri) (Hamzah Pansuri) (c. 1550-1600 [1608?]). Indonesian Sufi of the sixteenth century. Originating from the west coast of Sumatra, he was the author of treatises and poems in Malay.
Hamza Fansuri was probably born at Ayuthaya in Thailand, but his family evidently came from Barus in North Sumatra. It was in North Sumatra where Hamza Fansuri subsequently settled.
In his travels, Hamza Fansuri visited Arabia, Iraq, the Malay peninsula and Java. He was initiated in Baghdad into the Qadiriyyah religious order. Hamza Fansuri adhered to the so-called Wujudiyyah school of Sufis, who affirm the doctrine of Oneness of Being.
Hamza Fansuri wrote in Malay, but knew Arabic and Persian well. He was much influenced by Ibn al-Arabi, Jili as well as other classical Sufi writers and poets, among whom are al-Ghazali, Attar, Jalal al-Din Rumi, Sadi and Jami.
So far as is known, Hamza Fansuri was the first to write a systematic and definitive account of the Sufi doctrines in the Malay language. By writing about Sufism, Hamza Fansuri introduced Muslim philosophical and mystical terminology into the Malay language.
Hamza Fansuri is also credited with introducing the poetic verse genre of the ruba’i -- the quatrain -- which in Malay literature became popularly known as the sha’ir. His ideas have always been very much misunderstood and misrepresented, even up to the present day.
One of Hamza Fansuri’s most assiduous and potent accusers was Nuruddin Ar-Raniri who wrote several polemical treatises charging Hamza Fansuri with heresy. In 1637, the works of Hamza Fansuri were ceremonially burned by order of the Sultan of Aceh.
Hamzah Fansuri see Hamza Fansuri
Fansuri, Hamzah see Hamza Fansuri
Hamzah Pansuri see Hamza Fansuri
Pansuri, Hamzah see Hamza Fansuri
Hamza ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib
Hamza ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib (d. 625). Paternal uncle of the Prophet. He became the central figure of a popular romance called The Romance of Amir Hamza, known in Persia, Turkey and Indonesia.
Hamza ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib was the paternal uncle of the Islamic prophet, Muhammad. However, he and Muhammad were raised together as they were almost the same age.
Hamza was known as "Lion of God" and "Lion of Paradise" for his bravery. Among the champions of early Islam, few have rivaled his reputation in battle. He was martyred at the Battle of Uhud on March 19, 625 by the Abyssinian slave Wahshy ibn Harb. He was one of the bravest warriors of Islam.
Hamza converted to Islam due to the actions of Amr ibn Hishām, (who is infamous by the name of
Abu Jahl and known for his hostility against the Muslims). Hamza, uncle of Muhammad, had returned to the city of Mecca after a hunting trip in the desert. Upon returning, he soon learned that Abu Jahl, avowed enemy of Islam had heaped abuse and insults upon Muhammad, who had not responded and walked away from where he had sat in the Haram. Outraged, Hamza dashed to the Kaaba, where Abu Jahl sat with other leaders of Mecca and began to beat him with his bow, crying, "Are you going to insult him now, now that I am of his religion and vouch for what he vouches for? Hit me if you can!" As the companions of Abu Jahl warily stood, approaching Hamza, Abu Jahl feebily cried out from the ground, "Let Abu Umarah be, for indeed, I insulted his nephew deeply." And he cowered at the feet of Hamza, while his friends could not meet Hamza’s eyes. As he departed, he kicked sand back at the men, leaving all shocked at what Hamza had just said, none more so than Hamza himself.
Hamza, the son of Shaiba ibn Hashim, was the brother of Abd Allah ibn Abd al Muttalib, Muhammad's father, but he had also been weaned by the same woman, Halimah bint Abi Dhuayb, making him his foster brother as well. The two had grown up together, being just two years apart in age. But as the boys had become young men, they developed different attitudes toward life. Muhammad became thoughtful and concerned with the problems of society, Hamza was not such a contemplative thinker and was comfortable in his status of being part of Meccan elite, though their relationship remained as strong as ever. So it was a conflicted Hamza that witnessed the escalating situation in the city as Muhammad declared the message of Islam. On the one hand, he had absolute faith in the character of his foster brother and nephew, being one of those who had been closest to him for all of his life. Yet some of his most honored values were the respect he held for his family and the traditions they had always followed, his pagan religion among these. So he was indifferent to the controversy, discouraging his peers from worrying about what they saw as a revolution in their midst and not bothering to join them in torturing the defenseless Muslims, while declining Muhammad's invitation to convert to Islam.
The conversion to Islam of Hamza, gave the Muslims much greater strength and better morale among its followers. They were now able to speak and pray in public. Hamza had been one of the most renowned warriors of the Quraysh, known for his solitary hunting expeditions in the desert and his prowess on the battlefield, and was known as the "Lion of the Desert". He became a staunch supporter of Muhammad, enduring the ostracization of the Muslims, and helped him get through the Year of Sorrow, when many of his close relatives died. And he became a trusted advisor after the Hijra, when Muhammad led the fledgling Muslim state in Medina. Hamza advised Muhammad to go on the offensive against those who had driven the Muslims from their homes and seized their property, which Muhammad decided to do by seizing a Quraysh caravan from Mecca at the wells of Badr.
Stories about Hamza's life are collected in the Hamzanama. Hamza is the protagonist of a dastan-goi -- "narrative tales" from Islamic India, where he is portrayed as a larger-than-life hero who fights demons, trades witty remarks with Emperors and fights great wars. It resembles both the Shahnameh and the Ramayana in form.
"Lion of God" see Hamza ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib
"Lion of Paradise" see Hamza ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib
Hamza, the son of Shaiba ibn Hashim, was the brother of Abd Allah ibn Abd al Muttalib, Muhammad's father, but he had also been weaned by the same woman, Halimah bint Abi Dhuayb, making him his foster brother as well. The two had grown up together, being just two years apart in age. But as the boys had become young men, they developed different attitudes toward life. Muhammad became thoughtful and concerned with the problems of society, Hamza was not such a contemplative thinker and was comfortable in his status of being part of Meccan elite, though their relationship remained as strong as ever. So it was a conflicted Hamza that witnessed the escalating situation in the city as Muhammad declared the message of Islam. On the one hand, he had absolute faith in the character of his foster brother and nephew, being one of those who had been closest to him for all of his life. Yet some of his most honored values were the respect he held for his family and the traditions they had always followed, his pagan religion among these. So he was indifferent to the controversy, discouraging his peers from worrying about what they saw as a revolution in their midst and not bothering to join them in torturing the defenseless Muslims, while declining Muhammad's invitation to convert to Islam.
The conversion to Islam of Hamza, gave the Muslims much greater strength and better morale among its followers. They were now able to speak and pray in public. Hamza had been one of the most renowned warriors of the Quraysh, known for his solitary hunting expeditions in the desert and his prowess on the battlefield, and was known as the "Lion of the Desert". He became a staunch supporter of Muhammad, enduring the ostracization of the Muslims, and helped him get through the Year of Sorrow, when many of his close relatives died. And he became a trusted advisor after the Hijra, when Muhammad led the fledgling Muslim state in Medina. Hamza advised Muhammad to go on the offensive against those who had driven the Muslims from their homes and seized their property, which Muhammad decided to do by seizing a Quraysh caravan from Mecca at the wells of Badr.
Stories about Hamza's life are collected in the Hamzanama. Hamza is the protagonist of a dastan-goi -- "narrative tales" from Islamic India, where he is portrayed as a larger-than-life hero who fights demons, trades witty remarks with Emperors and fights great wars. It resembles both the Shahnameh and the Ramayana in form.
"Lion of God" see Hamza ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib
"Lion of Paradise" see Hamza ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib
Hamza ibn ‘Ali
Hamza ibn ‘Ali (Hamza ibn ‘Alī ibn Aḥmad) (Hamza al-Fatimi - "Hamza the Fatimid") (b.985). Founder of the Druze religious doctrine of the eleventh century. Of Persian origin, he played a role in the proclamation of the divinity of the Fatimd Caliph al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah. {See also Caliphs; Druze; Fatimids; and Hakim bi-
Hamza ibn ‘Alī ibn Aḥmad was an 11th century Ismaili and founding leader of the Druze sect. He was born in Zozan in Greater Khorasan in Samanid-ruled Persia (modern Khaf, Razavi Khorasan Province, Iran).
Hamza is considered the founder of the Druze sect of Islam and the primary author of the Druze manuscripts.
After spending the first twenty years of his life in Samanid-ruled Persia, Hamza emigrated to Egypt and became known in the Fatimid Government as Hamza al-Fātimī --"Hamza the Fatimid". He arrived in Cairo (modern Egypt) just as the Fatimid Caliph Tāriqu l-Ḥākim built the House of Knowledge, which became one of the main cultural centers of the Fatimid state. In a very short period of time, Hamza became a close associate of al-Ḥākim and the Caliph appointed him Head of Letters and Correspondence.
Hamza took as his headquarters the Raydan Mosque, which was located outside the walls of Cairo. This mosque became the center where Hamza organized a new missionary movement. In May 1017, al-Ḥākim issued a decree naming Hamza the imām of "the Monotheists" (al-Muwahhidūn) immediately after declaring the beginning of the Divine Call. Hamza demonstrated brilliant leadership for four years under al-Ḥākim’s direction.
Al-Ḥākim granted Hamza the freedom to preach this new reformist doctrine openly. Public resistance to Hamza's teachings increased as he spoke against corruption, polygamy, remarriage of divorcees and other social customs as well as his theological disputes with other prominent Ismaili leaders.
During this external resistance, an internal rivalry arose between Hamza and one of his subordinates, ad-Darazī. Ad-Darazī deviated from the essence of the movement’s message and falsified the writings of Hamza to present al-Ḥākim as divine.
Ad-Darazī had hoped that al-Ḥākim would favor him over Hamza, but instead there was public opposition to his teachings. Ad-Darazī then redirected the public’s resistance by declaring that he had acted on Hamza's instructions. Consequently, instead of attacking ad-Darazī, the crowds turned against Hamza and his associates, who were at Ridyan Mosque at the time. Although al-Ḥākim executed ad-Darazī for heresy and repudiated his teachings, many years later observers ironically attributed the Druze doctrine to ad-Darazī and did not mention Hamza at all. After the execution of ad-Darazī and his collaborators, Hamza continued his preaching activities for two more years.
Medieval chroniclers of the time not only failed to make the distinction between Druzes and Darazīs but attributed ad-Darazī’s doctrine to the followers of Hamza and argued that Hakim supported ad-Darazī’s ideas. Other historians have reported that it was Hamza who was subordinate to ad-Darazī, and still others have referred to Hamza and Darazi as the same person: Hamza ad-Darazī. As a consequence, the name “Druze” became synonymous with the reform movement.
Despite the ironic and misleading origins of the sect’s name, the title “Druze” never occurs in the Druze manuscripts of the 11th century. After the execution of Darazi and his collaborators, Hamza continued his preaching activities for two more years.
Many modern scholars have written that Hamza's and ad-Darazī's ideology was the same, which is preaching the literal divinity of al-Ḥākim, whom they say supported their claims. Such uncertainty is caused by the historical ambiguity of that era and the secretive, esoteric aspect of the Druze faith.
During the same year that al-Ḥākim disappeared in 1021, Hamza went into retreat and delegated the third leading figure, Baha'u d-Dīn as-Samuqī ("al-Muqtana Baha’ud-Dīn") to continue the missionary movement. Baha'u d-Dīn continued public preaching with the approval of Hamza, who was in a disclosed location known only to Baha'u d-Dīn and few other missionaries. Preaching was halted after the Druze sect was closed in 1043 by Baha'u d-Dīn.
Hamza ibn ‘Alī ibn Aḥmad see Hamza ibn ‘Ali
Hamza al-Fatimi see Hamza ibn ‘Ali
"Hamza the Fatimid" see Hamza ibn ‘Ali
Hamza ibn ‘Ali (Hamza ibn ‘Alī ibn Aḥmad) (Hamza al-Fatimi - "Hamza the Fatimid") (b.985). Founder of the Druze religious doctrine of the eleventh century. Of Persian origin, he played a role in the proclamation of the divinity of the Fatimd Caliph al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah. {See also Caliphs; Druze; Fatimids; and Hakim bi-
Hamza ibn ‘Alī ibn Aḥmad was an 11th century Ismaili and founding leader of the Druze sect. He was born in Zozan in Greater Khorasan in Samanid-ruled Persia (modern Khaf, Razavi Khorasan Province, Iran).
Hamza is considered the founder of the Druze sect of Islam and the primary author of the Druze manuscripts.
After spending the first twenty years of his life in Samanid-ruled Persia, Hamza emigrated to Egypt and became known in the Fatimid Government as Hamza al-Fātimī --"Hamza the Fatimid". He arrived in Cairo (modern Egypt) just as the Fatimid Caliph Tāriqu l-Ḥākim built the House of Knowledge, which became one of the main cultural centers of the Fatimid state. In a very short period of time, Hamza became a close associate of al-Ḥākim and the Caliph appointed him Head of Letters and Correspondence.
Hamza took as his headquarters the Raydan Mosque, which was located outside the walls of Cairo. This mosque became the center where Hamza organized a new missionary movement. In May 1017, al-Ḥākim issued a decree naming Hamza the imām of "the Monotheists" (al-Muwahhidūn) immediately after declaring the beginning of the Divine Call. Hamza demonstrated brilliant leadership for four years under al-Ḥākim’s direction.
Al-Ḥākim granted Hamza the freedom to preach this new reformist doctrine openly. Public resistance to Hamza's teachings increased as he spoke against corruption, polygamy, remarriage of divorcees and other social customs as well as his theological disputes with other prominent Ismaili leaders.
During this external resistance, an internal rivalry arose between Hamza and one of his subordinates, ad-Darazī. Ad-Darazī deviated from the essence of the movement’s message and falsified the writings of Hamza to present al-Ḥākim as divine.
Ad-Darazī had hoped that al-Ḥākim would favor him over Hamza, but instead there was public opposition to his teachings. Ad-Darazī then redirected the public’s resistance by declaring that he had acted on Hamza's instructions. Consequently, instead of attacking ad-Darazī, the crowds turned against Hamza and his associates, who were at Ridyan Mosque at the time. Although al-Ḥākim executed ad-Darazī for heresy and repudiated his teachings, many years later observers ironically attributed the Druze doctrine to ad-Darazī and did not mention Hamza at all. After the execution of ad-Darazī and his collaborators, Hamza continued his preaching activities for two more years.
Medieval chroniclers of the time not only failed to make the distinction between Druzes and Darazīs but attributed ad-Darazī’s doctrine to the followers of Hamza and argued that Hakim supported ad-Darazī’s ideas. Other historians have reported that it was Hamza who was subordinate to ad-Darazī, and still others have referred to Hamza and Darazi as the same person: Hamza ad-Darazī. As a consequence, the name “Druze” became synonymous with the reform movement.
Despite the ironic and misleading origins of the sect’s name, the title “Druze” never occurs in the Druze manuscripts of the 11th century. After the execution of Darazi and his collaborators, Hamza continued his preaching activities for two more years.
Many modern scholars have written that Hamza's and ad-Darazī's ideology was the same, which is preaching the literal divinity of al-Ḥākim, whom they say supported their claims. Such uncertainty is caused by the historical ambiguity of that era and the secretive, esoteric aspect of the Druze faith.
During the same year that al-Ḥākim disappeared in 1021, Hamza went into retreat and delegated the third leading figure, Baha'u d-Dīn as-Samuqī ("al-Muqtana Baha’ud-Dīn") to continue the missionary movement. Baha'u d-Dīn continued public preaching with the approval of Hamza, who was in a disclosed location known only to Baha'u d-Dīn and few other missionaries. Preaching was halted after the Druze sect was closed in 1043 by Baha'u d-Dīn.
Hamza ibn ‘Alī ibn Aḥmad see Hamza ibn ‘Ali
Hamza al-Fatimi see Hamza ibn ‘Ali
"Hamza the Fatimid" see Hamza ibn ‘Ali
Hamza ibn Habib
Hamza ibn Habib (d. 772). One of the “Seven Readers” of the Qur’an. He was a pupil of Abu Bakr ‘Asim.
Hamza ibn Habib (d. 772). One of the “Seven Readers” of the Qur’an. He was a pupil of Abu Bakr ‘Asim.
Hanafi, Hasan
Hanafi, Hasan (Hasan Hanafi) (b. 1935). Egyptian reformist thinker and professor of philosophy. Born of Berber and Bedouin Egyptian ancestry, Hanafi earned a bachelor’s degree in philosophy at the University of Cairo in 1956 and a doctorat d’etat at the Sorbonne in 1966. He taught Arabic at the Ecole des Langues Orientales to supplement a fellowship while he was a graduate student in Paris (1956-1966). On his return to Egypt, he taught medieval Christian thought and then Islamic philosophy at the University of Cairo, where he continues to be a member of its department of philosophy. As a visiting professor, he also taught at universities in Belgium (1970), the United States (1971-1975), Kuwait (1979), Morocco (1982-1984), Japan (1984-1985), and the United Arab Emirates (1985), and he was academic consultant at the United Nations University in Tokyo (1985-1987).
As a student at Khalil Agha Secondary School in Cairo (1948-1952), Hanafi was introduced to the thought and activities of the Society of the Muslim Brothers. In the summer of 1952, he formally joined the Muslim Brothers and, as a University of Cairo student (1952-1956), fully participated in their movement until they were banned. His studies and travels overseas broadened his intellectual horizons and helped to deepen his conviction that Islam has a leading role in world culture as a unique program for humanity. A staunch supporter of the populist ideals of the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, Hanafi believed in a fusion of the populist ideals within a revitalized, reinterpreted Islam in order to form what he called “the Islamic Left” and brought about national unity in Egypt, social and economic justice for the downtrodden masses, a democratic state free from Western domination and Zionist influence, the unification of the Arab world, and the restoration of Islam to a central position in world culture.
Hanafi’s major intellectual contribution is a lifetime project he called Al-turath wa-al-tajdid (Heritage and Renewal). Apart from his journalistic articles in Arabic – written originally for the general public and later collected in Qadaya mu‘asirah, Dirasat Islamiyah, Dirasat falsafiyah, and Al-din wa al-thawrah fi misr: 1952-1981 – Hanafi was engaged in producing a multi-volume scholarly study. It reconstructed the Islamic heritage in a new historicist and critical interpretation. It reassesses Western culture within a de-centering and downsizing critical approach; and it constructed a new hermeneutic of religious culture on a global scale in which Islam is the ideological foundation of a modern humanity liberated from alienation and provided with a comprehensive program of positive action leading to happiness, peace, prosperity, and justice for all.
Hanafi divided his project into three “fronts,” each of which had a theoretical introduction and was planned to be completed in several books. The fronts are the following: “Our Attitude to the Old Heritage” in seven multi-volume books; “Our Attitude to the Western Heritage,” originally planned to be in five books but later reduced to three; and “Our Attitude to Reality” in three books.
Of these planned works, only some have been published. Al-turath wa-al-tajdid: Mawqifuna min al-turath al-qadim (Heritage and Renewal: Our Attitude to the Old Heritage) introduced the project and offered a conspectus of its content and direction. Min al-‘aqidah ila al-thawrah: Muhawalah li-i‘adat bina’ ‘ilm usul al-din (From Doctrine to Revolution: An Attempt to Rebuild, the Science of Religious Fundamentals) was the first book of the first front. It was an attempt to reconstruct past Islamic theology, showing on the one hand its rational relation to divine revelation to the historical conditions to which its development succumbed as it tried over the years to consolidate Islamic dogma and to defend its world view against internal sectarian dissension and other religions. Hanafi argued that human beings and history were at the center of Islamic religious consciousness, and so he integrated the needs of modern Muslims into the Islamic theology he reconstructed, thus creating a liberation theology intended to serve as a revolutionary ideology enabling Muslims to face modern challenges and fight poverty, underdevelopment, coercion, westernization, and alienation.
His most recent work was a hefty tome entitled Muqaddimah fi ‘ilm al-istighrab (Introduction to the Science of Occidentalism) which he offered as a theoretical introduction to the second front of the project and as a temporary substitute for the three books on the Western heritage, while he continued writing the planned volumes of the first front. In addition to creating the discipline of Occidentalism opposed to Orientalisms and to offer a critical reconstruction of Western culture showing its limitations, its provincialism, and its conditioning by its own circumstances. Hanafi sees the Western heritage as a historical product in which divine revelation is no longer central, unlike the Islamic heritage that is strongly based on divine revelation recorded in the Qur’an, from which all aspects of Islamic civilization and history flow. He argued against the claim of Western culture to universality and made great efforts to reduce it to what he believed to be its natural size within world culture. His analysis of Western consciousness from its beginnings to modern times led to the conclusion that Western consciousness is in crisis and overcome by self-doubt and nihilism, while Islamic consciousness was on the rise to take its rightful place of world leadership, if properly oriented.
Despite Hanafi’s genuine interest in the Muslim masses, he had never gathered a popular following, and his influence was limited to academics, students, and other intellectuals. The significance of his thought lies in the fact that he has forcefully articulated the modern Muslim need for self assertion. For him, Muslims were not mere objects of study or manipulation by others; they were subjects in their own right. Islam, as he had reinterpreted it, is a viable way of life that can and should have a leading role in the world.
Hasan Hanafi see Hanafi, Hasan
Hanafi, Hasan (Hasan Hanafi) (b. 1935). Egyptian reformist thinker and professor of philosophy. Born of Berber and Bedouin Egyptian ancestry, Hanafi earned a bachelor’s degree in philosophy at the University of Cairo in 1956 and a doctorat d’etat at the Sorbonne in 1966. He taught Arabic at the Ecole des Langues Orientales to supplement a fellowship while he was a graduate student in Paris (1956-1966). On his return to Egypt, he taught medieval Christian thought and then Islamic philosophy at the University of Cairo, where he continues to be a member of its department of philosophy. As a visiting professor, he also taught at universities in Belgium (1970), the United States (1971-1975), Kuwait (1979), Morocco (1982-1984), Japan (1984-1985), and the United Arab Emirates (1985), and he was academic consultant at the United Nations University in Tokyo (1985-1987).
As a student at Khalil Agha Secondary School in Cairo (1948-1952), Hanafi was introduced to the thought and activities of the Society of the Muslim Brothers. In the summer of 1952, he formally joined the Muslim Brothers and, as a University of Cairo student (1952-1956), fully participated in their movement until they were banned. His studies and travels overseas broadened his intellectual horizons and helped to deepen his conviction that Islam has a leading role in world culture as a unique program for humanity. A staunch supporter of the populist ideals of the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, Hanafi believed in a fusion of the populist ideals within a revitalized, reinterpreted Islam in order to form what he called “the Islamic Left” and brought about national unity in Egypt, social and economic justice for the downtrodden masses, a democratic state free from Western domination and Zionist influence, the unification of the Arab world, and the restoration of Islam to a central position in world culture.
Hanafi’s major intellectual contribution is a lifetime project he called Al-turath wa-al-tajdid (Heritage and Renewal). Apart from his journalistic articles in Arabic – written originally for the general public and later collected in Qadaya mu‘asirah, Dirasat Islamiyah, Dirasat falsafiyah, and Al-din wa al-thawrah fi misr: 1952-1981 – Hanafi was engaged in producing a multi-volume scholarly study. It reconstructed the Islamic heritage in a new historicist and critical interpretation. It reassesses Western culture within a de-centering and downsizing critical approach; and it constructed a new hermeneutic of religious culture on a global scale in which Islam is the ideological foundation of a modern humanity liberated from alienation and provided with a comprehensive program of positive action leading to happiness, peace, prosperity, and justice for all.
Hanafi divided his project into three “fronts,” each of which had a theoretical introduction and was planned to be completed in several books. The fronts are the following: “Our Attitude to the Old Heritage” in seven multi-volume books; “Our Attitude to the Western Heritage,” originally planned to be in five books but later reduced to three; and “Our Attitude to Reality” in three books.
Of these planned works, only some have been published. Al-turath wa-al-tajdid: Mawqifuna min al-turath al-qadim (Heritage and Renewal: Our Attitude to the Old Heritage) introduced the project and offered a conspectus of its content and direction. Min al-‘aqidah ila al-thawrah: Muhawalah li-i‘adat bina’ ‘ilm usul al-din (From Doctrine to Revolution: An Attempt to Rebuild, the Science of Religious Fundamentals) was the first book of the first front. It was an attempt to reconstruct past Islamic theology, showing on the one hand its rational relation to divine revelation to the historical conditions to which its development succumbed as it tried over the years to consolidate Islamic dogma and to defend its world view against internal sectarian dissension and other religions. Hanafi argued that human beings and history were at the center of Islamic religious consciousness, and so he integrated the needs of modern Muslims into the Islamic theology he reconstructed, thus creating a liberation theology intended to serve as a revolutionary ideology enabling Muslims to face modern challenges and fight poverty, underdevelopment, coercion, westernization, and alienation.
His most recent work was a hefty tome entitled Muqaddimah fi ‘ilm al-istighrab (Introduction to the Science of Occidentalism) which he offered as a theoretical introduction to the second front of the project and as a temporary substitute for the three books on the Western heritage, while he continued writing the planned volumes of the first front. In addition to creating the discipline of Occidentalism opposed to Orientalisms and to offer a critical reconstruction of Western culture showing its limitations, its provincialism, and its conditioning by its own circumstances. Hanafi sees the Western heritage as a historical product in which divine revelation is no longer central, unlike the Islamic heritage that is strongly based on divine revelation recorded in the Qur’an, from which all aspects of Islamic civilization and history flow. He argued against the claim of Western culture to universality and made great efforts to reduce it to what he believed to be its natural size within world culture. His analysis of Western consciousness from its beginnings to modern times led to the conclusion that Western consciousness is in crisis and overcome by self-doubt and nihilism, while Islamic consciousness was on the rise to take its rightful place of world leadership, if properly oriented.
Despite Hanafi’s genuine interest in the Muslim masses, he had never gathered a popular following, and his influence was limited to academics, students, and other intellectuals. The significance of his thought lies in the fact that he has forcefully articulated the modern Muslim need for self assertion. For him, Muslims were not mere objects of study or manipulation by others; they were subjects in their own right. Islam, as he had reinterpreted it, is a viable way of life that can and should have a leading role in the world.
Hasan Hanafi see Hanafi, Hasan
Hanafites
Hanafites (in Arabic, Hanafiyya). Members of the school of Islamic law named after Abu Hanifa al-Nu‘man ibn Thabit. The Hanafi school originated in Iraq and was the school adopted by the ‘Abbasid caliphs. The Hanafi school gained popularity in Transoxania, Khurasan, Afghanistan, India, and China. In the Mediterranean, the Hanafi school became the school of the Ottoman empire, and is the one generally recognized in its former provinces. Its method can be characterized as more formal and literalist than some other schools, although it allows greater use of legal stratagems to circumvent positive provisions of the law.
While the school took its name from the Kufan jurist Abu Hanifa, credit for its foundation is generally given to two of his pupils, Abu Yusuf Ya’qub (d. 798), author of a treatise on the tax of non-Muslims, and his better known contemporary Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani (d.805) who wrote a treatise central to the foundation of the school, The Book of Roots, and two works with the designations The Small Collection and The Large Collection.
Since there is often disagreement among Abu Hanifa, Abu Yusuf, and al-Shaybani, the school is less uniform and coherent in its doctrine
than other schools. During the period of controversy between the old legal schools and the Traditionists in the second and third Islamic centuries, the school was attacked for its use of the discretionary opinion (ra’y) of individual jurists, but in fact it is only slightly more tolerant on this point than the extreme Hanbalites, who prefer traditions -- hadith -- to juristic reasoning.
The Hanafite school used legal stratagems to circumvent the positive precepts of laws governing such things as interest on loans. While interest is forbidden, it could be effected by use of the double sale in which the lender would buy the collateral, for an agreed price, and the borrower contracted to repurchase the collateral at a future date for a higher price, the difference between the two prices representing the interest. In line with this use of stratagems, the Hanafites are more formalistic than either the Hanbalites or the Malikites and do not inquire into the motives of the individual, concentrating instead on the external act.
The Malikites accuse the Hanafites of permitting legal means to achieve illegal ends. The Hanafites would not inquire into the motives of contracting, consummating, and ending the marriage of a woman to a third party in order to allow remarriage to a former husband after divorce, taking the act as evidence of having fulfilled the requirements of the law.
The Hanafi school originated in Iraq and spread to Syria, Khurasan, Transoxiana, Afghanistan, the Indian subcontinent, Turkish Central Asia and China. It later became the favorite school of the Saljuqs and of the Ottomans and, as a legacy of Ottoman rule, it has retained official status even in those former Ottoman provinces where the majority of the native Muslim populations follows another school, e.g., in Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon and Syria.
While Hanafi doctrine from the beginning recognized the importance of the Qur’an as an essential source of law, Hanafis were at pains to insist on the indispensability of personal judgment or reason (ijtihad or ra’y) as a tool of juridical elaboration. The freedom and flexibility that they sought to secure for juridical doctrine were given concrete expression in such concepts as istihsan (juridical preference) and qiyas (analogical reason). Although these concepts are to be found in Maliki and Shafi’i law, it was the Hanafis who applied them most consistently and extensively. The Hanafi school, however, did not entirely escape the influence of the traditionist movement, as a consequence of which Hanafis, too, were compelled to concede a larger role to prophetic tradition (hadith) as a source of law.
While the Hanafi school had its origins in southern Iraq and reflected the legal consensus of that particular region, it rapidly established itself as the dominant school of law in the eastern provinces of the Abbasid empire, thanks in no small measure to the favor shown it by the court in Baghdad. From Iraq and Persia, the Hanafi school found its way to Central Asia, Afghanistan, and India. With the penetration of Islam into China, especially from the thirteenth century, the Hanafi school became the dominant legal influence there as well. In each of these areas, the Hanafi school remains the legal affiliation of the vast majority of Muslims.
In modern times, Hanafi principles have influenced family law by their incorporation into the codes of several of the former Ottoman provinces (e.g., Turkey and Egypt), although, because of the adoption of Western style codes, these cannot still be said to belong to the Hanafi school.
Hanafiyya see Hanafites
The Hanafite school used legal stratagems to circumvent the positive precepts of laws governing such things as interest on loans. While interest is forbidden, it could be effected by use of the double sale in which the lender would buy the collateral, for an agreed price, and the borrower contracted to repurchase the collateral at a future date for a higher price, the difference between the two prices representing the interest. In line with this use of stratagems, the Hanafites are more formalistic than either the Hanbalites or the Malikites and do not inquire into the motives of the individual, concentrating instead on the external act.
The Malikites accuse the Hanafites of permitting legal means to achieve illegal ends. The Hanafites would not inquire into the motives of contracting, consummating, and ending the marriage of a woman to a third party in order to allow remarriage to a former husband after divorce, taking the act as evidence of having fulfilled the requirements of the law.
The Hanafi school originated in Iraq and spread to Syria, Khurasan, Transoxiana, Afghanistan, the Indian subcontinent, Turkish Central Asia and China. It later became the favorite school of the Saljuqs and of the Ottomans and, as a legacy of Ottoman rule, it has retained official status even in those former Ottoman provinces where the majority of the native Muslim populations follows another school, e.g., in Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon and Syria.
While Hanafi doctrine from the beginning recognized the importance of the Qur’an as an essential source of law, Hanafis were at pains to insist on the indispensability of personal judgment or reason (ijtihad or ra’y) as a tool of juridical elaboration. The freedom and flexibility that they sought to secure for juridical doctrine were given concrete expression in such concepts as istihsan (juridical preference) and qiyas (analogical reason). Although these concepts are to be found in Maliki and Shafi’i law, it was the Hanafis who applied them most consistently and extensively. The Hanafi school, however, did not entirely escape the influence of the traditionist movement, as a consequence of which Hanafis, too, were compelled to concede a larger role to prophetic tradition (hadith) as a source of law.
While the Hanafi school had its origins in southern Iraq and reflected the legal consensus of that particular region, it rapidly established itself as the dominant school of law in the eastern provinces of the Abbasid empire, thanks in no small measure to the favor shown it by the court in Baghdad. From Iraq and Persia, the Hanafi school found its way to Central Asia, Afghanistan, and India. With the penetration of Islam into China, especially from the thirteenth century, the Hanafi school became the dominant legal influence there as well. In each of these areas, the Hanafi school remains the legal affiliation of the vast majority of Muslims.
In modern times, Hanafi principles have influenced family law by their incorporation into the codes of several of the former Ottoman provinces (e.g., Turkey and Egypt), although, because of the adoption of Western style codes, these cannot still be said to belong to the Hanafi school.
Hanafiyya see Hanafites
Hanbalites
Hanbalites (in Arabic, Hanabila; in singular form, Hanbali). Followers of the Sunni school of theology, law and morality which grew up from the teaching of Ahmad ibn Hanbal. Hanbalism is the youngest of the four orthodox schools of law in Sunni Islam and it is based on a system of law and theology decidedly traditionalist in orientation. Hanbalism recognizes no other sources than the Qur’an and the Sunna of the Prophet. It is hostile to speculative theology (in Arabic, kalam) and to esoteric Sufism.
While not rejecting reason altogether as a source of law, the Hanbali school sought vigorously to circumscribe its scope, emphasizing rather the Qur’an and the sunna as the primary sources of law. Among the Sunni schools of law, Hanbalism was closest to that of the Shafi’is, differing from it mainly in the role assigned to reason. Under the Shi‘a Buyids, Hanbalism became a politico-religious opposition party in Baghdad, contributing decisively to Sunni restoration, as is clear from the works of many Hanbali theologians of this period. The final two centuries of the caliphate in Baghdad (1061-1258) are the golden age of Hanbalism. Some of the great Hanbalites of this epoch were ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn al-Jawzi, Ibn Aqil (d. 1120), Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (d. 1166), and Ibn al-Jauzi (d.1200).
Under the Bahri Mamelukes, Hanbalism remained very active in Syria and Palestine, the most famous Hanbalite then being Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328). It lost some of its importance in Syria and Palestine under the Circassian Mamelukes, and was not favored by the Ottomans, who gave pre-eminence to Hanafism. In the eighteenth century, under Ottoman rule, Shaykh Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab won over to Hanbalism the amir Muhammad ibn Sa‘ud, the founder of the al-Sa‘ud dynasty of Saudi Arabia. Through the writings of Ibn Taymiyya and the efforts of the Wahhabi movement in the eighteenth century, Hanbali influences made their way to India and Southeast Asia, where even today they continue to be felt.
Hanabila see Hanbalites
Hanbali see Hanbalites
Hanbalites (in Arabic, Hanabila; in singular form, Hanbali). Followers of the Sunni school of theology, law and morality which grew up from the teaching of Ahmad ibn Hanbal. Hanbalism is the youngest of the four orthodox schools of law in Sunni Islam and it is based on a system of law and theology decidedly traditionalist in orientation. Hanbalism recognizes no other sources than the Qur’an and the Sunna of the Prophet. It is hostile to speculative theology (in Arabic, kalam) and to esoteric Sufism.
While not rejecting reason altogether as a source of law, the Hanbali school sought vigorously to circumscribe its scope, emphasizing rather the Qur’an and the sunna as the primary sources of law. Among the Sunni schools of law, Hanbalism was closest to that of the Shafi’is, differing from it mainly in the role assigned to reason. Under the Shi‘a Buyids, Hanbalism became a politico-religious opposition party in Baghdad, contributing decisively to Sunni restoration, as is clear from the works of many Hanbali theologians of this period. The final two centuries of the caliphate in Baghdad (1061-1258) are the golden age of Hanbalism. Some of the great Hanbalites of this epoch were ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn al-Jawzi, Ibn Aqil (d. 1120), Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (d. 1166), and Ibn al-Jauzi (d.1200).
Under the Bahri Mamelukes, Hanbalism remained very active in Syria and Palestine, the most famous Hanbalite then being Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328). It lost some of its importance in Syria and Palestine under the Circassian Mamelukes, and was not favored by the Ottomans, who gave pre-eminence to Hanafism. In the eighteenth century, under Ottoman rule, Shaykh Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab won over to Hanbalism the amir Muhammad ibn Sa‘ud, the founder of the al-Sa‘ud dynasty of Saudi Arabia. Through the writings of Ibn Taymiyya and the efforts of the Wahhabi movement in the eighteenth century, Hanbali influences made their way to India and Southeast Asia, where even today they continue to be felt.
Hanabila see Hanbalites
Hanbali see Hanbalites
Hanifa, Abu
Hanifa, Abu. See Abu Hanifa al-Nu‘man.
Abu Hanifa al-Nu‘man see Hanifa, Abu.
Hanifa, Abu. See Abu Hanifa al-Nu‘man.
Abu Hanifa al-Nu‘man see Hanifa, Abu.
Hani’ ibn ‘Urwa al-Muradi
Hani’ ibn ‘Urwa al-Muradi (Ibn al-Hani Urwa Murad) (d. 680). Yemeni chief who lost his life during the attempt made by ‘Ali’s son al-Husayn to seize power.
Ibn al-Hani Urwa Murad see Hani’ ibn ‘Urwa al-Muradi
Hani’ ibn ‘Urwa al-Muradi (Ibn al-Hani Urwa Murad) (d. 680). Yemeni chief who lost his life during the attempt made by ‘Ali’s son al-Husayn to seize power.
Ibn al-Hani Urwa Murad see Hani’ ibn ‘Urwa al-Muradi
Hansawi
Hansawi (Shaykh Jamal al-Din Hansawi) (1184-1260). Sufi mystic of the Indian Cishtiyya order. His Persian diwan is the earliest known poetical work of a Cishti mystic, important for the history of North India in the early thirteenth century.
Shaykh Jamal al-Din Hansawi see Hansawi
Jamal al-din Hansawi see Hansawi
Hansawi (Shaykh Jamal al-Din Hansawi) (1184-1260). Sufi mystic of the Indian Cishtiyya order. His Persian diwan is the earliest known poetical work of a Cishti mystic, important for the history of North India in the early thirteenth century.
Shaykh Jamal al-Din Hansawi see Hansawi
Jamal al-din Hansawi see Hansawi
Harakat al-Tawhid al-Islami
Harakat al-Tawhid al-Islami (Islamic Unification Movement) (Islamic Unity Movement). Militant Sunni movement which emerged out of the political turmoil of the 1980s in the northern Lebanese port city of Tripoli. Tawhid, the term by which the movement was popularly known, was formed from a coalition of Islamic and Arab nationalist groups, which included Jund Allah, the Muslim Youth (Pro-Fatah), Popular Resistance, and the Lebanese Arab Movement. It came to power in the context of the Lebanese civil war in Tripoli through armed insurrection between October 1983 and October 1985.
Tawhid was part of a broader current of radical Islamic movements to emerge in the early 1980s in Lebanon. The post-1982 period, the year of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, saw at least eight radical Islamic groups form in Lebanon. All shared a radical rejection of Lebanese confessional politics and supported the idea of creating an Islamic state. Although these movements drew on the Sunni and Shi‘a radicalism of the period, the political climate created by the Israeli invasion was an important factor in mobilizing both popular local and international support for these movements.
Civil war and the collapse of the Lebanese state strongly influenced the character of Tawhid’s organization, as they had affected the secular Lebanese parties that preceded it in Tripoli. Although politically, militarily, communally, and geographically restricted, Tawhid was unique because it was a religious movement in the predominantly Sunni city of Tripoli, projecting a radical Islamic image and explicitly linking itself with the Islamic militancy of the Iranian revolution.
The movement was organized into five districts, each controlled by an “emir.” These districts coincided with the traditional administrative and clientalist arrangements of the city quarters. Islamic ideology provided the basis for unity, but administrative responsibilities were shared between the different founding groups, each controlling separate districts.
The movement’s leader, Shaykh Sayyid Sha‘ban, promoted the movement as an ecumenical one for both Lebanese Sunni and Shi‘a Muslims. The tangible expression of this ecumenism was his membership in the small Lebanese Association of Muslim ‘Ulama’ (Tajummu’) – an organization in which the Sunni ‘ulama’ have accepted the ‘ulama’ as the “heirs of the Prophet” and Ayatollah Khomeini as the leading religious figure of this generation. Shaykh Sha‘ban’s ecumenical orientation and support for Khomeini’s leadership of Islamic radicalism was tempered by historical theological differences between Sunnism and Shiism. These included the issue of the recognition by Sunni orthodoxy of all of the Rightly Guided Caliphs and the six Sunni codices of the hadiths as the basis for interpreting the Qur’an. Shaykh Sha‘ban was also critical of the Iranian rather than Muslim character of Khomeini’s regime in Iran. He once suggested that the reestablishment of the caliphate in Mecca was a better strategy to achieve Muslim unity.
Tawhid was a millenarian movement whose project was to bring Islamic order to the anarchy of Tripoli and to work toward the formation of an Islamic state. It was not, however, a broadly populist movement but an expression of the new coalition of local and international forces that controlled northern Lebanon. It was a politico-military group with an Islamic platform, which achieved power through arms by replacing a secular coalition of Lebanese nationalists and communists. It borrowed heavily from the revolutionary symbols of the Iranian revolution, including the turbaned, bearded, and armed clergy and the veil. Some Tawhid clerics even took to riding around Tripoli on horseback as a symbol of their return to the cultural origins of Islam in the first community (the ummah).
Tawhid’s ascent to power in Tripoli and its confinement to the city limits were reflections of the urban concentration of the Sunni population in Lebanon and the political eclipse of the Sunnis as the most powerful Muslim sect during the course of the civil war. Its most influential political links were not with other Lebanese Sunni communities but with the Shi‘a, especially the radical Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah and Hizbullah, as was borne out in the final siege of Tripoli when pro-Iranian radicals in West Beirut kidnapped Soviet diplomats in an effort to halt the Syrian bombardment by political pressure.
The involvement of Sunni clerics in Tawhid represented a radical departure from the traditionally conservative politics of the Lebanese Sunni religious establishment. Tawhid shaykhs were drawn from a stratum of local community shaykhs who only recently had been incorporated in the Lebanese Sunni religious establishment through the policy of increased bureaucratization and religious education. This connection made them more dependent economically on the state and exposed them to more militant Islamic thought and politics.
Of particular significance, were their links with radical Egyptian al-Azhar shaykhs, which they first established either as theological students in al-Azhar University or as labor migrants in the Arab world. There were two predominant al-Azhar networks in northern Lebanon. At least one Egyptian al-Azhar shaykh from these networks was directly involved in the initial organization of the movement in Tripoli. The politicization of the Sunni clerics through their international links occurred with the decline of the Sunni religious establishment on the collapse of state authority. This paralleled a similar process in secular politics whereby international patronage had been substituted for state patronage.
The Islamic program Tawhid sought to implement was limited and piecemeal. The sale of alcohol was banned, and some shops were destroyed by over-enthusiastic militiamen. The veil became more common, and a religious tax was imposed on wealthier businessmen to help fund welfare services to the poor. In practice, however, the Tawhid shaykhs preached individual Islamic moral rectitude as the basis for social transformation and the ultimate realization of an Islamic state.
The military defeat of Tawhid on October 6, 1985, reflected the limited popular base of its support in Tripoli and, perhaps more critically, the change in Syrian attitudes to independent militia rule in Lebanon. Shaykh Sha‘ban survived the military defeat, but several of the leading shaykhs and many militiamen did not. The movement was all but destroyed.
Islamic Unification Movement see Harakat al-Tawhid al-Islami
Islamic Unity Movement see Harakat al-Tawhid al-Islami
Harakat al-Tawhid al-Islami (Islamic Unification Movement) (Islamic Unity Movement). Militant Sunni movement which emerged out of the political turmoil of the 1980s in the northern Lebanese port city of Tripoli. Tawhid, the term by which the movement was popularly known, was formed from a coalition of Islamic and Arab nationalist groups, which included Jund Allah, the Muslim Youth (Pro-Fatah), Popular Resistance, and the Lebanese Arab Movement. It came to power in the context of the Lebanese civil war in Tripoli through armed insurrection between October 1983 and October 1985.
Tawhid was part of a broader current of radical Islamic movements to emerge in the early 1980s in Lebanon. The post-1982 period, the year of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, saw at least eight radical Islamic groups form in Lebanon. All shared a radical rejection of Lebanese confessional politics and supported the idea of creating an Islamic state. Although these movements drew on the Sunni and Shi‘a radicalism of the period, the political climate created by the Israeli invasion was an important factor in mobilizing both popular local and international support for these movements.
Civil war and the collapse of the Lebanese state strongly influenced the character of Tawhid’s organization, as they had affected the secular Lebanese parties that preceded it in Tripoli. Although politically, militarily, communally, and geographically restricted, Tawhid was unique because it was a religious movement in the predominantly Sunni city of Tripoli, projecting a radical Islamic image and explicitly linking itself with the Islamic militancy of the Iranian revolution.
The movement was organized into five districts, each controlled by an “emir.” These districts coincided with the traditional administrative and clientalist arrangements of the city quarters. Islamic ideology provided the basis for unity, but administrative responsibilities were shared between the different founding groups, each controlling separate districts.
The movement’s leader, Shaykh Sayyid Sha‘ban, promoted the movement as an ecumenical one for both Lebanese Sunni and Shi‘a Muslims. The tangible expression of this ecumenism was his membership in the small Lebanese Association of Muslim ‘Ulama’ (Tajummu’) – an organization in which the Sunni ‘ulama’ have accepted the ‘ulama’ as the “heirs of the Prophet” and Ayatollah Khomeini as the leading religious figure of this generation. Shaykh Sha‘ban’s ecumenical orientation and support for Khomeini’s leadership of Islamic radicalism was tempered by historical theological differences between Sunnism and Shiism. These included the issue of the recognition by Sunni orthodoxy of all of the Rightly Guided Caliphs and the six Sunni codices of the hadiths as the basis for interpreting the Qur’an. Shaykh Sha‘ban was also critical of the Iranian rather than Muslim character of Khomeini’s regime in Iran. He once suggested that the reestablishment of the caliphate in Mecca was a better strategy to achieve Muslim unity.
Tawhid was a millenarian movement whose project was to bring Islamic order to the anarchy of Tripoli and to work toward the formation of an Islamic state. It was not, however, a broadly populist movement but an expression of the new coalition of local and international forces that controlled northern Lebanon. It was a politico-military group with an Islamic platform, which achieved power through arms by replacing a secular coalition of Lebanese nationalists and communists. It borrowed heavily from the revolutionary symbols of the Iranian revolution, including the turbaned, bearded, and armed clergy and the veil. Some Tawhid clerics even took to riding around Tripoli on horseback as a symbol of their return to the cultural origins of Islam in the first community (the ummah).
Tawhid’s ascent to power in Tripoli and its confinement to the city limits were reflections of the urban concentration of the Sunni population in Lebanon and the political eclipse of the Sunnis as the most powerful Muslim sect during the course of the civil war. Its most influential political links were not with other Lebanese Sunni communities but with the Shi‘a, especially the radical Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah and Hizbullah, as was borne out in the final siege of Tripoli when pro-Iranian radicals in West Beirut kidnapped Soviet diplomats in an effort to halt the Syrian bombardment by political pressure.
The involvement of Sunni clerics in Tawhid represented a radical departure from the traditionally conservative politics of the Lebanese Sunni religious establishment. Tawhid shaykhs were drawn from a stratum of local community shaykhs who only recently had been incorporated in the Lebanese Sunni religious establishment through the policy of increased bureaucratization and religious education. This connection made them more dependent economically on the state and exposed them to more militant Islamic thought and politics.
Of particular significance, were their links with radical Egyptian al-Azhar shaykhs, which they first established either as theological students in al-Azhar University or as labor migrants in the Arab world. There were two predominant al-Azhar networks in northern Lebanon. At least one Egyptian al-Azhar shaykh from these networks was directly involved in the initial organization of the movement in Tripoli. The politicization of the Sunni clerics through their international links occurred with the decline of the Sunni religious establishment on the collapse of state authority. This paralleled a similar process in secular politics whereby international patronage had been substituted for state patronage.
The Islamic program Tawhid sought to implement was limited and piecemeal. The sale of alcohol was banned, and some shops were destroyed by over-enthusiastic militiamen. The veil became more common, and a religious tax was imposed on wealthier businessmen to help fund welfare services to the poor. In practice, however, the Tawhid shaykhs preached individual Islamic moral rectitude as the basis for social transformation and the ultimate realization of an Islamic state.
The military defeat of Tawhid on October 6, 1985, reflected the limited popular base of its support in Tripoli and, perhaps more critically, the change in Syrian attitudes to independent militia rule in Lebanon. Shaykh Sha‘ban survived the military defeat, but several of the leading shaykhs and many militiamen did not. The movement was all but destroyed.
Islamic Unification Movement see Harakat al-Tawhid al-Islami
Islamic Unity Movement see Harakat al-Tawhid al-Islami
Harakat ul-Mujahidin
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (Harkat-ul-Mujahideen- al-Islami) (HUM). Formerly part of the Harakat al-Ansar (HUA), the Pakistani-based HUM operates primarily in Kashmir. Long-time leader of the group, Fazlur Rehman Khalil, in mid-February stepped down. The popular Kashmiri commander and second in command, Farooq Kashmiri, assumed the reigns. Khalil, who has been linked to Bin Laden and signed his fatwa in February 1998 calling for attacks on the United States and Western interests, assumed the position of HUM Secretary General. The HUM is linked to the militant group al-Faran that kidnapped five Western tourists in Kashmir in July 1995. One was killed in August 1995 and the other four reportedly were killed in December of the same year. Supporters are mostly Pakistanis and Kashmiris and also include Afghans and Arab veterans of the Afghan war. The HUM trains its militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (abbreviated as HUM) is a Pakistan-based Islamic militant group operating primarily in Kashmir. In 1997, the United States designated HUM a foreign terrorist organization, and in the same year the organization changed its name from Harakat al-Ansar. The group splintered from Harakat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), a Pakistani group formed in 1980 to fight the Soviet military in Afghanistan.
In 1989, at the end of the Soviet-Afghan war, the group entered Kashmiri politics by use of militants under the leadership of Sajjad Afghani. In 1993, the group merged with Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami to form Harkat-ul-Ansar. Immediately following the merger India arrested three senior members: Nasrullah Mansur Langaryal, chief of the former Harkat-ul Mujahideen in November 1993; Maulana Masood Azhar, General Secretary in February 1994, and Sajjad Afghani (Sajjad Sajid) in the same month in Srinagar.
As a response, HUM carried out several kidnappings in an attempt to free their leaders, all of which failed. Linked to the Kashmiri group al-Faran that kidnapped five Western tourists in Kashmir in July 1995; one, Hans Christian Ostrø, was killed in August 1995 and the other four reportedly were killed in December of the same year. In 1997, the group renamed itself to the original Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, in a response to the United States defining Harkat-ul-Ansar as a terrorist organization. In 1999, Sajjad was killed during a jailbreak which led to the hijacking, by the group, of Indian Airlines Flight 814 in December, which caused the release of Maulana Masood Azhar, Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh and Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar. Azhar did not, however, return to the HUM, choosing instead to form the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), a rival terrorist group expressing a more radical line than the HUM.
HUM again came to the attention of the United States after the 9/11 attacks, leading President George W. Bush to ban the group on September 25, 2001.
In mid-February 2000, long-time leader of the group,
Fazlur Rehman Khalil, stepped down as HUM emir, turning the reins over to the popular Kashmiri commander and his second-in-command, Farooq Kashmiri. Khalil assumed the position of HUM Secretary General.
HUM is thought to have several thousand armed supporters located in Pakistani Kashmir, and India's southern Kashmir and Doda regions. HUM used light and heavy machineguns, assault rifles, mortars, explosives, and rockets. HUM lost some of its membership due to defections to the JEM.
HUM was based in Muzaffarabad, Rawalpindi, and several other towns in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but members conduct insurgent and militant activities primarily in Kashmir.
On October 10, 2005, Britain's Home Office banned HUM and fourteen other terrorist groups from operating in the United Kingdom. Under Britain's Terrorism Act 2000, being a member of a HUM became punishable with a 10-year prison term.
HUM see Harakat ul-Mujahidin
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen- al-Islami see Harakat ul-Mujahidin
HUM is thought to have several thousand armed supporters located in Pakistani Kashmir, and India's southern Kashmir and Doda regions. HUM used light and heavy machineguns, assault rifles, mortars, explosives, and rockets. HUM lost some of its membership due to defections to the JEM.
HUM was based in Muzaffarabad, Rawalpindi, and several other towns in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but members conduct insurgent and militant activities primarily in Kashmir.
On October 10, 2005, Britain's Home Office banned HUM and fourteen other terrorist groups from operating in the United Kingdom. Under Britain's Terrorism Act 2000, being a member of a HUM became punishable with a 10-year prison term.
HUM see Harakat ul-Mujahidin
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen- al-Islami see Harakat ul-Mujahidin
Harari
Harari. Inside the walls of the old Muslim city of Harar in Ethiopia, its inhabitants evolved a unique pre-industrial urban culture which persisted from the 1500s to recent decades. Although political and economic changes have dispersed the Harari from their old city, the ethnic group persists in mercantile centers in the region and has representatives in other urban centers throughout much of the world.
Harar had been an independent emirate since 1551, but it underwent a series of conquests beginning with the Ottoman Egyptian occupation from 1876 to 1885. A brief restoration of the emirate was followed by the defeat of the city’s forces by Ras Makonnen in 1887 and the consequent incorporation of Harar in the expanding empire of Ethiopia. During the early period of Ethiopian rule, Harar’s taxation and political affairs were managed by the occupiers, but its internal society and economy continued to function. The erosion of Harari economy began at this time with the confiscation of lands by Ras Makonnen as rewards for his troops. A much more long-lasting blow was dealt by the opening of the Djibouti-Addis Adaba railway in 1913, which bypassed Harar. The rise of Addis Adaba and the opening of the interior of Ethiopia during the first half of the twentieth century was a period of increasing stagnation for the old city of Harar.
Harari, who had maintained trading posts on the caravan routes for centuries, began to leave the old city in significant numbers in 1948. At that time, the newly restored Ethiopian rule of the city (following the Italian Occupation, 1936-1941) was perceived as hopelessly oppressive. The richer markets of Addis Adaba and Dire Dawa provided sufficient impetus to break the rule that all Harari should raise their families in Harar. As Harari of means shifted from agriculture to merchandising during the next two decades, this movement of population out of the city slowly gained momentum. It became a virtual diaspora after the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974. The already weakened economy of the Harari still residing in the old city, their number now reduced to about 8,000, was vitiated by two major reforms of the revolutionary government. The Rural Property Act of 1975, which proclaimed a maximum individual landholding of ten hectares (about 25 acres) and which affected a much needed land re-distribution throughout Ethiopia, eradicated the extensive Harari holdings of farms which had been tilled by Oromo tenants.
Also, in 1975, the Urban Property Act restricted the ownership of the number of homes and rooms by individual landlords. This was designed to eliminate exploitative landlords, particularly in Addis Adaba. Its effect in Harar, however, was perceived as a cultural disaster. The reform mandated a redistribution of occupancy without regard to ethnic affiliation. The Harari found themselves sharing their compounds and sometimes their homes with outsiders, most of them Christian Amharas. The city had ceased to be either the locale of a comfortable way of life or the sanctuary of Harari culture.
Despite the dispersal of Harari, the ethnic group continues to thrive, albeit under altered conditions. Although they are one of Ethiopia’s smallest ethnic groups, they have contributed significantly to the country’s managerial and executive (although not its military) ranks. In the 1980s, there were several Harari M.D.’s and Ph.D.’s in Ethiopia, and elsewhere. An Ethiopian ambassador and a cabinet minister were Harari, as was the president of Addis Adaba University.
Harari. Inside the walls of the old Muslim city of Harar in Ethiopia, its inhabitants evolved a unique pre-industrial urban culture which persisted from the 1500s to recent decades. Although political and economic changes have dispersed the Harari from their old city, the ethnic group persists in mercantile centers in the region and has representatives in other urban centers throughout much of the world.
Harar had been an independent emirate since 1551, but it underwent a series of conquests beginning with the Ottoman Egyptian occupation from 1876 to 1885. A brief restoration of the emirate was followed by the defeat of the city’s forces by Ras Makonnen in 1887 and the consequent incorporation of Harar in the expanding empire of Ethiopia. During the early period of Ethiopian rule, Harar’s taxation and political affairs were managed by the occupiers, but its internal society and economy continued to function. The erosion of Harari economy began at this time with the confiscation of lands by Ras Makonnen as rewards for his troops. A much more long-lasting blow was dealt by the opening of the Djibouti-Addis Adaba railway in 1913, which bypassed Harar. The rise of Addis Adaba and the opening of the interior of Ethiopia during the first half of the twentieth century was a period of increasing stagnation for the old city of Harar.
Harari, who had maintained trading posts on the caravan routes for centuries, began to leave the old city in significant numbers in 1948. At that time, the newly restored Ethiopian rule of the city (following the Italian Occupation, 1936-1941) was perceived as hopelessly oppressive. The richer markets of Addis Adaba and Dire Dawa provided sufficient impetus to break the rule that all Harari should raise their families in Harar. As Harari of means shifted from agriculture to merchandising during the next two decades, this movement of population out of the city slowly gained momentum. It became a virtual diaspora after the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974. The already weakened economy of the Harari still residing in the old city, their number now reduced to about 8,000, was vitiated by two major reforms of the revolutionary government. The Rural Property Act of 1975, which proclaimed a maximum individual landholding of ten hectares (about 25 acres) and which affected a much needed land re-distribution throughout Ethiopia, eradicated the extensive Harari holdings of farms which had been tilled by Oromo tenants.
Also, in 1975, the Urban Property Act restricted the ownership of the number of homes and rooms by individual landlords. This was designed to eliminate exploitative landlords, particularly in Addis Adaba. Its effect in Harar, however, was perceived as a cultural disaster. The reform mandated a redistribution of occupancy without regard to ethnic affiliation. The Harari found themselves sharing their compounds and sometimes their homes with outsiders, most of them Christian Amharas. The city had ceased to be either the locale of a comfortable way of life or the sanctuary of Harari culture.
Despite the dispersal of Harari, the ethnic group continues to thrive, albeit under altered conditions. Although they are one of Ethiopia’s smallest ethnic groups, they have contributed significantly to the country’s managerial and executive (although not its military) ranks. In the 1980s, there were several Harari M.D.’s and Ph.D.’s in Ethiopia, and elsewhere. An Ethiopian ambassador and a cabinet minister were Harari, as was the president of Addis Adaba University.
Harawi
Harawi (Ilyas Harawi). Elected president of Lebanon in 1989.
Ilyas Harawi see Harawi
Harawi (Ilyas Harawi). Elected president of Lebanon in 1989.
Ilyas Harawi see Harawi
Harbi, Abu Ishaq Ibrahim ibn Ishaq al- (Abu Ishaq Ibrahim ibn Ishaq al-Harbi) (9th century). Author of Al-Hammam and its Manners, a book on the appropriate protocol of bathing in hammams -- bath houses.
During the age of the Roman Empire, the Romans developed a bathing process. For the Romans, the bath was in an elaborate building complex, complete with a medium heated room or Tepidarium, a hot steam room or Caldarium, and a room with a cold plunge pool or Frigidarium. In some of the larger baths there were other sections with changing rooms called Apodyterium, a reading room and sports area. But these bathing centers were for the rich and political elite only.
With the demise of the Roman Empire, the bathing centers were abandoned. While these baths fell into disrepair as the Roman Empire lay in tatters, on the other side of the Mediterranean the Arabs, who had been under Roman rule in countries like Syria, inherited the tradition of using the bath. Instead of the waters becoming stagnant as the Romans left, the Arabs and then the Muslims gave them special promotion because of Islam's emphasis on cleanliness, hygiene and good health.
The bath house, or hammam, was a social place and it ranked high on the list of life's essentials. The Prophet Muhammad proclaimed that "cleanliness is half the faith." Hammams then were elaborate affairs with elegant designs, decor and ornamentation. Under the Mameluke and Ottoman rule, they were especially sumptuous buildings in their rich design and luxurious decorations, furnished with beautiful fountains and decorative pools.
The hammam was, and still is, a unique social setting for Muslim communities, playing an important role in the social activities of the community. As an intimate space of interaction for various social groups, it brought friends, neighbors, relatives and workers together regularly to undertake the washing ritual in a partying atmosphere. Group bonds strengthened, friendships rekindled and gossip was swapped. This therapeutic ritual was carried out by both men and women at separate times, with the women usually bathing in daylight and men in the evening and night.
The intrigue and sociability at the hammam did not just stop at scrubbing and gossip, as traditionally the setting played a significant role in matchmaking. In conservative communities such as those of North Africa, women who were looking for suitable brides for their sons would go to the hammam. Here they had the perfect opportunity to have a closer look at the bride to be and select the most physically fit.
It is also customary in many parts of the Muslim world for the new bride to be taken with her friends to the hammam, where she is prepared, groomed and adorned in stylized designs with henna, the herbal paste that leaves a reddish/brown color on the hair, hands and feet. The groom is also escorted there the night before he meets his bride.
The art of bathing in hammams is guided by many rules, such as: men must always be covered in "lower" garments, and women are forbidden to enter if men are present. Quite a few books have been written about the art of bathing in hammams, including Al-Hammam and its Manners from the 9th century by Abu Ishaq Ibrahim ibn Ishaq al-Harbi.
Hariri, Abu Muhammad al-
Hariri, Abu Muhammad al- (Abu Muhammad al-Hariri) (Abu Muhammed al-Qasim al-Hariri) Muhammad al-Qasim ibn Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Uthman al-Hariri) (al-Hariri of Basra) (1054–1122). Arabic poet and philologist. His best known work is the Sessions, which imitate very closely those of al-Hamadhani, but of which they are no more than a pale reflection. On the other hand, al-Hariri possessed an unequalled mastery of the Arabic language and a perfect command of its inexhaustible vocabulary.
Al-Hariri was a native of Basra in Iraq where he held a small administrative post. Al-Hariri produced a volume of 50 maqamat, which, although often longer and more elaborate than those of al-Hamadhani, follow almost exactly the same pattern. Their hero was another vagabond, Abu Zaid of Saruj.
The maqamat are written in rhymed prose, with interpolated passages of verse, and they are designed principally to exhibit the author’s skill in the manipulation of the Arabic language, the depth of his erudition in all branches of learning, and his adeptness at refined obscurity of allusion. In all of these al-Hariri’s writing is considered to be superior to that of al-Hamadhani. Al-Hamadhani perhaps tells a better story than al-Hariri, but, in this too, the latter is by no means deficient. Indeed, al-Hariri’s Maqamat could hardly have remained so populist had they not possessed the power of entertaining as well as that of exercising the learned. Some commentators have noted that for the better part of seven centuries, the Maqamat of al-Hariri “has been esteemed as, next to the Qur’an, the chief treasure of the Arabic tongue.”
The Maqamat of both al-Hariri and al-Hamadhani are particularly interesting to us as representing a picture of life in a Muslim community in the tenth and twelfth centuries.
Abu Muhammad al-Hariri see Hariri, Abu Muhammad al-
Abu Muhammed al-Qasim al-Hariri see Hariri, Abu Muhammad al-
Muhammad al-Qasim ibn Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Uthman al-Hariri see Hariri, Abu Muhammad al-
Hariri of Basra, al- see Hariri, Abu Muhammad al-
Hariri, Rafiq
Hariri, Rafiq (Rafik Hariri) (Rafic Baha El Deen Al-Hariri) (November 1, 1944 – February 14, 2005). Prime Minister of Lebanon from 1992 to 1998 and again from 2000 until his resignation on October 20, 2004. (1944-2005).
Hariri was born into a Sunni Muslim family in Sayda. In 1965, Hariri enrolled as a student of business administration at Beirut Arab University. He left the university in 1966, reportedly because he lacked sufficient funds to pay tuition. Hariri emigrated to Saudi Arabia and began working for a construction company.
In 1969, Hariri established his own construction company, CICONEST, which benefited greatly from the oil boom of Saudi Arabia in the 1970s. In 1975, the Lebanese Civil War began. Hariri stayed in Saudi Arabia, but was involved in both help projects in Lebanon, as well as in funding opposing militia groups.
In 1978, Hariri was granted Saudi citizenship as a reward from the royal family for his high quality of entrepreneurial services. Hariri subsequently purchased the French construction company Oger, and became the largest in the construction sector in the Middle East.
Hariri’s rise to power in Lebanon has a doubtful background. He bought support from Syria in the 1980s, and following the end of the Civil War he also bought support from leading politicians in Lebanon. Soon he had control over most of the reconstruction work, as well as control over Lebanese media: the radio and television stations, newspapers and magazines. The Lebanese media typically portrayed Hariri as the economic savior of Lebanon.
In the 1980s, Hariri was ranked one of the 100 richest men in the world. By that time, much of his activities were also based in Lebanon. Aiming at good political relations with Syria, Hariri constructed a new presidential palace in Damascus. This was, however, not to the liking of Hafiz al-Assad, who soon turned it into a conference center.
In August of 1987, Hariri tried to buy president Amin Gemayel out of office before the end of this term, and tried also to buy Syrian support for making Johnny Abdo president. Abdo had promised to make Hariri prime minister in such a case. However, Gemayel rejected this commitment.
In 1989, according to some sources, Hariri bought support from Lebanese delegates for allowing Syrian control over Lebanon during the reconciliation conference held in At Ta’if, Saudi Arabia.
In 1990, Hariri returned to Lebanon, where he started a campaign for involvement in the reconstruction process after the end of the civil war. Hariri donated a mansion to president Elias Hrawi and gave great sums of money to other leading politicians.
In 1992, President Hrawi appointed Hariri prime minister, hoping that the latter’s influential position in business would help bring the reconstruction process forward. This appointment occurred after Hariri had expressed his pro-Syrian attitude. The reactions in Lebanese society to Hariri’s appointment were very positive. Among Hariri’s first changes was the cutting of income and corporate taxes to ten percent. Hariri also borrowed billions of dollars to rebuild the infrastructure of Lebanon, in particular the infrastructure of Beirut. Hariri appointed many of his closest staff members from his own companies as ministers of the government, letting them fill important positions like finance minister (Fouad Siniora) and justice minister (Bahij Tabbara).
The matter of the economy was one where Hariri had little reason to blame anyone but himself, as Syria gave him wide autonomy in this field when he first became prime minister in 1992. He focused on rebuilding Beirut instead of the other cities of Lebanon. He was focused on the financial sector instead of the industries and the agriculture. According to his own ideology, if the financial sector ran well the rest of the economy would follow. This did not happen, and through the 1990s Lebanon went into a financial crisis.
Hariri was both the architect behind the reconstruction work of Beirut, as well as the one profiting most from it. The work was performed by The Company for the Development and Reconstruction of Beirut’s Central District, in which Hariri was the main shareholder. The company expropriated lands in exchange for shares, and the Lebanese state paid for the construction work with foreign loans.
In 1994, Hariri was accused of corruption and offered his resignation to the president. Hrawi refused. Later in the year, Hariri banned public demonstrations.
In 1995, with the possible start of a general strike, Hariri dispatched the army into the streets to quell the opposition and, in 1996, the Lebanese security forces cracked down on two initiatives for general strikes.
In 1998, the failure of Hariri’s corrupt economic politics became increasingly evident. The growth rate had dropped from an annual eight to two percent, and the foreign debt had risen above what Lebanon could handle. The heir apparent of the Syrian presidency, Bashar al-Assad started a campaign to remove potential opposition to his future presidency. With this, many of Hariri’s Syrian allies were stripped of their positions in the society. Bashar soon had Hariri removed from his position and Hariri was replaced by Salim al-Hoss.
In 2000, after the politics of Hoss did not result in increased economic growth in Lebanon, Damascus began transferring its support back to Hariri. At the parliamentary elections, Hariri received the necessary support to become prime minister for the second time. Hariri embarked on a policy that involved reform in Lebanon’s bureaucracy and some more independence from the directions of Damascus.
In his second term in office, Hariri showed more independence towards Syria, which angered the rulers in Damascus. He also established better contacts with the United States. It is speculated that Syria wanted to remove him from office, but hesitated as they saw him as important for Lebanon’s economy, and Lebanon’s economy was important for Syria.
Hariri was assassinated on February 14, 2005, in a car bombing, which United Nations investigators later tied to Syrian government officials. The assassination led to peaceful demonstrations. The demonstrations culminated in a March 14, 2005 rally in Beirut, Lebanon's capital, in which 1.5 million people -- almost forty percent (40%) of the entire Lebanese population -- participated. The demonstrators carried placards calling for the immediate withdrawal of Syrian troops and the Syrian intelligence services. The demonstrators also demanded to know the truth about Hariri's assassination and the assassinations of other political and religious leaders allegedly ordered by Syrian officials.
The demonstrators achieved their goal on April 26, when Syria withdrew its troops and intelligence services. Political commentators dubbed the popular movement that forced the withdrawal "the Cedar Revolution," in reference to Lebanon's national symbol, the cedars of Lebanon referred to in the Bible.
Rafik Hariri see Hariri, Rafiq
Rafic Baha El Deen Al-Hariri see Hariri, Rafiq
Hariri, Rafiq (Rafik Hariri) (Rafic Baha El Deen Al-Hariri) (November 1, 1944 – February 14, 2005). Prime Minister of Lebanon from 1992 to 1998 and again from 2000 until his resignation on October 20, 2004. (1944-2005).
Hariri was born into a Sunni Muslim family in Sayda. In 1965, Hariri enrolled as a student of business administration at Beirut Arab University. He left the university in 1966, reportedly because he lacked sufficient funds to pay tuition. Hariri emigrated to Saudi Arabia and began working for a construction company.
In 1969, Hariri established his own construction company, CICONEST, which benefited greatly from the oil boom of Saudi Arabia in the 1970s. In 1975, the Lebanese Civil War began. Hariri stayed in Saudi Arabia, but was involved in both help projects in Lebanon, as well as in funding opposing militia groups.
In 1978, Hariri was granted Saudi citizenship as a reward from the royal family for his high quality of entrepreneurial services. Hariri subsequently purchased the French construction company Oger, and became the largest in the construction sector in the Middle East.
Hariri’s rise to power in Lebanon has a doubtful background. He bought support from Syria in the 1980s, and following the end of the Civil War he also bought support from leading politicians in Lebanon. Soon he had control over most of the reconstruction work, as well as control over Lebanese media: the radio and television stations, newspapers and magazines. The Lebanese media typically portrayed Hariri as the economic savior of Lebanon.
In the 1980s, Hariri was ranked one of the 100 richest men in the world. By that time, much of his activities were also based in Lebanon. Aiming at good political relations with Syria, Hariri constructed a new presidential palace in Damascus. This was, however, not to the liking of Hafiz al-Assad, who soon turned it into a conference center.
In August of 1987, Hariri tried to buy president Amin Gemayel out of office before the end of this term, and tried also to buy Syrian support for making Johnny Abdo president. Abdo had promised to make Hariri prime minister in such a case. However, Gemayel rejected this commitment.
In 1989, according to some sources, Hariri bought support from Lebanese delegates for allowing Syrian control over Lebanon during the reconciliation conference held in At Ta’if, Saudi Arabia.
In 1990, Hariri returned to Lebanon, where he started a campaign for involvement in the reconstruction process after the end of the civil war. Hariri donated a mansion to president Elias Hrawi and gave great sums of money to other leading politicians.
In 1992, President Hrawi appointed Hariri prime minister, hoping that the latter’s influential position in business would help bring the reconstruction process forward. This appointment occurred after Hariri had expressed his pro-Syrian attitude. The reactions in Lebanese society to Hariri’s appointment were very positive. Among Hariri’s first changes was the cutting of income and corporate taxes to ten percent. Hariri also borrowed billions of dollars to rebuild the infrastructure of Lebanon, in particular the infrastructure of Beirut. Hariri appointed many of his closest staff members from his own companies as ministers of the government, letting them fill important positions like finance minister (Fouad Siniora) and justice minister (Bahij Tabbara).
The matter of the economy was one where Hariri had little reason to blame anyone but himself, as Syria gave him wide autonomy in this field when he first became prime minister in 1992. He focused on rebuilding Beirut instead of the other cities of Lebanon. He was focused on the financial sector instead of the industries and the agriculture. According to his own ideology, if the financial sector ran well the rest of the economy would follow. This did not happen, and through the 1990s Lebanon went into a financial crisis.
Hariri was both the architect behind the reconstruction work of Beirut, as well as the one profiting most from it. The work was performed by The Company for the Development and Reconstruction of Beirut’s Central District, in which Hariri was the main shareholder. The company expropriated lands in exchange for shares, and the Lebanese state paid for the construction work with foreign loans.
In 1994, Hariri was accused of corruption and offered his resignation to the president. Hrawi refused. Later in the year, Hariri banned public demonstrations.
In 1995, with the possible start of a general strike, Hariri dispatched the army into the streets to quell the opposition and, in 1996, the Lebanese security forces cracked down on two initiatives for general strikes.
In 1998, the failure of Hariri’s corrupt economic politics became increasingly evident. The growth rate had dropped from an annual eight to two percent, and the foreign debt had risen above what Lebanon could handle. The heir apparent of the Syrian presidency, Bashar al-Assad started a campaign to remove potential opposition to his future presidency. With this, many of Hariri’s Syrian allies were stripped of their positions in the society. Bashar soon had Hariri removed from his position and Hariri was replaced by Salim al-Hoss.
In 2000, after the politics of Hoss did not result in increased economic growth in Lebanon, Damascus began transferring its support back to Hariri. At the parliamentary elections, Hariri received the necessary support to become prime minister for the second time. Hariri embarked on a policy that involved reform in Lebanon’s bureaucracy and some more independence from the directions of Damascus.
In his second term in office, Hariri showed more independence towards Syria, which angered the rulers in Damascus. He also established better contacts with the United States. It is speculated that Syria wanted to remove him from office, but hesitated as they saw him as important for Lebanon’s economy, and Lebanon’s economy was important for Syria.
Hariri was assassinated on February 14, 2005, in a car bombing, which United Nations investigators later tied to Syrian government officials. The assassination led to peaceful demonstrations. The demonstrations culminated in a March 14, 2005 rally in Beirut, Lebanon's capital, in which 1.5 million people -- almost forty percent (40%) of the entire Lebanese population -- participated. The demonstrators carried placards calling for the immediate withdrawal of Syrian troops and the Syrian intelligence services. The demonstrators also demanded to know the truth about Hariri's assassination and the assassinations of other political and religious leaders allegedly ordered by Syrian officials.
The demonstrators achieved their goal on April 26, when Syria withdrew its troops and intelligence services. Political commentators dubbed the popular movement that forced the withdrawal "the Cedar Revolution," in reference to Lebanon's national symbol, the cedars of Lebanon referred to in the Bible.
Rafik Hariri see Hariri, Rafiq
Rafic Baha El Deen Al-Hariri see Hariri, Rafiq
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