Hizb al-Nahdah
Hizb al-Nahdah. Formerly called al-Ittijah al-Islami (Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique [MTI]), a political movement that, in 1988, adopted the name Hizb al-Nahdah (Renaissance Party). Hizb al-Nahdah was the principal representative of Islamist thought and political expression in contemporary Tunisia. The movement’s relations with the government have from the outset been contentious, but it has survived successive waves of repression. It is thought to have the diffuse support of as much as one-third of the Tunisian population.
The contemporary Islamist movement traces its roots to the Qur’anic Preservation Society (QPS), a cultural association founded in 1970 in reaction to modernist reforms promulgated in the 1960s, and to the Pakistan based Da‘wah (The Call), which spread across the Maghrib in the early 1970s “calling” Muslims to return to the faith. Out of this group emerged a nexus of activists who were satisfied with neither the cultural critique of the QPS nor the more personal approach of the Da‘wah, but who focused rather on the role of Islam in society and openly preached reform (tajdid). As these sentiments sorted themselves out in the 1970s, young men with beards and women in the chador-like hijab (veil) became a common sight in Tunis and other cities. By 1979, one group identifying itself as “progressive Islamists” and concentrating on the renewal of Islamic thought (ijtihad) had split off to pursue essentially intellectual matters. The energies of those who sought political action coalesced around Rashid Ghannoushi (Rashid al-Ghannushi) and Abdelfatah Mourou. Ghannoushi had recently returned from Syria, and Mourou, a jurist, had been studying at the Zaytunah Mosque in Tunis. At a press conference in 1981, they announced the formation of the MTI, which officially called for the reconstruction of economic life on a more equitable basis, the end of single party politics, and a return to the “fundamental principles of Islam” through a purging of what was viewed as well-entrenched “social decadence.” Further, MTI representatives announced that they were seeking recognition as a political party according to guidelines established by the government in the preceding autumn. That request was denied, and less than two months later most of the MTI’s leaders were imprisoned.
Despite this repression – or perhaps because of it – the MTI survived and even gained strength in the early 1980s. The MTI found allies in other Tunisian opposition forces, including the Movement of Democratic Socialists and the new Tunisian League of Human Rights, and its discourse took on egalitarian and republican overtones. Under pressure, the Tunisian government released MTI leadrs in 1984, and, in a symbolic gesture, the government outlawed the hijab. As the MTI’s condemnatory rhetoric once again gathered steam, in spring 1987 the government intensified its efforts to eradicate the movement, arresting more than three thousand of its alleged supporters. The party’s leaders were tried en masse before the State Security Court in August for ill-defined capital crimes, and several were sentenced to death in absentia.
The specter of politically motivated executions and uncontrollable social response created a backdrop for the coup instigated by Prime Minister Zine el Abidine Ben Ali a few months later. Islamists were the primary beneficiaries of the liberalizing policies introduced by the new regime. Prisons were emptied, a multi-party system was embraced, and the franchise was restored to those who had previously been imprisoned. The atmosphere of détente raised hopes among Islamists that they would be allowed to participate in the political system. To comply with new rules prohibiting parties from capitalizing on religious sentiments, the MTI changed its name.
The renamed Hizb al-Nahdah reached a turning point in relations with the new regime in April 1989. Without legal recognition, Islamists were prevented from participating openly in Tunisia’s first contested legislative elections, but the independent slates they fielded nevertheless garnered fourteen percent of the popular vote (thirty percent in certain Tunis suburbs) and sent shock waves through the government. Al-Nahbah’s pending request for recognition was denied, educational reforms aimed at curtailing Islamist influence were implemented, and the movement’s leaders were taken in for questioning. Tensions were exacerbated by the Gulf War, which fanned flames of anti-Western sentiment. The death of one Islamist student, shot by government militia during a demonstration, sparked protests that inspired a new wave of arrests and further restrictions. An assault by Islamists on an office of the ruling Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) in February 1991, which killed one guard and injured another, heightened the political confrontation. Al-Nahdah’s formal responsibility for that attack was never made clear, but together with the discovery in subsequent months of two alleged plots to overthrow the government, the event fueled a campaign of repression that resulted in more than eight thousand arrests. In 1992, 279 al-Nahdah members were tried before military tribunals; leaders in the government’s custody were sentenced to life in prison.
It is unclear how much al-Nahdah was affected by the far-reaching efforts to stifle it. However, its leadership did change. In 1993, Rashid Ghannoushi was still formally recognized as the head of al-Nahdah (although since 1989 he had been in self-imposed exile), but Mourou formally dissociated himself from the unauthorized party in 1991 following the attack on the RCD office. A new cadre of leaders emerged, and the government claimed to have uncovered a covert military wing. Meanwhile, El fajr, the al-Nahdah publication that was to have illuminated its thought, was silenced.
Concerted pressures in the early 1990s made al-Nahdah less visible. In particular, many young women ceased to wear the symbolic hijab. There was evidence that the Islamist movement continued to enjoy popular support – perhaps more than ever in the wake of disappointment with the Ben Ali government. A membership once described as young and chiefly comprised of students became aged, without obvious attrition. Students, particularly those in religious and technical institutes, continue to supply recruits, but the Islamist message of social and political resistance and reform resonated in the humanities and social sciences. The movement held particular appeal for sectors of society that have felt relatively disenfranchised by the modernist regime, and economic pressures only increased those sentiments. Parents and others of an older generation were commonly identified as sympathizers, and the movement was supported from abroad by a broad network of Tunisian students. It remained the most significant opposition group in contemporary Tunisia. {See also Ben Ali and Ghannushi, Rashid al-.}
Renaissance Party (Arabic: Hizb al-Nahda, also Hizb Ennahda; French: Parti de la Renaissance) is an un-authorized Islamist opposition political party in Tunisia.
Originally known as Islamic Action, the party changed its name to Movement of the Islamic Tendency, and then in 1989 Hizb al-Nahda.[1] Although traditionally shaped by the thinking of Sayyid Qutb and Maududi, starting in the 1980s they began to be described as moderate Islamist. They advocated democracy and a "Tunisian" form of Islamism which recognized political pluralism. They also discussed a "dialogue" with the West. These statements should not be misconstrued as they reject Western notions of liberal democracy and believe in an essentially Islamic constitution. Critics charge that one of their main leaders, named Rashid Al-Ghannushi, had a history of violence yet in courts he was accused by the ruling party of organizing a non authorized political party. Others say he supports any form multi-party democracy that offers a minimum of freedom for his party and followers.
Al Nahda a party published the banned newspaper Al-Fajr. The editor of Al Fajr, Hamadi Jebali, was sentenced to sixteen years imprisonment in 1992 for membership of the un-authorized organisation and for "aggression with the intention of changing the nature of the state". Al Nahda members were allowed to stand in the 1989 elections but the movement was banned in 1991. The Arabic language television station El Zeitouna is believed to be connected with Al Nahda.
[edit] References
Renaissance Party see Hizb al-Nahdah.
The contemporary Islamist movement traces its roots to the Qur’anic Preservation Society (QPS), a cultural association founded in 1970 in reaction to modernist reforms promulgated in the 1960s, and to the Pakistan based Da‘wah (The Call), which spread across the Maghrib in the early 1970s “calling” Muslims to return to the faith. Out of this group emerged a nexus of activists who were satisfied with neither the cultural critique of the QPS nor the more personal approach of the Da‘wah, but who focused rather on the role of Islam in society and openly preached reform (tajdid). As these sentiments sorted themselves out in the 1970s, young men with beards and women in the chador-like hijab (veil) became a common sight in Tunis and other cities. By 1979, one group identifying itself as “progressive Islamists” and concentrating on the renewal of Islamic thought (ijtihad) had split off to pursue essentially intellectual matters. The energies of those who sought political action coalesced around Rashid Ghannoushi (Rashid al-Ghannushi) and Abdelfatah Mourou. Ghannoushi had recently returned from Syria, and Mourou, a jurist, had been studying at the Zaytunah Mosque in Tunis. At a press conference in 1981, they announced the formation of the MTI, which officially called for the reconstruction of economic life on a more equitable basis, the end of single party politics, and a return to the “fundamental principles of Islam” through a purging of what was viewed as well-entrenched “social decadence.” Further, MTI representatives announced that they were seeking recognition as a political party according to guidelines established by the government in the preceding autumn. That request was denied, and less than two months later most of the MTI’s leaders were imprisoned.
Despite this repression – or perhaps because of it – the MTI survived and even gained strength in the early 1980s. The MTI found allies in other Tunisian opposition forces, including the Movement of Democratic Socialists and the new Tunisian League of Human Rights, and its discourse took on egalitarian and republican overtones. Under pressure, the Tunisian government released MTI leadrs in 1984, and, in a symbolic gesture, the government outlawed the hijab. As the MTI’s condemnatory rhetoric once again gathered steam, in spring 1987 the government intensified its efforts to eradicate the movement, arresting more than three thousand of its alleged supporters. The party’s leaders were tried en masse before the State Security Court in August for ill-defined capital crimes, and several were sentenced to death in absentia.
The specter of politically motivated executions and uncontrollable social response created a backdrop for the coup instigated by Prime Minister Zine el Abidine Ben Ali a few months later. Islamists were the primary beneficiaries of the liberalizing policies introduced by the new regime. Prisons were emptied, a multi-party system was embraced, and the franchise was restored to those who had previously been imprisoned. The atmosphere of détente raised hopes among Islamists that they would be allowed to participate in the political system. To comply with new rules prohibiting parties from capitalizing on religious sentiments, the MTI changed its name.
The renamed Hizb al-Nahdah reached a turning point in relations with the new regime in April 1989. Without legal recognition, Islamists were prevented from participating openly in Tunisia’s first contested legislative elections, but the independent slates they fielded nevertheless garnered fourteen percent of the popular vote (thirty percent in certain Tunis suburbs) and sent shock waves through the government. Al-Nahbah’s pending request for recognition was denied, educational reforms aimed at curtailing Islamist influence were implemented, and the movement’s leaders were taken in for questioning. Tensions were exacerbated by the Gulf War, which fanned flames of anti-Western sentiment. The death of one Islamist student, shot by government militia during a demonstration, sparked protests that inspired a new wave of arrests and further restrictions. An assault by Islamists on an office of the ruling Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) in February 1991, which killed one guard and injured another, heightened the political confrontation. Al-Nahdah’s formal responsibility for that attack was never made clear, but together with the discovery in subsequent months of two alleged plots to overthrow the government, the event fueled a campaign of repression that resulted in more than eight thousand arrests. In 1992, 279 al-Nahdah members were tried before military tribunals; leaders in the government’s custody were sentenced to life in prison.
It is unclear how much al-Nahdah was affected by the far-reaching efforts to stifle it. However, its leadership did change. In 1993, Rashid Ghannoushi was still formally recognized as the head of al-Nahdah (although since 1989 he had been in self-imposed exile), but Mourou formally dissociated himself from the unauthorized party in 1991 following the attack on the RCD office. A new cadre of leaders emerged, and the government claimed to have uncovered a covert military wing. Meanwhile, El fajr, the al-Nahdah publication that was to have illuminated its thought, was silenced.
Concerted pressures in the early 1990s made al-Nahdah less visible. In particular, many young women ceased to wear the symbolic hijab. There was evidence that the Islamist movement continued to enjoy popular support – perhaps more than ever in the wake of disappointment with the Ben Ali government. A membership once described as young and chiefly comprised of students became aged, without obvious attrition. Students, particularly those in religious and technical institutes, continue to supply recruits, but the Islamist message of social and political resistance and reform resonated in the humanities and social sciences. The movement held particular appeal for sectors of society that have felt relatively disenfranchised by the modernist regime, and economic pressures only increased those sentiments. Parents and others of an older generation were commonly identified as sympathizers, and the movement was supported from abroad by a broad network of Tunisian students. It remained the most significant opposition group in contemporary Tunisia. {See also Ben Ali and Ghannushi, Rashid al-.}
Renaissance Party (Arabic: Hizb al-Nahda, also Hizb Ennahda; French: Parti de la Renaissance) is an un-authorized Islamist opposition political party in Tunisia.
Originally known as Islamic Action, the party changed its name to Movement of the Islamic Tendency, and then in 1989 Hizb al-Nahda.[1] Although traditionally shaped by the thinking of Sayyid Qutb and Maududi, starting in the 1980s they began to be described as moderate Islamist. They advocated democracy and a "Tunisian" form of Islamism which recognized political pluralism. They also discussed a "dialogue" with the West. These statements should not be misconstrued as they reject Western notions of liberal democracy and believe in an essentially Islamic constitution. Critics charge that one of their main leaders, named Rashid Al-Ghannushi, had a history of violence yet in courts he was accused by the ruling party of organizing a non authorized political party. Others say he supports any form multi-party democracy that offers a minimum of freedom for his party and followers.
Al Nahda a party published the banned newspaper Al-Fajr. The editor of Al Fajr, Hamadi Jebali, was sentenced to sixteen years imprisonment in 1992 for membership of the un-authorized organisation and for "aggression with the intention of changing the nature of the state". Al Nahda members were allowed to stand in the 1989 elections but the movement was banned in 1991. The Arabic language television station El Zeitouna is believed to be connected with Al Nahda.
[edit] References
Renaissance Party see Hizb al-Nahdah.
Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami
Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami. Established in Jerusalem in 1953 by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani (1909-1977), an al-Azhar graduate and religious school teacher and judge from Ijzim in northern Palestine, and a group of colleagues who had separated from the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (the Islamic Liberation Party) declared itself to be a political party with Islam as its ideology and the revival of the Islamic nation – purged of the vestiges of colonialism and restored to an Islamic way of life – as its goal. The party sought to achieve this goal by creating a single Islamic state, erected on the ruins of existing regimes, which would implement Islam and export it throughout the world. Although the party never obtained official sanction, it enjoyed modest successes in Jordan and the West Bank until the suppression of the opposition in 1957. It indoctrinated recruits; disseminated its ideas through leaflets, lectures, and sermons; and contested parliamentary elections. The party early established branches in Syria, Lebanon, Kuwait, and Iraq. Although the ascendancy of Nasserism hindered its effort to gain popular support, the early 1960s witnessed its growing confidence, which culminated in two attempts at a coup d’etat in Amman in 1968 and 1969. Each of these coup attempts was coordinated with simultaneous arrangements in Damascus and Baghdad. Other such plots emerged in Baghdad (1972), Cairo (1974), and Damascus (1976).
The party construed the Islamic resurgence as evidence of society’s reception of its ideas. After the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991, its optimism grew, based on the belief that the insincerity of political movements and regimes in the region had been exposed and that public opinion had appreciated the correctness of the party’s understanding of Islam and its radical approach to change. Rigid adherence to its ideology made it unwilling to cooperate with other Islamic groups, and its confrontational approach brought it universal proscription. In spite of the isolation and marginalization consequent upon this, its members were active in Jordan, Syria, the Occupied Territories, Iraq, Lebanon, North Africa (especially Tunisia), Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Sudan, Turkey, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, and parts of Europe, including Britain, France, Germany, Romania, and Yugoslavia.
Activities were coordinated and prioritized throughout the Arab-Islamic region, reflecting the party’s well-organized, highly-disciplined, and overwhelmingly centralized structure. Membership was typical of modern mass parties, but the Hizb al-Tahrir exhibited totalitarian features, including a preoccupation with maintaining ideological homogeneity: To this end the leadership adopted ideological material, which became binding on members. Secondary school and university students and recent graduates constitute a significant proportion of new members. Conceptions of authority and leadership within the party derived from the Islamic tradition: executive power and authority were vested in a specific individual at each level of organization, but consultation (shura) also operated. In addition, the influence of quasi-fascist ideas was discernible.
Alongside its avowedly political nature, the party was distinguished by a consistent system of thought and a coherent political program. Central to the former was an attempt to construe Islam as an ideology superior to socialism and capitalism. This ideology was comprised of two parts: a rational doctrine that shapes Muslim thought and conduct and a system for ordering all aspects of Muslim life. The latter, which issued from the doctrine, is the shari‘a. The party urges Muslims to practice ijtihad in its ongoing elaboration. It excludes all forms of consensus (ijma‘), except that of the Prophet’s companions, as a source of jurisprudence and rejects the rational effective cause (‘illah) as a basis for analogical deduction. It also rejects the principles of general interest (al-maslahah al-mursalah), applying discretion in deriving legal rules (al-istihsan) and in acquiring good and repelling evil (jalb al-masalih; dar‘ al-mafasid). This stance effectively minimizes the role of reason in juridic elaboration and suspends mechanisms designed to serve the community’s immediate interests and to take account of its changing circumstances.
The party considers the implementation of the shari‘a as the lynchpin in the restoration of an Islamic way of life and the state as a sine qua non for achieving this aim. It upholds the classical model of the caliphate as the only authentic form of Islamic government, which it seeks to restore with its traditional accompanying institutions. To this end, it has drafted a constitution detailing the political, economic, and social systems of the proposed state. This document vests executive and legislative powers in an elected caliph, in whom most functions of state are centralized. Citizens are encouraged to exercise their right to call the state to account through a political opposition based on the Islamic ideology and expressed through a system of party plurality. Although involvement in politics is construed as a collective religious duty (fard al-kifayah), shura is not held to be a pillar of Islamic government. The party emphasizes the distinction between shura and democracy and holds that democracy is not compatible with Islam. It also denounces nationalism as a creation of unbelief.
The party’s program evidences an attempt to employ the constructs of traditional Islamic discourse to legitimize adopting modes of political organization and mobilization characteristic of the emergent modern, secular political parties contemporary with it in the Arab East. The heart of this program is the endeavor to replace erroneous concepts, prevalent in Muslim societies due to both their decline and the legacies of colonialism, with the party ideology. The objective is to create an extensive fifth column that will support the revolutionary state, which is to be established through a coup d’etat executed by the party and selected power groups that have been won over to its cause. It also aims to politicize the Islamic ummah, and to expose conspiracies hatched against it by the West. Its perceived role is confined to political and intellectual spheres: it expressly refuses to involve itself in social, religious, or educational projects.
The party’s major publications include Al-takattul al-hizbi (The Party Formation), Al-shakhsiyah al-Islamiyah (The Islamic Way of Life), Nizam al-Islam (The Islamic Order), Mafahim hizb al-tahrir (Concepts of the Islamic Liberation Party), Nizam al-hukm fi al-Islam (The System of Government in Islam), Nazarat siyasiyah li-Hizb al-Tahrir (Political Reflections of the Islamic Liberation Party), and Kayfa hudimat al-khilafah (How the Caliphate was Destroyed).
Islamic Liberation Party see Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami.
Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami. Established in Jerusalem in 1953 by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani (1909-1977), an al-Azhar graduate and religious school teacher and judge from Ijzim in northern Palestine, and a group of colleagues who had separated from the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (the Islamic Liberation Party) declared itself to be a political party with Islam as its ideology and the revival of the Islamic nation – purged of the vestiges of colonialism and restored to an Islamic way of life – as its goal. The party sought to achieve this goal by creating a single Islamic state, erected on the ruins of existing regimes, which would implement Islam and export it throughout the world. Although the party never obtained official sanction, it enjoyed modest successes in Jordan and the West Bank until the suppression of the opposition in 1957. It indoctrinated recruits; disseminated its ideas through leaflets, lectures, and sermons; and contested parliamentary elections. The party early established branches in Syria, Lebanon, Kuwait, and Iraq. Although the ascendancy of Nasserism hindered its effort to gain popular support, the early 1960s witnessed its growing confidence, which culminated in two attempts at a coup d’etat in Amman in 1968 and 1969. Each of these coup attempts was coordinated with simultaneous arrangements in Damascus and Baghdad. Other such plots emerged in Baghdad (1972), Cairo (1974), and Damascus (1976).
The party construed the Islamic resurgence as evidence of society’s reception of its ideas. After the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991, its optimism grew, based on the belief that the insincerity of political movements and regimes in the region had been exposed and that public opinion had appreciated the correctness of the party’s understanding of Islam and its radical approach to change. Rigid adherence to its ideology made it unwilling to cooperate with other Islamic groups, and its confrontational approach brought it universal proscription. In spite of the isolation and marginalization consequent upon this, its members were active in Jordan, Syria, the Occupied Territories, Iraq, Lebanon, North Africa (especially Tunisia), Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Sudan, Turkey, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, and parts of Europe, including Britain, France, Germany, Romania, and Yugoslavia.
Activities were coordinated and prioritized throughout the Arab-Islamic region, reflecting the party’s well-organized, highly-disciplined, and overwhelmingly centralized structure. Membership was typical of modern mass parties, but the Hizb al-Tahrir exhibited totalitarian features, including a preoccupation with maintaining ideological homogeneity: To this end the leadership adopted ideological material, which became binding on members. Secondary school and university students and recent graduates constitute a significant proportion of new members. Conceptions of authority and leadership within the party derived from the Islamic tradition: executive power and authority were vested in a specific individual at each level of organization, but consultation (shura) also operated. In addition, the influence of quasi-fascist ideas was discernible.
Alongside its avowedly political nature, the party was distinguished by a consistent system of thought and a coherent political program. Central to the former was an attempt to construe Islam as an ideology superior to socialism and capitalism. This ideology was comprised of two parts: a rational doctrine that shapes Muslim thought and conduct and a system for ordering all aspects of Muslim life. The latter, which issued from the doctrine, is the shari‘a. The party urges Muslims to practice ijtihad in its ongoing elaboration. It excludes all forms of consensus (ijma‘), except that of the Prophet’s companions, as a source of jurisprudence and rejects the rational effective cause (‘illah) as a basis for analogical deduction. It also rejects the principles of general interest (al-maslahah al-mursalah), applying discretion in deriving legal rules (al-istihsan) and in acquiring good and repelling evil (jalb al-masalih; dar‘ al-mafasid). This stance effectively minimizes the role of reason in juridic elaboration and suspends mechanisms designed to serve the community’s immediate interests and to take account of its changing circumstances.
The party considers the implementation of the shari‘a as the lynchpin in the restoration of an Islamic way of life and the state as a sine qua non for achieving this aim. It upholds the classical model of the caliphate as the only authentic form of Islamic government, which it seeks to restore with its traditional accompanying institutions. To this end, it has drafted a constitution detailing the political, economic, and social systems of the proposed state. This document vests executive and legislative powers in an elected caliph, in whom most functions of state are centralized. Citizens are encouraged to exercise their right to call the state to account through a political opposition based on the Islamic ideology and expressed through a system of party plurality. Although involvement in politics is construed as a collective religious duty (fard al-kifayah), shura is not held to be a pillar of Islamic government. The party emphasizes the distinction between shura and democracy and holds that democracy is not compatible with Islam. It also denounces nationalism as a creation of unbelief.
The party’s program evidences an attempt to employ the constructs of traditional Islamic discourse to legitimize adopting modes of political organization and mobilization characteristic of the emergent modern, secular political parties contemporary with it in the Arab East. The heart of this program is the endeavor to replace erroneous concepts, prevalent in Muslim societies due to both their decline and the legacies of colonialism, with the party ideology. The objective is to create an extensive fifth column that will support the revolutionary state, which is to be established through a coup d’etat executed by the party and selected power groups that have been won over to its cause. It also aims to politicize the Islamic ummah, and to expose conspiracies hatched against it by the West. Its perceived role is confined to political and intellectual spheres: it expressly refuses to involve itself in social, religious, or educational projects.
The party’s major publications include Al-takattul al-hizbi (The Party Formation), Al-shakhsiyah al-Islamiyah (The Islamic Way of Life), Nizam al-Islam (The Islamic Order), Mafahim hizb al-tahrir (Concepts of the Islamic Liberation Party), Nizam al-hukm fi al-Islam (The System of Government in Islam), Nazarat siyasiyah li-Hizb al-Tahrir (Political Reflections of the Islamic Liberation Party), and Kayfa hudimat al-khilafah (How the Caliphate was Destroyed).
Islamic Liberation Party see Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami.
Hizb-i Islami Afghanistan
Hizb-i Islami Afghanistan. Name shared by two political parties that from 1978 until 1992 fought against the Marxist government of Afghanistan. The better known and more influential of these parties was headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the other by Maulavi Yunus Khales. Both leaders were Pushtuns (Hekmatyar from northern Kunduz Province, and Khales from eastern Ningrahar Province), and their parties had their strongest bases of support in Pushtun regions of the country.
The origins of Hizb-I Islami can be traced to the efforts of a group of students at Kabul University who formed the Organization of Muslim Youth (Sazman-i Javanan-i Musulmun) in 1969. Initially an informal study group that was introduced to modern Islamic political ideology (particularly that of Sayyid Qutb and the Ikhwan al-Muslimun, (or Muslim Brotherhood) by professors who had studied in Egypt, the Muslim Youth began active political organizing and recruitment in response to the increasingly strident efforts of Marxist parties to expand their base within the student population during the early 1970s. The Muslim Youth was also concerned with the rapid secularization of Afghan society and the pro-Soviet direction of government policy, and its leaders railed against perceived corruption within the royal family and the traditional ‘ulama’. In its first years, the Muslim Youth Organization was primarily involved in campus politics, but a series of violent confrontations between Muslim and Marxist students led to the first arrests of Muslim Youth leaders in 1972.
In response to the July 1973 coup d’etat of Muhammad Da’u, an avowed leftist, the Muslim Youth joined forces with other covert Muslim political parties to overthrow the new government. These efforts were unsuccessful, however, and led to further arrests and the flight of many of the top Muslim Youth leaders to Pakistan, where they continued their efforts to overthrow the Afghan government. In July 1975, guerrillas associated with the Organization of Muslim Youth initiated an operation intended to combine a military coup d’etat in Kabul with rural insurrections in various provinces. The military coup never materialized, however, and the uprisings were unsuccessful, in large part because of the absence of popular support.
Hizb-i Islami Afghanistan. Name shared by two political parties that from 1978 until 1992 fought against the Marxist government of Afghanistan. The better known and more influential of these parties was headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the other by Maulavi Yunus Khales. Both leaders were Pushtuns (Hekmatyar from northern Kunduz Province, and Khales from eastern Ningrahar Province), and their parties had their strongest bases of support in Pushtun regions of the country.
The origins of Hizb-I Islami can be traced to the efforts of a group of students at Kabul University who formed the Organization of Muslim Youth (Sazman-i Javanan-i Musulmun) in 1969. Initially an informal study group that was introduced to modern Islamic political ideology (particularly that of Sayyid Qutb and the Ikhwan al-Muslimun, (or Muslim Brotherhood) by professors who had studied in Egypt, the Muslim Youth began active political organizing and recruitment in response to the increasingly strident efforts of Marxist parties to expand their base within the student population during the early 1970s. The Muslim Youth was also concerned with the rapid secularization of Afghan society and the pro-Soviet direction of government policy, and its leaders railed against perceived corruption within the royal family and the traditional ‘ulama’. In its first years, the Muslim Youth Organization was primarily involved in campus politics, but a series of violent confrontations between Muslim and Marxist students led to the first arrests of Muslim Youth leaders in 1972.
In response to the July 1973 coup d’etat of Muhammad Da’u, an avowed leftist, the Muslim Youth joined forces with other covert Muslim political parties to overthrow the new government. These efforts were unsuccessful, however, and led to further arrests and the flight of many of the top Muslim Youth leaders to Pakistan, where they continued their efforts to overthrow the Afghan government. In July 1975, guerrillas associated with the Organization of Muslim Youth initiated an operation intended to combine a military coup d’etat in Kabul with rural insurrections in various provinces. The military coup never materialized, however, and the uprisings were unsuccessful, in large part because of the absence of popular support.
Hizbu’llah
Hizbu’llah. Indonesian Islamic guerrilla organization that fought the Dutch between 1945 and 1950. Hizbu’llah along with Sabili’llah formed part of Masjumi, an Islamic party. Hizbu’llah (“Allah’s forces”), founded in December 1944, was intended to become a reserve corps in the war against the Allies and was open to youths between seventeen and twenty-five years of age. Its first chairman was Zainul Arifin and its first vice-chairman Moh Roemn. In August 1945, it had about five hundred trained members. Only after the declaration of Indonesian indepedence did the Hizbu’llah become one of Indonesia’s largest irregular guerrilla organizations.
Hizbu’llah. Indonesian Islamic guerrilla organization that fought the Dutch between 1945 and 1950. Hizbu’llah along with Sabili’llah formed part of Masjumi, an Islamic party. Hizbu’llah (“Allah’s forces”), founded in December 1944, was intended to become a reserve corps in the war against the Allies and was open to youths between seventeen and twenty-five years of age. Its first chairman was Zainul Arifin and its first vice-chairman Moh Roemn. In August 1945, it had about five hundred trained members. Only after the declaration of Indonesian indepedence did the Hizbu’llah become one of Indonesia’s largest irregular guerrilla organizations.
Hmad u-Musa
Hmad u-Musa (Sidi Hmad u-Musa) (c. 1460-1563). Great saint of southern Morocco and a patron saint of Sus. His tomb in Tazerwalt is an object of veneration.
Sidi Hmad u-Musa see Hmad u-Musa
Hmad u-Musa (Sidi Hmad u-Musa) (c. 1460-1563). Great saint of southern Morocco and a patron saint of Sus. His tomb in Tazerwalt is an object of veneration.
Sidi Hmad u-Musa see Hmad u-Musa
Hostages
Hostages (raha'in). Seizing, detaining, and threatening to injure a person in order to secure compliance with a condition or demand from a third party is the act of hostage taking. Before the advent of the modern regime of international law, belligerents often took hostages to secure compliance with requisitions, contributions, ransoms, bills, or treaties. The four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Hague Protocols I and II prohibited the taking of hostages in international and internal armed conflicts. The 1979 United Nations International Convention against the Taking of Hostages imposed a duty to either prosecute or extradite hostage takers, but this convention has been ratified by only a few nations. Nevertheless, in contemporary times, hostage taking probably violates customary international law.
The Arabic term for hostages, raha’in, means persons held as security. Like most medieval legal systems, classical Islamic law permitted the exchange of hostages to ensure compliance with a treaty. However, Islamic law considered such hostages inviolable and prohibited killing them even if the enemy violated the treaty or killed their Muslim hostages. On the outbreak of hostilities Muslim forces were commanded to safely return the hostages to their country. Furthermore, Islamic law prohibited Muslim forces from using enemy personnel or civilians as human shields in an armed conflict. Muslim jurists disagreed, however, on whether Muslim forces should attack if the enemy uses Muslim prisoners.
There is some obscurity as to the distinction between prisoners of war and hostages. In classical Islamic law, muqallah (combatants) could be prisoners of war. Muslim jurists disagreed on whether a prisoner of war could be ransomed, exchanged for Muslim prisoners, killed, or freed. Other than combatants, any non-Muslim who does not have aman (safe conduct) or who is a national of a territory without a peace treaty with Muslims could be placed into captivity. In the opinion of most jurists aman can be granted by any Muslim. Additionally, if the non-Muslim wrongly, but reasonably, believes that he or she enjoys safe conduct, then he or she cannot be made a captive. Under no circumstances could a captive be used to make demands on a third party, hence, no captive could be used as a hostage.
Classical Islamic law was developed over a long span of time, primarily from the eighth to twelfth centuries, in response to specific historical circumstances. Additionally, classical Islamic law is represented by a variety of Sunni and Shi‘a schools of thought that often reached different conclusions on many issues. Consequently, Islamic law leaves a rich and diverse legacy to its modern adherents. From this complex legacy an argument for or against hostage taking can be constructed, since both positions are supported by certain historical practices.
Since independence, in the 1950s and 1960s, the governments of most Muslim states have ratified the Geneva Conventions and have observed the prohibition against the taking of hostages. Only a few Muslim states, however, have ratified the Hostages Convention. Hostage taking has continued to be an issue in the Middle East because of the fact that guerrilla groups or national liberation movements, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, have used the taking of hostages as a means to secure compliance with their political demands. Typically, these groups have claimed that their captives are prisoners of war, but international law does not permit the endangering of the life of a captive in order to make demands on a third party.
In the 1980s, the taking of hostages became a subject of debate among Shi‘a scholars when several pro-Iranian groups seized hostages in Lebanon. Some Shi‘a leaders, such as Husayn al-Musawi, justified the taking of hostages in 1987 as a practical necessity. Interestingly, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989) used the same logic in 1986 to defend the taking of hostages in Iran in 1979 and in Lebanon. Others, such as the Lebanese Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, deputy chairman of the Higher Islamic Shi‘a Council, and Ayatollah Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, a senior Lebanese Shi‘a cleric, have condemned hostage taking as un-Islamic and illegal. In 1992-1993 the Western hostages held in Lebanon were released, and the issue, for the time being, has fallen out of public discourse. Significantly, whether among proponents or opponents, serious discussions of the legality of hostage taking under Islamic law are very rare. Ultimately, hostage taking in the Middle East is motivated by political consideration and has little to do with any set of religious or legal injunctions.
raha’in see Hostages
Hostages (raha'in). Seizing, detaining, and threatening to injure a person in order to secure compliance with a condition or demand from a third party is the act of hostage taking. Before the advent of the modern regime of international law, belligerents often took hostages to secure compliance with requisitions, contributions, ransoms, bills, or treaties. The four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Hague Protocols I and II prohibited the taking of hostages in international and internal armed conflicts. The 1979 United Nations International Convention against the Taking of Hostages imposed a duty to either prosecute or extradite hostage takers, but this convention has been ratified by only a few nations. Nevertheless, in contemporary times, hostage taking probably violates customary international law.
The Arabic term for hostages, raha’in, means persons held as security. Like most medieval legal systems, classical Islamic law permitted the exchange of hostages to ensure compliance with a treaty. However, Islamic law considered such hostages inviolable and prohibited killing them even if the enemy violated the treaty or killed their Muslim hostages. On the outbreak of hostilities Muslim forces were commanded to safely return the hostages to their country. Furthermore, Islamic law prohibited Muslim forces from using enemy personnel or civilians as human shields in an armed conflict. Muslim jurists disagreed, however, on whether Muslim forces should attack if the enemy uses Muslim prisoners.
There is some obscurity as to the distinction between prisoners of war and hostages. In classical Islamic law, muqallah (combatants) could be prisoners of war. Muslim jurists disagreed on whether a prisoner of war could be ransomed, exchanged for Muslim prisoners, killed, or freed. Other than combatants, any non-Muslim who does not have aman (safe conduct) or who is a national of a territory without a peace treaty with Muslims could be placed into captivity. In the opinion of most jurists aman can be granted by any Muslim. Additionally, if the non-Muslim wrongly, but reasonably, believes that he or she enjoys safe conduct, then he or she cannot be made a captive. Under no circumstances could a captive be used to make demands on a third party, hence, no captive could be used as a hostage.
Classical Islamic law was developed over a long span of time, primarily from the eighth to twelfth centuries, in response to specific historical circumstances. Additionally, classical Islamic law is represented by a variety of Sunni and Shi‘a schools of thought that often reached different conclusions on many issues. Consequently, Islamic law leaves a rich and diverse legacy to its modern adherents. From this complex legacy an argument for or against hostage taking can be constructed, since both positions are supported by certain historical practices.
Since independence, in the 1950s and 1960s, the governments of most Muslim states have ratified the Geneva Conventions and have observed the prohibition against the taking of hostages. Only a few Muslim states, however, have ratified the Hostages Convention. Hostage taking has continued to be an issue in the Middle East because of the fact that guerrilla groups or national liberation movements, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, have used the taking of hostages as a means to secure compliance with their political demands. Typically, these groups have claimed that their captives are prisoners of war, but international law does not permit the endangering of the life of a captive in order to make demands on a third party.
In the 1980s, the taking of hostages became a subject of debate among Shi‘a scholars when several pro-Iranian groups seized hostages in Lebanon. Some Shi‘a leaders, such as Husayn al-Musawi, justified the taking of hostages in 1987 as a practical necessity. Interestingly, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989) used the same logic in 1986 to defend the taking of hostages in Iran in 1979 and in Lebanon. Others, such as the Lebanese Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, deputy chairman of the Higher Islamic Shi‘a Council, and Ayatollah Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, a senior Lebanese Shi‘a cleric, have condemned hostage taking as un-Islamic and illegal. In 1992-1993 the Western hostages held in Lebanon were released, and the issue, for the time being, has fallen out of public discourse. Significantly, whether among proponents or opponents, serious discussions of the legality of hostage taking under Islamic law are very rare. Ultimately, hostage taking in the Middle East is motivated by political consideration and has little to do with any set of religious or legal injunctions.
raha’in see Hostages
Houris
Houris (in Arabic, in singular form, hur; in plural form, huriyah). The term is used in the Qur’an for the virgins of Paradise promised to the Believers. In Islam, a houri is one of the beautiful maidens who dwell in Paradise and reward true believers with the sensual pleasure of their companionship after death. The houris are perennially young and pure, although they have the power to conceive and bear children at the will of the faithful. Muslim theologians of modern times, offended by the unabashedly sensual picture of Paradise that the concept of the houris affords, have endeavored to place an allegorical interpretation upon them.
hur see Houris
huriyah see Houris
Houris (in Arabic, in singular form, hur; in plural form, huriyah). The term is used in the Qur’an for the virgins of Paradise promised to the Believers. In Islam, a houri is one of the beautiful maidens who dwell in Paradise and reward true believers with the sensual pleasure of their companionship after death. The houris are perennially young and pure, although they have the power to conceive and bear children at the will of the faithful. Muslim theologians of modern times, offended by the unabashedly sensual picture of Paradise that the concept of the houris affords, have endeavored to place an allegorical interpretation upon them.
hur see Houris
huriyah see Houris
Hrawi
Hrawi (Elias Hrawi) (September 4, 1926 - July 7, 2006). President of Lebanon (r.1989-1998). Hrawi was born into a landowning Maronite Christian family in Hawch Al-Umara, near the Zahle region. He was educated at Saint Joseph University in Beirut, Lebanon, from which he graduated with a commerce degree. A successful farmer and businessman, he started a vegetable export business, dealing with major Swiss companies. He also headed the Beqaa sugarbeet cooperative. When his export business was destroyed by the civil war that raged from 1975 to 1990, he switched his line of business to oil importing.
In 1972, Hrawi followed his brothers George and Joseph and became a parliamentary deputy, and in 1980, he was appointed Minister for Public Works. From 1980 to 1982, he served in the Cabinet as Minister of Public Works under President Elias Sarkis and Prime Minister Shafik Wazzan. He concentrated on building bridges and highways to link all parts of the country.
On November 24, 1989 Hrawi was elected president of Lebanon with ninety percent of the votes from the parliament. A native of the Beqaa valley, Hrawi was ther first president to come from outside of the Maronite heartland of Mount Lebanon. He was elected two days after the assassination of Rene Moawad, who had held office for just seventeen days.
His first challenge was to face Michel Aoun, the “temporary” prime minister, who would not bow to his presidency. He also started working for closer ties between Syria and Lebanon.
In August 1990, Hrawi was central in securing support for the forthcoming negotiations for the National Reconciliation Charter to be held in At Ta’if, as well as fighting Aoun. This campaign proved successful, as Aoun’s territory was reduced to one-third. Hrawi signed into law amendments to the Constitution that formalized the Taif Agreement reforms, giving a greater measure of power and influence to Lebanon's Muslim community. In October of 1990, together with his Syrian allies, Hrawi was able to defeat Aoun for good. This victory, on October 13, forced Aoun to surrender and marked the end of the Lebanese Civil War. This allowed Hrawi to create Greater Beirut, which was to be totally under government control.
On May 22, 1991, Hrawi signed the Treaty of fraternity, co-ordination and co-operation with Syria, in which Lebanon promised not to allow its territory to be used against Syria's interests. In 1992, in the general elections, Hrawi’s supporters gained more seats, making his power more effective.
In 1995, Hrawi had his presidency prolonged for an additional three years following a change in the constitution by the National Assembly.
In 1998, Hrawi stepped down as president, and was succeeded by Emile Lahoud.
As Hrawi’s Zahle region was under Syrian control through most of the civil war, he developed good relations with Damascus. This came to be central both to his rise to success, which was aided by Syria, and the direction of his politics through his nine years of presidency. Hrawi was the man in the driver seat when Lebanon achieved peace. However, his pro-Syrian politics did provoke many Lebanese nationalists.
The Lebanese people were divided in their opinion of Hrawi. Many appreciated his decisiveness in acting against the feuding militias and ending the civil war that had been tearing the country apart for fifteen years. He was also respected for his long-held conviction that national loyalty should take precedence over sectarian interests, and for promoting peaceful coexistence among Lebanon's religious factions. Some tried to nominate him for the Nobel Peace Prize. Others, however, accused him of inconsistency for disarming all Christian and most Muslim militias -- but not Hezbollah, a Shi'a fundamentalist militia. His critics also point out that he was very supportive of Syrian interests and charge that the cooperation treaty that he signed effectively turned Lebanon into a Syrian colony. He was also criticized by some for having the Constitution amended to extend his term of office by three years.
With his wife, Mouna Jammal, Hrawi had three sons and two daughters. He died of cancer at the American University Hospital in Beirut on July 7, 2006.
Elias Hrawi see Hrawi
Hrawi (Elias Hrawi) (September 4, 1926 - July 7, 2006). President of Lebanon (r.1989-1998). Hrawi was born into a landowning Maronite Christian family in Hawch Al-Umara, near the Zahle region. He was educated at Saint Joseph University in Beirut, Lebanon, from which he graduated with a commerce degree. A successful farmer and businessman, he started a vegetable export business, dealing with major Swiss companies. He also headed the Beqaa sugarbeet cooperative. When his export business was destroyed by the civil war that raged from 1975 to 1990, he switched his line of business to oil importing.
In 1972, Hrawi followed his brothers George and Joseph and became a parliamentary deputy, and in 1980, he was appointed Minister for Public Works. From 1980 to 1982, he served in the Cabinet as Minister of Public Works under President Elias Sarkis and Prime Minister Shafik Wazzan. He concentrated on building bridges and highways to link all parts of the country.
On November 24, 1989 Hrawi was elected president of Lebanon with ninety percent of the votes from the parliament. A native of the Beqaa valley, Hrawi was ther first president to come from outside of the Maronite heartland of Mount Lebanon. He was elected two days after the assassination of Rene Moawad, who had held office for just seventeen days.
His first challenge was to face Michel Aoun, the “temporary” prime minister, who would not bow to his presidency. He also started working for closer ties between Syria and Lebanon.
In August 1990, Hrawi was central in securing support for the forthcoming negotiations for the National Reconciliation Charter to be held in At Ta’if, as well as fighting Aoun. This campaign proved successful, as Aoun’s territory was reduced to one-third. Hrawi signed into law amendments to the Constitution that formalized the Taif Agreement reforms, giving a greater measure of power and influence to Lebanon's Muslim community. In October of 1990, together with his Syrian allies, Hrawi was able to defeat Aoun for good. This victory, on October 13, forced Aoun to surrender and marked the end of the Lebanese Civil War. This allowed Hrawi to create Greater Beirut, which was to be totally under government control.
On May 22, 1991, Hrawi signed the Treaty of fraternity, co-ordination and co-operation with Syria, in which Lebanon promised not to allow its territory to be used against Syria's interests. In 1992, in the general elections, Hrawi’s supporters gained more seats, making his power more effective.
In 1995, Hrawi had his presidency prolonged for an additional three years following a change in the constitution by the National Assembly.
In 1998, Hrawi stepped down as president, and was succeeded by Emile Lahoud.
As Hrawi’s Zahle region was under Syrian control through most of the civil war, he developed good relations with Damascus. This came to be central both to his rise to success, which was aided by Syria, and the direction of his politics through his nine years of presidency. Hrawi was the man in the driver seat when Lebanon achieved peace. However, his pro-Syrian politics did provoke many Lebanese nationalists.
The Lebanese people were divided in their opinion of Hrawi. Many appreciated his decisiveness in acting against the feuding militias and ending the civil war that had been tearing the country apart for fifteen years. He was also respected for his long-held conviction that national loyalty should take precedence over sectarian interests, and for promoting peaceful coexistence among Lebanon's religious factions. Some tried to nominate him for the Nobel Peace Prize. Others, however, accused him of inconsistency for disarming all Christian and most Muslim militias -- but not Hezbollah, a Shi'a fundamentalist militia. His critics also point out that he was very supportive of Syrian interests and charge that the cooperation treaty that he signed effectively turned Lebanon into a Syrian colony. He was also criticized by some for having the Constitution amended to extend his term of office by three years.
With his wife, Mouna Jammal, Hrawi had three sons and two daughters. He died of cancer at the American University Hospital in Beirut on July 7, 2006.
Elias Hrawi see Hrawi
Hubaysh
Hubaysh ( Hubaysh ibn al-Hasan al-Dimashqi) (al-A‘sam). Ninth century ranslator of Greek medicinal writings. With the exception of the Hippocratic oath and the herb-book of Dioscurides, he translated 35 of Galen’s works from Arabic into Syriac, and three from Syriac into Arabic. He also wrote additions to a work of his uncle Hunayn ibn Ishaq, which won extremely wide diffusion.
Hubaysh ibn al-Hasan al-Dimashqi see Hubaysh
al-A‘sam see Hubaysh
Hubaysh ( Hubaysh ibn al-Hasan al-Dimashqi) (al-A‘sam). Ninth century ranslator of Greek medicinal writings. With the exception of the Hippocratic oath and the herb-book of Dioscurides, he translated 35 of Galen’s works from Arabic into Syriac, and three from Syriac into Arabic. He also wrote additions to a work of his uncle Hunayn ibn Ishaq, which won extremely wide diffusion.
Hubaysh ibn al-Hasan al-Dimashqi see Hubaysh
al-A‘sam see Hubaysh
Hud
Hud. Name of the earliest of the five “Arab” prophets mentioned in the Qur’an, the others being Salih, Ibrahim, Shu‘ayb, and the Prophet himself. Hud is the name of a prophet of Islam, the prophet The eleventh sura of the Qur'an, Hud, is named after him, though the narrative of Hud comprises only a small portion of the sura, 11:50–60. Some Muslims believe that Hud lived for about 150 years and received revelations and prophethood sometime around 2400 B.C.T.
The Qur'an states that Hud was sent as a warning to the people of 'Ad. The recently discovered city of Ubar, mentioned in the Qur'an as Iram, is believed to have been the capital of 'Ad, which might connect it to the biblical character Aram, son of Shem. Ad was the name given to Hud's tribe because Ad was the name of Aram's granson
Although there is no mention of the amount of time elapsed after Noah in the Qur'an, according to Islamic secular tradition of history (but not from the Qur'an or Hadith), Hud was born eight generations after Nuh. In that time, his people had completely forgotten about The Flood that had struck generations past and had begun worshipping idols made of stone. Despite Hud's warnings and admonitions the people persisted in their idolatry (shirk). To punish them, Allah sent a drought. Even after the drought, the people would not relent, so they were destroyed in a large storm from which only Hud and a few believers emerged.
Some Muslims believe that Hud lived for about 150 years and received revelations and prophethood sometime around 2400 B.C.T. The Qur'an and Muhammad say nothing about the exact amount of years of Hud's lifespan or when exactly he was sent (it specified only that it was after Noah). Thus, on the secular level, this debate is subject to academic discussion.
Several sites are revered as his tomb, the most noted of which is located in the deserted Yemen village of the Wadi Hadhramaut.
Hud. Name of the earliest of the five “Arab” prophets mentioned in the Qur’an, the others being Salih, Ibrahim, Shu‘ayb, and the Prophet himself. Hud is the name of a prophet of Islam, the prophet The eleventh sura of the Qur'an, Hud, is named after him, though the narrative of Hud comprises only a small portion of the sura, 11:50–60. Some Muslims believe that Hud lived for about 150 years and received revelations and prophethood sometime around 2400 B.C.T.
The Qur'an states that Hud was sent as a warning to the people of 'Ad. The recently discovered city of Ubar, mentioned in the Qur'an as Iram, is believed to have been the capital of 'Ad, which might connect it to the biblical character Aram, son of Shem. Ad was the name given to Hud's tribe because Ad was the name of Aram's granson
Although there is no mention of the amount of time elapsed after Noah in the Qur'an, according to Islamic secular tradition of history (but not from the Qur'an or Hadith), Hud was born eight generations after Nuh. In that time, his people had completely forgotten about The Flood that had struck generations past and had begun worshipping idols made of stone. Despite Hud's warnings and admonitions the people persisted in their idolatry (shirk). To punish them, Allah sent a drought. Even after the drought, the people would not relent, so they were destroyed in a large storm from which only Hud and a few believers emerged.
Some Muslims believe that Hud lived for about 150 years and received revelations and prophethood sometime around 2400 B.C.T. The Qur'an and Muhammad say nothing about the exact amount of years of Hud's lifespan or when exactly he was sent (it specified only that it was after Noah). Thus, on the secular level, this debate is subject to academic discussion.
Several sites are revered as his tomb, the most noted of which is located in the deserted Yemen village of the Wadi Hadhramaut.
Hudids
Hudids (Banu Hud). Muslim Arab dynasty that ruled the taifa kingdom of Saragossa (Zaragoza) in Spain from 1039 until 1146 during the period of the Muluk al-Tawa’if. The Hudids were of the Banu Hud and were an Hispano-Arabic dynasty. Its leader, Sulaiman ibn Muhammad (r. 1039-1046) took over Zaragoza from the Banu Tujib. His successors, Ahmad I al-Muqtadir (r. 1046-1081) and Ahmad II al-Mustain (r. 1085-1110), were keen patrons of the arts, initiating an active building program (Aljaferia), and led Spanish resistance to the Almoravids. When the latter conquered Zaragoza in 1110, Abd al-Malik (r. 1110-1136) was able to escape to Rueda, where the last of the Hudids held out until 1146. The last ruler, Abu Ja’far Ahmad III al-Mustansir bi-‘llah, was killed in a battle with the Christians.
The Banu Hud were an Arab dynasty that ruled the taifa of Zaragoza from 1039-1110. In 1039, under the leadership of Al-Mustain I, Sulayman ibn Hud al-Judhami (Sulaiman ibn Muhammad), the Bani Hud seized control of Zaragoza from a rival clan, the Banu Tujibi. His heirs, particularly Ahmad I al-Muqtadir (1046-1081), Yusuf al-Mutamin (1081-1085), and Al-Mustain II, Ahmad ibn Yusuf (1085-1110), were patrons of culture and the arts. The Aljafería, the royal residence erected by Ahmad I, is practically the only palace from that period to have survived almost in its entirety.
Despite their independence, the Banu Hud were forced to recognize the superiority of the Kingdom of Castile and pay parias to it as early as 1055. In 1086, they led the smaller kingdoms in their resistance to the Almoravids, who did not succeed in conquering Zaragoza until May 1110. The conquest represented the end of the dynasty. The last of the Banu Hud, Imad al-Dawl abd al-malik al Hud, the last king of Zaragoza, forced to abandon his capital, allied himself with the Christian Aragonese under Alfonso el Batallador, who in 1118 reconquered the city for the Christians and made it the capital of the Kingdom of Aragon.
Banu Hud see Hudids
Hudids (Banu Hud). Muslim Arab dynasty that ruled the taifa kingdom of Saragossa (Zaragoza) in Spain from 1039 until 1146 during the period of the Muluk al-Tawa’if. The Hudids were of the Banu Hud and were an Hispano-Arabic dynasty. Its leader, Sulaiman ibn Muhammad (r. 1039-1046) took over Zaragoza from the Banu Tujib. His successors, Ahmad I al-Muqtadir (r. 1046-1081) and Ahmad II al-Mustain (r. 1085-1110), were keen patrons of the arts, initiating an active building program (Aljaferia), and led Spanish resistance to the Almoravids. When the latter conquered Zaragoza in 1110, Abd al-Malik (r. 1110-1136) was able to escape to Rueda, where the last of the Hudids held out until 1146. The last ruler, Abu Ja’far Ahmad III al-Mustansir bi-‘llah, was killed in a battle with the Christians.
The Banu Hud were an Arab dynasty that ruled the taifa of Zaragoza from 1039-1110. In 1039, under the leadership of Al-Mustain I, Sulayman ibn Hud al-Judhami (Sulaiman ibn Muhammad), the Bani Hud seized control of Zaragoza from a rival clan, the Banu Tujibi. His heirs, particularly Ahmad I al-Muqtadir (1046-1081), Yusuf al-Mutamin (1081-1085), and Al-Mustain II, Ahmad ibn Yusuf (1085-1110), were patrons of culture and the arts. The Aljafería, the royal residence erected by Ahmad I, is practically the only palace from that period to have survived almost in its entirety.
Despite their independence, the Banu Hud were forced to recognize the superiority of the Kingdom of Castile and pay parias to it as early as 1055. In 1086, they led the smaller kingdoms in their resistance to the Almoravids, who did not succeed in conquering Zaragoza until May 1110. The conquest represented the end of the dynasty. The last of the Banu Hud, Imad al-Dawl abd al-malik al Hud, the last king of Zaragoza, forced to abandon his capital, allied himself with the Christian Aragonese under Alfonso el Batallador, who in 1118 reconquered the city for the Christians and made it the capital of the Kingdom of Aragon.
Banu Hud see Hudids
Hui
Hui. The Hui (pronounced “whey”) are the most widely distributed and the second largest of all ethnic minorities in China. They are Muslims, or atheists of Muslim parentage, who speak Chinese as their native language and who trace their descent to Arabs and Persians who began settling in China during the seventh century of the Christian calendar. Among China’s ten Muslim minorities, the Hui are the most numerous, having the longest history in China, and are the most acculturated to the Han Chinese majority. They are the only Muslims in China who speak Chinese as a mother tongue and live dispersed through all provinces of the country.
In Chinese, Hui are known as Huihui, Huihui minzu (“Huihui people” or “Huihui nationality”) and Huizu (a contraction of Huihui minzu). Traditionally they have also called themselves Huijiaoren (“Hui-religion -- Islam – people”), Mumin (from the Arabic mu’min) and Jiaomen (a term meaning something like “people of the Teachings”). In the 1980s and 1990s, the Chinese government promoted the use of “Muslim” (“Muslim”) to denote Hui (and others) who actively believe in Islam as distinct from Hui in general, a portion of whom no longer practice the religion. In other countries, Hui are called by such names as Panthay and Dungan. In English, the Hui have often been referred to simply as Chinese Muslims, a term that has caused much confusion because it also rightly includes the nine other Muslim ethnic groups in China.
Islam was introduced to China during the flourishing Tang dynasty (618-906). Arab and Persian merchants and mariners sailed to and settled in Canton and other southeastern Chinese port cities, bringing the religion just after it was founded. Muslim soldiers, brought across Central Asia to help China’s emperor quell a rebellion in 757, introduced Islam to the interior. Many of these Arabs, Persians, and Central Asians, nearly all men, married local Han Chinese women and remained in China, speaking Persian and Arabic as their lingua francas. They lived in special districts (called “barbarian settlements”), where they were held responsible for maintaining law and order according to the customs of their homelands. The Muslims increased in numbers as the children of mixed Muslim and Han marriages were raised as Muslims and as foreign Muslims continued to settle in China for several more centuries. Another major Muslim influx came with the Mongols, who conquered China in the thirteenth century and imported thousands of Central and West Asian artisans, scholars and administrators to help them rule China. Muslims directed the financial administration of the empire and were appointed to other high positions in the central and provincial governments.
While the Muslims remained a distinctly foreign minority during their first seven centuries in China, during the next five centuries they had relatively little contact with the rest of the Muslim world. When the Han Chinese overthrew the Mongols in 1368, they sought to wipe out the much resented foreign influence and thus prohibited the use of foreign languages, foreign names and foreign clothing and restricted foreign travel. European capture of the Asian sea trade from the Arabs also contributed to halting Muslim migration to China. It was during this period (the Ming dynasty, 1368-1644) that the Muslims in China became sinicized, acculturating to Han Chinese ways through the adoption of Han surnames, clothing and food habits and through speaking Chinese as their everyday language. The continued in-marriage of Han women, as well as the adoption of Han children and occasional conversion of Han adults, further contributed to the increase in the number of Muslims and, at the same time, to their becoming increasingly similar, physically as well as culturally, to the Han. Muslims ceased being referred to as Arabs, barbarians and foreigners and came to be known instead by a new name, Huihui.
The next phase of Muslim history in China was one of violent ethnic conflict between the Han and the Hui. From the sixteenth to early twentieth century, Muslims of northwest China (Hui, Salars and others) and Hui in Yunnan in southwest China rose against both local Han and the government in a series of rebellions said to have claimed as many as ten million lives. Exacerbating the ethnic conflict were intense factional cleavages within the Muslim communities themselves, notably that between the so-called New Teaching adherents inspired by Naqshbandi fundamentalism and ideas of reform and Old Teaching adherents who clung to established practices of Chinese Islam.
With the founding of the Republic of China in 1912, the Hui were formerly recognized as one of China’s “five great peoples” (usually translated as “races” in English), part of the new Western inspired government’s attempt to win over the independent minded minorities who dominated more than half of China’s territory. Many Hui, following trends among the Han, became actively engaged in reform movements. During the civil war between the Chinese Communists and Nationalists, both sides actively sought to win Hui loyalties. After the Communist victory and establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, several thousand Hui fled with the Nationalists to Taiwan, while the majority remained on the mainland. There the Communist leaders developed a Soviet-inspired minority policy that formally identified major ethnic groups as “minority nationalities” (shaoshu minzu) and promised them rights of autonomy and self-government in exchange for their support. The Communist Party has now recognized 55 ethnic groups as minority nationalities and established 107 so-called autonomous governments at three levels -- 5 at the provincial level, 30 at a middle (prefecture) level and 72 at the county level. Twelve of these bear the name “Hui.”
The Communist government extended special considerations to Islam, all the while taking measures to ensure that all Islamic activity was consistent with official policies and under the control of the Muslim leaders loyal to the government. The Chinese Islamic Association, founded in Beijing in 1953 and reporting to the Religious Affairs Bureau of the State Council, was central in this regard. Mosques were exempt from property and housing taxes, and government funds were provided for renovation of several famous old mosques. Government funds are also provided for the official pilgrimage delegation sent each year to Mecca with goodwill stops in other Muslim countries.
The greatest resentment expressed by Hui today is over incidents during the Cultural Revolution, when Red Guards in many parts of China forced Muslims to eat pork and cremate their dead, defiled their mosques and humiliated ahongs (for example, by forcing them to tend pigs or parade down the street wearing a pig part). Yet Muslims survived the Cultural Revolution better than other religious groups, and at almost all times some mosques remained open where at least foreign Muslims were permitted to observe Friday prayer and the major festivals.
Hui spokesmen were quite positive about the more liberal religious policies that were adopted after 1979. Many Muslim leaders resumed leadership roles, and a few even traveled abroad to participate in international conferences. In 1980, the Chinese Islamic Association convened a national conference, its first in 17 years, and several regional and provincial Islamic associations began to meet annually. Government supported training of new ahongs also began.
Taiwan twice provided a new home for Chinese emigrating from the mainland. Both times Hui were among them. The first migration, during the mid-seventeenth century, was from the southeast coastal province of Fujian. With few exceptions, Hui descended from this migration have now been assimilated by their Han neighbors. The second migration occurred when Chinese loyal to the Nationalists fled the Communists in 1949. Muslims among them are usually said to have numbered 20,000. Nearly all are Hui and nearly all are city dwellers.
Hui people commonly believe that their surnames originated as "Sinified" forms of their foreign Muslim ancestors some time during the Yuan or Ming eras. These are some common surnames used by the Hui ethnic group:
* Ma for Muhammad
* Mu for Muhammad
* Han for Muhammad
* Ha for Hasan
* Hu for Hussein
* Sai for Said
* Sha for Shah
* Zheng for Shams
* Koay for Kamaruddin
* Chuah for Osman
A legend in Ningxia states that four Hui surnames common in the region - Na, Su, La, and Ding - originate with the descendants of one Nasruddin, a son of Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar, who "divided" the ancestor's name (Nasulading, in Chinese) among themselves.
Huihui see Hui.
Huihui minzu see Hui.
“Huihui people” see Hui.
“Huihui nationality” see Hui.
Huizu see
Hui.
Huijiaoren see Hui.
Huijiaoren see Hui.
Hujjatiyah
Hujjatiyah (Hojjatieh) (Hojjatieh Society). Conservative religio-political school of thought within Shiism, the Hujjatiyah was founded in the early 1950s. The Hujjati founder, Shaykh Mahmud Halabi, was rarely seen in public, and devotees of this school constituted the most conservative, ultra-traditionalist clergy and laypersons. Originally founded as the Hujjatiyah Society in Mashhad, Iran, the group was known for having organized several anti-Baha’i campaigns.
Hujjatiyah derives from the word hujjah, meaning both proof and the presentation of proof. In Shiism, the term has had three meanings or applications. It has been used to refer to a person through whom the “inaccessible God becomes accessible” or to “a particular function within the process of revelation”. The term has also been used to refer to “any figure in a religious hierarchy through whom an inaccessible higher figure became accessible to those below.” In this connection, Shi‘a doctrine holds that the Imams are the proofs of Allah.
During the reign of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1941-1979), the shah frequently gave the clergy permission to mount missionary campaigns against the Baha’is, who were perceived by the religious hierarchy as heretics. Shaykh Halabi emerged as a figure whose fiery anti-Baha’i sermons sent throngs of clergymen to various cities to lecture on the dangers of Baha’ism. Characteristics of their missionary behavior included spreading the works of, or news about, those Baha’is who had repented their presumed sins.
These activities led to intimidation of Baha’is in the cities of Shiraz, Isfahan, Yazd, and Kashan. Moreover, Hujjatiyah supporters pressured the government to cut off work permits, licenses, documentations of property ownership, and so forth to the Baha’is. There is no evidence that Shaykh Halabi met Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989) during these campaigns or that the grand ayatollahs in Qom supported Halabi’s actions. Whatever the situation, Halabi created a nationwide organization with a single objective: to seek out and eradicate all remnants of the Baha’i creed.
After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Hujjatiyah were accused by various fundamentalist clerics as oppositionists to the concept of vilayat-i faqih (rule of the jurisconsult), a constitutional power given to Khomeini. It was claimed that the Hujjatiyah took a passive stand on the return of the Hidden Imam (Mahdi) and hence were opposed to those who want to actively promote the necessary conditions for his return. In this fashion, Khomeini’s revolutionary stand, as well as demands for unquestioned loyalty to the faqih, was portrayed as anathema to Hujjati ideology. Furthermore, the label of Hujjatiyah in the post-revolutionary factional struggle was given to those who argued that the clergy must be less directly involved in the governing appraratus and who emphasized an islamization of all aspects of life. Also, those bazaari merchants who were keen to protect their trade from government taxes or other encroachments were easily labeled, Hujjati.
In the summer of 1983, the Islamic regime mounted a public campaign against Hujjatiyah sympathizers. Khomeini alluded to the existence of iqtishash (commotion), “internal rift,” and “the dangerous elements” that undermine the Islamic Revolution. He specifically alluded to the Hujjatiyah group when he said that some groups wanted “to force the return of the Hidden Imam,” meaning, to oppose the faqih.
After Khomeini’s remarks, the two major dailies, Kayhan and Ittila‘at, launched a series of attacks on the Hujjatiyah. Kayhan published extracts from a Hujjati pamphlet in which the authors stated that they understood Khomeini’s remarks to be directed at them and, having failed to gain an appointment with him, they consulted with Shaykh Halabi. The pamphlet stated that because of the “current atmosphere,” the Hujjatiyah could no longer continue its activities. They announced a suspension of the society. However, in conclusion, they directed an implicit criticism at Khomeini by stating, “Allah and the Hidden Imam would appreciate what the movement [Hujjatiyah] had done for the Islamic cause.” This gave the impression that Khomeini lacked this appreciation and therefore was out of line with God and the Hidden Imam.
After the summer of 1983, the regime practically ignored the existence of the Hujjatiyah. No one knew the whereabouts of Halabi or the extent of support for his group in Iran. On August 29, 1983, the chief revolutionary prosecutor, Husayn Musavi Tabrizi, was asked about his views on the Hujjatiyah Society and whether they were still continuing their activities. He replied, “They have said they have renounced their activities, they should get permission from the Ministry of Interior.” Musavi Tabrizi ignored the fact that the charter of the Hujjatiyah Society states specifically that it will not dissolve itself or end its activities until the appearance of the Hidden Imam.
Hojjatieh see Hujjatiyah
Hojjatieh Society see Hujjatiyah
Hujjatiyah (Hojjatieh) (Hojjatieh Society). Conservative religio-political school of thought within Shiism, the Hujjatiyah was founded in the early 1950s. The Hujjati founder, Shaykh Mahmud Halabi, was rarely seen in public, and devotees of this school constituted the most conservative, ultra-traditionalist clergy and laypersons. Originally founded as the Hujjatiyah Society in Mashhad, Iran, the group was known for having organized several anti-Baha’i campaigns.
Hujjatiyah derives from the word hujjah, meaning both proof and the presentation of proof. In Shiism, the term has had three meanings or applications. It has been used to refer to a person through whom the “inaccessible God becomes accessible” or to “a particular function within the process of revelation”. The term has also been used to refer to “any figure in a religious hierarchy through whom an inaccessible higher figure became accessible to those below.” In this connection, Shi‘a doctrine holds that the Imams are the proofs of Allah.
During the reign of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1941-1979), the shah frequently gave the clergy permission to mount missionary campaigns against the Baha’is, who were perceived by the religious hierarchy as heretics. Shaykh Halabi emerged as a figure whose fiery anti-Baha’i sermons sent throngs of clergymen to various cities to lecture on the dangers of Baha’ism. Characteristics of their missionary behavior included spreading the works of, or news about, those Baha’is who had repented their presumed sins.
These activities led to intimidation of Baha’is in the cities of Shiraz, Isfahan, Yazd, and Kashan. Moreover, Hujjatiyah supporters pressured the government to cut off work permits, licenses, documentations of property ownership, and so forth to the Baha’is. There is no evidence that Shaykh Halabi met Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989) during these campaigns or that the grand ayatollahs in Qom supported Halabi’s actions. Whatever the situation, Halabi created a nationwide organization with a single objective: to seek out and eradicate all remnants of the Baha’i creed.
After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Hujjatiyah were accused by various fundamentalist clerics as oppositionists to the concept of vilayat-i faqih (rule of the jurisconsult), a constitutional power given to Khomeini. It was claimed that the Hujjatiyah took a passive stand on the return of the Hidden Imam (Mahdi) and hence were opposed to those who want to actively promote the necessary conditions for his return. In this fashion, Khomeini’s revolutionary stand, as well as demands for unquestioned loyalty to the faqih, was portrayed as anathema to Hujjati ideology. Furthermore, the label of Hujjatiyah in the post-revolutionary factional struggle was given to those who argued that the clergy must be less directly involved in the governing appraratus and who emphasized an islamization of all aspects of life. Also, those bazaari merchants who were keen to protect their trade from government taxes or other encroachments were easily labeled, Hujjati.
In the summer of 1983, the Islamic regime mounted a public campaign against Hujjatiyah sympathizers. Khomeini alluded to the existence of iqtishash (commotion), “internal rift,” and “the dangerous elements” that undermine the Islamic Revolution. He specifically alluded to the Hujjatiyah group when he said that some groups wanted “to force the return of the Hidden Imam,” meaning, to oppose the faqih.
After Khomeini’s remarks, the two major dailies, Kayhan and Ittila‘at, launched a series of attacks on the Hujjatiyah. Kayhan published extracts from a Hujjati pamphlet in which the authors stated that they understood Khomeini’s remarks to be directed at them and, having failed to gain an appointment with him, they consulted with Shaykh Halabi. The pamphlet stated that because of the “current atmosphere,” the Hujjatiyah could no longer continue its activities. They announced a suspension of the society. However, in conclusion, they directed an implicit criticism at Khomeini by stating, “Allah and the Hidden Imam would appreciate what the movement [Hujjatiyah] had done for the Islamic cause.” This gave the impression that Khomeini lacked this appreciation and therefore was out of line with God and the Hidden Imam.
After the summer of 1983, the regime practically ignored the existence of the Hujjatiyah. No one knew the whereabouts of Halabi or the extent of support for his group in Iran. On August 29, 1983, the chief revolutionary prosecutor, Husayn Musavi Tabrizi, was asked about his views on the Hujjatiyah Society and whether they were still continuing their activities. He replied, “They have said they have renounced their activities, they should get permission from the Ministry of Interior.” Musavi Tabrizi ignored the fact that the charter of the Hujjatiyah Society states specifically that it will not dissolve itself or end its activities until the appearance of the Hidden Imam.
Hojjatieh see Hujjatiyah
Hojjatieh Society see Hujjatiyah
Hujr ibn ‘Adi al-Kindi
Hujr ibn ‘Adi al-Kindi. Shi‘a agitator in early Islam. He was put to death by the Umayyad Caliph al-Mu‘awiya I.
Hujr ibn ‘Adi al-Kindi. Shi‘a agitator in early Islam. He was put to death by the Umayyad Caliph al-Mu‘awiya I.
Hulegu
Hulegu (Hulagu) (Hulagu Khan) (c.1217 - February 8, 1265). Founder of the Mongol Ilkhanid dynasty of Iran. During his rule, from 1256 to 1265, Hulegu established the boundaries and basic policies of Ilkhanid rule. His successors ruled Iran for approximately one hundred years. Hulegu was Genghis Khan’s grandson and the brother of Mongke Khan, who in 1251 sent Hulegu to extend and consolidate Mongol rule in the Middle East. Hulegu conquered Iran, Mesopotamia, and Syria, the last of which, however, he soon lost. In the course of his campaigns, Hulegu suppressed the Isma’ili sect (known as the Assassins) and from 1256 to 1257 destroyed their strongholds. In 1258, Hulegu sacked Baghdad and killed the Abbasid caliph. Hulegu conquered Alamut in 1256, took Baghdad in 1258 and Aleppo and Damascus in 1260, but returned to Persia at the news of the death of the Great Khan. The army Hulegu left behind was destroyed by the Mamelukes at ‘Ayn Jalut in 1260. Hulegu was Buddhist but also favored Christians, and formed an alliance with the pope and European kings against the Arab Mamelukes. He likewise promoted Islamic culture, patronizing the Persian historian Juwaini and the Shi’ite scholar Nasir al-Din Tusi, for whom he built an observatory.
Hulagu Khan was a Mongol ruler who conquered much of Southwest Asia. Son of Tolui and the Kerait princess Sorghaghtani Beki, he was a grandson of Genghis Khan, and the brother of Arik Boke, Möngke Khan and Kublai Khan. Hulagu's army greatly expanded the southwestern portion of the Mongol Empire, founding the Ilkhanate of Persia, a precursor to the eventual Safavid dynasty, and then the modern state of Iran. Under Hulagu's leadership, the Mongols destroyed the greatest center of Islamic power, Baghdad, and also weakened Damascus, causing a shift of Islamic influence to the Mamelukes in Cairo. It was also in Hulagu's reign that historians switched from writing in Arabic to writing in Persian.
Hulagu was born to Tolui, one of Genghis Khan's sons, and Sorghaghtani Beki, an influential Kerait princess. Sorghaghtani successfully navigated Mongol politics, arranging for all of her sons to become Mongol leaders. Hulagu was friendly to Christianity, as his mother was a Nestorian Christian. Hulagu's favorite wife, Dokuz Khatun, was also a Christian, as was Hulagu's closest friend and general, Kitbuqa. Hulagu told the Armenian historian Vardan Arewelc'i in 1264 that he had been a Christian since birth. It is recorded however that he was a Buddhist. as he neared his death, against the will of his Christian wife Dokuz Khatun.
Hulagu had at least three children: Abaqa, second Ilkhan of Persia from 1265–1282, Taraqai, whose son Baydu became Ilkhan in 1295, and Teguder Ahmad, third Ilkhan from 1282-1284.
Hulagu see Hulegu
Hulagu Khan see Hulegu
Hulegu (Hulagu) (Hulagu Khan) (c.1217 - February 8, 1265). Founder of the Mongol Ilkhanid dynasty of Iran. During his rule, from 1256 to 1265, Hulegu established the boundaries and basic policies of Ilkhanid rule. His successors ruled Iran for approximately one hundred years. Hulegu was Genghis Khan’s grandson and the brother of Mongke Khan, who in 1251 sent Hulegu to extend and consolidate Mongol rule in the Middle East. Hulegu conquered Iran, Mesopotamia, and Syria, the last of which, however, he soon lost. In the course of his campaigns, Hulegu suppressed the Isma’ili sect (known as the Assassins) and from 1256 to 1257 destroyed their strongholds. In 1258, Hulegu sacked Baghdad and killed the Abbasid caliph. Hulegu conquered Alamut in 1256, took Baghdad in 1258 and Aleppo and Damascus in 1260, but returned to Persia at the news of the death of the Great Khan. The army Hulegu left behind was destroyed by the Mamelukes at ‘Ayn Jalut in 1260. Hulegu was Buddhist but also favored Christians, and formed an alliance with the pope and European kings against the Arab Mamelukes. He likewise promoted Islamic culture, patronizing the Persian historian Juwaini and the Shi’ite scholar Nasir al-Din Tusi, for whom he built an observatory.
Hulagu Khan was a Mongol ruler who conquered much of Southwest Asia. Son of Tolui and the Kerait princess Sorghaghtani Beki, he was a grandson of Genghis Khan, and the brother of Arik Boke, Möngke Khan and Kublai Khan. Hulagu's army greatly expanded the southwestern portion of the Mongol Empire, founding the Ilkhanate of Persia, a precursor to the eventual Safavid dynasty, and then the modern state of Iran. Under Hulagu's leadership, the Mongols destroyed the greatest center of Islamic power, Baghdad, and also weakened Damascus, causing a shift of Islamic influence to the Mamelukes in Cairo. It was also in Hulagu's reign that historians switched from writing in Arabic to writing in Persian.
Hulagu was born to Tolui, one of Genghis Khan's sons, and Sorghaghtani Beki, an influential Kerait princess. Sorghaghtani successfully navigated Mongol politics, arranging for all of her sons to become Mongol leaders. Hulagu was friendly to Christianity, as his mother was a Nestorian Christian. Hulagu's favorite wife, Dokuz Khatun, was also a Christian, as was Hulagu's closest friend and general, Kitbuqa. Hulagu told the Armenian historian Vardan Arewelc'i in 1264 that he had been a Christian since birth. It is recorded however that he was a Buddhist. as he neared his death, against the will of his Christian wife Dokuz Khatun.
Hulagu had at least three children: Abaqa, second Ilkhan of Persia from 1265–1282, Taraqai, whose son Baydu became Ilkhan in 1295, and Teguder Ahmad, third Ilkhan from 1282-1284.
Hulagu see Hulegu
Hulagu Khan see Hulegu
Humai
Humai (Ume). First ruler of the Kanuri empire of Kanem (in Chad, Niger, and Nigeria) to accept Islam (r.1085-1097). He was probably converted through the influence of Muslim traders who lived in colonies in the larger towns.
Ume see Humai
Humai (Ume). First ruler of the Kanuri empire of Kanem (in Chad, Niger, and Nigeria) to accept Islam (r.1085-1097). He was probably converted through the influence of Muslim traders who lived in colonies in the larger towns.
Ume see Humai
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